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NEWSLETTER NO.6

VC POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
STRATEGIC RESEARCH & ANALYSIS BRANCH

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER VIETNAM

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
12 September 1968

SUBJECT: CICV Newsletter, VC Political Infrastructure

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1. Forwarded for your information is the sixth newsletter of the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, concerning VC political infrastructure.
2. The purpose of the newsletter is to provide the intelligence community with the latest trends, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the VC political infrastructure. The ultimate goal is more effective identification and neutralization of the enemy's infrastructure.
3. This newsletter discusses the history and organization of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN).
4. Subsequent newsletters will be published periodically as new information, trends, and developments warrant. Comments and additional information pertaining to the newsletters should be submitted to HQ MACV J2, ATTN: MACJ231-5.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE:



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Secretary of the Lao Động Party (Worker's Party) in North Vietnam. Lê Đức Thọ, a member of the North Vietnamese Politburo, is currently the Politburo's "silent negotiator" for the Paris peace delegation. Phạm Hùng, a former Deputy Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Politburo member, is the present COSVN Secretary and Senior Political Officer.¹

d. After the Geneva Accords in 1954, COSVN was dissolved and control of Communist activities was once again divided between the Inter-region V and Inter-region VI committees. As a result of the Geneva Accords, 100,000 southern cadre members were regrouped in the North.² Reduced staffs for Inter-region V and Inter-region VI remained in South Vietnam. In 1956 these staffs were gradually reinforced through the infiltration of regroupees. Finally, in 1959, North Vietnam launched an intensive armed struggle against the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

e. The conflict was directed by the Inter-region VI (Nam Bo) Committee. It had jurisdiction over the Eastern, Central, and Western Nam Bo regions (which were then known as Regions 7, 8, and 9) and was composed of seven staff sections:

- (1) Finance and Economy (Ban Kinh Tài).
- (2) Organization Section (Ban Tổ² Chức).
- (3) Training Section (Ban Tuyên Huấn).
- (4) Farmers' Proselyting Section (Ban Nông Văn), also known as the People's Proselyting Section (Ban Dân Văn).
- (5) Religious Proselyting Section (Ban Tôn Giáo Văn).
- (6) Military Proselyting Section (Ban Binh Văn).
- (7) Enemy Situation Section (Ban Địch Tinh), also known as the Enemy Proselyting Section (Ban Địch Văn).

f. A notebook written by the Chief of the Office of the Military Affairs Section, subordinate to the Nam Bo Party Committee, revealed that COSVN was again reorganized in 1961. From March to September 1961, the Nam Bộ staff had been strengthened, but by September 1961 North Vietnam decided, apparently for coordination and control purposes, that it was time for the Nam Bộ and Trung Bộ Committees to merge into a Central Office for South Vietnam. A captured notebook sets the date for the unification of the two Committees by stating, "In September 1961, a7 (Bảy Tiên) and a2 (Hai Hậu) came here for a conference. In October 1961, Nam Bộ and Trung Bộ Party Committees were unified into COSVN (Central Office of South Vietnam)."³

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g. In another portion of the notebook, reference is made to the creation of COSVN in 1962. This discrepancy is probably due to COSVN's evolutionary creation which took place over several months. At the time of its absorption into COSVN in 1961, the Nam Bộ Committee was still undermanned, and the increased responsibilities of COSVN made this shortage even more pronounced. Consequently, it was not until early 1962 that the organization really became a functional entity.

h. As the evolution of COSVN was taking place, the overall political structure was also being revamped. On 13 May 1959, the Lao Động Central Executive Committee in Hanoi declared, "...the time has come to struggle heroically and perseveringly to smash the GVN."⁴ As a result, the Third Lao Động Congress, held in September 1960, formulated plans for establishing a broad, national, and united front whose purpose was to serve as a unifying force for Communist aggression in the South. A few months later, on 20 December 1960, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) was formally proclaimed.⁵ Leadership for the NFLSVN was provided by the existing core of Viet-Minh Communists and by prominent non-Communist dissidents who were dissatisfied with the Diem regime. To disassociate the Front from the political apparatus leading back to Hanoi and to make it appear that the Front was indigenous to South Vietnam, the Lao Động Party of South Vietnam was directed to change its name to the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP).

i. The political strategy of the VC in South Vietnam uses the classic Communist "United Front" technique, based on Lenin's tactic of the "minimum - maximum program."⁶ This program enables the Party to achieve power by advocating a politically popular non-Communist program (minimum program), after which it implements the Communist program (maximum program). This technique, as it is being applied in South Vietnam, requires the creation of a Communist-dominated mass organization to mobilize the populace behind the minimum program.⁷ The NFLSVN and its affiliated "liberation associations" constitute this united front of mass organizations and serve as the rallying force for Communist aggression in the South. However, the actual direction of the war resides with COSVN, with the NFLSVN serving as its front. To insure its responsiveness to the Party, and thus to Hanoi, the NFLSVN is controlled primarily by COSVN's Front Section.

j. An immediate objective of the NFLSVN was to gain recognition by the Diem regime as a precondition for future peace settlements. This objective has not yet been achieved and remains a major factor in the political struggle.

