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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1967.
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(2) November.

(a) 1 November 196th Brigade elements were engaged in the vicinity of BAU GON (XT438500) evacuating and destroying the large rice cache of approximately 870 tons that had been discovered during the previous month. VC reaction consisted of sniper and mining incidents.

(b) The area in the vicinity of (XT438500) north to SOUI BA HOA (XT4156) was part of a large VC logistical base controlled by Group 82, Forward Rear Service, COSVN an analysis of captured documents revealed.

(c) 4 November the VC launched two diversionary attacks in an attempt to draw US Forces away from SOUI BA HOA. Elements of 272d VC Main Force Regiment attacked the RFPPF outpost at SOUI CAU (XT438352) and suffered heavy casualties. At 0208 and 0545 the Brigade Base Camp received two mortar attacks. One hundred and three craters were located and crater analysis were performed. Firing positions for six 82mm mortars, 110 fuze caps and defensive positions for 71 personnel were found vicinity (XT152526). This site is now given a daily visual reconnaissance.

(d) The 273d VC Main Force Regiment vicinity (XT410539) made contact with elements of the Brigade during 4 November. The VC were well disciplined and supplied with ammunition. They defended tenaciously from reinforced log and concrete bunkers.

(e) Elements of the Brigade with the 1st Division Command Post at DAU TIENG (XT495475) and the Brigade base camp received mortar attacks the night of 11-12 November. Eighty 82mm mortar craters were found in the Brigade base camp. The results were three US KHA and 57 WHA.

(f) Two VC platoons encountered elements of 4/31 Inf on the eastern side of NUI BA DEN (XT285599). The VC conducted a deliberate defense from fortified caves.

(g) Between Tay Ninh City and SUOI DA elements of the Brigade detected and destroyed 14 anti-vehicle mines. Four mines caused the destruction of four vehicles, three US KHA and eight US WHA.

(h) Throughout November the VC harassed the Brigade base camp perimeter nightly with small incidents. There were no US casualties sustained and little evidence was found of VC losses.

(i) The VC initiated 23 small action against RFPPF outposts and six against Special Forces Camps.

(j) Two VC main force elements made contact with Special Forces CIDG elements on 21 November vicinity (XT038538). A VC battalion made contact with a BEN SOI CIDG company and on 23 November vicinity (XT404544) two VC companies engaged two SOUI DA CIDG companies.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96250

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967.
(RCS CSFOR - 65) (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Operational Report for Quarterly Period (RCS CSFOR-65)
Location: Vicinity, Tay Ninh (XT165522), RVN
Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles
Prepared by: Captain Andre F. Le Blanc, Brigade Staff Historian

1. (C) Significant Organizational Activities:

a. Operations:

(1) General. There were three Brigade operations, 14 Battalion size operations, eight company sized BUSHMASTERS, 26 platoon sized BUSHMASTERS and 317 small unit actions. Significant enemy contact was made on all of the Brigade operations. (Boundaries of the areas of operation- See Appendix 1.)

(2) ATTLEBORO: (14 Sep - 25 Nov 66). Phase I of ATTLEBORO ended on 22 Sep 66. Phase II commenced on 18 Oct when the 2d Bn 1st Inf was airlifted to DAU TIENG Air Base vicinity (XT495474). Phase II still in progress at the start of the reporting period.

(a) Phase II - continuing. (18 Oct 66 - 12 Nov 66). On 1 Nov 66 the concept and size of the operation changed from two battalions (2/1st and 4/31st Inf), to a brigade operation, with the 196th concurrently assuming OPCON of the 1st Bn 27th Inf. On 3 Nov 66 1/27 conducted a two company airmobile assault and established blocking positions. At 031040 Company C, 1/27 became heavily engaged with a reinforced VC company - armed with AW and SA. At 031148 Company B, 2/1 became engaged with an estimated VC company using SA and AW and claymores. The 2/27th was committed as a RRF to reinforce engaged elements of 1/27. The 3/21st Inf airlifted to battle area on 031215 (approx time). Enemy contact continued throughout the day. By 041800 the Brigade had committed: 1/27; Company A and C, 2/27; 2/1st; Company G, 3/21st and 4/31st. Company B, 2/27 remained at DAU TIENG Air Base on stand-by as RRF. A Btry, 3/82d Arty and A Btry 1/8th Arty continued in DS from DAU TIENG with four 155 Hows supporting from SOUI DA. On 4 Nov 66, A and C Companies, 2/27 and B and C Companies, 2/1st were heavily engaged with a dug-in VC main force unit, estimated to be battalion size vicinity (XT410538). Elements of 1/27 engaged the VC unit from the Southwest to relieve pressure on engaged units. Contact broken. No enemy

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Downgraded at three year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

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(c) Phase III (1-6 Dec 66). The Brigade conducted search and destroy operations in AO 3 with three battalions: 2/1 Inf, 3/21 Inf, and 4/31 Inf. Concurrently three CIDG companies, under the control of Team B-32, United States Special Forces (USSF), conducted search and destroy operations vicinity (XT0358), with no VC contact.

