

Disengagement & Redeployment

1970

As 1970 began, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew visited the Republic of Vietnam to inspect U.S. troops and met with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. The low level of ground action continued, with units reporting only minor incidents. From a military point of view, Vietnamization was moving forward on schedule in some places and ahead of schedule in others.

Although there were 112 enemy violations of the Tet truce, compared with past years, Tet of 1970 was quiet. In March, President Nixon announced the fourth increment of redeployment. The troop cutback would be more than 50,000.



CIDG soldier is inspected by U.S. adviser.



Soldiers search the smoldering remains of a suspected enemy sanctuary.

CAMBODIAN TENSION

In Cambodia, the political scene was undergoing change. While Prince Norodom Sihanouk was visiting Paris, Moscow and Peking, mobs of Cambodian students smashed the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong legations in Phnom Penh. The demonstrators were angered by increased encroachments on Cambodian sovereignty by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops who were using Cambodia as a staging area for their war effort.

On March 18, Cambodia's national assembly deposed

Chief of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk. He was in Moscow at the time. One day later, Premier Lon Nol had the 36,000-man Cambodian Army move east along the Vietnamese border, facing an estimated 60,000-man Communist force. On March 22, the Cambodian government asked that the International Control Commission be sent to expel North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops from Cambodian soil.

Communists picked up their attacks across the Cambodian border. On March 26, the 11th Armored

Cavalry Regiment battled the enemy for seven hours 25 miles north of Tay Ninh City, just three miles from the Cambodian border. The enemy troops withstood continued pounding until nightfall when they withdrew, leaving behind 61 dead. U.S. casualties were two dead and 22 wounded.

Fighting along the Cambodian border was becoming more prominent. On March 29, an NVA battalion unleashed more than 200 rockets and mortar rounds into Fire Base Jay, just five miles from the Cambodian border. The base was held by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Following the bombardment, NVA infantry advanced on the base. They were repelled, losing 74 killed to American gunners. U.S. casualties were 13 killed and 30 wounded.

In mid-April, several battalions of ARVN troops, under operational control of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, crossed the frontier and were joined by Cambodian troops in operations to rout enemy hideouts. They were soon to be joined by American GIs.

THE OFFENSIVE

"Tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire military operation in South Vietnam." On April 30, speaking to millions of Americans and the whole world, President Nixon announced that he was temporarily widening American involvement in Vietnam in order to shorten it. Two hours before Nixon spoke, on May 1 Vietnam-time, there was a roar of motors and a clanking of treads as American armored Cavalry shouldered aside a screen of jungle and plunged into Cambodia.

The troops were to seek out and destroy the enemy's headquarters and his supply points. This would weaken

A Cambodian rallier is questioned at an Allied base camp after his surrender.



American "tunnel rat" emerges from an enemy bunker.

enemy striking power and U.S. forces would thus be able to safely continue disengagement and withdrawal. Task Force Shoemaker slashed into the once-sacrosanct Fishhook area, while American-advised and supported South Vietnamese troops continued a four-pronged drive on the tactically important Parrot's Beak.

The search for COSVN (the enemy Central Office of South Vietnam) centered in the Fishhook, 65 miles north of Saigon. In early May, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 4th Infantry Division captured several large base complexes, each in turn thought possibly to be COSVN. One enemy supply and communications complex was so large, officers of the capturing 1st Cavalry Division called it "Bunker City."

Huge munitions caches, the largest of the war, were unearthed at the "City" and enemy heavy equipment was destroyed. ARVN troops also turned in remarkable performances. By the last week in May, ARVN troops had captured more than 100 tons of munitions.

President Nixon repeatedly emphasized that there would be no firm and permanent U.S. military presence in Cambodia. By mid-June, ARVN Task Force 318 replaced American troops in the Fishhook area. This marked the beginning of large American redeployment. By June 29, one day ahead of the 60-day deadline the President had set, the last American armored vehicle churned back across the border into South Vietnam.

CHANGING STRATEGY

In July, the NVA strategy seemed to be changing. American intelligence, supported by captured documents, indicated the swing of Communist strategy toward

protracted, guerrilla warfare.

It was an austerity plan of battle designed to minimize casualties and costs, to pit maneuverability and surprise against the fearsome firepower from air and ground attacks of the Allies. It was not a strategy for winning military victory, but for staving off military defeat.

Disengagement and the general lower activity on the battlefield was reflected in the casualty figures. American casualties hit a 3½-year low during the week ending July 4.

THE LULL CONTINUES

The ARVN was making progress in the Delta where it occupied almost all the hamlets. The fighting consisted primarily of small skirmishes and Communist acts of terrorism. Most Viet Cong forces had fallen back to their oldest base areas in remote, unpopulated areas in the Delta.

In Quang Tri Province, the VC attacked one hamlet, killing three, and then abducted 50 civilians. Only six days earlier, in Phu Yen Province in Military Region 2 (MR2), they had abducted 17 civilians.

U.S. military strength dropped by 3,200 during the week ending September 10. Total U.S. strength fell to 396,300 as the Marines redeployed 1,800 men, the Army 900, the Navy 400 and the Air Force 100.

During the month of October, non hostile casualties exceeded the hostile, indicating further the lull in fighting since the Cambodian offensive.

PEACE PLAN

On October 8, President Nixon's five-point peace plan was formally presented at the Paris Peace Talks and the Communists immediately rejected it. North Vietnam called it "an electoral gift certificate" while the Viet Cong assailed it as a means of "legalizing American aggression in Indochina."

The peace plan called for:

1. An immediate cease-fire in-place throughout Indochina with both sides holding their present positions, with international supervision, no buildup of military

strength.

2. Broadening of the Paris Peace Talks to include Laos and Cambodia as well as North and South Vietnam.

3. Further withdrawal of U.S. forces by 95,000 men during the coming spring to bring total withdrawals to 260,000.

4. North Vietnam to join in the search for political settlement that truly meets the aspirations of all the South Vietnamese.

5. Immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war including journalists and innocent civilians held by both sides.

As part of the previously announced troop reductions, remaining elements of the 9th Infantry Division redeployed to Fort Lewis, Washington in mid-October. U.S. casualties reached a five-year low for the last week of the month, with 30 Americans killed.

Fall monsoons in late October and November flooded huge lowland areas south and west of Da Nang, leaving thousands homeless or stranded and claiming 150 civilian lives. Army and Marine chopper pilots conducted operations to rescue stranded civilians. U.S. XXIV Corps headquarters at Da Nang set up a disaster coordinating center to feed and house the 200,000 evacuees.

On November 21, a small task force of U.S. soldiers landed in helicopters 20 miles west of Hanoi in an attempt to rescue American prisoners of war. The Son Tay POW camp was found abandoned. The mission had been planned for months and was carried out with the approval of President Nixon in the face of "continued adamant refusal" by the North Vietnamese to abide by the Geneva Conventions regarding prisoners of war to participate in negotiations for the release and treatment of POWs.

The final compilation of combat deaths in 1970 showed 4,204 Americans dead. This was the lowest number since 1965 when 1,179 Americans were killed in action. Enemy deaths for the year were put at 103,829.

Vietnamese soldiers wait to be picked up by assault helicopters.



Vietnamization Takes Hold

1971



American artillerymen fire into Laos in support of the RVNAF offensive.

Undoubtedly, 1971 was the most progressive year of the long conflict in Southeast Asia. Republic of Vietnam forces continued to bear the brunt of most of the fighting and their offensives during the year considerably weakened the momentum of the enemy. America's involvement in the war was coming to an end. In January, U.S. troop strength stood at 335,000 and major troop withdrawals continued throughout the year. Due to the success of the RVNAF forces, the Defense Department was able to predict early in the year that the major U.S. offensive combat role would end by May 1.

