

COMMAND COMMENT



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A SERIES OF COMMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, ENUNCIATING POSITIONS, POLICIES AND THOUGHTS BEARING ON THE ARMY. A CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT SIGNIFICANT ARMY HIGHLIGHTS IS ALSO INCLUDED. COMMAND COMMENT IS NOT A REGULAR MAILING, BUT IS PREPARED AND MAILED AS PERTINENT MATERIAL BECOMES AVAILABLE. THE FORMAT IS DESIGNED TO ALLOW CONVENIENT FILING BY SEPARATE SUBJECT HEADINGS.

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THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND VIETNAMIZATION

912. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD explains that reducing spending and budgets makes it also necessary to reduce our commitments:

I think that it's important for you to understand that we are making significant changes in the amount of funds that will be spent by the Department of Defense in the next year and in the next four or five years as we enter this new decade of the 1970's. Last year we reduced our Defense budget in expenditures by over \$4 billion. The Defense budget as it was sent to the Congress last year projected an expenditure rate of \$81 billion for Fiscal Year 1970, the current fiscal year. We realized that there were pressing needs in the field of health, education, welfare, urban problems; and it would be necessary for us to tighten the belt of the Department of Defense and to cut back on defense spending in order to meet other high priority needs that did exist in the United States, as well as to help in the fight against inflation that is so needed and necessary after 36 months of continual price increases -- in cost of living increases here in the United States.

Forces Must be Surveyed

When that budget was submitted for \$81 billion, it was projected that the budget for Fiscal Year 1971 would contain some \$83 billion exclusive of pay increases. The budget that will be presented by the President on Monday next will reduce that projected budget by over \$10 billion for Fiscal Year 1971. Now, as we make budget reductions it certainly is necessary to understand that it is absolutely essential that the obligations of the United States military forces must be surveyed, and, in some cases, they must be curtailed in order to live within the spending levels approved by the Congress and submitted by the Executive Branch in its budget. This review is going on through the National Security Council process. As many people know, as you reduce your spending and as you reduce your budgets, it is also necessary for us to reduce as far as our commitments are concerned...

Vietnamization

In the Vietnamization program we are turning over a greater responsibility to the forces of South Vietnam to handle this war. This war had become Americanized over a long period of time and we are trying to Vietnamize this war. We have thus far met with good success,

and the President has been able to reduce the troop levels in Vietnam from the troop ceiling of 549,500 to 434,000 during the last seven months since the Vietnamization announcement started during the last summer period.

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...As the Vietnamization program goes forward and meets with success, it is the first real test as far as the new Nixon doctrine is concerned for Asia and for other parts of the world. I think it's important that this first test be watched closely not only by the Department of Defense, but by all agencies of government....

Remarks before the 1970 Senate Youth Program Group in the Pentagon, 29 January 1970.

TRENDS AFFECTING THE DEFENSE COMMUNITY

913. GENERAL BRUCE PALMER, JR., Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, taking a look at some of the dominant trends of the times particularly affecting the Defense community, says:

The most insistent trend is a new look at priorities by policymakers in both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government, seeking to place greater emphasis and resources on our domestic and social problems. As a consequence Defense Budgets are being subjected to very severe and penetrating analyses. "How much is enough?" is a very real question. With regard to this question it is significant to note that the Defense Budget as a percentage of the total Federal Budget has dropped from a 43 percent level for FY 68 to 39.9 percent for FY 70. And as Secretary of Defense Laird recently pointed out, Defense expenditures will decrease further in the next Fiscal Year, 1971, which begins on 1 July of this year. These facts are particularly significant when we realize that we are still fighting a major war in Vietnam.

Another trend is a reduction of our involvement not only in Vietnam, but world-wide with a distinct effort being made to lessen U.S. presence and visibility abroad.

Then there is the perennial credibility problem. Here I refer to a strong feeling of disbelief which brings about demands for maximum visibility of all Defense activities to include its operations abroad, its organization, its procurement practices and its relationships with the public, industry, Congress, and the scientific/academic community.

How Much Armed Forces?

