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AFTER ACTION REPORT PAUL REVERE

+ HOOKER I



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2D BDE 1ST CAV DIV (AIRMObiLE)

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HEADQUARTERS
2D BRIG DE, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIR)
APO US Forces 96490

AVCBB-C

9 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations after Action Report

TO: Commanding General
1st Air Cavalry Division
ATTN: G-3
APO US Forces 96490

1. Name and Type of Operation:

- a. PAUL REVERE, Recon in Force.
- b. HOOKER I, Recon in Force.

2. Dates of Operation:

- a. PAUL REVERE; 2-10 June 66.
- b. HOOKER I; 11-22 June 66.

3. Location:

- a. PLEIKU Province bounded by YA 650220, YA 850450, YA 130280, and YA 130450.
- b. PLEIKU and KONTUM Province bounded by YA 530350, AR 000350, AS 000200, and YB 700200.

4. Command and Control Headquarters:

- a. 3d Bde, 25th Infantry Division.
- b. 2d Bde, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

5. Reporting Officer: Colonel H.J. Berenzweig

6. Task Organization:

- a. PAUL REVERE 1 June to 8 June 1966.

2/5 Cav

TACP
Sqd C/8th Engr
CIDG (DUC CO)
Intel Tm
RRU Tm

2/12 Cav

TACP
Sqd C/8th Engr
Intel Tm
CIDG (DUC CO)
RRU Tm

Bde

A/1/9 Cav
1/77 Arty (DS) (-)
C2/17 Arty
Plat 2/20 Arty (ARA)
C (-) 8th Engr
227th ASHB (DS) (24, UH-1D)
C/228 ASHB (DS) (6, OH-47)
2d Plat (-) 545 HF Co
Tm 2, IPW/191 MI
Tm 2, 16th Weather Sqdn
Tm 2, Sig Spt
2d FSE
Water Pt 8th Engr
TACP

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b. PAUL REVERE (8-9 June)

<u>1/14 Inf (-)</u>	<u>1/35 Inf</u>	<u>2/12 Cav</u>
Sqd C/8th Engr Intel Team	Sqd C/8th Engr Intel Tm	Sqd C/8th Engr TACP RRU Tm Intel Tm Psy War Tm

<u>1/69 Armor (-)</u>	<u>Bde</u>
B Co 1/14 Inf	A 1/9 Cav TACP 1/77 Arty (-) (Reinf) (DS) Plat 2/20 Arty (ARA) 227th AHB (DS) (24, UH-1D) C/228 ASHB (DS) (6, CH-47) 2d Plat (-), 545 MP Co Tm 2, IPW/191 MI Tm 2, 16th Weather Sqdn Tm 2, Sig Spt 2d FSE Water Pt, 8th Engr

c. (1) HOOKER I (10-16 June)

<u>2/5 Cav</u>	<u>2/12 Cav</u>	<u>Bde</u>
TACP C 1/77 Arty Sqd, C/8th Engr Tm, 10th RRU 3 Scout Dog Tms (PLEIKU) CIDG (PLEI MRONG)	TACP A 1/77 Arty Sqd C/8th Engr Tm, 10th RRU Intel Tm 3 Scout Dog Tm CIDG (POLBI KLENG)	1/9 Cav (-) 1/77 Arty (-) (Reinf) (DS) C 1/30 Arty (155) C 3/28 Arty (8") D 3/18 Arty (175) C (-) 8th Engr 227th AHB (DS) (24, UH-1D) C/228 ASHB (DS) (6, CH-47)

(17-18 June)Change: 1/9 Cav

C 2/12 Cav
C 1/30 Arty (155)

(18 June)1/9 Cav

Detached 2d Bde
one Scout Tm to 2d Bde.

7. Supporting Forces:

a. Arty fire support for both PAUL REVERE and HOOKER I was characterized by intense preparation of LZ's and extensive day and night harrassing and interdiction from all caliber guns on selective targets planned by the S-2/S-3. USAF visual and sky spot bombings were used to augment the interdiction program. Artillery batteries were employed within the supporting range of each other to provide mutual support. The Infantry operated within the supporting range of Arty. 155mm guns were used to extend the range at which infantry units could operate. ARA was used to fire H & I missions at night and to conduct night surveillance along the SE SAN River along with a search light ship. 8" How and 175mm guns were used to extend H&I fires into areas not assigned to Infantry forces. Between 350 to 550 rounds of all types were expended during each day of both PAUL REVERE and HOOKER

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for a total of 11, 120 rounds being fired.

b. TAC Air was extensively used to augment the interdiction program during both operations. Visual and sky spot bombings were used to hamper enemy movement both day and night. A total of 37 sorties were flown dropping a total of 24.25 tons ordnance.

c. The 11th Avn Group provided the 227th AHB and Co C, 228th AHB in direct support of the Bde during both operations. An average of 24 UH-1D's and 6 CH-47's were provided each day.

(1) Lift figures for PAUL REVERE

Unit	Flying Hours	Passengers	Cargo	Sorties
227th AHB	1797.2	7053	239.8	5432
Co C 228th AHB	293.3	1754	1375.5	1186

(2) Lift figures for HOOKER I

Unit	Flying Hours	Passengers	Cargo	Sorties
227th AHB	1658.9	9939	246.6	6172
Co C 228th AHB	194.5	1102	966.2	544

(3) CH-47's were used to displace arty and to supply the fwd positions with ammunition and supplies. CH-54's were used to displace C1/30 Arty (155) during displacement when road movement was not practical.