DRIVE TOWARD LAOS

During the first week in February, 30,000 U.S. and South Vietnamese troops were thrust into South Vietnam's two northernmost provinces to eliminate an enemy buildup along the Laotian border. Cutting off the Ho Chi Minh trail had, by 1971, become an important objective of the Allied effort in Indochina. To buy time for Vietnamization, hence speed redeployment of American forces, it was necessary to choke off North Vietnamese supplies and troops moving southward along the trail.

The early part of the drive, dubbed Operation Dewey

Canyon II, centered on securing Route 9, establishing a forward command post and resupply point at Khe Sanh, carrying out search and clear operations and establishing numerous fire support bases. American units involved included the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 23rd Infantry Division (Americal) and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

LAM SON 719

On February 8, Operation Lam Son 719 began as nearly 60 tracked vehicles along with 10,000 RVNAF infantrymen, Marines and Rangers crossed the border and drove into Laos. Meeting little resistance, Republic of Vietnam forces near the end of the first week had destroyed enemy base camps and supply depots along the Ho Chi Minh trail and had seized large amounts of enemy arms and foodstuffs. On February 15, Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, commander of the operation, declared that the South Vietnamese had severed all enemy supply routes to a point 15 miles in Laos. U.S. forces supplied air and artillery support but no American ground unit or adviser entered Laos.

In the weeks following, however, enemy resistance

increased and considerably stalled the RVNAF drive. American air support suffered heavy losses from anti-aircraft fire. At the end of February, there had been no forward movement by the South Vietnamese in nine days.

Shortly into March, the offensive was on again as U.S. aircraft moved RVNAF troops further into Laos, the first advance since February 17. Massive airlifts continued out of Khe Sanh, raising the number of South Vietnamese in Laos to 20,000.

The South Vietnamese were on the move and proved it when they took a key Ho Chi Minh trail junction at Tchepone, 24 miles west of the border. This had been one of the main objectives of the 27 day-old drive, Tchepone being described as the "throat" of the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Stressing the importance of mobility, ARVN forces shortly thereafter began evacuating their positions throughout Laos. As the withdrawals continued, Communist activity increased. By March 25, however, the last few hundred South Vietnamese had abandoned Firebase Hotel 1 and the drive in Laos was over. More than 20,000 South Vietnamese troops remained in Military Region 1 until April 10 when Lam Son 719 was concluded.

During the operation, 24,000 government forces were supported by 17,000 American troops at peak strength. The United States lost 107 helicopters, 66 Americans killed and 91 wounded in support of the operation. South Vietnamese casualties were put at 1,529 killed, 5,423 wounded and 651 missing. There were 13,694 Communists killed and 176,246 tons of munitions and 2,238 tons of rice destroyed.

CONTINUED WITHDRAWALS

Stating that, "our goal is no American fighting and dying any place in the world," President Nixon announced on April 7 that another 100,000 U.S. troops would be

ARVN troops prepare to charge during heavy fighting.



withdrawn from Indochina by December 1. This would bring the level of troops remaining in the Republic of Vietnam to 184,000. Later in the month, the troop level dropped below the 300,000 mark to the lowest point in 4½ years.

FIGHTING IN THE NORTH

Some of the heaviest fighting of the year took place in Military Region 1. By May, Lam Son 720, a combined U.S./ARVN drive against enemy bases and supply areas in the northern provinces of the republic, was well under way.

Much of the action took place in the A Shau Valley and later in the Khe Sanh area. By the time the operation ended, several months later, 3,104 Communists died and 12 were captured. ARVN losses totaled 346 killed and 1,257 wounded.

At the DMZ, government forces began to take over the defense as the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) began to redeploy. The fighting continued there in the next few weeks as Communist forces attacked several key ARVN firebases. On July 2, U.S. jets attacked on the north side of the demarcation line in the first "protective reaction" strike since March 10.

IN PARIS

President Nixon had stated earlier in the year that the United States would completely withdraw from Vietnam as soon as the prisoners of war were released and the South Vietnamese have the capability to defend themselves. At the July 1 session of the Paris talks, the Viet Cong delegation proposed a seven point plan for peace. A key point was an offer to release all prisoners taken in the war if the United States would withdraw all its forces by the end of 1971. A week later, the United States rejected the plan in part and moved to negotiate the new Viet Cong proposal in private talks. The Communists declined this and the settlement of the POWs remained unsolved.

Other events during the month were the announcement by President Nixon that he would visit the Peoples Republic of China before May of 1972 and the call by the Republic of Vietnam on North Vietnam for reunification talks. Ambassador Bruce, the outgoing ambassador at Paris, called for immediate negotiations on a general internationally controlled cease fire throughout Indochina.

As July ended, American troop strength stood at 226,000 men, the lowest since February of 1966.

ENEMY ACTIVITY INCREASES

During August, more air strikes were made inside North Vietnam against anti-aircraft positions and in retaliation for the firing on an American reconnaissance plane. President Nixon had approved these raids in order "to protect American troops as they withdraw from Vietnam."

Communists continued putting pressure on the DMZ as Quang Tri Combat Base was turned over to the ARVN. Nearly 6,000 members of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) had vacated the base. The closest American position to the DMZ now was Camp Evans, occupied by the 101st Airborne Division.

As the National Assembly elections neared, enemy



activity increased. On August 26, the Communist took the offensive 38 times. During that one day, 130 enemy soldiers were killed while 38 ARVN died.

Two-thousand troops were moved to the Saigon area in preparation for election day. Despite Viet Cong terror attacks and shellings, 78.5% of the electorate turned out to vote for a new lower house of the National Assembly.

Twelve more units stood down as September began, creating 2,280 reductions. This was the largest number in one day since August 1.

On September 6, another RVNAF drive began -- Operation Lam Son 810. Aimed at destroying the enemy buildup along the DMZ, the offensive was supported by U.S. helicopters, armored cavalry elements and 2,000 soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division. The operation was short lived, however, when the monsoon rains brought it to a halt less than three weeks later.

ARVN had been operating in the U Minh Forest of Military Region 4 for many months and, by September, the enemy's bases of operation had nearly been destroyed. In a week-long operation there during the month, over 500 enemy were killed in action.

As September ended, a new ARVN drive along the Cambodian border started as thousands of ARVN infantrymen and armored troops pushed north from Tay Ninh City toward the Cambodian town of Krek to relieve troops there under a Communist siege.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

On October 3, the Presidential election was held in the Republic and President Thieu won re-election. The President declared that he would consider the election "a vote of confidence in myself and policies," and promised to resign if he failed to gain a majority of the votes in the one man campaign.

On the morning of election day, 122mm rockets hit Saigon killing three and wounding five South Vietnamese. Throughout the country, rocket and mortar attacks combined with terrorist activities and student demonstrations failed to disrupt the election.

POW FREED

Staff Sergeant John C. Sexton, Jr. was released by his Viet Cong captors near Loc Ninh, 70 miles north of Saigon, on October 8. He had been a prisoner since August 12, 1969. As a reciprocal action, the United States released an NVA prisoner a week later.

Near the end of October, military operations were brought to a standstill in Military Region 1 when one of the worst storms in Vietnamese history hit a 200 mile stretch from Quang Ngai Province to the demilitarized zone. Countless numbers were killed and injured and left homeless. Worse hit of the American installations was Chu Lai, base for the 23rd Infantry Division.

President Thieu began his second term on October 31. In his inaugural address, he appealed to North Vietnam for a cease-fire as a first step toward peace. On the same day, 618 Viet Cong suspects were set free by the government and another 2,320 were transferred to the "Chieu Hoi" program.