(d) Phase IV (7-14 Dec 66). The 4/31 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of NUI BA DEN. The operation began with Company A conducting airmobile assault vicinity (XT257555), to secure a Fire Support Base. The remainder of the battalion followed in convoy to conduct search and destroy operations in the area. No significant VC contact was made.

(e) Phase V (1-11 Dec 66). The 3/21 conducted a search and destroy operation in AO BLUE and secured Highway 26 vicinity (XT3445) with Company A, Company C and the Anti Tank platoon from Company D. The operation resulted in 11 VC KIA (BC), two VC KIA (poss), three VC KBA, one rifle, and eight 60mm mortar rounds captured.

(f) Phase VI (7-22 Dec 66) & Phase X (22-26 Dec 66). Task Force 2/34 Armor (Company A and C, 2/34 Armor, F Troop, 17th Cavalry, Company A, 4/31 Inf and Battery A, 3/82 Artillery) was attached to the Brigade on 7 December 1966, and conducted search and destroy operations in AO BLUE, and secured Highway 26. Phase X began when 4/31 Inf relieved task force 2/34 Armor in place and assumed the security mission along Highway 26 in AO BLUE from (XT308487) to (XT376425). The operation terminated with limited VC contact.

(g) Phase VII (8-12 Dec 66). 2/1 Inf was airlifted to vicinity (XT168608) (AO WHITE) to conduct search and destroy operations vicinity (XT171610). No enemy contact was made during the operations.

(h) Phase VIII (14-23 Dec 66). 4/31 Inf conducted a search and destroy operation along both sides of the Oriental River sweeping southeast from vicinity (XT1046) to (XT1940). The operation resulted in one VC KIA (BC), two VC KIA (poss), one 7.92 submachine gun, one Chicom claymore mine and 1600 pounds of polished rice captured.

(i) Phase IX (16-23 Dec 66). 2/1 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in AO BLACK vicinity (WT996485). Company A conducted an airmobile assault on LZ X-RAY, vicinity (WT996485) and established a forward Command Post vicinity (XT010504). Daily search and destroy operations were conducted. The battalion was airlifted to base camp with no enemy contact made.

(j) Phase Xa (26-30 Dec 66). 4/31 Inf conducted a search and destroy operation in conjunction with one RF/PF company in the southeastern portion of AO BLUE. The operation resulted in three VC KIA (BC).

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activity during the evening hours. Heavy fighting again broke out the morning of the fifth as 1/27 and 2/27 began attacking with the 1/27 repulsing six mass attacks, causing the VC heavy casualties. In the afternoon of the fifth Company A and B, 3/21 was committed to aid in securing LZ for extraction of 1/27 and 2/27. Extraction completed that day. On 5 Nov 66, the Brigade came under OPCON of the 1st Inf Div, with attachment being effected on 6 Nov 66. Fighting from this day to 11 Nov 66 was sporadic with friendly casualties being light. Enemy casualties not determined. Brigade (less 2/1st Inf) detached from 1st Inf Div and returned to Base Camp on 11 Nov 66. The 2/1st Inf released from attachment on 12 Nov 66 and airlifted to TAY NINH Base Camp.

(b) Phase II - Continuing. (12-25 Nov 66):

1. Brigade (-) in defense of Base Camp.

2. The 3/21st Inf remained in security of Base Camp, alternating companies for conduct of BUSHMASTER operations in Brigade TAOR.

3. The 2/1st Inf during period 14-25 Nov 66 conducted road security (ROADRUNNER) along Highway 26 and limited search and destroy operations in AO BLUE, Brigade TAOR. Contact made on four occasions resulting in one VC KIA (BC) and the capture of one Chicom pistol and one 7.62 Chicom rifle, and the destruction of two bunkers and one tunnel.

4. The 4/31st Inf during period 12-18 Nov 66 conducted highway security (ROADRUNNER) and search and destroy operations vicinity NUI BA DEN Mountain (XT2758). VC contact occurred on two occasions during this period. Results to VC unknown. Friendly casualties very light.

(3) LANCASTER (25 Nov - continuing). (Reference OPLAN 25th Div Title: FITCHBURG). LANCASTER has been divided into phases and each phase covers the unit (s) and their area of operation. With the exception of Phase III which was a brigade operation, the remainder were battalion or company size operations. Areas utilized were within the Brigade Tactical Area of Operation (TAOR), the rock quarry vicinity of NUI BA DEN and Hwy 26 located in AO BLUE.

