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FILE

HEADQUARTERS 11TH AIR ASSAULT DIVISION
Fort Benning, Georgia

DEVELOPING THE AIR ASSAULT CONCEPT

Marshall Auditorium
United States Army Infantry School
1 February 1965

26 January 1965

OUTLINE

General Kinnard's Presentation to Career Classes, USAIS, 1 Feb 65,
0900 - 1200 hours, Marshall Auditorium

PART I - 1 hour and 30 minutes

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|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Introduction | General Kinnard |
| Outline of Presentation | |
| Background | |
| The Division | |
| 10th Air Transport Brigade | |
| Area of Operation - Air Assault II | |
| Forces Available | |
| Location of Units | |
| Schedule of Events | |
| Nature and Scope of the Exercise | |
| Corps and Division Mission | |
| 2. 2d Brigade Operation | Lt Col Buchan
Major Spiller |
| 3. Air Mobility in Battalion Area | Lt Col Moore |
| 4. Air Assault Infantry Company Opas | Capt Roll
Capt Johnson |
| 5. Movie on Air Assault Operations | Capt Horton
Capt Herren |
| 6. Conclusions | General Kinnard |

PART II - Coffee Break - 20 minutes

PART III - Question and Answer Period - 1 hour

Panel of Personnel listed below respond to questions as appropriate:

General Kinnard	Lt Col Buchan	Capt Roll
Colonel Beatty	Lt Col Moore	Capt Johnson
Colonel Lynch	Major Spiller	Capt Horton
Colonel Brown		Capt Herren

26 January 1965

GENERAL KINNARD'S PRESENTATION TO CAREER CLASSES, USAIS, 1 Feb 65
(0900 - 1200 hours)

"DEVELOPING THE AIR ASSAULT CONCEPT"

INTRODUCTION - (VU-GRAPH 1) This is a picture of our Air Assault Badge. It is awarded to all members of the 11th Air Assault Division who have served for a period of at least six months and who meet certain established skill standards. The wings represent our flying capability, the rifle represents the infantryman, and the bolt of lightning represents the speed and shock action of our operations. We wear the Badge on the right breast pocket, and I must say, we wear it proudly.

OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION - As a general outline for the briefing this morning, I will present some background information as to how and why the air assault concept got started and a few of the problems we encountered at the outset. Next I will present a thumb-nail sketch of the organization of the 11th Air Assault Division and the attached 10th Air Transport Brigade. Then, along with a team of officers from my division, we will cover a few of the highlights of selected operations that took place during AIR ASSAULT II in the Carolinas.

BACKGROUND - After World War II, the Army began to build and train for a new dimension of fighting capability, one that extended onto the nuclear battlefield. Dual-purpose capability came into vogue. The press of international events required our Army to develop an additional capability for undertaking in depth overseas operations quite different from nuclear or conventional warfare. More

so than ever before in its history, these overseas operations called for forces designed to safeguard or re-establish the peace and stability of areas threatened by guerrillas, insurrection, and other forms of local or foreign-inspired subversive pressure. Some of these peace-keeping or stability operations amounted to full participation in a limited war, as in Korea. Others included sizable participation in an advisory role in active warfare, as in Vietnam. Still others involved the occasional sharing of combat tasks by teams of U.S. military advisors and instructors, as in Greece, in the Philippines or in Laos; and a few were accompanied by no fighting at all and involved only the presence of organized military force, as in Lebanon or in Thailand.

I believe that for some time to come elements of our Army will continue to be called on for similar peace-keeping or stability operations. Never again can our Army regard itself solely as a double-purpose tool of national military power, its weapons and doctrine designed for use only in nuclear and conventional warfare. Rather, our Army must continue to orient its creative energies and resources toward a multi-purpose concept so that stability operations, as well as the other types of wartime landpower operations, are regarded as normal missions.

These factors, and others, taken together, led Secretary of Defense McNamara to send a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army in 1962, directing the Army to take a bold new look at the possibilities of increased use of aircraft to supplement or replace conventional means of mobility, reconnaissance and firepower. A board of some 300 officers and civilian scientists headed by General Hamilton H. Howze -- then Commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps -- conducted a study and

came up with a dynamic and forward-looking idea which they called the Air Mobility Concept. As a result of the Howze Board, the 11th Air Assault Division and the 10th Air Transport Brigade were activated here at Fort Benning in February 1963. We were given the task of organizing, equipping, and training units for air mobile testing. In the simplest terms, our job was to put into practice the theory of air mobility. The buildup of the Division and the testing program looked like this (VU-GRAPH #2).

