

I had much rather you had to bury me than I you. I have no desire to go again as a member of the Armed Forces, firmly believing, as a confirmed civilian, that two wars on one 43-year lifetime, are enough. But, ah, my children, my loves, fruit of my loins, there's the difference . . . it was then . . . when I went . . . A WAR!

In big, screaming four-inch headlines. A WAR! There was no doubt; there was no ideological dissent; no intellectual quibbling. It was WAR full blown, drum beating, pulse racing, bands playing, flag waving, give-all-for-our-country-WAR. The lines are not so clear now, but Lt. Calley's war is still war. You get just as dead now as then.

Your grandfather was in the Naval Air Force in Italy in 1917 when the only bombs they had were six pieces of metal spikes with stabilizing vanes.

Your great-grandfather's brother, until the day he died, at the age of 97, had a suppurating shin wound received on a little rise above the plains of Cuba named after St. John. Your other great-grandfather's uncle was Gen. Douglas H. Cooper who fought, we are told, gallantly and well . . . and probably killed some civilians . . . during the Civil War. Fought there for an unrealistic dream . . . a separate and equal Confederate States of America.

Further back, not counting the renegades, when the fledgling Colonies were flexing their wings to give the American Eagle wings, your ancestors fought for independence against the madman German, the old Crazy George III, an English king, who could scarce speak the King's Own English.

Yes, you have a heritage; you are typical Americans for in your veins flows the blood of English, Irish, Scotch, French, German, Indian, and God knows what other ethnic groups. You have a heritage but who am I to tell you what to do with it when almost everything I have believed comes crashing down with a verdict which condemns a man who has done no more or less than your ancestors . . . when a man is condemned to life imprisonment at hard labor for the rest of his natural life . . . for doing his job . . . killing the enemy.

Ecclesiastes tells us (Ecc. 3:1), you can probably cite verse and chapter) that to everything there is a season. A time to keep . . . to cast away; a time for silence . . . and to speak; a time of war . . . and of peace.

It is time to speak out in this time of war; a time to cast away that which is bad and a time to keep that which is good. It is time, maybe, to revise our teachings that our government can do no wrong; the democracy will continue; the republic will survive.

I believe it is time that we examine our society and our peerless leaders who bring us to this great chaos of dis- and un-belief in the precepts which we have crushed to our heart. They bring us here, you know, only because we let them.

(Unbelievably, within the hour that Calley's penalty was announced, the Selective Service System announced a Defense Department request for a 15,000-man draft call for May! What unmitigated, bare-faced, ludicrous ironic timing!)

My loved ones; my friends; my children; my posterity, I believe that from this day forward (mark the date well), unless the American people take a prayerful, soul-searching look at themselves and their government; unless new priorities and new thrusts, to use the gobbledegook of today, are found; from this time when the system trains a man to kill and then takes away his dignity and honor for doing what he has been trained to do; from this time forward, the decline of the American Republic is as fore-ordained as the fact that the sun will continue for millions of years. From this time forward . . . unless rapid and peaceful, meaningful and truthful changes are immediate.

Your mother and I have but one goal in life; to feed and clothe; to educate, to teach, train and instruct you in the best possible manner we know and the best possible paths that we can direct. I remain a hawk if labels are necessary, firm in my conviction that for freedom of the majority, sacrifices must be made. But the sacrifice of Lt. Calley as a scapegoat cannot in consciousness receive my support.

I don't deny—because Calley has never denied—that he killed.

Who can deny the fact of a napalm bomb? Or the B-52 bombers; or the atomic bomb, the most heinous crime ever committed against mankind although justification can be found when a million lives estimated to be lost in an invasion are weighed against 300,000 lost to the bomb?

Are we to go back in time and try Harry S. Truman who gave the order for Nagasaki and Hiroshima? Or the pilot and bombardier of the Enola Gay?

I do deny that the common, ordinary, hard-working, everyday, middle-class American citizen such as I is going to stand still, quiet and meek, while Lt. Calley is a sacrificial lamb.

The vast unprecedented American reaction to the Calley findings, as I said, provides a pivotal point in the annals of America; and of mankind. We will examine ourselves and bring about change for the better or we shall wither and die; a young nation, the strongest nation the earth has ever seen, will re-examine our path or we shall grow sere and sapped by our own hates and mistrusts; our own lack of direction.

