

From: Ph. T. Montgomery

To: Rear Admiral M. E. Miles, USN.

Subject: Report of Operations of the 5th and 6th Columns

As soon as we arrived in Linju 臨汝 Honan Province, we trained the Chinese in demolition and guerilla tactics, looking forward to a proposed plan for the demolition of the Yellow River bridge, north of Chengchow 鄭州. We had studied the reports submitted to General Tai by Mr. Sze-yi-ta, and we found a good many mistakes, especially misrepresentations on the enemy's dispositions and construction of the bridge itself. The Yellow River Bridge was part steel and part wood. It was approximately two (2) miles long, eighty (80) spans of the southern part were built of wood, the twenty (20) northern ones were steel. Searchlights, pill-boxes, cannons, all this surrounded by barbed wire, and in parts electric wire, presented severe handicaps for us. While we were planning the ways to attack the bridge by land, the enemy moved in fifteen hundred (1,500) men, thus creating further difficulties. It was, therefore, decided that forty (40) Chinese plus six (6) Americans would swim down the Yellow River the last days of May 1944, and attach charges to every fifth span setting off the whole at the same time. Before reaching the bridge, we had to enter the river ten (10) li to the west. Rafts and floats had been prepared to carry the two thousand eight hundred (2,800) pounds of explosive necessary. We were always being

for abandoning the operation.

The first weeks of April, <sup>14</sup> we received information from the Thirteenth Army that the Japanese had just launched an attack on all fronts to secure the Ping-Hai Railroad. The same day, I was up at Loyang <sup>陽</sup> having a meeting with the General commanding the First War Area. I saw him again the next morning at 11:00 a.m. before going back to Linju, and he had not yet been informed of any Japanese operation. It was only when I reached camp that I received the news. We asked ~~the~~ the Chinese general who was in command of the Chinese side of Camp Three (3) to let us take our students to go up to the front and resist the Japanese, who were advancing against no opposition. This was refused after many excuses.

We decided, as the Japanese were coming our way, to get all our supplies down to Chenping <sup>平</sup> and have the camp start working down there. It was only after Linju had been bombed twice and when the enemy was only thirty (30) miles north-east of us that we were given enough ox-carts and trucks to move men and gear. As there were only five (5) trucks, we used them to send all the men down with their equipment, taking the ox-carts for the supplies. Lt. A. Daniels (SC) and myself were in charge of getting this convoy down to Lushan <sup>山</sup> and from there, to Chenping. We left with over one hundred and twenty (120) ox-carts, travelling mostly at night and off the main highway, so as not to be targets for enemy planes. We got to Lushan after travelling three (3) days and three (3) nights, thus covering a bit over thirty (30) miles.

advancing against no opposition whatsoever, we sent the convoy on to Chenping. That night at 2000 hours, I was ordered to take four (4) men and report up to Loyang to help out with operations and planning for the Fifth Column. We took off that same evening with General Wang, Deputy Commander to Camp Three (3), and my interpreter. We arrived in Pao-Feng <sup>排</sup><sub>營</sub> close to 2400 hrs., and from then on our troubles started. The main highway had been cut with trenches every hundred (100) yards. We had to take to the wheat fields and fill up the ditches so that our truck could go ahead. We had covered approximately ten (10) miles at 0200 hrs. without seeing any Chinese forces. It was at the same time that the Japanese cavalry entered Pao-Feng. We continued going all night long, and as day started breaking, we were still over two hundred and fifty (250) li away from Loyang. A Japanese reconnaissance plane was spotted in the distance, and we immediately abandoned the truck and hid in the wheat fields as we didn't look forward to staying on top of over one thousand (1,000) pounds of explosives. The plane circled twice, then headed east. We immediately drove the truck to the closest village where we hid it under the main gate. As no enemy bombers appeared, we suspected that the Jap thought the truck had been abandoned. After having breakfast we drove on arriving in Linju for lunch. From there to Loyang the road was in fairly good condition, and we arrived at the Fifth Column Headquarters around 1900 hrs.

