

Truong Chinh
1946

THE AUGUST REVOLUTION

PREFACE

to the 1946 Vietnamese edition

Dear readers,

This little book is a collection of articles published in the newspaper *Su That* (Truth) on the occasion of the first anniversary of the August Revolution. The articles have been revised and filled out. Some passages have been re-written.

Our only aim is to relate the history of the heroic struggle of our people, to submit it to a serious assessment, to determine the character and the significance of the August Revolution, to outline its future development and, lastly, to propose to our compatriots the immediate main tasks necessary to the realisation of national *independence, freedom and happiness*.

At the present time, there are people who have not lost a drop of sweat for the revolution, or who have acted and are acting as traitors, who try to deny the importance of the August Revolution. They pretend that our people did not have to struggle very hard and that power fell into their hands by "chance". In face of this reactionary point of view, we have only to recall the phases of our people's struggle in the Great National Salvation Movement against the Japanese Fascists as well as in the August General Insurrection of 1945. We stress particularly the leading role and organising work of the Indochinese Communist Party and the Viet Minh Front as well as their skilful tactics in the preparatory period leading up to the insurrection.

We outline the details of this path to salvation and way of building the country at this stage, *the glorious path mapped out for our people by President Ho Chi Minh*, the way to check the policy of

the French colonialists which is a policy of aggression and of successive encroachments in the military field, and of division and deception in the political one.

The August General Insurrection, like the Great National Salvation Movement against the Japanese fascists, was a struggle which had a variety of forms and was rich in content. This book does not pretend to contain the full story of its manifold experiences. We hope that the fighters in our revolutionary movement will draw further lessons from that treasury of experience and complement this book.

In any case, the following pages will be of some use if they succeed in strengthening the reader's faith in the success of the task of national liberation, and help him to understand his civic duties better, and to correctly understand the policy advocated by the communists in our country for the present period and the Marxist-Leninist methods of mobilizing the masses, adapted to the situation in Viet Nam.

The August Revolution was of a decisive character, but it was only the first great victory of the national liberation movement. We shall have to fight harder battles to safeguard our national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to consolidate our democratic republican regime and to achieve total independence.

The struggle for national liberation is extremely hard, but it is sure to achieve complete victory. We firmly believe this and now invite the reader to review with us our recent heroic struggle so as to prepare for future struggles.

Hanoi, September 29, 1946

TRƯỜNG-CHINH

CHAPTER 1

A GLORIOUS PAGE IN OUR HISTORY

THE HIGH TIDE OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT

On March 9, 1945, the Japanese fascists swept the French colonialists out of the political arena in Indochina. In less than twenty-four hours the French colonialists laid down their arms and surrendered to the Japanese in all the main towns. Some French units scuttled to the frontiers. Others, in Cao Bang and Bac Can, made an attempt to cooperate with the *Liberation Army* in the fight against the Japanese fascists. In Bac Can, a "Franco-Vietnamese resistance committee against the Japanese fascists" was organized. But after a time, the French left us and fled to China¹. It can be said that the French troops in Indochina did not resist the Japanese, and that the Resistance was solely our people's work.

On the very night of March 9, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party decided to launch a "Great National Salvation Movement

1. Although Major Reul in Cao Bang and Lieutenant Pontiche in Bac Can ordered their troops to cooperate with the Liberation Army, it was rather to avoid being disarmed by our forces than to carry on the struggle against the Japanese fascists. That was why they fled before waging even a single battle on our side.

against the Japanese Fascists"¹ at a meeting held at Tu Son (Bac Ninh province), about 20 km. from Hanoi.

The next day, in the Hoang Hoa Tham resistance zone (High and Middle Regions of northern Viet Nam), the guerrillas took isolated posts by storm, and disarmed a number of French soldiers and of Bao An² units to prevent their arms from falling into the hands of the Japanese; they attacked the Japanese troops moving along the roads from Tuyen Quang to Thai Nguyen and from Bac Can to Cao Bang provinces, harassed them even in the Bac Can provincial capital, and launched sudden attacks against their base at Cho Chu, etc... In northern and central Viet Nam, thousands of Japanese paddy stores were stormed by the people and their stocks of rice distributed to the poor. In this way the famine was relieved by revolutionary means. In Bac Giang, Thai Nguyen, Bac Can and other provinces, peasants rose up, seized and distributed land held by the Japanese and French.

Most of the attacks on paddy stores became armed parades and demonstrations. Armed Viet Minh militants addressed the masses at cross-roads and in market-places to win them over to the national cause. The illusion that the Japanese fascists could be useful to us, that they had come to free us, etc. was firmly dispelled among the masses and in the revolutionary ranks. In the main towns, picked units of the Viet Minh Front, operating under the noses of the Japanese troops, killed dangerous traitors and predatory Japanese

1. See directive of the Standing Bureau of the Indochinese Communist Party of 12 March 1945: "The Japanese-French clash and our action".

2. Bao An: puppet troops.

officers, sowing confusion and fear in the ranks of the Japanese fascists and their lackeys. Self-defence units or guerilla teams developed quickly everywhere. Everyone was in a fever to get hold of any kind of weapon so as to be ready to hurl himself at the enemy at the first opportunity. People's Revolutionary Committees were set up in the regions controlled by the guerillas. In other zones, Liberation Committees sprang up like mushrooms. They led the masses in the preparations for the general insurrection, and trained them in the exercise of power.

The Revolution was gaining incredible momentum. Pre-insurrectionary anticipation prevailed everywhere, arousing the enthusiasm of members of national salvation organizations and winning over even the wavering elements.

In April, the Revolutionary Military Conference of Bac Ky (northern Viet Nam) held in Hiep Hoa, Bac Giang, drew up a plan for unifying the people's armed forces, made preparations for the general insurrection, carried out local insurrections and set up the High Command of the Liberation Army in northern Viet Nam.

The free zone was officially established by decision of the conference of cadres from the six provinces of Cao Bang, Lang Son, Ha Giang, Bac Can, Tuyen Quang and Thai Nguyen, convened by the Viet Minh General Committee in June. It included the territory of these six provinces, and unified the various regions placed under the control of the revolutionary power.

The new Viet Nam came into being.

The people's revolutionary committees adopted forceful measures to suppress the various forms of oppression and

exploitation by the fascist militarists, break the colonialist chains and improve the people's living conditions. A part of northern Viet Nam was effectively controlled by the revolutionary power, and this situation provided the August General Insurrection with extremely favourable conditions at the outset.

From June onward, the Allied air forces launched massive attacks against Japan.