In the light of these facts of life, the question of how much armed forces are enough is very much a basic one of what is essential for survival, not only in the short run but over the long term, recognizing the indivisibility of political, economic, psychological and military factors as elements of national power. With respect to offensive and defensive forces of a strategic nuclear nature, we are essentially talking about deterrence because neither side will willingly engage in such warfare. We are really talking about forces

of such destructive power that they are unusable in any reasonable sense and exist only to deter. Although the essentiality of such forces is clearly not in question, the relative strategic capabilities of our superpowers, that is, ourselves and the Soviet Union, now and in the future is a matter of considerable judgment. On the other hand, in the absence of an overt direct threat to the United States itself, the essentiality of general purpose forces, that is, the tactical forces of each Service, is not as clearly evident. Nevertheless, there is a definite inter-relationship between the two categories of forces, that is, strategic and general purpose. Each contributes to the over-all deterrence of conflict. In proper combination, they lend stability because they can deter over the entire spectrum of warfare.

More importantly, however, the record clearly shows that the big deterrent, that is, the nuclear deterrent, unfortunately, does not deter lesser conflicts which continue to occur over all the world. To deal with conventional hostilities short of the all-out nuclear war, conventional forces of all Services are essential and ground forces--armies--are uniquely capable. Only land forces can control land and the people who live thereon. Only land forces can physically occupy territory and war-making capabilities to bring about stability and guarantee a state of peace.

Army Self-Analysis

Within the Defense Establishment, the Army is vigorously attacking the problems posed by the national trends that I outlined previously. We are critically looking at ourselves to determine whether our policies and plans, organization, and procedures can meet the challenges confronting us.

In approaching this self-analysis, we have been guided by certain principles. First of all, we are basically more concerned about quality than quantity. The size of our Army, both Active and Reserve, will be ultimately determined by our Executive and Legislative Branches with due consideration to our international commitments, strategic considerations, resource limitations, risks, and the like. As a fundamental element of our Defense Establishment, we in the Army will have a voice in this determination.

Quality People and Materiel

Moreover, we want to assure ourselves with respect to quality in both people and materiel. We strongly believe that the American people want nothing less than the very best weapons and equipment that our country can produce for its fighting men. The United States has relied on its superior technology and capability in the past and I see no valid reason for not continuing this policy in the future. Admittedly it will be increasingly difficult as other nations improve their technical capabilities as well.

We, therefore, seek an Army that is modern, that is highly mobile, and that exploits the best possible man-machine combination. This man-machine relationship is particularly crucial to land forces, as we have yet to devise an instrument, vehicle, or weapon that can replace the Infantry soldier. Thus the need is clear for mission-oriented, professional, highly motivated, and enlightened leadership that can form a disciplined and trained Army from young men who are the products of a highly sophisticated, affluent, well-educated, and social-minded society. Finally, because of the resource-constrained nature of any modern military force, we seek a well-managed Army that knows exactly what it has on hand and what it needs in order to carry out its assigned responsibilities.

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Army-Industry Cooperation

In the development of our Armed Forces, the role of industry is vital. Obviously, a completely civilian-oriented industry could not produce the weaponry, special gear, armor plate, and the like, which Armed Forces need to survive. On the other hand, only a handful of our industries could be truly called Defense-oriented. With most industries, including the largest, Defense requirements are minor in comparison to their total output; moreover, in some ways, Defense commitments are a liability rather than an asset. Many industrial organizations, at the request of a Service or the Defense Department, have undertaken developmental tasks which could not be performed elsewhere simply as a patriotic service to the country. As a matter of fact,

in the light of ongoing public debates, uncertain commitments, competition for scarce resources, and a climate of risk with respect to any margin of profit, I believe it is a great tribute to industry that they are willing to stick their necks out in the national interest. Without this attitude on the part of industry, I do not believe that we as a nation could long survive.

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Seeking Improvements

With respect to our developmental processes, we recognize that we have considerably more homework to do. In our conceptual/qualitative definition of a new development we in the Army must be more specific. For example, our visualization of the environment and the type of warfare envisioned are critically important. Here I believe we have tended to try to produce equipment suitable for all environments and all types of warfare. The inevitable result is oversophistication or overly ambitious technical objectives which bring about delays, additional costs, or even failure. A specific example of overstating a prescribed characteristic is insistence on a fording/swimming capability for our tactical vehicles. A better approach might be to concentrate on modern, light, mobile assault bridging and ferry equipment, thus freeing our vehicles of one more complication.

