


COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1st CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)

7



OPERATION MASHER
25 JAN-3 FEB 66

OPERATION WHITE WING
4 FEB-6 MAR 66

HEADQUARTERS 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco, California 96490

AVOZE

28 April 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROS MACV J3/32)

THRU: Commanding General
Field Force Vietnam I
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: MACV 321
APO US Forces 96243

1. This after action report summarizes combat actions of the 1st Cavalry Division and supporting units during Operation MASHER and WHITE WING 25 Jan - 6 Mar 66. Division operations were initiated in response to Field Force Vietnam OPLAN 3-66 (MASHER) received on 22 Jan 66. The area of operations is shown on the 1:250,000 map section attached as Overlay 10. The operational area comprises the northeastern portion of Binh Dinh Province. Principal combat operations occurred in the HOAI NHON District coastal plain extending northeast of Bong Son and in the Kim Song Valley (Hai An District) southeast of Bong Son.

2. Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division was the control headquarters for these operations. The reporting officer is Major General Harry W. O. Kinnard. During the period 25 Jan - 2 Feb 66, Division control was exercised by the Division CP at the An Khe base and a forward CP under Colonel William A. Becker, Assistant Division Commander. On 3 Feb 66 the Division Main CP became operational in the Bong Son area and remained in that location through the end of this campaign. A roster of senior officers involved in the conduct of this campaign follows:

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Major General Harry W. O. Kinnard | -- Division CG |
| Brigadier General John M. Wright | -- ADC |
| Colonel William A. Becker | -- ADC |
| Colonel George S. Beatty Jr. | -- Chief of Staff |
| Colonel Elvy H. Roberts | -- CO, 1st Brigade |
| Colonel William A. Lynch Jr. | -- CO, 2d Brigade |
| Colonel Harold G. Moore | -- CO, 3d Brigade |
| Colonel Allen M. Bardett Jr. | -- CO, 11th Aviation Group |
| Colonel John J. Hennessey | -- CO, Support Command |
| Lt Col Lloyd J. Ficca | -- CO, Division Artillery |
| Lt Col Robert M. Shoemaker | -- CO, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav |

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Lt Col Robert J. Malley -- 00, 8th Regt Bn
Lt Col John D. White -- 01
Lt Col Bobby R. Lang -- 02
Lt Col Earl K. Buchan -- 03
Lt Col Benjamin S. Silver -- 04
Lt Col Robert J. Craig -- 05

3. Task organization and major changes during the Bong Son campaign were:

a. General. No organic units were detached during the period. The status of major nonorganic units follows:

(1) 6th Bn, 14th Arty (175mm/8" How) was detached effective 1 Feb 66 and returned to PFCORGV control.

(2) Units previously attached or OPCON whose status remained unchanged:

3d Bn, 18th Arty (8" How/175mm SP) -- one 8" Btry and one 175mm Btry were deployed to the operational area and one 8" Btry remained at An Khe for base defense.

"B" Btry, 29th Arty (Searchlight) -- an average of 4 searchlights were deployed in the operational area.

10th BRU provided normal teams to each committed brigade in the operational area plus additional teams to support the Division areas of interest.

191st MP Det provided normal IPW/CI teams to each committed brigade plus support for Division G2.

17th Avn Co (CV-2) remained attached to Division Support Command as did the 478th Avn Co (Hv Helicopter CH-54).

(3) 2d Bn, 17th Arty (105mm Towed) which is attached to this Division was used during Operation MASHER/WHITE WING to provide General Support for the ARVN Airborne Brigade. This mission was performed from 27 Jan through 20 Feb 66.

(4) 1st Bn, 30th Arty (155mm How, towed) (minus one battery) was attached to 1st Cavalry Division Artillery and given a General Support mission commencing 27 Jan 66 and continuing until the end of the operation.

b. Brigade task organization and major changes during the conduct of the operation follow:

24 Jan-3 Feb - PHASE I and II

Bong Son Area of Operations

An Khe Base/TACR Operations

3d Bde

1st Bde

1/7 Cav

1/8 Cav

2/7 Cav

2/8 Cav

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| | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|
| 1/12 Cav | 2/19 Arty (DS) |
| 2/12 Cav | 2d Bde |
| 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-) | 1/5 Cav |
| Avn Gp (-) (Spt) | 2/5 Cav |
| 1/21 Arty (DS) (Reinf as required) | 1/77 Arty (DS) |
| * Co C, 8th Engr Bn | |
| * Plat (-), 545 MP Co | |
| * IPW/CI Tn, 191 MI Det | |
| * Tn, 41st CA | |
| * Sig Spt Tn, Co A, 13th Sig Bn | |
| * Tn, 54th Inf Det (Surv Radar) | |
| * Tn, USAF Weather Det | |
| * Fwd Spt Elm, Spt Cmd (Spt) | |

* This grouping is normal for each committed brigade and will not be included in subsequent brigade task organization listings.

4-10 Feb PHASE III

Bong Son Area of Operations

An Khe Base/TACR Operations

2d Bde

1/5 Cav

2/5 Cav

2/12 Cav

1/77 Arty (DS)

3d Bde

1/7 Cav

2/7 Cav

1/12 Cav

1/21 Arty

1st Bde

1/8 Cav

2/8 Cav

2/19 Arty (DS)

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11-26 Feb PHASE IV
(11-14 Feb)

Bong Son Area of Operations

An Khe Base/TACR Operations

2d Bde

1st Bde

1/5 Cav

1/8 Cav

2/5 Cav

2/8 Cav

2/12 Cav

2/19 Arty (DS)

1/77 Arty (DS)

3d Bde

1/7 Cav

2/7 Cav

1/12 Cav

1st Sqdn, 9th Mar (-) (OP-008)

1/21 Arty (DS)

(17-26 Feb)

Bong Son Area of Operations

An Khe Base/TACR Operations

1st Bde

3d Bde

1/8 Cav

1/7 Cav

2/8 Cav

2/7 Cav

1/12 Cav

1/21 Arty (DS)

2/19 Arty (DS)

2d Bde

1/5 Cav

2/5 Cav

2/12 Cav

1/77 Arty (DS)

1-6 Mar PHASE V

Bong Son Area of Operation

An Khe Base/TACR Operations

2d Bde

1st Bde

1/5 Cav

1/12 Cav

2/5 Cav

9/75

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1/8 Cav

3d Bde

2/8 Cav

1/7 Cav

A Trp, 1/9 Cav (OPCON)

2/7 Cav

1/77 Arty (+) (DS)

1/21 Arty (DS)

4. Supporting Forces.

a. The Capital ROK Infantry Division supported these operations by --

(1) Security of the primary Ground Line of Communication (GLOG) (Hwy 1) from Qui Nhon to Phu Ly.

(2) Security of the forward supply point (Division and Qui Nhon Support Area) and aircraft laager area vicinity Phu Cat Rifle Range.

(3) Assumed responsibility for security of Hwy 19 to the west side of the Deo Mang (An Khe) Pass.

(4) The effectiveness of these operations was excellent insofar as their effect on Division operations was concerned.

b. 22d Infantry Division (ARVN) supported operations by --

(1) Securing Hwy 1 from Phu Ly north into the Bong Son area.

(2) Securing Division and Qui Nhon Support Area (1st Log Command) supply bases in the Bong Son area.

(3) Conducting offensive operations and blocking missions within zone in coordination with Division operations. Principal units employed in accomplishment of these operations were the 40th and 41st Regiments. On 17 Feb a VN Marine Task Force was attached to 22d Inf Div and assumed security mission in that portion of the coastal plain northeast of Bong Son initially cleared by the ARVN Airborne Brigade. 22d Div units conducted 31 company and 35 battalion or larger size operations in accomplishing their missions. Overlay 1 shows the principal areas of operation and tactical operations directly coordinated with 1st Air Cavalry Division. The results of operations by 22d ARVN Division are included in the summary of operations attached as Inclosure 1.

(4) 22d ARVN Division accomplishment of assigned missions in support of Division operations is considered excellent. There were no attacks or ambushes on Route 1 during the entire period. There were no attacks on Division installations in the Bong Son area except for one instance of 8 - 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on 21 Feb 66 which resulted in minor damage and 3 WIA.

c. ARVN Airborne Brigade conducted search and destroy operations in the area north of Bong Son and east of Hwy 1 from 28 Jan until relieved and withdrawn during the period 17 - 21 Feb 66. The Airborne Brigade sector and locations of principal operations are shown on Overlay 2. Results of operations are summarized in Inclosure 2. ARVN Airborne Brigade operations contributed significantly to the effectiveness of Division operations during Operation MASHIE.

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d. III Marine Amphibious Force (TF Delta, Operation DOUBLE EAGLE) operations in southern Quang Nai Province were coordinated with Division operations during the period 3 - 15 Feb 66. Liaison officers were exchanged between the Division and TF Delta on 3 Feb. Marine operations consisted of entry into the northern portion of An Lao Valley and along the Quang Ngai/Binh Dinh Province boundaries to block northern exits from the Division area of operations. No difficulty in coordination or fire support was encountered and these operations are considered to have enhanced the effectiveness of Division operations. (Refer to Overlay 3).

e. Qui Nhon Support Area, 1st Log Command established forward supply points located with Division logistical installations at Phu Cat 24 Jan - 18 Feb and moving to Bong Son 19 Feb. The USSA forward supply points and the FFORCNAV Combined Traffic Center rendered outstanding support to this Division during the campaign. (Refer to Overlay 3).

f. USAF Tactical Air support provided 600 sorties in support of Division operations in the Bong Son campaign. Of these 390 were preplanned and 210 were immediate request missions. All Tac Air requests were submitted through DASC Alfa, Nha Trang. Preplanned requests were submitted by Army communications (land line) and immediate requests were submitted by Air Force radio nets. Reaction time for immediate requests averaged 15 - 30 minutes. Operational data on missions and effectiveness is included in Inclosure 1.

g. Naval Gunfire.

(1) The following ships were positioned to support Division operations:

| <u>DATES</u> | <u>SHIPS</u> |
|-----------------|--------------|
| 28 Jan - 5 Feb | USS Mason |
| 30 Jan - 31 Jan | USS Shelton |
| 30 Jan - 1 Feb | USS Orleck |
| 7 Feb - 8 Feb | USS Barri |
| 28 Feb - 3 Mar | USS Orleck |
| 3 Mar - 4 Mar | USS Spruston |

(2) Fifty-seven missions were fired totalling 3213 rounds.

(3) ANGLICO personnel were available to this Division from FFORCNAV Advance CP co-located with the Division CP.

5. Intelligence.

a. Operation MASHER:

(1) Intelligence Summary. Prior to TET Holidays, 21-24 Jan, indications were that the 18th NVA Regt had moved to the vicinity of Dam Tra O Lake, BR 9802 to celebrate the holidays. As this Regt and the 2nd VC had left Binh Dinh together for action in Quang Ngai, there was a possibility that the 2nd VC might have returned unreported to the Binh Dinh

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area. Because of the absence of information the 2nd VC had continued to be carried in Quang Ngai. Three unidentified, unconfirmed battalion sightings were reported in the MASHER area, two on 4 Jan and three on 11 Jan, indicating some type of redistribution of forces was being undertaken. Additionally two other Main Force Battalions, unidentified, were reported in the area of operations.

(2) Enemy Strength and Disposition Anticipated. Enemy strengths and identifications at the beginning of Operation MASHER were as follows: With the exception of the D21 Local Force Co which is normally carried in the area, the identification of other units reported, was not known. After the 17 and 18 Jan engagement between ARVN and the 6th Bn, Quyét Thang (AKA 9th Bn/18th Regt) South of Phu Ou Pass vicinity of BR 9085, it was felt that the Division would probably be facing the remaining elements of the Quyét Thang or the 2d VC (AKA Quyét Chien). Various reports from Hoai Nhon District Police through Binh Dinh Sector Advisor indicated the existence of approximately 3 unidentified NVA Battalions with an estimated strength of 2000 including support troops. The disposition was as depicted on Overlay 4.

(3) Enemy strength encountered D-1 (27 Jan 66) in the Operation MASHER area began, following a deceptive phase lasting from 24 thru 27 Jan, in the vicinity of Dam Tra O.

(a) During the four days, 27 - 31 Jan, the following enemy units with strengths indicated were encountered. Identifications were obtained through prisoner interrogations and exploitation of documents.

| | |
|---------------------|-----|
| Quyét Tam Staff | 90 |
| A - Military | |
| B - Political | |
| C - Rear Services | |
| AA Company | 120 |
| 7th Bn | 500 |
| 9th Bn | 500 |
| Other Support Units | 540 |

(b) The Quyét Tam Regt (AKA 22d Regt) was a relatively new NVA unit which had previously been reported in Quang Ngai Province. From interrogations it was determined that this unit had infiltrated from NVN, through Gia Lai Province to the Kim Son Valley (BR 7679) and thence to Quang Ngai for operations. It was assumed that the 6th Battalion was also in the area however division units had no contact with it. The disposition of units is carried on Overlay 5.

(4) Losses - with the build up of friendly forces in the area of operations, the enemy began a withdrawal in a westerly and northwesterly direction characterized by fierce defense of suspected headquarters areas and important installations as well as rear guard action to cover escape of the NVA Battalions along with their wounded. The following enemy losses were accounted for during Operation MASHER:

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| | |
|-----------|-----|
| KIA (BC) | 603 |
| KIA (EST) | 956 |
| WIA (EST) | 357 |
| VOC | 242 |
| VCS | 459 |

The enemy, by breaking contact and dispersing in small groups, intermingling with the population and moving at night and during bad weather, avoided further contact. His estimated routes of withdrawal and final disposition are shown on Overlay 6.