At the Potsdam Conference in July the Soviet Union decided to participate in the war against Japan. The Viet Minh General Committee, headed by Comrade Ho Chi Minh, speeded up the convening of the National Congress. But, because of difficulties of communications, the Congress could not be held in the liberated zone until August, at the very moment of the Japanese capitulation.

THE AUGUST INSURRECTION

On August 9, the Soviet Red Army launched a tempestuous attack on Manchuria, and within six days, the crack Japanese Kwantung Army was destroyed. The survivors surrendered.

This decisive victory of the Soviet Army sealed the fate of the Japanese fascists, and it was the Soviet Union that actually liberated all peoples subjected to Japanese oppression.

Japan's position became hopeless. It was then that the Communist Party, which was holding its National Congress at the time, decided to launch the general insurrection and to found the democratic republican regime in Viet Nam. The Viet Minh General Committee was set up immediately.

At the news of the imminent unconditional surrender of Japan, this Committee on the night of August 13 gave the order to launch the general insurrection.

The People's Congress was convened at Tan Trao village, Tuyen Quang province, in the free zone on the morning of August 16. More than 60 delegates from big and small nationalities and of all political convictions in our country, gathered in an atmosphere of friendship and great enthusiasm, approved the Viet Minh General Committee's order for general insurrection, decided upon the domestic and foreign policies of the revolutionary power, and appointed the National Committee for the Liberation of Viet Nam, i.e. the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

After many years of perilous peregrinations and clandestine activities, Comrade Ho Chi Minh appeared before the people's delegates for the first time.

Because the People's Congress opened immediately after the general insurrection order had been launched, it had to hold a "lightning" session to allow the delegates to return to their regions quickly and lead the decisive struggle together with the local militants. (In fact, some delegates bound for the Congress received the order to turn back as early as August 10).

During this historic Congress, the Indochinese Communist Party advocated an extremely judicious policy: *to lead the masses in insurrection in order to disarm the Japanese before the arrival of the Allied forces in Indochina; to wrest power from the Japanese and their stooges, and finally, as the*

people's power, to welcome the Allied forces coming to disarm the Japanese troops stationed in Indochina.

In numerous places, the Viet Minh militants took advantage of the extreme confusion of the Japanese forces, who were conscious of their imminent defeat, and implementing the instructions given by the Communist Party on March 12, took the initiative to lead the people to rise up and seize power even before receiving the general insurrection order: from August 11 to 15, victorious insurrections took place in almost all provinces of Bac Bo and northern Trung Bo, in the rural areas of Quang Ngai, Khanh Hoa, (southern Trung Bo) and My Tho, Sa Dec (Nam Bo). Several Japanese posts in the vicinity of the free zone were overrun on August 14 and 15. On August 16, the news of the Japanese surrender began to spread rapidly. In all provinces, huge public meetings accompanied by armed demonstrations were held in the streets and along the roads. A great number of factories and public offices ceased work. The gold-starred red flag was seen waving everywhere. Many armed demonstrations were transformed into sudden attacks on Japanese posts. On August 17 and 18, hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated in Hanoi. A general political strike began. The Viet Minh delegates called on the masses to seize power. On August 19, the entire capital rose up. The Bao An troops and police detachments were sympathetic to the revolutionary forces. The insurrectional forces headed by vanguard detachments of youths and workers and led by Viet Minh cadres, stormed the palace where the Imperial Delegate had been residing. The latter had fled with his lackeys. The Viet Minh proclaimed the foundation of the provisional revolutionary

power. Faced with the irresistible growth of the revolutionary movement of the entire united nation and people, Bao Dai abdicated. The Tran Trong Kim puppet government surrendered. The Viet Minh General Committee sent their delegates to Hue to receive the king's abdication.

THE BIRTH OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

A few days later, almost all members of the National Committee for the Liberation of Viet Nam met in Hanoi. In conformity with the new situation, the Committee was re-formed to include some non-party personalities and constitute a provisional government of national union presided over by Ho Chi Minh. On August 29, 1945, a detachment of the Liberation Army from the resistance zone entered Hanoi and was hailed by the thunderous ovation of an enthusiastic crowd. On September 2, President Ho Chi Minh appeared before the people in Hanoi's Ba Dinh square, where 500,000 people gathered in a huge meeting to hear the first President of new Viet Nam read the Proclamation of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam to the Vietnamese people and to the world.

On September 23, a million of our compatriots demonstrated in the streets of Saigon-Cholon. The Nam Bo (southern Viet Nam) Administrative Committee was founded, and Vanguard Youth and militia units seized power in the provinces and united to form the revolutionary troops of the South of new Viet Nam.

In the cities and the rural areas, from the delta to the mountainous regions, People's Revolutionary Committees

were elected one after another and completely superseded the corrupt administrative machinery of mandarins and notables. Within less than fifteen days, the people's revolutionary administrative machinery had been established from the central to the local level.

The prison doors were opened and political prisoners and a number of common offenders were released by the revolutionary power; but traitors were punished. Poll-taxes were abolished. The former fiscal regime was gradually modified. Land rents were reduced by 25% and communal rice-fields distributed more equitably. The French industrial enterprises, in the hands of the Japanese since March 9, 1945, passed into the control of the new power and were temporarily managed by the workers. Democratic rights were proclaimed for all citizens and equality was to be practised regardless of nationality or sex. The democratic republican regime with a new democratic character, people's democracy, had been established. Vietnamese residents in Laos helped Lao patriots set up power for the Lao people.

The entire Vietnamese people rose up with inconceivable strength, did their utmost to break the yoke imposed by the Japanese fascists, and made determined progress. Side by side with the peoples of China and Korea, they marched in the vanguard of the liberation movement of the peoples in the Far East.

THE RESISTANCE IN NAM BO

People's power had hardly been established in Viet Nam when the British forces and those of the Chinese Kuomintang came to Indochina to disarm the Japanese troops on the

order of the Supreme Allied Command. The French colonialists in Indochina, who had surrendered to the Japanese, now relied on the British forces as they prepared feverishly to recover their former position.

The most active among the French colonialists were precisely those fascists of the Petain-Decoux clique who had formerly been the most zealous lackeys of the Japanese.

Armed and protected by the British forces, the French colonialists launched their attack and occupied Saigon on September 23. Our people replied by force of arms, and our heroic resistance began from that moment. Since that time, our compatriots in southern Viet Nam have endured hard trials and sacrifices, starting a liberation war which has enhanced the prestige of our people in the international arena and set a good example to the nations of the Far East.

The Dong Nai¹ land, once drenched with the blood of the colonialist aggressors when they landed in our country for the first time, has today become the strong bulwark of the Fatherland. Heroes such as Truong Cong Dinh, Nguyen Trung Truc, Nguyen Huu Huan and others sacrificed themselves to save the country nearly one hundred years ago, and continuing their tradition, their descendants are today in the vanguard of the fight for the freedom and independence of our people.