Avoiding Unjustifiable Costs

In this connection we are doing our best to avoid so-called "gold plating" which leads to unjustifiable costs. The term "austere version" is sometimes used to describe this state of simplicity in getting away from "gold plating." We must be careful, however, that this term is not misinterpreted. It is true that we want simple and rugged equipment and weapons, but we also want the best possible performance within the state of the art against the estimated threat. We have a real problem in the Army because modern weapons, whether we like it or not, are sophisticated. Today even the rifleman's M-16 is a relatively sophisticated weapon that requires considerable care. In other words,

we have had to pay a price to get the high performance which this rifle provides to the individual soldier. A modern tank is about as sophisticated a piece of equipment as you can imagine. To defeat first-class enemy armor requires such things as a laser range finder, stabilization gear which allows the tank to shoot on the move, night vision devices, and a relatively sophisticated missile launcher/gun as the primary weapon. The trick is to get such sophistication without making the end result overly complex. One helpful approach is to build in reliability and maintainability from the very first design efforts.

Sophisticated Forces

Sometimes we hear statements to the effect that the type of Army forces fighting in Vietnam are relatively unsophisticated and not really usable against a first-class enemy in a more developed area of the world -- Europe, for example. This is simply not true. Despite the close nature of the land combat in Vietnam against an enemy who is difficult to identify, who is skilled in guerrilla-type warfare, we are successfully using in battle many sophisticated items of equipment. Take the helicopter for example. Surely this is a sophisticated weapons system. The helicopter has revolutionized ground warfare and it or its follow-on air vehicles will be used from here on out regardless of the locale or the enemy. It is clear to us in the Army that air mobile concepts developed in Vietnam have very valid application in other possible theaters of operation, to include Europe. An all-weather helicopter gun ship with the TOW anti-tank weapon, for example, may well prove to be the answer to the very sizable enemy armor threat in Europe. The chopper, being able to move considerably faster than the tank and over any terrain, should be invaluable in stopping armor breakthroughs. Other Vietnam developments include a whole field of new sensor technology which has proved to be most effective in a wide variety of combat situations. On the wide fronts and varied terrain of Europe, we believe that such devices will have equal success. Night vision and all-weather capabilities being developed in Vietnam likewise will have complete applicability to the European environment.

Individual Soldier

One area which we must improve concerns the Infantryman himself. With the increasing lethality of weapons, we must find better ways to protect the individual soldier when he is operating on his own two feet. Much more lethal explosives and fragmentation, not to mention improved individual weapons, have increased the vulnerability of the soldier. We have failed to find an effective way to detect mines and booby traps. This is painfully obvious in Vietnam where the proportion of very bad wounds from such weapons is higher than any war we have ever fought. Although we have done very well by our soldier with respect to medical care and evacuation, thanks to modern medicine and the helicopter, we still have a long way to go.

In connection with the manpower question, we have not only the incentive of reduced casualties but also the driving fiscal cost aspect. What has become true in today's world of rising costs and standards of living is that people comprise our major monetary costs. This means that we not only want to keep our headquarters and overhead down to a minimum, but we must continue to look at the size of our basic units and formations. We believe that with respect to combat units we seek to reduce the strength without any degradation of combat effectiveness. This comes about as a result of improved range, lethality, and efficiency of weapons and equipment which can provide the necessary trade-off in performance. So we expect to see a trend toward smaller rifle companies, tank companies, and artillery batteries in our basic Army formations.

Materiel Costs

On the quantitative side with respect to materiel, we see clearly that as we produce new equipment of greater performance, we must find ways of offsetting the higher costs which inevitably and invariably accompany the new item. One way, of course, is an internal trade-off substituting the new item for the old on a different ratio which will balance off the increased cost. Another way is to reduce our over-all total quantitative requirement. We can do

this in a variety of ways, for example, providing only our forward battlefield area tactical vehicles with high-performance cross-country mobility and using much lower performance commercial type vehicles in the rear areas. On the management side we are also taking a hard look at all aspects.

Changes and Reforms

We are looking at organizational changes and reforms which would lead to more decentralization and reduced overhead. Here I have in mind fewer headquarters and fewer layers and echelons.

Operational reforms are in order. We are developing new concepts of depot operations handling our wholesale supply which take advantage of the most modern storage techniques and transportation advancements. Utilizing computer technology, management know-how, high speed air and sea lift, and containerization, we can literally put some items of inventory into motion, thus relying on a highly efficient and compressed pipeline as opposed to slow, ponderous pipeline with large forward stocks on the ground. Our maintenance concepts are also rapidly changing with changing technology. Here I have in mind the concept of modular maintenance, replacing components and black boxes, and doing repair and rebuild work well to the rear, perhaps all the way back to the United States, as opposed to making repairs in the forward areas with small spare parts.