2. Relationship Between COSVN and Other Organizations of Communist Aggression.

a. Control over Communist aggression in South Vietnam is presently vested in COSVN, Tri - Thien - Hue MR, the B-3 Front and MR-5. COSVN is charged with directing the aggression in southern South Vietnam to include Military Regions 2, 3, 6, and 10 and Eastern Nam Bộ, with its

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heavily populated Bien Hoa area, Tay Ninh and Ba Bien provinces. COSVN informs the Tri - Thien - Hue MR, the B-3 Front, and MR-5 of its activities and coordinates operations of mutual concern. (See Annex C.)

b. COSVN, an extension of the ruling Lao Động Party in Hanoi, is the command and administrative apparatus charged with directing and co-ordinating Communist aggression in southern South Vietnam. In the usual Communist manner, COSVN serves as both the military and political headquarters for its area of responsibility. Originally, it was subordinate to the Reunification Department of the Lao Động Party, which was believed to issue specific orders to COSVN based on directives of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee. Recent information indicates, however, that orders have flowed directly to COSVN from the North Vietnamese Politburo and High Command, and the National Defense Council. The Reunification Department may now function as COSVN's liaison office in North Vietnam. It is generally limited to correspondence with COSVN and its subordinate functional committees and the recruiting and training of political cadre prior to infiltration into South Vietnam. In addition, COSVN has other ties with North Vietnam. The Security Section of COSVN directly provides information to and receives intelligence from the Central Research Agency and the Ministry of Public Security.

c. Despite its ties with Hanoi, the most vital link between North Vietnam and COSVN resides in the personnel sent south to direct Communist aggression. The top men in COSVN are either full or alternate members of the Lao Động Central Committee. The presence of Lao Động Party leaders among the VC leadership insures North Vietnamese control of the aggression.

d. The key to COSVN's mission is its place within the Communist Party System. It is simultaneously the Central Committee of the PRP and a regional committee of the North Vietnamese Lao Động Party.⁸ As such it is both the leading Party agency in South Vietnam and the link between Communist aggression in the South and the North Vietnamese High Command.⁹ COSVN issues directives to subordinate elements in accordance with policies established by the North Vietnamese Lao Động Party. It issues broad mission-type directives as well as specific orders which limit freedom of action for all subordinates. In addition, COSVN functions as the Central Committee of the PRP, making major policy decisions for lower Party echelons and exercising some control over the discipline of Party members. Consequently, COSVN has the power to direct Communist aggression. As an administrative agency, COSVN functions similarly to a national government in providing administrative support to subordinate elements. This support includes training cadre for lower echelons of the VC infrastructure, producing propaganda, disseminating information, and coordinating operations.

e. The PRP is the southern branch of the Lao Động Party, although Hanoi has tried to make the PRP appear indigenous to South Vietnam.¹⁰ Viet Cong (VC) public doctrine asserts that there is only one Vietnamese

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Communist Party. According to a broadcast from Hanoi Radio on 12 January 1962, "the Conference of the South Vietnamese...decided to set up the PRP of SVN and approved the Party's program of action. The immediate aim of the new Party is to unify and direct the workers, peasants, and all South Vietnamese compatriots...to liberate South Vietnam."¹¹

f. Regulations of the PRP are structured as an independent entity and make no reference to subordination.¹² This is done to maintain the facade of a PRP indigenous to the South. Probably the best evidence to indicate that the PRP is a territorial department of the Lao Động Party is that infiltrating Lao Động Party members are automatically accorded PRP membership. Additional evidence of a direct alliance between the parties of the North and South was contained in an enemy document captured in SVN in May 1962 which stated:

In regard to the formation of the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, the creation of this Party is only a matter of strategy...to deceive the enemy in order to counter their accusations of an independent existence; actually, our Party is nothing but the Lao Động of Vietnam unified from the North to South under the executive committee of the Party, the Chief of which is Hồ Chí Minh... ."¹³

g. LTC Trần Văn Đắc, who rallied on 19 April 1968, stated that there was no such organization as a PRP with a Central Committee or a Standing Committee. The significance of this statement is not that it denies the existence of the PRP, but that the Lao Động Party is pre-eminent, and that hard core Communists continue to view the PRP as the Lao Động Party in the South. One of the arguments against the possibility that the PRP is an extension of the Lao Động Party is the considerably less stringent membership requirements of the PRP. Membership requirements have been further reduced in recent months due probably to a manpower shortage as a result of combat losses, especially pronounced during the first phase of the Winter - Spring campaign of 1968.

B. Policy Making Organs of COSVN (See Annex D).

1. Party Congress and Central Executive Committee. Similar to most Communist organizations, the highest echelon of the PRP in South Vietnam is theoretically the Party Congress. Congress membership consists primarily of high Party provincial and regional officials. The most important function of the Congress is to elect, from its own membership, a Central Executive Committee (CEC) of from 30 to 40 permanent members and an unknown number of temporary members. Out of its own membership, the CEC appoints the Current Affairs Committee (CAC) and its two functional elements, the Secretary Section and the Investigation Section. Thus, through this committee process, policy and guidance from the Party Congress is channeled down to its action agency, the CAC.

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a. Current Affairs Committee. The CAC conducts the day-to-day business for the CEC. Since it meets continuously, it is often referred to as the "Permanent" or "Standing" Section. The activities of the CAC insure control and direction by the CEC since the CAC implements the policies and directives established by the Central Committee. When the situation warrants, the CAC also meets jointly with the Military Affairs Committee to review past activities and to plan future military operations. Members of the CAC identified by rallier LTC Tran Van Dac as of 19 April 1968 were:

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Function</u> |
|---|--------------------------------------|
| Phạm Hùng (AKA Bay Hồng) | Secretary, CO and PO of COSVN |
| Phạm Cúc (AKA Muối Út) | Deputy Secretary |
| Hai Văn | Deputy Secretary |
| Hai Xe Nguja | Chief of Finance and Economy |
| Hai Hầu (AKA GEN Trần Lương and Trần Nam Trung) | Chief of Civilian Proselyting |
| Chín Vinh (AKA Trần Đô and Trần Quốc Vinh)* | Deputy Political Officer |
| Tú Chi (AKA Trần Văn Trà) | Commander of the Armed Forces in SVN |
| Sáu Dân (AKA Chín Dung and Phan Trọng Dân) | In charge of Saigon - Cholon |
| Ba Bình | In charge of Region 3 |
| Hoàng Văn Thái | Former CO of MR-5 |