At a press conference on November 12, President Nixon announced that another 45,000 U.S. troops would be withdrawn from the Republic of Vietnam by February 1, 1972, bringing the total level of American forces to 139,000. The President stated that a further announcement would be made prior to the beginning of February and that future withdrawals would depend on three factors: the level of enemy activity, the progress of the Vietnamization program, and the progress toward obtaining a cease-fire throughout Indochina and the release of American POWs.

IN RETROSPECT

There was a note of optimism as the year neared its end. Almost 150,000 U.S. forces had been withdrawn when the President made his November announcement and American units continued to stand down. During the year, the Communists had lost much of their momentum and support throughout the country because of the offensives conducted by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, who continued to improve week by week.

Highlights '71



Activity in the Republic of Vietnam underwent dramatic changes as America's Vietnamization program entered its third year. Where in past years American combat activity had made headlines, such was not the case in 1971. The year, however, was far from uneventful. Redeployment of American troops, combined with events on the social and political scene, made 1971 a significant event in the history of the Indochina War.

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Redeployment was a key word during America's sixth year of active involvement in the Republic of Vietnam. Numbers and percentages were debated and discussed by Congressmen, newsmen and GIs alike throughout the year. But as speculation continued and the year came to an end, more than 150,000 American GIs had left the Republic and the total number of American forces still there was well below the 200,000 mark.

The figure was impressive but more significant was what the figure indicated. America had ended its offensive role in Vietnam and had become an advisory and supporting force.

Indicative of the transition was the formation of the Second Regional Assistance Group (SRAG) and the Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC). Formerly known as I Field Force, Vietnam and II Field Force, Vietnam, respectively, they had had control over nearly every combat unit in Vietnam. By April, TRAC had operational control over one combat brigade only; the rest of its mission was strictly advisory. One month later, SRAG became an asset of MACV and assumed a wholly advisory mission.

Throughout the year, American combat units that had played major roles in previous years stood down and redeployed.

The 25th Infantry Division, beginning its standdown late in 1970, was gone by April along with two squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Prior to their departure, two brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) had redeployed. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) completed the turnover of its positions to the ARVN and, by August, had returned to Fort Carson, Colorado. During the same month, the 173rd Airborne Brigade left. Later in the year, during November, the 23rd Infantry Division (Americal) redeployed two brigades and was deactivated; the 196th Infantry Brigade became a separate unit. And finally, in November also, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), the last fully operational combat unit in Vietnam, began phasing out of combat and planned to redeploy one brigade before Christmas.

Under President Nixon's most recent redeployment phase, another 45,000 troops were scheduled to leave Vietnam: 25,000 in December and another 20,000 in January 1972. This was nearly twice as many per month as in the beginning of the year.

Units that remained were supporting and advising Republic of Vietnam forces and the civilian population. President Nixon was scheduled to announce further redeployments and progress in Vietnamization prior to February 1, 1972.

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It's cheap and easy to buy from the Delta to the DMZ. It is often available on the bunker line. GIs have been known to cut holes in the wire to walk out and buy it. It is 95% heroin, powdery and white. It looks something like laundry detergent, but you can tell it from soap by the taste. It is very bitter and the white particles burn like acid on the tongue.

As drugs the world over captured a large portion of the headlines in 1971, the problem was particularly acute in Vietnam. With combat activity drastically reduced and soldiers in rear areas confined to their base camps, the temptation to overcome boredom with drugs became serious. It was generally recognized that the drug situation was one of the five most pressing problems in Southeast Asia.

The government's top narcotics official, John Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs made a two week tour of Vietnam in April to help military authorities tackle the soaring drug problem among GIs in Vietnam, following a Congressional subcommittee report that as many as 30,000 servicemen may be using heroin in the war zone, "clearly epidemic proportions". Congressional investigators, upon returning from a tour of Southeast Asia in May said, "heroin is as available on the streets of Saigon as a pack of cigarettes or a Coke in Washington."

Early in the year, positive steps towards curbing the drug abuse problem included the Exemption program whereby a soldier drug abuser could turn himself in to the proper authorities (his CO, chaplain, first sergeant, etc.) and receive treatment and counseling with no fear of judicial prosecution.

By March, several new facilities had opened country-wide as extensions of the Exemption program to provide a place for the drug abuser to withdraw from drugs under medical supervision and a location for ex-drug users to discuss problems associated with drugs. Drug rehabilitation centers for people with heavy habits, coffee houses for rap sessions and personal guidance offices were opened wherever feasible throughout Vietnam.

The drug rehabilitation centers had their problems, ranging from counselors who were users and were arrested for possession to credibility gaps with both the establishment and drug using population. But mostly they were staffed with well qualified people who had educational background in psychology, sociology and teaching; the results of the program continued to be heartening.

However, by June, it was clear that more drastic measures would have to be instituted if the ever increasing problems of drug abuse were to be stemmed. A Congressional study reported in late May the GIs hooked on heroin in Vietnam should be forcibly hospitalized for at least three years.

On June 9, the Senate voted to compel the armed services to start an immediate program to identify and treat servicemen hooked on drugs and prohibit arbitrary discharge of addicts without offering them full treatment. On June 17, President Nixon made a major policy speech on drug abuse in a special message to Congress. He asked

for an extra \$155 million for combating drug pushers and drug abusers. He created a new White House organization to coordinate the effort and endorsed methadone treatment for servicemen addicted to heroin.

On June 18, the Army kicked off the U.S. Command's program of testing all GIs leaving Vietnam for drug abuse, using urinalysis machines at Long Binh's 90th Replacement Battalion and Cam Ranh Bay's 22nd Replacement Battalion. Persons identified as drug abusers by the urinalysis and follow-up tests have to undergo about a week of detoxification and treatment before being returned to their unit or medevaced to the United States.

In late August, the U.S. Command in Vietnam expanded urine testing to include unannounced tests of all units in Vietnam. The aim of the expanded program, which went

into effect August 25, is to have every unit tested once each quarter. Individuals detected as abusers are sent to treatment centers for detoxification and counseling. They are then returned to their units for close and continuous command follow-up programs.

Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard emphasized that "evidence developed as a direct result of urinalysis may not be used in any disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or as basis for supporting an administrative discharge under less than honorable circumstances."


To supplement the increased detection and treatment programs, military authorities redoubled their efforts to stop the drug flow. Allied commanders launched an intensive campaign against drug abuse throughout Vietnam, conducting raids and searches. In the first four days of a massive crackdown in the Mekong Delta, 30 arrests were made, 300 grams of heroin and 40 pounds of marijuana were seized; 120 servicemen signed up for the Exemption program. Similar campaigns became common.

MACV placed all Vietnamese pharmacies and drug stores off-limits to American military personnel. The directive was implemented because of the easy availability on the local market of pharmaceutical products such as amphetamines and barbiturates without prescriptions. A 100% inspection of parcel post packages was instituted to detect drug and contraband being mailed from military post offices in Vietnam and Thailand. In addition, the Joint Customs Group, responsible for checking hold baggage in all parts of Vietnam, began to use sniffing dogs to detect marijuana

Urine samples are analyzed.



Mandatory urinalysis is required during outprocessing.



leaving the country for DEROS, R&R or leave.

By years end, the drug problem in Vietnam remained a problem, but authorities certainly had the beast in their teeth and were beginning to shake the life out of it.


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During the year, President Nixon reemphasized many times America's goals in the Republic of Vietnam of establishing a country free to determine its own future. An important part of that goal included the guarantee of elections free from aggression and terror. Realization of this came in August and October of 1971 when the National Assembly and Presidential elections were held.