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In conclusion let me say that we in the Army are not afraid of challenge, change and critical analysis from within or without. Our Army today is a sound, solid one which continues to perform gallantly and selflessly in Vietnam with no lowering of morale. I believe this is a great tribute to our youth who perform in a hostile environment halfway around the world and do their duty without complaint despite the public clamor and debate that goes on in the United States. I have nothing but admiration for these fellow Americans. I firmly believe that we are on the right track in Vietnam and that with reasonably good fortune, an acceptable outcome will be the result. It will, nevertheless, take time as we reduce our forces and train, equip, and prepare our Vietnamese allies to take over more and more of the fighting.

Address before a Joint Meeting of the American Ordnance Association and the Association of the U.S. Army Chapters, Phoenix, Arizona, 26 January 1970.

PHILOSOPHY ON MANAGEMENT

914. GENERAL F. J. CHESAREK, Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command, describes his philosophy on management:

Redstone Arsenal and its offspring, the Marshall Space Flight Center, and the city of Huntsville form a triad of operators the like of which exists nowhere else in the country.

It reminds me of a speech by the President of Koppers Company, Mr. Fletcher Byrom, to an international marketing conference earlier this year in which he assumed that he was about to be fired by his board of directors and was counseling his successor, citing nine commandments. I won't list them all, but a few of them are well worth repeating because they not only describe the attitude of this remarkable triad here at Huntsville, but also describe my own philosophy on management.

Opportunities

First, he said, hang loose, which he described as the ability to take advantage of opportunities as they arise.

He enjoined his successor to listen to the winds of change and never fail to support an adequate research and development program.

He placed great reliance on intuition, and this is where the Huntsville triad has really profited.

You sensed the dawn of a new era for this area and moved out to capitalize on it.

Lastly, Mr. Byrom emphasized to his successor that he should make sure he generates a reasonable number of mistakes.

Now this comes naturally to some people, but some executives rigidify their organization with checks and counterchecks, discourage innovation, and in the end so structure themselves that they miss the kind of offbeat opportunity that can make an organization.

While it is a cliché to say we learn by our mistakes, it can be stated more strongly that you cannot learn without mistakes.

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What May Lie Ahead

We hope that the severe budget cuts that face the Army today and in the foreseeable future will be so structured as to continue to support this cradle of research that has proved to be of such tremendous value to the nation and, indeed, to the world.

I would be less than candid, however, if I were to prophesy a continuation of the level of employment and productivity that has occurred over the past ten years.

Under stringent fund and personnel ceiling limitations, we in the Army Materiel Command must follow the commandments expressed by Mr. Byrom to hang loose and seek opportunities to maximize the use of available resources, to preserve our research and development capabilities, to seek innovation, and not to fear intelligent chance-taking which can lead to bigger and better things to come.

Remarks to the Tennessee Valley Chapter, Association of the U.S. Army, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama, 9 December 1969.

TEN POINT RESERVE COMPONENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

915. MAJOR GENERAL W. J. SUTTON, Chief Army Reserve, highlights areas for improvement in the Army Reserve:

... Much of what we have done, and are doing, is reflected in the Ten Point Reserve Component Improvement Program recently announced by the Chief of Reserve Components, Lieutenant General William R. Peers. In his Ten Point program, General Peers has documented significant areas in which improvement should be made, along with the problems and required corrective action, in order to effectively manage improveOur November-December issue of the Army Reserve magazine carries a comprehensive article by General Peers on the Ten Point program, and I thought I might contribute to this conference by highlighting the projects it covers.

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Equipment Distribution and Modernization

Under the Ten Point program, the first problem area, and one of the greatest concern, is providing sufficient modern equipment to support training. Much of our equipment is ten years old, or older. Some of it is even obsolete. Consequently, a five year equipment distribution plan has been developed and submitted in hopes of relieving Reserve Component units of this problem.

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Home Station Facilities and Training Areas

The second point listed in the Ten Point program concerns construction. Over half of our Army Reserve training centers and National Guard armories are considered inadequate. Few of our units have suitable tactical training areas near their home stations. To correct the deficiencies, a 10-year construction plan has been submitted to the Department of Defense for approval.