As soon as we arrived, we went to the military headquarters which were located a bit west of the town and contacted General Liao , Fifth Column Commander. The same evening, I asked him what were his plans for operation. He answered that he still

to disrupt all enemy communications leading west. I also asked him if he planned to do anything about destroying the Dragon Gate Bridge east of Loyang. This bridge is the only feasible entry to the city for any mechanized unit of which the Japanese had many. I was told that the Chinese engineers had been given the job, and that they were to execute it as soon as the Japanese were within thirty (30) li of Loyang. I saw the preparation and the disposition of the explosives on this bridge, and, after giving my opinion (which was that they were not using enough charges), returned to our Headquarters. I found out later on that only one (1) span had been slightly damaged and was insufficient for delaying any mechanized forces. In case Loyang was taken, we decided to move our Headquarters down to Sungshien 縣音 about two hundred (200) li southwest. The next day a small Japanese reconnaissance plane was shot down close to the city, and we went in to look at the remains. The two (2) pilots had been killed instantly, and, as the plane had burned, we found no papers on them, but I had my interpreter copy all writing found on the plane itself. This was sent in to Camp Three (3) for forwarding to Chungking. That evening General Liao told me he had just received a message from Major W. W. Young, Jr., commanding officer of Camp Three (3) recalling us immediately to Siping. We found out later that this message was never sent by Major Young. On the contrary, he had told General Wen 文, commander on the Chinese side of Camp Three (3) that he wanted us to stay permanently with the Column. As we had no radio of our own we couldn't check this message. Late that same night, we went aboard the truck that had brought us up, again with General Wang, and started off via Lushih 氏盧. General Wang picked up all his friends in Loyang before departing, including one of his concubines and their

travelled all night so as to be out of range of enemy planes before daylight and arrived the next morning at Loning 寧洛 where we ate and rested until 1300 hrs. During that time General Wang had found ten (10) more people who were willing to pay for the trip to Siping. As we had no desire to push the truck up every hill, I told General Wang that I refused to go along if any more people were added. I ordered all my men off the truck, refusing to get back on until my request had been granted. This had to be done because of all the excuses given to me. He understood that he couldn't change my mind and had to comply with my demand. The road to Lushih was in very bad condition. There were many steep hills and curves. We covered half of the trip by night, arriving in the city at 0100 hrs. We spent the next day looking over the town, and left early the next morning for Siping, arriving there around 1800 hrs. I had never seen a road like the one between Lushih and Siping. It was just as bad as the Burma Road and was always being washed away by the rains. We just escaped being trapped in Lushih as a few days after we had left, flood rains covered the entire area putting the road out of commission for four (4) months and flooding all the fields around Siping. That same evening, I reported to Major Young who couldn't understand why I had come back until I asked him why he had sent that message. The Japanese were still advancing and had taken Loyang. They were coming down towards Lushih, and I received authorization to destroy any part of the road that hadn't been washed away. It was while I was on this job that most of the civilians living in Lushih raided the arsenal and set it on fire. This was due to the way the Chinese soldiers, who hadn't been paid in months, were stealing everything from the civilians. The Japanese entered the city two (2) days later, and stopped.

army that hadn't been paid in over six (6) months turned over to the Japanese. General Tang-En-Po had to flee for his life, having lost all his troops in the retreat, and was given twenty (20) men as escort when he arrived in Neishang .

By this time Camp Three (3) had moved up to Changshien 商州 where training had started. As we received no information in that locality I was granted permission to go up to Sian, capital of Shensi 陝 Province. All headquarters of the Chinese forces had moved up there and had been put under the command of General Hu-Sug-Nan. We drove up in one day and the next morning I went to the Chinese Headquarters to obtain the latest reports on enemy operations. The Japanese were in Lingbao 寶靈 driving towards Tungwan 閩潼. I immediately started off to Waying 陰華 as that was the closest one could get to the front by train. From there on, I rode horseback, arriving in Tungwan the day after the Japanese had been theoretically repulsed by the Chinese. The Chinese radio was claiming a great victory with over thirty (30) enemy tanks destroyed. The Chinese on their side had three ex-Italian light tanks that they had bought after the Ethiopian campaign. They were still on flat cars in Waying. The next morning as I arrived on the battlefield I saw nothing to confirm this victory published in all Chinese newspapers, and the only thing I could notice was the result of a few small skirmishes. The Japanese had only been consolidating their position in the west.

