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# Operation Pegasus: The Relief of Khe Sanh

31 March - 15 April 1968

Edited by  
Thomas F. Pike

Report No. MACJ3/BD/91B



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM  
APO San Francisco 96308

3 JUN 1968

AVII-MH

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3-32)(K-1)

THRU: Commanding General  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO San Francisco 96602

TO: Commanding General  
United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam  
APO San Francisco 96222

1. (U) Name of Operation: OPERATION PEGASUS
2. (U) Date of Operation: 310801H Mar 68 to 150800H Apr 68
3. (U) Location: Northwest quadrant of Quang Tri Province, I CTZ
4. (U) Control Headquarters: Provisional Corps Vietnam
5. (U) Major Unit Commanders:
  - a. Provisional Corps Vietnam LTG William B. Rosson
  - b. Provisional Corps Vietnam Artillery BG Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr.
  - c. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) MG John J. Tolson III
6. (C) Task Organization:
  - a. Provisional Corps Vietnam
    - HQ Co, PCV
    - Military Intelligence Det (Prov)
    - 33d Chemical Det
    - PI Fld Det (Prov)
    - Signal Det (Prov)
    - 31st Military History Det

NOTES: This report REGRADED - FOR  
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6 months after  
completion of operation (15 Oct 68).

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(1) Attached:

559th Engr Det (Terrain)  
172d Engr Det (Utilities)  
552d TC Co (CAR)(-)

(2) Area Support:

63d Signal Bn  
Aviation Co (Prov)  
Co A, 504th MP Bn

b. Provisional Corps Vietnam Artillery

HQB, Corps Artillery  
108th Arty Gp (-)  
2d Bn, 94th Arty (175 Gun)  
8th Bn, 4th Arty (175 Gun) (-)  
1st Bn, 44th Arty (AW)(GS) (-)  
Btry G, 65th Arty (M55) (-)

c. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

(1) 1st Bde

1st Bn, 8th Cav  
1st Bn, 12th Cav  
2d Bn, 19th Arty (105 How)(DS)  
B Btry, 1st Bn, 30th Arty (155 How)  
A Co, 8th Engr Bn (DS)  
2 Sqds, 25th Inf Plat (Scout Dogs)  
Det, Pathfinder  
Det, E Co, 52d Inf (LRP)  
Tn, 13th Sig Bn  
Tn, IPW/CI, 191st MI Det  
Tn, 245th PSYOPS Co  
Tn, 5th Weather Sqdn  
Plat, 545th MP Co  
FSE

(2) 2d Bde

1st Bn, 5th Cav  
2d Bn, 5th Cav  
2d Bn, 12th Cav

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- 1st Bn, 7th Arty (105 How)(DS)
- A Btry, 1st Bn, 30th Arty (15 How)
- B Co, 8th Engr Bn (DS)
- Sqd, 25th Inf Flt (Scout Dogs)
- Det, Pathfinder
- Det, E Co, 52d Inf (LRP)
- Tn, 13th Sig Bn
- Tn, IPW/CI, 191st MI Det
- Tn, 245th PSYOPS Co
- Tn, 5th Weather Sctn
- Plat, 545th MP Co
- FSE

(3) 3d Bde

- 1st Bn, 7th Cav
- 2d Bn, 7th Cav
- 5th Bn, 7th Cav
- 1st Bn, 21st Arty (105 How)(DS)
- C Btry, 1st Bn, 30th Arty (155 How)
- C Co, 8th Engr Bn (DS)
- 2 Sqds, 34th Inf Plat (Scout Dogs)
- Det, Pathfinder
- Det, E Co, 52d Inf (LRP)
- Tn, 13th Sig Bn
- Tn, IPW/CI, 191st MI Det
- Tn, 245th PSYOPS Co
- Tn, 5th Weather Sctn
- Plat, 545th MP Co
- FSE

(4) 1st Marine Regiment

- 1st Bn, 1st Marines
- 2d Bn, 1st Marines
- 2d Bn, 3d Marines
- 1st Bn, 11th Marine Arty (Rein)(DS)
- 3-105 Btrys
- 1-155 Btry
- 1-4.2" Mortar Btry
- 2-Plat Tanks (on call)(3d Mar Div)
- 1-Plat, AT Co (ONTCS)(3d Mar Div)
- Co A (-), 1st Engr Bn (1st Mar Div)
- Co A (-), 1st Shore Party Bn (1st Mar Div)
- 1-Shore Party (3d Mar Div)
- Co A (-), 1st Motor Transport Bn (1st Mar Div)

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- (5) 26th Marine Regiment  
1st Bn, 26th Marines  
2d Bn, 26th Marines  
3d Bn, 26th Marines  
1st Bn, 9th Marines  
FOB 3  
1st Bn, 13th Marine Arty (Rein) (DS)  
3-105 Btrys  
1-155 Btry  
1-4, 2" Mortar Btry  
Co A (-), 3d AT Bn (ONTOS)  
Plat, Co B, 3d Tank Bn  
Co B, 3d Recon Bn  
Coordination:  
37th ARVN Ranger Bn
- (6) Division Artillery  
HIB, 1 Cav Div (Airmobile) Arty  
2d Bn, 20th Arty (ARA) (GS)  
1st Bn, 30th Arty (-) (155 How) (GS)  
A Btry, 1st Bn, 83d Arty (8") (GSR)  
B Btry, 1st Bn, 83d Arty (8") (GSR)  
1st Bn, 44th Arty (AW) (GSR) (rotation of btrys)  
G Btry, 65th Arty (155) (GSR) (rotation of secs)  
6th Bn, 33d Arty (105 How) (GSR)
- (7) Division Troops  
HHC (-), 1 Cav Div (Airmobile)  
2d Bn, 9th Cav  
1st Bn, 9th Cav  
8th Engr Bn (-)  
11th Avn Gp  
Det (-), 5th Weather Sdn  
13th Sig Bn (-)  
545th MP Co (-)  
371st RR Co  
191 MI Det (-)  
Co D (-), 52d Inf (LRP)  
184th CIL Plat (-)  
14th MI Det (-)  
(8) Coordination:  
3d ARVN Airborne Task Force

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3d ARVN Abn Bn  
6th ARVN Abn Bn  
6th ARVN Abn Bn  
C Btry, 1st Bn, 20th Arty (10-12 Apr)(DS)

(9) Engineer Task Force

Command & Control Element, 3th Engr Bn  
11th Engr Bn, FIF  
Navy Mobile Construction Bn 5

d. Task Force KILO (3d Mar Div)

TF HQ  
2d Bn, 4th Marines  
3d Sqdn, 5th Cav (-) (USA)  
C Co, 2d Bn, 34th Armor  
Co A, 1st Bn, 502d Abn (101 Abn Div)

Coordination:

1st Bn, 2d ARVN Regt  
3d Bn, 1st ARVN Regt

e. Supporting Forces

7th Air Force  
7th Fleet  
1st Marine Air Wing  
U.S. Army Support Command, DaNang  
Force Logistics Command, DaNang  
Naval Support Activity, DaNang  
1st ARVN ALC, DaNang  
67th Medical Gp  
18th Surgical Hospital  
22d Surgical Hospital  
571st Med Det (Air Ambulance)  
NSA Hospital, DaNang  
3d Marine Med Bn (-)  
Co B, 1st Marine Med Bn  
Co C, 1st Marine Med Bn  
Nguyen TRI PHONG Station Hospital, HUE  
DUY TAN General Hospital, DaNang

7. (U) Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery

(1) Forces: (See Task Organization)

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(2) Employment and effectiveness:

(a) Two thousand four hundred twenty-two (2422) artillery fire missions were fired in support of Operation PEGASUS. During the period 310301H Mar - 150800H Apr, 31,546 rounds were expended in support of the operation. Five hundred sixty-three (563) missions were observed fire.

(b) One hundred two (102) tubes of artillery supported the operation from within the 1 Cav Div (Airmobile)'s AO, while an additional 39 tubes of 105mm howitzer and 16 tubes of 175mm gun artillery supported from outside the area.

(c) The lack of a suitable road network and the capability of the aerial supply system were major considerations in the employment of artillery. Even with these limitations, 26 battery-size moves were executed within the AO during the course of the operation.

(d) Although the margin of fire superiority had to come from air support, the air-artillery mix was effective.

b. Air Support:

(1) Arclight: Forty-five B-52 strikes, with a total of 269 aircraft were flown in support of the operation. Nineteen of these strikes were in direct support of the Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) or in the immediate vicinity.

(2) Tactical Air: One thousand six hundred twenty-five (1625) tactical air strikes were delivered by Marine, Air Force and Navy aircraft during the 15 day period. Sorties were flown as follows:

(a) Marines	650
(b) Air Force	463
(c) Navy	436
(d) Service unknown	57
	-----
Total	1625

(3) Supply of Khe Sanh: Air Force C-123 and C-130 aircraft delivered 343 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh Combat Base by air drop or ground parachute delivery during the period 31 Mar - 8 Apr. C-123's landed and off-loaded 132 passengers during the period 31 Mar - 4 Apr. The KSCB airstrip was open to all types of aircraft on 9 April.

8. (C) Intelligence:

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## a. Area of Operations

(1) Weather. Transitional weather between the Northeast and Southwest Monsoons prevailed during Operation PEGASUS. Low stratus and ground fog characterized the late evening and early morning hours with ceilings to 500 feet and visibility less than 1/2 miles. Ceilings lifted to 2500 feet and were broken to occasionally scattered for the remainder of the day. Visibility at ground level was usually five miles during the day, while haze restricted visibility from the air to four miles. Although precipitation did fall, there was no significant accumulation. Temperature ranged from a high of 98 degrees to a low of 67 degrees. Weather did not seriously hinder operations for any period of more than 12 hours.

## (2) Terrain

(a) Observation and Fields of Fire. The multi-canopied forests and the steep mountains restricted observation and direct fire and hindered the registration of indirect fire weapons. The valley floors allow fair observation and fields of fire except for local erosion features and the dense undergrowth along stream beds. The rolling hills and plains allow good observation and direct fire, limited only by occasional dense forests.

(b) Cover and Concealment. Both are excellent in the rugged mountains and in the multi-canopied forests. Local erosional features, dense undergrowth along stream beds, and occasional dense forests provide good cover and concealment in the rolling hills and plains.

(c) Obstacles. Steep slopes and dense undergrowth are major obstacles to movement in the rugged mountains. Rivers and streams remain fordable throughout the year except when channelized and during periods of abnormal precipitation.

(d) Key Terrain. The high ground along Highway 9 and the terrain overlooking the Khe Sanh Combat Base is key terrain.

(e) Avenues of Approach. Highway 9 provides an excellent avenue of movement in an East-West direction for vehicles and heavy equipment. The DA KRONG, the BAO QUAN, and the QUANG TRI River Valley complex provide good avenues into and through the area from the northwest, east, and southeast. Highway 921, an excellent avenue of movement, and its junction with the XE PON River Valley provide a very good approach from the west.

(f) Cross-country Mobility. The rugged mountains and dense jungle forests restrict all vehicle movement. Foot movement is generally restricted to existing trails, intermediate ridge lines, and stream beds. Valley floors and the plains permit fair to poor movement of tracked vehicles and poor movement of wheeled vehicles. Movement in the valley and on the rolling plains is restricted by erosion and dense vegetation.

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B. Enemy Situation Prior to Operation PEGASUS

(1) General

(a) Since January 1968, the enemy had attempted to isolate the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Movement of friendly troops outside their perimeter wire became hazardous at all times. The enemy gained control of much of the high ground around KSCB and could bring effective mortar and artillery fire upon the base at any time. The only overland resupply route, Highway 9, had been interdicted by the enemy and had been closed from the ROCK PILE (480 XD 9856) to KHE SANH forcing all resupply to be made by air. Heavy anti-aircraft fire frequently restricted supply missions, especially during periods of low visibility. LANG VEI SPECIAL FORCES CAMP (480 XD 7835), the only obstacle denying the enemy use of Route 9 from the west, was overrun by the enemy on 7 February, thus leaving an excellent approach route from the west into the Combat Base at Khe Sanh. Trenches had been constructed from Route 9 to the perimeter wire of the base, and reports of tunneling activity, under the base itself, were reported. (SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD PROVED THE REPORTS OF TUNNELING TO BE WRONG.)

(b) The enemy had been observed constructing weapons positions in preparation for an assault against Khe Sanh Combat Base. Heavy concentrations of mortar and rocket positions, anti-aircraft and automatic weapons positions, and strong points were sighted to the north, south, and west. According to various intelligence reports and counter-battery radar readings, the CO ROC Mountain Area, located to the southwest, vicinity 480 XD 431, had become a major supply and artillery base. Attacks by fire against Khe Sanh were a daily occurrence with a record of 1,300 rounds (estimate) being received on 23 February. Although shelling continued, the number of rounds received in a day began to taper off in the week prior to Operation PEGASUS.

(c) Evidence of the enemy buildup was also indicated by an increase in the number of intelligence reports and sightings of enemy artillery and armor in the Khe Sanh area. One returnee stated that in December 1967, he had seen 20 artillery pieces being towed on a road in LAOS only a few miles from the RVN border. Another individual stated that in February 1968, he had seen approximately 170 vehicles on Highway 9, again, only a few miles from the border. On 21 February, an aerial observer sighted self-propelled artillery north of Khe Sanh, and on 25 February, an aircraft engaged three self-propelled artillery guns northwest of KSCB. On 3 March, an aerial observer sighted a large mobile gun with a tube approximately 30 feet long mounted on a tracked-vehicle. On that same day, a BTR-40 was identified by an imagery interpreter. On 18 March, airstrikes reportedly destroyed ten occupied 57mm anti-aircraft positions only a few miles southwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base.

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## (2) Strength

(a) The first indication of a major thrust against the combat base occurred with the movement of the 304th NVA Division in December 1968, into an area that had normally been the AC of one or possibly two regiments of the 325C NVA Division. This brought the total enemy force in the vicinity of the base to 11 to 20 thousand men in two NVA divisions and one to three armor battalions. Attacks by fire against the base increased, and new weapons positions and anti-aircraft sites appeared on a daily basis as the enemy surrounded Khe Sanh. An attack appeared eminent, and only after elements of the 20th Regiment, 325C Division were sent to Hue, during the Battle of Hue City, did the question arise as to the enemy's real intentions in this area.

(b) Heavy bombardment from B-52's, Tac Air, and artillery began to take their toll as the enemy build-up continued. Refugees from the DEU tribe reported seeing hundreds of NVA bodies littering a hillside, as a result of these strikes. Frequent probes that often resulted in heavy contact were made against the perimeter wire of KSCB, also producing many enemy casualties. Intelligence estimates prior to the initiation of Operation PEGASUS revealed that approximately 14,000 NVA, including 16 maneuver battalions, remained in the area. (See para 12g)

(3) Disposition. Enemy units surrounded the combat base with regimental-size elements on at least three sides. The bulk of the 304th NVA Division was positioned to the south and southeast. The 101D Regiment, 325C NVA Division, was believed to be located to the west of KSCB, and the 95C Regiment, 325C NVA Division was carried to the north and northwest of the friendly installation. Numerous intelligence reports fixed artillery positions to the north and south of Khe Sanh. The 68th Artillery Regiment, 304th NVA Division, was believed to be located in the south in support of its division, while elements of the 164th Artillery Regiment were considered to be in the north, in support of the 325C NVA Division. The armored element was unlocated, but was probably somewhere to the west of Lang Vei.