(4) The 17th Avn Co provided CV-2 A/C to move the Bde on major displacements and to help resupply Bn forward bases where CV-2 strips were available.

d. Scout Dog Teams from II Corps (ARVN) were used by 2/5 Cav and 2/12 Cav on search ops to detect VC and to provide early warning.

e. Intelligence teams from II Corps were used to augment the intelligence effort of the Bns throughout the operation. The teams were used on a mission basis and consisted of interpreters and personnel familiar with the local area. These teams assisted in gathering information on local VC in populated areas.

8. Intelligence (PAUL REVERE)

a. General: The 2d Bde became OPCON to the 3rd Bde 25th Inf Div during operation PAUL REVERE on 1 June 1966. Combat intelligence gained up to that time (8 May - 1 Jun 66) confirmed the 33rd NVA Regt and the probability of the 66th and 32nd NVA Regiments operating in the AO. The AO initially given the 2d Bde (See Opn O/L 1) was suspected to be a major route to and from Cambodia. The second AO assigned the 2d Bde (See O/L 3 & 4) had no confirmed enemy units; however, the area had not been cleared and the terrain and facilities offered the VC an excellent sanctuary.

b. Terrain:

(1) The initial operational area consisted of a multi-canope jungle with dense forest scrub and undergrowth. The mountains in the eastern section had escarpments and steep slopes over 20%. The SE SAN River to the West and North provided an obstacle which limited enemy crossing sites. The river had an average width of 175 meters and was navigable during the rainy season. The varying terrain limited cross country movement; observation was restricted by dense jungle.

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(2) The AO from 7-9 June (See Opn O/L 2) consisted mainly of rolling plains and forested hills with a mountain range in the East. The area was broken by numerous streams. The prominent terrain features in the East were the GHI GOL and CHI KARA Mountains bordered by the IA PUCH River to the east and the IA BO LANG River to the NW. In the western plain area, vegetation consisted primarily of grass, crops and scrub. Small forest areas were scattered throughout the western section. The forest areas in the plains and mountains contained thick undergrowth, heavy canoped trees and dense undergrowth. The lowlands contained numerous cleared areas offering fair to good LZ's.

c. Intelligence Findings: There was no major encounter with VC forces in each area searched and cleared. Sporadic firing and sightings of individuals dressed in khakis, however, indicated that the VC may be employing OPs for a possible larger force. Several huts probably used as way stations were destroyed along with 2500 lbs of rice. A variety of comparatively new ammunition and military accessories were found abandoned apparently in haste along trails and at several locations along the SE SAN River believed to be crossing sites. Aerial surveillance reported canoes and in subsequent action, two rafts and 10 canoes were spotted and destroyed in the vicinity of suspected crossing sites. These operations indicated that the enemy may be attempting to return to CAMBODIA to escape pressure being exerted by U.S. Forces. Examination and analysis of 2d Bde's findings during operations conducted in the vicinity of the CAMBODIAN border clearly indicated that friendly dispositions and actions prevented any major VC or NVA force from egressing to the west. The 2d Bde's participation in Paul Revere was curtailed on 9 Jun 66, and the Bde commended operation HOOKER I. Prior to this change in plans, no significant enemy contact had been made by the 2d Brigade.

Intelligence (HOOKER I)

a. General: During HOOKER I every effort was made to obtain a complete intelligence picture for the large AO assigned. This was accomplished by direct coordination with PLEIKU Sector, KONTUM Sector, II Corps Hqs, 24th Special Tactical Zone and USSF. Intelligence gained indicated that no Main or NVA forces were confirmed in the area; however, the contact to the north with the 24th NVA Regt by 101st Airborne Bde and the contact in the south with the 33rd NVA Regt by the 3rd Bde 25th Division indicated that the HOOKER I AO could be utilized by supporting NVA units suspected of operating with these regiments. In addition, intelligence indicated that the USSF Camps of PLEI DJERENG, PLEI MRONG, and POLI KIENG were suspected targets of the anticipated Monsoon Offensive. Further, the AO had long been suspected as a VC zone containing secret bases, and reported caches, rest areas, and confirmed north/south infiltration routes. One reported secret base east of PLEI DJERENG allegedly was occupied by 3000 VC who used forced labor from the local Montagnard villages; a search of this area and the others disproved the reports for the time being.

b. Terrain: The large AO, consisting of approx 45,000 square KM, was made up of three main terrain features. These main features were high mountains in the central portion, rolling hills and lower mountains in the west and the river plains east of the DAK BA River. The mountains were covered with multi-canoped forests and dense underbrush which restricted ground movement and severely limited ground and air to ground observation. In the west, the relief was less exaggerated and slopes were more gentle. The area was heavy with tall bamboo thickets and dense vegetation which often limited observation to only a few feet. The river plain was speckled with cultivated fields and flooded rice paddies which restricted movement off trails and roads. The lowlands were well populated within the AO and offered the local VC forces an excellent sanctuary by melting in with the local populace. Heavily forested mountains, to include the border areas, severely restricted LZ selection. Conversely numerous landing areas were available on the plains contiguous to some of the rivers.