Both election days were marked by an increase of enemy and terrorist attacks along with shellings of military positions and towns. Some street fighting and anti-government demonstrations also occurred in Saigon and other cities on the day of the Presidential election.

However, most of the actions around the country were sporadic and, despite the incidents, nearly 80% of the electorate cast ballots and elected a new lower house of the National Assembly on August 29. Likewise, on October 3, an estimated 87% of the people elected President Thieu to a four-year term.

The results of the election were important but more significant was the fact that great percentages of the people in Vietnam's 56 constituencies were able to vote. If there was a unified Communist attempt to disrupt the elections, it failed to deter the Vietnamese people from electing representatives and a President.



A voter casts his ballot in the Vietnamese elections.

The elections may well have been the climax of the year for they showed the effects of the combat operations of the preceding months. Militarily, the Communists had suffered and their failure to interfere with the political process in the Republic proved that they had lost much of their ability to effectively influence activity in the South.

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The United States had made progress in 1971 toward defeating two enemies in Vietnam, one military and one social. It had successfully embraced an advisory and supporting mission only and, at the same, had moved closer than ever before toward establishing a free and secure Vietnam. All in all, it had been a year of achievement.



NATION BUILDING

A family slipped out of a Viet Cong controlled village and joined a resettlement community a few miles away from the Communist terror they had known for so long. Ralliers traveled many miles to a government outpost. Each received a small plot of land and help in building a new life.

A few miles away, a farmer worked his field using age-old outmoded methods to eke out a living for himself and his family. Now, thanks to better equipment and more modern methods, he is able to reap a larger and more frequent harvest and provide a higher standard of living than his family had ever known. These are but a few examples of the many who have profited from the Republic of Vietnam's community defense and local development programs - programs designed to give every citizen the opportunity to live free of fear.


Civic action is vital to these programs in maintaining civic and economic progress. In most instances, self-help is stressed. Sometimes, however, direct action is called for. For instance, when Phu Bai 5 village was resettled in the fall of 1970, it was discovered that the area had no water source. In a few days, a civil affairs team from the 29th

Civil Affairs Co. located some culvert, arranged to have it flown in on 101st Airborne Division helicopters and helped the villagers install wells. A typical civil affairs program is the distribution of Kubota tractors. There are now dozens of these machines throughout Thua Thien Provinces, south of Hue.

Another phase of civic action operations is the support of orphanages. Working in conjunction with charitable organizations in the United States, civic action facilitates the distribution of clothing and foodstuffs to Vietnamese.

Vietnam is one of the richest rice producing nations in all of Asia and the development of agriculture is of prime concern. Many free world nations are seeking to further the development of cooperatives to promote agricultural development.

The "miracle rice" IR8 has been introduced into Vietnam. This strain of rice, developed by free world nations, produces a stronger, more nutritious rice in much greater quantities than other varieties grown in Vietnam. As the use of this rice spreads, Vietnam may be able to export quantities to other Asian nations. This effort, in particular, has the possibility of helping not only the Vietnamese



Vietnamese farmer inspects his new rice crops (above). U.S. Army Engineers grade and pave Vietnamese roads as part of the national road construction program (bottom left, right).

people, but it may also develop a stable base for the nation's economy.

Essential to community defense and local development is an adequate highway system. Vietnam's highways, destroyed and rebuilt twice during the Indochina War, deteriorated so badly after the troop buildup of 1965 that many were no more than a series of potholes connected by bumps. Beginning in January 1968, the Vietnamese and their allies launched a four-year \$500 million program to reconstruct 2,500 miles of main highways. Despite three Communist offensives since then, 1,556 miles had been finished by the middle of November 1971. The program also calls for the repair or reconstruction of 15 miles of highway bridges. More than nine miles have already been completed.

At the heart of community defense and local development is the village policeman. He works with Rural Development teams to carry out economic and social programs. He cooperates with the self-defense corps to halt Viet Cong tax collecting and other harassment. He leads the effort to uncover secret Communist organizations that seek to sabotage government-supported development programs. More than half of South Vietnam's 88,000 policemen work and live outside the cities. Their presence in the provinces signals a return to normalcy in rural life. This is a big change from 1969 when almost all policemen were stationed in cities. As government and Allied forces drove the Viet Cong from most of the populated countryside, the



Republic of Vietnam decided to reestablish village police forces.

Dwindling and eliminating the enemy's numbers in the provinces is of primary importance if community defense and local development is to succeed. Psychological Operations (Psyops), to induce enemy soldiers to rally to the Vietnamese government, include the Chieu Hoi (open arms) program. A striking example of the program was "Operation Searchlight". Implemented during the weeks prior to Tet 1971, this massive campaign was designed to persuade VC and NVA soldiers to rally to large searchlights located near 22 U.S. and ARVN bases in Military Region 1. Posters, handbills, tapes and leaflets were distributed urging the campaign's theme "rally to the light of freedom and begin a new life with the government of the Republic of Vietnam."

Key targets of Viet Cong assassins at one time were the teachers of Vietnam. The enemy realizes that the destruction of the schools is necessary for the final subversion of society. To counter these atrocities, and to expand and improve the educational facilities of Vietnam, nations of the free world forces have been giving various forms of educational aid to the Republic of Vietnam. The aid has yielded heartening results.

When the 1969-70 school year ended, educators in South Vietnam celebrated the achievement of a goal they had worked hard to attain: 632,000, or 25 per cent of all youths in the high school age group, were enrolled in the nations 780 secondary schools.

This record figure represents nearly a 12-fold increase in secondary school enrollment since the Republic of Vietnam assumed responsibility for its own educational system. It compares with a three per cent enrollment in 1955, when the French were withdrawing from the country and when only 53,500 Vietnamese were attending secondary school classes. South Vietnam's population, then about 15 million, now is edging close to 18 million and the secondary school age group has expanded from 1.78 million in 1955 to 2.53 million today. In that period, high school classes have increased from 1,100 to 10,900 and teachers from 1,900 to 16,200. Ten years ago Vietnam's educators and their advisors were faced with a formidable task when they embarked on their program to forge an entirely new educational system for the country. As is evident from the facts, much progress has been made.

In a country engaged in war, good medical services for civilian and military populations are essential. Thanks to the free world, Vietnam today is enjoying the highest standard of medical treatment in its history. To bring medicine to remote areas of Vietnam, medical teams from New Zealand, Korea, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, Australia, the Republic of China, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Spain and the United States are stationed throughout the Republic.

A large part of the success of the community defense and local development program can be attributed to the genuine concern of the U.S. armed forces for those who suffered from the ravages of war in Vietnam. This concern is partially being expressed through the Medical Civic Action



Program (MEDCAP).

The MEDCAP program is teaching the Vietnamese higher medical and health standards. The main obstacle that MEDCAP personnel have encountered has been the villages and hamlets which are still bogged down in tradition, superstition and the contingencies of war while their problems of disease and poor health habits remain.

Training the people of South Vietnam to do the job themselves as a part of Vietnamization is the eventual goal





of the MEDCAP program. The medical and civil affairs officers recognize that any effort to bring some standard of medical care to the civilians would be limited without teaching local health workers the methods which U.S. medical personnel use.


Vietnamese health workers and medics are being trained to go out to the villages and hamlets with medicines and a comprehensive knowledge of first aid. They learn by working with and watching the doctors and medics in their villages diagnosing and treating the all-too-common diseases.

Setting up a preventive dental health program for a nation practically devoid of dentists is no small problem. This is the aim of a joint Vietnamese Ministry of Health-U.S. program. There have always been Dentcap programs in which care was prescribed for existing dental disease, but the idea now is to get at the causes of disease. The joint project has assembled a large variety of slide presentations, printed and spoken lectures, brochures and diagrams used as teaching aids to get the message across. The program is delivered to all the schools throughout the country; teachers are trained and thereafter supervise the program.

