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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)  
APO San Francisco 96490

DD FORM

15 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

THRU: Channels

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

## SECTION I: OPERATIONS

### 1. (C) OPERATIONS

#### a. GENERAL

(1) The reporting period covers the initiation of the following operations:

- (a) Operation CHEYENNE SPIRE (commencing 4 Feb 1969)
- (b) Operation TON THUNG III (commencing 17 Feb 1969)
- (c) Operation ELAS WEDGE (commencing 18 Mar 1969)
- (d) Operation MONTANA SCOUT (commencing 29 Mar 1969)
- (e) Operation MONTANA RANGER (commencing 13 Apr 1969)

(2) The following operations were concluded during the reporting period:

- (a) Operation TON THUNG II (terminating 16 Feb 1969)
- (b) Operation NVA/VC WERKSTRE (terminating 29 Mar 1969)
- (c) Operation ELAS WEDGE (terminating 2 Apr 1969)
- (d) Operation SHERIDAN SPIRE (terminating 2 Apr 1969)
- (e) Operation MONTANA SCOUT (terminating 12 April 1969)

(3) During the reporting period, the 1 ACD completed the extremely successful Operation TON THUNG II. Initiated on 12 November 1968, the mission of the Operation in its basic format was to eliminate and reduce the enemy threat in the TAOB by setting out to crush 4 NVA divisions and elements of a fifth operating along the more than 100-mile section of the lower Cambodian border. Final cumulative results of the Operation were:

(a) US: 279 KIA, 1,711 MIA

(b) Enemy (NV/VC): By US: 2,896/207 KIA, 37/9 PW, 461/0, detainees, 9/6 returnees, 20 defendants, 596 individual weapons, 187 crew-served weapons, 1,287 mines and booby traps, 4,873 grenades, 751,401 small arms rounds, 9,581 large caliber rounds, and 383.84 tons of rice.

(4) On 1 February 1969, the Division's 1st Air Headquarters was located at TAY NINH (XT 158513), and controlled 1/8 Cav, 2/12 Cav, 2/8 Cav, operating in the western Sheridan Sabre AO, north of TAY NINH CITY. Task force

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Duke, a two company force, continued operations in the Navajo Warhorse. The 1st Bde, with headquarters at GUM LCI, explored the 2/5 Cav, 5/7 Cav, and 2/2 Mtn (COCV), west of the LCI vicinity of the FISHHOOK (XT 6090). Headquarters, 3rd Bde at GUM LCI exercising command over 1/5 Cav, 2/7 Cav, 1/12 Cav, and 1/505 Bn (ABN), stretched east from GUM LCI to block enemy infiltration vicinity of Sarco's Jungle Trail. The following Free World Military Arrangements served with the Division during the reporting period: 11th ACR; 1/505 Bn (ABN); 2/505 Bn (ABN); 3d AVN Abn Bn; 3d AVN Marine Bn; 34th, 35th & 36th AVN Ranger Bn's. During the first part of February elements of the Division initiated operations in the Sheridan Sabre area, northeast of Bien Hoa, closing at the partition of Sheridan Sabre east of GUM LCI. On 1 February the 3rd Brigade was alerted in the area to prevent enemy movement toward Bien Hoa. During the middle of March a major adjustment of forces took place as the Division began moving from the Navajo Warhorse AO; 3d Brigade Headquarters moved to the south near the Crescent and Michelin plantation area. On 1 March CRETICOM ATLAS 4704, a combined effort with 1st Inf and 25th Inf Divisions was initiated vicinity of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. By the end of March, 1st Bde had turned over the Navajo Warhorse AO to units of the 25th Infantry Division. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, closed CRETICOM to the Division on 12 April, granted the Division additional fire power, mobility, and reaction capability, and signaled the start of CRETICOM MONTANA BRIDGE. The Cavalry Regiment operated in the Crescent area west of the Michelin Plantation initially, and then operated southwest of LZ JAK at GUM LCI. Operations in the Sheridan Sabre AO terminated in mid-April and by 12 April the 3d Brigade had begun operations in an AO south of the FISHHOOK. During the reporting period the brigades of the Division were deployed along the Cambodian border on the west to the vicinity of GUM LCI on the east, in the Sheridan Sabre AO. The 11th ACR continued CRETICOM MONTANA BRIDGE in an AO along the Division's eastern boundary. The 1st Bde at GUM LCI was comprised of 2/8 Cav, 2/12 Cav, and the 2/12 Cav; LIA KIT was the Headquarters of the 1st Bde with 1/5 Cav and 5/7 Cav (COCV); the 3d Brigade at GUM LCI controlled 1/12 Cav, 1/12 Cav and the 36th AVN Ranger Bn; the 11th ACR operated with the 1st and 2d Squadrons and 2/7 Cav (COCV).

1. 1st Brigade Operations

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period the 1st Bde was positioned in the western portion of the Sheridan Sabre AO, with LZs HUI (XT 45500), LIA KIT (XT 34623), and SF B (XT 27160). Operations in the Navajo Warhorse area centered on LZ TLD (XT 33246), controlled by Task Force Duke. Duke was comprised of a company of 1/8 Cav. On the 18th of February the 1/5 Cav relocated their new Camp LIA KIT to the new LZ DUM (XT 50360). This relocation extended the influence of the Division eastward and blocked enemy infiltration routes north of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. On 19 February a contingency mission, was motivated in response to the capture of a task force DUM TIENT during the early morning hours of 23 February. Elements of the 1/5 Cav deployed in the northeastern Michelin to block enemy movement toward. On 24 February the 1/8 Cav (-) moved to an expanded AO near LZ TLD (XT 440022). On the 25th the 2/5 Cav was released to be committed to Warhorse and given LZ TTRI (XT 421168). By the end of February the brigades were disposed with three battalions in the Sheridan Sabre and two battalions positioned in Navajo Warhorse.

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During the middle of March the 1/505 Bn (AB) replaced the 1/8 Cav on LZ TRACY, and by the end of the month Navajo Warhorse was under control of the 25th Inf Division, and the brigade's two battalions, 2/5 Cav and 2/8 Cav, occupied LZ's JESS (XT 188717) and ST BURBA (XT 274680). The 1/5 Cav, 1/8 Cav, and 2/12 Cav, had been placed TOCON to the 2d Bde to consolidate the eastern part of the Division AC. On 2 April, the 2/12 Cav was returned TOCON to 1st Bde. For the remainder of the month the battalions continued operations with the 2/5 Cav and 2/8 Cav redirecting efforts north to occupy fire bases IKE (XT 338719), and CAROLYN (XT 278788), respectively.

(2) The 1st Brigade participated in OPERATION TONG THUNG II and TONG THUNG III in AC's Navajo Warhorse I and II located along the Cambodian border in HAU NGHIA Province, and AC Sheridan Sabre (now called Montana Scout) located to the north of TAN BINH CITY. In February, the 1st Brigade captured over 150 tons of rice along with 3.5 tons of salt. The month of March netted ammunition caches totalling 20 tons and was highlighted by two ground attacks on LZ GIANT, with a cost to the enemy of 217 KIA's and 2 PW's. The Brigade made very light contact in April as the enemy attempted to regroup his forces for a suspected summer offensive. During the month several large bunker complexes were destroyed along with a regiment-sized hospital. The Brigade also captured or destroyed over 77 tons of rice and 2.5 tons of salt. Cumulative results for the 1st Brigade during the reporting period included; enemy (NVA/VC) 962/27 KIA, 27/2 PW; 354 weapons captured, 88,895 small arms ammo seized, 2250 grenades, and 70 pounds of documents.

### c. 2nd Brigade Operations:

(1) The 2d Bde occupied LZ's JAKE (XT 625813), DCT (XT 562854), and RITA (XT 499804) in the area of the FISHHOOK at the beginning of the reporting period. The 2/2 Inf (Mech) was TOCON and provided road security and a strong reconnaissance-in-force capability within the rubber plantations. The 3d ARVN Bn employed south of the FISHHOOK, was replaced on 5 February by the 3d ARVN Marines. During the second week of February, the brigade assumed control of the 3d Bde portion of Sheridan Sabre AC, and received TOCON of the 2/505 Bn at LZ JESSA (YT 063754). The Bn moved from ODSSA to JCT on 11 February to provide a blocking force for the ARVN Marines along the Saigon River. On 14 February, the 2/505 returned to its parent unit and closed LZ JCT. The 35th Ranger Bn arrived at QUU LON on 12 February, was employed north of SONG BE for a one day operation to exploit a 1/9 Cav contact, and then on 14 February replaced the 34th Rangers on LZ DOT. On the 16th, the 3d Marines were extracted from the field and air-lifted to LOC NINH with one US artillery battery to thwart a suspected enemy threat in that area. Several days later the Marines left LOC NINH and returned to interdict the Saigon River infiltration routes. On 8 March the unit air-lifted to ST BURBA, and was placed TOCON to the 1st Bde. As a reaction to the enemy offensive of 23 February, the 5/7 Cav was deployed to LZ BUTTNS (YU 140070) to protect the Provincial Capital at SONG BE. The next day, LZ's RITA and DCT were closed, and the 2/5 Cav, 35th ARVN Rangers were placed TOCON to the 1st Bde and 3d Bde respectively. On 12 March the brigade headquarters moved to LAM KHU, releasing the 5/7 Cav to control of DIVERTY as a Phuoc Vinh defense bn, and 2/2 Inf (Mech) to parent unit control. On the 15th, 1/5 Cav, 2/8 Cav and 2/12 Cav in southern Sheridan Sabre AC were placed TOCON to the 2d Bde. The 1/8 Cav returned from Navajo Warhorse on 17 March and reoccupied LZ WHITE (XT 455624). The 5/7 Cav joined the 2d Bde on 30 March and reopened LZ JOK (XT 629663). On the second of

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April, LZ GRANT and 2/12 Cav returned TOCOM to the 1st Bde, and from that time until the end of the reporting period, the brigade operated from LZs MITH, D LLY, and JCE to the north of the Michelin Rubber Plantation.