REMARKS

In reviewing the history of the August Revolution, some remarks should be made :

1. Dong Nai : name of a river in southern Viet Nam. Dong Nai land signifies Nam Bo (southern Viet Nam).

First of all, the triumph of the August Revolution was due to the two following subjective and objective conditions :

Subjective condition : our entire people were united around the Viet Minh Front which was led by the Indochinese Communist Party. The proletarian class exercised this leadership alone, without sharing it with any other class. This means that the revolutionary forces of our people were not scattered, that there were no rivalries or internal conflicts among them (except in some insignificant cases), and that at the decisive moment, they could be gathered under the leadership of a single organization to launch a direct and massive attack against enemy lines.

Objective condition : World War II created an extremely favourable opportunity for the Vietnamese people : the enemies of the Vietnamese revolution, the Japanese and French fascists, fought each other. After overthrowing the French, the Japanese were themselves defeated by the Soviet Red Army. That was enough for the Vietnamese people to be able to fell them with a single blow and to seize power.

Yet, however favourable the objective conditions may have been, they could not have led to triumph without good subjective conditions. That was a fact.

Besides, the August Insurrection was a real people's revolution. The Vietnamese people had to struggle against the Japanese fascists in valiant combat and with arms in their hands to regain their national independence. Immediately after this, they had to shed much blood to defend their freedom. It was by the August Revolution that the dictatorial fascist regime and the monarchy were overthrown and the democratic republican regime set up. Comrade Thorez said judiciously :

“History teaches us that a revolution has many particular features, the most important of which is the powerful uprising of the masses who take their fate into their own hands and pave the way to progress.”¹

Was that an important characteristic of the August Revolution? Certainly.

1. Maurice Thorez — *A French Policy*.

CHAPTER II

TACTICS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS IN THE AUGUST REVOLUTION

MORE FRIENDS. FEWER ENEMIES

It is impossible to speak of the August Revolution without stressing the role of its leading core, the Indochinese Communist Party. The favourable circumstances alone were not enough to assure victory. A correct policy and appropriate tactics were also needed. The triumph of the general insurrection of August 19, 1945, was not due to mere chance.

From 1940, the Indochinese revolutionaries were facing two new facts: the world was torn by war, the Indochinese people were oppressed and exploited by the double yoke of the Japanese and French fascists. The national liberation policy advocated by the Viet Minh Front in the period sprang from these two factors.

The war threw the antagonism between the two belligerent camps into sharp relief. The double Japanese and French yoke united rich and poor, equally hurt and humiliated, in the same hatred and the same struggle against the common enemy. At the same time, the conflicting interests of the Japanese and French who ruled Indochina together, caused a violent collision between them. One of the main tactics adopted by the Indochinese Communist Party and the

Viet Minh Front in those years consisted in fully exploiting this situation.

Thus the foreign policy of the Indochinese Communist Party and the Viet Minh Front was based on the realization that anti-fascist forces throughout the world were allies of the Vietnamese people, and consequently the decision to side without reserve with the anti-fascist camp.

In its domestic policy, the Indochinese Communist Party organized the different strata of the people into a national liberation front, the Viet Minh Front. The programme of this Front assured the protection of human and civil rights and of property rights, respect for private property, democratic liberties, equality between nationalities and the sexes, with the aim of bringing about unity of the whole people against the Japanese and French fascists. In view of the concrete conditions of the revolution in Indochina, the Indochinese Communist Party, promoter and leader of the Viet Minh Front, left the watchword "agrarian revolution" out of its programme (deciding, for the present, not to confiscate land held by landlords), and this with a view to making a differentiation between types of landlords and winning a number of them over to the anti-imperialist cause, widening the united national front in the struggle for independence. This Front was to comprise workers, peasants, members of the petty-bourgeoisie and even the national bourgeoisie, and include patriotic personalities sprung from the landlord class.

Besides this, the Indochinese Communist Party paid particular attention to developing and consolidating the peasants' and workers' organizations to give a solid base to the national united front, and waged a determined struggle against pro-French and pro-Japanese traitors.

On the one hand, the Party fully exploited the contradictions between the two enemies of our people — the Japanese fascists and French colonialists in Indochina — to give the revolutionary movement a vigorous impulse and on the other hand, it tried every means to isolate the Japanese and French fascists.

When the fascists used repressive measures not only against Vietnamese revolutionaries but also against progressive democratic Frenchmen, the Party undertook to win over these French progressives to its cause, or at least to induce them to adopt a neutral attitude in order to increase its own forces in the struggle against the French and Japanese fascists. When the French had been overthrown by the Japanese and were no longer really dangerous enemies the Party strove to promote unity of action with every French element ready to struggle against the Japanese fascists.

In brief, the Party always kept its sights on the principal enemy, the “concrete immediate enemy” of the Revolution, doing its best to deprive the enemy of his supporters and to find new allies, never deviating from the aim of the national liberation revolution.

FLEXIBILITY OF TACTICS

The Party had correctly foreseen that the Japanese and French would inevitably come into conflict, and had decided to change its tactics at once should this happen and immediately launch the general insurrection.

After the coup d'état of March 9, 1945, the Party accordingly launched a vast guerilla movement to seize local power

and organized a main resistance base against the Japanese in an area in the highlands and midlands of northern Viet Nam. At the same time it changed its slogans and forms of propaganda, organization and struggle so as to mobilize the masses more easily and rapidly lead them towards insurrection.

At this time, the basic aim of propaganda consisted in unmasking the hypocrisy of the Japanese fascists and militarists and in destroying all illusions about the expediency of using the Japanese and cooperating with them with a view to obtaining "reforms" within the "framework of legality"... Such ideas only sowed confusion among the people about the Japanese and their lackeys.

The propaganda used at that time took the ordinary form of speeches in factories, schools, markets, and public thoroughfares and the formation of mobile shock teams who put up flags, banners and posters and distributed revolutionary literature.

A higher form of propaganda was "armed propaganda" including armed demonstrations and guerilla activities.

As for agitation work, it dealt with the vital problem for the masses — checking famine — by leading the masses in the seizure of Japanese rice stocks; these actions could be transformed into armed demonstrations when the situation called for it.

The general form of struggle was the armed demonstration. A higher form used at this time was guerilla activity wherever the topography of the country was favourable, and yet another was the elimination of traitors in town and country by special squads.

“Provisional organizations” were used with great skill to set up local power; national-salvation and combat self-defence groups and militia guerilla teams or squads were organized and developed.