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c. Intelligence Findings:

(1) There were numerous evidences of local-type enemy presence during extensive and deliberate patrolling conducted by the 2d Bde and supporting USSF elements. However, there were no indications of Main Force VC or NVA units. Contact generally consisted of sighting and sporadic firing from local VMC travelling in small groups. In the mountainous area east of PLEI DJERENG the 2/12 Cav discovered an arms cache consisting of 2-60mm mortars, 3 shotguns, 2 French AR's, 4 French sub-machineguns and various types ammunition. The cache appeared to be the major weaponry from a local force unit that disbanded during US occupation of the area. In the same general area eight bunkers with overhead cover and spider holes were found. (See Sketch O/L 9 & 10). These positions showed signs of recent use and two bunkers had not yet been completed. Examination and analysis of incidents and sightings clearly indicated the presence of VC and VMC local forces, but no substantiating evidence of a large enemy build-up of forces was found. Debriefing of Air Cav recon units, ground patrols, and questioning of other available intelligence sources, provided no indication that the AO was being occupied or used by hardcore VC or NVA during Operation HOOKER I.

(2) Apache teams and long range patrols from the PLEI DJERENG, PLEI MRONG, and POLI KLENG USSF Camps supplemented by 2d Brigade personnel and the recon in force operations conducted by the 2d Bde maneuver battalions covered on the ground the main trails, approaches, and likely assembly areas available to the enemy. Three Apache Patrols operated near the Cambodian border checking for signs of VC movement and build up. One team reported contact with 15 armed VMC believed to be locals; two teams discovered signs of activity on N-S trails. However, no indications were found to suspect existence of NVA units or VC Main Force activities or build ups. One Apache team operating in the central portion of the AO detected movement and noises; however, no actual visual or physical contact was made; the CIDG planned subsequent operations in the general area.

9. MISSION:

a. Opn PAUL REVERE: 2d Bde OCA to 3/25 Div. Task Force 2/1 attacks to destroy NVA/VC forces in the assigned AO in conjunction with TF 3/25th Div.

b. Opn HOOKER I: 2d Bde conducts spoiling attacks to destroy enemy forces and to disrupt enemy attacks on USSF/CIDG Camps and other friendly installations in zone. Conducts mid-range and long-range patrols with priority to the western portion of the AO.

10. Concept of Operations:

a. PAUL REVERE: 2d Bde attacked to find and destroy NVA/VC forces NW of DUC CO to the SE SAN River in conjunction with a CIDG company from DUC CO from 3 June to 8 June. On 8 and 9 June 2d Bde attacked with three infantry Bns and one tank Bn in the area NW of OASIS to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces. 2d Bde OCA to 3rd Bde 25th Inf Div.

b. HOOKER I: 2d Bde conducted spoiling attacks and conducted recon in force from bases at POLI KLENG and PLEI MRONG to locate NVA/VC units in the AO with emphasis to the area just S of the boundary between 2d Bde and the 101st Abn Div at DAK TO during 10 June to 16 June. During the second half of HOOKER I 2d Bde conducted spoiling attacks and recon in force in the area vic PLEI DJERENG to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces suspected of planning to attack the camp.

11. Execution:

a. 1 June 2d Bde came under operational control of 3rd Bde 25th Division effective 1200 and commenced Opn PAUL REVERE. 2/5 Cav already OCA to 3/25th Div was returned to 2d Bde control. 2/12 Cav was relieved of security of Hwy 19 by 1/7 Cav and moved to vic BIEN HO at PLEIKU. 1/5 Cav remained in base camp and prepared to move to PLEIKU on 02 June. 2d Bde CP displaced by ground convoy from base camp to BIEN HO.

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b. 2 June 2d Bde Fwd moved to DUC CO (YB835251) and Bde trains moved to OASIS (YB105275). 1/5 Cav displaced from Camp Radoliff to the Trukey Farm (YB233517) and assumed TF COLT missions, secured construction engineers at BAN BLECK and PLEI ME E. 2/5 Cav continued to conduct search opns around LZ 2A (YA759466), 2C (YA762462) and 1A (YA609418). 2/12 Cav displaced to the operational area from BIEN HO with A Co air assaulting into LZ18A (YA748234) and B Co air assaulting into LZ18B (YA744267). Bn (-) moved to DUC CO. A Mike force from DUC CO continued to operate N and W vic YA675265. (See Opn O/L #1).

c. 3 June 1/5 Cav became OCA to 1st Cav Div as TF COLT reaction force vic PLEIKU. 2/5 Cav conducted local search opns with A Co vic LZ2C. Co B air assaulted from LZ2C into LZ9A (YA670351). Engineers were used to enlarge the LZ. D Co air moved to LZ9A from 2A. C Co continued plat search opns from LZ1A. C 2/12 Cav air assaulted into LZ 18C (YA09268), secured the LZ for Bn Hq, and A 1/77 Arty, then searched N to vic YA714291. A Co searched N from LZ 18A along two routes to vic YA743266. B Co conducted local search opns vic LZ18A, then was air lifted to LZ 18C and conducted three plat searches out from the LZ. USSF Mike forces continued to search the trail network in their sector.

d. 4 June A 2/5 Cav searched W & S of LZ 2A. At 1418 A Co was air lifted to LZ 9A. B Co searched N and S of LZ 9A. Recon Plat searched W of LZ 9A. Bn (-) and 2/17 Arty were air lifted to LZ 9A from LZ 2C. At 1030 B Co made contact with one NVA killing him and capturing 2 SKS weapons and packs vic YA689348. At YA677336 B Co found and destroyed 1000 lbs of rice and 4 huts. Later the Co found two VC bodies killed by arty fire. C Co conducted search opns to the west of LZ 1A. A 2/12 Cav continued search opns from vic YA733288 to YA729306. B Co conducted three plat search opns out from LZ 18C. C Co conducted search opns N from YA714291 to YA710312. CIDG Mike force continued to operate along trails in their sector.