(2) The results of the 2d Brigade's participation in OPERATION THUNG II from 1 February through 16 February 1969 saw 574 NVN KIA, 39 VC KIA, 477 small arms weapons and 141 crew-served weapons captured, 413,621 small arms rounds and 304.5 large caliber rounds seized, and 51.4 tons of rice destroyed. The 2d Brigade's involvement in OPERATION THUNG III from 17 February through 30 April 1969 saw 573 NVN KIA, 73 VC KIA, 104 small arms weapons and 41 crew-served weapons captured, 69,599 small arms rounds and 551.8 large caliber rounds seized, and 19.8 tons of rice destroyed.

#### 4. 3rd Brigade Operations:

(1) The 3d Brigade was disposed along a line of ricehouses in the southern tier of Sheridan Sabre AC occupying ELIMOR (XT 916736), JILL (XT 955-903), CARL (YT 058888), CDESA (YT 063754), and June (YT 137788). On 3 February, brigade jump GI and 1/12 Cav moved to Bien Hoa to prepare for deployment into the Cheyenne Sabre AC. This move was designed to thwart suspected enemy movement toward population centers. By 5 February the Brigade GI was firmly established at Bien Hoa, 1/12 Cav occupied LZ CENDY (YT 139313), and 2/7 Cav operated from LZ LIZ (YT 241345). The Brigade continued operations with two battalions in portions of the Cheyenne Sabre AC establishing LZ LOIS (YT 129229) and occupying LIL (YT 212128) on 22 February and 5 March respectively. The 35th Ranger Bn began operations in the southern part of Cheyenne Sabre on 25 February. On 12 March the 1/7 joined the 3d Brigade and initiated operations from LZ LOIS. The 3d mobile strike force became heavily engaged with a large enemy force east of the brigade's AC on 23 March. On the 25th, the force was placed TOCOM to the 3d Brigade to facilitate augmentation assisting the unit. On 26 February the 5/7 Cav was moved to LZ FIVE (YT 306255) to reinforce the 3d mobile strike force. On 30 March the 5/7 continued operations and was placed TOCOM to the 2d Brigade. The 3d mobile strike force was relieved TOCOM to the 3d Bde. From 15 to 18 April the Brigade moved from Cheyenne Sabre to an AC south of the FISBUCK. On 22 April the Headquarters of the 1/7 Cav, 1st INFANTRY (YT 537006); 1/12 Cav, LZ JETT (XT 625113); and the 36th Ranger Battalion, LZ KEE (XT 570764). A three company task force was sent to LZ KEE to respond to enemy activity. At the termination of the reporting period the brigade operated with two US battalions and one RVN Ranger battalion. One 3 company task force with an anti-airborne march company TOCOM was disposed near LZ KEE.

(2) Total enemy losses accounted for by the 3d Brigade in OPERATION CHEYENNE Sabre as of 31 March were 532 NVN KIA, 26 VC KIA, 7 PW, 93 individual weapons, 12 crew-served weapons, 12,980 pounds of rice, 33 mines, 2 booby traps, 281 grenades, 46,373 rounds of LC and 1,281 rounds of HC captured, and 18 detainees interrogated.

#### 5. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

(1) On 12 April the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was placed TOCOM to the Division and began deployment from Bien Hoa to DUY THING. On the 13th the 1/8 Cav (-) became TOCOM, and OPERATION NGUYEN RANG was initiated as the Regiment thrust into the crescent area northwest of DUY THING. This portion of OPERATION NGUYEN RANG lasted until 19 April at which time the unit returned

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to DAU TIENG for a maintenance standdown. On the 22nd of April, the 11th ACG moved from DAU TIENG to AN LOC, and on the 24th initiated operations in the northeastern portion of the Division AC approximately 15 kilometers south of the FIEHOCK. On 26 April the 2/7 Cav was placed OGCN, and at the end of the reporting period the Regiment was operating with 2 organic squadrons and an airborne battalion.

## f. 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Operations:

(1) The 1/9 Cav continued to provide general support to the Division and conducted operations for the brigades on a mission basis. The Squadron was organized primarily with one troop supporting each brigade; A Troop with 1st Brigade, B Troop with 3d Brigade, and C Troop with 2d Brigade. Due to fast moving and fluid situations, it was necessary at times for the units to support other troops or alter the normal alignments. Screening and reconnaissance missions, bomb damage assessment, securing downed aircraft, and economy of force measures continued to be the routine missions performed by the 1/9 Cav. During the reporting period A Troop was located at TAN NINH; B Troop at QUAN LOI through 17 March, at LONG BINH through 19 April, and at QUAN LOI; C Troop at THUC VIEN; and D Troop (Ground) at QUAN LOI through 12 March, and at THUC VIEN.

(2) Cumulative totals for 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Operations for the 3-month period saw 722 NVA KIA, 3 PW, 68 individual weapons and 13 C/S weapons captured or destroyed, and 32.8 tons of rice demolished.

## g. Division Cumulative Results:

(1) Results of operations from 1 February to 30 April 1969:

Enemy: Killed - 2,788; Prisoners of War - 61; Individual Small Arms and Crew Served Weapons captured or destroyed - 1,117; Friendly: Killed - 301; Wounded - 1,785.

## h. Combat Support Elements Operations:

(1) Division Artillery: Submitted separately

(2) 11th Aviation Group:

### a. Major Operations

(1) TOAN THANG II

(2) TOAN THANG III

b. General: The 11th Aviation Group continued to provide general, tactical, and logistical support for divisional and non-divisional units in III CTZ. B Company of the 227th AHB relocated on 16 Mar 69 to Di An providing better support to units in the southern portion of the Division area of operations. All major installations in the Division area of operations received numerous indirect fire attacks during the reporting period.

### c. Tactical Operations

(1) TOAN THANG II 7 Nov 68 - 16 Feb 69: The 11th Aviation Group continued to support this III Corps operation during the reporting period. The 227th and 229th AHB's provided company-size combat assaults daily. Other forms of support from 11th Group included logistical resupply, command and control, psyops, medevac, and Night Hawk/Blue recon missions. The 228th AHB was responsible for successfully relocating 1st Brigade fire bases during this operation.

(2) TOAN THANG III 17 Feb 69 - Present: TOAN THANG III began during and continued through the reporting period. This operation encompassed the annual Tet Offensive. The 227th and 229th AHB's gave aviation support to large reaction forces daily. Increased night support was given with emphasis placed on interdiction of enemy movement. Night combat assaults were conducted in southern portions of the Division area of operations. All facets

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of 11th Aviation Group support increased under TCM THUNG III during the Tet Offensive. After Tet subsided, 11th Group supported 3rd Bde relocation from Bien Hoa to Quan Loi.

d. Air Traffic control elements of 11th Aviation Group reported the following air traffic at Division Base airfield for the months of February, March, and April 1969:

(1) VFR

<u>R/W Day</u>	<u>R/W Night</u>	<u>F/W Day</u>	<u>F/W Night</u>
79998	12631	8328	908

(2) GCA: 1871

(3) During the reporting period, both GCA and NDB approaches were flight checked and certified.

Statistics for Reporting Period 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1969

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Tax</u>	<u>Hours</u>
AH-1G/UH-1B/C	7169	N/A	N/A	4356
UH-1H	94414	4025	108618	27293
CH-47	17785	24919	51243	6913
CH-61	6837	32	2356	2332

(1) Hits Fly: 42; (2) Hits No Fly: 8; Destroyed: 4

(3) 13th Signal Battalion Operations: Significant Activities:

a. Operation SHENYON SARRS: Communications installed in support of this Operation were reported in the CRLL ending 31 January 1969.

b. NAVJOC WARRHORN I, II: Additional communications installed in support of this Operation were:

(1) One 12 channel trunk group was provided from Phuoc Vinh to Tay Ninh.

(2) AN/MRC-112 four channel systems were installed from Tay Ninh to LZ's TERRY and TRACY in support of 1st Brigade operations.

c. CHEYENNE SARRS: This Operation was conducted in its entirety during the reporting period. Communications to support tactical operations in the Cheyenne Sabre AC were established as follows:

(1) One 12 channel system from Camp Corvad to Bien Hoa in support of the 3rd Brigade.

(2) FM radio retransmission facility provided at Phuoc Vinh to link 3rd Brigade Forward at Bien Hoa with rear elements remaining at Quan Loi. 3rd Brigade FM nets, B-1 and B-2 were relayed through Phuoc Vinh until all elements of the 3rd Brigade were relocated to Bien Hoa.

(3) FM radio personnel and equipment were provided at Bien Hoa to augment the 3rd Brigade's organic capability in order that they could operate simultaneously in the Cheyenne Sabre and Sheridan Sabre AC's.

(4) One AN/MRC-112 four channel system from:

- Bien Hoa to LZ CINDY
- Bien Hoa to LZ LIZ
- Bien Hoa to LZ LOIS
- Bien Hoa to LZ LIL
- Bien Hoa to LZ KATE
- LZ LIZ to LZ CINDY

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## d. MONTANA SCOUT:

(1) 1st and 2nd Brigades commenced operations in the Montana Scout AO on 29 March 1969. Communications installed for SHERIDAN SABRE were augmented as follows:

(a) One 12 channel system was installed from Camp Gervad to Lai Khe in support of the 2nd Brigade.

(b) FM retransmission sites were established on HUI BA DET and LZ DOLLY to enable the 2nd Brigade to communicate with its battalions west of the Razorbacks.

