

TRAN QUANG

~~LESSON LEARNED FROM~~  
THE AUGUST REVOLUTION IN SAIGON

BY ~~TRAN QUANG~~  
(LIBRARY OF CADRES)

*not capitalized*

- ~~1. LABOR MOVEMENT~~
- ~~2. YOUTH MOVEMENT~~
- ~~3. SAIGON UPRISING LESSON~~

PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING SECTION. ~~VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S~~

THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION <sup>ARY</sup> ~~PARTY~~ OF VIETNAM  
SAIGON. GIA DINH CHAPTER

~~SAIGON & GIA DINH AREA~~

## INTRODUCTION

This book entitled the August Revolution in SAIGON is now published and includes three following articles by Comrade Tran Quang:

1. A lesson from the SAIGON 1945 uprising.
2. SAIGON <sup>workers</sup> ~~labor~~ in the August Revolution.
3. Rising movement of the SAIGON Youth in the August Revolution.

While we are not yet in possession of all factors necessary for the recapitulation of the experiences gained from the August Revolution in SAIGON, it is certain that the above articles will be helpful to us by calling forth a number of ideas applicable to our <sup>immediate</sup> ~~outstanding~~ mission.

X Sep 1965

(In remembrance of the Twenty Years of the August Revolution)

PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING SECTION ~~VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S~~  
THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY PARTY OF VIETNAM  
SAIGON-GIA DINH CHAPTER

~~SAIGON - GIA DINH AREA~~

A LESSON FROM THE SAIGON 1945 UPRISING

The August Revolution was a great achievement of our people. ~~From~~ It illustrated materialized the outstanding leadership capability of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party. ~~In effect,~~ That Revolution not only brought an end to the 80-year domination imposed by the French <sup>imperialists</sup> Empire, but also opened a new era for the country of Vietnam, an era <sup>unprecedented</sup> which had never before taken place in our people's history. ~~In the midst of~~ <sup>With</sup> the collapse of the aggressive and feudal government, ~~the~~ <sup>of</sup> the people's democratic regime came into life. <sup>The basic characteristic</sup> Thanks to the basic principle of this regime, <sup>is the fact that from now on,</sup> those who ~~were~~ <sup>were had been</sup> without pity, <sup>oppressed</sup> ~~oppressed~~ and exploited <sup>without pity</sup> in the old society, automatically became ~~de jure~~ <sup>de facto</sup> the most powerful masters in ~~our~~ <sup>their</sup> country.

~~As residents of a colonized country,~~ <sup>We are</sup> ~~we~~ were the first <sup>colonial</sup> people in the world who successfully regained ~~our~~ full independence and <sup>freedom.</sup> ~~liberty~~ <sup>consistent</sup> with the correct import of these terms.

~~In the last analysis,~~ The August Revolution in SAIGON was ~~only~~ <sup>one part</sup> element of the nation-wide ~~effervescent~~ <sup>high tide.</sup> uprising movement. It was the common revolutionary conditions ~~in~~ in the entire nation that determined the success of the uprising in SAIGON. In consequence, one can never understand why the people in SAIGON ~~and~~ <sup>were able to</sup> seize ~~the~~ power from the French and Japanese ~~authorities,~~ <sup>advantageously and</sup> and develop ~~the~~ the revolution so promptly ~~and~~ <sup>to advantage,</sup> if one fails to place this ~~local~~ revolution in the overall background of Vietnam and overlooks the fact that the SAIGON uprising was ~~just~~ <sup>whole</sup> part of the ~~nation-wide~~ August Revolution <sup>which was placed</sup> ~~which could never spring~~

~~under the unified leadership~~  
~~out and proceed steadily without the guidance~~ of the ~~Central Party Central~~. It

However, the August Revolution in SAIGON <sup>has</sup> had its own characteristics resulting ~~from~~ <sup>its own</sup> ~~unique~~ conditions. ~~The~~ <sup>most</sup> important problem ~~is~~

~~the key~~ was how to ~~efficiently~~ <sup>appropriately</sup> coordinate the ~~former principles~~ <sup>of Saigon on the basis of respecting the general principles governing</sup> ~~lying any armed revolt from the standpoint of the Marxist-Leninist~~ <sup>all armed uprisings from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, and the general</sup> ~~doctrine and supporters of the Vietnamese uprising operating under the~~ <sup>principles governing all armed uprisings in Viet-Nam under the leadership</sup> ~~guidance of the Central Party.~~ <sup>of the Party Central.</sup> Then, the characteristics of the SAIGON situation had to be implemented with Party policy.

<sup>other word</sup> In short, how ~~could~~ it be possible to seize power in SAIGON, the second

capital of Vietnam, in a time of such difficulties? The failure of the Nam Ky <sup>[Cochinchina]</sup> ~~South Vietnamese~~ uprising in 1940 had ~~resulted in a critical breakdown~~ <sup>seriously damaged the vanguard</sup>

<sup>base organizations</sup> ~~of the SAIGON vanguard.~~ Although the ~~consolidation~~ <sup>of the Party structures</sup> ~~were reactivated~~

in SAIGON ~~was~~ <sup>nevertheless</sup> started in late 1941; ~~however,~~ when the nation-wide <sup>was on the verge of turning into a high tide,</sup> ~~revolution sprouted up and people from all walks of life prepared to~~

~~take part in the rising revolutionary movement,~~ these ~~structures~~ <sup>base organizations</sup> ~~had~~ developed rather insignificantly. <sup>In early 1945 Nam Ky did not have</sup> ~~In South Vietnam as recently as~~

~~1945,~~ local uprisings in rural areas ~~had not yet been organized.~~ There

were no base areas, and <sup>no</sup> ~~armed~~ <sup>which had they existed,</sup> ~~propaganda groups~~ <sup>entire activities were</sup> ~~essentially,~~ <sup>would have strongly boosted the urban movement and effectively</sup> ~~to actively motivate the movement in cities and effectively~~ <sup>supported the uprisings in the cities.</sup>

~~support the metropolitan uprising which was non-existent.~~ <sup>In compensation,</sup> ~~Conversely,~~ <sup>in Nam B5 in general and in Saigon in particular</sup> ~~and particularly in SAIGON,~~ <sup>political activities were extensively spread</sup> ~~a popular nature was widespread and intense.~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~spurred~~ <sup>out into the masses.</sup> The national ~~spirit~~ <sup>spirit</sup> was highly ~~motivated,~~ <sup>spurred,</sup> though,

~~in its substance,~~ <sup>it</sup> was somewhat distorted by reactionary elements who capitalized upon the opportunity to ~~seize~~ <sup>snatch leadership from</sup> ~~power in competition with~~ our Party, either for ~~supporting~~ <sup>aiding</sup> the Japanese imperialists, or for serving their own filthy personal interests. Millions of our ~~citizens~~ <sup>people</sup>

had taken part in political activities, ~~They had joined~~ <sup>either</sup> directly ~~by joining~~ <sup>by joining</sup> the Vanguard Youth Groups and trade unions, or indirectly, ~~the organiza-~~ <sup>the civilian passive [air] defense, the</sup> tions for the Relief of NVN, ~~Civil Defense,~~ <sup>association</sup> National Language Propagation as well as other educational and social welfare organizations.

The problem ~~of the day,~~ <sup>that stood out</sup> at that time, was that the opportunity for uprising had ~~ripened~~ <sup>come</sup> and that, ~~all over the country we possessed favorable~~ <sup>nationwide, the conditions as regards our</sup> ~~assets while disadvantages were on the enemy's side.~~ <sup>side and the enemy's had ripened.</sup> The uprising, then became indispensable. In reality, part of the NVN rural area had already risen up whereas the Revolution and ~~the~~ Party structures in SAIGON were ~~for practical purposes,~~ too small. On the other hand, the development of a ~~leading~~ <sup>leadership</sup> force was time-consuming. The opportunity would long have passed before this force could be able to coordinate with the nation-wide movement. In the above-mentioned situation, the ~~local~~ Party in SAIGON that was carrying out the directives from the Central Party had set ~~up a~~ <sup>forth</sup> a number of missions that various Party organizations in the city were to implement. ~~For the first part,~~ <sup>on one hand</sup> these organizations were to actively develop the Party structure, ~~upgrade~~ <sup>intensity</sup> the mass education, ~~especially the~~ <sup>task within the Party</sup> mass education ~~within the Party.~~ <sup>in motivating the masses.</sup> ~~For the second part,~~ <sup>on the other hand</sup> they were to motivate the masses through use of available legal and quasi-legal means so ~~as to adequately solve more essential matters,~~ <sup>that the most vital issues</sup> such as seizure of the power for the people, ~~elimination of pro-Japanese~~ <sup>tendencies, expectations,</sup> ~~inclinations, prepara-~~ <sup>about the</sup> tions for the welcome of Allied Forces, promotion of the Communist Party's and the Viet Minh League roles, ~~and deep infiltration and wide motivation~~ <sup>are deeply and broadly absorbed by the</sup> people of all strata. Simultaneously, the Party <sup>must</sup> at any cost, had to ~~seek and obtain~~ <sup>the leadership</sup> leading roles in the ~~organizations,~~ <sup>popular</sup> primarily in all trade unions and Vanguard ~~infra-structures.~~ <sup>the base level organizations of</sup> the Vanguard Youth.