## c. Situation During Operation PEGASUS

(1) General. Operation PEGASUS began on 310801 March 68, with extremely light opposition as Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMF) moved from Ca Lu along Highway 9 toward the Khe Sanh Combat Base. The operation evidently caught the enemy by surprise as large caches of weapons and supplies were found in relatively insecure areas. Enemy opposition was disorganized, and coordination between the enemy infantry units and their support elements (artillery, rockets, mortars, etc.) was virtually non-existent. Intensity of attacks by fire in the Khe Sanh base declined as the enemy withdrew. The speed of the withdrawal was apparent by the large number of enemy bodies and weapons found.

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(2) Significant Contacts. Contacts with enemy units were characterized by sporadic, but intense, engagements with what appeared to be remaining rear guard elements. On 5 April, the 1st Bn, 9th Marines became involved in the first major contact of the operation. This occurred after the Marines had captured Hill 471, located three kilometers south of KSCB. Although artillery fire accounted for 30 enemy KIA during the initial assault of the hill, the Marines counted 122 more NVA killed after a counter-attack by what is believed to have been elements of the 7th and 9th Bns, 66th Regt, 304th NVA Division. On that same day, the 1st Bn, 9th Cavalry engaged several squad-size groups of enemy further south of the base and killed 53 NVA. On 6 April, the 37th ARVN Ranger Bn, with the aid of an artillery and air attack, produced 70 NVA KIA. Also on 6 April, the 2d Bn, 26th Marines engaged an unknown-size enemy force in heavy contact that resulted in 48 NVA killed. On 8 April, the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force came under a heavy ground attack from an estimated battalion-size force. Eighty NVA were killed. The only other major contact that occurred during Operation PEGASUS was on 14 April when elements of the 3d Bn, 26th Marines assaulted Hill 881 North and encountered an estimated NVA battalion. Artillery and tactical air supported the attacking Marines in a contact that cost the enemy 106 dead and one NVA prisoner from the 8th Independent Bn (probably the 8th Bn, 29th Regt, 325C Div). (See para 12 f)

(3) Strength and Disposition.

(a) As the operation progressed, it became evident that the 304th NVA Div was the only division remaining in the Khe Sanh area. The 325C Division had withdrawn immediately before the initiation of the operation. Prisoners of War captured from the 304th Division and from elements of the 325C Division indicated that the 325C Division had moved from Khe Sanh, but there was no agreement among the prisoners as to its destination. The individuals captured from the 325C Division apparently had been left in the area as guides and filler personnel for the 304th.

(b) One PW captured from the 8th Independent Bn stated that his unit had been attached to the 29th Regiment, 325C Division. The prisoner said his battalion remained in the area when the 7th and 9th Bns went to Hue. A document captured on 4 April identified the 3d Co, 8th Bn, 29th Regt, east of Khe Sanh, thus supporting the prisoners statement.

(c) Eleven of the 21 individuals interrogated identified elements of three regiments of the 304th Division. The remaining prisoners were either from units that could not be further identified with parent organizations, or were from training units that had recently been sent into South Vietnam as replacements. Elements of the 204th Division, the 330th Division, and the 4th Division were each identified by one prisoner, while the 308th Division was identified by two prisoners. These

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individuals were probably trained by the identified divisions and then sent south as replacements.

#### d. Enemy Situation at the Completion of Operation PEGASUS

Although the total enemy strength in the area was reduced by the movement of the 325C Division out of the PEGASUS AO, the arrival of replacement personnel actually produced an increase in the strengths of the units within the 304th Division. Considering the enemy confirmed losses of 1,325 men and the displacement of the 325C Division, against the input of replacements, the total enemy strength in the operational area at the completion of PEGASUS was estimated to be 10,350 NVA.

#### e. Intelligence Gained

##### (1) 325C NVA Division

(a) The 325C NVA Division had moved south from the Khe Sanh area to the B-3 Front (II CTZ). Its withdrawal from the area began about one week before the initiation of Operation PEGASUS.

(b) The 8th Bn, 29th Regt, 325C Div, which had been located in the Khe Sanh area as a part of the 325C Division, is now believed to be an independent battalion operating between KCSB and Ca Lu. The 29th Regt, 325C Div, which is located west of Hue, is believed to contain three battalions: the 7th and 9th Bns, and a new 8th Bn which infiltrated from North Vietnam in early January 1968.

##### (2) 304th NVA Division

(a) On the basis of documents and interrogation reports, the 24th Regt, 304th Div, which had been carried near Hue, is now believed to be located in the Khe Sanh area. (At least two bns of the 24th Regt did participate in the Battle of Hue; but apparently returned to the Khe Sanh area sometime in late February or March.)

(b) Although the 57th Regt is organic to the 304th Div, according to unit history, only one prisoner (from a transportation group) stated that the 57th Regt was subordinate to the 304th Div. He stated that the 304th Div contained four regiments: the 9th, 24th, 57th, and 66th. However, none of the 11 prisoners captured from the 304th Div stated that the 57th Regt was an element of the division. Although the 57th is still carried on the enemy order of battle as subordinate to the 304th Div, its status is questionable. If it is subordinate to the 304th Div, it is either a fourth infantry regiment, or it is also known as (AKA) the 24th Regt.

(c) Five prisoners gave unit designations that were

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either different from the known order of battle or else recognized as training divisions located in North Vietnam. Although infiltration numbers for these units are not known, it is believed that two battalion-size groups from the 308th Div, and possibly one battalion-size group from the 330th Div came into the Khe Sanh area to supply replacements to the 304th Div.

(3) 78th Artillery Regiment. Documents picked up in the Khe Sanh area identified the 78th Artillery Regt. NVA order of battle indicates this unit was subordinate to the 325 NVA GARRISON Division in North Vietnam. This is the first indication of the 78th Artillery Regt in South Vietnam.

(4) Anti-Aircraft Artillery. Numerous reports emanating from the Khe Sanh area concerning NVA use of AAA weapons were received before Operation PEGASUS began. Although pilots claimed to have seen air bursts and imagery interpreters revealed AAA weapons and emplacements in the area, no confirmation of the presence of these weapons was made until 6 April. On that day Co C, 1st Bn, 12th Cav discovered one partially destroyed 57mm AAA piece and 200 rounds of 57mm ammunition. This weapon was produced by the Soviet Union and was the first 57mm AAA weapon captured in the Republic of Vietnam.

(5) Armor. Armor had been confirmed in the Khe Sanh area since 7 February when seven PT-76 tanks were destroyed in an enemy coordinated Infantry/Armor assault on the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. Although armor was used in direct support of this attack, there was a lack of the coordinated use of armor either in a direct or general support role during Operation PEGASUS. Armor elements evaded contact with FVMAF units throughout the operation. Several tanks were sighted and engaged, but only one is known to have been destroyed during the operation.

9. (U) Mission: Provisional Corps Vietnam, reinforced by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Task Force, attacked to open Highway 9 from Ca Lu west to Khe Sanh Combat Base; link up with KSCB; and destroy enemy forces in the northwest portion of the PCV zone.

10. (U) Concept of Operation:

a. 3d Marine Division initiated a deception plan by launching an attack at 300600H March 68, generally north toward the DMZ along the Gio Linh Coastal Plains northeast of Dong Ha (TF KILO).

b. 1st Cav Div (Airmobile)(Reinforced) attacked on 1 April 1968, in coordination with the 3d ARVN Abn TF, in a combined ground and heli-borne operation, to clear and open Highway 9 from Ca Lu west to Khe Sanh Combat Base and to destroy the enemy confronting the base.

11. (U) Execution: Inclosure 1

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## 12. (c) Results

### a. General

(1) Operation PEGASUS' succeeded in reopening Highway 9 and relieving the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Although contact had not been as heavy as anticipated, the enemy suffered the loss of 1,325 personnel in the 15 day operation. The capture of large caches of ammunition and supplies undoubtedly handicapped the enemy and curtailed any operational plans in the Khe Sanh area.

(2) The enemy changed from an offensive posture to a defensive attitude as he was forced into mountain retreats and west into LAOS. As the friendly units contested the control of the area, the enemy was denied the initiative to launch an attack against the combat base without a major regrouping of his force.

### b. Enemy Personnel Losses

	<u>HVA</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Killed	1302	2	1304
Captured	18	2	20
Hoi Chanh	1		1
Totals	<u>1321</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1325</u>

### c. Enemy Material Losses

Individual Weapons	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>
U.S. M-1 Rifle	6	
U.S. M-1 Carbine	15	
U.S. M-2 Carbine	3	2
U.S. Browning Automatic Rifle	6	
U.S. M-14	1	
U.S. M-16	18	
U.S. Pistol cal .45	5	
U.S. M-72 LAW	5	
U.S. M-79 Grenade Launcher	4	
Sub-machine gun (Not further identified)	3	
Shotgun 12 gauge	1	
SKS	149	
AK-47	95	
AK-50	8	

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Carbines (Not further identified)	18	
Mausers (Not further identified)	2	
Soviet 7.62mm Pistol	1	
MAT-49 SMG (Not further identified)	1	
Flare Pistols (Not further identified)	2	
Sniper Rifles (Not further identified)	4	
Individual Weapons (Not broken down)	208	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	355	2

Crew Served Weapons	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>
U.S. M-60 Machine gun	2	
Machine gun cal .30	7	8
Machine gun cal .50		5
RPD Light Machine gun	29	
Light Machine gun (Not further identified)	4	
Heavy Machine Gun 12.7mm	3	
Rocket Launcher B-50mm	2	2
Rocket Launcher RPG-2 (B-40)	23	
Rocket Launcher RPG-7 (B-41)	2	
Recoilless Rifle 57mm	2	
Recoilless Rifle 90mm	1	
Recoilless Rifle 106mm		2
Recoilless Rifle (Not further identified)	1	
Mortar 60mm	4	
Mortar 82mm	6	10
Mortar 4.2 in		5
Mortar Tube (Not further identified)	4	1
Crew Served Weapons (Not broken down)	84	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	174	33

Anti-Aircraft Artillery	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>
Anti-Aircraft Artillery 12.7mm	2	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	2	0

Vehicles	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>
Tank PT-76		1
Trucks	1	4
One-Quarter Ton		2
Trailers		4
Bus (Civilian Type)		1
Bicycles	3	
Motor Scooter	1	

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## Ammunition

### Captured

### Destroyed

Cal .30	2 Cases plus	24,490	
Cal .30 Carbine		2,000	
7.62mm		68,850	100 rds
Cal .45		5,000	
Cal .50	140 Cases plus	8,515	10 boxes
12.7mm		1,700	
Small Arms (Not broken down)		3,932	
M-79		80	
3.5in			10 boxes
B-40		879	6 rds
90mm RR		5	
Rockets (Not further identified)			15 rkte
60mm Mortar		2,795	400 rds
81mm Mortar		20	
82mm Mortar	4 Cases plus	1,493	110 rds
105mm Arty			4 rds
155mm Arty	3 Pallots		
Mines, grenades & Claymores	370 Cases plus	6,888	73
TNT	1 Crate plus	1,180 lbs	120 lbs

## Equipment and Supplies

### Captured

### Destroyed

Gas Masks		58	2
Canned Foods	132 Cases plus	280	
Radios			
US		6	
Chicom		1	
NVA		1	
Not Specified		3	
Field Phones			
US		3	
Not Specified		6	
Antenna (RC-292)		2	
Packs (NVA)		63	2
Mess Kits		112	
Picks and Shovels		400	
Rubber CBR Suit		1	
Radio Repair Kits		4	
Ice Chest		1	

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d. Friendly Personnel Losses

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	41	51	33	125
WIA	207	459	187	853
MIA	5	0	0	5
Total	253	510	220	983

e. Enemy Losses Attributed To:

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	640	404	260	1304
CAPTURED	6	9	6	21
IND WEAPONS	404	69	84	557
C/S WEAPONS	160	31	16	207

f. Prisoners of War Interrogated During PEGASUS

<u>Date</u>	<u>POC</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Unit</u>
5 Apr	XD 834347	HAI NINH TRANG	1st Co, Yen Tu Transportation Gp
5 Apr	XD 834347	DOAN VAN SINH*	7th Co, 5th Bn, 2d Regt, 304th Div
5 Apr	XD 848407	BUI VAN TINH	3d Co, 3d Bn, 3d Regt, 304th Div
5 Apr	XD 848407	HOANG VAN KHOI	2d Co, 7th Bn, 66th Regt, 304th Div
5 Apr	XD 848407	HOANG HIEU TOI	8th Co, 9th Bn, 66th Regt, 304th Div
5 Apr	XD 840400	DINH VAN THANG	12th Co, 9th Bn, 66th Regt, 304th Div
6 Apr	XD 964398	NINH VAN LIEV	11th Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt, 304th Div
7 Apr	XD 848394	DANG TUAT	3d Co, 7th Bn, 66th Regt, 304th Div
7 Apr	XD 870370	NGUYEN DAC HOA	14th Bn, 4th Regt, 408th Div
8 Apr	XD 775378	BUI VAN BINH	23d Co, 24th Arty Bn, 304th Div
8 Apr	XD 815383	NGUYEN VAN MAIN	2d Co, 85th Bn, 2d Regt, 204th Div
8 Apr	Khe Sanh	TRINH VAN KHUONG	7th Bn, 3d Regt, 304th Div
8 Apr	Khe Sanh	NGUYEN VAN HOA	14th Co, 7th Bn, 308th Div
8 Apr	Khe Sanh	NGUYEN VAN HOANG	C-6
9 Apr	XD 810390	NGUYEN VAN THANH	1st Co, 7th Bn, 3d Regt, 304th Div
10 Apr	XD 854364	HA VAN PHEN	11th Co, 3d Bn, 12th Regt, 330 Div
12 Apr	Lang Vei	NGUYEN VAN HAI	7th Co
13 Apr	XD 873396	LUONG VAN CHUC	1st Co, 2d Bn, 4th Regt, 4th Div
13 Apr	XD 788405	NGUYEN HONG XUY	6th Co, 2d Bn, 1st Regt, 325C Div

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13 Apr XD 788405 HOANG VAN LAN 6th Co, 2d Bn, 1st Regt, 325C Div  
 14 Apr XD 774457 BUI NGOI LAN 8th Independent Bn

\* HOI CHAN (Returnee)

### g. Comparison of Strengths in AO Before and After PEGASUS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>BEFORE PEGASUS</u>		<u>AFTER PEGASUS</u>	
	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
304th NVA Div	7,750	XD 8727	10,000	XD 7239
HQ and Support	1,450	-do-	1,700	-do-
9th Regt	1,700	XD 8230	1,800	XD 7045
1st Bn	(350)	-do-	(450)	-do-
2d Bn	(350)	-do-	(450)	-do-
3d Bn	(350)	-do-	(450)	-do-
24th Regt		Vic Hue	1,700	Vic Lang Vei
4th Bn		-do-	(350)	-do-
5th Bn		-do-	(350)	-do-
6th Bn		-do-	(350)	-do-
57th Regt	1,700	XD 8323	1,800	S of Khe Sanh
4th Bn	(350)	-do-	(450)	-do-
5th Bn	(350)	-do-	(450)	-do-
6th Bn	(350)	-do-	(450)	-do-
66th Regt	1,700	XD 9231	1,800	S of Khe Sanh
7th Bn	(350)	-do-	(450)	-do-
8th Bn	(350)	-do-	(450)	-do-
9th Bn	(350)	-do-	(450)	-do-
68th Arty Regt		Unlocated	1,200	Vic Khe Sanh
325C NVA Div	5,200	W of Khe Sanh	Unlocated	
HQ and Support	1,450	-do-	Unlocated	
101D Regt	1,700	XD 7838	Unlocated	
1st Bn	(350)	-do-		
2d Bn	(350)	-do-		
3d Bn	(350)	-do-		

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95C Regt	1,700	XD 748	Unlocated
4th Bn	(350)	XD 8242	Unlocated
5th Bn	(350)	XD 8546	Unlocated
6th Bn	(350)	XD 7947	Unlocated
8th Bn, 29th Regt	350	Khe Sanh	350 W of Ca Lu
Unidentified Armor Regt (-)	UNK	Lang Vei	UNK Laos

## Total Before PEGASUS

304th NVA Div - 7,750  
325C NVA Div - 5,200  
164th Arty Regt - 1,200

Total 14,150

## Total After PEGASUS

304th NVA Div - 10,000  
8th Bn, 29th Regt - 350

Total 10,350

### 13. (FOUC) Administrative Matters:

#### a. Supply

(1) On 28 February 1968, the HQ, MACV Forward Joint Staff Planning Group was established, with representation by the Office of ACofS G4, MACV Fwd. Logistical feasibility studies were completed, together with logistical support concepts and plans for the forthcoming campaign, to include Operation PEGASUS.