The foundation on which we began to build was shaky -- the TO&E's were full of errors of every magnitude. The concept of operations was a brilliant but sketchy plan, predicated on the replacement of ground vehicles and ground-based weapons systems by aircraft wherever possible. Tactical doctrine was hypothetical and was, for the most part, awaiting the results of our experiments for its development, revision, and refinement.

We were not dealing with specific quantities, rather, we found ourselves entering into unknown and uncertain areas, testing and evaluating various theories. We have been, and still are, researching, evolving, and solving. We soon discovered that our mission implied far more than it stated, and our responsibility became, in fact, the advancement of the air mobile concept on a broad front in five principal areas: organization, equipment, concept, doctrine, and training. Each area of interest had to be worked out and fitted, with the others, into an interrelated and coherent whole. The ultimate aims of our testing were:

- a. To refine and develop organizational structures and operational concepts and doctrine for air mobile units.

b. To provide the data so that the Army may determine the number and types of air mobile units for its force structure.

These, then, are some of the precepts which have guided us up to this time. For nearly two years, we have been engaged in a racetrack schedule of training, testing, and evaluating, culminating last fall in the longest peacetime maneuvers in the history of the Army -- AIR ASSAULT II. More will be said about this exercise in a few minutes.

DIVISION - The Air Assault Division is organized as shown on this slide (VU-GRAPH #3). You can see that like the ROAD Division, our division consists of a base made up of a headquarters and headquarters company, an armored cavalry squadron, an MP company, signal and engineer battalions, and a support command. There is also a division artillery, two tank battalions, eight infantry battalions, three brigade headquarters, and an aviation battalion, for a total of 15,594 personnel and 101 aircraft.

These red areas highlight the few differences of the two divisions as pertains to the basic structure. These differences are: an air cavalry squadron instead of an armored cavalry squadron; an increase of the division artillery aviation section of the headquarters battery to an aviation battery; replacing the medium artillery battalion with an aerial rocket battalion; deletion of the two tank battalions; and increasing the aviation battalion to an aviation group; that is, increasing the reconnaissance capability of the general support company to a surveillance and escort battalion, and increasing the organic lift capability to one-third of the combat elements of the division, by replacing the air mobile company with an assault support helicopter battalion and two assault helicopter battalions. These changes

result in a total of 15,954 personnel and 459 aircraft for the air assault division.

10TH AIR TRANSPORT BRIGADE - The 10th Air Transport Brigade is not a part of the Air Assault Division. It is commanded by a full Colonel and would normally operate at Field Army level and support a greater number of units, but it has been attached to us for convenience. At full strength, it would consist of two air transport battalion headquarters, five airplane companies (CV-2), two helicopter companies (CH-47), and one flying crane company. This unit provides the ALOC so vital to the existence of the Air Assault Division and is our "retailer" of supplies, as well as a troop-carrying support unit.

Thus, we now have a closely integrated, well-armed, highly-mobile divisional force, capable of operation across the entire broad spectrum of modern warfare, able to move rapidly over extended distances, freed of terrain obstacles which have for so long tied the infantryman to the earth's surface, and possessing a heretofore unparalleled maneuver capability.

AREA OF OPERATION - AIR ASSAULT II took place on 4 1/2 million acres of land in North and South Carolina, as shown here (VU-GRAPH #5). The maneuver area was approximately 50 miles wide by 150 miles long, running NE - SW, and it included both Fort Jackson and Fort Bragg. There are two significant terrain features to which we will refer frequently -- the Wateree Pond, north of Fort Jackson, and the Pee Dee River, which served as the international boundary between Blue land and Red land. You should also know that our movements were often limited by the large number of restricted areas, such as turkey and dairy farms, which we could neither pass through nor overfly at low altitudes (good time for a turkey story). (VU-GRAPH #6))

FORCES AVAILABLE - The next few Vu=Graph slides will acquaint you with the forces which participated in AIR ASSAULT II. First, there were the Neutral Forces (VU-GRAPH #7), including the Exercise Director Headquarters, which was composed of all the controllers, umpires, data collectors, communications personnel, and other supporting agencies. This group was headed by Lt General Rich, the Exercise Director. The support group consisted of the 5th Log Command, USAF support, and post support from Fort Bragg for the aggressors, and from Forts Jackson and Gordon for the Blue Forces.

