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Extracts April 10 (?) to
April 11 from notebook
of unidentified North
Vietnamese soldier

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Purpose and requirements of Campaign X:

To destroy the manpower of the White [possibly meaning troops of the Lon Nol Government]. While performing this mission, we should also destroy those US and Puppet elements which may be brought into "K" ((Cambodian)) territory.

To apply the tactics of three-pronged attacks (military attacks, political struggles, and military proselyting activities) in the expansion of a base area for friendly forces, and in aiding our friends to establish their governmental infrastructure.

To create favorable opportunities for our victory. The objective is to expand our base area. First of all, to accomplish the mission assigned to F [Division] we must destroy two sub-sectors along with aiding the Red K [Cambodian Communists] to build up their government. (Equipment must be captured and concealed at all costs).

Occupied areas must be held until they are transferred to friendly [Red Khmer] troops.

Attacks should be conducted in close coordination with the establishment of the governmental infrastructure.

This very important mission should be accomplish at all costs.

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Brother Thao of Z3 Party Committee [possibly meaning of 3rd Battalion, 141st Regiment, 7th NVA Division].

Report on the accomplishment of missions in Campaign X.

11 April

Lessons Learned from Campaign X

Preliminary results of the study of activities of Campaign X.

The troops understood the enemy plot, friendly policy, and the purpose of the campaign. This is an advantage in the accomplishment of our mission:

The troops understood the following requirements:

Destroy entire enemy units.
Capture equipment and conceal it at all costs.
Hold occupied areas, and attack the rescue forces.
Conduct armed military proselyting activities.

Because they understood the missions, the determination of the troops increased.

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II. WEAKNESSES WHICH STILL EXIST:

Four requirements of our missions are not fully appreciated:

Destroy entire enemy units.
Capture all available equipment.
Intercept the rescuing forces.
The importance of the armed military proselyting task.

The international significance of this mission, its direct relationship to the Revolution in South Vietnam, and the special nature of activities of this campaign, was not thoroughly understood.

Existing problems:

How to handle wounded personnel.
How to solve our material requirements.
How to support the armed action teams.
How to build up morale and a willingness to hold on [to occupied areas].

Subjects to be fully understood:

A. Characteristics of the situation:

1. The enemy is ready to fight. How is the White K? We know that the morale of the White K is lower than that of the US and Puppets.

They are confused, hesitant and reluctant. They lack unity of mind because of varying political tendencies.

Their combat experience is poor, their equipment was not standardized. There is still much French influence and ineffective coordination. Therefore, when we conduct a heavy attack, they retreat. However, there is a smaller number, particularly the officers, who would resist us.

The US and Puppet may land on our rear to coordinate with the White K to fight us. Or the Puppet troops may disguise themselves as White K.

2. The terrain is very favorable, due to dense forests which will facilitate the camouflage of our movements and bivouac areas during combat.

3. Population - The organization of the K Revolution has been developed. The masses place much confidence in it. The local inhabitants along the border are under the influence of the SVN Liberation army.

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Other people, such as officers, enlisted men and government officials, remain confused and hesitant.

Have received political indoctrination to improve our ideology.

The Revolution has adequate power to defeat the K Army even if it is supported by the US and Puppet.

However, in our evaluation, we did not fully understand the dark scheme of the enemy, and could not discriminate

between friend and enemy. We did not properly estimate the enemy.

Our rear areas have some problems which adversely affect the morale of our troops.

B. Significance and Nature of the Mission:

It has an international significance, and it also has a practical effect on the Revolution in South Vietnam. It is similar to the mission of attacking Saigon. Therefore, we must assist the troops to understand the importance of this mission.

The sub-sector is located inside the town [sic].

C. Combat mission:

1. While attacking the White K, we must completely destroy the whole unit and capture all available equipment. When attacking the US and Puppet on K territory, we must also destroy the entire unit, capture PW's, and seize many weapons.

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Deal the White K a blow that will make them fear us.

2. The requirement for combat is as follows: One of our D [battalion] must destroy one American D. When attacking the White K, one of our D must destroy three D's of White K. During an engagement with the White K, we are to be highly mobile.

3. The third mission is not to destroy the depots, but to capture everything.

4. During combat, we should not be over-confident and should have good fortifications. Trenches should be dug up before engagement.

5. Before departure, we should make a list of all equipment on hand. To properly implement our policy, we should **seize** everything and turn in all captured material. It is strictly forbidden to lose captured material. Do not underestimate the enemy, and do not let him attack us first.

D. Implementation of Policies:

The policy of handling our wounded and dead should be properly implemented.

It is strictly forbidden to take even a needle or a thread from the local

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inhabitants. We must respect their traditions and protect their property.

Prisoners should be carefully escorted.
Those who capture many prisoners, will be rewarded.

Successfully implement the civilian proselyting and military proselyting policy.

E. Leadership:

Coordinate closely with friendly units and local agencies.
Train all personnel to carry out combat orders properly and to observe discipline.

Only authorized individuals can contact our secret agents.

Any assistance given should be discussed directly with the district.

Security should be properly observed. Classified material should not be carried by individuals.

Continue to conduct two-hour-sessions to review past experience.

Discuss six questions on six nights.

[Note: The remainder of this 128 small-page note book with entries dated February 25 to April 17, 1970 is of no political or military interest. All relevent entries are reprinted in full].