(2) On 16 and 17 March 1968, the Office of the ACofS, G4, PCV, conducted a logistical planning conference incidental to Operation PEGASUS. The conference was attended by representatives of the following organizations: III Marine Amphibious Force; Force Logistics Command, Danang; 26th General Support Group of the U.S. Army Support Command, Danang; Force Logistics Support Group A; 1st Cav Div (Airmobile); 101st Abn Div; and the 3d Marine Div.

(a) The primary objective of the planning conference was to formulate a concept of logistical support for Operation PEGASUS, to include delineation of resupply requirements for forces to be supported.

(b) The conferees determined that the operation was feasible from a logistical standpoint, but only with uninterrupted use of Route 9, and prestockage of five (5) days of supply (DOS), all classes, in the vicinity of Ca Lu, the site of the Forward Support Area and LZ STUD.

(c) Logistical support for Operation PEGASUS was a joint

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effort, coordinated by III MAF, using U.S. Army Support Command, Fleet Logistics Command, and Naval Support Activity assets, culminating in a flexible and responsive logistical support system. Supply support for the operation was to come from the FSA established in the vicinity of Ca Lu. The FSA was operated by U.S. Army Support Command, Danang, with personnel and equipment augmentation provided by Fleet Logistics Command. Co-located with the Ca Lu FSA was the Forward Support Element (FSE) established by the 1st Cav Div (AM). The logistical support concept was promulgated in the PCV Operation Plan 1-68.

(3) On 21 March, the Ca Lu FSA was established and prestockage, all classes, was set at 5515 STONS. On 31 March, 80 percent of the prestockage objective was achieved and normal resupply of the attacking forces began on 1 April. Daily resupply requirements were 1133 STONS. Stockage levels proved adequate to meet all operational requirements, and employment of the prestock concept greatly facilitated the operation, particularly during its initial stages. Supplies were provided from two major supply points, FLSG\_B, Dong Ha, a subordinate element of FLC, Danang, and the Logistic Over The Shore (LOTS) site, established at Wunder Beach on 4 March. Operation of the LOTS site was a joint effort employing the assets of the 159th Transportation Bn (Terminal), a subordinate element of USASUPCOM, Danang, and the 625 Supply and Service Company, a subordinate element of the 26th General Support Group. Employment of the LOTS concept materially enhanced the supply posture for northern I CTZ (NICTZ).

(4) An informal cross service agreement was achieved on ammunition resupply before the commencement of the operation. This agreement not only facilitated bookkeeping, but assured the commanders of continued ammunition support in the event heavy contact should cause a severe drawdown of one service's stocks.

(5) Initial drawdown on stocks at Khe Sanh Combat Base, through consumption and restriction of resupply, commenced on 9 April. However, the Ca Lu FSA remained the primary logistical installation in support of Operation PEGASUS.

(6) Fleet Logistics Command assumed responsibility for the operation of the Ca Lu FSA subsequent to the termination of Operation PEGASUS.

b. Transportation

(1) The Ca Lu FSA was prestocked and resupplied primarily via Route 9, employing the transportation assets of the 57th Transportation Bn (Truck), augmented by transportation truck assets belonging to FLC, Danang.

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(2) On-call aerial resupply was available for resupply support of Operation PEGASUS; however, uninterrupted use of Route 9 negated this requirement.

(3) During the early stages of the operation the Khe Sanh Combat Base continued to be resupplied by air; however, on 15 April, the first truck convoy provided resupply to the base.

## c. Communications

(1) Positive communications were required from LZ STUD to the Khe Sanh Combat Base, as well as to Camp Evans and Phu Bai, once the 1 Cav Div (AM) assumed OPCON of the 26th Marine Regt. Voice circuits into KSCB were routed over the AN/TRC-97 tropospheric scatter system to the Hue-Phu Bai area and were then transferred to the high capacity tropo system between Hue and Khe Sanh.

(2) Upon termination of Operation PEGASUS, the Marine AN/TRC-97 terminals were left in place but returned to Marine control. They were then used for internal control by the 3d Marine Division. The Army equipment used in the operation was returned to the 63d Signal Bn contingency assets for use in subsequent operations.

(3) Careful prior planning, thorough coordination, and mutual cooperation on the part of signal staffs of III MAF, PCV, 1st Cav Div (AM) and the performance of elements of the 63d Signal Bn, 1st Signal Brigade (STRATCOM) combined to score a unique communications success and contributed to the favorable outcome of the operation.

## d. Medical Service

### (1) Field Evacuation Procedures

(a) The evacuation of patients from the field pick-up sites to the clearing stations was accomplished by helicopter. Several different concepts were used - depending on the service.

(b) The 1st Cav Div (AM) utilized organic air ambulances for all field pick-ups. These air ambulances also provided field pick-ups for the ARVN Abn TF.

(c) The 1st Marine Regt detailed two helicopters for the specific mission of evacuating casualties. By doing so, they utilized a system similar to that of the 1 Cav Div (AM). These helicopters were positioned at the composite Regimental Aid Station for immediate dispatch to the field pick-up site.

(d) The 26th Marine Regt utilized normal aviation

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support of the 3d Mar Div to make field pick-ups. They did not use helicopters specifically detailed for air evacuation, but utilized any helicopter available in the area.

## (2) Initial Medical Treatment Facilities

(a) Clearing stations or comparable facilities were used extensively as the initial treatment facility in the chain of evacuation during this operation. This differs somewhat from other operations, where casualties were often evacuated from the field directly to a hospital.

(b) The 1st Cav Div (AM) had two clearing stations located at LZ STUD. Nearly all patients were evacuated from the field pick-up sites to one of these two clearing stations.

(c) The 1st Marine Regt utilized a composite Regimental Aid Station and attached medical support team. This gave it a capacity similar to an Army clearing station. This facility was located at Ca Lu and provided initial treatment for personnel of the 1st Marine Regt.

(d) The 26th Marine Regt was supported by Co C (-), 3d Med Bn, 3d Mar Div. This unit's facility was located at Khe Sanh and was comparable to an Army clearing station. Initial treatment was provided prior to evacuation. Also considered a part of the initial treatment facilities utilized by the Marines was D Co, 3d Med Bn, 3d Mar Div, in Dong Ha. This unit has a greater capability than does an Army clearing station. Co D was utilized to provide emergency resuscitation and as a collecting point for patients being evacuated south by fixed wing aircraft.

(e) The ARVN Abn TF employed a surgical team, located at LZ STUD, in close proximity to the 1 Cav Div (AM) clearing stations. This team provided initial treatment to the ARVN personnel prior to further evacuation.

## (3) Evacuation and Hospitalization

(a) U.S. Army personnel were largely evacuated from the clearing stations by "Dustoff" helicopter ambulance to the 18th Surgical Hospital, Quang Tri. Some patients were evacuated directly to the 22d Surgical Hospital, Phu Bai.

(b) The ARVN Abn TF personnel were evacuated from the surgical team facility by "Dustoff" and U.S. Air Force fixed wing to the Nguyen Tri Phong Station Hospital, Hue. Some of the more seriously wounded were evacuated to the Province Hospital, Quang Tri.

(c) Marine personnel belonging to both the 1st Marine

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Regiment and the 26th Marine Regiment were evacuated from the Regimental Aid Station and Co C to "Delta Med" (Co D, 3d Med Bn) in Dong Ha. From there they were evacuated by fixed wing aircraft to the 3d Med Bn (-), in Phu Bai, where definitive care was begun. A few personnel of the 1st Marine Regt went directly to C Co, 1st Med Bn, Phu Bai.

## (4) Evaluation

(a) Although separate systems were used for various elements, there was little duplication of effort. Provisions were made for joint utilization of evacuation and treatment facilities when necessitated by the workload or in the best interests of the patient.

(b) There was some disadvantage to Marine personnel because of the location of the 3d Med Bn (-) in Phu Bai. This made the chain of evacuation to surgical treatment quite long. This situation will be eliminated when the 3d Med Bn (-) moves to Quang Tri.

## 14. (U) Engineer Effort

a. Engineer operations prior to, and during Operation PEGASUS were focused toward the accomplishment of three major missions: construction of the FSE/PBA at LZ STUD with the supporting C-123 airfield; opening and restoring Route 9 from the vicinity of Ca Lu to KSCB; and direct support of infantry elements in combined ground and heliborne operations.

b. Engineer support for the operation was provided by elements of the U.S. Army, Navy and Marines. Responsibility for coordination of the engineer mission was assigned to the Division Engineer, 1 Cav Div (AM), with the major construction effort being provided by the Navy and Marine elements. Close combat support was provided for tactical operations by the 8th Engr Bn and elements of the 3d Mar Div.

c. The establishment of the forward support base and airfield at LZ STUD and the opening of Route 9 to Khe Sanh were difficult engineer tasks which were necessary for the success of Operation PEGASUS. They were accomplished by a combination of the military engineer forces of three services and represent an outstanding achievement in interservice teamwork.

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## 15. (FOUO) Commander's Analysis

a. Operation PEGASUS was a highly productive interservice undertaking of the utmost renumeration - an end product of a high order of teamwork. This teamwork, involving Army, Marine, Air Force, Navy Seabees, and Navy logistics elements, reaped benefits in terms of a cross fusion of ideas and experiences - particularly in the realm of airmobile tactics and techniques.

b. The operation focused attention on the need for extensive low level reconnaissance to develop the situation in an area characterized by uncertain intelligence. As an example: the assault plan could not be finalized until reconnaissance had revealed acceptable approach routes, landing zones, and the location of enemy anti-aircraft emplacements.

c. The operation was an ideal example of the synchronization of massive B-52 strikes, tactical air support, and artillery firepower, with ground maneuver; all based on detailed pre-planning and fire support coordination, centralized under the Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Under these conditions, it was possible to achieve selectivity, flexibility, responsiveness and a saturation effect as desired. This capacity, coupled with speed of execution made possible by airmobility, proved to be decisive - disrupting the enemy's cohesiveness and control.

d. The operation was made possible by imaginative logistical support. The development of the logistics base at LZ STUD enabled the attacking elements to be supplied by helicopter from this base until Highway 9 could be opened forward of STUD.

e. The deception plan, implemented by the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, was exceedingly well executed and appears to have been successful in confusing, if not deceiving, the enemy as to our true intentions.

f. In addition, the operation was conducted in an aura of intense press interest which defied stringent control and which resulted in detailed reporting of intelligence. Much of this information was of value to the enemy.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



L. H. SCHWEITER  
BG, USA  
Chief of Staff

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HISTORICAL STUDY  
3-68

"OPERATION PEGASUS"

310801H March 1968 to 150800H April 1968

Prepared By

31st Military History Detachment  
HQ PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM  
APO San Francisco 96308

May 1968

## OPERATION PEGASUS

The "Battle of Khe Sanh" began on 21 January 1968, just eight days before the enemy launched his TET offensive throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces, which hammered the Khe Sanh Combat Base daily with rocket, mortar, artillery, small arms, and automatic weapons fire, were estimated to be 30,000 strong.<sup>1</sup> Principal Free World Military Armed Forces

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1

"Victory at Khe Sanh", Time Magazine, Asia Edition, Apr. 12, 1968, p. 27.

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(FWMAF), blocking the enemy's avenue of approach into Quang Tri Province at Khe Sanh, were the 26th Marine Regimental Landing Team and the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) 37th Ranger Battalion.

Support elements from the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force backed up the Marines and Rangers defending the combat base.

Within hours after the enemy launched his attack on the bastion at Khe Sanh, the U. S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (1 ACD) opened its forward command post in the Hue - Phu Bai (48Q YD 8020) area. Elements of the 1 ACD had been moved into the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) from the Bong Son (49P BS 8090) area in the II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ), and the headquarters became effective,

under operational control (CFCCN) of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), in its new location at 1200H hours, 22 January 1968.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Yeagley, Jack, Maj. Liaison Officer, 1st CAV DIV (Airmobile), Interview with--May 1968.

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On 25 January, Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman Jr., USMC Commanding General, III MAF, directed the Air Cavalry Division to prepare a contingency plan for the relief and/or reinforcement of the Khe Sanh base.<sup>3</sup> This action started the chain of events

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<sup>3</sup> MSG, HQ III MAF, dtg 251428Z Jan 68, subject: Contingency Planning (Fm CG, III MAF to CG, I ACD)

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that was later to emerge as OPERATION PEGASUS. But other events, including the Communist TET Offensive (29 January - 14 February), the Battle of Hue City (31 January - 25 February), the establishment of Headquarters, U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Forward (MACV FWD) (13 February), and its conversion into Headquarters, Provisional Corps, Vietnam (PCV) (10 March), were to take place before the operation became a reality.

During the month of February and into early March the 1 ACD conducted operations in and around the City of Hue and participated in destroying the enemy forces west of the walled city. In preparation for future operations, III MAF on 16 February directed that a Marine regiment, consisting of three battalions, would conduct the Khe Sanh operation with the 1 ACD.