Vietnam, like many developing nations is trying to modernize in a considerably short period of time. It is faced with the additional problem of trying to progress in the wake of constant war.

The Republic of Vietnam, the United States and nations of the free world are not waiting for the war to end in order to help the Vietnamese people. Free world nations are providing many types of assistance: military, medical, educational, agricultural, technical and economic. They are building a new nation.

All this has one common purpose: to enable the people of Vietnam to determine their own future.



Men of the 1st Signal Bde. help Vietnamese build a schoolhouse (top center)

The RF/PF are the key to community defense and local development at the hamlet level (bottom left). Providing modern medical aid fosters goodwill (above). U.S. soldiers double as teachers for these Montagnard children (below).





The Enemy We Face

They came to my house and told my mother that I had been chosen to be one of them. They wanted me to become a Chien si (soldier). My mother pleaded that I was too young. The North Vietnamese soldier said, 'He is old enough -- the draft age is 15 to 40.'

This is how 15 year-old Nguyen Van Qui became one of the enemy you faced. His story is typical. He was taken to a training camp near Com Ninh, in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam. There, he and other recruits were given their khaki uniforms and taught to aim and fire a weapon. The complete training cycle for duty as a regular Chien si in the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) lasted six days.

After his training, Qui and 1,200 others were sent on an eight week journey down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They

moved in small groups to escape B-52 raids. About 700 of them were armed.

"Many died on the trail," Qui recalled. "Some died of malaria and others died of not enough food. It was very hard. Everybody was sick but they kept pushing us."

Men like Qui from the North Vietnamese Army now compose over half of the total enemy combat forces in the Republic of Vietnam. The percentage of NVA troops is highest in the north and lowest in the Delta. They depend heavily upon infiltration for reinforcements and resupply. Each unit has a political officer who tries to maintain morale with a steady flow of North Vietnamese ideology.

It is probably true to say that these North Vietnamese soldiers pose a more formidable threat on the battlefield

than do the South Vietnamese Communists or Viet Cong, who compose the rest of the enemy's forces. There are three types of units within this army.

The elite units are the regiments and battalions of the VC main force. These are the best equipped and trained. They have acquired the name of "Hard Hats" because they often wear metal or fiberboard helmets that distinguish them from other units. These main force units are very mobile and range far afield in their combat operations.

The VC local force units are organized into battalions and companies and, while full-time fighters, are not as well equipped or trained as the main force. They usually operate within a specific province or district and are controlled by the Communist province or district committees.

The third type of VC unit are the guerrilla squads and platoons. These squads and platoons are controlled by the committees of the hamlets and villages where they fight. They seldom leave the vicinity of their homes. The members of these units are often poorly armed and trained and include old men and children. Many are not full-time fighters. Nevertheless, there are many such units in all areas of the country and they perform significant duties by harassing Allied forces and by assisting the other Communist forces in the attack and defense. The VC often draw upon the guerrillas to replace losses in their other units.

During the early days of the conflict, the Communists



A Viet Cong suspect is interrogated by Allied soldiers.

Captured enemy soldiers waiting to see their relatives at the Phu Quoc prison island.



fought with older weapons used in previous wars by the French, Japanese and Americans. But today, largely as the result of aid from Red China and the Soviet Union, North Vietnamese Army troops and many main force Viet Cong units are equipped with late-model weapons comparable to those used by the U.S. forces.

The most common of these are the SKS carbine, the Soviet AK47 assault rifle, or -- more often -- a Chinese copy of either. These weapons use identical 7.62mm rounds, similar to the round fired by the U.S. M14 rifle, but shorter. Both have a maximum effective range of 400 meters. The assault rifle most often captured is the Chicom (short for "Chinese Communist") Type 56, although soldiers in the field usually refer to it as the AK47, since it is virtually a copy of that weapon. It can be fired on automatic at a rate of 100 to 190 rounds a minute or on semiautomatic. The SKS Carbine--or the Chicom 7.62 copy--is a semiautomatic weapon. It weighs nearly nine pounds when loaded with a 10-round magazine.

Until six years ago, the only machine guns available to the VC were obsolete French, Chinese and German models. Today, however, each NVA and main force VC battalion is allocated 36 light machine guns, usually of the Soviet 7.62mm Type RPD or the older and heavier RP-46. Chicom copies are designated Type 58 and Type 56. The 56 can



A weapons cache uncovered in Cambodia. Note the bicycle at top used by the enemy to transport arms and equipment.

accurately fire 150 rounds a minute up to ranges of 800 meters, while the 85 can fire 230 to 250 RPM. These automatic weapons were first supplied to the North Vietnamese in 1965.

A weapon which the enemy has always used, especially in stand-off attacks on the U.S. and Republic of Vietnam military bases, is the mortar. Standard mortars in Charlie's arsenal are the 82mm -- backbone of his high-angle fire support -- and the 60mm, normally used in small guerrilla actions.

Ready to fire, the commonly used Chicom 60mm mortar weighs 45 pounds and its 3.2-pound projectile travels up to 1,500 meters. The 82mm in firing position weighs 123 pounds and hurls a 6.72-pound projectile at targets up to 3,040 meters away.

The 82mm round was designed one millimeter larger than the U.S. 81mm round so the Communists can employ captured U.S. mortar rounds in their tubes. During 1967, a 120mm mortar capable of hurling a 33.9-pound warhead 5,700 meters was added to the Communist arsenal. With a total weight of 606 pounds, it is more difficult to transport and is not widely used.

The enemy has also stepped up his use of rockets within the past year. Charlie employs rockets in stand-off attacks of military installations and as general support artillery.

The simple but effective Soviet-made 122mm rocket launcher, first used in Vietnam in March 1967, can hurl with area target accuracy a warhead weighing more than 40 pounds up to ranges of 11,000 meters. The 140mm rocket, with a carrying weight of 88 pounds and a warhead weight of 40 pounds, has a range of 9,500 meters. This rocket was first employed in an attack on Da Nang in February 1967.

The latest type of rocket introduced by the enemy is the Chinese-made 107mm, which weighs less than half as much as either of the others and has an estimated effective range of 8,300 meters.

In 1965, the enemy added to his grenade capability with the introduction of the Soviet-made RPG2 antitank grenade launcher. Two years later, the RPG 7 appeared.

The RPG2 has a maximum effective range of 150 meters and can penetrate six to seven inches of armor. The RPG7, with an improved sight, is effective up to 500 meters and



Detainees are often able to provide significant intelligence concerning Communist plans.

can penetrate steel 12 to 14 inches thick.

Although the enemy's equipment has improved with time, the overall effectiveness of his forces has declined noticeable, and in 1971 he has come off second best in virtually all major contacts with Allied forces. The once-confident Vietnamese Communist forces have clearly met their match in Vietnam.

Vietnamese Armed Forces

More than one out of every ten citizens of the Republic of Vietnam has been trained to fight Communist aggression. In the uniformed services, there are now 1,080,000 South Vietnamese, backed by nearly as many civilian home-defense soldiers.

The 1968 Mobilization Decree boosted the Republic of Vietnam's national, territorial and paramilitary forces to put six per cent of the country's total population into full-time military service. Including the People's

Self-Defense Force, which is composed of unpaid civilians trained to defend their homes and villages, the number is about 13 per cent.

More than 100,000 Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) personnel have been killed fighting the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars since 1960. The enemy lost 102,593 killed in 1970 alone.