After <sup>the</sup> French ~~troops~~ were <sup>toppled</sup> ~~disarmed~~ by the Japanese on March 9th, such slogans as "~~The Power~~ <sup>to</sup> Viet Minh" and "Support the Indochinese Communist Party" had become popular among the people. At that time,

the Party structures were <sup>had been</sup> further developed ~~to a significant extent~~ <sup>although not sufficiently.</sup>

The Party was now able to assume the absolute leadership of labor union organizations, from <sup>the</sup> general confederations <sup>to the base level trade unions</sup> through trade unions, and had assumed the leadership of the Vanguard Youth ~~units~~, and was <sup>exercising deep</sup> ~~exercising~~ influence over ~~the~~ other organizations such as the National Language Propagation Association, the NVN Relief Movement, etc.

As of March, 1945, in several large labor slum areas (such as BAN-CO, NGA SAU, PHU NHUAN, KOM CUI, KOM CHIEU, PHU THO, RACH CAT, etc) <sup>there prevailed</sup> a state of two <sup>parallel governments coexisting side by side</sup> concurrent political powers existed; one ~~was~~ pro-Japanese puppet government, the other <sup>was a government of the laboring people</sup> ~~was~~ a labor mass government. The labor mass govern-  
~~ment~~ <sup>ment</sup> gained more power and validity as time went on.

From March through August 1945, the Party conducted a ~~enlightened~~ <sup>to enlighten</sup> propaganda program ~~within~~ the masses <sup>which</sup> ~~that~~ our members had penetrated. ~~Thus, although the number of Party members and Group members was small, with even very few members,~~ the Party established a ~~most~~ <sup>most</sup> extensive relationship ~~between~~ <sup>with</sup> the masses.

For instance, the ~~CHOLON~~ <sup>city</sup> Party Committee (1) had approximately twenty party members and fifteen National Salvation Youth members including members at the command agencies of the <sup>city Party</sup> Capital Committee and <sup>Khun (zone) Party</sup> Regional Committee (2). The ~~CHOLON~~ <sup>city</sup> Party Committee ~~had to take~~ <sup>took</sup> charge of approximately 500,000 inhabitants ~~settled~~ <sup>settled</sup> in CHOLON City and its suburbs. Each of the ~~Party and~~ <sup>Party and</sup> Group members (including the <sup>comrades</sup> ~~members~~ at the command agencies), personally operated a ~~HO (ward) Party chapter and supervised one or two additional wards in a household party chapter and directed one of two households;~~ he also was in charge of a trade union or a branch of a trade union, ~~Vanguard Youths~~ and supervised several Vanguard Youth units through their respective core elements.

~~had~~, and was the approval authority for hardcore elements everywhere.

- Footnote :
- (1) Before the August Revolution, the organization of the Party ~~was in Saigon~~ ~~Cholon was divided into two City Party committees,~~ ~~divided into two Capital Committees.~~
  - (2) ~~"Khu" is organizationally below the City and above the city~~ ~~An organization level which was above the Regional and below the~~ ~~Capital.~~ ~~ward levels~~

Due to the <sup>general</sup> Nation-wide situation, ~~the predominance~~ <sup>of the nation</sup> of the Party ~~was~~ <sup>prestige</sup> which was deeply rooted in the masses, ~~The successes~~ <sup>scored by</sup> gained from the August Revolution in HA-NOI and HUE, and the ~~use of~~ <sup>use of</sup> methods of operation ~~were~~ <sup>mentioned above</sup> ~~strictly followed by~~ the SAIGON Party ~~When the Viet-Minh~~ <sup>Committee for</sup> ~~South VN (Cochinchina) and the Indochinese Communist Party~~ ~~and the SVN Regional Committee, under the guidance of the Indochinese~~ ~~Communist Party,~~ <sup>people</sup> made an appeal for uprising, millions of ~~citizens~~ <sup>stood rose</sup> up and ~~regained~~ <sup>to seize</sup> power on the night of August 23rd, ~~obviously through~~ <sup>They did so with the</sup> full awareness that they were carrying out the most profound revolution of our people's history and ~~acknowledging with the greatest pride the leadership~~ <sup>role of the Indochinese Communist Party.</sup> significant revolution in our history that recognized the leading role of the Indochinese Communist Party in a great and proud manner. It is necessary to add that on August 25th, the pro-Japanese National ~~Association~~ <sup>Restoration</sup> ~~Group~~ <sup>Renaissance</sup> held a marching demonstration ~~with the~~ <sup>with the</sup> purpose ~~to welcome~~ <sup>of greeting</sup> the high dignitary Governor Nguyen Van Sam and ~~to call upon~~ <sup>inviting</sup> Cuong-De to come to ~~«reign»~~ <sup>«reign»</sup> over Viet-nam. ~~In reality this was designed to oppose our uprising~~ <sup>In reality this was designed to oppose our uprising</sup> ~~the throne.~~ <sup>the throne.</sup> This in fact, opposed the goals of our nation-wide uprising. However this clique of traitors ~~Indeed, this mob of collaborators then met a shameful failure~~ <sup>Indeed, this mob of collaborators then met a shameful failure</sup> when ~~because their small~~ <sup>force was disintegrated in</sup> ~~strength had been broken within the human sea and~~ <sup>because their small strength had been broken within the human sea and</sup> ~~and their slogans~~ <sup>were drowned by the voice of millions of people</sup> ~~had been shaded by our own slogan of "Power Back to Viet~~ <sup>and their slogans</sup> ~~shouting in chorus: "Power to the Viet"~~ <sup>shouting in chorus: "Power to the Viet"</sup> ~~Minh - Long Live the Indochinese Communist Party", given by millions of~~ <sup>Minh - Long Live the Indochinese Communist Party", given by millions of</sup> ~~citizens in such unanimous fashion.~~ <sup>citizens in such unanimous fashion.</sup> The SAIGON people ~~expectation~~ <sup>had been waiting</sup> for the ~~Indochinese Communist~~ <sup>and they were</sup> Party ~~was positively~~ <sup>was positively</sup> satisfied. As a result,

All activities of ~~the~~ Party cadres were progressing successfully under the enthusiastic response from <sup>the</sup> masses everywhere; the new power was established ~~in every corner of~~ <sup>clearly present at any location within</sup> the city.

The August Revolution in SAIGON was victorious. ~~in nature.~~ <sup>while the</sup> Referring ~~to such large numbers of reactionary elements and~~ <sup>secret policemen</sup> ~~disguised as Trotskyist politicians~~ <sup>disguised as Trotskyist politicians</sup> were bewildered by the event, ~~epics in open-mouthed bewilderment,~~ <sup>epics in open-mouthed bewilderment,</sup> the Party found that the SAIGON ~~the communists were aware that,~~ <sup>the communists were aware that,</sup> besides other general reasons, people, in addition to some favorable common conditions, had actually ~~the reason for the success of the Saigon people lies in the fact~~ <sup>the reason for the success of the Saigon people lies in the fact</sup> seized the present power by following up the nation-wide uprising ~~that they seized power through a high tide of mass movement~~ <sup>that they seized power through a high tide of mass movement</sup> which was reorganized and guided by the Party. The political strength

<sup>force</sup> ~~that has contributed to the August Revolution~~ <sup>included</sup> consisted of millions of ~~people~~ <sup>people</sup> this force did not become an organized force until ~~citizens and was in fact, substantially augmented exactly on August~~ <sup>citizens and was in fact, substantially augmented exactly on August</sup> the night of August 24. ~~24th.~~ <sup>24th.</sup> Under conditions in which the leading <sup>entity</sup> force remained ~~was still~~ <sup>was still</sup> too

small and the closely organized <sup>force of the</sup> mass ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> still limited ~~in size~~ <sup>in size</sup> ~~undoubtedly~~ <sup>undoubtedly</sup>, the SAIGON Party, <sup>bodies</sup> from 1944 thru 1945, had never-

theless, ~~consciously~~ <sup>by a very good operational</sup> overcome all difficulties through use of a "best ~~method:~~ <sup>method:</sup> it brought into full play the relationship between the Party ~~operations\* policy.~~ <sup>operations\* policy.</sup> It promoted the relation of even its small structures: ~~base level personnel -- who were only a small number -- and the masses, it~~ <sup>base level personnel -- who were only a small number -- and the masses, it</sup> infiltrated the masses, especially the labor worker class and the ~~had them boldly infiltrate the masses, especially the workers, laborers and~~ <sup>had them boldly infiltrate the masses, especially the workers, laborers and</sup> young masses; ~~it aggressively motivated the masses, and hard core elements~~ <sup>it aggressively motivated the masses, and hard core elements</sup> youths, it vigorously agitated the masses and provided leadership ~~to lead to organized mass forces.~~ <sup>to lead to organized mass forces.</sup> The above analysis constitutes ~~that was a major~~ <sup>that was a major</sup> ~~motivation campaign for the~~ <sup>motivation campaign for the</sup> ~~an indispensable lesson of the August Revolution Campaign in SAIGON.~~ <sup>an indispensable lesson of the August Revolution Campaign in SAIGON.</sup>