The 1st Marine Division (1 Mar Div) designated the 1st Marine Regiment (1st Marines) to work with the cavalrymen.<sup>4</sup>

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4

MSG, HQ III MAF, dtg 160053Z Mar 68  
MSG, HQ 1 MAR DIV, dtg 160942Z Mar 68

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Major General John J. Tolson III, Commanding General, 1 ACD, on 2 March briefed General Creighton W. Abrams, Deputy Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam Forward (DEPCOMUSMACV FWD) on his concept of the operation to open Route 9 into Khe Sanh and relieve the pressure on the surrounded garrison. On 4 March, instructions were issued to begin construction on an airstrip in the vicinity of Ca Lu (48Q YD 0145) to provide the logistical flexibility considered necessary for the opening of Route 9. III MAF directed that construction be started on or about 12 March on an airfield capable of handling U. S. Air Force C7A

(Caribou) aircraft. The 3d Marine Division (3d Mar Div) was tasked to provide the necessary security for movement of the engineer equipment along Route 9 from Dong Ha (48Q YD 2461) to Ca Lu. The 11th Engineer Battalion, Fleet Marine Force (11th Engr Bn), and the U. S. Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 5 (NMCB 5) were to assist the 8th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (8th Engr Bn), 1 ACD. The strip was to be expanded later to take C-123 aircraft.<sup>5</sup>

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5

MSG, HQ III MAF, dtg 040516Z Mar 68, (Fm CG, III MAF to CG, 1 ACD, CG, 3 Mar Div, COMNAVFORV REP DNG)

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A conference was held at III MAF headquarters in Da Nang (49Z BU 0880) on 5 March on the transition of MCV FWD to Provisional Corps Vietnam and the resultant command relationships. The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the 3d Marine Division, and the 101st Airborne Division (101 Abn Div) which had just deployed to I CTZ were to be OPCON of PCV. The provisional corps in turn was to be OPCON of III MAF.<sup>6</sup>

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6

MSG HQ III MAF, dtg 041128Z Mar 68, subject: Command Support Forthcoming Deployments, (Fm CG, II MAF to DEP COMUSMACV FWD)

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LTG Cushman informed General William Westmoreland, Commander U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, (COMUSMACV) General

Abrams, DEBARKER, and Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, Commanding General - designate, PCV, that he intended to task the corps, on activation, to employ the 1 ACD and other required elements of PCV to open Route 9 and to conduct offensive operations in the Khe Sanh area. The III MAF commander now envisioned that construction of the airstrip at Ca Lu should begin on or about 20 March.<sup>7</sup>

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7

MSG HQ III MAF, dtg 081405Z Mar 68, (Fm CG, III MAF to COMUSMACV AND DEPCOMUSMACV FWD)

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Provisional Corps Vietnam was activated at Phu Bai at 1201H hours, 10 March, and LTC Rosson assumed command. In accordance with LTC Cushman's instructions the 1 ACD was directed to prepare a briefing on their plan for the construction and security of the 57A strip at Ca Lu. The briefing was to be presented to LTC's Cushman and Rosson at PCV headquarters on 12 March.<sup>8</sup>

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MSG HQ PCV, dtg 100822Z Mar 68, (Fm CG, 1 V to CG, 1 ACD; CG, 3d Mar Div; COMUSMACV)

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General Westmoreland and General Abrams arrived at PCV headquarters on 10 March to receive a briefing by LTC Rosson on planned operations. One aspect of the briefing covered the attack to open Route 9 and

to destroy the enemy forces around the Khe Sanh Combat Base. The operation was to begin on or about 1 April depending on the weather. General Westmoreland agreed to the concept of using a Marine regiment to open Route 9 in conjunction with air assaults by the 1 ACD and an over-land attack by an ARVN Task Force. He agreed that weather was the controlling factor on timing of the attack, and stressed that appropriate forces should be used to take the fight to the enemy and to relieve the garrison at Khe Sanh?

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9

MSG HQ PCV, dtg 110514Z Mar 68, subject: Visit of COMUSMACV to HQ Prov Corps Vietnam.

MSG HQ III MAF, dtg 120954Z Mar 68

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The plan for construction and security of the Ca Lu airstrip was presented by MG Tolson at PCV headquarters on 12 March. Design and construction management was to be the responsibility of the 8th Engr Bn. The Division Engineer, 1 ACD was responsible for coordination of the engineer effort with the 11th Engr Bn providing the bulk of the equipment, with an augmentation from elements of the 3d Navy Construction Brigade (3d NCB). The field was to be expanded to a C-123 aircraft capability, with the surface to be compacted and stabilized with asphalt cut-back or

penetration. If the southern side could be secured at night to allow for a ten hour work-day the strip could be ready for C7A's by 19 March and for C-123's on 21 March. If the work force had to retract into the Ca Lu perimeter each night the schedule would have to be revised to 22 March for C7A aircraft and 28 March for C-123's. As was true for the entire operation, the construction of the airfield could be greatly affected by weather. It was agreed at the conference that the CG, 1 ACD and the CG, 3d Mar Div would arrange security details.<sup>10</sup>

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10

MSG HQ PCV, dtg 141505Z Mar 68, (FM CG, PCV TO CG, III MAF)

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Three days later, on 15 March, LTG Rosson's headquarters requested LTC Cushman's headquarters to effect the coordination necessary to obtain the approval of Lieutenant General Lam, CG, I CTZ, and the Vietnamese government, for the participation of the ARVN Task Force. III MAF was informed that PCV would welcome the designation of a Task Force of three battalions from the newly activated ARVN airborne division.<sup>11</sup> III MAF was also asked to designate two Marine

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11

MSG HQ PCV, dtg 150235Z Mar 68, (FM CG, PCV TO CG, III MAF)

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battalions to participate in the operation and to deploy them to the vicinity of Ca Lu, under OPCCN of PCV, by 30 March. The two battalions, from III MAF resources were to be further placed under OPCCN of a regimental headquarters from the 3d Mar Div. The Marine division was also tasked to provide a battalion to fill out the Marine Regimental Task Force.<sup>12</sup>

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12

MSG HQ PCV, dtg 150240Z Mar 68, (FM CG, PCV TO CG, III MAF and CG, 3 Mar Div)

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Headquarters, III MAF was also informed on 15 March of the requirement for additional Army engineer support for PCV. In normal tactical operations the division engineer battalion furnishes one company in support of each brigade, thus leaving very little reserve. Both the 1 ACD and the 101st Abn Div engineer battalions were small battalions, and were equipped mostly with airmobile and/or airdroppable equipment; yet they provided engineer support for rather protracted areas of operations (AO). In addition, the deployment to I CTZ required extensive engineer effort to include construction of helipads, base camps, and defensive perimeters. Future planned operations which were to involve development of logistical bases, fire support bases and road improvements made it apparent that engineer requirements exceeded the engineer

capabilities. In view of the increasing requirements PCV requested the deployment of another Engineer Battalion (Combat).<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup>

MSG, HQ PCV, dtg 150712Z Mar 68, subject: Army Engineer Support for PCV, (Fm CG, PCV to CG, III MAF)

In order to expedite the completion of the Ca Lu airstrip, LTC Rosson instructed the CG's of the 1 ACD and 3d Mar Div to provide an additional rifle company each, not later than 1500H hours 16 March, for security of the construction site. To deceive the enemy, the company of the 1 ACD removed their division patches from their shoulders and were airlifted into Ca Lu by Marine helicopters. The Commanding Officer, 3d Bn, 9th Marines, 3 Mar Div was responsible for coordinating security for the airstrip.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup>

MSG, HQ PCV, dtg 151350Z Mar 68, subject: Ca Lu Airstrip (Fm CG, PCV to CG, 1 ACD and CG, 3 MAR DIV)

A Logistical Planning Group was formed at PCV headquarters at 1300H hours, 16 March. Representatives of the three divisions under CPJON of PCV were directed to participate while requests were submitted through III MAF for representation by III MAF,

Da Nang Support Command (DSC), Navy Support Activity, Da Nang (NSA), and Fleet Logistic Command (FLC). The group was formed to determine logistical requirements for the up-coming operation. 15

15

MEG HQ PCV, dtg 150940Z Mar 68, subject: Formation of Logistic Planning Group, (FM PCV TO CG, III MAF; CG, 1-ACD; CG, 3D MAR DIV; CG, 101 ABN DIV; CG, DSA; CG, FLC; CDR, NSA)

Also on 16 March, III MAF replied to PCV's request of the previous day for designation and deployment of two marine battalions. III MAF outlined that since all of the 3d Mar Div regimental headquarters were fully committed, it was their intention to deploy and to pass CPCCN of a Marine regiment (reinforced), less one battalion, from the 1st Mar Div to participate in the planned operation. A third battalion (reinforced) would be provided from the 3d Mar Div. The 1st Marine Division, in turn, designated the 1st Marine Regiment and instructed them to participate in a joint planning conference with the 1 ACD. 16

16

MSG HQ III MAF, dtg 160058Z Mar 68 (FM CG, III MAF TO CG, PCV)

MSG, HQ 1st MAR DIV, dtg 160942Z Mar 68 (FM CG, 1st MAR DIV TO CG, III MAF AND CG, TF ARMY)

General Westmoreland, accompanied by LTG Cushman, Brigadier General

Edward H. DeLange Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, III  
MAF, and Brigadier General William G. Thomson, Director, Combat  
Operations Center, III MAF, visited the three divisions under  
OPNAV of PCV on 17 March. At the 1st CG command post MG Tolson  
briefed COMUSMACV on the division's Operation Plan 1-68 (Operation  
PEGASUS) for the attack toward Khe Sanh. 17

17  
MSG, HQ III MAF, dtg 190114Z Mar 68 (Fm CG, III MAF to  
COMUSMACV) 17

Logistical Support for Operation PEGASUS was to be provided from  
a logistical base in the vicinity of Ca Lu. The base would be  
operated by U.S. Army Support Command. To insure continuous  
support the forward support activity (FSA) was to be pre-stocked  
prior to 1 April. Daily convoys between Ca Lu and Dong Ha were  
to commence on 22 March into the FSA established on 21 March.  
The Commanding Officer, 57th Transportation Battalion was des-  
ignated as the point of contact for the daily convoy. 18

18  
MSG, HQ III MAF, dtg 191448Z Mar 68, (Fm CG, III MAF to CG,  
PCV; CG, FLS; CG, DSC)

The coordinated engineer effort got under way on schedule.

Commencing on 20 March, upon order CG, PCV, equipment of the 11th Engineer Battalion augmented with equipment by NMCB 5 and a command and control element of the 8th Engineer Battalion staged at Dong Ha Combat Base in preparation for movement west on Route 9 and subsequent initiation of construction for the FSE/FSA and airfield. From D-12, 20 March, until D - Day, 1 April, the major portion of the 11th Engr Bn was directly committed to the construction of PCL area, ammunition storage area, command and control bunkers, helicopter revetments, and internal road net, and perimeter clearance of fields of fire for site security. Simultaneously, elements of NMCV 5, with heavy equipment augmentation, began work, initially on a C7A Type II capable airfield consisting of 1500 by 60' runway, and a 150 by 450' parking apron, compacted and stabilized with pemeprime. This strip was ultimately expanded to C-123 Type II by lengthening of the runway to 2300 ft and addition of an aircraft turnaround area.

19

MEMO, AVII-CE, HQ PCV, 23 April 1968, subject: Engineer Summary, Operation Pegasus, 20 March to 15 April 1968, (Memorandum for Record by Marshall, R.S., COL, CE, USA, Corps Engineer, PCV)

The Deputy Senior Advisor, I CTZ, informed III MAF and PCV on 21 March that the CG I CTZ, had approved the participation of an ARVN task force in Operation PEGASUS. The task force would consist of three airborne battalions and would be made available on 28 March. LTG Lam authorized Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, CG, 1st ARVN Infantry Division, direct liaison with LTG Rosson's headquarters.<sup>20</sup>

20

MEMO DSA I CTZ, dtg 210100Z Mar 68, ( FM DSA, I CTZ TO CG, III MAF; INFO: CG, PCV

The 1st ARVN division had earned the respect of all FVMAF throughout Vietnam for their actions during the Battle of Hue. General Rosson commented in his Commander's Daily Summary, on 21 March, that planning for the counter offensive was "proceeding on schedule." 21

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21

MSC HQ PCV, dtg 210420Z Mar 68 (FM CG, PCV TO CG, III MAF)

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Preliminary planning revealed a need to upgrade communications into the Ca Lu/Khe Sanh area by at least 24 channels to provide necessary command/control communications . . . . . it was determined that CG, 1 ACD would establish a forward command post in the Ca Lu area on D Day. CG, PCV would require 12 channels of voice and teletype to CG, 1 ACD. An additional 12 channels to connect 1 ACD (rear) at Camp Evans 480 YD 5332 to 1 ACD (forward) at Ca Lu (LZ Stud) would be required. . . . Location of LZ Stud in a valley surrounded by high peaks posed a need for a Signal Hill complex from which communications could be relayed to the valley and to rear areas. . . . In coordination with Signal Officer, 1 ACD, Hill 450 (480 YD 978 557) was selected as the Signal Hill for Operation PEGASUS. 1 ACD would be responsible for preparation and security of the installation, as well as airlift of all equipment to the hill and subsequent resupply. The hill was to be prepared and ready for occupancy by 26 March; communications were to be operational by 28 March, in anticipation of a 1 April D Day.

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22

MEMO, AVFI-SC, HQ PCV, 28 April 1968, Subject: Communications Support of Operation PEGASUS, (Memorandum for Record by Grambacher, Gerd S., LTC, SigC, USA, Corps Signal Officer, PCV)

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During this period, the combat base at Khe Sanh was continuously harassed by enemy fire including 130mm and 152mm artillery.

The great distance involved, difficult terrain, and bad weather made it almost impossible to pinpoint the exact location of the enemy guns firing from the northwest and southwest. Employment of airborne observers/forward air controllers and U.S. Air Force O-2 aircraft had a suppressing effect on the enemy fires but were not completely successful in determining the firing locations. 23.

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23

MSG HQ 3 MAR DIV, dtg 220450Z Mar 68, (Fm CG, 3 Mar Div to CG, PCV)

MSG HQ PCV, dtg 220605Z Mar 68, (Fm CG, PCV to CG, III MAF)

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The 1 ACD planned to initiate reconnaissance around the Ca Lu area on 26 March utilizing the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1/9Cav). To support the 1/9 Cav the division requested FM Artillery to pass OPCON of a 105mm howitzer battery and an eight inch battery to the 1 ACD. The batteries were to be positioned in the vicinity of Ca Lu. 24.

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24

MSG HQ 1 ACD, dtg 220540Z Mar 68, subject: Request for OPCON of Howitzer Batteries, (Fm CG, 1 ACD to CG, PCV)

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radio profile path studies revealed that line of sight commu-  
nications from any high ground in the Ca Lu area back to Phu Bai  
(III MAF) or to Camp Evans (1 AFV rear) would be marginal. The  
solution was the establishment of a tropospheric scatter (tropo)  
communications system. Resources of the cavalry division and the  
63d Signal Battalion (63d Sig Bn) did not include sufficient  
equipment to meet the requirement. Augmentation in terms of two  
24-channel systems were necessary. Both III MAF and U.S. Army  
Vietnam (USARV) made the additional systems available; however,  
the decision was made to utilize the Marine equipment because of  
its smaller size and easier transportability.<sup>25</sup> In addition,

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25 NMC, AVII-SC, HQ PCV, 28 April 1968, op.cit.