I returned then to Sian and went to see the representative of the Second War Area belonging to Marshall Yen-Shi-Sheng so that we could go up in his territory to attack the Tung-Pu-Lu railroad. If this request was granted, we could stop any attack on Sian from Puchou 州漢 . After two (2) weeks, we were granted permission

objectives and the amount of men we intended to bring with us. After getting the latest information from the air force, I returned to Changshien. The only available transportation was an old, broken-down Chinese truck which lost its fuel pump on the way, forcing us to spend the night in the hills. When I arrived at camp, I was informed that it had been arranged for some men to go to the Fifth and Sixth Columns to train and advise the Chinese on the operations to be undertaken. The Fifth Column, still under the direction of General Liao, was stationed in Siping ~~Shi~~, and the Sixth Column commanded by General Sun had its headquarters at Lahokow. Gunner J. Connelly, CPh P. Morris and GMLst R. Lohmer were chosen for the Sixth Column, and I took with me GM2nd T. Berry and B. Zuberbuhler. We all left together on the same truck with General Wang, the same one who had been up to Loyang with us, lately appointed Executive Officer of the Fifth Column. Also with us were the General's concubine, two interpreters, two houseboys and a car-load of explosives and ammunition. The trip to Siping lasted four (4) days as a few bridges had been destroyed by floods, and we had to wait to have them repaired before proceeding. As usual, we had to push the truck up most of the hills. When we arrived in Siping, we were quartered in a schoolhouse as the village in which was stationed the column headquarters had no more accommodations for us. Connelly continued on to Lahokow where he arrived two (2) days later. On arriving, General Liao told us that he was planning to recapture his equipment buried around Sungshien as they had had no time to salvage it before the Japanese entered the city. This equipment was in no man's land between the front lines. At the same time, he wanted to attack a small enemy garrison located in that town. As the weather was hot, we started our classes at 0500 hrs., and finished at 1000 hrs. As we had over ten (10) li to walk before

I judged the men sufficiently prepared to start off on the operation. I never did hear much about the details or date of the operation, but had only been told that the equipment had been recaptured. I was also shown some equipment captured from the Japanese garrison consisting of an empty five (5) gallon size fire extinguisher, an electric switch, a compass, a theodolite and part of a radio. A few days after these classes had finished at 2200 hrs. one evening, four (4) Americans of Camp Three (3) drove in from Changshien, telling us that they had just received information from Chungking that a B-29 No. 26274 had crashed in occupied territory and that we had been ordered to get the crew out and destroy the plane. I immediately sent out notice to all my men to be on the lookout for any plane wreck in northern Honan. The plane was supposed to have crashed close to <sup>陽伊</sup> I-yang southwest of Loyang. We left early the next morning for Fangli <sup>方里</sup>, northeast of Lushih, then operational headquarters at the front. The road to Lushih had not been repaired since the flood, and we were obliged to drive through fields and rivers. We stayed there for three (3) days waiting for news of the plane as it was too late for us to walk in as if the crew hadn't now escaped, the Japanese would not have located them. We received information that the plane had crashed over two hundred (200) miles east of the location given to us and that some of our men had destroyed it, and were escorting the pilots to Chenping. At the same time our men salvaged two (2) .50 calibre machine guns with ammunition. It was later on that two (2) Japanese light bombers (Lily's) were shot down by my interpreter and myself. When we returned to Siping, as the Japanese had stopped advancing, we decided to move Headquarters to the center of our circle of

October of 1944. The trip down to Chencing was uneventful as we used a merchant's truck which took us three (3) days to cover one hundred (100) miles.

Our Headquarters were situated in a little village four (4) li north of Chenping, the soldiers being stationed all around. I was given a compound with two (2) houses and a little garden. This was quite different from Siping which was infested with rats. As we were once taking a meal in a restaurant with a few Chinese officers, a rat fell off the rafters into the soup bowl. The manager was kind enough to bring us another bowl of soup. While in Chenping, I was asked to train a group in forest fighting. This was quite difficult to undertake as we were located in nothing but plains. Nevertheless, I gave them the essential tactics and had them execute them through sweet potato fields. The difficulty, of course, was to make the officers understand to keep their men close together as this was supposed to be in a forest, and even at the end of the course some of the leaders would still separate their men as if they were fighting in the open. The class finished, we sent these men back to Chengchow.

The organization was set up as follows: In Chenping we had one hundred and fifty (150) men .