e. 5 June A 2/5 Cav conducted a company search to LZ 9B (YA684373) from LZ 9A. B Co conducted search opns to the E of LZ 9A. C Co conducted search opns out from LZ 1A to the SW. A 2/12 Cav conducted search opns vic YA729308. B Co conducted plat sweeps out from LZ 18C. C Co conducted plat sweeps out from their company base at YA710312.

f. 6 June A Co 2/5 Cav conducted search opns vic of LZ 9B. B Co secured LZ 9A while the Recon and AT Plats searched vic of the LZ. AT Plat found and destroyed 1500 lbs of rice in two huts vic YA679343. C Co conducted plat sweeps out from LZ 1A to the S. A 2/12 Cav conducted search opns from vic YA729308 NW to LZ 110 and then W to LZ 109. B Co b conducted plat sweeps to the NW and SW of LZ 18C. C Co conducted plat search opns from YA709311 to YA693307.

g. 7 June 2/5 Cav redeployed from LZ's 1A, 9A, and 9B by A/C to OASIS. At 1200 2/5 Cav OCA to 3rd Bde 25th Div became IFFORCEV reserve/reaction force. One plat of B Co was left as a stay behind force at LZ 9A, OCA to 2/12 Cav. A and C 2/1 Cav conducted search opns vic of LZ109 and YA693307, at 1150 C Co made contact with 2 VC vic YA674314. Fire was exchanged and VC fled. During the afternoon A and C Co's were air lifted to DUC CO. One plat C Co was left as a stay behind patrol vic YA615314. B Co and A 1/77 Arty remained at 18C to provide support for the two stay behind patrols and the CIDG patrol.

h. 8 June A 2/12 Cav remained at DUC CO as the Bde reserve/reaction force at 0830 B and C Co's lifted off from DUC CO and air assaulted into LZ4B and 12A. B Co searched S of LZ 4B and C Co searched N of LZ 12A. Bn (-) and A 1/77 Arty were air lifted into LZ12A from 18C. At 2100 the Recon Plat ambushed and killed one VHC vic YA957363. Effective 080500 June 1/35 Inf, 1/14 Inf, and 1/69 Armor became OPCON to 2d Bde from 3rd Bde 25th Div. At 0730 C 1/14 Inf air assaulted into LZ 5B followed by A Co air assaulting into LZ 5C. Recon Plat air assaulted into LZ 13A and secured it for Bn (-) and A 2/9 Arty. A and C Co's searched S to night defensive positions where ambushes were established. Co B OPCON to 1/69

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armor. At 0901 and 0935 ground elements of A 1/9 Cav were placed on the ground at 5Y and 5X to block VC escaping from 2/12 Cav on the W and 1/14 Inf on the E. At 1130 C 1/35 Inf air assaulted into LZ 4Z and searched S. A Co air assaulted into LZ 5Z and searched S. B Co air assaulted into LZ 12Z and secured it for Bn (-) and C 2/9 Arty. Night operations were characterized by ambush patrols placed out from night defensive positions. 1/69 Armor augmented with B 1/14 Inf established blocks and ambushes along Hwy 19 from ZL080310 to prevent the VC from moving S. (See Opn O/L #2).

i. 9 June B 2/12 Cav searched S while B Co conducted search opns vic of LZ 12A. A Co remained reserve/reaction force at DUC CO. Effective 1200 2/12 Cav OCA to 3/25 Div. 1/14 Inf, and 1/35 Inf continued to sweep S in zone became OCA to 3/25 Div at 1200 hrs. 1/69 Armor continued to occupy blocking positions along Hwy 19, became OCA to 3/25 Div at 1200 hrd. 2d Bde CP prepared to commence HOOKER I on 11 June.

j. 10 June 2/12 Cav displaced from DUC CO by CV-2 to CONFEDERATE (PALEI KIENG) and established a Bn base from which to conduct opns. 2/5 Cav moved by CV-2 from OASIS to UNION (PLEI MRONG). C Co established a company base at LZ GRANT with C 1/77 Arty to conduct future opns. 1/9 Cav (-) OPCON to 2d Bde screened the AO, 2d Bde displaced from DUC CO to UNION by CV-2. 2d Bde terminated Operation PAUL REVERE and commenced Operation HOOKER I. (See Opn O/L #3 & 4).

k. 11 June A Co 2/5 Cav remained at UNION as the Bn reserve/reaction force. B Co air assaulted plato into LZ JACKSON (ZA049155) and LZ MC CELLEN (ZA022675) and searched to LZ SHERMAN (ZA055697). C Co conducted plat search opns N and W of LZ GRANT. D Co (-) air assaulted into LZ CUSTER and established a base. A 2/12 conducted search opns N and SW of FOB #1. B Co searched N from ZA012964 to FOB #2 (ZA003015). A 1/77 Arty displaced to FOB #2 using CH-47. C Co conducted search opns vic of CONFEDERATE. C 1/30 Arty (155) displaced from KONTUM to CONFEDERATE via CH-54. 1/9 Cav conducted reconnaissance of the AO with emphasis on the NW corner. An USSF Apache team was placed along the border by B Trp vic YB855063.