USARV directed the 1st Signal Brigade (1 Sig Bde) to provide  
four one-quarter ton trucks equipped with radios having a multi-  
channel voice capacity to provide communications between the corps  
and division. The four vehicles were to be used in conjunction  
with aircraft equipped with an aerial FM relay capability and pro-  
vide a degree of the desired communications duplication.<sup>26</sup>

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26 NMC, HQ PCV, dtg 231105Z Mar 68, (Fm CG, USARV to CG, PCV)

The air traffic approach pattern into Khe Sanh was such that had it continued to be used once the operation began the attacking forces would have been denied vital air and artillery support. The 3d Mar Div, on 23 March, recommended that the pattern be changed to route Dong Ha and Quang Tri helicopter traffic north of the axis of advance and then into Khe Sanh. PCV recommended that III MAF adopt the 3d Mar Div recommendation because of its apparent benefit to aircraft.<sup>27</sup>

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27

MSG HQ 3d MAR DIV, dtg 231212Z Mar 68, (FM CG, 3d MAR DIV TO CG, PCV)

MSG HQ PCV, dtg 271540Z Mar 68, (FM CG, PCV TO CG, III MAF)

MSG HQ 1 MAW (1st Marine Air Wing), dtg 280320Z Mar 68, (FM CG, 1st MAW TO CDR, 7TH AF, OTHERS)

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LTG Rossen held a meeting of his division commanders at Camp Evans on 22 March. At this meeting the relief of the 1 ACD by elements of the 101 Abn Div was formulated. To assure that sufficient forces would be available to off-set any new enemy threat to the Hue area, General Rossen recommended that an effort be made to retain the Vietnamese Marine Task Force at that location. In the event the Task Force could not be retained he requested that

a fourth Vietnamese Airborne battalion be obtained for the Hue area and that additional U.S. Forces be made available for employment in the Hue area.<sup>26</sup> LTG Cushman forwarded LTG Rosson's

28  
MSG, HQ PCV, dtg 231215Z Mar 68, (Fm CG, PCV to CG, III MAF)

request to COMUSMACV with the recommendation that the Airborne Task Force be raised to four battalions and that the task force close into Quang Tri to enhance the deception plan and to place the task force closer to the ultimate zone of action in Operation HEGEMIS. General Cushman planned to employ the fourth battalion in the vicinity of Hue.<sup>29</sup> He invited LTG Rosson; the Commanding

29  
MSG, III MAF, dtg 250538Z Mar 68, (Fm CG, III MAF to COMUSMACV)

Officer, Task Force Clear Water; and the Commander, Naval Support activity, Da Nang to visit III MAF to discuss the deception plan and to determine the details of its implementation and its effects on logistical support in Norther I CTZ (NICTZ).<sup>30</sup>

30  
MSG, III MAF, dtg 231148Z Mar 68, (Fm CG, III MAF to CTF CLEAR-WATER; CG, PCV; COMNAVSUPPACT DNG)

Battery A, 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery (105mm howitzer, towed) and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery (8 in) arrived in the Ca Lu/ LZ STUD area on 25 March, and were positioned as reinforcing fires for the 1 ACD Artillery.<sup>31</sup> The 2d Battalion, 1st

31

SIT REP, HQ 1 ACD, 24001H to 242400H Mar 68, No. 084

FRAG ORDER, HQ 1 ACD, dtg 251658 (FM CG, 1 ACD TO CG, PCV)

Marines closed into LZ STUD on 24 March. They were placed under OPCON of 1 ACD at 0800H 26 March with the mission of providing security for LZ STUD and Signal Hill. They also assumed OPCON of Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry. The Cavalry company was responsible for providing security for Battery A, 1/83d Arty which was positioned at Ca Lu. Companies E, G, and H provided security to the airstrip and construction at LZ STUD while Company F secured the communications site in the vicinity of Signal Hill.<sup>32</sup>

32

SIT REP, HQ 1 ACD, 28001H to 282400H Mar 68, No. 88

FRAG ORDER, HQ 1 ACD, dtg 251658 (FM CG, 1 ACD TO CG, PCV)

The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines assumed responsibility for security of Ca Lu on 29 March.<sup>33</sup>

33

SIT REP, HQ 1 ACD, 28001H to 292400H Mar 68, No. 89

The 3d Mar Div issued their operation Order on 25 March to cover both the deception plan being executed in the north-eastern portion of their AO, in conjunction with the 1st Mar Div, and their actions in Operation PEGASUS. The 4th Marine Regiment was to secure Route 9 in their zone and provide convoy security. The 9th Marine Regiment would provide security of Route 9 in their zone. The 26th Marine Regiment, in Khe Sanh Combat Base, was alerted to come under OPCON of 1 ACD on order. The 12th Marines were instructed to support with artillery the attack of 1 ACD within their capabilities. <sup>34</sup>

34

MEG HQ 3d MAR DIV, dtg 251 032Z Mar 68, (FM CG, 3d MAR DIV TO 3dMAR DIV: TF ROBBIE; 3d SQDN, 5th CAV)

The 1 ACD declared a no Bomb Zone in their assigned portion of the Operation PEGASUS AO effective 26 March. In order for the 1/9th Cav to conduct reconnaissance in the area between Khe Sanh and Ca Lu, all bombs dropped in the area had to be requested and controlled by the division. Targets in the PEGASUS AO, outside the No Bomb Zone, were to be handled routinely and the Marines and Air Force continued to deliver massive air support to the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh. <sup>35</sup>

35

MEG HQ 1 ACD, dtg 250900Z Mar 68, (FM CG, 1 ACD TO CDR, 7 AF)

The CG, Task Force X RAY, 1st Mar Div, was instructed by the CG, 1st Mar Div to deploy the 1st Marine Regiment, minus one battalion, on or about 27 March to close at Ca Lu not later than 30 March. Units which were placed under CFCOM of 1st Marine Regiment by Task Force X RAY included: Company A (minus) (reinforced), 1st Engineer Battalion; Co A (minus) 1st Shore Party Battalion; Company A (minus), 1st Motor Transport Battalion; and 1st Battalion (minus, 11th Marines. The 1st Bn, 11th Marines consisted of: one 105mm artillery battalion minus one battery; one provisional 155mm artillery battery (four 155mm howitzers, towed); and one 4.2in mortar battery (three 4.2in mortars and one Howtar).<sup>36</sup>

36

MSG HQ 1 MAR DIV, dtg 260200Z Mar 68 (FM 1 MAR DIV TO CG, TF XRAY; CG, PCV; 11 MAR; 11 MT BN)

An analysis of all enemy actions and activities around Khe Sanh indicated a possibility of a decreasing threat to that base. Third Mar Div elements at Khe Sanh had light contact on 26 and 27 March with only 42 incoming rounds during the 24-hour period from noon of the 26th until noon of the 27th. All courses of action were considered before LTG Rosson notified LTG Cushman on 27 March that he had approved MG Telsen's plan for the 1 ACD portion of Operation PEGASUS. He added that the enemy situation was being closely watched.<sup>37</sup>

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37

MSG HQ PCV, dtg 2701425Z Mar 68, (FM CG, PCV TO CG, III MAF)

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Information was received on 27 March that the request to retain the Vietnamese Marine Task Force in the vicinity of Hue would not be approved. III MAF further informed PCV that the additional U. S. battalion, which PCV had requested to be made available if the Marine Task Force was withdrawn, would not be provided. Adequate reaction to any Hue City contingency could be provided by other U. S. forces.

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38

MSG HQ III MAF, dtg 270816Z Mar 68, (FM CG, III MAF TO CG, PCV)

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Planning for the operation continued at PCV headquarters as representatives of the 1 ACD, 3d Mar Div, and 101 Abn Div, met with Lieutenant Colonel Floyd W. Baker, Corps Surgeon, to plan medical support for Operation PEGASUS<sup>39</sup>

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39

MSG HQ PCV, dtg 251331Z Mar 68, subject: Medical Planning Conference (FM CG, PCV TO CG, 1 ACD; CG, 3d MAR DIV; CG, 101 ABN DIV)

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At 1200H hours the same day, the 101st Abn Div Main command post opened at Camp Eagle (48Q YD 808162). The 101 Abn Div Rear headquarters remained at Bien Hoa (48F YT 0525)<sup>40</sup>

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MSG HQ 101ABN DIV, dtg 252310Z Mar 68, Subject: Command Post (FM CG, 101ABN DIV TO CG, PCV, OTHERS)

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Considering that the major support of Operations PEGASUS would be by Route 9; taking into account the large volume of supplies to be moved and the marginal capability of the roadway; and recognizing the possibility that the enemy might attempt to interdict this main supply route, III MAF on 28 March requested that preparations be made for providing an air-drop resupply capability for Operation PEGASUS. This all weather drop capability was to be augmented by air-landing supplies into Ca Lu utilizing C-123 aircraft.<sup>41</sup> Logistical

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41

MSG HQ III MAF, dtg 280600Z Mar 68, (FM CG, III MAF TO COMUSMACV)

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support for all items not peculiar to the Marines are to be coordinated with the 1 ACD and would be supplied by the FSA established by the U. S. Army Support Command. Those items

utilized only by the Marines were to be requested from Fleet  
Logistical Support Group Bravo through the FMA. <sup>42</sup>

42

MSG HQ PCRF/SECOND, dtg 280854Z Mar '68 (FM CG FLC TO CG  
1 MAF APT 1ED FLAG BRAVO)

General Westmoreland visited III MAF headquarters in Da Nang  
on 28 March. LTC Cushman and LTC Rosson were present for the  
conference, and General Rosson presented the overall concept  
for Operation PEGASUS. General Cushman and Rosson indicated  
to General Westmoreland that preparations for PEGASUS, to in-  
clude logistic support, redistribution of forces, and construc-  
tion of the C7A airstrip at Ca Lu, would be ready for the planned  
attack on 1 April. The deception plan calling for a regimental  
size attack by the 3d Mar Div from the vicinity of Dong Ha  
towards the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) was also discussed.

General Westmoreland stated that Operation PEGASUS should go as  
scheduled. <sup>43</sup>

43

MSG HQ III MAF, dtg 290448Z Mar 68 (FM CG, III MAF TO COMUS-  
MACV)

PCV Operation Plan 1-68 was redesignated PCV Operation Order  
1-68, on 29 March. Instructions were issued to execute the

operation order with D-Day being established as 010001 April.

The CG, 3d Mar Div ordered the execution of his Operation Order

8-68 and established D-Day, H-Hour for Task Force Kilo as

300600H March. Task Force Kilo was the name given the U. S.

elements participating in the coordinated ARVN and U. S.

attack northeast of Dong Ha. The ARVN portion was designated

LAM RON 203. It was to consist of the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry

and the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiments under control of

the 1st ARVN Infantry Division. Task organization of the

U. S. elements under control of the 3d Mar Div were: 3d Squadron,

5th Cavalry (minus); Company C, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor;

Company A, 1st Battalion, 502d Airborne, (101st Abn Div); and

the 2d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment. <sup>44</sup>

44

SIT REP 021, HQ PCV, 300001H to 302400H Mar 68

MSG HQ PCV, dtg 290238Z Mar 68, Subject: Execution,  
OPLAN 1-68 (FM CG, PCV TO CG, 1 ACD; CG, 3d MAR DIV;  
others)

MSG HQ 3d MAR DIV, dtg 290515Z Mar 68 (FM CG, 3d MAR DIV  
TO 3d MAR DIV; TF ROBBIE; 3/5 CAV)

Throughout the period tactical air was being concentrated on

interdicting the enemy's main avenues of approach into the area

surrounding Khe Sanh and the larger AO of the 1 ACD. Special emphasis was placed on neutralizing known and suspected locations of NVA artillery and anti-aircraft artillery positions. B-52 missions continued to give priority to the support of Khe Sanh Combat Base and the pending operation.<sup>45</sup>

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45

MSG HQ PCV, dtg 291448Z Mar 68 (FM CG, PCV TO CG, III MAF)

MSG HQ 1 ACD, dtg 300215Z Mar 68, Subject: Air Support Operation PEGASUS, (FM CG, 1 ACD TO CG, PCV)

MSG HQ PCV, dtg 310235Z Mar 68 (FM CG, PCV TO CG, III MAF)

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On 30 March General Westmoreland in a message to LTG Cushman expressed his confidence that weather was being closely watched to insure that it did not inhibit getting the operation off to a good start. Weather was still the major factor in determining the timing of the attack. General Westmoreland also expresses his feeling for the important role that the Vietnamese Airborne Task Force was to have in the operation.<sup>46</sup>

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46

MSG HQ MACV, MACO4334, dtg 301150Z Mar 68 (FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND TO LTG CUSHMAN, INFO: LTG BOSSON)

Engineer projects at the Ca Lu (Landing Zone STUD) airstrip were eighty-two percent complete by 30 March. The water point was in place, 12 bunkers had been completed, logistic convoys had arrived with M3A1 matting for the airfield and barrier material was delivered. The fuel system for refueling aircraft was being completed and the estimated completion date for up-<sup>47</sup>grading of the strip to C-123 capacity was 6 April.

<sup>47</sup>

ATTN: HQ 1 ACD, dtg 301815Z Mar 68 (FM CG, 1 ACD TO CG, FCV)

At 0600 hours, 30 March, U. S. Army, Marines, and ARVN forces initiated the deception plan for Operation Pegasus five kilometers northeast of Bong Ha. The search and destroy operation attacked generally north toward the DMZ along the Gio Linh Coastal Plains (area between the Cau Viet River and the DMZ). All units reached the assigned phase line by that afternoon. Results of the first days operations: Killed in Action: U. S. - five; ARVN - 14; Enemy - 150. Wounded in Action: U. S. - five; ARVN - 47; Enemy - unknown. Missing in Action: U. S. - six. Detainees: Enemy - three. The 3d Bn, 1st ARVN Regt. and the 3d Sdn, 5th Ar. each lost one armored personnel carrier destroyed while the 3d Bn ARVN captured 22 individual and 11 crew served weapons from the enemy.<sup>48</sup>

48

SIT REF, HQ PCV, 300001H to 302400H Mar 68, No. 021

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The 3d Mar Div augmented the 1st Mar Regt with the following elements on 30 March: two A.2 in mortars; two platoons (10) of tanks (available within four hours of any request); one platoon (4) of CNTCS; and one shore party. Engineer support could not be made available because of the heavy commitment of the 11th Engr Bn. A 105mm artillery battery was to be provided from other PCV resources.<sup>49</sup>

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49

MSG HQ 3d MAR DIV, dtg 301910Z Mar 68 (FM CG, 3d MAR DIV TO CG, PCV)

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Operation JEB STUART terminated 310800H March. Operational control of the 1st Marine Regiment had passed to the 1 ACD at 1500H hours, 29 March, and the 3d Mar Div passed OPCON of the 26th Marines in Khe Sanh to the 1 ACD.<sup>50</sup> The 1 ACD

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MSG HQ PCV, dtg 311223Z Mar 68, Subject: Operation JEB STUART, (FM CG, PCV TO CG, III MAF; OTHERS)

MSG HQ 1ST MAR DIV, dtg 291057Z Mar 68 (FM CG, 1st MAR DIV TO CG, PCV; CG, 1 ACD; OTHERS)

SIT REF, HQ PCV, 310001H to 312400H Mar 68, No 022

Tactical Operations Center became operational at LZ STUD and the 1 ACD assumed responsibility for the PEGASUS AO. Operation PEGASUS began at 0801H hours 31 March, and OPCON of the 1st Bn, 9th Marines, also in Khe Sanh, was passed to the 1 ACD at that time. <sup>51</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> MSG HQ 3d MAR DIV, dtg 310701Z Mar 68 (FM CG, 3d MAR DIV TO CG, 1 ACD and 4th MAR REGT)

MSG HQ 3d MAR DIV, dtg 010450Z Mar 68 (FM CG, 3d MAR DIV TO CG, 1 ACD and 26th MAR REGT)

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On 31 March, radio contact was established between all points, and by morning of D-Day most voice circuits were in operation. Installation of teletype circuits proved difficult. Some were established by the evening of 1 April. Activation of all teletype circuits; however, was delayed by several days. The problem was one of interface between U. S. Army VHF and USMC tropo equipment. The problem was solved by mutual and constant cooperation between Army and Marine communicators at the operator, command and staff levels. <sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>

MEMO, AVII-SC, HQ PCV, 28 April 1968, op. cit.

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NOTE:

With Operational Control of the 26th Marine Regiment passing from the CG, 3d Marine Division to the CG, 1st Cavalry Division, Operation SCOTLAND I was terminated at 0800H Hours, 31 March 1968. Statistics for operations involving Khe Sanh Combat Base prior to that date have been reported as a part of Operation SCOTLAND.

of the 3d Bde, 1 ACD. The western Corps zone was cloudy during the morning hours with ceilings 0 to 300 feet. Visibility was reduced to 0 to 2 miles in fog and light drizzle during the morning hours. By early afternoon the weather had cleared sufficiently for the lift and the brigade began landing in support bases north and south of Route 9. The Brigade headquarters moved into LZ MIKE (48Q XD 935410) with the 1st Bn, 7th Cavalry (closed at 1350H) and the 2d Bn, 7th Cavalry (closed at 1650H). The 5th Bn, 7th Cavalry assaulted into LZ GATE (48Q XD 928438) and closed at that location by 1455H hours.