In Mihsien 縣 三 three hundred (300) of our soldiers were living around a city occupied by one hundred (100) Japs and two thousand (2,000) puppets. This force was destroying enemy installation along the Lung-Hai railroad between Loyang and Chengchow.

At Sungshien three (300) men were cutting enemy communication lines between Loyang and Tungwan.

The enemy disposition was as follows:

Sungshien eight hundred (800) Japs.

Laoning 縣 各 four hundred (400) Japs.

Yinan 陽信 six hundred (600) Japs.

Linju three hundred (300) Japs.

Linjuchen 顧汝臨 one thousand (1,000) Japs.

To the southeast two hundred (200) guerillas stationed around Singchow 鄭新 were in charge of destroying the Ping-Han railroad and roads leading west. These men operated from Shenchow to Chuan-tien 店馬駐. At Pi-Ying one hundred and sixty (160) Fifth Column men in association with one hundred fifty (150) from the Sixth Column were operating together from Chuan-tien to Hsin-Yang 陽信. We had one hundred (100) men in reserve in Nanyang 陽南, fifty (50) at Senchow, and three hundred and fifty (350) returning from the training course of Camp Three (3), which still had three hundred and sixty-four (364) of our men. Around Sinsyang 鄉新, north of the Yellow River, one hundred (100) more men were sabotaging the Daoi-Sin-Syang railroad. These forces were in operation in December 1944. At the same time as these men were operating against the enemy, they sent in some valuable intelligence reports which forwarded to Camp Three (3) so that the Fourteenth Air Force could attack some of the targets.

At that time, I had already spent four (4) months alone at the Fifth Column Headquarters, and as the new year was close, I decided to walk down to Lahokow to check on the Sixth Column and at the same time stay with CPh. T. Morris and the pilots at the airfield. I left Chenping the day after Christmas and covered two hundred and fifty (250) li in two (2) days. That New Year's Eve was interrupted by some Japanese bombers trying to destroy the field, forcing Morris and myself to man one of the machine-guns protecting the field. We were quite lucky that evening as one one hundred (100) kilo phosphorus bomb fell fifty (50) yards in

Jan 4  
By this time we decided to quit as there was too much smoke around us to see anything. Two (2) days after, I walked back to Chenping via Tungshien .

As all our intelligence reports predicted a new attack on Honan, as soon as I arrived in Chenping I decided to go to Nanyang, one of the main cities in the center of Honan Province, to check all military buildings that could be taken over by the Japanese. This was done so that we would be able to mine them and leave a few men in the city for further intelligence reports. I went down on horseback, and at the same time visited General Lee, Commander of the Twelfth Army Group, to discuss his plans of defense. I also studied the roads leading west to be ready to destroy them in case of necessity. The city was protected by trenches dug all around the walls. These were to be manned by untrained recruits with very little equipment. The main plan on the whole was to abandon Nanyang and to pull back towards Siping where they would make a stand. Many temples and schoolhouses that had already been occupied by the Japanese in 1941 and 1942 seemed apt to be reused by the enemy. We made plans of these buildings with three (3) of the Fifth Column officers, marking the location for booby-traps and mines. After five (5) days, I returned to Chenping, and made out the plan for defense and sabotage of the area. I also trained our men in handling and placing booby-traps. Two (2) weeks later, I received a message from Lahokow that CPh. Morris had had another attack of appendicitis and would have to return to Sian for an operation. Also, General York had just replaced General Sun as Commander of the Sixth Column. Therefore, I went back to Lahokow to see how the situation stood. The Sixth Column, having very few men, was in no position to undertake many operations. Their job<sup>✓</sup> was to destroy

on the Hanchiang river. They had already destroyed quite a few trains and warehouses. At that time, I received a message from General Liao that he was coming down, and requesting me to get him air transportation to Sian. Also General York received the message to report to the same place. I found out indirectly, through unofficial channels, that General Tai and Commodore Miles were visiting Camp Three (3), and wanted to see the generals in command of the Column. On my own initiative, I decided to take the first plane to Sian as I had had quite a few difficulties and wanted to smooth them out with higher authorities. One of the main things was the question of supplies. The Chinese would request enormous quantities, and when I would refuse to give it to them in a lot, they would send messages in my name and without letting me know about it to get what they wanted. I found this out by intercepting a supply column and discovered much more than I had ever ordered. Also the supply officer had enclosed a letter for me telling me that he had sent all I had asked for. The Generals admitted that they had sent these messages so I kept all these supplies in a warehouse for which I had the key, handing them out only according to operations.