l. 12 June A 2/5 Cav continued as the Bn reserve/reaction force. B Co air assaulted one plat into LZ MC CELLEN and conducted search opns to LZ BURNSIDES. C Co conducted plat search opns to LZ GRANT from LZ's STUART and MOSBY. D Co (-) air assaulted and conducted search opns from LZ CUSTER, to LZ LONGSTREET. A 2/12 Cav conducted search opns vic of FOB #1 while B Co conducted search opns W and SW of FOB #2. C Co provided the Bn reaction and conducted a plat search opn vic YA 955968. 1/9 Cav (-) continued to screen the AO and provide back up for Apache Teams. B Trp placed an USSF Apache Team via YB7388. D Trp conducted ground recon of Hwy 14 from KONTUM to POLEI KIENG. Two Long Range CIDG Patrols departed POLEI KIENG to search along their respective routes.

m. 13 June A 2/5 Cav remained the Bn reserve force. B Co conducted plat opns vic LZ BURNSTIDE and LZ HAMPTON. C Co conducted plat search opns vic of LZ FORREST and JOHNSTON. D Co (-) conducted opns vic of LZ LONGSTREET and placed out two long range patrols vic ZA019678 and ZA 062568. A 2/12 conducted plat opns vic of FOB #1 and air assaulted to ZA 920790. B Co air assaulted into LZ #8 (YB9389580). C Co remained at CONFEDERATE as the Bn reaction force and conducted a platoon search vic ZA 099988. 1/9 Cav continued to screen with emphasis on the NW section in an effort to seek out the enemy. D Trp conducted ground recon of the N road net from KONTUM to UNION.

n. 14 June A 2/5 remained the Bn reaction force at LZ GRANT. B Co conducted plat search opns vic LZ's MC CELLEN and JACKSON. C Co conducted three plat opns from LZ GRANT to LZ's SHERIDAN and MOSBY. Co D (-) air assaulted into LZ SWIFT from LZ LONGSTREET and conducted search opns. A 2/12 Cav conducted search opns vic YA925468. B Co continued to conduct plat opns vic of YOHOE, FOB #2 and LZ #12 YB943097. C Co conducted search opn vic of LZ #11 (ZB109013) 1/9 Cav (-) continued

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to screen and recon the AO for possible enemy movement along the boundary between 2d Bde and 101st Abn Div. At 0735 B Trp extracted the Apache team via YB743044. D Trp conducted route recon on the S route from KONTUM to UNION being forced to repair many cuts in roadway via ZA845882. CIDG long range patrol #9 was picked up and returned to POLEI KLENG via YB854959. Patrol #10 continued to operate.

o. 15 June A 2/5 Cav air assaulted into LZ's SUN, MOON and STAR while CIDG troops from PLEI MRONG established blocks at ZA165723, ZA179721, and ZA193723. B Co commenced search opns from ZA050713 and ZA046672 to LZ UNION. C Co conducted three plat opns vic of LZ's SMITH, JONES and SHERIDAN. Co D (-) conduct opns vic of LZ SWIFT and then air assaulted into LZ CUSTER leaving the Recon plat at SWIFT to make a night patrol to LZ CUSTER. A 2/12 Cav conducted three plat opns vic LZ #10. Co B continued to conduct plat opns via YAHOE, LZ #16 and FOB #2. C Co remained Bn reserve/reaction force at CONFEDERATE. One plat C Co assisted B 1/9 Cav in searching selected LZ's in the NW Sector of the AO. The plat was placed on the ground at YB825225, YB868185, YB952174 and YB907197 (See opn O/L #4). The hunter teams found and destroyed 4,000 lbs of rice. 1/9 Cav continued to screen the entire AO with emphasis on the NW sector. D Trp conducted route recon from KONTUM to UNION. Contact was maintained with the Apache team via YB8013.

p. 16 June A 2/5 commenced opns from LZ's SUN, MOON, and STAR while CIDG forces blocked at pre-arranged positions. B Co remained at UNION as the Bn reserve force. C Co conducted plat opns via LZ GRANT and BELUG RD. D Co (-) conducted search opns via LZ CUSTER. A 2/12 Cav continued to conduct search opns via YAHOE and FOB #2. C Co moved to YANK (POLEI DJERENG) with A 1/9 Cav. B 1/9 Cav continued hunter opns in the NW corner of the AO with a plat from A 2/12 Cav by searching the area via YB916194 and the B Trp ground element via YB855178. (See Opn O/L #7) C Trp continued to screen the AO. CIDG long range patrol #10 was picked up by A/C via ZA853513 and returned to POLEI KLENG.

q. 17 June A 2/5 air assaulted into LZ HILRY and conducted opns to the NE. B Co air assaulted into LZ CAROL, secured the LZ for C 1/77 Arty and Bn (-). C Co air assaulted to LZ NANCY and conducted search opns N toward LZ CAROL. A 2/12 Cav air assaulted into LZ BARN (ZA068447) to secure area for Bde CP. B Co air assaulted into LZ YANK and secured the LZ so Bn (-) and A 1/77 Arty could be lifted in from CONFEDERATE. 2d Bde CP conducted convoy movement from UNION to BARN. 1/9 Cav with elements of C 2/12 Cav conducted hunter opns via objs 8A, 9A, and 15A. B and C Trps continued to screen the AO. (See Opn O/L #5)

r. 18 June A 2/5 Cav conducted search opns to the N and NE of LZ HILRY. B Co conducted search opns via LZ CAROL. C Co conducted three plat search opns from LZ NANCY to LZ JAN. C Co (-) provided the Bn reserve/reaction force. A 2/12 Cav continued to secure the Bde CP at BARN. B Co air assaulted into LZ #1 and conducted search opns while a CIDG company attacked N from YA958435 to YA975482. 1/9 Cav continued to conduct hunter opns with C 2/12 Cav around POLEI DJERENG by placing troops on the ground to search out the area at LZ's 7A, 6A, 19A, 21A and 23A. B and C Trps continued to screen the entire AO. Effective 1800 1/9 Cav detached and placed OPCON to 1st Cav Div.