*Chín Vinh was reportedly killed in Saigon on 11 February 1968. There is evidence that his replacement is Lê Chan, former Political Officer of the 9th VC Division.¹⁴

b. Secretary Section. The Secretary Section is the administrative element of the CAC and is headed by the Party Secretary and two Deputy Secretaries. The Party Secretary is the most important member of the CAC because he decides what matters the CAC is to consider. Rallier LTC Trần Văn Đắc identified the following members of the Secretary Section as of 19 April 1968: Phạm Hùng (AKA Bay Hồng), Secretary; Phạm Cúc (AKA Muối Út), Deputy Secretary; and Hai Văn, Deputy Secretary.

c. Investigation Section. The Investigation Section is responsible for the investigation of Party members accused of deviating from Party ideology. Although this section would normally handle only those cases involving high Party officials, its members can investigate any Party member.¹⁵

C. Functional Organs. Subordinate to the COSVN Executive Committee are a number of functional sections that are responsible for administering COSVN's civil activities, for advising the CAC on execution of CEC decisions, and for exercising technical supervision over the programs of

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subordinate Party echelons. The chiefs of these functional sections are probably members of the CEC.¹⁶ For example, Hai Hau, a member of the CEC and CAC, is also Chief of the Civilian Proselyting Section. A discussion of each of the functional sections follows.

1. Civilian Proselyting Section.

a. The function of the Civilian Proselyting Section (CPS) is to organize the people into the all-important mass organizations covertly directed by the PRP. The CPS also recruits people with a potential for organization. They are to infiltrate existing non-Communist groups in order to bring them under the control of the NFLSVN and the PRP. The section is headed by General Trần Lương of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).

b. The CPS is divided into a number of subsections, each having jurisdiction over a different mass front organization. (See Annex E.) Front organizations consisting of a particular professional group are initially controlled by the element of COSVN whose function is most related to that of the organization.¹⁷ For example, the Farmer's Association Sub-section subordinate to the CPS will attempt to establish Farmer's Associations. Once the associations are established, control would be relinquished to the NFLSVN.

2. Security Section.

a. The Security Section is located in War Zone C of Tay Ninh Province and is responsible for VC intelligence, counterintelligence, and police activities. It is subordinate to COSVN's CAC, but also has direct communication links with the Ministry of Public Security in Hanoi which provides the Security Section with many of its personnel.¹⁸ The section has grown considerably in recent years. Of its 150 members in late 1962, 50 were administrative personnel.¹⁹ By 1967, the section had increased to 650 members.²⁰ The quality and political reliability of Security Section personnel is undoubtedly high. For example, when the section's strength reached 362 in June 1965, 205 (56%) were Party members and 91 (25%) belonged to the Party Youth Group.²¹ These percentages, as a ration of Party affiliation to total strength are uncommonly high for any VC organizational level.

b. The COSVN Security Section has at least five major functions:

(1) To provide guidance and general direction to subordinate Security Sections from region to hamlet level.

(2) To advise the COSVN hierarchy on security and counter-intelligence matters.

(3) To provide internal security for COSVN and its subordinate agencies.

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(4) To conduct a security/espionage school for security cadre serving at district level and above in South Vietnam.

(5) To conduct counterintelligence and espionage operations in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.²²

c. The Security Section operates under a Leadership Committee and has ten major subsections, codenamed B1 through B10, each of which has a number of subordinate cells (see Annex F). The Leadership Committee is composed of the chief of the Security Section and representatives from the subsections. It makes the section's major policy decisions, oversees the more important operational activities of the committee subordinates, and supervises the financial and personnel actions of the subsections. Important decisions, such as establishing an agent network in Saigon, are made by the chief of the committee. Many of the minor decisions and most of the routine administrative and Party matters are handled by the chief's deputy or by one of the representatives of the subsections.

d. Subsection B1 is the administrative component of the Security Section and is divided into 12 elements, five of which have been positively identified as the correspondence, food supply, management, operational, and financial elements. Captured documents indicate that the correspondence element handles the processing of all incoming and outgoing documents and reports; the food supply cell draws rations from COSVN's Finance and Economy Section; the operations element handles clothing allowances; the management cell takes care of personal affairs; and the financial element provides funds for operation of the Security Section.

e. Subsection B2, whose function is not entirely clear, appears to be one of the section's internal security components. It is divided into an office staff consisting of 32 men, an armed reconnaissance unit of 46 men, and a component entitled "Permanent Section 9" about which little is known. Since B2 subsections at military region, province, and district levels perform an internal police function, it is probable that COSVN's B2 Subsection also performs such a function.

f. Subsection B3 has a research role. It is the smallest of the security subsections, with a 1967 programmed complement of 24 members. Its size, its equipment, and the type of memoranda it produces suggest the research function. For example, among the materials it asked for in 1966 were newspapers (printed in Vietnamese, Chinese, Cambodian, French, and English), maps, film for pictures, and documents. It also maintains an extensive file on counter-revolutionary personnel.

g. Subsection B4 appears to be a small guard component, used for the protection of foreign visitors. Since COSVN now has a Physical Security Section, B4's role is not clear.

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h. Subsection B5 is probably a production element. Production sections usually grow rice and raise cattle for consumption by their parent unit and attempt to make VC base areas as self-sufficient as possible. The workers are often transients or low-level personnel assigned temporarily (sometimes as punishment) by their parent unit. B5 is omitted from distribution of such routine COSVN Security Section information as circulars and pay rosters, implying that their sole function is food production.

i. Subsection B6 is the Security Section's Internal Security and Intelligence School. During 1965 - 1966 the subsection was under pressure to reduce its administrative staff, and in March 1966 only 24 staff members remained. The school does not have regular semesters. Classes begin at irregular intervals, with as many as four groups undergoing simultaneous training. The B6 Subsection graduates approximately 500 students a year.²³

j. Subsection B7 appears to be the Security Section's permanent military component. The exact functions of this subsection are unknown; however, it may possibly be the "organic mobile unit" referred to in some captured documents. It has a reported strength of 204 men.