The general organizational forms at that moment were the national-salvation associations and the national-salvation and combat self-defence groups.

The higher forms were the Viet Nam National Liberation Committee — that is, the Provisional Government; the People’s Revolutionary Committees, and the Liberation Committees; these Committees had an administrative, political and military character (a pre-governmental character, that is), worked in a specific period, parallel to the local administrative organisms founded by the Japanese, and were transformed into local official administrative organizations after the general insurrection; and lastly, the National Insurrection Committee, the Action Committee for each part of the country or each locality during the decisive hours, etc.

In brief, the tactics of the Party from March to August 1945 had the following characteristics:

First: to exploit the situation created by the Japanese coup de force (March 9, 1945) fully and at the correct time, in order to lead the masses immediately to new forms of struggle and organization of a higher level, to abandon old methods, not to sit back with arms folded in face of the new situation, in other words, to know the importance of:

“Bringing to the fore precisely those forms of struggle and organization which are best suited to the conditions prevailing at a given moment during the ebb or flow of the movement and which therefore can facilitate and ensure the progress

of the masses to the revolutionary positions, of the millions to the revolutionary front, and their disposition on that front." ¹

In fact, forms of struggle such as armed propaganda, demonstrations followed by displays of force, sudden attacks against isolated posts and even some district centres in the delta and midlands, suppression of zealous agents of the Japanese fascists, organization of people's militia units even outside guerilla zones, etc., were so many bold actions showing the flexible character of the Party's tactics. These tactics sowed confusion in the enemy ranks, developed the spirit of struggle and the initiative of the masses, won over the waverers and rapidly spread the movement for national salvation all over the country.

Second : in any given situation, to determine the fundamental task requiring immediate fulfilment in order to concentrate on accomplishing it at any cost, because this is the best way of advancing the movement.

The Japanese coup of March 9, 1945, broke out when the famine was causing frightful ravages among the population. Hundreds of thousands of people starved beside granaries full of rice belonging to the Japanese and the French. A task of the greatest importance for the communist and Viet Minh cadres at that moment was to lead the armed masses in seizing Japanese rice stores and French concessions full of stocks of agricultural produce. The result was that organized and unorganized masses were inspired to take an active part in the movement against the Japanese, so that the more actively they struggled, the more conscious they

1. Stalin — *Principles of Leninism*.

became of their own strength and the more clearly they saw the real face of the enemy.

It was thanks to these attacks on granaries and colonialist plantations that the national salvation movement could be developed, the people armed and the self-defence brigades founded, even where the movement had never been organized, and Liberation Committees set up in numerous provinces, all in a short space of time. As Stalin said :

“The point here is to single out from all the problems confronting the Party that particular immediate problem, the answer to which constitutes the central point, and the solution of which will ensure the successful solution of the other immediate problems.”¹

Third : to use “transitory organizational forms” according to the situation, such as Revolutionary People’s Committees, Revolutionary Workers’ Committees, Local Liberation Committees, Viet Nam National Liberation Committee. The aim was progressively to gain on enemy power and paralyze its administrative machine. These organizations were very effective. They gave the people the opportunity to realize universal suffrage and become acquainted with administrative affairs, led them to assume mastery over their own destiny henceforth, break their chains themselves and ameliorate their living conditions by revolutionary means, not paying any attention to the administration of the Japanese fascists and their lackeys. These “transitory organizations” mobilized the masses and encouraged them to participate in the revolutionary struggle ; they extended the national united front against the Japanese to its broadest point and created the

1. Stalin — *Principles of Leninism*.

bases for a new Viet Nam. After the August General Insurrection, the liberation committees became real administrative organs. To use People's Committees and Liberation Committees as springboards for direct transition to the democratic republican regime, was an extremely interesting characteristic of the communist tactics in the pre-insurrectionary period.

Wasn't the triumph of the August Revolution due in great part to the intelligent and correct leadership of the Party?

CHAPTER III

THE GOOD POINTS OF THE AUGUST REVOLUTION

CAREFUL PREPARATION

Revolution is the work of the masses. But in order to develop their potentialities to the full, the masses must be mobilized, organized and led by a genuinely revolutionary party.

The victory of the August Revolution was due in great part to the correct leadership of the Indochinese Communist Party, to the work of organization and preparation by the Party and the Viet Minh during the pre-insurrectionary period.

In no revolution does victory come by itself; one must prepare it, win it. How did the Party prepare and win the victory of the August Revolution? It skilfully exploited favourable conditions created by the war in thorough preparation of the insurrection. Here is the outline of this preparation.

On the one hand, to unify the people's revolutionary forces, to mobilize the people, to stimulate the patriotic ardour of the people, to consolidate the different national-salvation organizations, to lead the people in the struggle against white terror and for the defence of rights and interests of their daily lives.

On the other hand, to develop para-military and military organizations such as the self-defence and guerilla groups, to train military and political cadres, to procure arms, to establish resistance zones, to carry out propaganda among enemy soldiers, to train the people for destruction work and the tactics of scorched earth, etc., to launch guerilla warfare and seize power in different localities.

The documents of the Party and the Viet Minh Front such as Preparations for the Armed Insurrection, Active Preparations for the Insurrection, Get Arms to Expel the Common Enemy, Towards the General Insurrection, the pamphlets teaching guerilla tactics etc., prove that, besides psychological preparations, we paid especial attention to the materials one. The Party realized clearly that the spirit of sacrifice is necessary but not enough to ensure the success of a revolution; meticulous material preparation is also needed, that is to say military preparation: setting up bases, organizing the regular army, regional troops and militia-guerillas, arming the troops and the people.

As early as the end of 1941, the Party founded two bases, one in Bac Son-Dinh Ca (Lang Son-Thai Nguyen), and another in Cao Bang-Bac Can. The Viet Nam National Salvation Army born at the time of the Bac Son insurrection (October 1940), developed in the course of eight months of guerilla warfare waged in Dinh Ca and Trang Xa (August 1941-April 1942), and in the second armed struggle in Dinh Ca (at the end of 1944). The Viet Nam Propaganda Brigade for Liberation was founded during the struggle against white terror in Viet Bac (1941-1945). In April 1945, these two armies were unified and became the Viet Nam

Liberation Army. After the Japanese coup de force, the Ba To (Quang Ngai province) insurrection gave birth to another guerilla brigade. These formations played an extremely important role in the upsurge of the anti-Japanese movement for national salvation and in the August General Insurrection.