(a) Phase I (25-29 Nov 66). The 4/31st Inf relieved 2/1st Inf of Hwy 26 route security mission in AO BLUE. VC contact on two occasions with unknown results:

(b) Phase II (28-30 Nov 66). Task Force 3/21st Inf with Company C, 1/5th (M) Inf attached, conducted search and destroy operations in THANH DIEN forest south of the TAY NINH base camp in AO 2. The operation was in conjunction with the PHILCAG and ARVN for the purpose of clearing the forest prior to PHILCAG beginning their New Life Hamlet. Contact with the VC was established twice during the operation with unknown results.

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(k) Phase XI (1-4 Jan 67). 3/21 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in AO GREEN, vicinity (XT226572). The battalion CP moved forward with Battery B, 3/82 Arty. Companies A, B, and C conducted local patrolling vicinity NUI BA' DEN. No significant VC contact was made.

(1) Phase XII (1-7 Jan 67). 2/1 Inf conducted route security of Highway 26 in AO ELUE and rock quarry security vicinity NUI BA DEN. The rifle companies (B&C), Recon & Mortar Platoons with elements of Headquarters Company (CP Group), established forward CP vicinity (XT340423), with the mission of securing Highway 26 from coordinates (XT308486) to (XT373423). Concurrently, they conducted surveillance patrols in area 4,000 to 5,000 meters North and South of the Highway. Company A, 2/1 Inf, with an Anti-Tank platoon attached, located at forward CP vicinity (XT267572) and continued security of quarry (rock crusher site) on NUI BA DEN vicinity coordinates (XT266577)/(XT263587). No significant VC contact was made.

(m) Phase XIII (7-25 Jan 67). 4/31. Inf conducted route security of Highway 26 in AO BLUE and rock quarry security vicinity NUI BA DEN. No significant VC contact was made.

(n) Phase XIV (26 January - 1 February 67) 4/31 Inf moved to AO BLUE, vicinity (XT305483), to secure Highway 26. Company B was dispatched to secure the rock crusher site. The battalion conducted route security of Highway 26 in AO BLUE and rock crusher security vicinity NUI BA DEN. No significant VC contact was made.

(o) Phase XV (27-31 Jan 67). Task Force 3/21 Inf conducted a joint operation with PHILCAG. Company A 3/21 Inf and B Battery, 3/82 Artillery departed base camp 281235 hrs and closed FSB vicinity (XT160467) at 1340 hrs. The Battalion Command Post, Company B and 2nd platoon A Troop, 3/4 Cavalry, departed base camp 280858 hrs and closed FSB vicinity (XT160467) at 0946 hrs. The battalion conducted search and destroy operations in zone and supported the PHILCAG engineer effort. No significant VC contact was made.

(4) CEDAR FALLS (5-25 January 67) The Brigade Task Force consisted of: 2/1 Inf, 3/21 Inf, 3/82 Arty, F Troop, 17th Cavalry, 175th Engineers Company, 2/22 (M) Inf, 1/5 (M) Inf, B Troop, 3/4 Cavalry, 2/13 Arty (-) and A Btry 2/77 Arty. The mission of the Brigade was to locate and destroy key VC installations and fortifications, deny the VC the use of the area as a logistical base and headquarters and to establish blocking positions to prevent exfiltration by the VC across the Saigon River. The operation began when the Brigade Command Post moved overland to TRUNG LAP. On 6 January 1/5 (M) Inf moved to secure LZ's vicinity FSB #2 (XT6023) and FSB #3 (XT5925) for an airmobile assault by companies A and B, 3/21 Inf. These two companies provided security for the FSB's and the eventual air-lift by CH-47 of Btry B, Btry C and Btry A, 3/82 Arty to FSB #2 and FSB #3 respectively. Battery A, 3/82 Arty and A 2/77 Arty were located at FSB #3.

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(3) December.

(a) Brigade elements encountered attempts to interdict the CAU KHOI Plantation roads with mines.

(b) Two Brigade unit base camps in the CAU KHOI Plantation were mortared.

(c) Brigade elements conducting search and destroy operations in the CAU KHOI Plantation, noted the VC continued to utilize sniper tactics and command detonated claymore mines.

(d) The VC on NUI BA DEN made contact with Brigade squad size elements on five occasions between 15 and 17 December.

(e) Elements of the 9th VC Div 271 Regiment attacked TRANG SUP on 20 December.

(f) Agent reports and visual reconnaissance indicated preparation for an attack on TRAI BI Special Forces Camp.

(4) January.

(a) VC activity in reaction to operation CEDAR FALLS was evasive in nature. The VC exfiltrated their main force units from the area of operation. The majority of contacts consisted of ambushing small VC groups attempting to leave the IRON TRIANGLE area via the Saigon River.

(b) 2/22 (M) Inf made two contacts with squad size VC units who employed anti-tank weapons. Three APC's were destroyed and six US WHA.