k. Subsection B8 performs a commo-liaison function. It delivers correspondence to other COSVN agencies, the various military regions, and to nearby provinces and districts.

l. Subsection B9 is the logistical element for the Security Section. It maintains an armory and food depots, and has a distribution component equipped with pack bicycles.

m. Subsection B10 is the interrogation and detention facility. This subsection has a leadership element, an interrogation and indoctrination element, a jail, an administrative element, and an organic guard unit. The number of prisoners held by Subsection B10 rarely exceeds twenty.²⁴

n. In addition to the above known functional subsections of COSVN's Security Section, there are several additional elements which are listed below and about which little is known:

(1) Espionage Element. The exact organizational structure for the espionage element is not currently known. According to a recent rallier report, however, this element has eleven subordinate military intelligence units scattered throughout the various military regions. Each is a collection agency with approximately 30 personnel and one radio for contact with higher echelons. The rallier also stated that intelligence units used their own trained covert agents rather than relying on the local populace to provide them with information. Since officers-in-charge of agent teams operate in both Cambodia and South Vietnam, the espionage component may be broken down into foreign and domestic bureaus. Much of the espionage

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component appears to be centered around Saigon.

(2) Signal Element. A signal element is almost certainly present because of the large amount of radio equipment mentioned in Security Section documents. It appears from the contents of some documents that certain security elements have their own radio facilities. Some Security Section radio operators appear to have been trained in North Vietnam.

(3) Cryptographic Element. There is some evidence of the existence of a cryptographic element which is responsible for decoding messages received and encoding messages to be transmitted by the communications element. It may have as many as 30 personnel.

(4) Guerrilla Unit. Several documents also indicate the existence of a guerrilla unit (codenamed "Village") that is attached to the COSVN Security Section. It does not, however, appear to be a permanent unit. It seems to become active only when Allied sweep operations threaten War Zone C.

(5) Radio-Intercept and Cryptoanalysis Element. A radio-intercept and cryptoanalysis facility has been reported by rallier LT Trần Văn Tâm; however, this information has not been confirmed.

3. Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section.

a. The Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section, headed by CAC member Hai Hâu, is responsible for supervising the propaganda, education, and training operations of the entire VC infrastructure. The section is also responsible for the Liberation Press Agency and Liberation Radio, as well as entertainment, motion picture production, editorial work, foreign news monitoring, and various cultural activities. Additionally, the section has an administrative office, a printing house, a rear services element, a food production team, a dispensary, and a defense platoon.²⁵ A captured document indicates that the primary functions of the section are performed by eight subsections: Propaganda; Arts and Cultural Training; Education; Broadcasting; Liberation Press Agency; Propaganda Abroad; the PRP newspaper, Tiền Phong; Nguyễn Ái Quốc Political School.²⁶

b. The Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section publishes the Party newspaper, Tiền Phong, as well as the NFLSVN's newspaper Cờ Giải Phóng. It also publishes Văn Giải Phóng (Liberation Art and Culture) and the English and French language newspaper, The Fighting South. In addition, this section is responsible for operating the Liberation Press and Radio as well as preparing and disseminating Party training materials. It also renders assistance to the Front Section for supervising two NFLSVN associations, the Democratic and Patriotic Journalists Association and the Patriotic Teacher's Association.²⁷

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4. Public Health Section.

a. The Public Health Section is responsible for advising the CAC on medical care throughout the COSVN structure, for providing health care to cadre living within COSVN's base areas, for supervising lower echelon medical activities, and for providing the lower echelons with medical and technical assistance and supplies.²⁸

b. The Public Health Section acts in an advisory role to the CAC and supervises the execution of CEC policies and decisions regarding medical care. For example, a captured document contained a plan for inspection of village medical facilities to insure proper execution of COSVN's policy of improving the public health system at all echelons. Other objectives were to acquire an intimate knowledge of local medical facilities in order to facilitate technical leadership and to help to improve local medical operation. The inspection was to include a thorough medical survey concerning the health status of the populace, medical facilities and organization, medical training, and operational experiences.²⁹

c. Another function of the Public Health Section is administering medical care to COSVN's lower level cadre. One patient who was treated by the COSVN Public Health Section indicated a possibility of two dispensaries for COSVN cadre--one for the high ranking cadre and one for the workers. The section may also be responsible for providing personnel to the organic medical detachments of other COSVN level agencies. The section maintains training facilities for medical technicians, low-level first aid men, and pharmacists. In addition, the section maintains a program for advancements in medical technology by disseminating training bulletins on medical techniques and practices.

d. The COSVN Public Health Section is believed to be the major supplier of medical supplies to subordinate echelons. In addition, captured documents indicate that the section is probably responsible for processing bulk pharmaceuticals (e.g. rolling or pressing pills), manufacturing oriental remedies, stocking medical instruments, and issuing these items to lower echelons.

5. Organization Section.

a. The function of the Organization Section is to manage all administrative affairs, primarily at COSVN and region level, pertaining to the civilian political cadre members of the PRP/NFLSVN organization.

b. The Organization Section has six subsections, as shown in the line and block chart at Annex G:³⁰

(1) The Correspondence Subsection's function is to receive all incoming correspondence and submit it to the Chief of the Organization Section for review. It is then distributed to the appropriate subsection for action. The Correspondence Subsection also prepares all outgoing correspondence.

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(2) The Plans and Policies Subsection drafts Party policies concerning the assignment, training, promotion, and reward of civilian political cadre and studies GVN policies concerning land development and pacification of the populace. The subsection also develops detailed policies concerning all aspects of the life of the civilian political cadre of the NFLSVN. It also helps determine measures to be taken to make GVN pacification policies ineffective.

(3) The Personal Affairs Subsection is responsible for food supply, pay and allowances, and clothing for the Organization Section's personnel. Members of this subsection also cultivate the food required by the Organization Section.