We can no longer go on as a nation riven by ideological differences. Race against race, workers against drogues; hawks against doves, republicans against democrats, youth against age, establishment against anti-establishment, pigs against protesters.

You deserve a better inheritance than that. We must change.

I see this hope, this faint glimmer of hopeful light shining ahead. Reaction to the Calley trial will once again weld us into a nation of peacekeepers, a nation of doers, of activists; a nation, indivisible with liberty and justice for all.

It must weld us together, for if it doesn't, God forgive us.

If it doesn't, God save us.

Love to you all,

YOUR DAD.

OUR POISONING OF VIETNAM

HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 20, 1971

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, today when every politician has his pollution program, when protection of the environment is a major tenet of most political speeches, the United States continues to unleash ton after ton of tear gas, herbicides, and defoliants in Vietnam against men and environment. Since 1961 when our policy of defoliation began, 15 percent of South Vietnam, an area the size of my own State of Massachusetts, has been sprayed to the saturation point. Thirty percent of the tropical hardwood forest, a major staple of the Vietnamese economy, has been doused with chemicals. The equivalent of 600,000 man-years of food, 500,000 acres, has been destroyed.

These are frightening figures, more frightening, because they represent only a portion of the violence and destruction

reigned upon Vietnam. This ecological devastation is part of our heritage to this Asian country which the United States went to defend and protect. It is a bitter heritage, lasting longer than American troops or commitment. These are thoughts we should all reflect upon as the Senate begins its deliberations over the Geneva Protocol of 1925, banning the "use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases." I recommend to my colleagues Anne Wyman's article "Our Poisoning of Vietnam" which deals eloquently with this subject:

OUR POISONING OF VIETNAM

(By Anne Wyman)

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Just under half a century ago the United States played a leading role in drawing up the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases." This spring the US Senate, which under the Constitution must give its advice and consent to the ratification of treaties by a two-thirds vote, is deliberating whether to join 98 of the world's nations as a signatory to that protocol.

The thing that holds up ratification now is the diminished but continuing use of tear gas and herbicides or defoliants by US forces in Vietnam. And, if the Senate does advise ratification of the Protocol, it must also decide whether or not to consent to Administration reservations allowing that program to continue.

The defoliation program in Vietnam operates under the ironic code name of "Operation Ranch Hand" with the cheery motto—reminiscent of our national parks and Smokey the Bear—"only you can prevent a forest."

Since 1961 when defoliation began, 15 percent of South Vietnam (an area larger than the whole of Massachusetts) has been sprayed to the saturation level. Thirty percent of the tropical hardwood forest has been doused with chemicals. More than half of the coastal mangrove trees have been wiped out. Crops over 500,000 acres, the equivalent of 600,000 man-years of food, have been destroyed.

This trail of ecological devastation will be the heritage of the Asian country the United States went to defend and pacify, long after American troops have been withdrawn. And these attacks on nature have continued at a time when protection of the environment was a major platform in every political speech on the home front.

Yet only last Aug. 27, the Senate voted 48 to 38 against an amendment to the military procurement bill that would have banned the use of defoliants in Vietnam. On Aug. 19 (nine months after he promised to do so on Nov. 25, 1969), President Nixon sent the Geneva Protocol to the Senate with a report by the Secretary of State stating that the Protocol does not prohibit the use in war of chemical herbicides. While not as strong as a formal reservation, this "understanding" leaves the use of tear gas and defoliants wide open.

Herbicides have been used in Vietnam to clear the perimeters of friendly bases as a prevention of surprise attacks, to open roads so that friendly forces could move without fear of ambush, to expose enemy infiltration routes to aerial surveillance, to uncover enemy bases so that hostile camps had to be moved, and to destroy crops being grown for enemy forces.

It is argued that defoliation of the mangrove forests between Saigon and the sea successfully hindered attacks on cargo vessels and that the chemical treatment of the triple-canopy jungle north of Saigon was effective in exposing enemy sanctuaries and infiltration routes. And the U.S. Mission to Vietnam stated in 1968 that "the military benefits in terms of lives saved and other

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EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

factors have far outweighed certain adverse economic effects."

In fact, it has become increasingly difficult to balance the military effectiveness of defoliation with the moral and practical objections.