The Communist attacks during Tet 1968 marked a turning point for the Republic's armed forces in terms of morale, manpower and equipment. The Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) hurled 84,000 troops, many of them their most combat-experienced, against the Republic of Vietnam forces and their allies. Hanoi had





ARVN soldiers on patrol in Thang Binh (left). An ARVN trooper emerges from an enemy spider hole (top below). A flotilla of Republic of Vietnam Navy river patrol boats helping to secure the Mekong River (bottom below).

assured its forces that RVNAF units would desert in masses to the Communist banner. However, not a single unit went over to the enemy.

The enemy lost almost half of his attacking force during the Tet attacks: 20,300 to the RVNAF; 18,581 to the U.S. and other free world forces. Within two days, the VC/NVA forces were pushed out of most towns and cities.

Much of the RVNAF toll of the enemy, however, has not been the result of large operations, but of small actions. Many of these involved Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF). Stationed in villages and hamlets or operating from small bases, RF/PF personnel make up more than 50 per cent of the RVNAF. These Regional and Popular Forces consist of locally recruited personnel who serve in their home areas.

The RF/PF have greatly increased in efficiency since the issuance of M16s began. All maneuver battalions of RVNAF have been equipped with M16s, M60 machine guns and are receiving 60mm and 81mm mortars. Deliveries of the M79 grenade launchers and M113 armored personnel carriers are about 90 per cent complete.

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) combat units increased their transportation capability by replacing old vehicles with new models while communications were improved by newer, lightweight PRC25 radios.

In addition to separate armored, infantry and artillery units, the ARVN consists of ten numbered divisions, an airborne division and Special Forces organized along the same lines as the U.S. The average ARVN division has 3,000 to 4,000 fewer men than a U.S. division. Although usually employed in offensive operations against the VC and NVA main force units, ARVN units also provide security for key areas and installations.



The destruction of enemy materiel and personnel has not been the ARVN's sole job over the years. The Republic's initial pacification work was done by the members of the nation's young army and today many of the elements of the armed forces have pacification as their primary mission.

In addition to the Army division, the Republic of Vietnam has a 13,000-man Marine Division. Although primarily concerned with amphibious operations, the Marines often engage in joint operations with the Vietnamese Army and other free world forces.

Also supporting the ARVN is the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), which is playing an increasingly large role in the war. VNAF currently flies more than 50 per cent of the fixed-wing tactical air missions throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

Organized in 1955 with a total of 92 pilots and 32 planes, VNAF now has more than 900 aircraft.

There are seven VNAF bases in Vietnam, six of them in joint use with 7th Air Force. Soc Trang is the only all-Vietnamese base, VNAF will assume complete responsibility for operating and maintaining all facilities and equipment in all joint-use American and Vietnam bases by the end of the summer.

The Navy consists of the Fleet command, the Coastal Forces, River Forces and the River Assault and Interdiction Division (RAIDS).

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Vietnamese Navy, Vietnamese Air Force and the Vietnamese marines as well as the 4,200-member Women's Armed Forces Corps are headed by the RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS). The JGS is headquartered just outside Tan Son Nhut Air Base. In addition to the forces themselves, JGS is also responsible for the training of RVNAF personnel.



Vietnamese Air Force jets prepare for an air strike.

The South Vietnamese Armed Forces school system includes the National Military Academy and the Command and General College at Dalat, the Naval Academy and the Air Force Training Center at Nha Trang, the Reserve Officers School at Thu Duc, and a number of branch and trade schools.

Additionally, all divisions have their own training centers for basic and advanced training.

A tank of the ARVN 5th Cavalry Regiment operating with III Corps Task Force 333 pulls into a night defensive position near Svay Rieng.





R&R, A TIME TO RELAX

Just as every cloud has a silver lining, so a tour in Vietnam has its little bright side called Rest and Recuperation (R&R), and no story about 'Nam would be complete without its mention.

Begun in 1962 using C54 and C118 aircraft, the R&R program was designed to take people serving in Vietnam and forward bases in Thailand away from the rigors of combat for a short vacation because there were no suitable sites for in-country leave. The R&R program began using commercial airlines with the Vietnam buildup in 1966. By 1967, transportation for the program was completely contracted to commercial jets.

Increased numbers of U.S. personnel in the Republic of Vietnam added more emphasis to the program because recreational facilities in Vietnam were limited. The program also reduced the money being poured into an already inflated economy and diverted these funds to Hawaii and other allied countries. To the average GI, R&R was that precious week when he ate off a tablecloth, enjoyed a society composed of two genders instead of one, and slept

in a real bed with clean sheets. The chance to get away from it all and see another part of the world is an experience you will remember the rest of your life, regardless of which R&R location you chose.

If you chose your R&R in Bangkok, the memories of the pomp and grandeur of the ancient court of Siam were impressive. There are almost 23,500 temples in Thailand and you had the chance to see 381 of them right in Bangkok. The 5½-ton solid gold Buddha you might have seen in one of them was not easy to forget. Temples, however, were not the only attraction the guidebooks listed.

That sprawling city of 3½ million, with abundant hotels and restaurants, faced gleaming contemporary office buildings next to classical Thai architecture. In Bangkok, a visit to any of the many nightclubs convinced you that you were in a swinging city.

Souvenirs were everywhere and the tourist in Bangkok could not pass up the chance to buy a few samples of Thai silk noted for its luxurious texture, bright colors, durability

and resistance to wrinkling. Rubies, black star sapphires and cat's eyes made the jewelry counters sparkle before your very eyes. If you didn't purchase jewelry or silk, maybe the teakwood carvings or bronzeware found their way into your baggage. The Thai food was highly seasoned whether you ate in one of the plush restaurants or an open-air eatery, and the deliciously different fruit will linger on your tastebuds for a long time.

The men and women who chose Hawaii for their week's respite will never forget that island paradise. Hawaii not only held the promise of fun, but a chance to meet your loved ones. To have the chance again to set foot on soil belonging to the States helped make Hawaii the most visited R&R site.

Honolulu, the "crossroads of the Pacific", offered every activity you could have possibly desired, from bikini-watching on sunny beaches to a zestful and colorful nightlife that included Hawaiian luaus and top-name American entertainment.

The variety of exotic foods from all over the world served in Honolulu's finest restaurants was only limited by the size of your wallet. Luaus offered a combination of Polynesian food and entertainment all rolled into one. Another special treat the weary Vietnam visitor found was the chance to drive a car that wasn't OD. Of course, if you didn't rent a car, remember how nice it was to be able to understand the bus route signs.

Fishing, swimming, surfing and boat tours offered plenty to do in the daytime if you hadn't planned on sleeping late, lying in the sun or shopping. When the sun went down, there was still plenty to do with a multitude of nightclubs to choose from. An R&R spent in the beautiful 50th state is indeed something to talk about.

If you sought something off the beaten path and chose your R&R in Taipei, you couldn't possibly have been disappointed. The low prices alone were enough to make the trip worthwhile. For the Chinese food fiend, Taipei was the place. Hundreds of restaurants all serving Chinese cuisine for less than a dollar made San Francisco somehow not so attractive at the moment. Of course, for the barbeque fans, there were those delicious Ghengis Khan dinners where all you could eat cost less than two dollars.

If a night on the town with so much to see and do didn't make you tired, the endless shopping routes should have. Jade seemed to grow on the trees and was priced as if it did. It was also sad to have to pass up all those bargains on books and records. Taiwan, the nation without copyright laws which sold a full 20-volume encyclopedia for less than \$20 and a long-playing album for 25 cents was something else.

During 1971, two cities were discontinued as R&R locations, although they remain authorized leave sites. Hong Kong was removed from the R&R list on September 30 and Sydney on December 31.

To get away from it all for a shorter time and less expense too, there were the in-country R&R sites at China Beach in Da Nang and the Vung Tau R&R Center. Because of the quarters available at each site, China Beach



Temple on the palace grounds in Bangkok (opposite page). Classic Thai dancing girl (top). An Hawaiian Luan (above). Street scene of Taipei (below).