(c) A MRC-112/GRC-163 four channel system was installed from Tay Ninh to the following locations in support of the 1st Brigade:

- 1 LZ JESS
- 2 LZ CAROLYN

(2) The 3rd Brigade displaced to Quan Loi on 19 April 1969 and assumed responsibility for the northern portion of the Montana Scout AO. Communications installed in support of 3rd Brigade tactical operations were:

(a) An FM retransmission station was established at Camp Gervad to link the 3rd Brigade Forward at Quan Loi to rear elements at Bien Hoa. The brigade non-secure command net was relayed until all elements displaced to Quan Loi.

(b) AN/MRC-112 four channel systems were installed from Quan Loi to:

- 1 LZ PHYLLIS
- 2 LZ JAKE

e. MONTANA RAIDER I, II, III: This Operation was initiated on 13 April 1969 with the 11th ACR conducting RIF operations in the expanded Montana Scout AO. Phases I and II were conducted with the 11th ACR CP at Dau Tieng; the CP relocated to Quan Loi for the conduct of Phase III. Communications support was furnished as follows:

(1) Two AN/MRC-112 systems were installed from Camp Gervad to Dau Tieng during phases I and II.

(2) Circuits were obtained from the corps area system between Camp Gervad and Quan Loi during Phase III.

## (4) 8th Engineer Battalion: Operations: Significant Activities:

a. During the reporting period, the majority of the 8th Engineer Battalion's effort was directed toward support of the 1st Cavalry Division in Operations TON THANG II, CHEYENNE SABRE, SHERIDAN SABRE, NOVAJIC HORSE II, TON THANG III, and MONTANA SCOUT. Engineer efforts in III Corps continued to be directed at improving or renovating base camps in Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, and Quan Loi to accommodate the Division's aviation resources. Although most of the actual construction work was done by non-divisional resources, all coordination was effected through the 8th Engineer Battalion. Nearly all divisional engineer effort expended during this period can best be classified as direct combat support. In addition to normal minesweep, demolition, and other engineer support provided to units in the field, the battalion constructed or improved 18 fire bases for the Division, including 5 fire bases in a 4-day period in late April. All elements devoted maximum effort toward preparation for the maintenance inspections.

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Company remained at Phuoc Vinh during the reporting period. In all operations, HHC supported the line companies by placing construction equipment and water points (COC) to them. The three line platoons of HHC were also involved in various construction tasks in the development and maintenance of the Division base camp at Phuoc Vinh.

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Significant projects completed includes aircraft maintenance areas for the 227th AHB and 228th ASHB, fields of fire in the Orange, Red, White, and Brown Sectors, and an aircraft control tower for THE FIRST TEAM VII pad. Additionally, considerable effort was expended on improving the drainage in Camp Gorvad. On 12 February, work was completed at the Montagnard Refugee Camp in Song Re; over 3.5 kilometers of access roads and streets were constructed and 60 acres of land were cleared for gardens and houses. On 11 April, work was initiated to upgrade the abandoned Frek Klock airstrip (XT267788) to C-130 capability. The first C-130 landed on 28 April.

c. Company A supported the 1st Brigade during this reporting period. The base camp was located at Tay Ninh during the majority of the reporting period. The majority of base camp development and maintenance work was done by non-divisional engineer resources. One squad was committed to provide technical assistance in SEA Hut construction to the 229th AHB in Dau Tieng. Direct combat support included daily demolition and minesweep teams in support of infantry units. New fire bases TRACY, TETRI, DOLLY, IKE, CAROLYN, and JESS were opened by A Company supported by airmobile dozers, backhoes, and water points (FCQV from HHC). In Tay Ninh, limited construction projects to improve 1st Brigade unit areas were completed on a mission request basis. On 25 March, one platoon of A Company displaced to Bien Hoa to aid in constructing the Division Training Center. This platoon remained in Bien Hoa at the close of the reporting period.

d. Company B remained in direct support of the 2nd Brigade with its CT in Quan Loi until 12 March. On that date, the Company displaced to Lai Kho to co-locate with a forward CT of the 2nd Brigade. Work in both locations was directed at constructing new company areas and aiding 2nd Brigade units in area improvement projects. Work continues on limited construction projects at the close of the reporting period. On 1 April, one platoon of B Company displaced to Bien Hoa to aid in construction of the Division Training Center. This work was completed on 22 April. On 17 April, one platoon of B Company displaced to Camp Gorvad to become the general support platoon for the Division. This platoon remains at Camp Gorvad at the close of the reporting period and is currently engaged in drainage and construction of the TM club. Direct combat support included daily minesweep and demolition support to infantry units on the ground, to include elements of the 11th ACR during the period 11-22 April. Fire bases JOE, WHITE, and JUNE were reopened and rehabilitated during this period. On 24 April, B Company constructed a new fire base, LZ JAMIE.

e. Company C remained in direct support of the 3rd Brigade with its CT in Bien Hoa during most of the reporting period. On 16 April, the CT displaced to Quan Loi in conjunction with a 3rd Brigade move. Limited general support was provided to 3rd Brigade units during the reporting period as C Company continued to provide massive combat support, to include daily minesweep and demolition support, to 3rd Brigade maneuver battalions. The main company effort was directed at opening new fire bases, and on two occasions, two new fire bases were constructed on consecutive days. Fire bases JAKE, KELLY, and KATE were reopened or rehabilitated during the reporting period. New fire bases CINDY, LIZ, LOIS, and THULLI9 were reopened by C Company supported by airmobile dozers, backhoes, and water points (FCQV from HHC). One platoon of C Company was committed as the Division general support platoon in Camp Gorvad, during the period 5 March - 17 April. On 25 March, one platoon of C Company was committed to aid in construction of the Division Training Center in Bien Hoa, and that platoon remains in Bien Hoa at the close of the reporting period.

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f. The engineer effort expended during the reporting period by non-divisional engineer units has been significant. Both the 588th Engineer Battalion in Tay Ninh and the 31st Engineer Battalion in Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi responded quickly with massive construction efforts in order to upgrade new base camps in III Corps. Considerable earth work was required to expand hardstands for revetment, maintenance and flyway areas. Construction support by these two battalions continues on a mission request basis. On 17 April, the 31st Engineer Battalion completed matting the Camp Corved C-130 parking apron and airstrip with M&A steel matting. Work was continued on construction of twelve fixed-wing revetments, a 21 bay ASF, a perimeter road for Camp Corved, and a new aircraft maintenance/revetment area for the 15th Medical Battalion. This unified effort and "Can Do" attitude exhibited by non-divisional engineer troops added immeasurably to the overall effort. It freed elements of the 8th Engineer Battalion from general support missions, thereby greatly increasing the quantity and quality of direct combat support rendered to each of the three brigades.

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## 2. (C) Significant Activities

a. General: See paragraph 1a.

b. Significant activities occurring in Operation SHRIDAN SURE, MAJANO W B-HORSE, CHEYENNE SURE, MONTANA SCOUT, MONTANA RAIDER, and ATLAS WOODS during the reporting period:

(1) 7 Feb: Company A, 2d Bn, 12th Cav was conducting operations vic XT 38872 and discovered a large rice and ammunition cache. The cache included 54,000 pounds of rice, 50 B-41 rockets, 20 B-40 rockets, and 15 57mm rounds.

(2) 9, 10, and 11 Feb: The 3d ARVN Marines, under CCON of the second Brigade, was operating in vic XT 544719 when they discovered a large cache. The Marines consequently captured 105,000 AK-47 rounds, 111 122 rocket warheads, 10 oversize 122 rocket warheads, 1,380 chicom grenades, 198 82mm mortar rounds, 216 B-40 rockets, 348 60mm mortar rounds, 37 60mm mortars, complete, 22 107mm rocket launchers, 66 107mm rounds, 22 RPG machineguns, 7 RPG rocket launchers, 25 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 74 7.62mm sniper rifles, 137 AK-47 weapons, 15 anti-aircraft guns, and 10 tons of assorted ammo and equipment.

(3) 10 and 11 Feb: Company D, 2d Bn, 8th Cav, was operating near XT 3173 and found a total of 126,000 pounds of rice stored in 200 pound bags.

(4) 12 Feb: Aircraft from Company B, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav, were reconnoitering and received intense ground to air fire from several locations in the area of YU 045145. The firing continued and one LCH was shot down resulting in 3 US missing in action. Three other aircraft flying in the same area, at various times during the day, were also engaged with small arms and automatic weapons fire. In an attempt to locate the three missing personnel, Air Cavalry Infantrymen were inserted in the area. Their search was unsuccessful, but before the infantrymen were extracted, they encountered an enemy unit resulting in 8 NVA being killed in action. After the troops were extracted, the area was engaged with organic airmobile weapons, artillery, and air strikes which resulted in an additional 66 NVA being killed in action. Later, the bodies of the three missing personnel were recovered by elements of the 35th Ranger Bn.

(5) 15 Feb: In an area 1 kilometer east of Nu Ba Dien Mountain, A Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav, encountered heavy enemy contact after an LCH was shot down. The Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted to extract the crew and secure the aircraft. During the extraction of the rifle platoon, the lift helicopters received heavy small arms and B-40 fire. Two lift ships were hit and subsequently crashed and burned. A troop suffered 5 KIA's, and 18 WIA's during the brief encounter, which was followed by an immediate B-52 strike. A ground raid followed the air strike which resulted in a negative assessment of enemy casualties.

(6) 19 Feb: C Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav, located an enemy base camp at YU 238368. Eight enemy were killed by helicopter gun fire and organic weapons. Seven more enemy troops were killed by artillery. Following the barrage of artillery, the C Troop Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted and destroyed the enemy base camp. Their efforts led to an additional 6 NVA KIA and the seizure of numerous small items of equipment.

(7) 22 Feb: A Scout Helicopter from C Troop 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav, spotted a suspected enemy cache site at YT 122568. The Aero Weapons Platoon immediately engaged the area with organic weapons. Results showed 12 NVA KIA, 12 bicycles destroyed, and over a ton of rice destroyed.