(VU-GRAPH #8) This slide depicts the two player forces, Blue and Red. The Blue Force was the 11th Air Assault Division with six infantry battalions and all organic support elements. In addition, we had the 10th Air Transport Brigade, the 72d Air Traffic Control Company, and the 14th Aircraft Maintenance Battalion from the Atlanta Depot. The Red Force was General York's 82d Airborne Division with six infantry battalions, a tank battalion (tanks were represented by APC's), a Hawk battery, and a National Guard AW battalion equipped with the old familiar 40mm dusters.

LOCATION OF UNITS - (VU-GRAPH #9) This chart shows the locations of the participating units. The maneuver area is outlined in black, and this black line is the Pee Dee River. Generally speaking, the 82d Airborne Division operated east of the Pee Dee, and the 11th operated from its base in the vicinity of the Wateree Pond. Exercise Director Headquarters and Neutral Forces Headquarters were located at Fort Jackson. The 10th Air Transport Brigade and the 5th Log Command operated out of Fort Gordon, and the 14th Aircraft Maintenance Battalion worked out of Atlanta. Air Force support was drawn from Myrtle Beach, Shaw, and Pope Air Force Bases.

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS - The next two charts outline the schedule of events for AIR ASSAULT II. I want to point out here that the schedule you see is for the formal portion of the exercise only. We actually moved to the Carolinas in mid-September and spent one month training and preparing for the test. (Describe schedule from charts - VU-GRAPHS #10 and 11.) There were four active phases of AIR ASSAULT II: I Bravo, I Delta, II Bravo, and II Delta. The time periods of the intervening phases were used in movement to and preparation for the next active portions. Each active phase was designed to test the air assault concept in a particular type of tactical environment.

Phase I Bravo, for example -- which you just saw -- exercised the division's ability to move rapidly and achieve tactical surprise throughout the combat zone. In this phase, we conducted an advance to contact and subsequent offensive action, then assumed a mobile defense posture followed by a delaying action, including feints and over-obstacle attacks in a retrograde operation as the corps covering force. This provided an excellent opportunity to demonstrate our inherent mobility and maneuverability.

Phase I Delta saw the division executing antiairborne operations and an envelopment of the enemy by driving deep into his territory.

During Phase II Bravo, the division was employed in offensive operations as part of a larger force and initiated both parachute and helicopter-borne assaults. This phase included an enveloping attack to the aggressor flanks and rear, followed by an attack across the Pee Dee to secure river-crossing sites for the advancing 4th and 5th Mech Divisions.

Phase II Delta depicted the Air Assault Division in a continuation of its role as part of a larger force in offensive operations, but with the added harassment of a nuclear warfare environment.

The exercise was guided by a scenario which detailed each evaluated move and the events leading to it on a day-to-day basis. The test was, of necessity, strictly controlled to provide the framework for proper documentation and analysis.

NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE EXERCISE - (VU-GRAPH #12) This brings us to the exercise itself. The situation was one of limited war in a semi-sophisticated

area. Nuclear warfare was played only on a limited basis, and counter-insurgency was not stressed. This chart shows the locations of the major units at the outset. The Pee Dee River, shown here in red, was the international boundary. Corps Headquarters was at Fort Jackson, the 4th and 5th Mech Divisions (Sim) were 3 - 4 days away, and the border was patrolled by para-military forces and a Corps recon squadron. Two aggressor divisions and numerous support units faced us from the Redland side of the border. Redland forces crossed the border at 1800 hours on D-1 and are shown as two penetrations on this chart. Shortly after this took place, Corps ordered the 11th to attack and destroy the aggressor forces and to restore the international boundary. Our basic plan was to attack at 0900 hours on D-Day with two brigades. (VU-GRAPH #13) The 2d Brigade in the north was to go in with two infantry battalions with helicopters, and the 1st Brigade on the south was to parachute in with three battalions, one from the 11th Division and two that we borrowed from the 82d for this particular operation. This was to be followed up by air landing another infantry battalion about an hour after H-Hour in the area of the 1st Bde.