By nightfall the two Marine battalions were on a line extending from 48Q XD 9847 to 48Q XD 9942, with units of the 3d Bde having established defensive positions in the vicinity of LZ MIKE and LZ GATE.

The deception operation northeast of Dong Ha was concluded on 1 April with light contact. The friendly forces, consisting of the 2d Bn, 4th Marines, 3d Sqdn, 5th Cav (U.S. Army), and the ARVN Task Force (1st Bn, 2d Inf. and 3d Bn, 1st Inf.) secured objectives on the south side of the DMZ with no FVMAF casualties reported.

Night B-52 strikes were flown in support of Operation PEGASUS,

The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (reinforced) attacked, on 1 April, by a combination of air and ground assaults to establish fire support bases and conduct offensive operations on an axis from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh. The attack was to clear and open Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh Combat Base and to destroy the enemy forces in the assigned area of responsibility.

At 0700H hours, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, attacked west out of Ca Lu. The 1st Marines' battalion attacked to the north of Route 9 and seized Objective 6 (48Q XD 997467), while the 2d Bn, 3d Marines attacked south of Route 9 and took Objective 1 (48Q YD 014437). Meeting little resistance the 2d Bn, 3d Marines continued on to overrun Objective 7 (48Q YD 005431).

As the Marines initiated tactical operation west of Ca Lu, Company B, 11th Engineer Bn, commenced the repair and up-grading of Route 9. As the operation progressed, and as infantry maneuver elements cleared the flanks of the road, two additional engineer companies were committed to the project. The engineers constructed four by-passes and cleared 1.5 kilometers of Route 9 on D-Day.

Early morning fog delayed the planned 0700H air assault by elements

four of which were in the vicinity of Khe Sanh Combat Base. Poor weather in the morning cut tactical air support to 66 sorties at Khe Sanh. U.S. Air Force resupply of material consisted of eight C-130 and four C-123 air drops for an input of 115.6 tons. Twenty-four helicopters landed cargo to boost the total input to 149.5 tons. One C-123 landed with 44 passengers.<sup>53</sup>

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SIT REP, HQ PCV, 010001H to 012400H Apr 68, No 023

INTSUM, HQ PCV, 010001H to 012400H Apr 68, No 22-68

SPEC REP, HQ PCV (TOO), 010900H to 020900H Apr 68

CDR'S DAILY SUM, HQ PCV, 011200H to 021200H Apr 68

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Operation PEGASUS continued on 2 April with the 2d Bn, 1st Marines and the 2d Bn, 3d Marines attacking west, in zone, commencing at 0655H. Completing a vertical envelopment at 1745H, Co E, 2d Bn, 1st Mar received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown-size enemy force in the vicinity of 48Q XD 963448. Fire was returned and a helicopter gunship supported the Marines. Results of the engagement were one U.S. KIA, four U.S. MIA, three NVA KIA, and two detainees. Four AK-47 rifles, one B-40 rocket launcher, and

one Chinese Communist (Whicom) grenade were captured. Moving from the area a booby trap was detonated wounding an additional Marine. At 2000H the western most defensive positions for the 2d Bn, 1st Mar were at 48Q XD 965445 (Co's. E and G) and for the 2d Bn, 3d Mar at 48Q XD 985420 (Co's. F and H). The 1st Bn, 1st Marines remained responsible for security of Ca Lu and LZ STUD. The combined effort of the U.S. Army and Marine Engineers and the Navy Construction Battalion completed two bridges and two more bypasses as they cleared almost three kilometers of Route 9.

The 2d Bn, 7th Cavalry conducted an air assault beginning at 1300H into a landing zone in the vicinity of 48Q XD 890405 (LZ THOR).

All D plus One objectives were taken with only light contact throughout the PEGASUS AO. Other elements of the 3d Bde conducted clearing operations in the vicinity of their operating bases.

Six B-52 strikes with a total of 36 aircraft were flown in support of Operation PEGASUS. Five of the strikes were in the area around KSOB. The U.S. Navy flew 87 tactical air sorties, the Air Force flew 32, and the Marine Air Wing flew 23 in support of PEGASUS. Air Force resupply of material into Khe Sanh consisted of seven C-130 and four C-123 air drops for an input of 91.4 tons.

General Rosson lauded the logistical effort which had been largely responsible for Operation PEGASUS being able to meet the tight schedule imposed to take maximum advantage of the weather. He recognized that the launching of the operation on schedule had been due in a large part to the outstanding and dedicated efforts of the logistical agencies supporting PCV. General Rosson informed General Cushman:

Against short deadlines, and with exercise of the highest degree of professional expertise, the officers and men of Naval Support Activity, Force Logistical Command, United States Army Support Command (Prov), the 11th Marine Force Engineers, and the 3d Naval Construction Brigade developed a logistics base at the place required, at the time required and at effective stockage levels. All concerned have acquitted themselves with distinction.

This truly joint effort provides not only a source of pride and gratification, but reflects great credit on the logistical elements of participating Services. WELL DONE.<sup>56</sup>

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MSG, HQ PCV, dtg 020200Z Apr 68, Subject: Operation PEGASUS, (Fm CG, PCV to CG, III MAF)

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On 3 April, LTG Rosson notified IG Tolson that BG Troung had concurred with the concept for the use of ARVN forces in linking-up with the 37th Ranger Battalion in Khe Sanh. In accordance with General Tolson's plans, a company of the ARVN Task

Thirty-six helicopters landed with cargo to raise the total cargo delivered to 162 tons. Weather in the PEGASUS area was marginal until noon due to ground fog and haze. Scattered clearing developed after noon returning to fog and haze by 1800H. Visibility was going to 3 to 5 miles, lowering again after sunset.<sup>54</sup>

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SIT REP, HQ PCV, 020001H to 022400H Apr 68, No 024-68  
INTSUM, HQ PCV, 020001H to 022400H Apr 68, No 23-68  
SPEC REP, HQ PCV (TOC), 020900H to 030900H Apr 68  
CDR'S DAILY SUM, HQ PCV, 021200H to 031200H Apr 68

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When the 3d Bde, 1 ACD units air assaulted into LZ's CATES and MIKE on D-Day they were followed by 105mm batteries of the 1st Bn, 21st Artillery. By early evening Battery C had airlifted into LZ CATES while Battery B was moved into LZ MIKE. After the 2d Bn, 7th Cav completed its air assault into LZ THOR of 2 April, Battery A of the 21st Artillery closed into the landing zone at 1650H.<sup>55</sup>

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ARTILLERY SIT REP, HQ PCV, 1 Apr and 2 Apr 68

Force was to be made available to him at Quang Tri on the morning of 4 April.<sup>57</sup>

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MSG, HQ PCV, dtg 031339Z Apr 68

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Two battalion-size air assaults and one battalion airlift by elements of the 2d Bde, 1 ACD, previously scheduled for D plus Three were moved up to D plus Two in order to extend ground actions in Operation PEGASUS to the southeast of Khe Sanh Combat Base. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry conducted an airlift to LZ STUD to stage for commitment into their portion of the 1 ACD's AO. At 1225H the 2d Bde began the air assaults. The 2d Bn, 5th Cav attacked LZ TOM (48Q XD 900345). The 2d Bn, 12th Cav assaulted into LZ TIMOTHY (48Q XD 880360) and secured the area for the landing of the 1st Bn, 5th Cav. All 2d Bde units, including A, B, and C Batteries, 1st Bn, 77th Artillery, closed into the brigade AO with only light contact. At 1330H in the vicinity of LZ TOM. Co. D, 2nd Bn, 5th Cav, received four rounds of recoilless rifle fire resulting in ~~one U.S. KIA, and five wounded.~~ LZ TIMOTHY came under artillery attack at 2215H, while the 3d Bde's LZ MIKE came under mortar

attack about ten minutes later. Three men were killed at LZ TIMOTHY while the 1st Bn, 7th Cav. at LZ MIKE suffered no casualties.

3d Bde elements conducted local ground operations around LZ MIKE, LZ THOR, and LZ GATES on 3 April, while the 1st Marine Regiment units advanced to the western boundary of their assigned AO. Engineer units working on Route 9 were working on the bridge at 482 KD 976435 at the close of D plus Two.

Weather in the Khe Sanh area on 3 April was low overcast with heavy fog during the morning. Partial clearing by 1400H permitted resupply until marginal conditions returned at 2200H. Air Force resupply of material consisted of five C-130 and three C-123 air drops for an input of 75.4 tons. Nine helicopters landed with cargo and the total input on 3 April was 85.6 tons. The lower input into Khe Sanh was requested because desired stockage levels inside the combat base had been reached.

Five B-52 strikes were flown in support of PEGASUS with all of the missions supporting the Khe Sanh complex. One hundred thirty-six tactical air sorties were flown by Air Force, Marine, and Navy pilots in support of the operations.

The deception plan, initiated on 30 March, had been so successful that it was continued as a separate operation by the 3d Mar Div. The 3d Bn, 3d Marines in coordination with the 2d ARVN Regt, began sweeping south from Gio Linh (48Q YD 213732) with final objectives west of Dong Ha. <sup>58</sup>

58

SIT REP, HQ PCV, 030001H to 032400H Apr 68, No 025.

INTSUM, HQ PCV, 030001H to 032400H Apr 68, No 24-68

SPEC REP, HQ PCV (TO3), 030900H to 040900H Apr 68

SIT REP, HQ 1 ACD, 030001H to 032400H Apr 68

On 4 April, the 26th Marine Regiment, under OPCON of the 1 ACD since 31 March, attacked out of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. At 0600H, the 1st Bn, 9th Marines moved southeast with Hill 471 (48Q YD 846939) as their objective. Prior to and during the assault, the Marines were supported by extensive artillery fire. Although the attacking force met little resistance, 30 NVA bodies were discovered. The hill was secured by 1720H. During the night, the Marines received one hundred eight 82mm mortar, seventy-two 122mm rocket, and twelve 152mm artillery rounds into their positions. Seven Marines were killed and thirty-four wounded.

The 2d Bn, 1st Marines and the 2d Bn, 3d Marines, west of Camu, concentrated on clearing the area around Route 9. G Company, 2d Bn, 3d Mar south of Route 9, engaged seven enemy soldiers at 1545H. Artillery was fired resulting in one NVA killed and one AK-47 rifle captured.

At LZ THOR, the 2d Bn, 7th Cav continued to secure the area around the landing zone. Companies A and C engaged an enemy force of unknown size in the vicinity of 48Q XD 883399, at 1340H. Artillery supported the two companies. Result of the engagement were: two U.S. KIA, five U.S. WIA, seven NVA KIA, four AK-47's, one light machine gun, one Soviet transformer, one Chicom Claymore mine, and an assortment of ammunition captured.

The artillery build-up within the operational area continued with the airlifting of Battery A, 1st Bn, 30th Artillery into LZ TIMOTHY at 1510, and Battery B, 1st Bn, 77th Artillery into LZ TOM at 1600H.

Six B-52 strikes were flown in support of the Khe Sanh area, delivering 900 tons of ordnance. Tactical air strikes flown during the day included 11 U.S.M.C., 51 Air Force, and 114 Navy sorties. Sixty-two of the strikes were in the immediate

vicinity of Khe Sanh.

Total Air Force resupply of material accounted for 105.9 tons. Five C-130 and four C-123 air drops were made with three of the C-130's delivering cargo using the ground parachute extraction system. Fifteen OH-46 and two OH-53 helicopters landed with cargo boosting the input to 170 tons. One C-123 landed with 44 passengers.

Northern I Corps was overcast during the early morning hours with ceilings ranging from 0 to 300 feet. Visibility was 0 to 3 miles in fog during the early morning hours. After 0900H visibility was generally 3 to 5 miles in haze and fog.<sup>59</sup>

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59

SIT REP, HQ PCV, 040001H to 042400H Apr 68, No 026

INTSUM, HQ PCV, 040001H to 042400H Apr 68, No 25-68

SPEC REP, HQ PCV (TSS), 040900H to 050900H Apr 68

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At 0515H on the morning of 5 April, an estimated NVA battalion launched a counter-attack against elements of the 1st Bn, 9th Marines occupying Hill 471. In what was later to be described by LTC Cushman as one of the highlights of the battle for Khe Sanh.<sup>60</sup>

A, B, and D Companies of the 9th Marines held off the enemy force. Contact continued throughout the day as the enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, B-40 rocket and mortar fire against the friendly positions. Tactical air, artillery and mortar fire supported the Marines. The battalion lost one man killed and 19 wounded while accounting for 122 NVA killed and five prisoners. The prisoners revealed that the Marines had successfully thrown back the 7th Bn, 66th Regiment, 304th NVA Division. The enemy also lost 13 Light machine guns, 29 AK-47 rifles, two SKS rifles, one B-40 rocket launcher, one AK-50 rifle, one 60mm mortar and miscellaneous grenades, equipment, and food stuff.

The 1st Bde, 1 ACD began moving to LZ STUD where they were to stage in preparation of an air assault into their assigned AO. By 1330H the first assault elements of the Bde landed in LZ BRANTER (48° 20' 845344). Meeting no resistance on the LZ, the Bde, less the 2d Bn, 8th Cav closed by 1515H.

Contact was moderate to heavy throughout the operational area as

cavalrymen and Marines concentrated on company-size operations to secure the dominating terrain around Khe Sanh and along Route 9. Elements of the 1st Bn, 5th Cav; 1st Bn, 8th Cav; 2d Bn, 7th Cav; 1st Bn, 12th Cav; as well as the 1st Bn, 9th Marines made contact with enemy units of up to estimated battalion strengths.

At 1100H, an aerial rocket artillery (ARA) helicopter engaged an enemy tank seven kilometers south of KSCB (vic 480 8635). The tank had been firing into LZ 53 OTTY and withdrew to the south when fired upon with 2.75 in. rockets.

Route 9 had been reconstructed for a distance of 5.5 kilometers from Ca Lu; four bridges and twelve bypasses had been completed by the end of D plus Four. Resupply efforts into Khe Sanh accounted for 180.7 tons. Eighty-four point one tons were air-lifted by helicopter while the Air Force C-123 and C-130 air drops delivered 96.6 tons. A 30 day supply of rations and 17 plus days of major ammunition was on hand in the combat base as plans were made for the 1 ACD units to start drawing from Khe Sanh stocks as well as from the FSA/RSB at Ca Lu.

Weather in the northern portion of the Corps area of operations was marginal with overcast ceiling ranging from 0 to 500 feet in the early morning. After 1200H the area was partly cloudy.

to cloudy with ceiling above 3000 feet. After 2000H, all areas had ceilings ranging from 800 to 2000 feet. Visibility was 0 to 3 miles in fog during the early morning hours. After 1000H visibility was 4 to 6 miles in haze.

Two Arc Light (B-52) strikes with a total of 12 aircraft were flown in support of the operation. Tactical air strikes flown in support of PEGASUS added up to 140 sorties. Of these the Marines flew 72, the Air Force 17, and the Navy 51. Eighty-nine of these were delivered in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh Combat Base.