(c) VC mining increased along the routes of communication between CU CHI-TRUNG LAP and from TRUNG LAP into the operational area. A total of forty-eight anti-tank mines were recovered. Mine activities accounted for 70% of the casualties.

(d) Eleven VC rallied to elements of the Brigade and to TRUNG LAP district officials during CEDAR FALLS. Their reasons for rallying were: the prolonged presence of US troops in the area; the fear of US artillery and air power; and the continued hardships of VC life.

(e) Visual reconnaissance and agent reports indicated VC resupply and infiltration in the northern areas of War Zone C continue. The area from XOM GIUA (WT969700) to (WT950780) has been heavily traveled and off loading points along the RACH BENG GO show heavy use. On three occasions, truck convoys in Cambodia have been sighted proceeding south along Route 22 toward the border. Aircraft on VR missions continued to receive ground fire. The increased activity in the area indicates the 271st VC Main Force Regiment

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Battery A, 3/13 Arty was located at FSB #1 and secured by Company C, 3/21 Inf. On 7 January 1/5 (M) Inf moved and secured LZ Victor for an airmobile assault by 2/1 Inf. The 2/22 (M) Inf attacked toward Obj C vicinity (XT5631). During the remainder of the operation 3/21 Inf secured FSB #1, FSB #2 and FSB #3 and conducted company sized airmobile assaults to search and clear villages, acting mainly on information received from Returnees. F Troop, 17th Cavalry and 175th Engineers Company cleared and secured routes for necessary resupply convoys. The remaining Brigade elements conducted search and destroy operations in zone and established blocking positions along the Saigon River. The 175th Engr Co improved roads from TRUNG LAP and constructed new roads to FSB 2 and 3, permitting ground resupply. The occupation of blocking positions proved highly successful as large number of VC were killed attempting to flee from the area North of the river and the Iron Triangle. Information from "Returnees" assisted the Brigade in locating cache sites and large tunnel complexes. It was in these tunnel complexes that the most valuable intelligence information was gained. Significant results achieved during Operation CEDAR FALLS by the Brigade included: 220 VC KIA (BC), 66 VC KIA (poss), 21 VC (POW), 357.1 tons of rice and 73 weapons captured, and numerous documents of vital interest to Army Intelligence, including key maps of the battle area, and VC After Action Battle Reports.

b. Artillery: There were 50,201 rounds fired during the period with the following results: 59 VC KIA (BC), 69 VC KIA (poss), 50 structures destroyed, 14 sampans destroyed, 33 bunkers destroyed, and 20 secondary fires & explosions.

c. Air Support:

(1) There were 721 air sorties during the period with the following results: 24 VC KBA (BC), 172 VC KBA (poss), 126 structures destroyed, 193 bunkers destroyed, 45 sampans destroyed, and 30 secondary fires & explosions.

(2) On more than half of the 721 sorties no bomb damage assessment was available due to the nature of the mission, the nature of the target, or because no information was available by friendly troops assessing the damage.

d. Intelligence:

(1) General: During the months of November and December Viet Cong initiated incidents against the 196th Light Infantry Brigade Base Camp and within Tay Ninh Province increased. However, in January the VC shifted their emphasis to their own resupply and procurement of rice during the harvest.

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(c) Ice: Potable ice is shipped by refrigerator van from the 25th Division. A potable ice plant within the Brigade base camp is scheduled for completion in February 1967. The plant will have a capacity of 30,000 pounds of potable ice per day.

	Pounds per mess hall
Potable	25 average per day
Non-potable	100 average per day

(3) Class II & IV:

(a) The 8th Support Battalion maintains a central supply point and issues TA 50-902.

(b) Items in critical demand and action taken.

1. Twenty six 10 KW generators. The generators are on valid due out, document number 6262-1026. At the end of the period it was found that 800 generators are available for shipment from CONUS and lift data will be furnished by Hq, 1st Log Command as soon as possible.

2. Lighting Set 6230-299-5642. This item was requested on USARV Form 47 but disapproved stating that the request should be submitted to PA&E for installation. A subsequent request was submitted requesting temporary loan of this item. As of the end of the report period no reply has been received on the status of this item.

3. A semi-trailer tank, potable water 5,000 gallons with prime mover, was requisitioned on DSO Doc. No. 6305-1004 and 6305-1005. Item status at the end of the period no reply.

4. Four each trucks, tank, fuel servicing, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton 6x6 have been requested to augment the bulk POL transport capability of the 8th Support Battalion. These items have been requested on DSO Doc. No. 6305-1003, IPD 05. At the end of the report period the status was no reply.

(4) Class III: Issues during the period.

Commodity	Daily (average)
Diesel	2000 (gals)
Mogas	2500 (gals)
JP-4	15000 (gals)
Avgas	740 (gals)

(5) Class V: The Brigade issue total was 7,849 tons for the period, average per day was 87.9 tons.