Volleyball game at China Beach (above). A GI rides the surf at Vung Tau (below).

specialized in three and five day R&Rs while Vung Tau was usually inhabited for one or three day R&Rs.

At China Beach, snack bars, clubs and surf topped the list of things to do. The center located right on the beach served good food, fun and relaxation to thousands of troops who dropped in for a visit. Imagine eating off a plate with a waitress to bring the food right to your table. Remember the steak or hamburger, the first in several months? Just having a choice made it something to remember. Not quite all the conveniences of home, but at least one step closer than the field. A bed with sheets and inside latrines contributed to a successful week at China Beach.


At Vung Tau, located about 30 miles from Saigon, the weather might have been the feature attraction. Having a more temperate climate than Da Nang, Vung Tau was accessible throughout the year. The R&R center here had a snack bar, conversion point and a beach equipment loan booth. For the normal person, about one hour in the bright sun was enough to insure that beautiful lobster look. Patrons of Vung Tau were easily recognized as those having difficulty moving and sporting glowing noses. With Vung Tau city on limits, many a GI will remember the French restaurants, the souvenir concessionaires and the mamasans peeling fresh pineapple right there on the beach making a tasty break from the hot sea air.

Being able to sleep late and just wallow in that warm water as long as you wanted made you forget the rigors of the field or fire support base. Quenching your thirst with an ice cold drink and some fried chicken for that gnawing in your stomach made you almost a new man.

Regardless of where you went, what you did or how many souvenirs you brought back, R&R has to linger as one of the nicest things about a Vietnam tour.



PLEASANT MOMENTS





“Above And Beyond The Call Of Duty”