The 3d Brigade with two infantry battalions was to be held in Division Reserve behind the Wateree. For convenience, the 1st Brigade staged its airborne operations out of Pope Air Force Base.

CORPS AND DIVISION MISSION - 1st DAY OF PHASE I BRAVO - To set the stage for the subsequent presentation, I will give you the Corps and Division mission at the onset of the first active phase of AIR ASSAULT II.

The Corps mission was as follows: "VI Corps attack H-Hour, D-Day, with one division in airborne and air assault operations; destroy enemy vicinity

Wadesboro and west of Pee Dee River vicinity Cheraw; expel Redland forces from Blueland and re-establish the international border; two mechanized divisions move initially to positions vicinity Pee Dee River; one air cavalry brigade screens international border and protects Corps flanks. "

The Division mission was: "11th Air Assault Division will:

- (1) Conduct airborne assault to seize Objective CLAW.
- (2) Conduct air assault to seize Objective EAGLE.
- (3) Be prepared to provide covering force for 4th and 5th Mech

Divisions upon arrival in sector. "

- (2) 2D BRIGADE OPERATION - Lt Col Buchan and Maj Spiller will now present the activities of the 2d Brigade.
- (3) Air Mobility in Battalion Area - - - - Lt Col Moore
- (4) Air Assault Infantry Company Operations - - Capts Roll and Johnson
- (5) Movie on Air Assault Operations - - - - Capts Horton and Hegren
- (6) CONCLUSIONS - You have been exposed today briefly to the revolutionary nature of the air assault concept. I believe that we of the 11th Air Assault Division have only begun to unearth a doctrine which in years to come will enhance many, many times over the capabilities of the U.S. Army in the realm of land warfare.

I am convinced that air assault units can find and fix an enemy by a combination of surveillance means and then bring superior firepower and maneuver elements to bear on him. It convinced me further that it can maintain itself and conduct

sustained ground combat based on either an air or ground LOC or a combination, and do so day and night; good weather and bad, over a considerable range of tactical situations and over a very large area. In short, I found in the operations during AIR ASSAULT II, solid evidence of an impressive overall capability to exert measured and flexible military power swiftly over large areas and freed from the restrictions of terrain or obstacles. In my opinion, a division of the general makeup of the 11th Air Assault Division can perform (though not necessarily in the same way as other divisions) virtually every mission any other division can do and can perform it at least as well. A possible exception is a position defense in which for various reasons a particular piece of ground, per se, must be physically and continuously held. Even in such a role, the Air Assault Division, with appropriate attachments and support, could be used (much as was the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne in World War II).

Beyond what I believe to be its capabilities to perform roles normal to other divisions, I am even more impressed by what I feel is its ability to perform in unique ways beyond the abilities of other divisions. For example, in a low scale war, I believe it can exert control over a much wider area and with much more speed and flexibility and with much less concern for the problems of interdicted ground communications or of difficult terrain. In higher scales of war, I see in this division an unparalleled reserve of screening forces capable of operating over very large frontages. By properly picking times, places, and methods, I believe it can also operate with devastating effect against the rear of the enemy. Faced with threat or use of nuclear weapons, I believe it can widely disperse and yet, when required, quickly mass (even over irradiated ground,

blown down forests or rubble cities), strike an enemy, then disperse again.

My conclusions, having commanded the 11th Air Assault Division and attached 10th Air Transport Brigade since February 1963, is that the air mobility concept shows tremendous present and future prospects for our Army.

(INTRODUCE LEAN-MEAN SQUAD)

PART II - - Coffee Break

PART III - - Question & Answer Period

DEVELOPING THE AIR ASSAULT CONCEPT

Sequence of Vu-Graph Slides

1. Air Assault Badge
2. Snake Chart
3. 11th Air Assault Division
4. 10th Air Transport Brigade
5. Maneuver Area
6. Restricted Areas
7. Forces Available
8. Forces Available
9. Location of Units
10. October Schedule
11. November Schedule
12. General Situation
13. D-Day
14. D+1 Day