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is in Northwestern War Zone C.

(f) VC activity in opposition to Operation RELIEF in the THANH DIEN forest area continued. Friendly positions and installations in the area received mortars and rifle grenades on five occasions. One PHILCAG soldier was killed and one wounded.

(g) The major VC initiated incidents was the mortar attack against the Brigade base camp, 290120 January 1967. Eighty-eight 82mm mortar rounds were received in the base camp and an additional 70-100 rounds fell outside the perimeter. Crater analysis revealed all rounds fired were 82mm. Nine firing positions and thirty security positions were discovered vicinity (XT194548).

(5) VC Personnel and Equipment Losses 1 Nov - 31 Jan 67.

VC KIA (BG)	441
VC KIA (poss)	338
VCC	24
Small arms	138
Grain & rice	774 tons
Returnees	12

e. Logistics.

(1) The First Logistical Command supports the 196th Light Infantry Brigade utilizing a fixed base camp area forward supply distribution point within the Brigade base camp. All stockage levels of Class I, II, (selected repair parts), III, IV (engineer) and V are maintained by the 266 Supply and Service Bn (SS).

(2) Class I Supply:

Type Ration	Stockage objective	O/H (days)
A	First Log	First Log
B	First Log	First Log
C	10	10

(a) Fresh fruits and vegetables are being received dependent upon availability of these perishables in-country. The Brigade has received adequate amounts in a satisfactory condition.

(b) Ice cream is issued three times a week at the rate of 2.5 gallons per 100 men.

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2. Over 300,000 gallons of water was processed during operation Attleboro and Cedar Falls by the 175th.

3. On operation Cedar Falls, eight miles of two lane scrapped and shaped roads were constructed between the Brigades' forward base camp and two fire support bases.

4. One timber trestle bridge was constructed at (XT366458) and an elderly French Eiffel bridge located at (XT213542) had the decking replaced.

f. Administration.

(1) Personnel. During the period the personnel posture of the Brigade has been excellent. Assigned strength (approximately 105.8%) exceeds the authorized strength. There are no major shortages. The eligibility of E4's for promotion will help the E5 strength in MOS 11B4 and 11C4. Fill action for casualties has been adequate except in specific MOS (such as 67W). In some instances, on the job training is being taken to retain enlisted men in jobs not encountered until deployment. Approval of new Table of Organization and Equipment positions would relieve both the overage of 5.8% and the inability to promote enlisted men being retrained. During December 1966 and early January 1967, the first step to partially relieve the July 1967 rotational hump was taken by the infusion of 426 personnel with the 25th Infantry Division. The program was highly successful, and accounts for the large number of replacements received during the period.

(2) Key losses/gains:

(a) 1 November 1966, Colonel Francis S. Conaty Jr., Deputy Commander, assigned to HHC 1st Bde 25th Inf Div APO 96225

(b) 10 November 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Hugh J. Lynch, Battalion Commander 4th Bn, 31st Inf reassigned to HQ USARV, APO 96307

(c) 11 November 1966, Lieutenant Colonel James P. Coley assumed command of 4th Bn, 31st Inf.

(d) 13 November 1966, Brigadier General Edward De Saussure Jr, Brigade Commander, reassigned to I FFORCEN Arty APO 96240

(e) 14 November 1966, Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles, assumed command of 196th Lt Inf Bde

(f) 18 November 1966, Major Stephen E. Nichols assumed command of 2d Bn, 1st Inf.

(f) 18 November 1966, Major Stephen E. Nichols assumed command of 2d Bn, 1st Inf.

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(6) Maintenance.

(a) The maintenance platoon of the 8th Support Battalion supported many non-brigade units, however, the 548th Lt Equipment Company will phase into operation on 1 Feb 67, taking over the support of non-Brigade units.

(b) The maintenance platoon completed its move to a permanent location during January 1967. Operation at complete capacity was realized on 21 January 1967.

(c) The following is a completion of job orders for the reporting period by type: wheeled vehicles 95, artillery 69, small arms 302, signal 652, fire control 281, engineer equipment 93, office machines 31, service and evacuation 277.

(7) Engineer Section:

(a) General: The Brigade engineer section has operational control of the organic 175th Engineers Company (GS), and gives priority guidance for base camp constructions to B Company 588th Engineer Battalion and the 507th Engineer Detachment (R&U). Throughout operations Attleboro and Cedar Falls, the Brigade received general support in the form of construction, mine clearing and water point operations.

(b) Base Camp Support: During the period, the three Engineer units supported the Brigades' base camp development projects in addition to the requirements of lodger (1st Logistical Command) units.