Up in Sian Commodore Miles told me that he was planning to expand our columns and that I was to go down to India to pick all officers and men I needed and also requisition more weapons and supplies. I planned on using two (2) officers and ten (10) men per column, thus having one (1) officer in each headquarter with one (1) radioman and one (1) pharmacist's mate, sending the others with the groups in the field. After missing the plane on which I was to fly down to Chungking with Commodore Miles and General Tai, I hitchhiked a ride direct to Kunming and from there to Calcutta. On my arrival I went immediately to the supply officer, giving him

this wasn't the thing to do, and that I should pass through channels consisting of Chunking, Kunming, then India. After explaining that the Commodore had sent me down on purpose to save time, he told me that he had to check. After telling my whole story to Commander Smith, then Commanding Officer in Calcutta, I requested two (2) weeks leave. On my return, as the Commodore had just passed through India on his way to the United States, the situation had been straightened out, and the supply officer gave me a free hand to choose anything I wanted. It was at that time that having asked for Springfield rifles and trying to get light machine guns, this supply officer told me he had plenty of .50 calibre machine guns, but no .30s, and that I was ridiculous to order weapons that would require two different kinds of ammunition. Therefore, he thought I should take the .50 calibre machine guns. After telling him to go and fire a Springfield using .50 calibres, I started explaining to him the difference. Once my requisition had been filled, I was told that I was in charge of a navy convoy going over to China by the Lido road. The men being ready and properly trained, all supplies on hand and ready to load, we were ready to leave in a day but were delayed by the animosity between the army and navy. At that time, the army wouldn't let the navy use the road to bring its supplies into China. As I figured that the debates would last for quite some time, I put in for extra leave. A week later I received information that the Japanese had launched their attack in Honan. After having my orders changed, I flew back alone to Sian where I spent three (3) days before leaving with my interpreter and a truckload of ammunition and explosives for the Fifth Column Headquarters from where I would direct both Columns. The headquarters hadn't retreated, they had only moved up into the hills, and from there were carrying out the plans we had already drawn up.

the Japanese now being two hundred (200) miles to their rear. After spending three (3) days with the Governor of Honan who was located in a little town north of Siping thirty (30) miles from the Japanese, we rounded up enough coolies to carry our supplies for the two hundred (200) mile hike behind the lines. The trip took four (4) days as we had many hills to climb. We arrived at Hai-ying 海 漢, small walled city forty (40) li north of Chenping, which was now taken over as our Headquarters. General Liu had replaced General Liao as Fifth Column Commander. He was one of the best generals I have met in China. He would never stay on the defensive but always be first to attack. Our Headquarters were established in an old school building that had been evacuated as soon as the Japanese entered Chenping. These buildings were not in Hai-ying itself but seven hundred (700) yards to the west, a small creek running between. My living quarters were still two (2) li further to the west in a little village called Kuai-go 快 各, in which lived a couple of families of farmers. I had a whole house to myself including one room for myself, and one room for my interpreter. The school building itself was occupied by General Liu and one hundred and fifty (150) men which guarded our camp. The day after my arrival I rode over all the area and inspected all paths and valleys so that we could mine the critical points through where all the enemy patrols could sneak in and attack us. Guards were stationed, and anti-tank traps dug. We also got in touch with a General Wang, Commander of the Chinese local militia. He told me that due to his lack of weapons and ammunition and the repeated Japanese attacks on his area, he would be obliged to surrender. General Liu and myself talked him into joining us after I had explained that we were expecting supplies any day.