<sup>Speaking of the characteristics of Saigon, →</sup> The August Revolution, of course, imparts many other lessons, such as ~~the coordination of rural uprisings with capital uprisings, the coordina-~~ <sup>between the rural and urban areas between</sup> ~~tion of public activities with secret activities and the formation of~~ <sup>and</sup>

a ~~unified~~ <sup>unified</sup> front. ~~Nevertheless,~~ <sup>Nevertheless,</sup> and within the scope of this

material, our desire is to cover only the problem of how to ~~operate~~ <sup>operate</sup> ~~favorable direction~~ <sup>favorable direction</sup> under rising revolutionary conditions when and where

It had been trained and guided by the Party. The masses through the core elements.

*leadership*  
the ~~leading~~ force remains small and weak.

*SAIGON*  
THE ~~LABOR WORKER'S CLASS IN SAIGON~~ *IN*

~~DURING~~ THE AUGUST REVOLUTION

*He Nam Bo*  
In late 1944, the first Congress of ~~SVN~~ Trade Unions was called. This Congress was ~~opened~~ *held* in a small house near a Japanese barracks in a suburb ~~hamlet~~ of SAIGON, now called the Truong Minh Giang market area.

The congress was ~~in fact~~, camouflaged in the form of a death anniversary *feast*. Working under ~~adhering to~~ the slogan "~~Unification of the Labor Worker Force in~~ *Unifying the forces of the working class in*

*high tide*  
preparation for the ~~Nationwide~~ Uprising Movement", representatives of tailor, shoemaker, blacksmith, plantation *workers'*, farmer, tricycle driver, porter, *transportation, railroad, bus and automobile workers'* unions, and other enterprises such as BA-SON *workshop* ~~(textile) factory~~, FACI

Company, SIMAC Company, MIC Company, Ice ~~house~~ factory, Power ~~station~~ *plant*, BINH TAY Alcohol Company, Dai ~~Nam~~ Kosi Company, *Bairner company*, Ben ~~Me~~ *factory*, Jean *Comte*

~~Company~~, etc, ~~the congress~~ solved two important problems during *day of* two meeting ~~days~~. They established the *Nam Bo Trade* ~~SVN~~ General Labor Union, ~~an~~ *an organiza-*

*lion* ~~organized~~ *unifying* ~~all~~ revolutionary trade unions, and approved a *calling* resolution for the preparation of the general uprising. Under the Chairmanship of the Indochinese Communist Party *Nam Bo* ~~SVN~~ Regional Committee representative, comrade Ha-Huy-Giap, the Congress also elected the first ~~Executive~~ *Executive* Committee of *He Nam Bo Trade* ~~SVN~~ General ~~Labor~~ *Union*.

After the Congress had ended, *trade* labor union activities were pushed forward *vigorously* with intense concentration. Prior to the Congress, each trade union had *only*

*a* few ~~practical~~ hard core elements. At that time, the Party directed ~~labor~~ *the*

~~Worker proselyting~~ elements to promptly build ~~up~~ <sup>among the</sup> ~~organized~~ force ~~of~~ <sup>placed</sup> ~~workers~~ and <sup>absolute</sup> ~~organize~~ structure them into a ~~closely knit~~ political force, under the leadership of the Party. ~~A~~ <sup>those of</sup> ~~great~~ <sup>planted</sup> ~~many~~ party cadres, including bourgeois and intellectual ~~elements~~, were ~~maneuvered~~ <sup>origins</sup> ~~into~~ the enterprises ~~and worked to work~~ together with ~~related~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~workers~~ <sup>in order</sup> to conduct propaganda for the revolution ~~campaign~~. In just a short time, the ~~labor~~ <sup>trade</sup> union structure was significantly developed and the political education of ~~labor~~ <sup>the working</sup> masses was ~~stepped~~ <sup>stepped</sup> up in a desired direction. All elements of the ~~labor~~ <sup>trade</sup> unions structure were ~~permitted~~ <sup>given</sup> ~~instruction~~ <sup>education</sup> on some ~~basic~~ materials including ~~the~~ classes and the class ~~struggle~~, <sup>the</sup> "Viet Minh program", ~~the~~ <sup>worker</sup> ~~worker~~ ~~proselyting~~ <sup>task</sup> ~~and agitation~~, etc.. The newspaper "Lao Dong", political ~~organ~~ <sup>of</sup> the ~~General~~ <sup>Trade U.</sup> ~~labor~~ union, ~~was published and distributed among~~ <sup>had a wide circulation</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>to</sup> labor workers. Succeeding congresses were, in turn, held by several other trade unions ~~and branches~~ such as the SVN shoemakers, tailors, ~~...~~ <sup>trade unions</sup>. After the political ~~upheaval~~ <sup>went of</sup> on March 9<sup>th</sup>, ~~domestic and foreign~~ <sup>while the situation at home and</sup> ~~situations~~ <sup>abroad</sup> ~~were strongly agitated in a way favorable to Party causes~~ <sup>was undergoing vigorous changes, while the</sup> ~~the~~ French were ousted ~~[from Indochina]~~ and the Japanese were ~~defeated~~ <sup>confused</sup> by their impending defeat, ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> compliance with Party guidance, all trade unions ~~simultaneously~~ <sup>simultaneously</sup> stepped ~~forward~~ <sup>forward</sup> to conduct ~~public~~ <sup>public</sup> activities. The ~~current~~ <sup>current</sup> Fascist ~~system~~ <sup>regime</sup> ~~inhibited~~ <sup>prohibited</sup> ~~any~~ rights to democratic freedom, but, in the ~~face~~ <sup>face</sup> of the ~~people's~~ <sup>people's</sup> high tide attitude resulting from the ~~Victnamese~~ <sup>Vietnamese</sup> Revolution, the Fascists, ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> fact, were forced to close their eyes to these activities. The trade unions' ~~own~~ <sup>own</sup> offices ~~opened~~ <sup>publicly displayed their signs</sup> under their shop place and became ~~assembly~~ <sup>the sites where</sup> and political discussions ~~were held by~~ <sup>were held by</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> workers. For example, in ~~a~~ <sup>the</sup> tailor's shop, "Van-Bô", on the Phan Thanh Gian

Street (now ~~is the~~ Ngô Tung Châu Street) was the <sup>office of the</sup> SVN tailor trade union; ~~the shoe maker~~ shop "My Tin" at No. 93 George <sup>Guymer</sup> ~~Guynemer~~ Street (now ~~is the~~ Võ Di Nguy Street) was the <sup>the office of</sup> SVN shoemakers trade union; the leather shop "Kim Sơn", near the <sup>tramway</sup> ~~main railway~~ station <sup>Louvain</sup> located on ~~the~~ Gallien <sup>office of the</sup> ~~Gallien~~ street (now Trần Hưng Đạo street) was the Ben Thanh market trade union ~~main office~~.

Hundred ~~of thousands~~ <sup>people</sup> of ~~100,000~~ <sup>people</sup> were in and out of these establishments daily.

In order to develop its strength in time, the Party advocated <sup>the</sup> expansion of the trade union organization into <sup>various city sections areas</sup> ~~the streets~~, slums, and public offices. As a result, a series of new trade unions <sup>came into being much as the</sup> ~~appeared~~ as Ngã Sáu Area, Ban Cỏ Area, <sup>Nancy</sup> ~~Nancy~~ Area trade unions, etc.. Their members included not only ~~labor~~ workers but small traders, small ~~shop~~ owners, <sup>and even</sup> ~~partisans~~ <sup>(bi-ho)</sup> ~~soldiers~~ (1) firemen, and policemen ~~as well~~.