s. 19 June A 2/5 conducted three plat search opns SW of LZ HILRY and then relieved A 2/12 Cav at LZ BARN. B Co air assaulted plats into LZ's JOAN and JANE and conducted opns. C Co conducted search opns to the S, SW & W of LZ JAN. D Co (-) air assaulted plats into LZ's MARBLE and ANN and conducted opns. Recon plat made contact with one VC via ZA097492 killing him. A 2/12 Cav was relieved by A 2/5 Cav at LZ BARN and moved to LZ #1. B Co conducted search opns to the NW of LZ #1. At 0915 B Co located a weapons cache containing 2 B.R.'s, 2x60mm mtrs, 4 SMG's, 3 shot guns and a case of SA ammo via YA955524. C Co air assaulted from YANK to LZ #2 and conducted opns. A CIDG Co continued to operate in conjunction with 2/12 Cav.

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t. 20 Jun A 2/5 Cav continued to secure the Bde CP at BARN. B Co with the aid of an intelligence team questioned inhabitants of villages located at ZAO95 520, ZAO78473, ZAO49500, ZAO15499. C Co air assaulted three plats into LZ's BETTY, FLITH, and RITA while plats conducting opns closing back on LZ FLITH. A and C 2/12 Cav conducted plat search opns N and S of LZ #2. B Co conducted a plat air assault into LZ #7 and searched to YA929773 while B Co (-) conducted search opns vic LZ#1. CIDG conducted opns vic of LZ#1 in conjunction with B Co.

u. 21 June 2/5 Cav redeployed by A/C to KONTUM and assumed TF COLT missions. A 2/12 Cav continued to secure the Bde CP at BARN. B Co continued search opns vic of LZ#1. C Co closed into YANK and then conducted a raid vic YA815462 with CIDG elements. One CIDG body from a previous opns was recovered. Remainder of 2/12 Cav (-) closed into LZ YANK.

v. 22 June 2/12 Cav deployed to Camp Redcliff utilizing 15 CV-2 sorties. 2d Bde CP displaced back to base camp from BARN by motor convey. 2/5 Cav displaced to Base Camp from KONTUM by C-130.

w. During PAUL REVERE CIDG forces were incorporated into Brigade Opns as much as possible. The USSF Camp at DUC CO provide one long range company which operated between the CAMBODIAN border and 2/12 Cav. Artillery fire support and A/C lift support was given when required. (See Opn O/L #1).

x. During HOOKER I CIDG forces from POLEI KLENG and PLEI MRONG were extensively used to support the Bde operations. CIDG guides were furnished to each unit. Long range patrols with US personnel were sent out from POLEI KLENG. Apache teams from both PLEI KLENG were utilized to the fullest extent possible, in an effort to obtain intelligence information. (See opn O/L #6&8) CIDG elements were also used to screen flanks and to hold blocking positions while US forces drove the enemy into the blocks.

12. Results:

a. Results of PAUL REVERE 1-10 June:

(1) US Losses:

KIA	0	
WIA	6	
Non Battle	2	(2 Malaria)

(2) Enemy Losses:

KIA 4
WIA 0

661x7.62 rds, 4x9mm rds, 2 SKS carbines, 1 RPG 40mm AT MKT, 2,500 lbs rice, 2 grenades, 1 1/2 lb TNT, 5 packs, 2 entrenching tools, pistol belt, ammo pouch and canteen.

b. Results of HOOKER : 11-22 June:

(1) US Losses:

KIA	1	
WIA	1	
Non Battle	304	(121 Malaria)

(2) Enemy Losses:

KIA 4
WIA 1
CIA 1 (VCMS)

1 MAS 36, 2 US Carbines, 2 French 7.5 B.R.'s, 4 French SMG, 2 SMG, 2x60mm mtrs (US), 3 shot guns, Case Sa. ammo, ammo pouches & magazines.

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13. Administration and Logistics:

a. Administration: Administratively the greatest problems arose due to extended lines of communications with the Division rear and the forward Bns. This caused a temporary delay in distribution of administrative actions while enroute to the Bde rear and Bde Fwd. The rotation system for new arrivals was effective despite some communication difficulty. A problem developed on getting orders on personnel with replacements already on hand. This problem improved with a steady influx of replacement personnel with orders.

b. Logistics: Opn PAUL REVERE was logistically supported from psn OASIS (ZA124278). The 2d FSE and Bde trains were located at coordinates ZA124278. Services provided during opn PAUL REVERE consisted of two water points, a mobile laundry facility and a shower point. All services were located at psn OASIS except one water point that was placed at DUC CO. Opn HOOKER I was logistically supported from KONTUM with 2d FSE and the Bde trains co-located at coordinates AR706822. Services provided during opn HOOKER I were three water points, a mobile laundry facility and a shower point. All services were located in KONTUM except two water points which were located at PLEI MRONG and POLMI KIENG. A CV-2 courier service was initiated during opn HOOKER I. Air and ground LOC was used during both operations to resupply the 2d FSE.

