

"AIR ASSAULT - HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE"

1. SELECTIVE, ABBREVIATED AND OPINIONATED BIT OF HISTORY
 - a. DA VINCI AND HIS HELICOPTER
 - b. FRANKLIN AND HIS BALLOON BORNE VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT CONCEPT
 - c. BILLY MITCHELL'S PARACHUTISTS IN WWI
 - d. PRE WWI AND WWI
 - (1) CAVALRY (AND I DO MEAN HORSES) - MOBILITY DIFFERENTIAL
 - (2) AIRBORNE DEVELOPMENTS AND OPERATIONS - PROS AND CONS
 - (3) ARMY AIR CORPS/AIR FORCE AND USAF - WILD BLUE YONDER;
BASES
 - (4) CUBS-GROUND SOLDIER PILOTS; FORWARD BASING
 - (5) HELICOPTER MAKES COMBAT DEBUT

- e. THE 1950s - KOREA; ALGERIA; MALASIA - 700 >>>> 5,000 AIRCRAFT
- f. ROGERS BOARD AND A MEMORABLE ADDENDUM (HAND OUT COPIES)
- g. MCNAMARA'S MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
- h. HOWZE BOARD - RECOMMENDATIONS:
 - (1) AIR ASSAULT DIVISION
 - (2) AIR CAVALRY COMBAT BDE
 - (3) CORPS AVIATION BDE
 - (4) AIR TRANSPORT BDE
 - (5) SPECIAL WARFARE BDE
 - (6) FORCE STRUCTURE AND STATIONING RECOMMENDATIONS
- i. DECISION MADE TO TEST AIR ASSAULT DIVISION AND AIR TRANSPORT
BDE

SLIDE 2

2. PROJECT TEAM - 11TH AAD, 10TH ATB AND TEST/EVALUATION GROUP

a. OUR MISSION AS STATED BY GENERAL WHEELER

b. OVERALL TESTING PROGRAM - MODULAR; ARMY/JOINT; COMPETITIVE;

ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

c. OUR APPROACH TO OUR MISSION:

(1) DEFINING "AIR ASSAULT"; USING THE FIVE FUNCTION MATRIX

(2) DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING

(3) INNOVATIVE THINKING, INITIATIVE, DELEGATION; IMAGINIVITY

IDEA CENTER; "PLUMBERS FRIEND" ADAPTION EXAMPLE

(4) TAILORING

(a) "AIR MOBILE METRECAL" - EXAMPLES: SIGNAL BN, ENG.

(b) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT - EXAMPLES: CHINOOK LADDER

BLIVITS, LT. WEIGHT PUMPS

(5) TRAINING—HARD, REALISTIC AND COMBINED—VS SAFETY

(6) TEAMWORK - FROM THE BOTTOM UP

(7) AIRMOBILE STATE OF MIND

(8) FORWARD BASING - LEARNING FROM THE CUBS AND USAF

(9) AT LEAST SHOW "PROOF OF PRINCIPLE" - "CRAZY WHEELS"

d. OBSTACLES, ANKLE-GRABBERS AND NAY SAYERS:

(1) OLD BIRDS THAT WERE A PAIN - H-34; H-37

NEW BIRDS THAT WERE AN INITIAL PAIN - CH-47

(2) ARMY DOUBTS:

(a) SUSTAINABILITY

(b) MAINTAINABILITY

(c) WEATHER/NIGHT

(d) VULNERABILITY

(e) COST

(3) ARMY PRIORITIES - VIETNAM, TRAINING BASE, PROJECT TEAM

(4) AIR FORCE OPPOSITION

e. SOME FAVORABLE FACTORS:

(1) ABLE TO PICK GOOD PEOPLE

(2) SOME ARMY PEOPLE VERY SUPPORTIVE

(3) BOB WILLIAMS AND HIS TEC GROUP

(4) "GOLDEN TILT"