In the case of Operation Junction City, which involved spraying large areas of jungle near Cambodia in 1967, defoliation was only part of the "pacification" tactic so its effectiveness cannot be clearly calculated. Where roads have been sprayed, friendly forces become more visible targets still within rifle range, while the enemy easily finds alternate routees. Even the spraying of the deep jungle has adverse military effects since the resulting penetration of sunlight produces an impassable tangle of bamboo and vines. Further, because it takes many days to act, defoliation gives the enemy warning of a coming offensive.

Crop destruction has proved still less productive. As early as 1967, two studies by the Rand Corp. based on interviews with Viet Cong prisoners, showed that less than five percent of the enemy depended on locally grown crops; that varied rice portions were unrelated to crop-sprayed areas; that surrender due to hunger was not allied to crop spraying and that the drift of herbicides from spraying had serious effects on friendly farmers.

The greatest effect has been on the Montagnards of the Central Highlands, a sturdy independent people who are looked down on as an inferior race by the South Vietnamese and considered by American troops among our staunchest allies. Because of their animist religion, the Montagnards believe the spraying constitutes a curse on their terraced valleys. As a consequence they sacrifice their animals including water buffalo, and move away to wind up in refugee camps.

Herbicides were dropped in sufficient quantities to destroy the food of the entire Montagnard population. And although crop spraying was supposed to be limited to "remote unpopulated areas" until it was finally stopped just before the Senate opened hearings on the Protocol on March 5, photographs show that there were freshly thatched huts in the valleys.

Closer to Saigon, the loss of major hardwood forests stretching in an arc from the Cambodian border to the South China Sea will have a lasting effect on Vietnam's economy. Nearby Malaysia which has similar forests, earns \$300 million a year from the export of forest products.

And the mangrove swamps, once South Vietnam's major source of high-sheen charcoal fuel and an important source of nutrients for fish, are now bleak turf bogs of raw mud, open to erosion and killing invasions of salt sea water.

Last summer's vote on an amendment that would have cut off funds for the use of herbicides for crop destruction warfare had only four supporters among the New England delegation. They were Sens. Kennedy (D-Mass.), Muskie (D-Maine), Pastore (D-R.I.) and Ribicoff (D-Conn.).

Opponents of the amendment included Sen. Edward W. Brooke, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, who is presently chairman of the foreign relations subcommittee on ocean, space and the environment. Other key figures in this year's vote will be Sen. George Aiken (R-Vt.) who submitted the new Nelson resolution barring the use of herbicides under the Protocol at this year's hearings, and Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre (D-N.H.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on research and development, charged with reporting on such things as chemical-biological warfare.

The United States stands in a distinct

minority before the United Nations on this subject, having been one of three nations which voted in December 1969 against a resolution by the General Assembly stating that the Geneva Protocol prohibited all chemical weapons in "international armed conflict" specifically mentioning "chemical agents of warfare . . . which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals and plants"

Eighty nations voted in favor of the resolution, 36 nations abstained and only Australia, which is participating in the Vietnam war, and Portugal, which uses herbicides against African tribes in Angola, sided with the U.S.

Yet crop destruction violates a current US Army field manual and two international treaties to which the United States is a signatory. The field manual, 27-10, issued in 1958, states that soldiers can destroy food crops by harmless chemical or biological agents if they are intended solely for enemy forces and if that fact can be determined. This is based in part on a Hague convention of 1907 forbidding the use of "poison or poisoned weapons" in war and on a 1949 Geneva agreement which states that occupying powers may not destroy food supplies in an occupied nation.

Last April, President Nixon banned the use in Vietnam of agent "Orange" containing a defoliant known as 2,4,5-T. Yet, military sources in Saigon have revealed that this defoliant was used five times between May 8 and Aug. 19, 1970, by the American Division in two northern provinces.

Last Dec. 26 the White House announced an "orderly, yet rapid, phase-out" of herbicides, using up supplies remaining in Vietnam only on "the perimeters of firebases and US installations or remote unpopulated areas." Since remote unpopulated areas have included valleys densely populated by Montagnards, it is clear that the White House order allowed the continued use of herbicides against our own friends in Vietnam.

It is not a commendable picture. It is not even a sensible one. In addition to violating environmental principles preached in America, the use of defoliants and herbicides hurts South Vietnam more than it hurts the enemy and leaves the country economically weakened at the very time the United States is trying to withdraw.