14. Civil Affairs:

a. General - During Operations PAUL REVERE and HOOKER I, extensive civil affairs activities were conducted by 2d Brigade and the attached Civil Affairs team from 41st C. company, operating in PLEIKU and KONTUM Provinces. Emphasis was placed on obtaining intelligence sources and any information about Viet Cong activities in the area of operations. Extensive psy war (loudspeaker and leaflet) was used to induce restlessness and disloyalty among VC/VNC and NVA personnel. Chic' Hoi, Safe Conduct Passes, and picturesque photo printings were used during leaflet drops in Vietnamese, North Vietnamese, and Jarai languages. Ground psy war teams were utilized in conjunction with air loudspeakers to control the village people when entering villages, to exploit them by psychological means and to reduce or eliminate non-combatant casualties during offensive maneuvers.

b. Military Civic Action/Operations.

(1) During PAUL REVERE the CA team, and 2/12 Cav conducted sick call at 12 villages treating a total of 356 personnel.

(2) On Operation HOOKER I, the CA team, 2/12 Cav, and 2/5 Cav conducted sick call at 15 villages treating a total of 482 personnel.

c. Civil Government.

During an area study of THANH AN District, PLEIKU Province, information was obtained on friendly populated villages in the vicinity of district headquarters under district control. With the exception of the 5 villages at DUC CO under Special Forces control all other villages in the district were considered as unknown and the Rules of Engagement applied.

District controlled villages are as follows:

<u>Village/Hanlet</u>	<u>Families</u>	<u>Population</u>
Thanh Lac Village (ZA107293)		
Le Ngoc	25	118
Sanh Duc	93	456
Duc Ngiep	112	553

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<u>Village/Hamlet</u>	<u>Families</u>	<u>Population</u>
Thanh An Village (ZA130294)		
Duc Klanh	29	107
Duc Hung	359	1805
Thanh Duc	133	670
Sung Thien	52	216
Gia Thien	119	560
Thanh Binh Village (ZA090305)		
Thanh Gia	64	291
Thanh Binh	65	314

d. Psy War Operations.

(1) Psy War was used extensively by the brigade on tactical maneuvers and in conjunction with plans of 24th Special Tactical Zone to implement their program of psychological warfare directed at the VC/VMC and NVA army. The most significant response was the defection of 110 VMC to the PLEI KLENG CIDG Camp as a result of a taped loudspeaker mission conducted by the 2d Brigade on 16 June.

(2) The following psy ops missions were conducted by 2d Brigade during PAUL REVERE and HOOKER I:

(a) Three (3) loudspeaker and leaflet drops were made on 8 June, covering area YA9040-E-ZA1040-S-ZA1030-W-YA9030-N-YA9040 at 0800, 1000 and 1730 hrs. The loudspeaker theme was "Move to your villages and remain there; stay in your homes at night; appeal for VC and NVA to give up." A total of 160,000 leaflets were dropped. The leaflets were Chieu Hoi, Safe Conduct Passes and picturesque with no writing. Jarai and Vietnamese language was used.

(b) One loudspeaker and leaflet drop was made at 1200 hrs on the date above, using the same theme as above but in the following area: coordinates YA9844-E-ZA0644-S-ZA1030-W-YA9829-N-YA9844. Forty thousand (40,000) leaflets were dropped.

(c) On 091000 June 66 a loudspeaker mission was flown in the following area: YA9040-E-ZA1040-S-ZA1030-W-YA9030-N-YA9040. Theme: "Move to your villages and stay there; Appeal for VC and NVA to give up." No leaflets were dropped during this mission. Loudspeaker language was Jarai and Vietnamese.

(d) S-5, 2/12 Cav and a 4 man ground psy war team moved with G, 2/12 to the following villages and gave speeches concerning Allied Forces' efforts to halt the VC and aid Chieu Hoi ralliers; PLEI MNANG (YA962422), PLEI DEL (YA955434), PLEI YA PON #2 (YA958368), PLEI KAK YUT (YA968367), PLEI DAK TOL (YA955366), PLEI RACH YGE (YA957352), PLEI RACH TO (YA951351).

(e) Five thousand (5,000) leaflets were dropped on 121300 June 66 covering the following area: YA9494-E-YA9594-S-YA9592-W-9402-N-YA9494. Theme: GVN and Allied Forces operating in the area, give your support." Language was in Jarai and Vietnamese.

(f) 2/12 Cav issued 800 Montagnard comic books during a sick call at PLEI KLENG (ZA026936) on 13 June 66.

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(g) On 161300-1500 June a loudspeaker mission was flown over XA DO DINH (ZA16042) and TRI DAN (ZA1506). Theme of the mission was "Encourage populace to support U.S. operations in the area and to report VC weaknesses." In conjunction with that, a loudspeaker mission was flown during the same time upon request of the SF Camp at POLEI KLENG from coordinates ZL015987 to ZAO27935 and from coordinates YA870840 to YA930800. This broadcast encouraged the Montagnard in the area to go to POLEI KLENG and get living quarters, food and a job with pay. The language of both tapes was Jarai. On 201615 June 66, USSF Camp at POLEI KLENG reported that 110 refugees had turned themselves in as a result of Psy War broadcasts by 2d Brigade during operation HOOKER "I". The refugees stated they were from POLEI BAR GOK (YA955953), approximately 8 kilometers west of POLEI KLENG. Of the 110 refugees, 20 were of military age and in good health.