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all Japanese communication lines. Very little ammunition, food, weapons managed to reach the front lines. In our whole area there was not one night that passed without at least ten (10) convoys being destroyed by our men. Warehouses were burned, roads blown as the trucks were passing over, trains destroyed were executed almost daily by the guerillas. The Japanese knowing where our Headquarters were would come and try to chase us out. One day three (3) tanks, two (2) 37 mm cannons, five hundred (500) cavalry and one thousand (1,000) infantry attacked us. After a fight of four (4) hours, the enemy started to retreat. We pursued them until evening. We were told later by some Chinese living in the towns occupied by the enemy that the Japanese had lost over one hundred and fifty (150) men killed, and about four hundred (400) wounded. Of the three (3) tanks, all were damaged by our home-made mines. Unluckily, we couldn't capture them as our tommy-guns had too short a range against the enemy rifles. At about this time, we started having communist trouble. Around Mishein one of our small groups operating on the Ping-hai railroad were attacked by over two hundred (200) Chinese communists, resulting in the loss of some of our sub-machine guns. I immediately reported this to Camp Three (3) for further forwarding to Chungking. I found out later that the communists took down the numbers of those sub-machine guns and sent in an official report to Ambassador Hurley, claiming that the National Forces were using "lend-lease" weapons against them, giving the serial numbers of the weapons captured.

Down around Lahokow, one of the Sixth Column groups under the leadership of their chief of staff was ambushed by another group of communists, resulting in the death of their leader and about twenty (20) men. The situation up north was getting out of hand as none of our groups could operate due to the attacks from the

recalled our men in the Chengchow area, sending them to Wu-Yang

20 June  
The Japanese were still attacking Headquarters, and after going out on reconnaissance, I decided to mine a path in a valley leading to our camp. We placed ten (10) pounds of TNT every twenty-five (25) yards and connected them all together. From a spot up on a hill, we installed the blasting machine ready to detonate the charges. A few days later, we were notified that the enemy was coming to attack us, using the path we had prepared. After having placed about twenty (20) men along the edge of the valley on the two hundred (200) yard premined section, I went to the lookout point where I controlled the explosion. A whole company in close file came unsuspectingly down the road, and when they were at the proper spot, I set off the charges, our men finishing off all the survivors. That day we had no casualties.

Not long after, the Japanese came back to dislodge us, and succeeded in entering Hai-Ying placing a machine gun in the gate of the city, firing at the schoolhouse. As our effective range for sub-machine guns was under three (300) yards, I had to use my Winchester with telescopic sights which had an accurate range of over one thousand (1,000) yards. After hitting two (2) of the Japanese manning their machine gun, they decided to evacuate this spot. We later on surrounded the village killing off all who remained in it and pursuing the others until sunset.

My equipment hadn't yet come through, and not having any radio of my own, I had to code all my messages and send them over the Chinese radio. The operators knew very little about our alphabet as they would only use figures. In all my messages sent or received, if we were able to decode them, we found many mistakes and had to guess the contents. This was especially characteristic when

We decided that we had not enough men around headquarters, and as there had been a special group that just returned from the Second War Area, having failed to get into operations due to General Tai sending too many political advisers in with the men, we requested they be sent down to us. As this group had no plans for the present, it was appointed to the Fifth Column Headquarters to be under our operational command but supplied and equipped directly from Camp Three. Captain J. Hanley, U.S.M.C.R., with a radio man and a chief pharmacist were in charge. The Chinese commander was a colonel with whom I had gone down to Nanyang to inspect the locations we should mine as mentioned above. Had it not been for his executive officer, the group would have been annihilated as the commander was too excitable. It took them a month to reach the Fifth Column, and we stationed them in Hai-Ying, ordering them to fortify it as it had already once been taken by the Japanese. I have omitted to mention that not long before this group arrived, the Fourteenth Air Force bombed this town with fifteen (15) para-frags, ten (10) of which were duds. They had made a mistake in location and wounded a couple of our men. The Chinese farmers rescued the unexploded bombs so that they could use the metal. One of them lost an arm in the process due to the use of a hammer and chisel.



A week after this group was settled, I decided to inspect its weapons. There were two (2) Lewis machine-guns that had only been used a couple of times. When they were shown to me, they were so rusty that there was danger of them bursting on firing. Some of the sub-machine guns were in the same condition. I had them brought over to General Liu and explained to him that I saw absolutely no use in issuing any weapons if they were going to be spoiled in three weeks time. The General was just as mad as I was and said he would get this group trained as well as