Ironically, passage of the 1925 Geneva Protocol as submitted by the President, will not end defoliation in Vietnam, or elsewhere. Only by rejecting the "understanding" which exempts the use of tear gas and herbicides, and by approving the Protocol with a clear agreement that it includes all forms of biological and chemical agents in international conflict can the United States end a tactic that makes more enemies than friends.

HISTORY OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

1922—Washington Treaty banned "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases." Ratified by the US Senate but never came into effect because France rejected it.

1925—Geneva Protocol included the above language and also banned "the use of bacteriological methods of warfare." Approved by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Debated one day on Senate floor in December, 1926. No vote taken.

1927-47—Protocol remained in Foreign Relations Committee.

1928, Feb. 8—Geneva Protocol became effective. To date it has been joined by 96 nations including every major country except the United States.

1943—President Roosevelt pledged that the United States would never be first to use chemical-biological agents in war.

1947-59—Protocol returned to Executive Branch without Senate action.

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1959—Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (D-Wis.) introduced a resolution (H Con Res 483) calling for reaffirmation of "the long-standing policy of the United States that in the event of war the United States shall under no circumstances resort to the use of biological weapons or the use of poisonous or noxious gases unless they are first used by our enemies." The resolution was opposed by Departments of Defense and State. No action taken.

1969, Feb. 14—President Nixon confined US activities on toxins to defensive research.

1969, April—Sen. William J. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asked President Nixon to resubmit the Geneva Protocol.

1969, Nov. 25—President Nixon renounced the use of lethal biological or germ weapons and ordered Department of Defense to dispose of existing stockpiles. He also promised to resubmit the protocol.

1969, December—United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution stating that the Geneva Protocol prohibited all chemical weapons (a move aimed directly at US chemical activities in Vietnam). The vote was 80-3, with 36 nations abstaining. Opposing were Portugal, Australia, and the United States.

1970, Aug. 19—The protocol was resubmitted to the Senate with a reservation on the right to retaliate with chemical weapons and an understanding that herbicides are not included.

1970, Dec. 26—President Nixon announced a phase-out of the use of defoliants in Vietnam and restricted the use of herbicides to clearing areas around allied base camps.

1971, Mar. 5—Hearings open before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

HOW NEW ENGLAND SENATORS VOTED

A breakdown of the Senate vote of Aug. 27, 1970, on the Nelson-Goodell amendment to the military procurement authorization—aimed at cutting off funds for the use of herbicides for crop destruction warfare—showed seven New England senators voting against the ending of crop warfare, four in favor and one absent. The amendment was rejected 48 to 33. The President took no stand.

Connecticut: Abraham Ribicoff (D) yes; Thomas J. Dodd (D) absent. (Dodd has since been replaced by Lowell P. Weicker, a Republican.)

Maine: Edmund S. Muskie (D) yes. Margaret Chase Smith (R) no.

Massachusetts: Edward M. Kennedy (D) yes. Edward W. Brooke (R) no.

New Hampshire: Thomas J. McIntyre (D) no. Norris Cotton (R) no.

Rhode Island: John C. Pastore (D) yes. Claiborne Pell (D) no.

Vermont: George Aiken (R) no. Winston L. Prouty (R) no.

LEGALITY OF HERBICIDES

At the American Association for the Advancement of Science annual meeting in Chicago, Dec. 29, 1970, Prof. George Bunn of the University of Wisconsin law school, a disarmament expert, cited the following grounds for finding the use of herbicides in war illegal:

1907 Hague Convention, to which the United States is a party, forbids the use of "poison or poisoning weapons" in war.

1949 Geneva Agreement, to which the United States is a party, forbids occupying powers from destroying food supplies in an occupied nation.

1958 Army Field Manual 27-10, still in current use, says soldiers can kill crops only if they are solely for use by enemy troops and if that fact can be determined. It further states that the principles of the 1949 Geneva pact apply "in areas through which troops are passing and even on the battlefield."

UNCLASSIFIED

RANCH HAND AIRCRAFT OVER PHAN RANG FLYING
IN A WING TIP (DIAMOND) FORMATION

FIGURE 3



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FROM M-38245-47a
13 JUN 1971

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"PATCHES" THIS AIRCRAFT SUSTAINED OVER 600 HITS




FIGURE 1

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From M-38241-47a
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