The base itself continued to be harrassed by enemy artillery and mortar rounds. A total of 57 incoming rounds were accounted for during the period 0900H, 5 April to 0900H, 6 April. Cumulative results for the first five days of Operation PEGASUS showed 302 enemy killed, 35 individual and 16 crew-served weapons captured.<sup>61</sup>

61

SIT REP, HQ PCV, 050001H to 052400H Apr 68, No 027

INTSUM, HQ PCV, 050001H to 052400H Apr 68, No 26-68

SPEC REF, HQ PCV (TOC), 050900H to 060900H Apr 68

SIT REP, HQ 1 AGD, 050001H to 052400H Apr 68, No 096

During the early morning hours (0410H to 0500H) of 6 April, Company B, 1st Bn, 12th Cav received two B-40 rocket and 15 60mm mortar rounds into their positions southwest of LZ SHAPPER. Small arms and artillery were called in on the enemy location. A search of the area, following the encounter, revealed 12 NVA killed. Eight B-40 rocket rounds, two AK-47's, one AK-50, four gas masks, 12 AK-47 magazines and some miscellaneous documents were captured. No friendly casualties were sustained. Later in the morning elements of the 1st Bn, 12th Cav conducting security operations in the general area where the enemy tank had been engaged the previous day found 28 NVA bodies, 12 individual and one crew-served weapon. West of LZ SHAPPER, at 0800H, A Company, 8th Cav found an additional NVA body and one AK-47 rifle.

Within the 2d Bde's AO, the 1st and 2d Bn, 5th Cav conducted local operations around LZ's TIMOTHY and TOM. At 1152H, Company D, 1st Bn, 5th Cav in the vicinity of TIMOTHY, was hit with 70 rounds of unknown size mortars. Artillery was fired on the suspected enemy positions with unknown results. Forty-seven U.S. soldiers were wounded by the enemy attack.

The 2d Bn, 12th Cav moved northeast from LZ TIMOTHY to relieve the 1st Bn, 9th Marines on Hill 471. With the relief effected by 1200H, the Marines initiated a clearing attack to the northwest.

At 1400H C Company, 5th Bn, 7th Cav air assaulted into the high ground northeast of Khe Sanh Combat Base in the vicinity of 48Q XD 850425. Thirty-five minutes later, Company B, of the same battalion, assaulted northeast of Khe Sanh into 48Q XD 860422.

Making a sweep southwest of KSCB, C Company, 2d Bn, 7th Cav engaged a sniper at 1346H, resulting in one NVA KIA. Continuing their operations to within three kilometers of the base, the company killed 14 of the enemy and captured 15 individual weapons, five crew-served weapons, six cases of 60mm mortar ammunition, 100 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, one motor cycle, and 100 rockets of Russian manufacture.

Five kilometers northwest of KSCB, G Company, 2nd Bn, 26th Marines engaged a company-size force. The Marines received heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and artillery fire. Fire was returned, supported by mortars and artillery. Contact which began around noon continued until 1930H. The results were four USMC KIA, 47 wounded, and 48 NVA killed.

The initial relief of Khe Sanh and the link-up of forces came at 1350H, 6 April, when a company from the ARVN Airborne Task Force air-landed in the base and linked-up with the ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion. Sweeping outside their perimeter, in

conjunction with the operations of the 26th Marine Regiment, the Ranger battalion moved into an area previously hit with tactical air and artillery support. The Vietnamese units found 70 NVA dead, four 60mm mortars, 16 AK-47's, six SKS's, two LMG's, one 12.7mm heavy machinegun, and one flare pistol.

Artillery support at LZ SNAPPER was increased on 6 April over the one 105mm Howitzer battery (Battery A, 2d Bn, 19th Artillery) which was air land on the previous day. Battery B, 2d Bn, 19th Arty was airlifted into SNAPPER at 1145H, and Battery B, 1st Bn, 30th Arty at 1745H.

Resupply of materials amounted to 76 tons dropped from C-123's and C-130's while helicopters landed an additional 112 tons.

Two B-52 strikes delivered a total of 360 tons of explosives in support of the Khe Sanh perimeter, while 115 tactical air strikes were flown in the PEGASUS AO. The Marine Corps flew 63, the Air Force flew 48, and the Navy flew 4 sorties.

Weather in the Khe Sanh area was marginal on 6 April with fog until 1000H and thereafter clear.<sup>62</sup>

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62

SIT REP, HQ PCV, 060001H to 062400H Apr 68, No 028

INTSUM, HQ PCV, 060001H to 062400H Apr 68, No 27-68

SIT REP, HQ 1 ACD, 060001H to 062400H Apr 68, No 097

Enemy resistance in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh Combat Base began to decrease on 7 April as elements of the 1 ACD; the 26th Marine Regiment, with the 1st Bn, 9th Marines; and the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion cleared to the south, east, and north. While the enemy initiated attacks by fire were fewer, ground probes against friendly positions continued.

One battalion of the ARVN Airborne Task Force began air assaulting into LZ SNAKE (48Q XD 815274), two kilometers southwest of Khe Sanh Base, at 1314H. The initial landing of the battalion (minus one company which had air-landed in Khe Sanh the previous day) was unopposed. However, at 1435H heavy mortar and artillery fires were received in the landing zone. The battalion (minus) closed into LZ SNAKE by 1650H.

At 1335H Company B, 2d Bn, 7th Cav south of LZ THOR, in the vicinity of 48Q XD 881400, found 24 NVA bodies believed to have been killed in the previous days fighting. Shortly after finding the enemy dead the company observed and killed five additional NVA. Less than 2,000 meters to the west D Company, 2d Bn, 7th Cav, found 30 NVA soldiers, in uniform, in a mass grave.

F and G Companies, 2d Bn, 26th Marines, operating northwest of KSCB in the vicinity of 48Q XD 811431 contacted an estimated enemy company

in well dug-in positions. The NVA employed small arms, automatic weapons supported by mortars. The Marines attacked with organic weapons supported by mortars. Contact was broken by the Marines at 2030H. Friendly casualties were two KIA and 21 wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown.

Artillery ground and air observers were particularly successful on D plus Six in placing fire on hostile elements. They were credited with 46 enemy killed.

Weather in the PEGASUS area was clear following an early morning haze and 242 tactical air strikes were flown in the operational area. The 7th Air Force topped the list with 108, while the Navy ran a close second with 91. The Marines flew the rest. Only two B-52 strikes hit in the PEGASUS area as US and ARVN ground troop worked on all sides of the previously surrounded outpost.

By 7 April, the engineers working on Route 9 had completely re-constructed over 8 kilometers of the road and had replaced or rebuilt five of the nine bridges to Khe Sanh.<sup>63</sup>

63

SIT REP, HQ PCV, 070001H to 072400H Apr 68, No 029

SPEC REP, HQ PCV (TCC), 070900H to 080900H Apr 68

CDR'S DAILY SUP, HQ PCV, 071200H to 181200H Apr 68

At 0350H on the morning of 8 April, an element of the ARVN Airborne Task Force came under a ground attack near the 3d ARVN Abn Bn Command Post (48Q XD 812372). The element again received small arms with mixed mortar fire at 0410H. The enemy withdrew at 0715. A sweep of the area revealed 74 enemy KIA with two detainees and 39 weapons captured. ARVN casualties were 11 KIA and 30 WIA.

The 1st Co, 3d ARVN Abn Bn, engaged an estimated enemy squad at 1600H. The squad was protecting an artillery forward observer party in the vicinity of 48Q XD 889388. At 1735H contact was terminated with one friendly KIA, one enemy KIA, three individual weapons and one radio captured from the enemy.

All elements of the 3d ARVN Abn TF, which consisted of the 3d (minus 1st Co), 6th and 8th Abn Bns, closed at LB SNAKE seven kilometers west of Khe Sanh Base. The task force began offensive operations to the west along Route 9.

Completing the 3d Bde, 1 ACD's link-up with the Combat Base, C Co, 2d Bn, 7th Cav closed at Khe Sanh at 1000H, followed by the 3d Bde headquarters at 1015H. The 1st and 5th Bns, 7th Cav continued to secure the area around LZ MIKE, LZ CATES, and LZ THOR. Companies B and C, of the 5th Bn, 7th Cav had received small arms fire and nine rockets into their perimeter (48Q XD 851425) earlier that morning.

In the 2d Bde AO, the 1st Bn, 5th Cav worked out of LZ TIMOTHY and LZ TOM with the 2d Bn, 5th Cav conducting operations in the vicinity of an old French fort at 48Q XD 858387. The 2d Bn, 12th Cav, situated on Hill 471, sent two companies attacking to the south into the village of Khe Sanh (48Q XD 847382).

Within the 1st Bde's area of operation, the 1st Bn, 12th Cav continued operations southwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base. At 1000H Company D, 1st Bn, 12th Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force at 48Q XD 829398. The enemy broke contact at 1030H. The results of the actions were five U.S. KIA and three enemy killed with five weapons captured.

Attacking to the west of Khe Sanh, the 1st Bn, 9th Marines seized Hill 869 (48Q XD 803409) at 0730H with no opposition. Northwest of KSCB Companies F and G, 2nd Bn, 26th Marines found 37 NVA killed from a contact the night before at 2030H.

A total of 119 sorties of tactical air struck in support of the area with ninety in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. Air Force resupply consisted of two C-130 and four C-123 air drops. Thirteen helicopters land with cargo while two C-123's landed with 45 passengers. 64

64

SIT REP, HQ PCV, 080001H to 082400H Apr 68, No 030

SPEC REP, HQ PCV (TOC), 080900H to 090900H Apr 68

INTCOM, HQ PCV, 080001H to 082400H Apr 68, No 29-68

The 1st Bde on 9 April conducted operations around LZ SNAPPER with offensive maneuvers to the north northwest. Eight kilometers south of Khe Sanh Combat Base (48Q XD 831326), Co A, 1st Bn, 8th Cav received sniper fire at 1014H. Artillery and tactical air support were called in on the enemy's positions. The results were one friendly and eight enemy killed.

At the same time, Company B, 1st Bn, 12th Cav engaged two individuals attempting to avoid contact; results: two NVA KIA.

A cache was discovered in the area (48Q XD 7853557) consisting of: 300 Chicom grenades, 50 B-40 rockets, one AK-47 rifle, one Chicom 7.62mm rifle, one SKS rifle, and one M-60 machinegun.

Moving northeast (48Q XD 834384) they found 50 NVA killed by either tactical air strikes or artillery at 1114H.

At 1855H Company C, 1st Bn, 12th Cav received 22 rounds of artillery. Counterfire was placed on the suspected enemy location (48Q XD 770320). Enemy losses were unknown while one US soldier was wounded.

In operations four kilometers south of KSCB, Company D, 1st Bn, 12th Cav found a large weapons and ammunition cache containing: 15 AK-47's, 29 SKS's, four 82mm mortars (three with baseplate), one 81mm mortar with baseplate, one Browning Automatic Rifle,

one 82mm launcher (B-10), two .45 cal. pistols, one M-60 machinegun, three B-40 rocket launchers, one PPS-43 sub-machinegun, five light machineguns, four M-16's, 943 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, 153 B-40 rockets, 617 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, 20000 Chicom grenades, 50,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 500 pounds of TNT, and 25 pounds of medical supplies.

The 1st Bn, 5th Cav continued to secure LZ TOM and TIFOTHY within the 2d Bde's area of operation. South of Khe Sanh the 2d Bn, 5th Cav and the 2d Bn, 12th Cav conducted offensive operations. Company D, 2d Bn, 5th Cav uncovered a grave containing 35 MVA bodies at 0905H in the vicinity of 48Q XD 855375. Moving further to the south, they found an ammunition cache at 1330H. The cache contained 141 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, 48 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition and one individual weapon.

At 1100H Company A, 2d Bn, 12th Cav located a cache (48Q XD 858394) consisting of: 34 Chicom grenades, 22 B-40 rockets, seven Soviet rifle grenades, six Chicom anti-personnel mines, five Chicom rifle grenades, 13 60mm mortar rounds, 700 light machinegun rounds, 150 AK-47 rounds, 30 pounds of Chicom explosives, one SKS rifle, and 16 Chicom gas masks.

Another cache was found at 1615H, in the vicinity of 48Q XD 849375, by A Company, 2d Bn, 5th Cav. Included in the find were six

AK's, five AK-47's, two light machineguns, one M-2 carbine, and one .45 cal. submachine gun (grease gun) and one 12-gauge shotgun.

In the 3d Bde area, the 2d and 5th Bns, 7th Cav conducted offensive operations in the area around the Khe Sanh base, while the 1st Bn, 7th Cav continued to secure LZ MIKE and LZ THOR. The command post of the 5th Bn, 7th Cav was airlifted into the combat base proper.

The 26th Marine Regt continued to initiate attacks to the northwest of Khe Sanh in an effort to secure the base. An element of K Company, 1st Bn, 26th Marines found eight NVA bodies in a shallow grave at 1100H (48Q XD 779445). To the south of that location, the 3d Bn, 26th Marines received automatic weapons and 120 mm mortar fire at 1115H. Artillery returned fire on the suspected enemy positions. The results were one Marine killed and 13 wounded. Enemy losses were undetermined.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Bn, 9th Marines, received 18 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at 0720H. Artillery supported the Marines. Friendly casualties were two KIA and four wounded.

In operations northwest of LZ STUD, B Company, 1st Bn, 1st Marines at 1047H attempted an airlift into an LZ at 48Q XD 995512. The landing had to be aborted because of intensive ground fire. Heavy preparatory fires preceded the second assault and the unit successfully landed at 1215.

The 3d ARVN ABN TF continued offensive operations out of LZ SNAKE on 9 April. An element of the 6th ABN Bn received a grenade into their defensive position in the early morning hours. At 0600H, the ARVN unit maneuvered against the enemy force, five kilometers south of KSCB, and succeeded in capturing an NVA officer. An unknown size enemy force attacked the 8th ABN Bn at 0800H near LZ SNAKE. The enemy employed small arms and automatic weapons fire. Contact was broken at 0815H with eight enemy killed and five individual and one crew-served weapon captured. The 3d ABN Bn (48Q XD 795393) at 1200H came under artillery attack with enemy losses unknown. At 1555H, the same unit, received mortar and small arms fire approximately one kilometer south-east of the previous encounter. Counter-mortar fire was returned, again with unknown enemy losses. Ten additional ARVN soldiers were wounded. Battery C, 1st Bn, 30th Artillery was airlift into LZ SNAKE from LZ STUD, during the day to support the Task Force.

Three C-123's landed at Khe Sanh along with nine helicopters to deliver 19 tons of equipment. There were no air drops on 9 April because the airstrip was open to all types of aircraft.

One hundred five sorties were flown in support of the area with 69 strikes in the immediate vicinity of the combat base. There were no B-52 strikes flown in support of Operation PEGASUS. <sup>65</sup>

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SIT REP, HQ PCV, 090001H to 092400H Apr 68, No 031

HTTSUM, HQ PCV, 090001H to 092400H Apr 68, No 30-68

SIT REP, HQ 1 ACD, 090001H to 092400H Apr 68, No 100

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Operation PEGASUS continued on 10 April with supporting fires accounting for the majority of enemy casualties inflicted. The reconnaissance element of the 1 ACD, the 1st Bn, 9th Cav was extremely active. At 0915H an element of Company A, 1st Bn, 9th Cav killed one NVA in the vicinity of 48Q XD 793363. At the same time an aircraft from the same unit observed a PT-76 tank located in a suspected enemy assembly area. Tactical air strikes were called on the enemy tank. The PT-76 was destroyed and 15 NVA were killed. The camouflaged tank was located near 48Q XD 720375.