equipment, and after watching the work of the Chinese doctor who was attached to the column, I refused to give him any more medicine. The reasons were as follows: I gave him a quart of paregoric, two days later he came to me asking for more as, he said, none was left. He was also treating patients with toothaches by injecting novocaine without doing any work while the patient was under anesthesia. Of course, the pain disappeared momentarily, and as he didn't treat them in the meantime, once the effect was worn off, he would give them another dose. Also, sulphur drugs were given like candy, and many men were getting symptoms of overdosage -- so I took over and cared for all the troops and myself. As I would go off on trips to visit our groups in the field, some on the other side of the railroad and the Yellow River, I would at the same time check operations and take care of the sick and wounded. I had more than one bullet to extract, and broken bones to set. Even the villagers around our Headquarters would come in for medical care. I never had expected to deliver babies, but everything happened. The difficulty was giving pills to the soldiers, especially when it was for malaria. As one pill of atabrine cost approximately one thousand (1,000) CNC, they preferred having their attacks, keeping the pills to sell. I didn't mind their not taking the pills so much as I did the danger of propagation to the other soldiers. So they would line up, open their mouths, and I would toss the pills in. They had already been given water to wash it down.

The main illnesses were, of course, trachoma, scabies, relapsing fever and malaria. I had four (4) cases of meningitis, and very few comparatively of dysentery. They all recovered. It was awfully interesting to notice that the wounded would go through very great pain without murmuring, but a blister on a heel would cause more fuss than a shattered arm. Unless a man was killed outright, he always managed to survive,

his palate. After two (2) weeks treatment, his wounds were healing normally, and he felt as fine as ever. Another one was hit by a bullet that depressed his skull, slightly paralyzing his left hand. A few months later, no traces remained.

It was a month and a half before the Armistice that the Japanese launched their main attack on our Headquarters. Instead of coming by path as they had done up until then, one battalion profited of the moonlight to pass through the fields and surprise Hai-Ying. One company set fire to the houses in which our men were living while the others surrounded the village. They opened up on our Lewis machine gun positions which were located on a small hill overlooking the town. They were using two (2) 37.mms. guns and plenty of grenade launches. Our men had to pull out, but with the help of reinforcements managed, after four (4) hours of fighting, to dislodge the enemy and start him retreating. During that time a cavalry regiment with a few tanks was attacking from the other side but didn't manage, thanks to our land mines and traps, to close in on us. The fight lasted for two (2) days as the Japanese were sending reinforcements. It was astonishing the few amount of casualties we had. Only three (3) men were killed, and five (5) wounded. We were told that the enemy had sustained quite a few losses.

Among my trips to visit our groups out on the field, I went to Kwaitien  which is on the other side of the Yellow River. These trips would take an average of three (3) weeks, and I would spend another week inspecting the operations. I also went down to Miyang  on our side of the railroad and to Mihsien next to Chenchow. These trips were not so difficult as one would well imagine, as the Japanese didn't penetrate very far off the highways. The main difficulty was crossing the railroad as the Japanese had had dug trenches twenty (20)

barbed wire on each side all of which was patrolled by dogs. Nevertheless, we always managed to sneak by. I would dress as a peasant and wear a broad brimmed hat so as not to attract too much attention. We would mostly travel at night, staying with some Chinese farmers during the daytime.

During this time, the Sixth Column was operating on the Han-Ching River that the Japanese used to supply Hankow. With a few sampans, they would patrol the rivers, attaching, when possible, delayed mines to the Japanese river junks, and destroy enemy warehouses and unguarded supplies along the shore. We also devised a way of making contact water mines so as to bar the river. Most of them worked with good results, the only danger being that sometimes the Chinese boats would suffer.

The main danger in all the operations was the way the Chinese peasants would go up and down the roads with their ox-carts as if everything was peaceful. It was very difficult for us to lay mines for the Japanese as there would be more Chinese traffic than enemy. The Japanese would also protect their convoys by having Chinese peasants with their ox-carts laden down with rocks proceed them to blow up the mines, if any. The only thing we could do was to make a mine that needed double contacts which would only be detonated by caterpillar treads and not by wheels. We also used charges we would set off from the field when we saw the enemy trucks were in a good position. We had the same difficulty on the railroads. The locomotives would push four or five heavily laden flat cars so that the cars would be destroyed by the mines and not the locomotive. We solved this problem by stringing primacord to our charge for a length of four railroad cars. Therefore, the car would set off the explosion that would blow up under the locomotive. We had so perfected our demolition that it was possible to blow up one special car on any train we wanted. Having to teach the Chinese all these tricks was at times quite risky as they wouldn't realize the danger of mis-

men had been wounded when picking up unexploded enemy ammunition, and I had given strict orders that no one was to touch any unexploded mines or bombs, but to let me know as soon as any were discovered. We didn't have too much trouble with enemy booby-traps as if anything looked suspicious we would explode it from a distance.