A noteworthy feature of the activities of the Party in preparing for the armed insurrection is that it made the masses conscious of the preparations and led them to active participation in it. At the same time the military action of guerilla brigades was closely coordinated with the political action of the masses, so that the latter, while resisting the terror and struggling for the defence of their rights and immediate interests, might feel the necessity of taking up arms to win power. The struggles against the concentration of villages, arrests, requisitions of paddy, forced enlistment and conscription of labourers, food crop destruction for the cultivation of jute, the pillage of markets, etc., hastened the arming and training of the masses for a bold march towards the insurrection.

Meticulous and principled preparation was a major good point of the August Revolution.

PROMPTITUDE AND TIMELINESS

The victory of an insurrection depends not only on careful preparation, but also on its timely launching.

As we have seen, the August Revolution broke out at a very favourable juncture.

If the general insurrection had broken out immediately after the Japanese coup de force on March 9, 1945, the Revolution could have lost much and power could not have been established all over the country, because the Japanese forces, still strong at that moment, would have been able to destroy the revolutionary forces where they were. That is why only partial insurrections were launched in small areas, to conquer local power. However, if our people had waited passively after the Japanese surrender for the Allied forces to come and "liberate" them, without rising immediately to win power all over the country, what would have happened? Two possibilities existed: either the Japanese lackeys would have come onto the stage to solemnly boast of "having no more links with the Japanese" and to parade themselves as the "defenders of independence and democracy", not for liberating the people, but for surrendering to the Anglo-Americans. Or the French would have tried to raise their heads again, gather the remnants of their forces in Indochina, call back the debris of the troops who had fled abroad in March 1945 and this would have allowed them to found a puppet government over the whole country with the participation of the pro-French traitors, and to declare that they had implemented the Proclamation of March 24, 1945, and given autonomy to Indochina¹.

Both these eventualities would have created equally fatal consequences for our country.

1. It was only after the French surrender in Indochina that the de Gaulle Government agreed to issue a Proclamation recognizing the "autonomy" of Indochina. This hypocritical proclamation was as stupid as it was ridiculous in the eyes of the Indochinese peoples, because it was published when the French no longer had the slightest bit of authority in Indochina.

But fortunately the Party had led the people's struggle for national salvation and effectively created favourable conditions for the victory of the August Revolution. And just before the Japanese defeat (August 13, 1945), it issued orders for the general insurrection to conquer power from the Japanese without the least hesitation or weakness, to organize people's power, and thanks to the revolutionary forces of the masses to reject the bait of "autonomy" dangled by the French!

The leaders of the August Revolution had "chosen the right moment for the decisive blow, the right moment for starting the insurrection, and so timed it as to coincide with the moment when the crisis has reached its climax, when it is fully apparent that the vanguard is prepared to fight to the end, the reserves are prepared to support the vanguard, and maximum consternation reigns in the ranks of the enemy"¹.

Promptitude and timeliness, that is another good point of the August Revolution, which broke out at just the right moment.

THE WHOLE PEOPLE ROSE UP

The victory of the August Revolution was also due to the unity of the whole people and the masses' uprising.

The August Revolution did induce the great majority of the people to rise up and completely paralyze the reactionary

1. Stalin — *Principles of Leninism*.

elements. This is a fact of great importance. If the general insurrection had not involved the whole people :

First, the French colonialists could have found a way out, could have exploited the elements unfavourable to the Revolution, and basing themselves on the latter's attitude, they would have been able to declare before the world that the Vietnamese people would welcome the restoration of their power ; at the same time they would have accused the forces of insurrection of being "rebellious elements" who were preventing them from disarming the Japanese troops and restoring order and peace in Indochina, etc.

Second : the international reactionary elements in general could have exploited our lack of unity to widen the gap between the various strata of our people still further. Worse still, they could have provoked a civil war, plunged the country into division and anarchy and sapped our strength, dominating us easily.

Fortunately, our people, who were living wretched lives under the double yoke of oppression and exploitation of the Japanese and French fascists, closed their ranks under the gold-starred red flag and, relying on their own strength, rose up to win back their liberty.

In August 1945, the Dai Viet¹ allied to pro-Japanese elements of the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang² and the Phuc Quoc asked the Japanese to hand administrative power over to them in some places (such as Vinh Yen, Mon Cay etc.),

1. Dai Viet (Great Viet Nam) and Phuc Quoc (National Restoration) were two pro-Japanese traitor organizations.

2. Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang : Viet Nam Nationalist Party, another reactionary organization.

in opposition to the Democratic Republican Government. But their shabby behaviour as lackeys of a foreign country was so obvious that the whole people had the most profound contempt for them, and all pro-Japanese parties found themselves completely isolated.

Third : An overall rising by the entire people : this is the third good point of the August Revolution.

Those three good points were entirely due to the powerful organized forces and the correct political line of the Indochinese Communist Party and of the Viet Minh Front.

We can say that without the Indochinese Communist Party and the Viet Minh Front, the Revolution would have taken another road. If the Viet Minh had not been able to unify all social classes, had not had prestige among the masses and had not led the entire people in insurrection for the conquest of power, the Revolution could have failed.

Liberation movements launched by predecessors against the French had all failed, mainly because of the lack of a united anti-colonialist national front and a correct political programme. Previous insurrections were crushed principally because they were the rising of a sect only, of a group of militants, or a little vanguard detachment and not a far-reaching and deep-rooted revolution of the people.

In order to triumph, a revolution of these new times must be a real revolution of the broad masses, prepared and led by a vanguard revolutionary organization. The August Revolution conquered power, the direct aim of every revolution, because it was the work of a whole people united in the struggle for liberation under the leadership of the Indochinese Communist Party.

CHAPTER IV

THE WEAKNESSES OF THE AUGUST REVOLUTION

VARYING DEGREES OF DETERMINATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY

Those were good points, but had the August Revolution any weak ones? Yes, it had.

First, the general insurrection was not launched with the same resolution throughout the three "Ky"¹. This does not mean that the uprisings should have been carried out in one sweep throughout the whole country. It would have been difficult to achieve this in an agricultural country like Viet Nam, where the degree of political consciousness and organizational skill of the people was at different levels in different places and means of communications were still backward. But in the conditions prevailing in our country in August last year, it would have been better to launch the uprisings simultaneously in the main towns. This would have allowed a more decisive and better managed seizing of power and a quicker overthrow of the fascists and their stooges. As it was, the insurrection was launched simultaneously everywhere in the first week following the Japanese surrender, but Saigon waited until the 23rd to rise up.

1. Viet Nam was divided by the French into 3 parts, the 3 "Ky".

Nam Bo was a little late because among the ranks of the army of insurrection in the South, there were many elements who did not believe in the strength of the masses and would rather have used mere diplomacy to persuade the Japanese to hand over power to us than struggle relying on our own strength to wrest it from them or support the diplomatic work with action by the armed masses. Furthermore, they feared the crushing of such an uprising by the Japanese forces, forgetting that the latter were already almost paralysed at that moment and would be paralysed even further in face of the strong, broad masses of the whole nation.