The Japanese defeat became apparent at the beginning of August, and <sup>news from</sup> ~~information pertinent to the success gained in the Viet Bac Liberated~~ area was relayed back to South Vietnam. The <sup>uprising</sup> atmosphere here became more effervescent, ~~the uprising~~. The Viet Minh Front's flags, banners,

slogans, posters, and leaflets appeared everywhere. In the trade unions ~~main~~ offices, ~~labor~~ workers <sup>discussed</sup> ~~debated about~~ the <sup>current</sup> ~~present~~ situation <sup>thus affording</sup> ~~permitting~~ our cadres <sup>an opportunity,</sup> to introduce the Viet Minh Front <sup>to the workers and induce them to</sup> ~~and make an appeal for uprising.~~ <sup>rise up.</sup> → <sup>were not</sup>

→ These discussions ~~progressed smoothly~~ and without hindrance. ~~Not~~ <sup>The</sup> pro-Japanese ~~collaborators and religiously camouflaged dough face politicians,~~ <sup>traitors, the political speculators operating behind religious</sup> ~~facades and especially the Trotskyites, did all they could to restrict~~ in particular, the Trotskyist ~~camouflaged collaborators, attempted to limit~~ the people's revolutionary will. ~~They did their best to show off such~~ <sup>they clamored about such</sup>

(1) Puppet troops on Japanese payroll.

theories as "Independence <sup>granted</sup> ~~granted~~ by the Allied Forces", "Self-Government within the French Union", and "Cuong-De ~~who~~ will save our country from <sup>all</sup> dangers", etc. ~~In addition~~, the Trotskyite <sup>in particular</sup> collaborators called for the ~~establishment of~~ so-called "Absolute Proletarian Revolution". The <sup>immediate establishment</sup> ~~prompt setup~~ of a proletarian dictatorship, and ~~the~~ <sup>At meetings</sup> ~~immediate constitution~~ of a communist regime. During assemblies held by ~~the~~ <sup>our</sup> workers, Party cadres had <sup>fought</sup> fearlessly and firmly <sup>to</sup> ~~overcome~~ defeat those <sup>but seductive tendencies,</sup> ~~many misled inclinations and had to simultaneously offer rival attractions.~~ <sup>Thanks</sup> ~~Due to the Party's~~ <sup>correct</sup> slogans and brilliant struggle ~~waged~~ <sup>dedicated</sup> achievements by the Party, the cadres were totally dedicated and had high capabilities. ~~workers' personal experiences, all these miscellaneous of organization and enjoyed the benefits of the individual experiences~~ <sup>workers' personal experiences, all these miscellaneous</sup> anti-communist reactionary forces were defeated. <sup>Also</sup> ~~obtained by the labor workers. All reactionary and anti-communist forces were consequently overwhelmed.~~ At the beginning of August, the ~~labor~~ workers started displaying their strength. ~~There were several alternate~~ <sup>Groups of male and female workers</sup> ~~workmen, workwomen,~~ and Vanguard Youths <sup>were seen</sup> ~~groups~~ noisily marching in the streets at any ~~given~~ time. The revolution had been already engrained upon the people's mind. The people acted <sup>following a clearly defined</sup> ~~in accordance with the obvious~~ ideal and displayed <sup>an unprecedentedly happy, impatient and enthusiastic</sup> ~~more joyful, impatient, and interested spirit than~~ ~~ever before.~~ <sup>siastic mood.</sup>

By mid August, the <sup>Trade</sup> General Labor Union published a ~~declaration~~ <sup>manifesto</sup> analyzing the <sup>general</sup> situation, <sup>confirming its</sup> ~~it defined its stand~~ as "Strictly Completely in Support of the Viet-Minh Front", and <sup>calling on the</sup> ~~called upon~~ labor workers to prepare for an uprising.

On the night of August 24th, a <sup>large</sup> ~~well-attended~~ meeting was held in the Nguyen Van Hao theater. ~~This marked the first public appearance of the Regional Viet-Minh Front and its to introduce its salvation program.~~ <sup>There the Viet-Minh Front Regional Committee made its first public appearance. It introduced the Front's national salvation program and</sup>

and called upon the <sup>compatriots</sup> ~~citizens~~ to make a demonstration in order to ~~seize~~ <sup>take</sup> ~~power~~ <sup>to the streets the following</sup> ~~power on the following day, August 25th.~~ <sup>day August 25 to seize power.</sup>

Taking part in the demonstration were people from various ~~social strata~~ <sup>attending the meeting were a great many classes, the majority,</sup> ~~but the workers were in majority.~~ <sup>however, were members of the labor worker force.</sup> The General labor trade

Union was ~~tasked to stage and present the meeting.~~ <sup>responsible for organizing and protecting the demonstration.</sup> Workers stood in a

long line that extended from <sup>the tramway</sup> Arras Station to the <sup>central Market</sup> Public Square. They

kept themselves in order and <sup>were</sup> ~~ready~~ <sup>to</sup> use force against any possible acts

of sabotage ~~which~~ <sup>staged</sup> ~~expected~~ by ~~either~~ the Japanese <sup>or the</sup> opposing factions.

When the Regional Viet-Minh Front representative made an appeal for the

SAIGON <sup>people</sup> ~~citizens~~ to rise up, the hall reverberated with loud noises of

acclamation. Immediately the <sup>Trade U</sup> ~~General labor~~ Union cadres stretched a ten-

meter long banner across the Nguyen Van Hao theater <sup>bearing a</sup> upon which such slogans ~~which~~

<sup>read:</sup> Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh

"The SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH ~~labor workers~~ <sup>labor workers</sup> heartily welcome and ~~pledge~~ <sup>pledge</sup>

<sup>to carry out</sup> with the Viet-Minh Front's <sup>order</sup> ~~appeal~~ for uprising" ~~were written~~

<sup>From that moment</sup> ~~It was at this time that the SAIGON uprising~~ <sup>began in earnest.</sup> ~~people started~~ <sup>The</sup> Members

<sup>of the</sup> trade union, and Vanguard Youth ~~committees~~ <sup>city blocs</sup> occupied public offices and ~~streets~~

within the night of August 24 <sup>the entire power structure of Saigon</sup> and ~~then~~ the whole power in SAIGON fell into the people's hands.

On the morning of August 25, a general <sup>display of force</sup> ~~demonstration~~ <sup>of the great</sup>

<sup>staged</sup> ~~force~~ <sup>people</sup> ~~attended~~ by a million <sup>burst out</sup> ~~citizens~~, took place and spilled over the Saigon

SAIGON city, <sup>spearheaded by the Saigon workers and peasants</sup> ~~leading elements of this great demonstration proved to be~~ →

SAIGON labor workers and farmers <sup>Duc-hoa, Hoc-mon, Ba-diem</sup> from BOO HOA, HOC MON, and BA DIEM areas.

<sup>A forest</sup> ~~large clusters of sharpened pieces of bamboo,~~ <sup>ham-vong sticks,</sup> chopping knives, <sup>machetes, hammers,</sup> scimitars,

axes, bush knives, ~~bush hooks,~~ hoes, rifles, and <sup>hunting</sup> ~~sports~~ guns moved from

<sup>Cholon</sup> ~~CHOLON~~ to <sup>Saigon</sup> SAIGON. Shouted slogans covered all other familiar noises ~~in~~ <sup>of</sup>

the city. ~~The slaves~~ <sup>footsteps</sup> shook ~~avenues~~ <sup>the city streets and the people</sup> with their marching steps and exchanged greetings <sup>in the workers' fashion</sup> ~~they saluted each other~~ with one clenched hand held at head level.

The August revolution was successfully completed. However, ~~not only~~ a few days ~~later~~ after, on September 2nd, the ~~SAIGON~~ <sup>Saigon</sup> labor workers had to shed their blood in ~~order to preserve~~ <sup>defense of</sup> their newly ~~created~~ <sup>won</sup> power.

~~As a result, the~~ <sup>Then</sup> ~~people's~~ resistance war ~~was~~ broke out, ~~this causing~~ and detachments of workers were set up <sup>through which</sup> the ~~labor workers to be grouped into detachments and tens of thousands~~ working class contributed to the fatherland tens of thousands of ~~of labor class's eminent sons to be dedicated to the fatherland. The~~ its elite children. ~~those who stayed behind in the city~~ <sup>remained, though staying in the city</sup> carried on the ~~revolution~~ <sup>struggle</sup> according to their own ~~under the existing~~ conditions, <sup>and</sup> ~~The SAIGON~~ <sup>Saigon</sup> labor workers' ~~struggle and movement had not come to an end~~ <sup>movement</sup> never stopped.

\*  
\* \*

Through the ~~materialization~~ <sup>August</sup> of the highest revolution, the ~~labor~~ working class and the labor masses had ~~explicitly displayed~~ <sup>demonstrated</sup> their great revolutionary force and capability. It may be said that the August revolution materialized essentially through the motivation ~~and~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> workers and that the historic uprising on August 25th was the people's uprising of which the ~~core~~ <sup>high</sup> and leading elements were the ~~extremely~~ <sup>most</sup> oppressed and exploited ones. The ~~labor~~ <sup>of Saigon</sup> working class and the laboring masses ~~undertook a~~ <sup>high</sup> great role, raised the national ~~and~~ <sup>flag</sup> democratic standard and led millions of ~~people~~ <sup>people</sup> of various classes ~~through the~~ <sup>to surge forward</sup> ~~revolt to overthrow~~ <sup>by violence</sup> the ~~mob of~~ <sup>clique of</sup> reactionary rulers, ~~this was too difficult a~~ <sup>role no</sup> ~~for any~~ <sup>could</sup> other class ~~than the labor worker to~~ assume.

