

Points to Stress

1. Why did the Army decide to test the air mobility concept at the time and on the scale that it did? Because:
 - a. Firepower was ahead of mobility (as well as ahead of reconnaissance, surveillance and logistics support).
 - b. Ground mobility was not making - and showed no promise of making - really significant strides.
 - c. The Army was seeking solutions to very difficult problems at both ends of the spectrum of conflict:
 - (1) Tactical atomic warfare
 - (2) Stability operations(Strategic/tactical mobility was required in both above)
 - d. Technical strides had been made in V/STOL aircraft especially rotary wing aircraft (for example the turbined helicopter) in such fields as:
 - (1) Maintenance
 - (2) Reliability
 - (3) Speed
 - (4) Load carrying capability.
 - e. Proximate cause was Sec. McNamara's directive and the resultant Howze Board study which indicated a promising theoretical potential for air assault divisions, air transport brigades and air cavalry groups in solving problems a thru c and in capitalizing on d above.

2. What was the Army seeking from the tests of an air assault division and an air transport brigade? The Army sought:

a. Areas in which the substitution of aircraft for ground vehicles, ground based weapons, ground surveillance and reconnaissance systems and surface logistics systems would produce enhanced ability to wage land warfare.

b. Sound guidelines on the structure and composition of units in which primary reliance was placed on air mobility rather than ground mobility.

c. Areas of strength and weakness in such units.

d. A comparison of such units with more conventional units over a wide range of geographic areas and combat environments.

e. To identify situations in which such units could wage land combat in new or different ways.

In short, the Army sought to determine whether a new milestone had been reached in which aircraft might begin to replace as well as augment ground vehicles in the same way ground vehicles had replaced the horse about 40 years ago. Or, to say it another way, the Army sought to find how far and how fast it could and should go in substituting aircraft for surface based systems in accomplishing the Army's diversified land combat missions.

3. Of what did the Army program consist?

Answer: The overall Army program was very extensive. Since the fall of 1962 the Department of the Army has carried on 83 major field exercises, tests, war games and studies. This has been by far the most comprehensive analysis and testing to which any division concept has ever been subjected.

4. What was the role of the 11th AAD and 10th ATB in the Army's overall program?

The role of the 11th Air Assault Division and the 10th Air Transport Brigade, which has been and is attached to the 11th Air Assault Division, was the field testing portion of the Army's overall test and evaluation program. The 11th Division and the 10th Brigade were to provide appropriate elements or slices of air mobile tactical units in a series of functional tests and field tests whose results were to be observed, recorded, analyzed and reported on by a Test, Evaluation and Control Group headed up by a well-known Army aviator, Brigadier General Bob Williams. Thus from the point of view of the Army, the job of my people and I was to organize, equip, train and exercise various elements or components and, finally, the complete size organizations to provide a basis for the hard data and judgments which the Test, Evaluation and Control Group required. However, our job as we in the 11th AAD and 10th ATB found out involved a great deal more than simply organizing, equipping, training and exercising. It involved development of the techniques, the equipment, the tactics, the organization and the concept itself from the incomplete or sketchy forms in which we found them into workable, practical realities. What we had to do, in short, was to convert the theory of air mobility into its practice. Our approach to converting into practice of that which we inherited was to look at each function, each organization, each piece of equipment from the point of view of how it might be improved. To do this we enlisted the participation and support of everyone of all ranks in the Division and the Brigade as well as in other agencies, in and out of the military service which were

either directed to assist us or wanted to be of help. What we were seeking was not only the overall improvement in operational capability which would result from such an approach, but also seeking to go as far as possible toward solving every known problem with equipment in existence or through the use of equipments, techniques and tactics which could be easily improvised. We felt this was important so that no single deficiency or problem could so becloud the capabilities of air mobility as to make the whole concept suspect when, in fact, all that was needed ^{was} a little imagination and developmental effort.

5. How hard was it?

a. For the Army: Answer: It was a difficult undertaking for the Army in that the forming of the test units and keeping them together for a period of over two years involved very difficult decisions in the allocation of the precious resources of people and equipment in light of the many conflicting requirements for these resources at home and abroad.

b. For the test units: Again, the answer must be - very hard. We were required to move at an extremely fast pace. We had first to simultaneously develop many of the things required to properly display the capabilities of air mobility. It was a very large undertaking by any standards, covering many areas which were new either in kind or degree. For example: We had to go a great deal farther in the development of formation flying and night operations of helicopters than Army units had heretofore gone.

6. What did we learn? We learned:

a. A very great deal and certainly enough on which the Army can base sound decisions.

b. That the approach which we took to test and development offers fast, broad, solid progress if the enterprise is given, as we were, good people, adequate equipment and funds, and what we call in the Army a "mission type order," meaning to be given maximum latitude to exercise one's own judgment and experience.

c. (And, this is a personal point of view), - That there is great promise in the direction of air mobility,

d. That there are no unsurmountable problems.

e. Or re-learned that good people who feel themselves really challenged and given the means and latitude to use their skills and intelligence can do almost anything.

7. Conclusion: The final decision on whether or not the Army will incorporate one or more air mobile divisions or air transport brigades is even now at the very highest level of the Department of Defense; we have been expecting news momentarily. Irrespective of the decision, I feel that we have certainly extended the concept and application of air mobility so that the Army can move on to higher ground from a very solid plateau of developed know-how. Now I would like to show you a brief film made at one of our demonstrations to give those of you who have not seen air assault in action a feel for how it looks. After the film, if appropriate and there are questions, I will be glad to field them.

Thank you.

$$\frac{5405}{3} = 1802$$

$$\frac{23}{5} = 4.6$$