(5) "SLUSH" FUND

(6) CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

f. KEY TEST RESULTS

(1) IMPRESSIVE AT EVERY STAGE

(2) FREEDOM FROM TERRAIN/ABLE TO FOCUS ON ENEMY

- (3) ABLE TO MASS QUICKLY IN TIME AND SPACE THEN REDISPERSE
- (4) EVERY UNIT NOT ENGAGED A POTENTIAL RESERVE
- (5) HELICOPTERS SHOWED GREAT FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO
OPERATE IN MILEU OF GROUND SOLDIER
- (6) THE "WHO SHOT JOHN?" PROBLEM WAS A NAGGING ONE

g. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) 11TH AAD AND 10TH ATB SHOULD NOT BE BROKEN UP
- (2) THERE SHOULD BE AN AIR ASSAULT DIVISION AND AIR
TRANSPORT BRIGADE IN THE ARMY
- (3) COMBAT ARMS OF AIR ASSAULT DIVISION SHOULD BE
PARACHUTISTS
- (4) KEY POINTS OF GENERALS YORK, KINNARD, AND RICH ABOUT
AIR ASSAULT (SLIDE 9A ON)

3. THE FIRST AIR CAV IN VIETNAM

a. LBJ's "NON STATE OF EMERGENCY" AND ITS IMPACT

b. DIFFICULT MOVE TO VIETNAM

c. AREA OF OPERATIONS (TAOR) - ALMOST 150 MILES X 150 MILES

OR ALMOST 22,500 SQUARE MILES COMPARISONS: HOLLAND IS

13,433 SQUARE MILES; MARYLAND IS 10,577; MASS. IS 8,257

d. VERY LONG LOC (STRATEGICALLY AND TACTICALLY).

e. SOME INITIAL IGNORANCE IN HIGH PLACES ABOUT AIR ASSAULT

f. THE ATROCIOUS "GROUND RULES"

g. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(1) STRONG, SMALL BASE

(2) MAXIMUM NUMBER OF UNITS OUT FIGHTING

(3) BRIGADE/CAV SQUADRON ORIENTATION

h. OPERATIONS

(1) TYPES

(2) NUMBER AND FREQUENCY

i. SOME OPERATIONAL INNOVATIONS:

(1) ARTILLERY FIRE BASES-(IN FIRST, MUTUALLY SUPPORTING)

(2) ARTILLERY ON HIGH GROUND; ORIENTATION FIRES

(3) FEINTS AND FALSE INSERTIONS

(4) AIR FORCE "DEMOLITION TEAMS"

(5) "TALKING BIRD"; SKY CRANE MODULES

(6) "BAIT AND SWITCH" FOR HIGH STAKES

(7) EVERY UNIT A POTENTIAL RESERVE

j. SOME RESULTS VIS A VIS THE FIVE FUNCTIONS OF COMBAT

(1) INTELLIGENCE / SURVEILLANCE / RECONNAISSANCE:

- (a) IMPORTANCE OF AIR CAV SCOUTING—EVEN WITH H-13s
THEY COULD AND DID FIND THE ENEMY; BEING FIRED
ON AS A PRECURSOR TO COMBAT
- (b) MOHAWKS LESS USEFUL THAN HOPED
- (c) PRISONERS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS IMPORTANT
- (d) MANY "EYES IN THE SKY" ARE A VALUABLE SOURCE
- (e) FEINTS PROVIDE VALUABLE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

COMMENTS OF THREE KEY OBSERVERS OF EXERCISE AIR ASSAULT II:

GENERAL YORK, CG OF THE AGGRESSOR FORCE

(82D AIRBORNE DIVISION REINFORCED)

"AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS AS PIONEERED ON EXERCISE AIR ASSAULT II HAVE A DYNAMIC POTENTIAL. SELDOM DO WE SEE A NEW MILITARY CONCEPT WHICH CAN CONTRIBUTE SO DECISIVELY THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF WARFARE. CERTAIN AIR ASSAULT TECHNIQUES USED DURING EXERCISE AIR ASSAULT II WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE HAZARDOUS IN ACTUAL COMBAT. HOWEVER, THESE DEFICIENCIES CAN BE CORRECTED AND DO NOT DETRACT FROM THE VALIDITY OF THE OVERALL CONCEPT."