1. Seventeen permanent type buildings were constructed within the Brigades' area.

2. Working at times 24 hours a day, over 75,000 cubic yards of laterite were trucked into the base camp.

3. On 4 January, the Brigade engineer effort began receiving limited small amounts of crushed rock from the quarry site at the base of NUI BA DEN.

4. During the period, the dry season began and so did the dust problem. Penaprime and a mixture of diesel and penaprime have been spread on road surfaces and helicopter pads.

(8) Tactical Operations:

1. Each of the Brigades' infantry battalions, when on operations, has attached one squad from the 175th Engineers Company.

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(7) Provost Marshal operations.

(a) General. The Provost Marshal section of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade is responsible for Military Police support of base camp and Brigade tactical operations.

(b) Base Camp operations.

1. Daily commitments during the reporting period included four roving patrols and three stationary posts. The roving patrols are responsible for the enforcement of regulations within the base camp area, villages surrounding the base camp, and Tay Ninh City. The three stationary posts are the Brigade Tactical Operation Center, and one post at each of the two base camp entrances.

2. Processing Indigenous Personnel. The processing of local Vietnamese civilians by the Military Police, in close coordination with the Vietnamese National Police, began 5 December 1966. The processing is done twice a day except on Sundays. There is an average of 3240 civilians processed weekly for labor within the base camp.

3. Prisoner of War Collection Point.

a. Due to the inadequacy of the old collection point, construction of a new POW complex began on 2 January 1967 and was operational on 29 January 1967.

b. During the period there were 86 detainees processed through the collection points: 84 through the old and two through the new. Of the 84, 59 were released, 19 were civilian defendants and six were VC POW's. Of the two processed in the new complex, one was released and one was a civilian defendant.

4. Convoy Escorts. Convoys are escorted 7.6 miles from a check point east of Tay Ninh City to the Brigade base camp. Convoys arrive from both Cu Chi and Dau Tieng. There are, during convoy movement, two traffic control post operated in Tay Ninh. Three hundred and nine convoys composed of 28,689 vehicles were escorted.

5. Registration. Two privately owned firearms were registered during the period.

6. Discipline, Law and Order. There were 228 non-traffic violations, including minor offenses during the period, and of these six were unfounded. Seventy one cases were investigated with seven becoming CID cases. One hundred and fifty-five offenders were indentified. Thirty-eight minor traffic offenses and 41 motor vehicle accidents were processed. The Brigade had one motor vehicle fatality.

(c) Brigade Tactical Support.

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(g) 19 November 1966, Colonel Charles P. Murray Jr., assumed duties of Deputy Commander.

(h) 19 November 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Weddle assumed duties of Executive Officer.

(i) 24 November 1966, Major Daniel K. Hall, Bde Chaplain assigned to I Field Force Vietnam APO 96240

(j) 5 December 1966, Lieutenant Colonel John F. Russell assumed the duties of the Bde Chaplain.

(k) 13 December 1966, Major Cedric L. Blackwell, Bde S2, reassigned to Georgia Sector Command XII USA Corps

(l) 14 December 1966, Major Derrell J. Savage assumed duties of Brigade S2.

(m) 7 January 1967, Major William E. Koerher assumed duties of Brigade S4.

(n) 27 January 1967, Major Derrell J. Savage, Bde S2, assumed duties of Bn S3, 4th Bn, 31st Inf

(o) 27 January 1967, Major Thomas A. Seale assumed duties of Brigade S2.

(3) Strengths as of 31 January 1967

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Auth	233	21	3563	3817
Asg	248	16	3889	4153
PDY	232	16	3644	3892

(4) Losses (1 Nov 66 - 31 January 67)

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
KHA	3	0	63	66
WHA	11	0	222	233
MHA	0	0	0	0

(5) Gains (1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67)

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
27	2	1009	1038

(6) The following awards were approved: DEC-1, SS-7, HS "V"-52, ES "M"-41, SM-1, ARCOM "V"-60, ARCOM "M"-28, PH-548.

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(10) Public Information Office: The following activities took place in the 196th Light Infantry Brigade Information Office during the report period. There were 173 News releases, 147 Press visits, 80 Press accomodations, 1340 Home town news releases, 67 Home town tapes, and 56 Home town pictures.

(11) Post Exchange.

(a) Construction of the main Brigade Exchange was completed by the Brigade Engineers on 26 November 1966. Opening day sales on 15 December 1966 totaled \$20,994.80.

(b) Of the nine annex exchanges, from 26 December 1966 to 11 January 1967 six were closed leaving three infantry exchanges in operation.

(c) The Class VI store was officially opened 26 Dec 66.

(d) The results of the Quarterly Inventory taken 10 Jan 67 reflected an authorized dropage of \$5554.71; however, the actual dropage was \$194.99.

(e) A mobile exchange was sent to the field in support of Operation Cedar Falls, and on 14 January 1967 exchange supplies were being lifted by helicopters from the Trung Lap base to troops in the forward areas.