This weakness is due to the unequal development of the Vietnamese Revolution and the relative weakness of the Viet Minh organization in Nam Bo prior to zero hour of the insurrection and to the lack of homogeneity in the ranks of the national united front in the South. Another reason is that Nam Bo is situated far from the national leading organism¹. This led to the Viet Minh in the South issuing instructions which were not entirely in keeping with the situation, preventing the southern branch of the Viet Minh from entirely keeping pace with the general situation and the general line of the Party. In the South, the slowness in starting the insurrection, and the lack of resolution in the seizing of power gave encouragement to the counter-revolutionaries, especially the French colonialists and pro-French Vietnamese traitors.

1. At this time, the Central Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party and the General Committee of the Viet Minh had their headquarters in the northern part of Viet Nam.

FAILURE TO FULLY DISARM THE JAPANESE TROOPS

The second weakness of the August Revolution was the failure to fully implement the slogan of disarming the Japanese troops at the time of the insurrection, before the entry of the Allies into the country. This task was carried out to a certain extent only. There were many places where after assessing our own strength and theirs, we did not use violence to disarm the Japanese; we left them alone when they remained neutral and let us organize the people's power. Generally speaking, that policy was correct in the circumstances prevailing in August last year, because the revolutionaries have no right to waste the masses' blood and launch into hazardous undertakings, out of mere conceit.

Our shortcoming did not consist in negotiating with the Japanese, but in failing to make the fullest use of the armed masses to support the diplomatic action and force the Japanese to surrender more arms; furthermore, we did not act in time to prevent them from destroying a great many modern arms.

Now, each time we consider our lack of modern arms, we cannot in retrospect help regretting that the insurrection troops missed an excellent opportunity to secure such arms in many places.

The pro-Japanese puppets have repeatedly reproached the Viet Minh for having failed to be "flexible" towards the Japanese thus provoking them to destroy many good-quality arms instead of transferring them to us. These people asserted that, had the Viet Minh not intervened, they would have been able to "negotiate" with the Japanese and get many arms

from them within a few days in the conditions prevailing last August. This is our answer to those puppets: if the Viet Minh had not led the whole people in the general insurrection, permitting the quick seizure of a portion of the Japanese arms no one could say when you would be "given" arms by the Japanese and even if you would eventually succeed in your effort to "beg" arms from the Japanese, you would certainly have used them for quite another purpose than establishing and consolidating the democratic republican system and the people's power, or expelling the foreign aggressors and checking the counter-revolution!

This failure to completely disarm the Japanese troops was due to the subjective conditions of the August Revolution. In plain words, without tanks and heavy artillery of our own, we could not take possession of Japanese tanks and heavy guns.

What happened was that in many regions, the Japanese entrenched themselves in their blockhouses and made ready to defend themselves immediately after the insurrectional forces had stormed a post or a town, either by a sudden attack from outside or by an inner uprising. They had enough supplies and munitions to hold out for a long time and so our troops would encircle them but, for want of sufficient firepower, would fail to destroy their fortifications (as happened, for example, in the seizure of Thai Nguyen). Whatever the case it must be admitted that with more promptitude and boldness, we should have been able to disarm the Japanese troops in other places at the very beginning of the insurrection. Were not the insurrection troops successful in many places without any bloodshed? It seemed that

the forces of insurrection were pushing a door that was already unlocked: faced with an enemy that had been knocked down, yet they failed to go one step further and snatch the arms from his hands. Our military task in that period consisted in fact more in disarming the enemy than in defeating him.

LACK OF FIRMNESS IN THE REPRESSION
OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS

Here lies the third weakness of the August Revolution: we did not firmly eliminate the various categories of traitors immediately after the establishment of revolutionary power, and we failed to take sufficiently energetic measures against the French colonialists and their agents. Only in some regions, such as in Quang Ngai, did the forces of insurrection carry out the policy "Sweep away all reactionaries", but there they overdid it. Almost everywhere else we were conciliatory to the point of weakness, forgetting that "*any victorious power can only be a dictatorial one*"¹.

The more democratic the power, the more dictatorial it must be — that is, it must exercise the dictatorship of the masses of the people against the very small reactionary minority which is ready to grab back its domination or hinder the march of the revolution. Not being firmly repressed, the reactionaries at home have been used by the French and international reactionaries to create difficulties for the revolutionary power and to divide our nation. One wonders why the Administrative Committee of Nam Bo immediately

1. Lenin: *On the History of the Question of Dictatorship* (1919).

after its foundation, did not order the immediate arrest of the pro-French traitor Nguyen Van Thinh and his clique, of some of the most dangerous elements among the pro-Japanese, and of many confirmed trotskyite saboteurs. This allowed these people to prepare the return of the French by creating provocations before and on Independence Day (Sept. 2, 1945). One wonders why many pro-Japanese traitors and other machiavellian agents of foreign countries in Bac Bo were not arrested after the foundation of the people's power in the capital.

We admit that the extremely intricate situation of our country and the relatively limited strength of the Vietnamese Revolution made it impossible to carry out a systematic repression of the counter-revolutionary elements on Jacobinical or Bolshevik lines. The Vietnamese Revolution was not opposing counter-revolutionary forces at home alone, other forces were intervening from abroad making the situation extremely complicated.

But at a time when the reactionaries in the country were still at a loss and had no time yet to reorganize themselves, it is to be regretted that energetic measures to counteract all possible dangers in the future were not taken immediately upon the seizing of power and before any foreign intervention. This does not mean that we should have imprisoned all the French, after the general insurrection, or put to death all elements who had collaborated in any way with the French or the Japanese. No! We regret only that the repression of the reactionaries during the August Revolution was not carried out as fully as was necessary at the time.

Revolutionary power may pardon the guilty who repent but it must be firm with all traitors.

For a new-born revolutionary power to be lenient towards counter-revolutionaries is tantamount to suicide. Did not the Paris Commune commit a grave error in failing to pursue and eliminate the "Versillais" ?

FAILURE TO SEIZE THE BANK OF INDOCHINA

The fourth shortcoming of the August Revolution was that the forces of insurrection failed to seize the Bank of Indochina: they even failed to gain control of the Bank. The colonialists availed themselves of the opportunity to attack us in the financial field later on, for example by refusing to honour their 500-piastre notes, thus placing more difficulties in our path. The Paris Commune met with many obstacles precisely because it too failed to seize hold of the Bank.