Recruitment and Retention

Point three refers to personnel recruitment and retention. All of us know that attracting prior service personnel, Vietnam veterans and retention of first term enlistees, are steps necessary to maintain experience and stability in Reserve Component units. Under the Ten Point program, a study group has been formed to develop motivational incentives which will be broad enough to attract these personnel.

Personnel Qualification

In the "Personnel Qualification" area, the fourth point in the program, we have overcome several hurdles recently which should be of great assistance to you. Not long ago, as you well know, we had a REP backlog, which was a real problem. Now, with a portion of the Army training base reserved each month for REP personnel, I expect considerably less delay in their beginning the initial period of active duty for training. We have been guaranteed a portion of the Active Army training base capabilities across the MOS spectrum.

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Technicians and Advisors

On technicians and advisors, another point, we have a different situation. We have only about 65 per cent of our authorized manning level of technicians in the Army Reserve. Money and spaces to bring us up to 90% manning have been allocated to CONUS and overseas commands and DA has issued instructions that these jobs be filled by 30 June 70....

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Aviation

The sixth point covered concerns aviation. It is fully realized that Army aviation personnel being released from active duty are an asset the Army can ill afford to lose. We must have more modern aircraft and an aggressive recruiting program to attract these combat experienced aviator personnel into our units. To achieve this goal, positive action is being taken to develop a baseline structure, obtain aircraft and aviator training spaces, and implement an aggressive aviator recruiting program.

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Improved Readiness

Another matter being brought into focus by the Ten Point program is improved readiness. To sustain a high level of readiness in the Reserve Components, it is considered essential to have reviews made of ongoing programs and to maintain complete compatibility with the Active Army.

This is being accomplished by developing plans for systematic transition to the G-Series TOE - by ensuring that units being demobilized are closely monitored during their transition to Reserve status - by placing units in the proper priority with active units - and by fostering closer association with active units to gain maximum utilization of their modern equipment, expertise, and doctrine.

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One Army Concept

Under the Ten Point program, the "One Army" concept is listed as an objective to establish mutual confidence between the Active Army, the Army Reserve, and the National Guard. This can be done through better understanding, development of a sense of belonging, full integration of planning, and mutual cooperation.

We are working toward this goal by fostering instruction on the Reserve Components in Active Army Schools, by encouraging DA and DOD staff visits, and by upgrading the role of the Reserve Components in any future expansion of the Army.

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Expanded Public Affairs

In the Public Affairs area, the goal of the Ten Point program is to improve the flow and applicability of information about the Reserve Components to both the American public and the Active Army. It also aims to expand the domestic action program, improve cooperation and rapport between the Active Army and the Reserve Components, and increase the attractiveness of Reserve service.

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Management

The last point in the Ten Point program refers to close supervision over the development of plans and implementation of programs within the Ten Points. It is titled "Management," and its goal is to ensure budgetary support, equitable allocation of resources, and accurate and timely flow of information.

Remarks before the USAR Training Division Commanders' Conference, Fort Bliss, Texas, 27 January 1970.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 9 January Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor announced that due to budget reductions it will be necessary to separate approximately 5,037 civilian career and career-conditional employees at 44 military installations throughout the United States. This reduction-in-force is expected to be completed within the next two months.
- 12 January The 1st Infantry Division was identified as the major element of the Phase III redeployment of U.S. forces from Vietnam announced by President Richard Nixon on 15 December 1969. The 3d Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division was also included in the Phase III redeployment.
- 12 January As announced by MACV, at Saigon, when the 1st Infantry Division returns to the United States, it will be redesignated as the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and will take over the mission, assignments, organization and unit stationing of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The 24th Division will be inactivated.
- 26 January As revised, DoD Instruction 1332.15, "Early Release of Military Enlisted Personnel for College or Vocational/Technical School Enrollment," issued 26 January 1970, now additionally provides that eligible enlisted personnel may be released up to three months prior to their normal separation date to enter a recognized vocational/technical school.
- 29 January DoD announced that the total numerical strength of the Armed Forces on 31 December 1969, based on preliminary reports, was 3,298,172. This represents a decrease of 52,784 from the 30 November 1969 combined strength of 3,350,956. The December strength figure of the Army was 1,431,838; the Navy, 721,992; the Marine Corps, 301,675; and the Air Force, 842,667.

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