(f) The Brigade Exchange staff has a strength of two officers, six non-commissioned officers and 32 enlisted men.

(g) Sales by monthly report period were: 11 Nov 66 - 25 Nov 66 -- \$81,182.90; 26 Nov 66 - 10 Dec 66 -- \$61,565.70; 26 Dec 66 - 10 Jan 67 -- \$172,922.94; 11 Jan 67 - 25 Jan 67 -- \$123,490.05.

(12) Postal Section.

(a) General. The 196th Light Infantry Brigade Postal Section has increased in strength and responsibility, successfully processed the Christmas mail and moved to a new location during the period.

(b) The Brigade Postal Section (APO 96256) had been processing mail in two G.P. Medium tents. On 20 November 1966, APO 96256 became operational in a 20x96 foot quonset hut.

(c) During the period APO 96256 began processing mail for all U.S. Army activities and the 1st PHILCAG in Tay Ninh Province. The record volume of mail received during the Christmas season was 17,603 pounds on 19 December 1966. A record amount of money orders was sold, \$63,525.16, 30 Nov 66. Throughout the period, over 370,000 pounds of mail was received and 180,000 pounds of mail was dispatched. A total of \$975,486.66, in money

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1. Military Police participated in two Brigade and one battalion sized operations. In both Operation Attleboro and Operation Cedar Falls, thirty Military Police operated a POW collection point and secured the Brigade Command Post.

2. There were 99 detainees processed during two Brigade operations: 55 during Operation Attleboro and 44 during Operation Cedar Falls. Of the 55 during Attleboro, 14 were released, five were POW's, one was a returnee, and 35 suspects were released to other headquarters for final determination. During Cedar Falls there were 13 released, 11 returnees, 16 civilian defendants, and four VC POW's.

3. The 544th MP Platoon was attached to the 4/31 Inf during a search and destroy operation on NUI BA DEN. The platoon has the only 90mm recoilless rifles in the Brigade. These weapons were successfully employed in direct support of the Battalion.

(8) Staff Judge Advocate.

(a) During the report period, the Staff Judge Advocate has continued operating in its principal activities of military justice, legal assistance, and claims.

(b) In the field of military justice, there have been five summary courts-martial, and eight special courts-martial. Two special courts and one general court are pending trial. Recurring offenses have been disobedience and disrespect.

(c) In the area of legal assistance 93 clients were counseled, who required the following services: 46 Powers of Attorney; six Notarizations; 11 Wills; 30 domestic relations; debts and taxation.

(d) The claims function has resulted in the payment of nine solatium gratuities, the payment of five foreign national claims, and the processing of four military personnel claims. The largest problem in this area has been the length of time required by the MACV Claims Commission to settle meritorious claims; however exceptional claims will be expedited.

(9) Finance Section.

(a) During this period the finance section in addition to the normal activities of paying the Brigade in-processed and paid over 500 personnel during the current infusion program as well as out-processing a similar number of Brigadesmen.

(b) Federal Withholding Statements (W-2) were prepared and distributed to members of the Brigade and the sale of U.S. Treasury Checks and Piasters was extended to all personnel in the Tay Ninh area.

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schools in Trang Sup and Thai Binh received much needed repair and additions.

(5) Commodities: The following either captured or U.S. produced commodities were distributed within Tay Ninh Province.

Food stuffs	250 tons
Clothes	5000 pounds
School kits	2083
Toys	1700 pounds

(6) Education and Training: Three instructors taught 236 hours of English and art to 112 students.

(7) Community Relations: At the request of the 25th Div G-5, the Brigade organized and sponsored a victory celebration for the Suoi Cao hamlet that had withstood a seven hour attack by the VC during Operation Attleboro. During Thanksgiving and Christmas, school children from surrounding hamlets were treated to the holiday meals in unit mess halls. The Commander and members of the staff have represented the Brigade at various social festivities.

(8) Tactical Operations. Civil Affairs as a major participant in Revolutionary Development was proven during Operation Cedar Falls. Rapport with the population in an unpacified area was gained by aiding the villagers with medical attention and with the distribution of much needed commodities. Fourteen hundred and thirty patients were treated while aid was also given to over four hundred refugee families in resettlement moves. A favorable change in the attitude of the people was noted, which will prove beneficial to the advisory group stationed in the area.

h. Psychological Operation: Leaflet drops, and loudspeaker missions increased as did the number of returnees. The 246 Psychological Company supported the Brigade with C-47 leaflet drops and U-10 loudspeaker missions. During the period 4,973,000 leaflets were dropped, 52½ hours of loudspeaker missions were flown, and Tay Ninh Province had 94 returnees.

i. Medical

(1) Personnel and Supporting units:

(a) There are nine out of ten authorized medical officers in the Brigade. All battalions have a surgeon who not only takes care of the sick call and other medical requirements, but also holds MEDCAP missions. An average of 2000 MEDCAP patients per month have been seen.