The Japanese and the French left our people's power with an almost hopeless economic and financial situation ; but we were able to hold our own because of the sacrifices made by our workers, public servants and soldiers, and because of the industrious and devoted efforts of the government and the whole people.

This fourth shortcoming was not due to any underestimation by the leaders of the August Revolution of the financial question, but rather to the fact that the Bank of Indochina was a financial institution acting not only on behalf of the French and the Japanese but also of other countries. We lost some of our forces when we attacked the Bank of Indochina then resolutely held by Japanese troops.

The four above-mentioned shortcomings of the August Revolution each had their reasons. But, in an objective criticism, we cannot fail to point them out frankly.

We realize that it was difficult to avoid them for one reason or another and taking into account the conditions of the August Revolution. The shortcoming of our revolutionaries consisted in failing to avail themselves of the high tide of the revolutionary movement and of the people's spirit of sacrifice in the decisive hours, so as to reduce to a minimum the extent of these weaknesses.

CHAPTER V

CHARACTER AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AUGUST REVOLUTION

CHARACTER OF THE AUGUST REVOLUTION

The August Revolution was a revolution of national liberation. It aimed at liberating the Vietnamese people from the colonial yoke and making Viet Nam an independent and free nation.

It also had the character of a democratic revolution, because the struggle was against the Japanese fascists and their lackeys, the feudal reactionaries; and because it was a part of the great struggle waged by the world's democratic and progressive forces against fascism. However, it has not abolished all the vestiges of feudalism in Viet Nam, nor realized agrarian reform and given the land to the tillers.

In the present historical conditions, a colonial revolution such as ours must have the following double character: first, it must be an anti-imperialist revolution aimed at overthrowing imperialist domination, and second, it must be an agrarian revolution which confiscates the lands of the feudal landlords and distributes them to the peasants. The August Revolution aimed only at overthrowing the imperialist rule and that of the feudal puppets, and setting up the democratic republican regime; but it has not abolished feudal land

ownership and all feudal and semi-feudal vestiges to create conditions for industrial development. Thanks to the August Revolution, a portion of the imperialists' and traitors' lands have been confiscated, land rents have been reduced by 25 per cent and some of the old debts (principal and accrued interest) have been cancelled. However, the relations between landlords and peasants have not changed generally speaking. Therefore we can say that, although the August Revolution has a democratic character, this character is not strongly marked enough.

Some people have said that, because the August Revolution has abolished the Imperial Government with its machinery composed of mandarins and notables, it has an anti-feudal character. But by abolishing the Imperial Government, we have abolished only one aspect of the feudal regime. Because its basis, the relations between landlords and peasants in the agrarian field, is still alive, the feudal regime has not yet been uprooted. We must advance the anti-feudal struggle still further and not be complacent about the achievements of the August Revolution.

It is clear that the August Revolution has established a democratic republican regime with the character of a people's democracy, a new democracy in Viet Nam. Broad popular representation has been established at all levels by universal suffrage; extensive democratic freedoms, personal liberty, equality between all nationalities, big and small, and complete equality between the sexes, have been proclaimed; the State economic sector is taking shape; the people's living conditions are improved; the 8-hour working-day is officially established; the proletariat now actually holds power, etc.

All these facts make it amply clear that the Vietnamese regime is that of a democratic republic of a new style, quite different from the old-style bourgeois democratic republican regime (for example the French bourgeois parliamentary regime).

The democratic regime in Viet Nam guarantees the interests of all social strata. On the contrary, the parliamentary republican regime in France is a disguised dictatorship of the bourgeoisie: under the cloak of democracy the bourgeois class exerts a dictatorial power which defends only the interests of a minority of exploiters, the capitalists. However, the democratic regime in Viet Nam is different from the present Soviet democratic regime. Under the Soviet Union's democratic soviet regime, the proletariat openly exercises dictatorship, suppresses all exploiting classes and strata (landlords, bourgeois and kulaks) and guarantees the widest interests of all labouring people (workers, collective peasants, socialist intellectuals) who are cooperating to build a new life under the leadership of the proletariat.

The democratic republican regime in Viet Nam is in keeping with the stage of development of our country and with the present trend in the world. Though it has been established in a backward agricultural country, it has a new and progressive character, because it was born of the hard, fierce struggle against the French and Japanese fascists, out of the struggle for national liberation led by the working class. A struggle led by the most revolutionary class against the most reactionary enemy must be crowned with the installation of a non-conservative regime, quite the opposite of the retrograde regime of the enemy. Another reason why our

regime has the character of a new democracy is because it was born at a time when the vanguard democratic regime (socialist democracy) of the Soviet Union has fully triumphed and has been further consolidated in the trials of war, after the collapse of the world system of fascism, and while the great movement of democracy is spreading throughout the world.

Being a product of these new times, the democratic republican regime in Viet Nam inevitably bears the stamp of the new times. The August Revolution is a revolution of national liberation with a new democratic character. It constitutes an integral part of the national people's democratic revolution of Viet Nam.

THE HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AUGUST REVOLUTION

The August Revolution highlights the indomitable spirit of the Vietnamese people, a people with a long tradition of struggle for independence and freedom, a people who will never resign itself to slavery. It crowns 80 years of uninterrupted struggle of the Vietnamese people against the French colonialists. It also constitutes the greatest historical event in our country since the victory gained by Quang Trung, who drove the Manchu troops out of Viet Nam in 1789. In fact, there has been no national movement since then which has given evidence of the indomitable heroism and the strong unity of the Vietnamese people as fully as the August Revolution. It has not merely broken the yoke imposed by the imperialist fascists, but it has also overthrown the thousand-year-old monarchic regime in Viet Nam, and changed the country into a democratic republic, elevating the Vietnamese people to the rank of the vanguard peoples.

Therein lies the great significance of the August Revolution ; and President Ho Chi Minh, the first President of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, the leader of the August Revolution, fully deserves the title of national hero.

Through the August Revolution, the Vietnamese people have clearly shown their anti-fascist spirit and their attachment to democracy and peace. The revolution constitutes the splendid completion of the great anti-fascist movement in Viet Nam during World War II. Before the August Revolution, the Vietnamese people struggled in very hard conditions to harass and wear down the Japanese forces' rear lines. From the end of 1944, the Japanese sea-lines were attacked by the Allied forces and Indochina became a "bridge" over the Japanese "Greater East Asia" road, an extremely important bridge for the movement and supply of Japanese troops from their northern positions to Indonesia. The blocking of this bridge to the Japanese forces was the task assumed by the Vietnamese people. In March 1945, the Indochinese Communist Party launched the great movement of struggle for national salvation against the Japanese, actively leading the Vietnamese people in attacking important strategic Japanese positions, thus blocking the traffic of the Japanese over the "Greater East Asia" road.