CPT Roger H. C. Donlon
5th Special Forces (Abn), 6 July 1964

2LT Charles Q. Williams
5th Special Forces (Abn), 9-10 June 1965

SSG Larry S. Pierce*
173rd Abn Bde, 20 September 1965

PFC Milton L. Olive III*
173rd Abn Bde, 22 October 1965

SP5 Lawrence Joel
173rd Abn Bde, 8 November 1965

2LT Walter J. Marm
1st Cav Div (AM), 14 November 1965

1Lt James A. Gardner*
101st Abn Div (AM), 7 February 1966

SP4 Daniel Fernandez*
25th Inf Div, 18 February 1966

2LT Robert J. Hibbs*
1st Inf Div, 5 March 1966

SGT James W. Robinson*
1st Inf Div, 11 April 1966

SGT Jimmy G. Stewart*
1st Cav Div (AM), 18 May 1966

SP4 David C. Dolby
1st Cav Div (AM), 22 May 1966

CPT Ronald E. Ray
25th Inf Div, 19 June 1966

SGT Charles B. Morris
173rd Abn Bde, 28 June 1966

SGT Donald R. Long*
1st Inf Div, 30 June 1966

PFC Billy L. Lauffer*
1st Cav Div (AM), 21 September 1966

SP4 John F. Baker Jr.
25th Inf Div, 5 November 1966

CPT Robert F. Foley
25th Inf Div, 5 November 1966

CPT Euripides Rubio Jr.*
1st Inf Div, 8 November 1966

1LT Joseph X. Grant*
25th Inf Div, 13 November 1966

SGT Ted Belcher*
25th Inf Div, 19 November 1966

PFC Louis Albanese*
1st Cav Div (AM), 1 December 1966

SSG Delbert O. Jennings
1st Cav Div (AM), 27 December 1966

1LT John E. Warren Jr.*
25th Inf Div, 14 January 1967

SP4 Donald W. Evans Jr.*
25th Inf Div, 27 January 1967

1LT George K. Sisler*
5th Special Forces (Abn), 5-7 February 1967

PFC Louis E. Willett*
4th Inf Div, 15 February 1967

PFC James H. Monroe*
1st Cav Div (AM), 16 February 1967

SSG Elmelindo R. Smith*
4th Inf Div, 16 February 1967

1SG Maximo Yabes*
25th Inf Div, 26 February 1967

PSG Matthew Leonard*
1st Inf Div, 28 February 1967

2LT Stephen E. Karopczyc*
25th Inf Div, 12 March 1967

1LT Ruppert L. Sargent*
25th Inf Div, 15 March 1967

SP4 Charles C. Hagemeister
1st Cav Div (AM), 20 March 1967

SFC Charles E. Hosking*
5th Special Forces (Abn), 21 March 1967

MSG David H. McNerney
4th Inf Div, 22 March 1967

SP4 Don L. Michael*
173rd Abn Bde, 8 April 1967

PFC Louis E. Willett*
4th Inf Div, 15 April 1967

SP4 George A. Ingalls*
1st Cav Div (AM), 16 April 1967

SGT Kenneth E. Stumpf
4th Inf Div, 25 April 1967

PFC Leonard B. Keller
9th Inf Div, 2 May 1967

PFC Raymond R. Wright
9th Inf Div, 2 May 1967

PSG Bruce A. Grandstaff*
4th Inf Div, 18 May 1967

SP4 Dale E. Wayrynen*
101st Abn Div (AM), 18 May 1967

PFC Leslie Bellrichard*
4th Inf Div, 20 May 1967

SSG Frankie Z. Molnar*
4th Inf Div, 26 May 1967

SP4 Carmel B. Harvey Jr.*
1st Cav Div (AM), 21 June 1967

SP5 Edgar L. McWethy Jr.*
1st Cav Div (AM), 21 June 1967

SSG Webster Anderson
101st Abn Div (AM), 15 October 1967

2LT Harold B. Durham Jr.*
1st Inf Div, 17 October 1967

CPT Riley L. Pitts*
25th Inf Div, 31 October 1967

SP4 Robert P. Stryker*
1st Inf Div, 7 November 1967

1LT James Taylor
23rd Inf Div (Americal), 8-9 November 1967

PFC John A. Barnes III*
173rd Abn Bde, 12 November 1967

PFC Sammy L. Davis
9th Inf Div, 18 November 1967

MAJ Charles J. Watters*
173rd Abn Bde, 19 November 1967

PFC Carlos J. Lozada*
173rd Abn Bde, 20 November 1967

CPT Angelo J. Liteky
199th Inf Bde, 6-7 December 1967

SGT Allen J. Lynch
1st Cav Div (AM), 15 December 1967

MAJ Patrick H. Brady
44th Medical Bde, 6 January 1968

CPL Jerry W. Wickam*
11th ACR, 6 January 1968

PFC Gary G. Wetzel
1st Avn Bde, 8 January 1968

PFC Clarence E. Sasser
9th Inf Div, 10 January 1968

PFC William D. Port*
1st Cav Div (AM), 12 January 1968

SP5 Dwight H. Johnson
4th Inf Div, 15 January 1968

SGT Gordon Yntema*
5th Special Forces (Abn), 16-18 January 1968

CW2 Frederick E. Ferguson
1st Cav Div (AM), 31 January 1968

SSG Drew D. Dix
MACV Advisory Group, 31 January 1968

SFC Eugene Ashley Jr.*
5th Special Forces (Abn), 6-7 February 1968

PFC Thomas J. Kinsman
9th Inf Div, 6 February 1968

SSG Fred W. Zabitosky
5th Special Forces (Abn), 19 February 1968

SSG Clifford C. Sims*
101st Abn Div (Am), 21 February 1968

SGT Joe R. Hooper
101st Abn Div (AM), 21 February 1968

SP4 Nicholas J. Cutinha*
25th Inf Div, 2 March 1968

1LT Jack H. Jacobs
9th Inf Div, 9 March 1968

CPT Paul W. Bucha
101st Abn Div, 16-19 March 1968

SP4 Edward A. DeVore Jr.*
9th Inf Div, 17 March 1968

SP4 Peter M. Guenette*
101st Abn Div (AM), 18 March 1968

1LT James M. Sprayberry
1st Cav Div (AM), 25-26 April 1968

PFC Milton Lee*
101st Abn Div (AM), 26 April 1968

1LT Douglas B. Fournet*
1st Cav Div (AM), 4 May 1968

SGT Robert M. Patterson
101st Abn Div (AM), 6 May 1968

SP4 Kenneth L. Olson*
199th Inf Bde, 13 May 1968

PFC James W. Fous*
9th Inf Div, 14 May 1968

PSG Finnis D. McClerry
23rd Inf Div (Americal), 14 May 1968

SGT Anund C. Roark*
4th Inf Div, 16 May 1968

PFC Phill G. McDonald*
4th Inf Div, 7 June 1968

SP5 John J. Kendenburg*
5th Special Forces (Abn), 13 June 1968

SP4 Hector M. Santiago-Colon*
1st Cav Div (AM), 28 June 1968

PFC Frank A. Herda*
101st Abn Div (AM), 29 June 1968

SSG Paul Lambers
25th Inf Div, 20 August 1968

SP4 William W. Seay*
1st Log Cmd, 25 August 1968

SSG Nicky D. Bacon
23rd Inf Div (Americal), 26 August 1968

SGT Marvin R. Young*
25th Inf Div, 8 October 1968

LTC Charles C. Rogers
1st Inf Div, 1 November 1968

SSG Laszlo Rabel*
173rd Abn Bde, 13 November 1968

PFC Michael Crescenz*
23rd Inf Div (Americal), 20 November 1968

SGT John N. Holcomb*
1st Cav Div, 3 December 1968

SP4 Ray McKibben*
1st Avn Bde, 6 December 1968

PFC David P. Nash*
9th Inf Div, 28-29 December 1968

SFC Robert L. Howard
5th Special Forces (Abn), 30 December 1968

SSG Rodney J. Yano*
11th ACR, 1 January 1969

SGT Don J. Jenkins
9th Inf Div, 6 January 1969

1LT Harold A. Fritz
11th ACR, 11 January 1969

1LT John E. Warren Jr.*
25th Inf Div, 14 January 1969

PFC Garfield Langhorn*
1st Avn Bde, 15 January 1969

PFC Thomas W. Bennett*
4th Inf Div, 9-11 February 1969

1LT Gary L. Miller*
1st Inf Div, 16 February 1969

SP4 George C. Lang
9th Inf Div, 22 February 1969

SP4 Robert D. Law*
1st Inf Div, 22 February 1969

SP5 Robert W. Hartsock*
25th Inf Div, 23 February 1969

SGT Lester R. Stone Jr.*
23rd Inf Div (Americal), 3 March 1969

SP4 Thomas J. McMahon*
23rd Inf Div (Americal), 19 March 1969

PFC Terry T. Kawamura*
173rd Abn Bde, 20 March 1969

SP4 Donald R. Johnston*
1st Cav Div, 21 March 1969

SFC William M. Bryant*
5th Special Forces (Abn), 24 March 1969

1LT Stephen H. Doane*
25th Inf Div, 25 March 1969

CPT Kern W. Dunagan
23rd Inf Div (Americal), 12-14 May 1969

PFC Daniel J. Shea*
23rd Inf Div (Americal), 14 May 1969

SGT Charles C. Fleek*
25th Inf Div, 27 May 1969

1LT Robert L. Poxon*
1st Cav Div (AM), 2 June 1969

SGT Hammett L. Bowen*
25th Inf Div, 27 June 1969

PFC Michael R. Blanchfield*
173rd Abn Bde, 3 July 1969

SP4 Gordon R. Roberts
101st Abn Div (AM), 11 July 1969

SGT Rodney J. Evans*
1st Cav Div (AM), 18 July 1969

SGT Donald S. Skidgel*
1st Cav Div (AM), 14 September 1969

CW3 Michael J. Novosel
Med Cmd, 2 October 1969

SSG Robert J. Pruden*
23rd Inf Div (Americal), 20 November 1969

SSG Franklin D. Miller
5th Special Forces (Abn), 5 January 1970

SP4 Richard A. Penry
199th Inf Bde, 31 January 1970

SP4 John P. Baca
1st Cav Div (AM), 10 February 1970

SP4 Peter C. Lemon
1st Cav Div (AM), 1 April 1970

*indicates posthumous award

...U.S. Awards Granted In Vietnam



Distinguished Service Cross



Distinguished Service Medal



Silver Star



Legion of Merit




Soldiers Medal



Bronze Star Medal



Air Medal



Joint Services Commendation Medal



Purple Heart



Good Conduct Medal




National Defense Service Medal



Combat Medical Badge



Presidential Unit Citation



Valorous Unit Award



**Distinguished Flying
Cross**



**Army Commendation
Medal**



Combat Infantry Badge



Meritorious Unit Citation



1. Vietnam Advisory Campaign - March 15, 1962 to March 7, 1965
2. Vietnam Defensive Campaign - March 8, 1965 to December 24, 1965
3. Vietnam Counteroffensive Campaign, Phase I - December 25, 1965 to June 30, 1966
4. Vietnam Counteroffensive Campaign, Phase II - July 1, 1966 to May 31, 1967
5. Vietnam Counteroffensive Campaign, Phase III - June 1, 1967 to January 29, 1968
6. Tet Counteroffensive Campaign - January 30, 1968 to April 1, 1968
7. Vietnam Counteroffensive Campaign, Phase IV - April 2, 1968 to June 30, 1968
8. Vietnam Counteroffensive Campaign, Phase V - July 1, 1968 to November 1, 1968
9. Vietnam Counteroffensive Campaign, Phase VI - November 2, 1968 to February 22, 1969
10. Tet Counteroffensive Campaign - February 23, 1969 to June 8, 1969
11. Vietnam Summer-Fall '69 Campaign - June 9, 1969 to October 31, 1969
12. Vietnam Winter-Spring Campaign - November 1, 1969 to April 30, 1970
13. Sanctuary Counteroffensive Campaign- May 1, 1970 to June 30, 1970
14. Vietnam Counteroffensive Campaign, Phase VII - July 1, 1970 to June 30, 1971
15. Current Campaign - July 1, 1971 to a date to be determined

Any member of the Army who is serving or who has served in Vietnam or contiguous waters or air space, in accordance with AR 672-5-1, is authorized to wear a bronze battle star on the Vietnam service ribbon for each period in which he served in Vietnam.

... Vietnamese Awards



**National Order
Of Vietnam**



**Army Distinguished
Service Order**



Gallantry Cross



Armed Forces Honor Medal



Staff Service Medal



Technical Service Medal



Training Service Medal



Civil Action Medal



Vietnam Campaign Medal



**Civil Action Medal
(unit award)**



**Gallantry Cross
(with palm)
(unit award)**



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375



Your tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam is now complete. Whether you have served in a support role or out in the field, you have contributed to the successful completion of the mission of the United States Army in Vietnam.

This magazine is, in part, a history of Vietnam, its people and the Vietnam conflict both past and present. I hope that it will help you understand the role you have played in this long and difficult struggle.

You will soon be on your way home. Your family and your friends are anxiously waiting for your return.

I extend sincere thanks for the fine job you have done. I suggest that in the years ahead you will take pride in the fact that when called, you served your country. I wish you all success in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "W. J. McCAFFREY", is written over the typed name.

W. J. McCAFFREY
Lieutenant General, US Army
Deputy Commanding General