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(8) 23 Feb: The enemy began an offensive characterized by standoff attacks, large scale ground attacks, and by fire. The following 1st Cavalry installations and units were attacked by fire: TAV NDM, LZ ELRON (XT 339866), LZ ANDY (XT 8291), LZ RITA (XT 499803), C/P CORV/D, LZ DOT, and Company A, 1st Bn, 12th Cav. The results of these attacks were 5 US killed and 76 wounded in action. LZ GRANT (XT 387623), repelled a ground attack which was initiated at 0330H, killing 16 of the enemy and capturing 2 others. Friendly losses consisted of one killed in action and 7 others wounded.

(9) 25 Feb: At 1155H, Company C 2/2 Mech, which was OPCCW to the 2d Bde, and Company C, 1st Bn, 5th Cav encountered and attacked a bunker complex vic XT 553482. Their action resulted in 25 NVA killed, while US forces had 11 men wounded in action.

(10) 25 Feb: At 1545H, C Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav spotted 30 individuals wearing black and green clothing at YT 100279. The Troop Commander called for artillery and an air strike while his men fixed the enemy with organic weapons. The combined firepower killed 23 NVA and set off numerous secondary explosions.

(11) 26 Feb: At 0120H, Company C, 1st Bn, 5th Cav made contact with a large enemy force in bunkers vic XT 556475. Company A, 1st Bn, 5th Cav and Company C, 2d Bn (Mech), 2d Infantry OPCCW, reinforced the engaged unit and the combined effort resulted in 150 bunkers being destroyed and 46 NVA killed. There were 15 US troops wounded in the encounter.

(12) 26 Feb: At 1705H, Scouts of C Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav began a series of engagements with enemy troops located in a bunker complex at YT 110285. Air strikes were requested and these engagements caused 10 secondary explosions. Results of the encounter revealed 23 NVA killed and there were no friendly casualties.

(13) 27 Feb: Company A, 2d Bn, 7th Cav experienced a series of contacts with an enemy force well fortified in bunkers at YT 092267. The battle raged for 4 hours with Company A, 2d Bn, 7th Cav sustaining light casualties while the enemy had 34 men killed in action.

(14) 8 Mar: The 2d Bn of the 12th Cav, located at LZ Grant (XT 387623), received a large scale ground attack supported by a heavy volume of supporting weapons. The attack began at 0030H and the enemy broke contact at 0615H. During the encounter, 157 NV were killed, 2 prisoners were taken, 23 individual weapons, and 10 crew served weapons were captured. Friendly forces had 13 men killed and 39 others wounded.

(15) 9 Mar: Company B, 2d Bn, 5th Cav was occupying a night ambush position in AC NAVEJO W/HORSE vic XT 349154, when they made contact with an enemy battalion size element. The ensuing battle cost the enemy 36 lives while US forces had 14 men killed and 31 others wounded.

(16) 9 Mar: Company B, 2d Bn, 7th Cav, made contact with an enemy company size force located at bunkers at YT 255210. Company B sustained light casualties and killed 15 enemy troops.

(17) 10 Mar: At XT 545884, B Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav spotted approximately 30 NVA dressed in new uniforms, with web gear and AK-47 rifles. The men appeared to be located in a resting area. B Troop employed IRL and air strikes to inflict maximum casualties. The action resulted in 7 NVA being killed by helicopters, 7 NVA killed by air strikes, 4 killed by IRL, and there were several blood trails leaving the area.

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(18) 11 Mar: During the night, 2d Bn, 12th Cav, who were located on LZ Grant (XT 387623), was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. The enemy unit employed a ground unit supported by mortar and rocket fire resulting in 15 friendly troops being killed and 27 others receiving wounds. The battle lasted from 0145H to 0330H with 62 enemy being killed and 2 prisoners being captured.

(19) 17 Mar: At 0143H, Company E, 1st Bn, 7th Cav was occupying a defensive position vic XT 058206. An estimated 2 platoon enemy size force overran the CP and penetrated the perimeter. In their attack, the NVA had 20 men killed, while friendly forces had 10 killed and 14 wounded.

(20) 17 Mar: At 0325H, Company E, 1st Bn, 7th Cav, located at LZ Lois (WT 129229), was attacked by an enemy force estimated to have been 2 reinforced companies. The enemy struck during the hours of darkness, using heavy mortar fire, B-40 rockets, and sapper attacks. A fierce battle ensued resulting in heavy US casualties and 12 enemy troops killed.

(21) 21 Mar: Company A, 1st Bn, 5th Cav was operating in the northern portion of the 2d Bde AO when they found an arms cache. The cache included 24 AK-47's, 4 AK-50's, and 20 SKS's. In the same area, the unit also discovered 60 bunkers and the bodies of 70 NVA who had previously been killed.

(22) 22 Mar: Aircraft from C Troop, 1st Sqn, 9th Cav made scattered contacts in the 2d Bde AO resulting in 21 NVA being killed in action.

(23) 24 Mar: Company A, 1st Bn, 5th Cav ambushed an unknown enemy size force at XT 572658. The results of the encounter were 2 NVA killed and 4 NVA taken prisoner.

(24) 2 Apr: A Troop, 1st Sqn, 9th Cav was inserted to locate a helicopter that had been recently shot down vic XT 233774. While working in the area, the Aero Rifle Platoon found and destroyed a 25 foot long bridge that crossed a stream at YT 238794. At 1120H, the unit entered an enemy base camp which had a number of well concealed bunkers with overhead cover and cook stoves. At 1130H, while working in the same area, the unit found and destroyed 2 15x20 foot structures and located several new graves. The unit also destroyed eight tons of rice. Later, at 1400H vic YT 223792, the platoon was pinned down by heavy enemy fire. With the assistance of an air strike and 'R', contact was broken resulting in 4 NVA KIA. The platoon continued on and found another bunker complex at XT 221791. The unit found in this area, food, clothing, hand grenades, and several documents. The documents were confiscated and the platoon was later extracted at 1625H.

(25) 5 Apr: The C Troop, 1st Sqn, 9th Cav Scouts at XT 438642 spotted 15 NVA and engaged them with rockets and air strikes resulting in 11 NVA KIA.

(26) 13 Apr: The 11th ACR Aero Rifle Platoon was sent to conduct bomb damage assessment vic XT 4755. The unit, while in this area engaged an enemy force. Company A, 1st Bn, 11th Cav was deployed to reinforce the platoon and quickly made sharp contact. The engagement increased in intensity and Company C, 2d Bn, 12th Cav and Company C, 1st Bn, 8th Cav were sent into the area to reinforce the two already engaged units. The action resulted in 15 US soldiers being killed, 17 others wounded, and 7 NVA were killed.

(27) 18 Apr: At 1000H, A Troop, 1st Sqn, 9th Cav, called for an air strike at XT 407760. The air strike caused one large secondary explosion, uncovered two underground mess halls that were 20x30 feet with 12 wooden tables

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in each. One office building, containing desks, and filing cabinets, 9 billets with bunk beds, and numerous bunkers were also uncovered. After the air strike at 1500H, the A Troop Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted to search the complex, but the unit found the area too intensive to fully exploit it and requested assistance. By 1535H, the friendly forces realized they had discovered a large NVA hospital complex. After finding 31 tons of rice and numerous medical supplies, the decision was made to remain in the area overnight. By the following afternoon, the Aero Rifle Platoon and the reaction force, Company B, 2d Bn, 5th Cav, had collected two laundry bags of documents, several chicom grenades, Claymore mines, books, propaganda documents, and additional medical supplies. The remainder of the afternoon was spent making an LZ so all the equipment could be evacuated. The Aero Rifle Platoon was extracted at 1711H on 17 April.

(28) 18 Apr: At 0840H an LCH from the 11th AGR, spotted and engaged an individual vic XT 433600. The aircraft, in the process, developed mechanical problems and had to make a forced landing. Tm B 1/11 moved to secure the aircraft and established contact with an enemy force in bunkers. Tm A 1/11 was then committed to reinforce the already engaged unit. The engagement resulted in 80 enemy soldiers KIA while friendly forces had suffered 6 KIA and 28 MIA.

(29) 21 Apr: Company C, 5th Bn, 7th Cav at XT 566694 made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The following day, during a sweep of the contact area, the company found 7 graves and the remains of another NVA making a total of 8 NVA being killed.

(30) 27 Apr: At XT 468724, Tm B 1/11, found a weapons cache which contained 179 bolt action Chinese carbines, 1 M-60 machinegun, and 1 50 cal machinegun.

(31) 29 Apr: At XT 416792, Tm C 1/11 engaged an enemy force in bunkers and Company A, 2d Bn, 7th Cav, and M 3/11 were called to reinforce the engaged unit. This contact resulted in 57 NVA being killed and 25 US troops being wounded.

(32) 30 Apr: Company D, 5th Bn, 7th Cav at XT 565733, received mortar, B-40, and small arms fire during the early morning hours. Later in the day, the unit swept the area and reestablished contact with an estimated enemy company size force. Scouts from C Troop, 1st Sqn, 9th Cav, Bde Scouts, JRI, and air strikes were called in support of Company D. This action resulted in 6 NVA being killed in action.

(33) 30 Apr: Tm M 2/7 received B-40 fire from an enemy force at XT 419790. The resulting battle killed 19 NVA while 5 US troops were MIA.

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### SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED

#### 1. Personnel: None

#### 2. Operations:

##### a. Aerial Loudspeaker AEW-ARS-4:

(1) Observation: The 1000-watt aerial loudspeakers without portable frames are hard to handle, slow to load into helicopters, and easily damaged.

(2) Evaluation: The Division PSYOP Section tested mounting the AEW-ARS-4 loudspeaker on both wooden and aluminum frames. The aluminum frame was harder to make, but proved to be lighter and more durable than the wooden one. The Division adopted the aluminum frame and made three. In early April 1969, a UH1H Helicopter was shot down and crashed. The AEW-ARS-4 survived the crash.

(3) Recommendation: The 1000-watt AEW-ARS-4 loudspeaker should be equipped with an aluminum frame to facilitate ground and aerial handling and to protect the equipment.

##### b. Use of Artillery Smoke:

(1) Observations: A delicate situation is often encountered in the field when an element gets pinned down by enemy in bunkers and can't attack or withdraw without accepting heavy casualties. This situation becomes even more difficult when some or many of those pinned down are already casualties. To move in either direction, they need fire support. The range at which these contacts take place (often 15-30 meters) eliminates tube artillery for close support. IRA can be used no closer than 30 meters without running the risk of additional friendly casualties. In addition, IRA is ineffective against bunkers, although the psychological effect of a screaming airborne fire spitter can be of some value for a short time.

(2) Evaluation: In a tested case it was found that the almost forgotten smoke screen can be very effective in facilitating either a continuation of the attack or withdrawal. The 105mm base ejection smoke round has been used successfully in this role to break contact when all other normal means have been used unsuccessfully. The unit is allowed to withdraw in good order, retrieving its dead and wounded without receiving further casualties. In one case, 30 rounds were found to be sufficient but this can be varied depending upon prevailing winds and terrain.

(3) Recommendation: Whenever the nature of contact precludes the use of close-in tube artillery or IRA fire support, the use of a smoke screen can perform the valuable function of allowing an engaged friendly unit to regroup, deploy, and/or maneuver. A certain risk is involved because to obtain the desired effect, the rounds must be adjusted so the pods fall within the friendly element. If a pod hits a man, it can cause a casualty but it is extremely unlikely that anyone would be killed if he had his helmet on. However, the cannister can kill regardless of the helmet status. The chances of a cannister or pods hitting friendly is smaller still, but it is a risk which must be considered. Compared to bringing IRA closer than 30 meters, the risk is negligible. Base plate fragments are also negligible and not worth consideration. This method has been proved effective and the decision rests with the commander with respect to specific employment.

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### c. Preliminary Defenses of Landing Zones:

(1) Observation: Often, it is not possible to construct complete perimeter defenses on a new LZ in one work day due to time limitations or shortages of protective devices.

(2) Evaluation: Recent experiences on division LZ's indicate that improvised materials, already available on the new LZ, may well prevent or at least give earlier warning to an impending enemy ground attack.

(3) Recommendation: Bangalore torpedoes can, in the initial stage of an LZ, be used to clear fields of fire and supplement night defenses. Placing bangalores in areas to be cleared and firing them at random during the night will serve to keep the enemy off balance and clear fields of fire at the same time. Makeshift bangalores can be made by packing C-4 into eight-foot nickets and wrapping them with barbed wire. These can then be employed in addition to or in lieu of bangalores. Trip flares should be placed in bands outside the perimeter wire with safe lanes rather than solely within the perimeter wire. The lanes should be constructed to allow infantry units leaving the LZ freedom of movement without setting off employed warning devices. Makeshift fourasse/flammies can be constructed by placing diesel or fourasse in 105mm brass and igniting them with trip flares. These devices will provide illumination for periods up to 30 minutes.

1. Carrying of CS grenades by the individual soldier for breaking contact or maneuvering against bunker complexes:

(1) Observation: Most bunker complex contacts are begun by a unit unsuspectingly walking into a well-camouflaged and densely foliaged bunker complex.

(2) Evaluation: Usually the first three men of the point squad of a platoon or platoons are automatically hit and pinned down if not immediately KIA. Action such as this occurs anywhere from 10' to 20' from the initial bunker, thereby making maneuver quite difficult without risk of further casualties.

(3) Recommendation: By having each soldier carry one CS grenade, as soon as contact is established at close range and in bunker complexes, CS can be hand thrown without waste of time, thereby enabling the unit to gain momentary maneuver superiority to assault. The point must be made aware that immediately upon contact, the agent should be utilized to overwhelm the enemy before he can react with his own counter-measures.

3. Training: None

4. Intelligence: None

5. Logistics:

#### a. Timely Response to a Fast Moving Tactical Situation:

(1) The method of operation within the Airmobile Division requires a rapid deployment of men and materials to establish a strong battalion fire support base from which the rifle companies will operate. There are often times when a decision to open a fire support base will be made and executed with less than 24 hours lead time.

(2) In order for the logistical system to react to these requirements, there must be a prepositioning of the amount of material needed to provide the infantry establishing the base and the supporting artillery overhead cover, a tactical operations center, and sufficient wire to encircle the base with one triple concertina fence on D-day. There must also be an amount of Class IV

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material readily available to sustain the strengthening of the base defense on D+1 and D+2. Experience has shown that the following list of materials is needed as a minimum:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>UI</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>UI</u>	<u>QTY</u>
Concertina	CL	420	Lumber		
Barb Wire	RL	18	2X12X16'	BF	2560
Ficket 8'	EA	1110	3X12X16'	BF	9600
Ficket 6'	EA	666	6X6X20'	RF	4800
Ficket 3'	EA	666	6X8X20'	RF	1600
Sandbags	HD	500	8X8X20'	BF	6420
Culvert 72"	EA	320			
Culvert 60"			Nails		
			16 D	LB	100
Chain Link			30 D	LB	200
Fence	RL	20	60 D	LB	200
			8" Spike	LB	100
WALL Net	BD	10	7" Spike	LB	

The above RQ will provide the following:

Bn TOC: 20'X20' Arty FDC: 10'X14' Aid Station: 12'X12'

30 Perimeter Bunkers: 8'X8'

Overhead cover for: 2 Inf Cos, Arty Btry and Cml & Control Elem.

With these standard materials, the unit is provided a fair amount of flexibility as to what can be built to meet varying requirements and situations.

(3) Recommendation: Using the above figures as a guide, each brigade should requisition through the OPCON battalions an amount of material sufficient for the establishment of two (2) fire support bases. These materials should be broken down into 7,000 pound loads and positioned for immediate use in establishing fire support bases dictated by the tactical situation.

6. Organization: None

7. Other:

a. US Economic Relationship to Local Community:

(1) Observation: When the Division arrived at its new AO, maintaining rapport with the local populace was difficult. The hamlet adjacent to the base camp had been on limits to US personnel for previous units. These units employed local civilians to perform personal and unit services as Thais and KP's. 1st CAV policy placed the town "off limits" and restricted civilian employment to 100 hire. Local Vietnamese resented the new policy.

(2) Evaluation: The reasons for the 1st CAV policy were explained to the people. Citizens learned that the town had to be cleared up and that the Division did not want to give them a false economy. After about two months,

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the Division adopted a policy which lessened the economic recession of the town. Laundries, gift shops, and eventually restaurants were placed on limits to US personnel from 1200 to 1830 hours. Businesses catering to the needs of the Vietnamese were encouraged. The economy appeared to stabilize around the needs of the community with a limited dependence on US personnel.

(3) Recommendation: When moving to a new area, the US unit should send a Civil Affairs representative in advance to evaluate the local economy and provide advance liaison with local officials. This will help minimize adverse effects caused by policies which effect the local economy.

b. Reinforced anchoring of tactical wire at Forward LZ Log Pods:

(1) Observation: On many LZ's, keeping tactical wire in place around log pods is extremely difficult due to excessive ground winds caused by rotorwash from helicopters.

(2) Evaluation: Loose wire presents serious hazards to aircraft as well as people on the ground who are caught in blowing wire.

(3) Recommendation: The number of engineer stakes used in normal spans of triple standard concertina should be doubled. This will stabilize the fence and significantly reduce the hazard to personnel and aircraft.

c. Firebase Construction:

(1) Observation: On several occasions, the soil at firebases has been extremely hard, and in some cases, too hard to work with either the CASE 450 or D6B Dozers used on firebases.

(2) Evaluation: It is necessary to construct sumps, ASP's, defensive positions, and personnel shelters on Division firebases with equipment organic to the Engineer Battalion.

(3) Recommendation: Fifteen and forty pound cratering charges should be used to significantly loosen the hard, dry, clay soil found in the Division area of operations. This was successfully accomplished at LZ Rita. Employment of explosives must be made in the early phases of construction, however, as once artillery is emplaced, demolition activities must be curtailed to preclude accidents setting off the artillery shells.

### SECTION III: HQS, DA SURVEY INFORMATION

Escape, Evasion and Survival: NONE

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**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969

**FOR THE COMMANDER:**



G. E. DOYLE  
CPT, USA  
ASST AG

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- TAB A: Task Organization
- TAB B: Weather and Terrain
- TAB C: Enemy Activities
- TAB D: Aerial Surveillance
- TAB E: Intelligence Activities
- TAB F: Training/Combat Developments

- TAB G: Personnel Roster
- TAB H: G-1 Activities
- TAB I: Division Strength
- TAB J: Casualty Statistics
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- TAB M: Reenlistments and Extensions
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- TAB AA: Inspector General Activities
- TAB AB: Logistics
- TAB AC: Civil Affairs
- TAB AD: Psychological Operations
- TAB AE: Chemical Activities
- TAB AF: Fire Base Construction

TAB G - Y and TAB AF wd Hq, DA

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- 1 - Gen Staff Section (6)
- 1 - 14th Mil Hist Det

AVFBC-RE-H (15 April 69) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1969  
RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 18 JUN 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APC 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOI-DE, APC 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for the period  
ending 30 April 1969, with the following comment: Reference para 5a(3).  
The concept of prepositioning construction and barrier materiel is  
considered sound. However, the bill of materials recommended is esti-  
mated to weigh 238 short tons for each brigade. Therefore, it would  
be considered advantageous to centrally position fire support base  
kits at the Division Support Command to avoid the extraordinary  
transportation requirements needed to move them in the event of re-  
location of the brigade trains.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



B. G. MACDONALD  
1LT. AGC  
Asst AG

AVHGC-DST (15 May 69) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1969  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 25 JUN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-UT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Aerial Loudspeaker AEW-ARS-4, section II, page 15, paragraph 2(a); concur. The aluminum frames fabricated for the AEW-ARS-4 Aerial Loudspeaker equipment add stability for the protection of this equipment. Unit involved will be advised by this headquarters to submit an EIR.

b. Reference item concerning Timely Response to a Fast Moving Tactical Situation, section II, page 15, paragraph 5(a); concur. Materials required may be obtained through normal requisitioning. Materials will be provided based on the established priorities and the availability of material. No further action required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

To furnish:  
1st Cav Div (Ambl)  
11 AFV

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GPOP-DT (15 Apr 69) 3d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)  
for Period Ending 30 Apr 69, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 89 JUL 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ment and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
C. L. SHORT  
CPT, AGC  
Act AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
TAB A: Task Organization

## Task Organization

- a. 1st Air Cavalry Division
  - HHC, 1/ACD
  - 1/9 Cav
  - 62d Inf Flt (Combat Trackers)
  - 3th Engr Bn
  - 13th Sig Bn
  - 1st Personnel SVC (PRCV) Bn
  - Co B, 52nd Inf (LRF)
  - 54th MF Co
  - 26th Chem Det
    - 184th Chem Flt
  - 371st Radio Research Unit
  - 191st Military Intelligence Det
  - 583rd Military Intelligence Det
  - 14th Military History Det
  - 42nd Public Information Det
  - Special Security Det
  - Det 31, 5th Weather Sqdn (AF)
- b. 1st Bde
  - 2-5 Cav
  - 2-8 Cav
  - 2-12 Cav
- c. 2nd Bde
  - 1-5 Cav
  - 5-7 Cav
- d. 3rd Bde
  - 1-7 Cav
  - 1-12 Cav
  - TF DUKE
    - D/1-8
    - A/1-7
    - C/2-2 Mech
    - 36th Rmr Bn
- e. Div Arty
  - 1-8 Cav (-)
  - HHC, Div Arty
  - 2/19th Arty (105)
  - 2/20th Arty (105)
  - 1/21st Arty (105)
  - 1/30th Arty (155)
  - 1/77th Arty (105)
  - E Btry, 82nd Arty (AVN)
- f. 11th ACR
  - TF 1/11th ACR
  - TF 2/11th ACR
  - TF 2-7 Cav
  - A/1-8
- g. 11th Avn Gp
  - HHC, 11th Avn Gp
  - 227th Aslt Hel Bn
    - 273rd Hvy Hel Co (-)
    - 478th Hvy Hel Co (-)

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**SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969**  
**TAB A: Task Organization (Cont)**

229th Aalt Hel Bn  
11th GS Co  
h. Division Support Command  
HHC & Band, Div Spt Grd  
15th S&S Tn  
15th Med Bn  
15th Trans Aaft Maint Bn  
27th Maint Bn

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
TAB B: Weather and Terrain

### 1. Operations THOAN THANG II & III

a. The terrain in the Division AO is generally flat. Some portions of Tay Ninh are rice and marshlands while the north and east are forested. Binh Long Province is flat with dense forests in the north and forests mixed with rubber plantations in the south. Phuoc Long Province consists of a rising plain to the west and a mountain range in the northeast. The province is generally heavily vegetated, primarily with multicanopied forest. Four rivers, the Van Co Dong, the Saigon, the Be, and the Dong Nai, flow through the IACD AO. These rivers present an obstacle to ground movement due to their depth and steep banks. There are three prominent land masses in the area; Nui Ba Den, The Razor Back, and Nui Ba Ra.

### b. Weather:

(1) During the month of February the weather continued to be under the influence of the Northeast Monsoon, becoming a more stagnant air mass which caused a reduction of visibility. Haze, fog and smoke became prevalent during the early morning hours. March was also dominated by the northeast monsoon, although overall flow was weaker and less organized than that of February. Haze and smoke were again a dominant feature, with the usual afternoon scattered cumulus clouds developing into thunderstorms on 3 days during the month. During the month of April it became most evident that the Northeast Monsoon was giving way to the Southwest Monsoon. Afternoon temperatures were high and therefore high Density Altitudes resulted. There was a noticeable decrease in early morning fog. On several mornings strato-cumulus clouds were evident by 0800 hours and by 1300 hours had lifted and developed into cumulus. During the last week of this warm dry month, thunder storms and rain showers dominated the entire AO.

(2) Maximum Temperatures: February - 99°, March - 103°, April - 107°.

(3) Minimum Temperatures: February - 64°, March - 70°, April - 71°.

(4) Relative Humidity: February - 70.0%, March - 69.5%, April - 71.0%.

(5) Rainfall: February - 0.09 inches, March - 1.35 inches, April - 1.44 inches of precipitation.

(6) Maximum Density Altitudes: February - 3310 feet, March - 3616 feet, April - 3692 feet.

(7) Minimum Density Altitudes: February - 60 feet, March - 1050 feet, April - 1205 feet.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
TAB C : Enemy Activities

1. The first 17 days of February saw the conclusion of Thuan Thang II. During the three months of this operation, the 1st Cav killed 2896 NVA, 207 VC, captured 596 individual weapons, 187 crew-served weapons, 751,400 rounds of small arms ammunition, 9581 large caliber rounds, 383.8 tons of rice, and 10,477 pounds of salt.
2. Operations remained rather light in the first two weeks of February. On 3 February THE FIRST TEAM initiated operations in AO Cheyenne Sabre with light contacts. The number of contacts increased as the month wore on. On 2, 4, and 7 February approximately 138,000 pounds of rice were found in bunker complexes and under brush camouflage. The 2/8 Cav and 2/12 Cav were responsible for these finds, operating in an area northwest of Base Area 355.
3. On 9 February, the 3rd VN Marines at XT 544719 discovered one of the largest weapons caches of the Vietnam War. Included in the find were 216 82mm mortar rounds, 161 122mm rocket warheads, 10 oversized 122mm rocket warheads, 66 oversized 107mm rockets, 3 82mm mortars complete, 37 60mm mortars complete, 132 AK-47 rifles, and 106,600 AK-47 rounds.
4. On 11 February, C 2/7 Cav at YT 1028 came in contact with an enemy battalion, receiving small arms, automatic weapons, and B-40 fire. The enemy was engaged with artillery and air strikes resulting in 39 NVA killed.
5. On 12 February, at YU 0451 B 1/9 Cav aviation elements came under heavy 50 caliber machine gun fire resulting in 2 OH-6A aircraft downed and destroyed, with 3 US killed and 1 US wounded. Artillery and TAC air engaged the enemy resulting in 66 enemy killed.
6. At 0001H on 17 February, Operation Thuan Thang III officially began.
7. On 23 February, coordinated attacks by fire and limited ground probes launched the enemy's 4th Offensive. These attacks were sprung against most of THE FIRST TEAM'S Fire Support Bases resulting in light friendly casualties and damage. Contact with main force units in the Michelin Rubber Plantation increased.
8. At XT 5548, 1/5 Cav elements together with C 2/22 Mech Inf made contact with an unknown-sized enemy force on 26 February. Friendly elements received small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 fire during the 5 hour contact which resulted in 52 enemy KIA and 16 US WIA.
9. During the 4th Offensive, ground-to-air firings also increased throughout the Division's AO. During the first seven days of March, operations throughout the 1st ACD's AO were characterized by light, scattered contacts with enemy forces. On 8 March, LZ GRANT (XT 385626) came under indirect fire and ground attack by the 1st Battalion, 95th VC Regiment with contact continuing throughout the early morning hours. As daylight hours approached, the enemy withdrew leaving behind 157 dead and 2 POW. There were moderate US casualties. Four days later, LZ GRANT received another ground attack from a reinforced enemy

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**SUBJECT:** Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
**TAB C - Enemy Activities (Cont)**

battalion. Again the enemy withdrew, this time leaving behind 100 NVA bodies and 2 POW's. US casualties were light.

10. Between these two attacks, elements of the 1st ACD fought a savage battle with a reinforced enemy battalion in the vicinity of the 'New's' Ham (XT 34215). Friendly platoon-sized units initiated the contact and the enemy assault became disorganized. The enemy withdrew into Cambodia leaving behind 34 NVA killed and numerous blood trails. There were heavy friendly casualties in the ambush elements.

11. During the remainder of March, elements of the 1st ACD working northward and in the Michelin Plantation had several sharp battles with platoon and company-sized enemy forces in bunker complexes. There was an increase in aircraft firings that was particularly noted in the HAM 042 00000 'RE' located north of NUB 01 000 and north of the Michelin Rubber Plantation along the Saigon River. On several occasions, elements of the Division and the 1st Battalion (ABN), 309th Infantry (OPCON) found enemy caches in the vicinity of LZ 'TRACY' (XT 43703). The caches were found along the banks of canals buried in water-tight metal containers just under the water line. All ammunition was in good condition and evacuated.

12. During the last three days of March, an extended battle occurred between SKYTRUCKERS and an enemy battalion as a new fire support base was opened northwest of NUB 01 000 (XT 186718). Contact remained light to heavy during the three-day period with the enemy defending a heavily used bunker and trail network. Seventy-nine enemy were killed with light US casualties.

13. During the month of April, operations throughout the 1st ACD AO were characterized by moderate to heavy contact with platoon and company-sized enemy elements in heavily fortified bunker complexes. These contacts saw heavy enemy resistance, necessitating large quantities of artillery and TAC Air to route the enemy. Friendly casualties ran from light to moderate and the enemy body count was low due to the enemy having the opportunity to remove his dead.

14. On 18 April, elements of the First Coy (ABN) together with elements of the 11th ACR (OPCON), made contact with a large enemy force in a bunker complex at XT 433600 with contact lasting throughout most of the day. US casualties were light and a sweep of the contact area revealed 80 enemy bodies.

15. On 29 April, the 1st ACD and the 11th ACR made renewed contact with a large enemy force in a bunker complex at XT 416792 and again the enemy withdrew leaving behind 57 NVA bodies. US casualties were light.

16. During April several large enemy rice caches were found throughout the THUAN THUAN III AO. More than 206,000 pounds of rice were uncovered with some of the larger caches located in the following areas: XT 513737 - 24,000 pounds; XT 31757 - 8400 pounds; XT 217823 - 13,000 pounds; XT 410743 - 31,000 pounds; XT 428748 - 14,400 pounds; XT 374705 - 22,800 pounds; and XT 516685 - 6000 pounds. All the rice was either distributed to refugees, evacuated, or destroyed.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
TASK: Aerial Surveillance

1. Mission Statistics for the period 1 February - 30 April 1969:

<u>MISSION TYPE</u>	<u>SCHD/COMP</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
IR	543/508	25,000 (approx)
SLAR	180/176	3,673
PHOTO	182/164	
PHOTO (Hand Held)	2/2	

2. General Comments: There were no significant effects on operations due to weather. Maintenance was not a significant problem except for infrared missions in February when 20 missions were cancelled due to sensor malfunction.

3. IR: During the quarter 93.7% of the missions were completed. 35 missions were cancelled, 22 due to sensor malfunction, 6 due to aircraft nonavailability, 5 due to over-exposed film, and 2 due to weather.

4. SLAR: During the period 97.8% of the SLAR missions were completed. There were 2 missions aborted due to sensor malfunction, and 1 due to aircraft non-availability. One mission was diverted to support the 25th Division who was in a major contact.

5. PHOTO: 90.1% of the photo missions were completed during the quarter. There were 6 missions cancelled by the originators, 4 missions were cancelled by G-2 Air as no longer required and 6 missions are outstanding.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
TAB E: Intelligence Activities

### (1) Counterintelligence (CI) Operations

#### (a) Background Investigations

- (1) Cases on hand at beginning of reporting period: 2
- (2) Cases received during reporting period: 18
- (3) Cases closed during reporting period: 17
- (4) Cases on hand at end of reporting period: 3
- (5) Cases processed past suspense dates: 0
- (6) Leads completed: 65

#### (b) Security Services

- (1) Announced security inspections: 15
- (2) Courtesy inspections and checks: 34
- (3) Unannounced security checks: 1
- (4) Unannounced sanitary fill checks: 12
- (5) Fingerprinting: 92
- (6) Tech services (locks, combination changes, etc.): 30

#### (c) Liaison contacts

- (1) Local GVN Officials: 1085
- (2) Military Officials: 3527
- (3) Other Intelligence units: 1968

#### (d) Blacklist Personalities screened: 0

#### (e) Interrogations: 23

- (1) IVA: 4
- (2) VC: 19

#### (f) Brightlight Reports: 7

#### (g) Collections

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**SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969**  
**TAB E: Intelligence Activities (Cont)**

**(1) Overt**

**(a) Spot Reports: 512**

**(b) Translations: 0**

**(2) Covert (casual): 0**

**(h) Personnel Security Actions**

**(1) Number of Validations: 1120**

**(a) TOP SECRET: 71**

**(b) SECRET: 1049**

**(2) Interim Clearances granted: 143**

**(a) Interim TOP SECRET: 121**

**(b) Interim SECRET: 22**

**(3) Cryptographic access granted: 0**

**(4) Requests for USAIBR checks submitted: 186**

**(5) Local Files completed: 6180**

**(6) Request for BI submitted: 11**

**(7) Request for NAC submitted: 54**

**e. (FCUO) IPW**

**(1) Detainees: 271**

**(a) PW's: 63**

**(1) NVA: 55**

**(2) VC: 8**

**(b) Returnees: 11**

**(1) NVA: 9**

**(2) VC: 2**

**(c) CD: 18**

**(d) IC: 179**

**(2) Documents: 520 Batches (1,259")**

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
TAB F: Training/Combat Developments

## 1. Division Trainings:

a. The 1st Cavalry Division Training Center at Bien Hoa conducted individual training for all Division replacements. During the quarter, 612 officers and 5233 enlisted men received a three-day course of instruction.

b. The Combat Leaders Course graduated 179 personnel in grade E-3 through E-5 during the period despite the relocation of the training center from Da Khe to Bien Hoa. The 10-day FDI provides training for combat experienced junior PM who have demonstrated potential to become scout, section and fire team leaders. Subjects stressed air evac tactics, map reading, communications, weapons training, medical training, and leadership.

c. The Kit Carson Scout Course graduated 18 personnel during the period. The object of the training is to provide a well trained scout to every rifle squad and reconnaissance platoon in the Division. The training includes Division tactics, care and operation of US equipment, English, and the mission of a Kit Carson Scout.

## 2. Training from Non-Divisional Units: The following school courses were filled:

Aviation Schools - BN 102	
Aviation Schools - CFF 5	
Jungle Survival Schools 6	
Recon School 8	
Signal School 28	

## 3. Combat Developments: The following projects were completed in the quarter:

a. Portable Maintenance Lamps: The lamp is a small fluorescent light which is used to increase the efficiency of night aircraft maintenance. Test results indicated that the lamp is only partially effective.

b. Ballistic Blankets: The blankets are used in cases where revetments are not available or as a temporary protection during maintenance, refueling, and/or refueling. The blankets seemed to be useful, however, they did not receive any fragmentation hits, therefore an evaluation of the blankets ballistic characteristics was not possible.

c. Variable Type Body Armor: The armor was designed to give extra protection to personnel on duties where the extra weight will not interfere with operational requirements. Test results indicated that the increased protection offset the disadvantage of the extra weight.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
TAB 2: Surgeon's Activities

1. Submitted are the complete and final statistics for the stated period.

2. Medical

a. Disease and injury statistical data:

(1) Non-battle injuries	197
(2) Disease	639
(a) Malaria	149
1 Vivax	59
2 Falciparum	87
3 Unknown	3
(b) FUO	189
(c) Psychiatric cases	92
(d) Other	433
(3) Remaining in hospital (In-country)	245

b. Discussion of Disease:

(1) Malaria cases: A total of 149 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this Division from 1 Feb to 30 Apr 69, inclusive. Of them 59 (39.5%) cases were due to Plasmodium vivax and were caused in most U.S. Forces by failure to take the weekly chloroquine-primaquine pill.

(a) The malaria incidence was as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>M/R</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC 1st Bde	0	0	0	0
1/8	0	1	1	5
2/8	1	2	3	6
1/12	15	8	5	28
HHC 2nd Bde	0	0	0	0
1/5	5	7	3	15
2/5	5	3	1	9
2/12	10	4	2	16
HHC 3rd Bde	2	0	1	3
1/7	13	3	0	16
2/7	13	5	4	22
5/7	12	6	2	20

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
TAB 2: Surgeon's Activities (Cont)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Div Arty	2	0	0	2
1/9	0	0	0	0
Avn Gp	0	0	0	0
Spt Cnd	0	0	1	1
Sig Bn	0	0	1	1
Ch R Bn	0	0	0	0
WAC Div	0	1	0	1
LRHF	2	1	0	3
15th Admin	1	0	0	1
545 MP	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	84	41	24	149

(b) The malaria rate has decreased since the last reporting period, 1 Feb 68 through 31 Jan 69. This decrease is due to the dry season which now prevails in the III CTZ.

(2) Other selected diseases of importance are as follows:

Immersion Foot	0
Heat Exhaustion	13
Poisoning	0
Animal Bites	2
Hepatitis	14
Dengue Fever	0
Infectious Meningitis	0
Scrub Typhus	0

c. LRHF: From 1 Feb 69 through 30 Apr 69, the 15th Medical Battalion treated a total of 1156 U.S. Army personnel who were LRHF. Of these, 593 were bitten and 563 were CRO.

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**SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969**  
**TAB AA: Inspector General Activities**

Requests for Assistance	238
Complaints	6
Total Cases	214
Annual General Inspections	19
Investigations	5
Non-appropriated Fund Inspections	20

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
 TAB ID: Logistics

1. During the reporting period, the 15th S&S Bn (AM) continued to support the 1st Cav Div (AM) throughout Operations TOAN THUNG II and TOAN THUNG III. Operations were conducted from its base area at Dien Hoa Army Base with forward support platoons at Phuoc Vinh, Tay Ninh and Quan Loi. The 15th S&S provided THE FIRST TEAM with class I, II, III, IV, V and CI VII supplies with the exception of repair parts, medical supplies, and cryptographic material. A&S Company assisted units of the 1st Cav Div (AM) in preparing 23,436 tons for sling out operations, for a total of 7210 sorties. During the reporting period there was no change in the organization of the 15th S&S Bn which remains: Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Supply Company, and A&S Company.

2. Supply and Services:

a. Class I - (Note 1 applies)

(1) Issue by type ration

Type Ration	Quantity for Reporting Period
"A" Rations	1700 Tons
"B" Rations	1215 Tons
"C" Rations	1,719,551 meals
LRRP Rations	73,300 meals

(2) Issue of Ration Supplements

Item	Quantity for Reporting Date
Ice	5052 Tons
Sunbly Packs	1373 Tons
Ice Cream	41,017 Gals

b. Class II & IV (Note 1 applies)

Received	3714 Tons
Issued	1776 Tons

c. Class III Issues - Figures represent issues at Quan Loi, Dien Hoa and LZ's provided with fixed-wing resupply. Records of 1st Cav issue are not maintained at common user bases such as Tay Ninh and Loi Khai.

Item	Quantity for Reporting Period
JF-4	2,670,500 lbs
AVG/S	53,300 lbs
WOG/S	607,170 lbs
WE-2	337,000 lbs

d. Class V (Figures represent only ammo procured through 540 unit's services directly by local 1st Cav ASF's.)