The success gained by the ~~labor~~ workers and the labor masses in Saigon  
~~SAIGON~~ in August 1945 was essentially due to the following factors:

FIRST: The workers absolutely believed in the leadership of the vanguard Party, the Indochinese Communist Party, their own Party. Experiences ~~drawn after many~~ <sup>over the</sup> years have proven that there was no political organization more faithful to the worker class and <sup>the national</sup> people's interests than the Communist Party. Although the reactionary powers, ~~tried~~ <sup>tried</sup> by ~~deception~~, terror, ~~mystique~~ or by ~~misleading~~ <sup>misleading</sup> revolutionary words, ~~tried~~ to corrupt the workers, they gained nothing ~~from the workers~~ <sup>but indifference and contempt</sup> ~~from the latter~~ <sup>from the latter</sup> who treated them coolly. The workers and labor people in SAIGON Saigon considered all policies of the Party as their own. Therefore, they ~~have actively supported and stood as guarantors for the revolution which~~ <sup>served as a prime mover and a core force to carry out</sup> ~~the revolution which was a complex undertaking and ensure~~ <sup>was a complicated affair but was nonetheless completed successfully and</sup> ~~to advantage~~ <sup>its total success.</sup>

Because of that, ~~the~~ <sup>in</sup> leadership <sup>matters</sup> of the Party ~~has~~ <sup>was</sup> considered the workers class as the central <sup>force</sup> strength and the main force <sup>unit on which</sup> the Party can ~~place its confidence concerning uprising in the cities.~~ <sup>place its confidence concerning uprising in the cities.</sup> ~~could depend on in the revolution of the city.~~ Obviously, the workers ~~class has~~ <sup>have</sup> merited the Party's confidence.

SECOND: The workers class and labor people in SAIGON ~~knew~~ <sup>SAIGON realized</sup> that the only way to change their ~~unstable~~ <sup>wretched</sup> life and save the country was to violently overthrow the Japanese government and their ~~henchmen~~ <sup>puppets</sup> and seize power for the people. Although <sup>in reality</sup> the August Revolution in SAIGON ~~was~~ <sup>SAIGON</sup> proceeded progressing in relative peace, it was an armed <sup>uprising</sup> ~~revolution~~ in that the ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> authors of which were determined revolutionaries ~~decided~~ <sup>decided</sup> to use violence to liquidate the enemy. All the people ~~men who participated in the August Revolution had the spirit, the method,~~ <sup>men who participated in the August Revolution had the spirit, the method,</sup> were prepared mentally and methodically to a fierce struggle with bloodshed if necessary and ~~had no illusion~~ <sup>had no illusion</sup> about the rulers.

~~and the strength for the most desperate struggle. Illusion about the rulers was completely wiped out.~~ If the Japanese imperialists and their puppets <sup>offered no</sup> government made ~~no~~ resistance <sup>It was because</sup> they were incapable of resisting. In fact, <sup>had they resisted, they</sup> ~~Even in the case of a well prepared resistance,~~ <sup>defeated</sup> it would have been ~~definitively brought down~~ by the <sup>Saigon</sup> SAIGON People.

The <sup>Saigon</sup> SAIGON workers, ~~class~~ and labor <sup>ing</sup> people clearly understood that uprising <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ the culminating phase of the class struggle, <sup>and</sup> that as an invariable rule there <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ no class struggle which can proceed ~~moderately~~ <sup>gently</sup> and peacefully and ~~that in a class struggle,~~ <sup>can</sup> no success ~~will~~ be obtained without sacrifice. This was the strong determination of the ~~entire~~ <sup>Saigon</sup> SAIGON workers, <sup>who had been nursed by</sup> ~~was fostered by~~ the Party <sup>since</sup> ~~from~~ its creation, especially <sup>1944</sup> since ~~from 1911~~ when armed uprisings became a reality, and an essential factor of the existing situation.

THIRD: The <sup>Saigon</sup> SAIGON workers ~~class~~ and labor <sup>ing</sup> people had a sound and well-grounded ~~own~~ confidence in their <sup>own</sup> proper strength. <sup>Outwardly,</sup> ~~From the outside~~ the Japanese Forces appeared to be powerful for they had plenty of arms, bombs, ammunition, and fortifications. <sup>Inwardly,</sup> ~~from the inside,~~ they were far from strong. Each day the Pacific War was going from bad to worse for the Japanese troops and the March 9 Coup d'etat marked a new declining step for the Japanese in Indochina. This <sup>[coup d'etat]</sup> ~~operation~~ was an effort to <sup>eliminate</sup> ~~eradicate~~ the French imperialists from the administrative apparatus here. It was essentially <sup>designed</sup> ~~aimed at~~ focusing their forces to cope with the rising movement of our entire people to resist the Japanese all over our country. ~~All things considered,~~ The coup d'etat in fact could

not bring ~~with~~ any new breath of life for the Japanese expeditionary troops.

On their side, the Vietnamese in general and the South Vietnamese in particular clearly perceived the Japanese stalemate and knew that sooner or later the Japanese would ~~unconditionally~~ surrender. However, the Japanese's defeat and the seizure of power by the Viet Minh ~~posed~~ <sup>Front</sup> were two different problems. If our people did not ~~decide to~~ <sup>resolutely</sup> rise up it was then ~~highly~~ <sup>even</sup> possible, and ~~perhaps~~ <sup>perhaps</sup> certain, that this power would be transferred ~~gradually~~ <sup>successively</sup> from the Japanese to the English in South Vietnam and to Chiang Kai-Shek in North Vietnam, ~~so that it would fall into~~ <sup>and finally from the latter to the</sup> French hands upon the conclusion of the war.

The failure of all plans devised by the Japanese, English, French, Chiang Kai-Shek, and Americans was primarily due to the timely uprising of our people.

Though unarmed, the <sup>Saigon</sup> workers' class, ~~nevertheless, trusted in~~ <sup>were confident in</sup> their ~~close unity~~ <sup>solidarity</sup> and their political ~~strength~~ <sup>strength</sup>. ~~So, with this firm confidence~~ <sup>That is why they were</sup> ever present in their mind, ~~they~~ <sup>→</sup> determined to take action.

~~Therefore,~~ There is no revolution in which the oppressed dispose, from the ~~very~~ onset, a material advantage over the enemy. If the revolutionaries take such a simple consideration <sup>on the balance of forces</sup> as a ~~basic principle~~ <sup>base for</sup> ~~action,~~ then, it is obvious that they will never dare to take action. Experiences drawn from history ~~show~~ <sup>proved</sup> that the most effective weapon of the workers, ~~which~~ <sup>life-and-death</sup> in the ~~struggle~~ <sup>struggle</sup> against ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> reactionary rulers, has been their revolutionary morale, their firm will and their ~~determination to sacrifice.~~ <sup>readily accept</sup> With such a weapon, the workers ~~can~~ <sup>can</sup> succeed in defeating any ~~enemy,~~ <sup>no matter where he comes from</sup> ~~regardless of their origin and~~ <sup>and how he is equipped.</sup>

~~their equipment.~~

The August revolution has ~~irrefutably~~ proven these experiences once again.

FOURTH: The <sup>Saigon</sup> SAIGON workery ~~class~~ and labor <sup>ing</sup> people knew how to secure the opportunity as well as to act <sup>with urgency.</sup> ~~promptly~~ and in strict ~~accordance with the existing situation.~~ They <sup>Capitalizing</sup> on the enemy's confusion and <sup>weakness they</sup> ~~feebleness~~ <sup>to</sup> responded harmoniously with the nation-wide uprising movement <sup>by dealing a final decisive blow at the enemy.</sup> ~~by striking a long finishing stroke at the enemy.~~

~~There are no objections to the inference that~~ In every revolutionary process, strength constitutes <sup>a</sup> the decisive factor. However, <sup>this does not mean that</sup> while recognizing this ~~as an essential element,~~ the workers ~~do not~~ <sup>ed</sup> disregard the opportunity factor. ~~In the last analysis,~~ There are different types of opportunities: the small, the medium, the great, and the strategic. The defeat suffered by the Japanese forces in the Pacific theater <sup>presented a</sup> ~~was~~ strategic opportunity. The August revolution broke out <sup>at the right</sup> ~~at~~ time. An early break out would have required more sacrifices while a delayed one would have missed the opportunity.