(5) Terrain. The terrain consisted of a coastal plain with mountains to the west and south. Aerial photographs of typical terrain within the area of operations are attached at the end of this report.

(6) Impact of friendly operations on the enemy. Two Battalions of the Quyét Tam Regt, 7th and 9th plus unidentified support elements, were rendered ineffective as a result of Operation MASHER. The long range results of loss of equipment, personnel, and prestige will be difficult to overcome and further task his overburdened infiltration system.

b. Operation WHITE WING:

(1) Intelligence Summary: At the completion of Operation MASHER on 3 - 4 Feb 66 the Division was faced with the following choices: Continue to pursue the enemy, who it was felt had exfiltrated the MASHER area in a northwesterly and westerly direction; undertake operations in the Kia Song Valley or initiate a campaign down the coast south of the Song Lai Giang River. The presence of Task Force Delta, III MAF in SE Quang Ngai Province set the stage for a combined 1st Cav/Marine Operation in northeastern Binh Dinh Province with particular emphasis on attempting to locate and destroy enemy units which had successfully escaped from the Coastal Plain into the An Lao Valley and hills between. Although the enemy strength and disposition was unknown prior to Operation WHITE WING it was felt that a major effort in the An Lao Valley would be worth while since the area had long been known as a major VC North to South logistical communications route and contained many rice caches and resupply points for VC military units. Repeated firing at aircraft indicated the presence of unknown hostile forces in and near the An Lao Valley. Reportedly the Sao Vang Headquarters was in the high ground to the north of the valley.

(2) Enemy strength and disposition anticipated: One battalion plus service troops and security troops for hospital, rear service and district headquarters, Sao Vang.

| | |
|-----------------|-----|
| Enemy KIA (BC) | 11 |
| Enemy KIA (EST) | 18 |
| VOC | 25 |
| VCS | 267 |
| Individual Wpns | 10 |

(5) Impact of friendly operations on the enemy: Division operations in and around An Lao Valley were the first since the area was lost to the VC by ARVN in December of 1964. The psychological effect gained through knowing that friendly forces can enter and scrutinize VC controlled areas "at will" cannot be overlooked. In addition to the KIA count, a large amount of rice was taken in the operation and much valuable intelligence was gained which can be utilized in future operations. The operation succeeded in throwing the enemy off balance, disrupting his movements, and added to the general turmoil experienced by the VC during current operations. Four thousand five hundred Vietnamese elected to come out of the valley to avoid VC control. The adverse effect on enemy forces will have a long lasting effect in that area.

c. Operation WHITE WING (EAGLES CLAW)

(1) Intelligence summary: Prior to Division operations into the area bounded by coordinates BR 6067, BS 6000, CR 0667, it was known that the Kim Son Valley served as a rest area for regimental-size units and that it was a part of the VC infiltration route system in Binh Dinh Province. Because of the continuous movement into and out of the area and its use as a staging area, many unit identifications were associated with the locale, but the momentary extent and disposition of forces was hazy.

(2) Enemy strength anticipated: It was felt that one main force regiment, possibly the 210th VC, was established in the Kim Son Valley area. Other units believed in the area included one local force company and possibly one or two main force battalions. SPAR reports during the period prior to operations strongly indicated the presence of a divisional or high control headquarters in the area. One other major unit, the Quyét Thang (AKA 18th NVA) Regt was carried east of Hwy 1 with the reported intention of returning to the Kim Son area. It was concluded that the enemy would attempt to withdraw his major forces from the area, covered by an aggressive delaying action. It was believed that enemy units fleeing from the An Lao Valley could possibly have entered the Kim Son area. See Overlay 7.

(3) Enemy strength encountered:

(a) On the 11th of February, the 3d Bde commenced operations in the Kim Son area followed a few days later by the 2d Bde. Activity for the first several days consisted of company and smaller size engagements. On 15 Feb contact was made with elements of the 1st Bn, Quyét Chien Regt (AKA 93rd Bn, 2nd VC Regt) which resulted in substantial enemy losses and capture of a VC Bn Commander. Following the action, heavy contact with elements believed to be from the 1st and 2nd Bns plus the possible headquarters of the Quyét Chien Regt (AKA 2nd VC) continued in the "Iron Triangle" area (BR 774760, 774756, 777758) and vicinity of BR 7374 until 21 Feb, when after a B-52 strike, the VC broke contact and are believed to have withdrawn to the West.

(b) On the 23rd of February the 1st Bde made contact along the high ground west of Hwy 1 (BR 8681) with elements of the 4th Bn, Quyét Thang (AKA 7th Bn, 18th NVA) Regt, who had crossed the highway from the East. Sporadic contact in the area continued through 27 Feb, and as of that time, it was felt that the entire Quyét Thang Regt (AKA 18th NVA) was in the area, with its 4th (AKA 7th) and 5th (AKA 8th) Battalions west of the highway and the 6th (AKA 9th) Battalion east of Hwy 1. The Quyét Thang Regt suffered the loss of most of its heavy weapons capability during this engagement. See Overlay 8.

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(c) The following units were identified with the strengths indicated during the operational phase:

| | |
|---|-----|
| Sao Vang "A" (Military) | Unk |
| Sao Vang "B" (Political) | Unk |
| Sao Vang "C" (Rear Service) | Unk |
| 704 Signal Co | 106 |
| 706 AAA Co | 125 |
| 200th Bn | 420 |
| Lien Tien 10 ("D" Bn Mobile Hospital) | 400 |
| F106 Bn | 500 |
| 1st Bn, Quyét Chien (AKA 2d VC Regt) | 680 |
| 2d Bn, Quyét Chien | Unk |
| 17th Mortar Co, Quyét Thang (AKA 18th Regt) | 140 |
| 16th BR Co, Quyét Thang | 80 |
| 4th Bn, Quyét Thang | 400 |

The Sao Vang organization developed by Division operations during MASHIER/WHITE WING is at Inclosure 2.

(4) Enemy losses for operations "WHITE WING" (EAGLE CLAW) as of 281800 Feb 66 (less An Lao Valley Operation).

| | |
|------------------|-----------|
| KIA (BG) | 709 |
| KIA (EST) | 760 |
| MIA (EST) | 978 |
| VCC | 326 |
| VCS | 259 |
| Ind Wpns | 154 |
| Crew Served Wpns | 46 |
| Misc (Commo) | 10 Radios |

(5) Impact of operation WHITE WING (EAGLE'S CLAW) on the enemy: Division operations in the Kim Son area have had the following impact on enemy capabilities in eastern Binh Dinh Province:

(a) In addition to the loss of over 1469 personnel killed and 978 wounded, main force units have had their heavy weapons strength reduced substantially by the loss of 6 -75mm BR, 13 AA guns (10 - 12.7 and 3 - 50 cal), and the disclosure that the Quyét Thang Regt has only one of its 82mm mortars combat effective.