Issues	Feb-Mar-Apr
Inspections/Vitals	11,794 Tons
	42

e. Food service activities include 124 formal and informal inspections during the reporting period as compared with 94 during the previous period. Continued improvement in mess operations throughout the Division was noted.

Note 1: Figures represent all known issues to 1st Cavalry Division.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
T/AB AG: Civil Affairs

### 1. Population and resources control:

a. Refugees: The Division assisted the GVN in the relief of about 8000 refugees during the reporting period.

(1) The 8th Engineers completed construction of the Montagnard relocation hamlet of Nu Bu Tho in early March. The families were moved from temporary quarters at the Song Be refugee camp to their new village.

(2) Approximately 5000 persons were made temporarily homeless in Phuoc Long Province by the February Offensive. The Division assisted province officials by transporting rice and nurse men from other areas for distribution to the war victims.

(3) The Division also continued support of 41 refugee families living in the Phu Giao District headquarters compound. Funds were furnished to buy materials for the construction of homes, which were built by the refugees themselves. Resettlement was complete by the end of April.

(4) In conjunction with Tay Ninh Province officials and other PAV, the Division gave support in the form of clothing and emergency transportation to approximately 100 families made homeless by an ammo dump explosion at Tay Ninh.

b. Rice distribution: The 1st Cavalry Division (AM) captured a total of 445 tons of rice during the quarter. Whenever the tactical situation permitted, units turned over rice to the GVN for distribution. In one operation, 22 tons of rice were transported by UH-1 to Tay Ninh; from there by fixed wing to Quan Loi, and then by CH-47 to Song Be for emergency relief of the food shortage there.

### 2. Civic action:

a. The Division continued support of GVN projects through out the AC. The major obstacles to civic action were the lack of people in the areas of operation and the frequent moves of all units. During the period, seven schools, one orphanage, one hospital, one PF compound, and one market place were supported. Total expenditures from the C/PAC/AR fund amounted to 1,061,295\$V.

b. Projects of particular importance were:

(1) IR8 (Miracle Rice) demonstration plots were planted in the area near the Division base camp. This is the first step in a project which when completed could make the area self-sufficient in rice production and add approximately 17 million piasters to the local economy.

(2) The 191st MI Detachment conducted 90 hours of English classes for approximately 180 students at schools in Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi.

(3) The An Tuc Dispensary project at An Khe, which was started in 1965 and has continued to receive support from division units, was completed in early April. The 86-bed hospital with a staff of 12 Vietnamese serves a population of 78,000 people in the An Khe area.

(4) The renovation of the Tay Ninh Orphanage, a project conducted jointly by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), 25th Infantry Division and PHILC/O was completed in March. The living conditions of 86 orphans were improved by adding a new kitchen and latrine facilities and refurnishing the rest of the orphanage complex.

(5) The Division furnished another combined effort project in Tay Ninh,

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TOPIC: Civil Affairs (Cont)

the construction of a 35 classroom girls high school. The project is now 50% complete.

c. During the period, the Division held 55 MOPCUG treating 5542 patients.

d. Commodities distributed amounted to 15,942 pounds of construction material, 17,185 pounds of food (excluding captured rice), 50 pounds of clothing, and 860 pounds of health and sanitation items.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
T: B AD: Psychological Operations

1. General: At the beginning of the quarter, as THE FIRST TEAM moved to combat major elements of four enemy divisions, the Division expanded its PSYOP activities. As part of the expanded PSYOP program, under the guidance of Division G5, the Brigade's 35's simultaneously operated against the 5th VC Division in War Zone D, 7th NV Division along the Saigon River Corridor, 1st NV Division in War Zone C, and the 9th VC Division along the Angel's Wing. In conjunction with these operations, PSYOP was used in three important area denial operations, designated MOUNTAIN RIDER I, MOUNTAIN RIDER II, and MOUNTAIN RIDER III. In all, PSYOP was aggressively employed in six provinces and across a 4500 square mile AO. The enemy's Winter/Spring Offensive reached a peak when 5th VC Division elements attacked and failed to seize Bien Hoa City. Capitalizing on this enemy military defeat, the 1st ACD mounted a four phase Psychological Counteroffensive Campaign. In April, with the 11th ACD CCCC to THE FIRST TEAM, Division G5 executed an intensive aerial and ground psychological operations campaign, first against elements of the 1st NV Division and later against the 7th NV Division. Supporting the ground elements of MOUNTAIN RIDER were three HB ground loudspeaker teams and one aerial loudspeaker team.

## 2. Support:

a. The 5th Special Operations Squadron (USAF) supported the 1st ACD PSYOP effort with leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. Using both U-10 and C-47 aircraft, 34,086,000 leaflets were dropped in pre-planned target areas specified by THE FIRST TEAM. Loudspeaker appeals totaling 90 hours were broadcast to selected target audiences.

b. The 6th PSYOP Battalion located at Bien Hoa provided general support with personnel, equipment, advice, and media. The battalion furnished one liaison officer and three HB loudspeaker teams, one HB audio visual team, a mobile advisory team for a period of four weeks, and additional personnel during MOUNTAIN RIDER ground operations.

c. 1st ACD Brigade HB PSYOP teams operating from Division UH-1H helicopters broadcast 517 hours and dropped 54,499,825 leaflets. Brigade operations include weekly pre-planned and daily planned target areas and quick reaction exploitation.

d. To improve the division's PSYOP capability, G5 obtained the following additional equipment: 2 polaroid cameras, 2 tape recorders, 50 seven-watt megaphones, one M90 85 vehicle mounted movie system, and three aluminum frames to support airborne loudspeaker systems.

e. The Division PSYOP section improved its knowledge of enemy units. Two intelligence specialists were added to the PSYOP section. Coupled with closer coordination with G2, these specialists assisted in compiling intelligence dossiers and targeting specific enemy. Enemy vulnerabilities were listed for exploitation. A Propaganda Development Committee was formed within the G5 section. This committee developed psychological material to demoralize the enemy and promote the GVN image. The residual effect of the Division's PSYOP effort was reflected most directly by the 5th VC Division as it moved along infiltration routes from Cambodia to its attack departure point near Bien Hoa City. The Division leapfrogged brigade elements to maintain PSYOP contact and to reduce the enemy's desire to fight. On the third day of the fight in

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TITLE: Psychological Operations (Cont)

Tan Hiep village, outside of Bien Hoa, 46 5th VC Division soldiers were induced to surrender by loudspeaker appeal.

f. Chieu Hoi Campaign: 1 LCD Psychological Operations successes were reflected by a growing increase of Hoi Chanhs (returnees) throughout III CTZ. As the Division moved into different and challenging areas of operations, the target audiences were introduced to day and night psychological operations. For the quarter, 110 Hoi Chanhs returned to GVN authority within THE FIRST TONKIN, 11 Hoi Chanhs returned to Division elements and 55 PW's surrendered.

3. Kit Carson Scouts: G5 assumed primary staff responsibility for the KCS program ten days before this reporting period began. As a result of the Division move from I to III CTZ, KCS strength had been reduced to 47 personnel. Many of these 47 were dissatisfied with their new environment and appeared to have low morale. A significant percentage of scouts were discharged from the program for administrative or disciplinary reasons. Concurrently, an intensified recruiting and training program was conducted. Vietnamese and Montagnard scouts were selected from NVA/VC returnees at Chieu Hoi centers in Song Bo, An Loc, Phu Cong and the National Center in Saigon. Initially vouchered for 100 scouts, the Division requested and received approval to bring KCS up to 200 during FY 69. During the quarter, the Division Training Center moved from An Khe to Bien Hoa without halting the training effort. The 1 LCD maintained four week KCS training course, the longest course given by any division in Vietnam. As of 30 April the Division had 94 scouts in training or assigned to units in the field. Two scouts were killed and three wounded during the quarter.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
TAB A: Chemical Activities

## 1. Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. GENERAL: During the reporting period 1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969, Division Chemical along with the 184th Chemical Platoon and the 26th Chemical Detachment conducted chemical support activities for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). A sharp increase in chemical support activity took place.

(1) On 1 February, the 26th Chemical Detachment's first bunker contamination team contaminated 30 bunkers with persistent CS. Additional teams were placed on an on-call basis to contaminate bunkers, tunnels and trails for units of THE FIRST TSGM.

(2) With the finding of large enemy rice caches, a method of effectively burning rice was established by chemical personnel. On 11 February, 30 tons of captured rice was burned by 1st Brigade chemical personnel using the kiln method, with Napalm as the flame medium. The rice completely burned in approximately 24 hours.

(3) On 11 April, the 184th Chemical Platoon made an experimental drop of 3 each 55 gallon drums of Napalm on a bunker complex. The results were excellent with each drum covering an area of 40 meters in diameter. Two successive drops were made of 15 drums each on 13 and 15 April, again with excellent results. The drop on 13 April produced one secondary explosion in the vicinity of XF 2583.

b. OPERATIONAL TOTALS: Totals for the reporting period includes most, but not all of the wide variety of chemical support given THE FIRST TSGM.

### CS DRUM DROPS

39 Missions for 80,480 pounds of CS

### SNIPER MISSIONS

48

### FUMIGASS DISTILLED

339 55 gallon drums

### F-158 MISSIONS

169 Munitions Dropped

### NAPALM DROPPED

33 55 Gallon Drums

### BUNKERS CONTAMINATED

390

### RICE BURNED

78 Tons

39

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969  
TAB A: Chemical Activities (Cont)

INSECT BOMBING MISSIONS

21 Missions 2,310 Gallons of Malathion

FLAME CHERMITS ON TROPICAL AT CPT GOVAD  
42,000 Square Yards

Q-9 CHARGER EXERCISES

22

MARK DISTRIBUTIONS

26

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