GENERAL KINNARD, CG 11TH AIR ASSAULT DIVISION AND ATTACHED UNITS

"BEYOND WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE ITS CAPABILITIES TO PERFORM ROLES NORMAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS, I AM EVEN MORE IMPRESSED BY WHAT I FEEL

SLIDE 9B

IS ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM IN UNIQUE WAYS BEYOND THE CAPABILITIES OF OTHER DIVISIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN A LOW SCALE WAR, I BELIEVE IT CAN EXERT CONTROL OVER A MUCH WIDER AREA AND WITH MUCH MORE SPEED AND FLEXIBILITY AND WITH MUCH LESS CONCERN FOR THE PROBLEMS OF INTERDICTED GROUND COMMUNICATIONS OR OF DIFFICULT TERRAIN. IN HIGHER SCALE WARS, I SEE IN THIS DIVISION AN UNPARALLELED RESERVE OR SCREENING FORCE CAPABLE OF OPERATING OVER VERY LARGE FRONTAGES. BY PROPERLY PICKING TIMES, PLACES, AND METHODS, I BELIEVE IT CAN ALSO OPERATE WITH DEVASTATING EFFECT AGAINST THE REAR OF THE ENEMY. FACED WITH THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, I BELIEVE IT CAN WIDELY DISPERSE AND YET, WHEN REQUIRED, QUICKLY MASS (EVEN OVER IRRADIATED GROUND, BLOWN DOWN FORESTS OR RUBBLED CITIES), STRIKE AN ENEMY, THEN DISPERSE AGAIN."

SLIDE 9C

GENERAL RICH, TEST DIRECTOR, MADE THESE RECOMMENDATIONS:

FIRST, I URGE THAT THE TWO YEARS OF EFFORT, THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PEOPLE ON HAND AND THE EQUIPMENT ON HAND NOT BE LOST BY DISSIPATION, FRAGMENTATION, OR DISPERSAL OF THE TESTED UNITS.

SECOND, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE 11TH AIR ASSAULT DIVISION OR A DIVISION STRENGTH UNIT WITH THE AIRMOBILITY CAPABILITY OF THE 11TH AAD BE INCLUDED IN THE ARMY'S FORCE STRUCTURE WITH A FULL PARACHUTE CAPABILITY FOR ITS NON-AVIATION ELEMENTS; AND THE 10TH AIR TRANSPORT BRIGADE BE RETAINED INTACT AND INCLUDED IN THE ARMY'S FORCE STRUCTURE. THE SIGNIFICANT QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER WE CAN AFFORD SUCH ORGANIZATIONS, BUT WHETHER THIS NATION, WITH ITS RAPIDLY EXPANDING POPULATION AND EVER INCREASING GNP CAN AFFORD NOT TO HAVE THEM. THE TESTED ORGANIZATIONS ARE PROTOTYPES, IN BEING, OF THE

SLIDE 9D

MOST VERSATILE FORCES WE CAN ADD TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY. THE MOVEMENT CAPABILITY OF ALL DIVISIONS, INCLUDING THE 11TH AIR ASSAULT DIVISION HAS BEEN ENHANCED BY AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT; HOWEVER, THE INTEGRATION OF ARMY AIRCRAFT INTO THESE TESTED UNITS HAS PROVIDED THE CRUCIAL MANEUVER CAPABILITY OF LIGHT MOBILE FORCES TO CLOSE WITH AND DESTROY THE ENEMY. IN COMBINATION WITH ROAD DIVISIONS AND OTHER STANDARD ARMY ORGANIZATIONS, AIRMOBILE UNITS OFFER A BALANCE OF MOBILITY AND AN INCREASED ARMY COMBAT READINESS ON A THEATER SCALE THAT IS APPLICABLE TO THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF WARFARE.

(2) MOBILITY:

(a) TERRIFIC-DAY/NIGHT; ALMOST ANY WEATHER (MICRO WEATHER)

(b) THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER ALSO-VERY IMPORTANT, BUT EASILY FORGOTTEN

(3) FIREPOWER

(a) GREAT; ONE OF OUR REAL ADVANTAGES

(b) TUBES

(c) ARA

(d) GUNSHIPS

(e) DOOR GUNNERS

(f) AIR FORCE, BETTER THAN I EXPECTED, BUT VERY RESTRICTED BY BASING, WEATHER TERRAIN AND

ALL THE USUAL IFF PROBLEMS. B-52s TOO LONG

(4) C&C:

(a) EXCELLENT

(b) HEARING KOREA AND CALLING CONUS ON SINGLE SIDE BAND

(c) INFREQUENT SOI CHANGES

(d) AERIAL RELAY (TALKING BIRD)

(e) SKY CRANE COMMO POD, AND TOC POD

(5) LOGISTICS:

(a) GENERALLY GOOD

(b) AVIATION PARTS A CONSTANT PROBLEM

(c) BATTLE DAMAGE ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS THAN IN HIGHER

INTENSITY COMBAT

(d) ABLE TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS (PLEIKU 35 DAYS; MASHER/
WHITE WING 41 DAYS)

(e) SOME STATISTICS - (SEPT '65 - APRIL '66)

400,000 SORTIES IN 161,000 HOURS

DELIVERED 82,000 TONS OF COMBAT SUPPLIES

AND 523,000 COMBAT PASSENGERS

(f) THE IGNORANCE PROBLEM AGAIN ON USE OF AF LIFT

(6) SUMMARY OF FIVE FUNCTIONS: ALL WORKED WELL AND

FURTHERMORE PLAYED TOGETHER WITH EACH PART

STRENGTHENING ALL THE OTHERS IN A WONDERFUL

SYNCHRONIZATION

k. SOME BRAGGING:

(1) C/S OF THE ARMY TELEGRAM

"THE ARMY AND THE NATION TAKE PRIDE IN YOUR DISPLAY OF COURAGE, DETERMINATION AND FIGHTING SKILL. THE BRAVE AND RESOLUTE PERFORMANCE OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) IS IN KEEPING WITH THE FINEST TRADITIONS OF THE AMERICAN SOLDIER."

(2) SEC. DEFENSE MCNAMARA:

PLEIKU CAMPAIGN IS "AN UNPARALLELED ACHIEVEMENT; UNIQUE IN ITS VALOR AND COURAGE, THE AIR CAVALRY DIVISION HAS ESTABLISHED A RECORD WHICH WILL STAND FOR A LONG TIME FOR OTHERS TO MATCH."

(3) AWARD OF DIVISIONAL PRESIDENTIAL D.U.B. ONLY ONE AWARDED IN VIETNAM AND ONLY 5TH IN MILITARY HISTORY.

SLIDE 13

4. OVERALL OBSERVATIONS:

a. DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING A POWERFUL TOOL FOR EVALUATING A NEW
KIND OF ORGANIZATION.

b. THE OLD BUGABOOS:

(1) MAINTAINABILITY/SUSTAINABILITY

OK IF WE STRUCTURE TO&Es PROPERLY AND ARE SMART AND
AGGRESSIVE ABOUT SPARE PARTS

(2) WEATHER/NIGHT

OK WE ARE ALMOST A TRUE 24 HOUR A DAY, ALL WEATHER
FORCE, BUT HAVEN'T REALLY TESTED WHETHER OUR CREW
MANNING IS ADEQUATE

(3) VULNERABILITY

OK IN MY BOOK, BUT SEEMS DESTINED TO COME UP FOREVER

WITH ALL THE PEOPLE WHO DON'T DO THEIR HOMEWORK. (I
HAVE A SLIDE ON THIS, WHICH, TIME PERMITTING, I'D
LIKE FOR YOU TO SEE).

(4) COST

STILL VERY MUCH A PROBLEM.

COST IS RELATIVELY EASY TO COMPUTE (ONCE WE AGREE
ON WHAT WE ARE COSTING);

EFFECTIVENESS IS TOUGH! THE "WHO SHOT JOHN" PROBLEM;
EFFECTIVENESS TO DO WHAT? NEED TO PUT COST AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR ASSAULT UNITS UNDER INTENSIVE
SCRUTINY

(5) AIR CAVALRY COMBAT BRIGADE

WE STILL HAVEN'T TESTED ONE A LA THE 11TH AAD TESTS.

DOES THAT HAVE A BEARING ON WHY THE 6TH ACCB WASN'T
AMONG THOSE CALLED TO THE GULF FOR DESERT SHIELD/
STORM, OR WAS IT PURELY BECAUSE THE 6TH WAS STILL
RECOVERING FROM THE STORM DAMAGE?

5. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS:

- a. AIR FIGHTING UNITS IN THE AIRLAND BATTLE
- b. AIR FIGHTING UNITS AS IN THEATER FORCES
- c. AIR FIGHTING UNITS AS CONUS BASED STRATEGIC RESERVES
- d. AIR FIGHTING UNITS IN CIVIL DISORDERS AND CIVIC ACTION

OPERATIONS

6. QUESTIONS / COMMENTS: