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FILE SUBJ.
DATE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

APR 1981

OTTUZYUW RUMJPGA3996 1121000
IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE
O R 220941Z APR 81

FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1782

INFO CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
BT

AMEMBASSY PARIS 1132

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 3996

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, CH, CB
SUBJECT: SIHANOUK PRESS CONFERENCE

1. SUMMARY: PRINCE SIHANOUK HAS ANNOUNCED THAT HE IS WILLING TO SUPPORT AND POSSIBLY TAKE PART IN A TRIPARTITE UNITED FRONT COALITION OF CAMBODIAN ANTI-VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, HE STATES THAT HE WILL NOT ACCEPT THE LEADERSHIP OF THAT FRONT SHOULD THE CHINESE AND AMERICANS REFUSE TO PROVIDE THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE HE IS REQUESTING FOR A LARGE ARMY OF HIS OWN. HE SUGGESTS THAT UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, SON SANN SHOULD LEAD THE FRONT. HE SAYS THE CHINESE HAVE ASSURED HIM THAT SON SANN IS NOW WILLING TO PARTICIPATE. THE FOLLOWING IS BASED UPON A TAPE OF THE INTERVIEW MADE BY A SOURCE WHO WAS PRESENT. END SUMMARY.

2. AT AN APRIL 21 PRESS CONFERENCE IN BEIJING, PRINCE

39

ACTION
INFO

(U,6,7,8)

NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(2) RDJTF:LO(1)
DAMI(*) AOC-DAMI(*) DAMO(*) DACS-ZK(*) X0XX(*) IN(*)
009(*) 61(*) SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(7) USDP(15) DI-1(1)
NMIC(*) SWS(1) AT(1) DIO(1) V 12 FRD(1) DE(1)
DB-2B(1) DB-2C(1) DB-3B(2) D-1(1) DB-5(1) DT-1(1)
DIA FILE(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

39

MCN=81112/10353 TOR=81112/1121Z U=81112/1123Z CDSN=RP0943

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FILE 2087
DATE 200-02

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NORODOM SIHANOUK SAID HE IS WILLING TO SUPPORT AND TO CONDITIONALLY PLAY A ROLE IN A TRIPARTITE ANTI-VIETNAMESE COALITION WITH THE KHMER ROUGE AND SON SANN. HOWEVER, HE EMPHASIZED THAT IF HE DOES NOT RECEIVE THE MILITARY AID FOR GREATLY ENLARGED FORCES OF HIS OWN WHICH HE IS REQUESTING FROM CHINA AND THE U.S., HE WILL REFUSE TO ASSUME THE LEADERSHIP OF THE FRONT. HE ADDED THAT HIS "MAJOR CONCESSION" TO JOIN A FRONT WOULD HAVE TO BE APPROVED BY HIS FOLLOWERS.

3. SIHANOUK REVEALED THAT HE HAD REQUESTED ARMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR HIS OWN EXPANDED ARMY FROM PRC FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA DURING A MEETING THE PREVIOUS DAY. HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM HUANG AT THE TIME. ALTHOUGH HE WILL MEET AGAIN WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER APRIL 22, HE DID NOT APPEAR OPTIMISTIC THAT THE CHINESE WOULD MEET HIS DEMANDS. THEY MERELY WANTED TO CHAT, NOT NEGOTIATE AT THIS STAGE, HE SAID.

4. SIHANOUK DECLARED HIMSELF EQUALLY PESSIMISTIC, DESPITE THE "TALENTS OF HENRY KISSINGER," ABOUT OBTAINING ANY ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. HE SAID THAT KISSINGER HAD PROMISED HIM LAST YEAR THAT IF REAGAN WERE ELECTED PRESIDENT, HE COULD GREATLY ASSIST SIHANOUK IN OBTAINING FROM THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HELP IN FORMING AN ARMY. HE SAID KISSINGER REPRESENTED HIS CHANCE TO OBTAIN "FRIENDLY AID" FOR HIS ARMY.

5. THE PRINCE OPINED THAT CHINA MIGHT SHOW SOME INTEREST IN A SIHANOUKIST ARMY NEXT YEAR OR IN 1983, AFTER BEIJING HAD SEEN, A) THAT NEITHER SON SANN NOR THE KHMER ROUGE COULD SUCCEED IN GAINING THE SUPPORT OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AND, B) THAT THE POSITION OF KHMER ROUGE AT THE UN HAD WEAKENED. HE CAUTIONED THAT TIME WAS ON THE SIDE OF THE VIETNAMESE AND THE SOVIETS, WHO WERE SUCCEEDING IN THEIR ENDEAVOR TO CREATE A GOVERNMENTAL AND MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN CAMBODIA. HE SOUGHT TO JUSTIFY THE CREATION OF A STRONG SIHANOUKIST ARMY AS A MEANS NOT MERELY TO GIVE HIM THE LEVERAGE NECESSARY TO CONTROL, OR PRESERVE HIS POSITION IN A UNITED FRONT, BUT ALSO OF COUNTERING SOVIET-VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME WHILE THERE WAS STILL TIME. HE CLAIMED

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HE ALREADY HAD OFFICERS, AND THAT HE COULD RECRUIT AN ARMY OF 100,000 "IMMEDIATELY&C. HE WARNED THAT THOSE WHO HAD EXPRESSE D WILLINGNESS TO JOIN HIS FORCES, ASSUMING THAT WEAPONS AND SUPPLIES WERE MADE AVAILABLE, WOULD INSTEAD JOIN WITH HENG SAMRIN IF THE ONLY OTHER ALTERNATIVE WERE THE KHMER ROUGE.

6. SIHANOUK REAFFIRMED HIS SUPPORT OF THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES AND STANCES OF ASEAN, JAPAN, AND THE U.S., AND SAID THAT EVEN IF CHINA TURNED HIM DOWN HE WAS NEVERTHELESS "AUTOMATICALLY IN CHINA'S CAMP." NEVERTHELESS, HE APPEARED FOR GREATER REALISM. EVEN IF A CONFERENCE WERE TO BE COMVENED, WITH OR WITHOUR VIETNAMESE/ SOVIET PARTICIPATION, THIS WOULD NOT RESOLVE THE KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM, HE POINTED OUT. MOSCOW AND HANOI WOULD CONTINUE TO LABEL THE SITUATION IRREVERSIBLE AND PROCEED WITH A BUILDUP OF HENG SAMRIN/PENN SOVAN FORCES INTO A FORMIDABLE ARMY, COMPLETE WITH ARMOR AND ARTILLERY. CONSEQUENTLY, HE INSISTED, THE U.S. AND CHINA SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT SUPPORT OF A SIHANOUK ARMY OF SIZABLE DIMENSIONS IS IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS.
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OTTUZYUW RUMJPGA3996 1121025
IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE
O R 220941Z APR 81

FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1783

INFO CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
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AMEMBASSY PARIS 1133

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIJING 3996

7. SIHANOUK ONCE AGAIN CALLED FOR THE CAMBODIAN UN SEAT TO BE LEFT VACANT, SAYING THAT NEITHER THE DK NOR HENG SAMRIN WAS QUALIFIED TO REPRESENT THE KHMER PEOPLE.

#3 :)-8.3\$ 5#-5 \$748,& 5#384 .3358,& 8, 069,&6-,& (#837 SAMPHAN HAD IMPLIED THAT THE KHMER ROUGE PLAN TO KEEP ALL DE FACTO STATE AND GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THEMSELVES, BUT NEEDED THE NAME OF SIHANOUK TO GIVE THEM RESPECTABILITY THEY LACKED. THE PRINCE REAFFIRMED THAT IF HE IS TO LEAD, HE WANTS TO BE A REAL LEADER WITH REAL POWER, NOT AN AMBASSADOR OR A PUPPET IN THE HANDS OF THE KHMER ROUGE. HE INSISTED THAT HE DID NOT WANT A LARGE ARMY IN ORDER TO FIGHT THE DK, BUT TO ASSURE THE KHMER PEOPLE HE COULD PROTECT THEM IN THE FUTURE, SINCE "WE CANNOT BE CONFIDENT OF THE PROMISES OF THE KHMER ROUGE NOT TO BE LIKELY THEY WERE DURING THE PERIOD 1975 TO 1978".

ACTION
INFO

(I,M)

NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(2) RDJTF:LO(1)
DAMI(*) AOC-DAMI(*) DAMO(*) DACS-ZK(*) XOXX(*) IN(*)
009(*) 61(*) SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(7) USDP(15) DI-1(1)
NMIC(*) SWS(1) AT(1) DIO(1) VP-A2 FRD(1) DE(1)
DB-2B(1) DB-2C(1) DB-3B(2) DB-4A(1) DB-5(1) DT-1(1)
DIA FILE(1)

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8. THE ONLY SOLUTION SIHANOUK DAID HE COULD SEE FOR THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM WAS TO CREATE SUFFICIENT MILITARY DIFFICULTY ON THE GROUND THAT MOSCOW AND HANOI WOULD BECOME AMENABLE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION. AT THAT TIME, A CONFERENCE SIMILAR TO GENEVA 1954 COULD BE CONVENED. THE PRINCE WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY SOLUTION ARRIVED AT WOULD OF NECESSITY BE A COMPROMISE. THE SOVIET UNION, VIETNAM, AND THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME WERE REALITIES WHICH WOULD NOT GO AWAY AS A RESULT OF WISHFUL THINKING.

9. SIHANOUK REITERATED HIS CALL FOR COMPLETE NEUTRALIZATION, GENERAL DISARMAMENT, FREE ELECTIONS, AND INTRODUCTION OF A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE, FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS. HE CAUTIONED THAT GENERAL DISARMAMENT WAS NECESSARY NOT ONLY TO PREVENT THE KHMER ROUGE FROM TAKING OVER, BUT TO PREVENT ANOTHER CIVIC WAR BETWEEN DK FORCES AND A HENG SAMRIN ARMY WHICH BY THAT TIME PRESUMABLE WOULD HAVE GROWN TO FORMIDABLE DIMENSIONS.

THE PRINCE, NEVERTHELESS, INSISTED THAT HE WAS NOT RESURRECTING HIS PROPOSAL FOR DISARMAMENT OF ALL KHMER FORCES AS A PRECONDITION TO HIS JOINING A FRONT WITH THE DK NOTING HE WOULD NOT PURSUE THIS WITH KHIEU SAMPHAN, SINCE KHIEU "DIDN'T WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT."

10. THE PRINCE INFORMED HIS AUDIENCE THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH KHIEU SAMPHAN HERE DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN MAY. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT HUANG HUA HAD CAUTIONED HIM AGAINST HOLDING A THREE MAN SUMMIT MEETING IN BEIJING, AS THIS WOULD ALLOW THE VIETS AND THE SOVIETS TO CLAIM THE COALITION WAS A CREATURE OF THE PRC. CONSEQUENTLY, SAID THE PRINCE, THE VENUE FOR SUCH A SUMMIT WOULD BE BANGKOK OR SINGAPORE, PROVIDED THE THAI AND SINGAPOREAN GOVERNMENTS AGREED. HUANG HUA HAD ENCOURAGED HIM TO CREATE THE UNITED FRONT FIRST AND RESOLVE DIFFERENCES AMONG ITS PARTIES LATER, HE SAID. SIHANOUK WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE SOME PROGRESS IS EXPECTED DURING THE MAY MEETING, THE FORMING OF A UNITED FRONT IS A VERY COMPLICATED PROCESS WHICH WILL REQUIRE SOME

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MONTHS BECAUSE OF AS YET UNRESOLVED DIFFERENCES AND
CONTROVERSIES.

11. THE PRINCE DRAMATIZED HIS BASIC PESSIMISM WITH A
TYPICALLY SIHANOUKIAN FLOURISH: HE SAID HE HAD RENOUNCED
ANY PLAN TO RETURN HOME TO DIE WHILE VIETNAM STILL
OCCUPIED CAMBODIA. HE WAS RESIGNED, INSTEAD, TO DYING
IN PYONGYANG, WHERE HE SAID KIM IL SUNG WOULD CONSTRUCT
A BUDDHIST STUPA FOR HIM NEAR HIS CHANGSON PALACE.
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