From March to August last year, Japanese territory suffered more and more violent bombing raids. In Indochina, the Vietnamese guerillas were fighting the Japanese with increased strength. A free zone was established in the highlands and midlands of northern Viet Nam and constituted a permanent obstacle on the path of the Japanese from southern China to Indochina. In this zone, the guerillas

harassed the Japanese forces and inflicted heavy losses on them. In this way the Vietnamese people made an effective contribution on the side of the Allies, speeding the defeat of the Japanese and indirectly hastening the Soviet Red Army's victory. It is an indubitable fact *that the Vietnamese people have made their share of sacrifices in the struggle against the fascist aggressors during recent years.*

The French colonialists slanderously call the August Revolution "pro-Japanese" and "Japanese-led" to belittle its significance. But there is plenty of evidence which gives the lie to their defamation. Today everybody has to admit that the reactionary attitude of the French colonialists with regard to the August Revolution is that of the thief crying "Stop thief". In point of fact, was it not the French colonialists, abetted and assisted by the British imperialists, who counter-attacked the Vietnamese Revolution in the hope of regaining their position and interests in Indochina?

Among the peoples oppressed by the Japanese, the Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese and Indonesian peoples have been the most successful in seizing the opportunity offered by the Japanese unconditional capitulation to win independence, democracy and freedom¹.

By waging the August Revolution, the Vietnamese people have lodged this general claim to the *U.N.O. : the Great Powers must recognize the right to self-determination of*

1. The peoples of Burma, Malaya and the Philippines also organized guerilla forces to resist the Japanese invaders but when the Japanese surrender took place, they were not resolute, strong and quick enough to cope with the US and British imperialists, who were more powerful than their congeners, the French and the Dutch. Therefore, in spite of their efforts and sacrifices, their struggles have not brought adequate results.

the Vietnamese people, in accordance with the Atlantic and San Francisco Charters. As a natural consequence of the Japanese collapse, all peoples under the Japanese yoke must be liberated, and nobody must be allowed to replace the Japanese in oppressing and exploiting them. The Vietnamese people have suffered from Japanese domination since 1940 and they have played a worthy part side by side with the Allies in the struggle against the Japanese. Thus they fully deserve their independence. The Vietnamese people will resolutely oppose the return of the French oppressors as well as the regime of an international "mandate", because they have already attained political maturity.

The August Revolution and the war of self-defence the Vietnamese people have waged for almost a year now against the French reactionaries proclaim these eager aspirations to the world.

The August Revolution breached the colonial system of the imperialists at one of its weakest links, starting a process of irreticvable disintegration of colonialism throughout the world. It warned that the hour of liberation for the oppressed peoples has struck. The Vietnamese Revolution, like the Chinese and Indonesian Revolutions, is a strong impulse to the liberation movements of the Lao and Cambodian peoples and other colonial countries in South-East Asia : this explains clearly why the British imperialists have done their best to help the French colonialists repress the Vietnamese Revolution in southern Viet Nam and why the international reactionaries have made concessions to one another in allowing the French to relieve the troops of Chiang Kai-shek in northern Viet Nam.

In fact, from September 23 last year and all through our struggle waged against the French, our forces have met British, Indian, French and Japanese troops in many battles. Our struggle in self-defence has unveiled the perfidious schemes of the international reactionaries. It has exposed before world opinion that from their landing in Indochina, the British troops, who were only commissioned by the Allies to disarm and repatriate the Japanese soldiers, instead of performing this task of repatriation, used many of these soldiers to help the French colonialists to counter-attack the Vietnamese Revolution and repress the Vietnamese people's struggle for liberation: *Thus, we can say that the Vietnamese people are fighting not only for themselves, but also for the defence of peace, democracy and national independence throughout the world.*

After the anti-fascist war, the task of all progressive world forces is to struggle for national independence, develop democracy and consolidate peace. With the August Revolution and the present War of Resistance, the Vietnamese people have courageously shouldered a part of the responsibility to fulfil this mission with the progressive and democratic forces struggling for a better world. Whether one likes it or not, the August Revolution is part of the great struggle of mankind for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress. The Vietnamese people fully understand their international role in this post-war period. They are determined to fulfil this task, whatever the obstacles!

It is precisely for that reason that the August Revolution is warmly acclaimed by progressive opinion in the world and that the Vietnamese people now enjoy the solidarity and support of the world's people, especially the oppressed peoples.

CHAPTER VI

PROSPECTS OF THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION

FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS OF THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION

What conditions will advance the Vietnamese Revolution and ensure its final victory? These two :

First, subjectively speaking, the Vietnamese people, long under the weight of the French yoke, and in recent years doubly oppressed and exploited by the French and Japanese fascists, have realized that only a revolution can liberate them. Closely united under the national banner, they are determined to support the Democratic Republican Government in national liberation and in the building of a new life. The National United Front, under the clear-sighted leadership of President Ho Chi Minh and with the national salvation and democracy bloc — the Viet Minh — as its base, will certainly fulfil its duty of mobilizing the whole people to smash all reactionary forces and overcome all difficulties and obstacles on the march forward.

Secondly, from the objective point of view : since the world war, the international situation has brought new prospects to the Vietnamese Revolution. The Soviet Union, completely victorious, has become an invincible force. In many countries, the Communist Party has organized power or shared power ; people's democratic movements are developing

in many countries, especially in those just liberated from the fascist yoke ; the movement for national liberation is boiling up in colonial and semi-colonial countries. After the collapse of fascism, the imperialist system has been weakened. The movement for the consolidation of peace, against international reaction, has attracted the majority of mankind. The Vietnamese Revolution, as part of the world movement of peace and democracy, is deeply influenced by the international progressive movement.

The Vietnamese Revolution is also at the confluence of these revolutionary streams : national-liberation revolution, people's democratic revolution and socialist revolution, from which it receives a good influence and with which it is in tune ; at the same time the Vietnamese revolution exerts a considerable influence upon those movements.

In short, the Vietnamese Revolution has sufficient conditions to advance forcefully and will certainly achieve final victory.

OBJECTIVES TO BE ACHIEVED

Nevertheless, no matter how important the achievements of the August Revolution are at present, we must recognize this objective truth : *the national-liberation revolution in Viet Nam has not yet completely succeeded*. The August Revolution seized power for the people, but on September 23, 1945, the French colonialists attacked us and have since partly wrested it back. In the south of Viet Nam, they set up the puppet government under Nguyen Van Thinh and reestablished their domination in some towns. According