The Japanese were always trying to find out the exact number of men we had around Headquarters and would send men, women and children to obtain that information. Many were caught, and we have no record of any figures reaching the enemy. Each time the Japanese came to attack us, they were led by Chinese country folk who knew the area. When our men caught them, they would be buried alive. The same would happen to any puppet forces we captured. This was done in reprisal to the treatment received by some of our men taken by the enemy.

On August 10th, the officers, men and equipment who had just arrived from India reached the Fifth Column. There was very great excitement from all the Chinese when we showed them the new weapons. The next day I sent them out with the Americans to attack enemy convoys between Nanying and Chenping. It was that evening that I heard on my new radio the news from Okinawa and the repeated phrase "It is only a rumor that the Japanese have asked for an armistice." I immediately spread the rumor to all our generals. Useless to say, we stayed up all night listening for confirmation. The next morning I received messages from the groups in the field stating that they had destroyed one (1) convoy and were chased a mile by Japanese cavalry, but sustained no casualties.

Once the Armistice had been accepted, and the "cease fire" order had been given, we still had to continue fighting as many of the Japanese entrenched in the hills refused to surrender. When they did, they requested that we escort them to the main highways as they were

ing to see the expression on the Japanese faces when they saw Americans way behind their lines. We rarely carried guns, our only weapons being cameras.

One of our difficulties was to stop the enemy from taking away Chinese property, and more than once we went out after the retreating forces to take back oxen and donkeys stolen from the Chinese farmers. I'll never forget one day when a Japanese officer tried pulling his sword to stop us, and after our using some quite appropriate cuss words, he resheathed and went away. It was amusing to see the Japanese bluff called down as they had been using quite a bit of this with the Chinese who were still very afraid of them even after they surrendered. About this time in Chenping, the leader of the 1st Group of the Fifth Column decided to have a party for the Japanese officers who had just surrendered. All the high Chinese officials, the Americans, the colonel commanding the Japanese cavalry regiment and his staff were to be present. The party was held at the Catholic Mission with the Japanese sitting on one side of the table and the Americans on the other. All weapons were left at the door, and the place was surrounded by our guards. We found out at that time that the Japanese thought there were about fifty (50) Americans behind the lines and knew my name as leader. They also believed that two (2) American divisions were on the front lines ready to start an offensive, only stopped by the Japanese surrender. The party broke up after many "gambey's" to our victory.

A few days later we went down to Nanyang where the Column was moving as there were a few difficulties with some puppet troops, and a Japanese general. While we were down there, we stayed ten (10) li out of the city at one of the main Catholic missions in Honan. There we had another party with a puppet general. He said he turned over to the Japanese on orders from the National Government as he was trapped

ed us that he had been appointed by the National Government as Military Commander of the area. As General Liu, Fifth Column Commander, had received official notice from Chungking to take over the command of that region, everybody made speeches claiming their rights. As they were all addressed to the Americans, I was obliged to answer. I said that we were just interested in fighting all enemies of our Government, and that we had nothing to do with Chinese internal politics. I also reminded them that the Nanking Government had declared war on us and that, therefore, we had to consider them enemies.

Later on, I called in the Japanese Commanding General of the area as there had been too much stealing and beating up of the Chinese farmers. Also some of our men, unarmed, who had come up to Nanyang by the highway had been ambushed by a Japanese company, one of our men being wounded and some equipment stolen. I complained about all this to the General and told him that I was making him personally responsible for the good behavior of his troops, and that any more complaints would be sent in to Allied Headquarters, and he would be treated as a war criminal. He left after apologizing and stating that he would send out orders forbidding any further disobedience to International Law under penalty of death.

We received a message recalling us to Sian and telling the Column to proceed to Chengchow. We requisitioned a Japanese truck to drive us back to Chenping where we met a weapons' carrier that had been sent down to pick us up. After staying five (5) days in Sian I hitchhiked a plane ride to Chungking where I found out that almost none of my messages had been relayed by Camp Three.