Later in the day another aircraft from Company A observed what the pilot estimated to be one hundred NVA in the vicinity of 480 746368. Artillery was called on the target with 30 NVA killed by artillery fires. Four secondary explosions were also observed. At 1615H in the vicinity of 480 793365, A Company engaged an additional 15 individuals who attempted to evade contact. Results of the action were three NVA KIA.

A cache of weapons was found by Company A, 2d Battalion, 5th Cav at 1205H. The cache, located at 480 854366, contained one 12.7 mm anti-aircraft weapon, one light machinegun, one B-40 rocket launcher, 50 SKS rifles, three AK-47 rifles, one M-2 carbine, and two flare pistols. Company Q, of the same battalion had discovered six NVA killed at 1130H (480 849422). At the same location where the weapons cache was found by Co A, 2nd Bn, 5th Cav, the unit also found: 12 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, two rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, 900 rounds of .50 cal. ammunition, 315 pounds of TNT, one Chicom radio receiver, 50 cans of powdered milk, 30 cans of tea, two lanterns, 112 mess kits, 2 US maps, one ice chest, 200 pounds of canned food, 600 pounds of sugar, 45 NVA packs and 25 pounds of medical supplies.

The 2d Bn, 26th Marines, located on Hill 861 (480 804444), received three rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The sporadic firing resulted in the wounding of one Marine at 1620H.

Two B-52 airstrikes hit enemy positions in the vicinity of Lang Vei (48Q MD 794363). Tactical air provided 89 sorties in support of the operation, while 177 artillery fire missions were delivered with 2,932 rounds expended.

The enemy continued to pull away from the Khe Sanh area. U.S. Army, U.S. Marines, and ARVN forces were operating in and all around the combat base with the 3d Bde, 1 ACD being responsible for the immediate security of the base itself.

Artillery elements in support of the 1 ACD began to make their extraction from the area of operation as units of the 1st and 3d Bdes began moving into the Quang Tri area.<sup>66</sup>

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66

ACT REP, HQ FCV, 100001H to 102400H Apr 68, No 032

INTSUM, HQ FCV, 100001H to 102400H Apr 68, No 31-68

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Route 9 into Khe Sanh Combat Base was officially opened April 11 as a Class 50 Road at 1600H. General Westmoreland and LTG Rosson expressed their congratulations to the 11th Engr Bn, FTF, and the 8th Engr Bn, 1 ACD for their initiative, drive, and outstanding display of engineering skill. General Westmoreland described the task as "herculean". In 11 days the engineers had reconstructed

over 14 kilometers of road, repaired or replaced 9 bridges and constructed 17 by-passes. In addition numerous sections of the road had to be cleared of landslides and craters.

Although enemy initiated attacks by fire increased, contacts consisted primarily of small unit actions as the 1 ACD elements began to withdraw from the PEGASUS AO in preparation for Operation DELAWARE. The 1st Bde, less the 1st Bn, 12th Cav airlifted into an area south of Quang Tri City, and the 37th ARVN Ranger Bn moved to Da Nang. The weather deteriorated to rain in the afternoon to slow the extraction of the 1 ACD units.

Beginning late in the morning of 11 April, A, B, and C Companies, 1st Bn, 12th Cav began moving toward the site of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp (48Q RD 783358). The camp had been over-run by NVA Forces on the night of 6-7 February. At 1437H Companies A and C received 14 rounds of undetermined size artillery in the vicinity of 48Q RD 785360. As dusk approached (1800H), B Company, 1st Bn, 12th Cav made contact with an estimated 30 individuals. Artillery and tactical air were called in on the enemy's bunkers and fighting positions. Two cavalymen were wounded while the enemy lost 27 killed. Equipment captured by the company was primarily U.S. equipment which the enemy apparently had seized when the Lang Vei camp was taken. Included were: eight carbines, one

M-1 rifle, one 3.5 in. rocket launcher, one light machinegun, two 57mm recoilless rifles, and one 81mm bipod.

An element of A Company, 1st Bn, 9th Cav, operating in the area on 7 April (48Q XD 781355) had destroyed four .50 cal. machine guns, eight .30 cal. machine guns, two 106mm recoilless rifles, two 3.5 in. rocket launchers, ten 82mm mortars, and five 4.2 in. mortars.

No aerial resupply of Khe Sanh Combat Base was made on 11 April. The levels of supply in the base remained at a satisfactory level even though some 1 ACD units were drawing on these stocks. And the FCA/FCE at Ca Lu remained the primary logistical installation in support of PEGASUS.<sup>67</sup>

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67.

CDR'S DAILY SUM, HQ PCV, 111200H to 121200H Apr 68

SINCG BNP, HQ PCV, 110900H to 120900H Apr 68

REG, HQ 1 ACD, dtg 111425Z Apr 68

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Continuing the operation in the vicinity of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp on 12 April, B Company, 1st Bn, 12th Cav, located approximately one kilometer east of the camp, received an artillery attack at 1130H. Two U.S. cavalrymen were wounded. Conducting a

search of the area, the company, at 1525H, found 13 NVA bodies in the southwest portion of the camp. Ten of the enemy had been killed by small arms, and three by artillery as the battalion fought to secure the base. In the same area, and in the vicinity of the 1st Bn, 9th Cav's engagement of 7 April, B Company found seven machineguns, two M-1 carbines, four AK-47's, two M-79 grenade launcher, one M-16 rifle, one BAR, one M-1 rifle, one 81mm mortar base plate, and the two 106mm recoilless rifles destroyed in the earlier action.

Company C, 1st Bn, 5th Cav encountered small arms fire from an estimated platoon-size force while being airlifted into an LZ (L80 XD 828321) at 1410H. With artillery supporting, fire was returned which resulted in 18 NVA killed and no U.S. casualties. Seven AK-50 machineguns, two U.S. gas masks, three M-16 magazines, five Chicom grenades, and assorted web equipment and medical supplies were captured from the enemy element. At 1630H, Companies B and C, 1st Bn, 5th Cav observed approximately 18 rounds of artillery outside their perimeter. There were no casualties.

Near the village of Nho Sanh (L80 XD 845380), Company A, 2d Bn, 5th Cav found one AK-47, one SKS, one carbine, two radio antenna (RC-292), one U.S. telephone (TA-1), one rectifier, one case of flares, two radios (AN/PRC-10), one radio (AN/GRC-9), 13 60mm rounds, 17 hand

flares, 20 carbines, 17 M-79 rounds, 20 U.S. gas masks, 5000 rounds .45 cal. ammunition, 20,000 rounds .30 cal. ammunition, 2000 rounds carbine ammunition, 4 trailers, 2 one-quarter ton trucks, one GMC truck, one civilian type bus, three bicycles, and one motor scooter. At 1518H, they located eight partially destroyed bunkers containing six rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition and one AK-47 rifle.

Northwest of KSCB, Company L, 3d Bn, 26th Marines operating between Hill 881 South (480 XD 7743) and Hill 881 North (480 7745) discovered a bunker and trench complex at 0715H. The Marines received an undetermined number of 120mm mortar rounds as they were moving into the abandoned enemy positions. Five U.S. were wounded.

The Battalion Command Post operating from Hill 881-S was hit between 1000H and 1530H with 152 rounds of 120mm mortar fire and 35 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Fire was returned on enemy position on Hill 881-N with unknown enemy casualties. Twenty-eight Marines were wounded in the attack by fire.

At 0905H, the 2d Bn, 26th Marines operating approximately three kilometers east of Hills 881 N and 881 S received two rounds of mortar fire. The 82mm mortar attack wounded one Marine.

Company B, 1st Bn, 9th Marines, at 1200H found 27 bunkers containing 50 pounds of rice, 400 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 13 Chicom grenades, two 60mm mortar rounds, eight bamboo bangalore torpedoes, and assorted items of uniforms and equipment (48Q XD 815400). Company A, in the vicinity of 48Q XD 787405, at 1500H, received 14 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Artillery and mortar returned fire. Ten U.S. were wounded with three NVA killed. Five AK-47's were captured while 97 rounds of 82mm mortar and 47 Chicom grenades were found and destroyed.

At 1145H, the 3d Bn, 3d ARVN Abn TF exchanged fire with an undetermined size enemy force. The action which occurred in the vicinity of 48Q XD 793390, resulted in four ARVN wounded and five NVA killed. The airborne unit also captured one 60mm mortar. At 1230H, the 8th Abn Bn, received three rounds of 130 mm artillery in the vicinity of LZ SNAKE. Fire was not returned since the location of the enemy artillery position could not be determined. One ARVN soldier was killed and four were wounded.

Visibility of 10 miles was reported by Forward Air Controllers as two B-52 strikes and 41 tactical air sorties were flown in support of the operation.

SIT RPT, HQ 1 ACD, 120001H to 122400H Apr 68, No 103

SPEC REP, HQ 1 CV, 120900H to 130900H Apr 68

Light resistance was encountered on April 13 throughout the PEGASUS area as the 1 ACD continued its redeployment of forces into the Quang Tri/Camp Evans complex. Two sorties of C-130 aircraft, seven sorties of C-123, and 31 sorties by CH-47 helicopter lifted personnel and equipment to the vicinity of Camp Evans. The 1st Bde, less the 1st Bn, 12th Cav and elements of the 3d Bde completed their moves out of the PEGASUS AO, as marginal weather continued to delay the movement schedule. The 1st Bn, 12th Cav came under OPCON of the 2d Bde, 1 ACD.

At 1130H the 3d ARVN Abn Task Force in the vicinity of 48Q MD 787384, received seven rounds of 82mm mortar fire and returned fire with artillery on the suspected enemy position. Five minutes later, the 6th Bn, 3d ARVN Abn TF received two rounds of 82mm mortar about 150 meters to the northeast. Four ARVN paratroopers were wounded in the two attacks by fire.

During the period 1152 to 1125, A and B Companies, 1st Bn, 12th Cav moved in and occupied the site of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. The cav troops had gone quickly through the camp at dusk

on 11 April and moved some 1000 meters to the east to the location of an older camp which had been abandoned when the newer camp was constructed. The two companies found a weapons and ammunition cache consisting of: 21 .30 cal. machineguns, six BAR's, one .50 cal. machine gun, one Soviet machinegun, one RPD light machinegun, eight carbines, one M-16 rifle, two AK-47's, six U.S. M-1 carbines, one unidentified sub-machinegun, four 81mm mortar tubes, three 57mm recoilless rifles, two B-40 rocket launcher, two M-79 grenade launchers, various mortar and machinegun base plates, tripods and bipods, 5000 rounds of 81mm mortar, 2700 rounds of .50 cal. ammunition, 1000 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle ammunition, 50 rounds of 106mm recoilless rifle, 300 rounds of 4.2 in. mortar, 400 M-79 grenades, 1000 rounds of .45 cal. ammunition, 10000 rounds of carbine ammunition, 75000 .30 cal. rounds, 25000 rounds for M-1 rifle, 200 fragmentation grenades, 50 white phosphorous grenades, and 70 smoke grenades. Also found were one radio receiver, and 11 MVA bodies.

No B-52 strikes were flown in support of the area and tactical air sorties were limited to 57 USMC flights as weather generally hampered support operations.

The 1 ACD CP and elements of the 3d Bde began their extraction

from the PEGA US operational area, in preparation for Operation  
DELAWARE.<sup>69</sup>

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69

MIT REP, HQ 1 ACD, 13000LH to 132000H Apr 68, No 104

INTSUM, HQ 2AV, 13000LH to 132400H Apr 68, No 34-68

SPEC REP, HQ PCV, 130900H to 140900H Apr 68

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On the morning of 14 April between 0240 and 0255 hours, the 1st Bn, 5th Cav received eight unknown-sized rockets, ten to fifteen mortar rounds, satchel charges, small arms and automatic weapons fire southeast of Khe Sanh (48Q XD 828321). There were six cavalrymen killed and nine wounded. Artillery fire was called in on the enemy's position. At 0410H the 1st Bn received seven more rounds of mortar; there were no casualties. As a result of the artillery support one NVA was killed.

The Khe Sanh airfield (48Q XD 8442) was hit with thirteen rounds of unknown-sized artillery and two 122mm rockets at 1200H. No casualties were sustained. Artillery support was called in on the suspected enemy's position (48Q XD 7244). At 1900H the airfield received one round of 82mm mortar.

Responsibility for Khe Sanh passed from the 3rd Bde, 1st ACD to the 2d Bde at 1100. Companies A and C, 1st Bn, 5th Cav were airlifted into Khe Sanh. LZ SWAPPER and LZ TOM were secured by D and C Companies respectively.

In the 2d Bn, 5th Cav, Company A conducted offensive operations near Hill 471 while B Company continued security operations around Khe Sanh. Company C was airlifted into Khe Sanh leaving D Company to secure LZ TIMOTHY.

The 26th Marines conducted operations north and northwest of Khe Sanh. At 0800H the 3d Bn (Companies I, K, L, and M) assaulted Hill 881 N from Hill 881 S. With artillery and tactical air support, the Marines encountered an estimated NVA battalion. At 1428H the Marines seized Hill 881 N killing 106 NVA and capturing two detainees. Seven crew-served and 59 individual weapons were captured. The Marines suffered six killed and 14 wounded.

In offensive operations northwest of Khe Sanh (1480 ZD 803443), the 2nd Bn, 26th Marines received one round of sniper fire at 0920H. They returned fire with negative results. At 1255H the Marines found one AK-47, one gas mask, two packs, three helmets, three entrenching tools, two canteens and other assorted equipment. The Command Post of the 2d Bn, 3d Marine Regiment received twelve

rounds of 81mm mortar at 1500H in the vicinity of 480 894404. 81mm mortar fire was returned with negative results. There were no Marine casualties.

At 1530 Company F found between twenty-five and thirty bunkers and fighting holes (480 865400). In addition the Marines found one TNT bangalore torpedo, three B-40 rockets, three Chicom grenades, two rolls of wire, 20 electrical caps with cords, two 82mm mortar rounds, nine 1 1/2 pound blocks of TNT, four boxes of time fuses, seven boxes of blasting caps, and other assorted articles.

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70

INTREP, HQ 1 ACD, 140001H to 142400H Apr 68, No 105

INTSUM, HQ 1 ACD, 140001H to 142400H Apr 68, No 105

INTSUM, HQ PCV, 140001H to 142400H Apr 68, No 35-68

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Provisional Corps Vietnam terminated Operation PEGASUS on 15 April at 0800H. The operation had successfully opened Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh and routed the enemy from their strongholds around the Combat Base. Task Force Glick of the 3d Marine Division, with the 2d Bde (minus), 1 ACD under its OPCCN, assumed responsibility for tactical operations in the Khe Sanh area. Operation SCOTLAND II

was launched by the 3d Mar Div at 0801H, 15 April.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> MSG, HQ PCV, dtg 170731Z Apr 68, Subject: PEGASUS/SCOTLAND  
II (U)

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The 1st Cav Div (Airmobile), the 101st Abn Div, and the 3d ARVN  
TF were already preparing to launch Operation DELAWARE.

## **Maps & Unit Dispositions**

*1:50,000 scale topographical map sheets (the kind you had) of Khe Sanh or all  
of Viet Nam are available!  
Please contact us today!*

D M Z

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Enemy Situation  
D Minus 1  
31 March 1968

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
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
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






OPERATION PEGASUS

Friendly Situation  
D Plus 3  
9 April 1968



DMZ

# OPERATION PEGASUS

## Enemy Situation After Operation PEGASUS

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XD8

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Scale 1:250,000