Under the leadership of the Party, the whole working <sup>ing</sup> class and our people <sup>made maximum</sup> ~~made~~ efforts to gain time and to prepare <sup>for</sup> the <sup>uprising</sup> ~~revolution.~~ This enabled the <sup>Saigon</sup> SAIGON people to respond adequately to the nation-wide uprising movement.

From the end of 1944 to August 1945, everywhere and at every moment, the workery <sup>were discussing</sup> ~~class~~ debated ~~on~~ the situation, <sup>seizure of</sup> on the ~~recovering~~ of political power, and ~~on~~ the <sup>uprising</sup> ~~revolution.~~ This <sup>see thing</sup> ~~stormy~~ atmosphere ~~was expressed~~ <sup>reflected</sup>

~~by~~ the high <sup>enlightenment</sup> ~~sense of responsibility~~ of the workers and <sup>their</sup> ~~by~~ the realization ~~of the~~ ~~class~~ that the hour of action was coming and that they must seize this opportunity to rise <sup>up boldly and timely in order</sup> ~~heroically to gain a certain~~ victory at the favorable moment. <sup>To win victory with certainty.</sup>

FIFTH: The SAIGON workers and labor <sup>ing</sup> people ~~also~~ understood that the secret ~~method~~ of creating strength was to <sup>solidarity</sup> collaborate and <sup>the unification of</sup> unite <sup>all</sup> ~~all~~ <sup>all forces of the working class</sup> ~~worker class~~ forces in a revolutionary organization of <sup>the</sup> workers. <sup>For this reason</sup> Trade unions were rapidly developed and became an organized <sup>and prestigious</sup> political force <sup>of the workers</sup> ~~with firm authority over the worker class.~~

The Vanguard workers realized that it was necessary to gather thousands of workers and labor <sup>ing</sup> people into trade unions <sup>which are a good medium for</sup> ~~where the revolutionary~~ propaganda ~~would be more advantageous.~~ <sup>the propagation of the revolution.</sup>

At first, the trade union was an entirely secret organization.

Taking advantage of the evolving situation, <sup>it</sup> ~~the trade union~~ was gradually <sup>emerged</sup> in <sup>semi-public activities despite prohibition</sup> ~~operated in public~~ although ~~it was prohibited~~ by enemy laws. The workers were conscious that they must firmly protect the trade union; under the Japanese <sup>occupation</sup> domination, the survival of all trade unions <sup>attested to</sup> ~~verified~~ the great strength of the workers.

Another <sup>significant aspect of the trade union was the fact that it</sup> ~~question having a special significance:~~ ~~The trade union was~~ <sup>was</sup> not subjected to reformist ideas and was not influenced or exploited by ~~the corrupt~~ ~~g~~ leaders.

→ The trade union was the <sup>workers'</sup> ~~revolutionary~~ instrument for <sup>revolutionary struggle.</sup> ~~the workers.~~

Owing to this instrument, ~~there simultaneously took shape~~ a <sup>double</sup> ~~dual~~ government <sup>almost took shape in the laboring people's dwelling</sup> ~~in the labor~~ quarters during the days immediately following

the Japanese Coup d'etat. On one hand, the Japanese Puppet government was represented by the labor quarters <sup>chiefs</sup> ~~delegates~~; on the other hand, the popular government was represented by the trade unions. The ~~real~~ <sup>practical</sup> power was ~~inclining from day to day towards~~ <sup>slipping after</sup> into the hands of the trade unions.

SIXTH: The SAIGON worker class and labor <sup>people</sup> knew how to rally <sup>form</sup> ~~assemble~~ all other revolutionary forces to <sup>form</sup> ~~create~~ a <sup>broad National Front</sup> ~~large peoples front~~, with the laboring workers as its core, and through the Vanguard ~~the keystone of which was the workers and labor people.~~ They knew they ~~had to rely on the youth assault strength through the Vanguard youth organization.~~ <sup>Youth organization, rely on the assault strength of the youth.</sup> At first, <sup>glance</sup> the formation of <sup>trade unions in city streets and</sup> ~~the labor quarter and town~~ <sup>blocs</sup> ~~trade unions~~ appeared to be illogical, but in the long run, <sup>the trade unions</sup> ~~this forma-~~ ~~tion proved to be the popular attraction of all trade unions.~~ <sup>have a great</sup> ~~It was~~ <sup>on the population</sup> ~~must be~~ <sup>born in mind</sup> ~~important to know that, at the time, the trade union was not merely a~~ professional organization. <sup>First of</sup> ~~Above~~ all, it was a <sup>political organization of the</sup> ~~people politico organiza-~~ <sup>masses</sup> ~~tion~~, and everybody knew that the trade union was under the leadership of the Party, <sup>and that to join</sup> ~~to be enrolled in~~ the trade union <sup>was to join a mass</sup> ~~meant participation in the~~ ~~popular~~ organization of the Party.

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There <sup>are</sup> ~~were~~ many aspects worthy of mention about the worker movement experiences of the 1944-45 period. But in <sup>the framework of a</sup> ~~newspaper articles,~~ <sup>I will only</sup> ~~we confined~~ <sup>concern</sup> myself with the main subjects mentioned above, ~~subjects which~~ ~~the problem only to the above important subjects.~~ The South Vietnam ~~may be useful for the present worker movement.~~ A ~~general trade union was created over 20 years ago. During these 20~~ ~~years, the SAIGON worker class has made great advances.~~

It has been 20 years since the foundation of the Nam Bô General Trade Union. During these 20 years the Saigon working class <sup>20</sup> has matured considerably.

At present, we must perform a mission identical to <sup>those</sup> that of 20 years ago. If history ~~is~~ never ~~a~~ <sup>repeats itself, this notion is true in so far as</sup> ~~repetition~~ <sup>that means in comparison</sup> as concerns the Saigon workers who now enjoy more favorable ~~in the August revolution period, the SAIGON workers~~ <sup>conditions than they did in the August Revolution period.</sup> ~~of course, ~~points in their favor~~~~ <sup>they are</sup> not without ~~been exempt from~~ <sup>difficulties which did not exist in 1945,</sup> ~~however, favorable~~ <sup>however, favorable</sup> conditions are still the essential ~~favorable factors of the moment were the essential factors. The~~ <sup>features of the present [workers] movement in the cities.</sup> The political standard, and the struggle experiences of the present workers

~~are~~ <sup>are</sup> more advanced and more abundant than in the past. The enemy ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> very weak. The ~~city~~ <sup>cities</sup> now ~~afford~~ <sup>have a</sup> firm support ~~points~~ <sup>available</sup> not existing in 1945. ~~These points were the~~ <sup>This support comes from the entire</sup> liberated rural areas, the ~~rural~~ <sup>entire</sup> class of peasants

who are devoted to the support of ~~our~~ <sup>their</sup> allies, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> our leaders in the cities, and the heroic liberation ~~army~~ <sup>army</sup> who ~~has~~ <sup>has been</sup> continuous ~~successes~~ <sup>victorious on all</sup> all over the battlefields. The worker ~~class~~ <sup>class</sup> and labor ~~people~~ <sup>people</sup> ~~were added as a~~ <sup>also have the support of</sup> enthusiastic fellow travelers ~~composed of petty~~ <sup>enthusiastic fellow travelers composed of petty</sup> ~~company formed by the bourgeois,~~ <sup>company formed by the bourgeois,</sup> intellectual ~~and student class.~~ <sup>school pupils and university students.</sup>

The SAIGON worker ~~class~~ <sup>class</sup> and labor ~~people~~ <sup>people</sup> ~~were faced with a~~ <sup>are</sup> facing a splendid ~~chance~~ <sup>opportunity</sup> for liberation.

A ~~similar~~ <sup>similar</sup> situation to that of 1945 ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> coming into sight.

SAIGON youth high tide in the August revolution ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~capitalized~~ <sup>[capitalized]</sup>

The role of ~~the~~ youths and ~~the~~ youth organization ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> brought outstanding in the 1945 August revolution in SAIGON.

Right after ~~the~~ <sup>was overthrown</sup> French ~~subversion~~ <sup>subversion</sup> by the Japanese ~~forces~~, a youth high tide ~~took~~ <sup>took</sup> ~~was shaped~~ <sup>was shaped</sup> in South Vietnam, especially in SAIGON. People wearing white shorts and straw caps, ~~equipped with bamboo sticks~~ <sup>carrying «tâm vlog»</sup> ~~were busy~~ <sup>marshaling day</sup> ~~night~~ <sup>and night</sup> day in the streets, ~~singing revolutionary songs~~ <sup>singing revolutionary songs</sup> ~~and marching in step.~~ <sup>with passion:</sup> this was

to the sounds of whistles

<sup>the sign</sup>  
~~There were indications~~ of a new epoch <sup>in the</sup> political life of the South.

These youths warmly answered the <sup>uprising</sup> appeal of the Viet Minh <sup>Front</sup> and the

Indochina Communist Party. ~~They~~ They stayed up whole nights <sup>to guard</sup>

<sup>the</sup> ~~watching~~ meeting <sup>places</sup> of the Party and <sup>of the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>trade unions.</sup> ~~Cooperation.~~ They distributed <sup>hundreds of</sup> thousands of leaflets and hung thousands of <sup>banners and flags</sup> ~~banners~~

~~of the~~ Front and of the Party. They served as <sup>core elements</sup> ~~keystones~~ in

every public rally of the Party. They assaulted and seized the enemy

public offices on the night of August 24 <sup>and</sup> ~~they~~ heroically <sup>stood in the front</sup> ~~took~~ the

~~front~~ line to protect the revolutionary power. The success of the

August revolution in <sup>Saigon</sup> SAIGON and <sup>in Nam Bô in general</sup> South VIETNAM was firmly fastened to the <sup>was closely</sup>

<sup>associated with the</sup> youth high tide of <sup>that</sup> this period. <sup>of the</sup> Imperialists <sup>to</sup> were very interested in <sup>the youths and</sup>

<sup>who strove</sup> to employ <sup>the latter</sup> this for the <sup>service</sup> interests of the regime. In the

first years of WW II <sup>the</sup> French <sup>colonialists</sup> imperialists had a well prepared ~~training~~

plan for <sup>training in a way beneficial to them.</sup> youths ~~that was favorable to their benefit.~~ Physical training

schools were <sup>set up in haste</sup> built with <sup>the government encouraged</sup> alacrity; authorities stimulated the activities of the

~~with a type of "physical training"~~ <sup>aimed at improving "physical fitness" in an attempt</sup> in order to attract the youths towards

a direction entirely opposite to the <sup>tendency of the</sup> youth movement ~~a revolution tendency~~ <sup>at the</sup>

~~of the time.~~ Realizing that Vietnam possessed new conditions for <sup>breeding</sup>

~~out the~~ revolutionary high tides, the French <sup>colonialists</sup> imperialists <sup>began to</sup> ~~so~~ threw out the

<sup>French Empire</sup> so-called "French Imperialist Youth Organization", under the leadership of lieutenant <sup>colonel</sup> ~~and~~ Ducoroy. They aimed at diverting the youths' attention to "big

shoulders and muscular thighs", to the "Five <sup>states</sup> Nations" <sup>soccer</sup> Ping Pong prize,

to the Indochina <sup>Bicycle</sup> Tour <sup>Race</sup> with the competitors <sup>Le Thanh Cac</sup> PHUNG HOANG <sup>Le Thanh</sup>

~~and~~ <sup>the Phoenix and Nguyen Van Thieu</sup> with the King of Mountain Climbing <sup>Nguyen Van Thieu</sup>, to <sup>swimming</sup> ~~about~~ <sup>tournaments</sup>

in the HO TAY Lake, to the olympic <sup>stadiums which</sup> ~~courts~~ groups sprung up everywhere, rather

than letting the youths' attention focus on the <sup>once-in-a-</sup> thousand-year opportunity which was opening for the people of

the entire country to abolish the yoke of slavery and

win independence.  
~~awaking to this rare opportunity. This was proving convenient to~~  
~~throw off the slavish yoke for recovering our independences. This~~  
~~was a valuable occasion for the people of the whole country.~~

After <sup>overthrowing</sup> the French ~~subversion~~, the Japanese also had planned to <sup>use</sup> ~~employ~~  
the youths for their interests. ~~We~~ Ida was appointed to replace Ducoroy

in organizing the pro-Japanese youths. The Japanese ~~used~~ <sup>did not</sup> the slogan  
"Physical <sup>fitness</sup> ~~training~~" to <sup>deceive</sup> ~~train~~ the youths <sup>instead they clamored their</sup> ~~and divert them to their Great~~

<sup>Great</sup> East Asia doctrine. They did not ~~aim at~~ <sup>take</sup> the political aspect ~~of the~~  
<sup>the</sup> youth <sup>movement</sup> ~~organization~~, but they directed the youth <sup>political aspirations</sup> ~~aspirations~~ <sup>toward</sup> ~~in~~ another

direction more reactionary, more useful to their policy ~~for the great~~ <sup>of down-</sup>  
~~East Asia~~ <sup>and prolonging the war.</sup>

<sup>nating</sup> East Asia ~~annihilation~~. It must be noted that, when we pushed the youth  
movement to a high tide, and guided this movement toward the purpose of  
~~educating and proselyting the youths, snatching them from the imperialists,~~  
revolution the progress of the Party was becoming stable. We educated  
~~hands and turning them into an assault force of the revolution, the~~  
~~and took the youths out of the imperialist's hand in order to turn them~~  
~~youth movement had grown into a high tide which stuck to~~  
~~into revolutionary assault troops. the objective of the revolution.~~

Experiences about youth motivation during the ~~historical~~ period of  
1941-1945 were abundant. We <sup>can mention the following major</sup> ~~could enumerate these~~ ~~experiences as follows:~~

One: Our Party well understood the role <sup>and</sup> ~~the~~ position of the youths  
in the revolution, ~~We~~ accurately <sup>evaluated</sup> ~~estimated~~ their role and position and  
confirmed <sup>its</sup> ~~our~~ resolute determination <sup>to exert</sup> ~~for recovering~~ the Party leadership ~~over~~  
~~with this organization.~~ Our Party had a clear <sup>policy line on</sup> ~~youth motivation line,~~ ~~proselyting~~  
It <sup>set forth the objective and development</sup> ~~prompted a purpose and~~ direction for ~~progressing~~ the youth movement  
and concentrated efforts ~~into~~ the youth ~~mission~~ <sup>work</sup>.

It was obvious that all reactionary regimes <sup>rely</sup> on the youth <sup>force, on</sup> the youths' dynamism and their appetite <sup>for novelty</sup>. <sup>Winning</sup> these <sup>reserve</sup> forces, on their activity and character. ~~The problem of gaining these~~ This reserve force for the revolution was one of the great missions of the Party. The success of the Party, <sup>youth proselyting work</sup> during the years 1941-44 originated from this point.

Two: The Party <sup>had</sup> ~~was~~ patient <sup>ed</sup> in educating the youths, <sup>and pointed out an</sup> ~~in tracing for~~ ideal for them to live <sup>and struggle</sup>. ~~the youths, a lively ideology and establishing a spirit for struggle.~~ Of course, <sup>national</sup> the peoples liberation problem was the <sup>central</sup> education <sup>at theme</sup> center of the <sup>used</sup> Party among the youths <sup>at the</sup> of this time. <sup>However</sup> Simultaneously, Communism was also <sup>simultaneously to a definite group of youth.</sup> introduced ~~into the defined youth elements.~~ At first, <sup>proselyting</sup> the youth <sup>task</sup> ~~mission~~ was <sup>first of all</sup> an ideological <sup>task</sup> mission. To speak clearly, it was the <sup>introducing</sup> mission of <sup>and</sup> exposing a just concept of life, a revolutionary <sup>spirit</sup> morale, <sup>and</sup> a hero's doctrine <sup>and</sup> about the future and <sup>ethics of</sup> ethics for the youths. Our Party frankly <sup>pointed out</sup> ~~expressed~~ that the youths' future was <sup>linked</sup> fastened to the liberation ~~of~~ the poorest class of the society. <sup>The youths were discussing, although to a</sup> ~~limited extent, about the class and the liberation of the laboring people,~~ youths were busy for the classes, for the labor peoples' liberation, they <sup>and tacitly recognized the leadership of the Party.</sup> ~~taefully, recognized the leadership role of the Party.~~

It is <sup>not true</sup> ~~wrong to assume~~ that the Party took no interest in tactics <sup>(to be discussed</sup> later), <sup>however, experience</sup> ~~experience~~ shows that <sup>relative to</sup> the youths, <sup>even youths of petty bourgeoisie</sup> ~~as well as to various~~ <sup>ascendancy</sup> classes of bourgeoisie it is imperative to point out to them the basic <sup>absorbing</sup> problems and <sup>absorbing</sup> revolutionary problems for they are highly capable of <sup>receiving</sup> these basic notions.

Third: In the youth <sup>proselyting work</sup> ~~motivation~~ mission, the Party attached interests <sup>the</sup> to <sup>laboring</sup> various class <sup>relied on this</sup> of youth ~~and~~, and <sup>to found</sup> ~~considered these~~ class ~~as a large~~ a broad based ~~the~~ youth front. ~~Therefore~~ ~~the labor people and the youths were~~ ~~united~~ Consequently, the worker proselyting task and the youth proselyting task were tied together.

Simultaneously, the Party paid special attention to <sup>the</sup> various classes of <sup>petty</sup> bourgeoisie <sup>youth, especially</sup> chiefly to the students who constituted a large force <sup>having high</sup> imbued with a revolutionary <sup>capacities</sup> high tide. It was on the <sup>basis</sup> of ~~the~~ <sup>solidarity</sup> ~~unity~~ between the workers, youth class and the <sup>petty</sup> bourgeoisie <sup>youth and</sup> student class that a <sup>broad</sup> large and strong youth front was formed.

Fourth: The Party attached importance to the formation of a ~~large~~ <sup>broad</sup> youth front. ~~According to the situation,~~ The slogan for such a youth front <sup>vary according to the circumstances</sup> ~~permitted~~ <sup>to be modified</sup> would be modified. Sometimes it was a cultural slogan <sup>(to bring into play the national</sup> ~~(to express the people's morale and the national tradition))~~ <sup>spirit</sup>

Sometimes it was a slogan <sup>calling for improving</sup> for ~~improving~~ the people's intellectual standard through the "National Language Propagation Movement"; sometimes <sup>slogan calling for</sup> it was a national solidarity ~~slogan~~ through the <sup>movement</sup> "North Female Victims Assistance Movement" and finally it was <sup>calling for</sup> through the slogan "Power to the Viet Minh" <sup>born from a versatile</sup> The Vanguard Youth movement was ~~the result of a lively~~

<sup>tactic</sup> ~~stratagem~~ of the Party. <sup>had their own intention when</sup> The Japanese fascists ~~paid particular attention~~ when they authorized the foundation of ~~the Vanguard youth movement.~~ The reactionary or uncommitted elements <sup>had their own intentions about</sup> were also ~~attentive to~~ this movement. The Japanese <sup>wanted to turn</sup> ~~aimed at converting~~

the Vanguard Youth movement into a fascist youth organization <sup>operating under</sup> ~~armed with~~ the slogan "Japan-Vietnam <sup>solidarity</sup> ~~Unity~~" for the common prosperity of Southeast ~~East Asia.~~ The reactionary <sup>cliques</sup> ~~groups~~ wanted the Vanguard Youth to become

an organization with <sup>mean</sup> ~~a minimum~~ national <sup>st leaning</sup> ~~tendency~~ serving as an instrument for <sup>them to compete for</sup> ~~uprising~~ the power; the <sup>petty</sup> bourgeoisie elements, who <sup>did not go</sup> ~~were not~~ devoted <sup>all out for</sup> ~~entirely~~ to the revolution, wanted to <sup>use</sup> ~~enroll~~ in the Vanguard Youth ~~organization with the purpose of propagating the reformed ideas at the~~ <sup>for</sup> ~~half-way point.~~ <sup>their half-measure reformist ideas.</sup>

*P* also had its own plan when it got involved with the Vanguard Youth.  
Our Party meddled with the Vanguard Youth for its own intention.  
At first, *of all this* it was a public organization *with a capacity to gather* ~~consisting of~~ a large number of people (in reality the Vanguard Youth was not merely a Youth front, older ~~senior~~ people were also *joined it* ~~taking part~~), and if the Party did not *dispute* ~~dispute~~ *seated* the leadership of this organization, the Japanese, pro-Japanese, reactionary *clique* ~~sect~~ and uncommitted groups would, ~~disrupt~~ it. Therefore, the Party *decided to seize control* ~~advocated the seizure~~ of the Vanguard Youth movement.  
*In fact,* a number of the Vanguard Youth *founding committee members* ~~promoters~~ were under the influence of our Party.

However, it would not *be a* ~~have been~~ right *thing to do* ~~had we planned to turn this~~ *advantage of this organization* ~~organization to our normal profits~~ for the general situation of the country *allowed* our Party to *seize leadership of* ~~disrupt~~ the Vanguard Youth leadership. The important *thing* was to direct the Vanguard Youth *ward* to the revolutionary path, ~~was to the uprising for overthrowing~~ *of existing* the present regime ~~in order to and the~~ *ment of* establish a new popular regime. The Party cadres ~~were~~ *to work* assigned ~~a mission~~ within the Vanguard Youth organization. ~~They~~ *given the mission of* were ~~tasked with~~ taking control of its infrastructure. *At this level* ~~On the low level~~, the Party organized the leadership nucleus, \* The National Salvation Youth Group. ~~at that~~ *the same* time, the Party *had* ~~subordinated~~ the Vanguard Youth movement to the *trade* labor union organizations. In reality, it was difficult to *make the distinction* ~~discern the line~~ between those two organizations, and in a *definite scope* ~~defined sphere~~, the Vanguard Youth organization *was* ~~performing~~ the mission of the *trade* labor union and vice versa.  
Of course, the Vanguard Youth movement was not an *affiliate* ~~organization~~ of ~~adjoining to~~ the Party. Before, and even after the August Revolution, *different* other forces strived to deviate the Vanguard Youth movement, *and* so that the class struggle *went on* ~~continued~~ in a complex manner ~~continued~~ until 1949-1950.

*it was obvious that*  
Nevertheless, ~~the Party~~ <sup>had basically won</sup> took over the leadership ~~of~~ <sup>the</sup> Vanguard Youth movement and put this organization into ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> service of ~~for~~ <sup>political objectives</sup> the most correct and useful ~~purpose~~ <sup>purpose</sup> for the people's interests.

The Vanguard Youth organization was a ~~large~~ <sup>broad</sup> political front. It was a Youth high tide before and during the General ~~Revolution~~ <sup>Uprising</sup>. Among the Vanguard Youths, the Party had discovered many capable elements, ~~educated~~ <sup>trained</sup> them ~~to become~~ <sup>to become</sup> National Salvation youths and ~~an~~ outstanding Party members many of them became ~~the most~~ outstanding cadres of the Party during the first <sup>[War of]</sup> resistance. *xx*

In brief, the experiences in the leadership of the Youth Movement before and during the August Revolution could be summarized as follows:

1. <sup>It was necessary</sup> to concentrate ~~the~~ efforts to ~~realize~~ <sup>materialize a</sup> Youth high tide.
2. The youth high tide emerged from a ~~large~~ <sup>broad</sup> youth front. ~~which~~ <sup>This front</sup> developed by ~~progressing~~ <sup>progressing</sup> from social, cultural activities to political activities, from ~~the public~~ <sup>a status a</sup> to the semi-public ~~nature~~ <sup>one</sup>, and ~~to gradually become the~~ <sup>finally to a status of</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>total</sup> entire opposition ~~movement~~ to the reactionary ~~power~~ government.
3. This youth front should be ~~directed~~ <sup>led</sup> by the Party, the leadership of ~~of which~~ <sup>the Party</sup> should be ~~established on the basis of:~~ <sup>built on the basis of:</sup>
  - a) Promoting the revolution spirit among the young people.
  - b) Educating the youths in all subjects related to ideology, including communist ~~ideology~~ <sup>ideology</sup>, and ~~determining~~ <sup>resolutely</sup> to defeat all reactionary, uncommitted tendencies of many ~~sect~~ <sup>factions</sup> ~~fostering~~ <sup>fostering</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>the intention</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>to</sup> exploit the youths.
  - c) <sup>Using</sup> ~~To~~ ~~organize~~ the ~~young~~ ~~worker~~ ~~forces~~ <sup>and laboring youths in a close</sup> as a base and ~~to strictly ally~~ <sup>ally</sup> ~~with~~ <sup>with</sup> the bourgeoisie youth and students ~~forces~~.

*alliance with*

- d. <sup>building a</sup> ~~To create~~ a leadership nucleus in the youth organizations which at the ~~same~~ time <sup>was</sup> ~~existing~~ the National Salvation Youth Group.
- e. <sup>tying</sup> ~~To fusion~~ the youth movement to the worker movement through <sup>the establishment of relations</sup> ~~liaison~~ between the Vanguard Youth organization and ~~all corporations~~ <sup>the trade unions</sup>.
- f. <sup>Getting firm control of</sup> ~~to carry out~~ the low level organization of the Vanguard Youth movement and at the same time <sup>competitor</sup> ~~to displace~~ the leadership of the <sup>movement's</sup> high level, <sup>At</sup> ~~at which time~~ the upper level, <sup>with those forces having a</sup> ~~to~~ the Party must ally <sup>to the national tendency</sup> and democratic tendency, ~~not~~ <sup>to</sup> isolate the political <sup>opportunists</sup> ~~opportunists~~ and ~~to~~ attack the pro-Japanese <sup>elements</sup>.
- g. <sup>Through</sup> ~~To realize~~ the youth movement <sup>striving to</sup> develop all installations of the Party <sup>'s and Group's base-level organizations</sup> and consolidate the portions of the Party in order to ensure that the Party's influence among <sup>to gradually become firm and large in the youth movement</sup> the youths grows steadily day after day. Those ~~are~~ the principal experiences, and at present, they ~~have a sure effect on our youth motivation conditions in~~ <sup>saigon</sup> which certainly are still useful in our present youth proselyting task in Saigon.