(h) Ten thousand (10,000) leaflets were dropped in POLEI KLENG Valley (ZAO26936) on 171400 June 66. Theme was "GVN and Allied Superiority, NVA Deception." The language was Jarai.

(i) On 181400 June a loudspeaker and leaflet drop took place in POLEI KLENG Valley. Theme for the two were "GVN/Allied Superiority, Safe Conduct Passes, NVA Deception" and telling refugees to go to POLEI KLENG for food and work. Fifteen thousand (15,000) leaflets were dropped. Loudspeaker language was Jarai. A mission was also flown in conjunction with the above coordinates YA5098 to YA5004, YA4598 to YA4504. People were also told "If you shoot at our aircraft we will destroy your homes." Picturesque leaflets were used.

(j) Safe Conduct Passes were dropped at 181400 June 66 for 2/12 Cav at coordinates YA9752. Amount of leaflets dropped, unknown.

(k) Two psy war missions were flown on 191400 June 66. One leaflet drop of undetermined number was conducted in target area YA8148-YA8448, YA8144-YA8444. The theme was "NVA government betrayal, Allied power." Pictorial leaflets were directed at Montagnard, not to shoot at aircraft. The second was a loudspeaker and leaflet drop at coordinates YA558-YA5596, YA5088-YA5098. Theme of this one was "Allied Superiority, Death to NVA away from land of their ancestors and Safe Conduct Passes." Fifteen thousand (15,000) leaflets were dropped. The loudspeaker language was Jarai.

(l) A loudspeaker mission was flown 201400 June 66 at coordinates YA6088-YA6098, YA5588 - YA5598. Theme: Surrender now, turn in your weapons for reward, and deception by NLF and NVN government. Language was in North Vietnamese.

(m) Sixty-thousand (60,000) Chiey Hoi and Safe Conduct leaflets were used to pack in arty shells for dissemination in the AO, trying to avoid wooded areas because of the density of the canopy. Six (6) coordinates and H&I's were fired, they were:

<u>No</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No Rds</u>
KA743	ZA091578	20 June 66	3
KA746	ZA081555		3
KA005	ZA111511		6
KA750	ZA123527		2
KA751	YA960445	21 June 66	4
KA752	YA957433	21 June 66	6
H & I		20 - 21 June 66	10

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15. Commanders Analysis:

a. Opn PAUL REVERE proved that there were no large enemy units preparing to attack DUC CO nor were units moving through the area to attack other post. The operation did find evidence of large enemy forces once in the area but indications were that they infiltrated back across the border in small groups along multiple routes. A well used trail network was found paralleling the border with many off shoots leading across the border.

b. Opn HOOKER I was to seek out possible enemy staging areas or supply routes leading to the DAK TO area. After extensive search opns and extensive air reconnaissance little evidence of any enemy units or major installations was found. Bunkers, trails, foxholes, a rice cache and a weapons cache were the only indications of enemy activity. It is felt the only contact was made with local VC trail watches or guides. Extensive use was made of USSF apache teams in an effort to find major enemy routes in advance. CIDG long range patrols were also used to enhance the Bde's efforts.

b. Lessons Learned: No new lessons learned were discovered.

c. Problem Areas:

(1) Problem: Control of airfields when more than one major unit and both fixed wing and helicopter aircraft operate from the same field.

Discussion: On 3 Jun 66 a request was placed to 2d FSE for control personnel to operate the airstrip at DUC CO. Strip was being used by 2d Bde elements, 3/25 Inf Div elements, USSF/CIDG elements. Arty units were also positioned around the south side of the field to support opns both north and south of DUC CO. 2d FSE stated Spt Cnd had the equipment to operate the field but had transferred their control personnel to 11th Avn Gp for control work at the Golf Course at Camp Radcliff. A temporary control team of Pathfinders was provided by the 227th AHB, but their capabilities are overextended controlling more than one LZ. Pathfinders were not equiped to operate fixed wing airstrips.

Recommendations: Div reevaluate the control personnel and equipment requirement. Return both to control of one unit and assign responsibility for control of fixed wing airfield and all traffic using the field.

(2) Problem: Establishment of a responsive clothing issue system for units operating away from Camp Radcliff.

Discussion: Lifelines submitted for clothing during opns PAUL REVERE and HOOKER I required 3-5 days for supply action to be accomplished.

Recommendations: That a responsive system of clothing and footwear replacement be established to provide priority to the greatest need, troops in combat operations. Torn or damaged clothing increases the amount of exposed skin to mosquito bites.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Thomas B. Cotton

THOMAS B COTTON
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

ANNEXES:

- I - PAUL REVERE 1-7 June O/L #1
- II - PAUL REVERE 8-9 June O/L #2
- III - HOOKER I 10-16 June O/L #3, 2/5 Cav

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ANNEXES:

- IV - HOOKER I 10-16 June O/L #4, 2/12 Cav
- V - HOOKER I 17-22 June O/L #5
- VI - HOOKER I Apache Teams O/L #6
- VII - HOOKER I 1/9 Cav & Plat 2/12 Cav O/L #7
- VIII - HOOKER I CIDG Patrol O/L #8
- IX - HOOKER I Intel O/L #9
- X - HOOKER I Intel O/L #10

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