(4) The Movement Subsection conducts investigations of cadre activities at the military region and province levels and solves existing problems.

(5) The Cadre Administration Subsection maintains complete statistical records concerning cadre strength throughout South Vietnam. These records include Party strength, educational level of the cadre, and years of Party membership--commonly called "Party age." This subsection also assigns civilian political cadre to functional organizations. It does not, however, control the final assignments of the cadre within the gaining unit. Additionally, the subsection provides guidance concerning the training and indoctrination of all non-military cadre, makes recommendations for promotions, keeps track of awards granted to political cadre, carries out disciplinary actions, and insures that all Party policies concerning cadre are properly executed. The subsection also maintains files on captured Party members.

(6) The Cadre Administrative Subsection is the organizational element that has maintained a complete personnel roster of all South Vietnamese cadre who regrouped to North Vietnam. It has also prepared the requests to the North Vietnamese Reunification Department for regroupee cadre to be infiltrated back into South Vietnam.

6. Finance and Economy Section.

a. The organizational details of the COSVN Finance and Economy Section are not available. The size and complexity of the VC economic system suggest, however, that a group of highly trained economists and financial advisors must staff the section.

b. The Finance and Economy Section is believed to formulate economic policy recommendations for presentation to the CAC. It provides technical supervision of COSVN's finance and budgeting and supervises the financial activities of lower echelons.³¹ In formulating the budget, COSVN economists take into consideration the estimated budgets received from

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lower echelon Finance and Economy Sections, anticipated surpluses and deficits of the various VC administrative areas, and programmed operations for the next fiscal year. Following development of the budget, annual tax collection quotas for each of the military regions are established. The section also issues detailed instructions to lower echelons for accounting procedures and provides the services of experts to train and monitor the performance of lower level Finance and Economy Section cadre. The section reportedly has some additional special functions, such as obtaining foreign currency for out-of-country purchases.

c. The Finance and Economy Section is responsible for providing some of the food and other supplies required by COSVN agencies and for obtaining the necessary funds for military operations by subordinate echelons. While the section does not appear to be responsible for fixing the budgets of COSVN's agencies, it does establish, subject to the approval of the CAC, the rules governing the expenditure of funds.³² For example, the section published the "Regulations on the Reception and Entertainment of Foreign Guests," which provided that "...the daily allocation for each guest and his guide during work at agencies and units, movements and visits is 50 South Vietnamese piasters for guests who cannot consume Vietnamese food and 40 piasters for guests who can consume Vietnamese food."³³

7. Forward Supply Council.

a. The VC logistical system is controlled primarily by the Forward Supply Council (FSC) through coordination with the Finance and Economy Section of COSVN and the Rear Services Section of Liberation Army Headquarters. The FSC system was initiated by COSVN in 1965 to aid the re-supply of combat units and to solve logistical problems resulting from the Allied buildup. The Finance and Economy Section was responsible for budgeting and providing funds for purchases while the FSC had the responsibility for building stockpiles and delivering supplies to the military. There was an apparent overlap, however, between the functions of the FSC and the Rear Services Section of the Liberation Army, which was also charged with the responsibility of assuring logistical support to field elements. This overlap may have been recognized by COSVN since recent evidence indicates that the FSC, with its procurement and coordination functions, is being incorporated into the Finance and Economy Section while the Rear Services Section is taking over primary control of military logistics. According to a high-ranking VC defector "...the mission of the FSC is to coordinate logistical requirements between COSVN and the Liberation Army in support of campaigns. These campaigns usually involve multi-regimental size units."³⁴ In addition, evidence from lower echelons suggests that the FSC may also be responsible for supplying manpower resources to VC military and civilian agencies.³⁵

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b. Comparison of the military Rear Services Section with the civilian FSC reveals a duplication of activity. The Rear Services Section has the mission of producing, procuring, storing, and securing materials, weapons, and equipment. Moreover, the functional sections of the Rear Services Section provide supervision over all normal logistical activities concerning production, purchase, and procurement of supplies. It is organized into subsections dealing with clothing, medical aid, production, storage, and transportation. In addition to functional sections, the Rear Services Section has a number of groups (Doans 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, and 86) which are essentially lower echelon area support elements. Generally, they are concentrated in the III CTZ area. These groups, which vary from battalion to regimental size, support military units in their areas of responsibility. The groups obtain supplies by purchase on the open market, from production agencies within the group itself, from the COSVN level Rear Services Section, or from other area groups. The extent of their activities depends upon operational needs. For example, one of the most active elements is the Medical Section which is responsible for the procurement of medical supplies. Most of its medical supplies are procured on the open market by VC agents who operate primarily in or near the cities.

c. The FSC is composed of the chief of the Finance and Economy Section, who is also a member of the Party Committee; the Chief of the Liberation Army Rear Services Staff; and other cadre from the military region Rear Services.³⁶ The FSC has two elements, the Standing Section and the Members Section. The Standing Section is primarily concerned with labor supply and has the mission of implementing resolutions of higher councils, planning all activities of the Council, organizing and administering material resources, and preparing guidance for utilization of civilian labor teams. The Members Section is concerned with military affairs, security, public health, and economics. It has the mission of organizing the civilian labor teams required to fulfill the tasks assigned by the Standing Section.

d. A primary source of labor to support the VC logistical system is Assault Youth Groups. The Assault Youth Groups (AYGs) were first established in March 1965 when the VC planned to increase the number of partially trained units available for upgrading to main force units. The original functions of the AYGs were front support, rear consolidation, weapons and ammunition transportation, casualty evacuation, battlefield recovery, and bridge and road sabotage. Political indoctrination of the AYGs was also stressed in order to establish a combat spirit and a revolutionary life.

e. In contrast to the AYGs, who are lightly armed, semi-militarized units, the civilian labor teams are unarmed and require security guards for movement. The civilian teams have a less formal organizational structure than the AYGs. The VC emphasize political indoctrination within the teams to insure that daily duties, as well as special efforts for large scale operations, will be carried out. The degree of emphasis on political indoctrination reflects the difficulties encountered by the VC in recruiting laborers. As a result, large numbers of civilians are recruited.

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8. Military Proselyting Section.

a. VC documents continually emphasize that the "three pronged attack" of political struggle, military struggle, and military proselyting will ultimately yield a VC victory. As explained in a captured document:

The political struggle will train the people to be an organized force for the general insurrection, and this training of the people for the political struggle will give birth to an armed force. A strong force will support the political struggle effectively. The harder the armed force fights, the more enthusiastic the people will be. As the morale of the ARVN decreases it will lessen its suppression of the political force. At the same time we carry out our political struggle, we will try to win over the ARVN soldiers and motivate them to join the political force.³⁷

b. The importance the enemy attaches to military proselyting is evident in the elaborate preparations for proselyting activities. The goal of the Military Proselyting Section is to encourage ARVN soldiers to either desert and join the insurgent ranks with their weapons, or to defect in place as "fifth columnists" or proselyting agents. Supervision of troop proselyting activities, conducted by lower echelon proselyting elements of the infrastructure, is the principle function of the COSVN Military Proselyting Section. In performing its task, the section prepares propaganda materials to be used by lower echelons and maintains special advisory teams to assist them. Whether the COSVN Military Proselyting Section conducts penetration actions, or whether these activities have been transferred to Military Intelligence, is not clear.³⁸ It is, however, reasonable to assume that there is a close liaison between the Military Proselyting Section and the Civilian Proselyting Section in order to maintain a coordinated and unified propaganda and recruiting effort.

9. Office of Postal Service and Communications.

a. The Office of Postal Service and Communications Committee (OPSCC) is concerned primarily with the operation of COSVN's courier system and with electronic methods of communication. It does not have operational control of lower elements of the commo-liaison system, but it does provide guidance to these elements. Three subsections of OPSCC have been identified. They are the Administration, Political, and Military Subsections. Their precise functions are not known.

b. The OPSCC has an extensive commo-liaison route consisting of 15 known stations, including seven principal stations, located in Binh Duong, Binh Long, and Tay Ninh Provinces.³⁹ The OPSCC guides VC passengers travelling throughout these provinces to specific COSVN commo-liaison stations. From these COSVN stations passengers are directed to their ultimate destinations through subordinate commo-liaison stations. The system also works from lower echelons to higher echelons.

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c. On 14 February 1967 COSVN's CAC, in response to the increasing militarization of the war, placed the OPSCC under military control making it directly subordinate to the Military Staff Department of Liberation Army Headquarters.⁴⁰

D. Military/Party Relationship.

1. The Viet Cong infrastructure is a Party organization in South Vietnam which controls both the military and civilian agencies conducting the Communist aggression. The Party structure parallels the military organization at each level in the chain of command. The two systems are interrelated and are designed to insure Party control over the Communist aggression in both its military and political aspects.

✓ 2. Party Organization in Military Units.

a. The Military Affairs Party Committee (MAPC) is the Party leadership element of the South Vietnamese Liberation Army Headquarters (SVNLAHQ) which oversees the Military Affairs Committee, the supreme military element on the COSVN staff. The MAC leadership consists of a Command Committee which is composed of the commander and five deputies, who are normally members of the Command Committee Party Chapter. Subordinate to the Command Committee are the Chiefs of the Political, Military, and Rear Services sections of the MAC, who also head Party Chapters within their respective staff sections. Membership of the MAPC is, in turn, drawn from the Command Committee Party Chapter and the three staff section Party Chapters.

b. Subordinate to the MAPC, down to battalion level, are Party chapters that duplicate the COSVN level MAPC/MAC structure. At each echelon "...the political officer performs the role of Party Secretary in the unit and takes charge of Party tasks."⁴¹ At military region level the MAPC is referred to as a Military Party Committee while the Coordination and Operations Committee is the MAPC equivalent at province and district levels.

c. According to MAPC, all units are given the following tasks:

- (1) To establish a Party Headquarters, to review lower Party Committee membership elected by a Party Headquarters Congress, and to assign lower Party Committee members.
- (2) To administer and promote cadre and to assign positions.
- (3) To consider awards and disciplinary measures of the Party and authorities.

d. The MAPC, through its Political Staff, supervises Party activities for Military Party Committees and Coordination and Operations Committees, which carry out their Party activities through the political staffs at their echelon. Annex H shows the relationship between the MAPC and the Central Committee at COSVN level with their counterparts at military region, province, and district levels.

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3. Policy Formation and Execution at COSVN Level. The Military Affairs Committee (MAC) drafts plans concerning military, political, and rear services activities for review, approval, and issue by the COSVN Current Affairs Committee (CAC). Thus, the MAC has an advisory role as well as being responsible for insuring that the MAC staff sections fully consider all relevant factors affecting proposed military operations. The MAPC role in the planning process is to inject Party guidance prior to the time draft plans are sent to the CAC for approval. The typical Communist emphasis on the MAPC political role is shown in an agent report which stressed the need for strengthening the Party leadership over the military to provide unity of action in political, military, and rear services activities. Once the CAC decides that the proposed military operation is favorable and within the guidelines established by the CEC, the secretary of the CAC issues orders to the Command Committee of the MAC, where the orders are executed through the Military, Political, and Rear Services Staffs. Command Committees exist at each level and consist of select cadre assigned to that level or unit.⁴² The Command Committee is the only element capable of actual command since all of its members are Party Committee members. This qualifies them to receive military and political directives. In 1966 the Command Committee at SVNLHQ was composed of the following members:⁴³

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Function</u> |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Nguyễn Chí Thanh* | Commander, Command Committee |
| MG Trần Văn Trà | Deputy Commander, Command Committee |
| MG Hà Kế Tân | Deputy Commander, " " |
| Mrs. Nguyễn Thị Định | Deputy Commander, " " |
| Sr. Col. Đồng Văn Công | Deputy Commander, " " |
| Col. Xuyên | Deputy Commander, " " |
| Nguyễn Chí Thanh* | Political Officer |
| BG Trần Đô* | Assistant Political Officer |
| Sr. Col. Hoàng Đức Anh | Chief of Staff |
| Sr. Col. Trần Dinh Xu | Deputy Chief of Staff |

* Deceased.

4. Policy Formation and Execution at Region Level. The MAPC equivalent at military region level, the Military Party Committee (MPC), is formed from the Command Committee Party Chapter and the Party chapters of the three staff sections--political, military, and rear services. The military region MAC, with the guidance of the MPC, forwards plans to the CAC of the military region Executive Committee (referred to at COSVN level as the Central Executive Committee). Decisions are made at the Region CAC where execution orders are prepared and sent to the MAC Command Committee, a procedure similar to the decision-making process employed at COSVN.

5. Policy Formation and Execution at Province and District Levels. At province and district levels, the Coordination and Operations Section (COS)

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performs the same function as the MPC and MAPC at higher levels.⁴⁴ Functions of the COS were explained in an official letter dated 6 January 1967 containing excerpts from a speech delivered by Major General Trần Đô, former Chief of the Political Staff Department of SVNLAHQ:

The Coordination and Operations Committee is entrusted by the Province Committee to guide the province Command Committee in doing the following:

Clearly understand resolutions of higher levels and the Province Committee to study military problems in the province. Report and recommend specific plans for the decision of the Province Committee.

Report aspects of the military situation to the Province Committee and get its opinion for the execution of orders, directives and resolutions of higher level military agencies. To be in charge of development and military operations within concentrated units subordinate to the province and replace the Province Committee in managing problems concerning the Party within the concentrated armed forces.⁴⁵

In addition, a recent intelligence report indicates that the COS directs "...all tasks concerning cadre affairs, awards and commendations, Party discipline, and Party development..."⁴⁶ Therefore, the COS handles both military and Party affairs and operates in the same manner as the higher level MPC and MAPC.

6. Operation of the MPC Apparatus.

a. The Politburo in Hanoi occasionally sends policy directives to COSVN which ultimately result in military actions. Normally, however, military direction comes to COSVN from the NVA High Command. From COSVN the orders go to the Party Committees at the region, province, and district levels. It is the responsibility of each echelon Party Committee to see that the orders are implemented. Since Command Committee members are also Party Committee members, they receive all political and military directives and are able to execute them without consulting with the echelon Party Committee.

b. Following a military operation, the echelon military unit involved in the action submits three after-action reports: one is sent to the next higher military unit, a second to the Central Committee of the next higher echelon, and a third to the Military Party Committee and Executive Committee of the local echelon.⁴⁷ Each echelon is responsible for relaying the report to the next higher level.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) Report Number 05-066-68.
- ✓2. "Regroupees Still in South Vietnam," Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, (CICV), Project Number 6291, dated 6 June 1968.
3. Ibid.
4. Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) Log Number 04-1992-67.
5. Douglas Pike, The Viet Cong, vol. I, page 58 (original manuscript).
- ✓6. See generally Brimwell, Communist in South East Asia (1963).
7. CICV ST 67-023, "Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN)," page 4.
8. Op cit., page 2.
9. Ibid.
10. National Interrogation Center 1365/67.
11. Radio Hanoi broadcast on 12 January 1962.
12. USMACV DEC 5-176-(1964); IR 6-076-6780-66 (CRD IR-I-59-66).
13. Douglas Pike, The Viet Cong, vol. II, page 240 (original manuscript).
14. CDEC Bulletin Number 12,797.
15. CMIC US Source Number 353-66/1211.
16. CMIC US 353-66/1211; COSVN Study, pages 3, 7-8.
17. USMACV DEC 02-1997-66; USMACV DEC 01-1556-66.
18. "The VC Security System," an official US Government study (1967), page 3.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.

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23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Research and Analysis Study, CICV ST 66-30.
26. USMACV DEC 6-509-65.
27. Ibid.
28. CICV ST 67-023, page 15.
29. Op. cit., page 17.
30. CMIC US Source Number 353-66/1211.
31. CICV ST 67-023, page 13.
32. Ibid.
33. USMACV DEC 10-1427-66.
34. CMIC US 334-66/1211.
35. CICV ST 67-023, page 17.
36. Ibid.
37. Rand Corporation Interview AG 153, Q. 36.
38. CICV ST 67-023, page 12.
39. CMIC US Source Number 1210/67.
40. CDEC Bulletin Number 11,351.
41. Intelligence Report (IR) Number 11-1208-67.
42. IR 6-027-1967-68.
43. CMIC US Source 353-66/1211.
44. IR 07-2182-67.
45. Tactical Report 12-1171-67.
46. IR 6-027-1967-68.
47. IR 03-1316-66.

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ANNEX B: Copy of Document Creating COSVN

Decision of Creation of the Central Office for the Southern Region.

Headings and seals employed by the Office and subordinate echelons.

Vietnamese Worker Party

Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Central Office for the Southern Region
(Trung Ương Cục Miền Nam)
No / Tc - T.U.C.M.N.

Independence-Liberty-Happiness

-NOTICE-

Object: -"Creation of "The Central Office for the Southern Region" and
abolition of the "Nambo Regional Committee."

Pursuant to the decision of the Central Executive Committee in its
first assembly, relative to the abolition of the "Nambo Regional Committee"
(XỦ-UY Nam Bộ) and to the creation of the "Central Office for the Southern
Region (TRUNG ƯƠNG CỤC MIỀN NAM)."

The Central Office for the Southern Region advises all the echelons
of the Party of the Nam Bộ that:

1. The Nam Bộ Regional Committee (XỦ-UY Nam Bộ) is abolished effective upon the appearance of this notice.
2. There is created the Central Office for the Southern Region (TRUNG ƯƠNG MIỀN NAM), and the Central Office for the Southern Region comprises 6 comrades, commissars of the Central Office.

-Comrade HÀ HUY GIÁP

SV 3R + 9 Bn, VC Political
Infrastructure Newsletter No. 6
Sep 64, C, bp 4
uLmH

B-1

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ANNEX B: Copy of Document Creating COSVN (Cont)

-Comrade LÊ DUÂN, Private Secretary [Trans. possibly Party Secretary.]

-Comrade LÊ ĐỨC THO, Assistant Private Secretary [possibly Assistant Party Secretary.]

-Comrade PHẠM HƯNG

-Comrade THƯỜNG VŨ

-Comrade ƯNG VĂN KHIÊM

3. Comrade THƯỜNG VŨ, Assistant Party Secretary of the Nam Bo Regional Committee will represent the Central Office for the Southern Region in signing Party papers under the name of Trung Nam.

4. Effective upon the appearance of this notice, the Central Office for the Southern Region will be in Cambodia. The diverse echelons of the Party will correspond directly with the Central Office for the Southern Region.

5. The Central Office for the Southern Region will ground itself on the individual capacities and the needs of the task in entrusting work to the Comrade Commissars of XU²-Uy².

6. The headings and the seals of the Committees of the diverse echelons of the Party are fixed as follows:

a) Central Office:

Heading: Vietnamese Worker Party (Đảng Lao Động) Viet-Nam Central Office for the Southern Region (Trung Ương Cục Miền Nam).

Seal:

Dimensions: Without change.

Replace the words in a circle "Executive Committee of the Regional

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ANNEX B: Copy of Document Creating COSVN (Cont)

Party" (BAN CHẤP HÀNH XỦ ĐẢNG BỘ) with the words "Vietnamese Worker Party" (ĐẢNG LAO ĐỘNG VIETNAM).

Replace the word "NAM BỘ" in the middle with the words "Central Office for the Southern Region" (TRUNG UỐNG CỤC MIỀN NAM).

b) Provincial Committee

Heading: Vietnamese Worker Party (ĐẢNG LAO ĐỘNG VIETNAM).

Mytho Provincial Committee (TỈNH ỦY MỸ THO) (Each province will insert its own name).

Seal: -in circle: Vietnamese Worker Party (ĐẢNG LAO ĐỘNG VIETNAM).

-in the middle: Provincial Committee of MỸ THO (TỈNH ỦY MỸ THO).

c) Huyen Committee

Heading: Vietnamese Worker Party (ĐẢNG LAO ĐỘNG VIETNAM).

Provincial Committee of Vinh-Trà (TỈNH ỦY MỸ THO).

Huyen Committee of Tam-Binh (HUYỆN ỦY TAM-BÌNH).

Seal: -in circle: Vietnamese Worker Party (ĐẢNG LAO ĐỘNG VIETNAM).

-in the middle: Huyện of Chợ Gạo (HUYỆN (1) CHỢ GẠO, in big letters). MỸ THO (between parentheses).

[Trans. Huyện is probably Vietnamese for district]

d) Chi-Bộ Committee (village-cell):

Heading: Vietnamese Worker Party (Đảng Lao Động Vietnam)

Provincial Committee of MỸ Tho (Tỉnh Ủy MỸ Tho)

Xã of NHI MỸ (HUYỆN ĐỂ CHỢ GẠO)

[Trans. probably - "Village-cell of Nhi My (District of Chợ Gạo)].

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ANNEX B: Copy of Document Creating COSVN (Cont)

Seal: -in circle: Vietnamese Worker Party-My[~] Tho (ĐÀNG LAO ĐÔNG VIETNAM-MỸ THO).

-in the middle: XÃ of NHI MY[~] (in big letters)

CHỎ GAO (in small italicized letters between parentheses).

e) CHI-BỘ Inter-group for the Nam BỘ (LIÊN CHI NAM BỘ):
(there is no seal for the echelons of province and zone).

Heading: Vietnamese Worker Party (ĐÀNG LAO ĐÔNG VIETNAM).

Chi-BỘ Inter Group for the Command (Liên Chi BỘ TƯ LINH).

Seal: -in circle: Vietnamese Worker Party (Central Office for the Southern Region) (ĐÀNG LAO ĐÔNG VIETNAM-TRUNG ƯƠNG CỤC MIỀN NAM).

-in the middle: Chi BỘ Inter-group Committee for the Command (in big letters) (LIÊN CHI ỦY BỘ TƯ LINH).

[Trans. May be Chi-BỘ Command Inter-Group].

Note: In the seals, the hammer and the sickle must not be represented

7 June 1951
For the Central Office
(TRUNG NAM: signature and seal)

Vinh Long, 25 July 1951
For the Current Affairs Committee of the Provincial Committee
the Bureau Chief
BÙI SƠN (signature and seal)


confirmed copy N 125/5y

TAM BINH, 11 August 1951
For the Current Affairs Committee
of the Party Committee (of the Huyện),
The Private [special] Secretary

VĂN CHẤT

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


**INEX C : COSVN CONTROL OVER COMMUNIST
AGGRESSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

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PARTY CONGRESS (THEORETICALLY)




★ FORWARD SUPPLY MAY HAVE MERGED WITH FINANCE AND ECONOMY AND REAR SERVICES WHICH IS SUBORDINATE TO THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

ANNEX D: POLICY MAKING ORGANS OF COSVN

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
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ANNEX E: CIVILIAN PROSELYTING AND FRONT SECTION RELATIONSHIP.

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
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ANNEX F: ORGANIZATION OF SECURITY SECTION.


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ANNEX G : ORGANIZATION SECTION


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ANNEX H: MILITARY/PARTY
RELATIONSHIP

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ANNEX A · VIET MINH INTER-REGIONS IN SOUTH
VIETNAM

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