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(b) Based upon confirmed and estimated personnel and equipment losses, the following units are now carried as combat ineffective:

AA Co, Sao Vang Division

1st Bn, Quyét Thien Regt (AKA 93rd Bn, 2nd VC)

Hq, 4th (AKA 7th), Mortar Co, and 75mm RR Co, Quyét Thang (AKA 18th NVA) Regt.

Unidentified support elements of 704th and 705th Co's of Sao Vang Division.

(c) Enemy dispositions carried as of 28 Feb 66 is shown on Overlay 9.

d. Operation WHITE WING/BLACK HORSE.

(1) Intelligence summary. From interrogation of captives from the Quyét Thang Regt (AKA 18th NVA), information from the local populace, and reports from a Hurricane Team that had been sent into the area 72 hours prior to H-Hour it was believed that at least one NVA bn and perhaps one local force company were in the N Chop Chai/Hon Cao hill mass (BR 9493) east of Hwy 1.

(2) Enemy strength anticipated. The 6th (AKA 9th) Bn of the Quyét Thang Regiment and one unidentified local force company were expected to be encountered. The remainder of the Quyét Thang Regiment, the 4th Bn and 5th Bn, were believed to be west of Hwy 1 and could possibly be employed in a reinforcing role in support of the 6th Bn. It was concluded that the enemy would attempt to avoid contact with friendly forces and exfiltrate the area.

(a) On 1 March the 2d Bde attacked in the N Chop Chai/Hon Cao area. 1/8 Cav received a probe (30 - 40 VC) via Obj 100 at 1830. During the next four days operations continued with results as shown in par (b) below. It is believed that guerilla forces were encountered. No identifiable units were encountered.

(b) Enemy Losses for Operation WHITE WING/BLACK HORSE as of 6 Mar 66:

| | |
|-----------|-----------------|
| KIA (BC) | 19 |
| KIA (EST) | 12 |
| WIA (EST) | 13 |
| VCC | 40 |
| VCS | 102 |
| IND WPNS | 5 |
| MISC | 41,600 Piasters |

(c) Information received from the local populace indicated that the 6th Bn had in fact been in the area but that, perhaps because of prior knowledge of the operation, it had exfiltrated to the south approximately 48 hours before the operation commenced.

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6. (C) Division missions:

a. Conduct offensive operations as necessary to dominate the tactical area of responsibility and to contribute to GVN pacification program in the Song Ba and Song Con Valleys.

b. In conjunction with RVNAF and other US/PVNAF conduct search and destroy operations in Northeastern Binh Dinh Province.

c. Provide one 105mm Howitzer Battalion in a GS/reinforcing role in supporting operations by the ARVN Airborne Brigade.

d. Maintain one battalion as Field Force Vietnam reserve/reaction force.

7. Conduct of operations:

a. Basic guidelines that influenced the tactical operations for each phase of this campaign included:

(1) Operations should be of sustained duration in each area in order to develop accurate intelligence and to disrupt VC/NVA freedom of movement and control over the civilian population and resources.

(2) Within populated areas minimum force was to be applied until combatants and non-combatants could be identified and separated. Use of Riot Control Agents and Psy War operations were to be considered to support this goal.

(3) Friendly forces were to orient on enemy forces as developed within sectors and zones. Minimum control measures were placed on brigade operations within assigned sectors. Extensive use of artillery and USAF Tac Air was specified in all operations to interdict VC/NVA movements within sectors once a force had been found. A vigorous Psy War program (leaflets, loudspeakers, and taped appeals) was to be closely integrated with tactical operations.

b. Division initiated operations in the Bong Son area with one brigade TF (4 Inf Bn's). An additional brigade headquarters and up to two additional infantry battalions were to be prepared to enter the operational area if the size of enemy forces located and engaged warranted additional forces. As the campaign developed a second brigade and six infantry battalions were committed in the Bong Son area leaving base defense and TACR operations to one brigade (2 Inf Bn's) effective 3 Feb 66.

8. Executions: Division operations in the Bong Son Campaign during the period 25 Jan - 28 Feb 66 were conducted in four phases. The areas of primary emphasis during each phase are indicated on Overlay 10. A separate overlay is furnished to provide a more detailed representation of each phase.

a. PHASE I, 25 - 27 Jan 66. The 3d Brigade (4 Battalions) moved by air and surface commencing 24 Jan 66 and established a forward base at Phu Cat. On 25 Jan 66 the 3d Bde and 1/9 Cav initiated operations along the Southern portion of the Chop Chai hill mass southeast of Bong Son to deceive the VC as to our main area of interest and to enhance the security of Hwy 1 as a ground supply line which had been planned for the campaign. Operations were conducted using reconnaissance in force techniques. The 2d Bde still located in the An Khe base was alerted to be prepared to relieve 3d Bde should significant enemy forces be located and engaged in this area. Actions during this phase are portrayed on Overlay 11.

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(1) 24 Jan 66. 1/12 Cav moved by organic air from An Khe to Phu Cat Rifle Range (BR 905520) and secured an aircraft laager area, forward support base and acted as Division reserve. 1/7 Cav moved by convoy from An Khe to Phu Cat (Hwy 19 and Hwy 1) with 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav and 2/20 Arty (Aerial Rocket) providing column cover.

(2) 25 Jan 66. 1/7 Cav moved by convoy to assembly area George and commenced deception operations attacking to PZ TANGU encountering moderate resistance. 2/7 Cav moved by air (USAF C-123) from An Khe to Bong Son and occupied positions to secure the airfield area for 3d Bde CP and Div Forward CP that closed in the afternoon of 25 Jan. During the 2/7 Cav move one C-123 crashed shortly after take off from An Khe with all 42 troops from 2/7 Cav plus four USAF crew members on board killed in the crash. 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav conducted deception operations in the Suoi Ca Valley to include landing and ground reconnaissance by infantry elements.

(3) 26 Jan 66. 1/7 Cav intensified its deception operations sweeping to the north to objective GOLF and ECHO meeting sporadic resistance. 2/7 Cav air assaulted from Bong Son to Obj DOG encountering light enemy resistance.

(4) 27 Jan 66. 1/7 Cav in the final deception phase air assaulted to the Suoi Dinh Binh Valley and conducted search and destroy operations to the north to the Song Lai Giang River meeting light enemy resistance. 2/7 Cav continued clearing Obj DOG and the 3d Bde Forward CP displaced to Obj DOG.

(5) Inclosure-2 includes the results of operations for PHASE I.

b. PHASE II - 28 Jan-3 Feb 66 (Operation MASHER). This was the major phase as directed by Field Force Vietnam. It included the security of Hwy 1 by the 22d ARVN Division, security of Hwy 19 by the Capital ROK Division, and search and destroy operations by the ARVN Airborne Brigade on D-Day (28 Jan) in conjunction with the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The Airborne Brigade was to attack in zone east of Hwy 1. Division operations into the heavily populated and productive coastal plain were initiated by the 3d Brigade and 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav. The 2d Brigade and two added infantry battalions moved into the area 2-3 Feb and the Division Main CP was established at Bong Son 3 Feb. The objective of these attacks was to locate and destroy VC/NVA units; enhance the security of GVN installations in Bong Son; and to lay the ground work for restoration of GVN control of the population and resources of the rich coastal plain area. During this phase, Division units inflicted known losses of 300 on the 7th and 200 on the 9th Bn Quy Tan Regt. Both enemy battalions were rendered ineffective with survivors split into small groups. Concurrent with tactical operations Co A, 8th Engr Bn constructed a C-123 airstrip at Obj DOG. This airstrip was desired primarily for use in the event the ground line of communication (Hwy 1) was disrupted. The 1st Cavalry Division plan was based on using infantry to secure positions STEEL and BRASS for artillery and then search and destroy within artillery support range. Actions during this phase are shown on Overlay 12.

(1) 28 Jan 66. 2/7 Cav air assaulted into LZ 3 and LZ 4. LZ 3, on the eastern end of position STEEL was secured without enemy contact. The landing at LZ 4 was met by heavy small arms fire and mortar fire. Three CH-47's were hit by fire enroute with the artillery to STEEL. One hour after the initial lift-off, four CH-47's were down from enemy fire and twelve UH-1D's had been hit by fire. This period of operations was characterized by extremely bad weather requiring low level flight. The decision was made to abandon the idea of securing STEEL and orient on the enemy. Another company of the 2/7 Cav was maneuvered north towards LZ 4 to assist but became heavily engaged with the enemy. Elements of the 1/7 Cav were ordered into

PAPA to secure a CH-47 which had been shot down and contained a 105 howitzer. The company encountered moderate enemy resistance and utilized the howitzer in a direct fire role to repel the enemy. By 1500 hours, 28 aircraft had been hit by fire. An attempt was made to insert another company of the 2/7 Cav into LZ 4 since the initial group was still engaged south of the LZ in their original location. The effort wasn't successful; three ships being hit on the first lift with two crewmen being wounded. Contact in the LZ at the end of the day was still heavy, with the enemy located in well dug-in positions.

(2) 29 Jan 66. Early on the morning of 29 Jan, the two companies of the 2/7 Cav linked up in LZ 4, but were still under intense enemy fire. The 2/12 Cav assaulted south of LZ 4 to maneuver north and flank the enemy. 1/7 Cav elements secured ROMEO north of LZ 4. TAC Air worked over LZ 4 with napalm to assist the 2/7 Cav, getting many secondary explosions in the trenches. Enemy disposition included well fortified positions, deep trenches, and extensive tunneling. 2/12 Cav maneuvered towards LZ 4 to relieve the enemy pressure, and elements of the 1/7 Cav north of LZ 4 set up blocking positions facing south to engage the fleeing enemy.

(3) 30 Jan 66. LZ 4 was still under heavy fire early on 30 Jan. Resistance decreased at dawn and extensive clearing operations began by 2/7 Cav while 2/12 Cav began moving slowly north out of the LZ area. The 1/12 Cav was moved from Phu Cat to pan DOG and air assaulted into LZ MIKE and LZ TOM. Elements of 1/5 Cav were sent from the Division base area to Phu Cat to replace the 1/12. The 2/7 Cav confined their search and destroy missions to LZ 4 area. A detailed account of small unit ground action at LZ 4 is attached at Inclosure 3.

(4) On 31 Jan 66, 1/7 Cav became heavily engaged in the vicinity LZ ROMEO by the enemy attempting to escape the area. 2/12 Cav moved north and linked up with the 1/7 Cav. All elements of 1/12 Cav consolidated in vicinity of LZ TOM and started sweeping south toward ROMEO. 2/12 Cav moved north and encountered moderate to heavy resistance as did 1/12 Cav moving south.

(5) On 1 Feb 66, 1/7 Cav started sweeping west toward pan QUEBEC. 2/12 Cav continued sweeping north and linked up with the 3rd APC Company of the ARVN Division. 1/12 Cav established a blocking position at BS 865134 and 2/12 Cav turned west driving into the 1/12 blocking position. 1/7 Cav returned to vicinity LZ 4 while elements of the 2/7 Cav were securing the artillery at LZ MIKE and position DOG. Sporadic enemy resistance was encountered during the day.

(6) On 2 Feb 66, 2/12 Cav elements encountered moderate resistance receiving mortar and recoilless rifle fire early in the morning. 1/5 Cav arrived at position DOG from Division base. A B-52 strike southeast of position STEEL was exploited by elements of 1/9 Cav. 2/12 Cav air assaulted to LZ SUB without having enemy contact, and continued to sweep south. 1/7 Cav made a sweep to the West closing into position STEEL with light enemy contact.

(7) On 3 Feb 66, 1/9 Cav made extensive reconnaissance of another B-52 strike area south of position BRASS with negative enemy contact. 2/12 Cav continued south into An Do Valley. 2/5 Cav arrived at position DOG from Division base area and air assaulted to Position GOLD with negative enemy contact. The 2d Brigade CP arrived at Bong Son while the 2/7 Cav returned to Position DOG.

(8) Inclosure 1 includes the results of operations for PHASE II.

c. PHASE III 4 - 10 Feb 66. (Operation WHITE WING). PHASE III was designated Operation WHITE WING to denote the escalation from one brigade to a divisional operation employing two brigades and six battalions of infantry. The concept envisioned air assaults by battalions from both brigades from the Mui Da Dan Mountains into the An Lao Valley, a reported VC stronghold, under enemy domination for over a year. The brigades were to establish blocking positions east of the valley on the dominant terrain, assault three battalions west of the valley, and then attack East into and through the valley. The attack would then move South to clear the valley, with the brigades providing security for and assisting in the evacuation of refugees. The attack was coordinated with the III Marine Amphibious Force in the north who established blocking positions to prevent the enemy from escaping, (See Overlay 3). Similarly, the 2d Bn, 40th Regt (22d ARVN Division) established a blocking position at the southern end of the valley, to block that escape route (Overlay 2). Marine and ARVN actions were coordinated with the attacking elements of the 1st Cavalry Division. Readjustment of Marine and ARVN boundaries was accomplished several times in this phase to fit the tactical situation. Actions during this phase are shown on Overlay 13.

(1) The period 4 - 6 Feb was typified by extensive saturation patrolling in the vicinity of battalion position areas to enhance local security but negligible enemy contact was reported. The planned lift off to the valley was delayed because the mountain area where the troops were was completely covered by low clouds.

(2) 7 Feb saw the air assault of three battalions into LZ's west of the valley. The 1/5 Cav air assaulted from BRASS to COPPER, the 2/5 from GOLD to COPPER, and the 2/7 Cav from DOG to ROOT. The battalions moved generally east into the initial objectives overlooking the valley. Little enemy resistance was encountered. One battalion moved onto the high ground east of the northern area of the valley establishing blocking positions and preparing to exploit or assist units in the valley area.

(3) During the period 8 - 10 Feb, divisional units cleared the An Lao Valley of VC. The brigade on the north encountered sporadic resistance and slow progress through densely populated areas. The brigade on the south moved south down both sides of the valley by combined air and ground moves by companies and platoons with light enemy contact, securing intermediate objectives and on 10 Feb secured their final objectives, (18 and 19).

(4) During the Operation WHITE WING Phase, 10 infantry battalion moves and 12 artillery battalion moves were completed. Additionally as an indication of the 1st Cavalry Division's capability, 3,491 refugees were evacuated from the An Lao Valley by helicopter.

(5) A summary of operations data for PHASE III is included in Inclosure 2.

d. PHASE IV 11 - 28 Feb 66 (Operation WHITE WING/EAGLE'S CLAW). The EAGLE'S CLAW Phase of operations was based on intelligence reports of large enemy forces located in the Kim Song Valley in the southern portion of the Division area of operations. The 3d Brigade was to air assault with three battalions to establish company size ambush sites astride probable enemy escape routes in the valley fingers. The ambush forces carried supplies for 48 hours and moved overland from landing zones into the ambush sites. The remainder of the force (approximately 1/3) would air assault into the

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center of the valley, (position BIRD - Overlay 14A) and act as the "beater" force, attacking out of the valley forcing the enemy towards the ambush sites. The 2d Brigade would concentrate its efforts in completing search and destroy operations in the An Leo Valley and the coastal plain area working generally from North to South and prepare to be committed in the Kim Song Valley on order. 2d Brigade operations 10 - 15 Feb prior to entry in the Kim Song Valley is illustrated on Overlay 14. Operations by all three brigades during WHITE WING/EAGLES CLAW is depicted on Overlays 14A and 14B.

(1) The plan became actuality on 11 and 12 Feb. Two companies from each of two battalions air assaulted into landing zones and moved immediately into ambush sites. The remaining companies, plus another battalion air assaulted into position BIRD, encountering only light resistance. These forces, acting as "beaters", began attacking out from BIRD in the sector forcing the enemy down the valleys. These forces coordinated their attack and saturated the zone as they pushed from BIRD.

(2) On 13 Feb, the ambush sites became company patrol bases and extensive patrolling in sector located two large weapon caches and contact with an enemy platoon. On 14 Feb contact was made with an estimated company, and there was a noticeable rise in small unit contact throughout the sector. These widely dispersed ground operations continued through the 15th and were accentuated by increased heliborne assaults of platoon and company size.

(3) On 16 Feb the 2d Brigade conducted air assaults into COIL (1/5 Cav) and RECOIL (2/5 Cav) during the morning and established blocking positions. The 2/12 Cav initially was retained at PONY as a reaction force and to protect the brigade forward base and artillery at PONY. No enemy resistance was encountered vicinity COIL and RECOIL although two dead VC and some abandoned 81mm mortar ammunition were found. During the afternoon of 16 Feb the 2/5 Cav tightened their ring of blocking positions by establishing C 2/5 at MIKE as well as establishing units vicinity LZ's JOHN and JIM. One company 2/12 at PONY was dispatched with an engineer demolition squad to destroy a cave large enough to hold two VC companies. The 1st Brigade assumed responsibility from the 3d Bde at 1500 hours for operations in the southern end of the Kim Song Valley and the 3d Bde returned to An Khe and assumed Division Base and TACR missions on this date. On 17 Feb 1/5 Cav began ground attacks West toward MIKE and RECOIL, 2/5 Cav attacked to seize LZ PETE within the RECOIL area with Co B and at 0915 hours made contact with a VC company with heavy weapons and a large number of automatic weapons. Co A and C 2/5 Cav moved Southwest from MIKE to assist Co B 2/5 and Co B 2/12 was attached to 2/5 Cav. Co B 2/12 conducted an air assault to vicinity BR 755744 (southwest of PETE) and immediately came under fire. Artillery and TAC Air were used to provide close support for 2/5 Cav units and by 1800 hours the enemy broke contact. The results of this 2/5 Cav action was 127 VC KIA (BG), 100 VC KIA (est) plus the capture or destruction of 3 x 81mm mortars, 4 . 51mm RR, 1 x 75mm RR, 75 . 81mm mortar rounds and 10 x 57mm RR rounds. Based on the number of heavy weapons, volume of automatic weapons fire, and extent of communications and defensive positions it was concluded that the 2/5 Cav had attacked and destroyed a weapons battalion.

(4) On 18 Feb the 1st Brigade continued sweep and patrol actions with 1/8 Cav in the high ground north of BIRD and 2/8 Cav in the area southeast of BIRD. Single and multi-company search and destroy operations, with blocking positions along likely avenues of escape, continued in the upper reaches of the Kim Song Valley. The 2d Brigade continued to encounter heavy enemy contact vicinity BR 779758 and this area, because of the disposition and elaborateness of enemy defensive positions, became known as the "IRON TRIANGLE". Artillery and TAC air strikes, in the objective area, supported the attack by friendly forces but the enemy defenses were not penetrated.

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Company sized blocking positions were established east of MIKE and on the south (BLOCK #2) by 2/5 Cav to interdict the suspected exfiltration of the enemy from the "IRON TRIANGLE" area. 1/9 Cav screened the Division area of operations to the east and west.

(5) On 19 Feb, the 2d Brigade continued to attack the "IRON TRIANGLE" against determined enemy resistance. Patrol and ambush operations from the blocking positions were intensified to contain the enemy force inside the "TRIANGLE" by 1/5 Cav, 2/5 Cav, and 2/12 Cav (-). The 1st Brigade (1/8 and 2/8 Cav) continued search and destroy operations north and southeast of BIRD and 1/9 Cav screened the Division area of operations.

(6) On 20 Feb, 1/5 Cav conducted ground and heliborne assaults with the enemy resisting from well fortified positions in the "IRON TRIANGLE". From enemy radio transmission intercepted and the volume and caliber of fire received, it was estimated that a Regimental Hq was encircled in that area. Encirclement of the RECOIL area in depth continued as elements of 2/12 Cav air assaulted into Obj SAM (southwest of RECOIL) and Obj 22 (west of RECOIL). Fierce fighting ensued vicinity Obj 22, between A 2/12 Cav and an estimated enemy company, with the enemy unit suffering heavy casualties. 1/8 Cav and 2/8 Cav continued sweeping the upper reaches of the Kim Song Valley with numerous clashes with small enemy groups reported.

(7) On 21 Feb, friendly forces withdrew from the vicinity of the "IRON TRIANGLE" to allow a B-52 and CS strike on that area at 1600 hours. Withdrawal was completed under cover of artillery fires and TAC Air strikes. Then, after the B-52 and CS strike, friendly forces were airlifted back to LZ's vicinity the "IRON TRIANGLE" with 1/5 Cav reaching the eastern edge of the "IRON TRIANGLE" and 2/5 Cav blocking at PEEF. 2/12 Cav (-) had remained in blocking positions vicinity LZ SAM with A and C Companies at LZ JOHN and Obj 22.

(8) On 22 Feb, 1/5 Cav swept through the "IRON TRIANGLE" area. 2/5 Cav swept southwest from PEEF and joined 2/12 Cav (-) at SAM. A, C, and Recon of 2/12 continued local patrols vicinity Obj 22. At 221300, 2/12 Cav was extracted by CH-47 from Obj 22 and LZ SAM and closed PONY at 221446. 2/5 Cav was airlifted from LZ SAM to DUCK and 1/5 Cav was airlifted from the "IRON TRIANGLE" area to PONY, closing at 221600. The "IRON TRIANGLE" engagement is summarized as follows: At 0940 hours 17 Feb, elements of the Division initiated action against a well fortified enemy force estimated to be a VC Bn reinforced with a heavy weapons company and possibly a Regimental CP vicinity BR 779958. Subsequent attacks during the next four days resulted in heavy fighting as the enemy continued a stubborn defense of the area. Division Arty fired a total of 491 mission from conventional tube arty, 10 ARA missions, and 43 TOTS on the objective area from 17 - 21 Feb 66; 39 TAC Air sorties were put into the target area. Friendly units conducted a total of 21 air movements into and around and out of the objective area, and conducted a total of 33 ground attacks with units ranging from platoon to company size. Friendly casualties were 23 KIA and 106 WIA and enemy losses were 313 KIA (BO), 398 KIA (Est), 4 WIA, 908 WIA (Est). A B-52 strike and a CS mission on the objective area at 211600 resulted in cessation of the enemy's defense of the area. Troops exploiting the B-52 strike encountered very light resistance; some bodies, weapons and individual equipment items were found among the fortified positions. The following enemy equipment was captured by friendly forces during the engagement:

7 - SKA Russian Carbines

6 - Chicom AK's

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- 5 - LMG
- 5 - US M-1 Carbines
- 5 - US M-1 Rifles
- 1 - 60mm Mortar
- 3 - 81mm Mortars
- 1 - 82mm Mortar
- 1 - 40mm Rocket Launcher
- 5 - 57mm Recoilless Rifles
- 3 - BAR's
- 5 - SMG
- 1 - 9mm Pistol

(9) On 23 Feb, 1/8 Cav continued aerial and ground search and destroy operations north of BIRD. 1/12 Cav conducted offensive operations in the high ground and along trails in the Noi Go Chai hill mass southeast of PONY and engaged an estimated VC company vicinity BR 859805. 1/5 Cav, 2/5 Cav, and 2/12 Cav conducted local search and destroy operations vicinity PONY and DUOK.

(10) On 24 Feb, 2/8 Cav air assaulted into the Noi Go Chai hill mass to reinforce 1/12 Cav. The two Bns then conducted search and destroy operations sweeping the hill mass area. Enemy contact was light and the enemy appeared to be moving in small groups to the NW and attempting to avoid engagement with friendly forces.

(11) On 25 Feb, 2/8 Cav occupied blocking positions in the Noi Go Chai hill mass. 1/8 Cav air assaulted into the Niu Hon Giang hill mass (BR 8177) and attacked in the southwest portion of the valley. 1/12 Cav was extracted from the Noi Go Chai area. 1/5 Cav and 2/5 Cav air assaulted into Suoi Ca Da Valley (BR 8387) and the Nui Dau Truong high ground (BR 8484) south of the valley. Enemy contact remained light. Several crew-served and individual weapons (75mm BR, 7.62mm LMG, Rifles and SMG) were captured.

(12) On 26 Feb, the 1st and 2d Bdes, with 4 Bns, searched the Suoi Ca Da Valley and experienced sporadic contact with small groups of VC. 1/5 Cav returned to the "IRON TRIANGLE" (BR 7775) to demolish fortifications and destroy any enemy forces in that vicinity. 1/9 Cav established ambush sites in the valley vicinity BR 900800. Indications that enemy morale was low resulted in increased Psy War efforts with emphasis on loudspeaker broadcasts by enemy leaders who had surrendered.

(13) On 27 Feb, the 1st and 2d Bdes with 1/8 Cav, 2/8 Cav, and 2/5 Cav extended their search of the Suoi Ca Da Valley and adjoining high ground. 1/5 Cav established blocking positions in the high ground northeast and east of PONY. Extensive search operations caused further fragmentation of enemy forces into small groups, thereby reducing his effectiveness.

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(14) On 28 Feb, units conducted local patrolling and security missions. 1st Bde and 1/12 Cav returned to An Khe leaving the 2d Bde (5 Bns) in the operational area planning to execute search and destroy operations in the N Chop Chai hill mass southeast of Bong Son.

(15) PHASE IV results through 28 Feb 66 are contained in Inclosure I.

e. PHASE V, 1 - 6 Mar 66 (Operation WHITE WING/BLACK HORSE).

(1) The Division order to the 2d Brigade for BLACK HORSE had as its objectives the location and destruction of enemy forces and base installations suspected of being hidden in the rugged N Chop Chai/Hon Cao hill mass (Overlay 15). The 6th Bn, Quy Thang Regiment was suspected of being in the area on the basis of prisoner interrogations plus information from the local population. Persistent reports over a long period had speculated that the area contained large supply caches.

(2) The Division concept of operations was based on a thorough ground search of the area due to the heavy vegetation and deep ravines throughout the area plus support from the 22d ARVN Division to seal off the area. Arrangements were made for the 22d ARVN Division to occupy blocking positions along the Song Lai Giang River and Hwy 1, to screen the sea approach with the 22d Division Junk Fleet, and to sweep the low ground along the southern edge of the hill mass in conjunction with Division airmobile operations.

(3) 2d Brigade airmobile operations were characterized by the use of marginal LZ's including holes blown in the forests by Air Force bombs. Entry by rappelling from UH-1D's and by OH-47 trooper ladders was used to good advantage throughout this phase.

(4) 1 March. The 2d Bde initiated operations with three battalions. 2/5 Cav conducted an air assault from DUCK to BOB at 0843 hours and conducted subsequent ground search activities without enemy contact. 1/8 Cav moved by air and ground into Obj 100 without contact - commencing at 0847 hours. 2/8 Cav air assaulted into LZ JOHN at 0910 hours engaging and killing 2 VC. The ARVN 3/3 APC Troop sweep to a blocking position south of LZ JOHN (refer to Overlay 15) produced the best results of the day as contact was made with about 150 VC. After the 3/3 APC Troop engagement was completed the 2/8 Cav moved into BULLS EYE in preparation for subsequent operations. The APC Troop reported 50 VC KIA (BC), 30 VCC from this encounter. The 1/5 Cav remained at DUCK as Brigade reserve and 2/12 Cav continued to secure Brigade and Division installations at TWO BITS.

(5) 2 March. 1/5 Cav air assaulted into HAMMER at 0745 hours without contact. 2/5 Cav conducted extensive patrolling vicinity BOB resulting in 2 VC KIA and 35 VCS. 2/8 Cav conducted three company size patrols in the BULLS EYE area encountering one enemy squad with 3 VC KIA (BC) and 2 WIA (EST). 1/8 Cav at Obj 100 was probed by 30 - 40 VC twice during the night of 2 - 3 March resulting in 7 VC KIA (BC).

(6) 3 March. 1/8 Cav conducted an air assault from Obj 100 to SPUD at 0910 hours with minor contact. 2/8 Cav continued sweeps around BULLS EYE locating one hut used to manufacture booby traps and having one VC surrender. Other units continued operations with only minor contacts.

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(7) 4 March. 2/12 Cav departed for An Khe by CV-2 and was replaced at TWO BITS by 2/5 Cav. 1/5 Cav continued operations vicinity HAMMER and in sweeps along the Song Lai Giang River picked up 42 VCS. 1/8 Cav conducted search operations west of STUD without contact. 2/8 Cav conducted an air assault into PAF at 0745 with no contact.

(8) 5 March. The Division CP, 1/5 Cav and 2/5 Cav deployed from Bong Son by CV-2 and 2/8 Cav was returned by CH-47's. 1/8 Cav moved to TWO BITS to provide security pending return of this battalion to An Khe on 6 March.

(9) Although BLACK HORSE did not achieve the desired contact with major enemy forces the information concerning VC activities in the area will assist future operations. It is felt that any major forces in the area moved out, probably to the South, about 27 Feb 66. There was no evidence that this area is used by regular VC units on a recurring basis nor is there any evidence of extensive supply caches. However a local VC guerilla organization exists in most villages and the area is used as a rest area and to support transient units. Results of Phase V operations are summarized in Inclosure 1.

9. Results. Inclosure 1 summarizes the following operations data for Operation MASHER/WHITE WING 25 Jan - 6 Mar 66:

a. Enemy losses of personnel and equipment by phase and totals as a result of Division operations plus Division casualties for the same period.

b. Total enemy losses inflicted by 1st Cavalry Division, ARVN (22d Division - ARVN Airborne Brigade), and ROK Division in execution of missions outlined in FFORCEV OPORD MASHER.

c. 1st Cavalry Division - Army Aviation Performance Data.

d. 1st Cavalry Division Artillery Performance Data.

10. Administrative matters. During Operation MASHER/WHITE WING logistical elements were faced with supplying two brigades conducting sustained operations as well as the Division base. This support was closely coordinated by representatives of this Division and Qui Nhon Support Area (QNSA).

a. Basic logistical planning for Operation MASHER/WHITE WING was based on maintenance of Route 1 as an "open road" by ARVN and ROK forces. The outstanding manner in which this was accomplished has already been described earlier in this report. Another provision was the planned co-location of QNSA forward supply points with Division Support Command FSB's at Phu Cat (24 Jan - 18 Feb) and at Bong Son (19 Feb - 6 Mar). This system resulted in outstanding coordination and liaison. Stockages were built and depleted according to the tactical situations. Through-put of supplies direct from Qui Nhon to tactical units was greatly facilitated by this co-location.

b. The Combined Traffic Control Center established by FFORCEV to control and schedule convoys on Route 1 was very effective and should be continued in future operations.

c. This Division constructed an airstrip suitable for C-123 use in Area DOC (BS 880004) as a back up in the event Route 1 was interdicted. It was unnecessary to use this field for resupply but it was used during

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the withdrawal of the ARVN Airborne Brigade and will support HVNAF armed forces stationed in the coastal plain area as part of the pacification effort. Division engineer troops constructed a second airstrip at BR 880535 (vicinity Phu Cat) capable of accepting C-130 traffic to support future operations in NE Binh Dinh Province.

d. During the operations large quantities of Class IIIA were consumed. The bulk of Class IIIA was delivered by the 1st Log Command elements directly to the operations area. Fuel bags (500 gallon) were received in sufficient quantities to sustain operations. A significant quantity of replacement fuel dispensing pumps, both 30 - 40 GPM and 100 GPM were received during the period.

e. Large tonnages of Class V were delivered directly from Qui Nhon to the operations area in Bong Son. Although pyrotechnics and illumination rounds continue to be in national short supply this has not effected the combat capability of the Division. Double and triple ASR were authorized during the period as dictated by the combat situation.

f. Supply support for the Division in the MASHER/WHITE WING operation in Bong Son area included the following:

| | |
|-----------|---|
| CLASS I | (A) 9 Tons (B) 41 Tons (C) 35,735 Cases |
| CLASS III | MOGAS 103,100 Gal |
| | Diesel - 27,100 Gal |
| | AVGAS - 60,450 Gal |
| | JP4 - 1,283,195 Gal |
| CLASS V | 3,813 Tons |

For the first time fresh vegetables were procured for troops in the forward area.

g. Medical evacuation from the operational areas to the supporting medical companies was performed by back-haul on non-medical helicopters and organic medical helicopters assigned to the 15th Medical Battalion. Casualties were split between Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and the 2d Surgical Hospital (Mobile Army) at An Khe. Evacuation of the Division medical companies was accomplished primarily by 498 Medical Company (Air Ambulance) helicopters with assistance from 17th Aviation Company OV-2's in some instances. The Medical Pod (OH-54) was employed in the operational area by the 15th Medical Battalion during this campaign.

h. Reliable communications were maintained between the Division base at An Khe and the Main CP at Bong Son to include secure teletypewriter circuits. During Operation MASHER/WHITE WING teletype circuits from Division Forward CP to brigade CP's were established over the VHF radio relay system. Circuits were operated with on-line security equipment. The system enhanced communication security as well as providing a printed copy of numerous operational messages passed between Division and Brigade Tactical Operations Centers.

11. Special Equipment and Techniques.

a. A significant "first" was achieved during Operation MASHER/WHITE WING by airborne displacement and positioning of the 155mm Howitzer (towed) under combat conditions. Four gun batteries of 1st Bn, 30th Arty