(b) Since the 45th Surgical Hospital became operational in Nov 66, most serious casualties have been evacuated directly to it. Company C (Med), 8th Support Battalion has handled the less serious casualties and illness, and any overflow of serious casualties from the 45th Surgical Hospital that need resuscitation and then evacuation to other hospitals. This arrangement has afforded a very high grade of medical care for the Brigade.

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orders and stamps were sold.

(d) The original one NCO and six enlisted men TOE strength was designed to give mail room type service for a Brigade of 3500 individuals. APO 96256 is rendering complete servitude: mail distribution and dispatch, money orders, parcel, stamp, accountability and APO directory services. As a result, the Brigade Postal Section now has a strength of one officer, two NCO's and twelve enlisted men.

(13) Chaplain Section.

(a) General: During the period, the Brigade Chaplain Section's operational organization was changed and the Brigade Base Camp Chapel completed.

(b) After 6 December, the chaplains began living in each of the battalion areas and taking a special interest in that battalion. The chaplain remains an assistant Brigade Chaplain and will provide coverage where needed.

(c) Under a self help program and assistance provided by the Brigade Engineers, construction of the Brigade Chapel was begun on 20 November and completed 23 December.

(d) The five Brigade Chaplains conducted 441 services with a total attendance of 14,321 both in base camp and on operations.

g. Civic Action.

(1) General. The 8th AA Platoon, 2d Civil Affairs Company was attached to the Brigade, and put under the operational control of the Brigade Civil Affairs Section. During the period, the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), construction, commodities distribution, education and training, and community relations projects grew in importance with time, experience and additional personnel.

(2) The 8th AA Platoon 2d Civil Affairs Company was attached to the Brigade 22 Dec 66. The platoon has a strength of two officers and four enlisted men which are undergraded, inexperienced, and untrained in their area of operation; however, the platoon has grown effective in surveying all available agencies. The basic data on health, education and economic status is being gathered by the platoon which will be the basis for future civil affairs activities.

(3) MEDCAPS: Fifty-eight MEDCAPS were conducted by the medical section of the different battalions. The battalions' doctors treated 5822 patients.

(4) Construction: The Brigade engineers completed seven miles of laterite surfaced double lane roadways within Tay Ninh Province. The market place in Cao Xa hamlet was resurfaced with 96 cubic yards of laterite. The

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2. Commanders Observations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Item. Payment of hospitalized personnel.

Discussion: A two man team consisting of a cashier and guard toured the hospitals and paid all hospitalized members of the Bde. This system proved to be too costly in man hours lost. A limited depository was opened. All hospitalized personnel are paid by Military Payment Certificate Check which can be cashed at the hospitals.

Observation: Finance sections in RVN should open a limited depository account and pay all hospitalized personnel by Military Payment Certificate Checks.

(2) Item. Rest and Recuperation partial pay.

Discussion: Enlisted personnel leaving for Rest and Recuperation were required to submit a copy of DA Form 2142 (Request for pay action) signed by their commanding officer prior to receiving a partial payment. An agreement was reached between the finance section and unit commanders. Enlisted personnel departing for Rest and Recuperation would present a copy of the R&R orders in lieu of DA Form 2142 and thereby reducing the administrative burden of unit commanders on combat operations.

Observation: By requiring one copy of R&R orders for a partial payment, the administrative burden on unit commanders' has been reduced.

b. Operations.

(1) Item. Failure of Ambush Patrols to Observe Basic Principles.

Discussion: When an ambush patrol reaches the preplanned ambush site, the patrol leader must reconnoiter the site for possible enemy activity and, concurrently, select positions for security teams, fire support teams and the killer teams within the ambush limits. Following the accomplishment of these tasks, the patrol leader must position his teams and insure that they remain in position.

Observation: An ambush patrol conducted during Operation Cedar Falls failed to observe the principle of requiring individuals to remain in place once positioned and, further, apparently failed to make a thorough reconnaissance of the area. The resultant effect was that three VC armed with AW's took the patrol under fire inflicting two casualties. Strict adherence to principles of patrolling is an absolute necessity if the patrol is to be successful.

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(2) Preventive Medicine and Health of the Command:

(a) Personal hygiene is excellent. Adequate clothing, showering, and laundry facilities are available.

(b) Physical condition and nutrition of the troops is excellent.

(c) Skin and foot diseases have been encountered, but major problems have been circumvented by insuring adequate supplies of dry socks, underwear, and use of footpowder.

(d) The fighting strength has not been appreciably affected by diseases. The average daily non-effectiveness rate has been 2.5/1000 average strength/day. Venereal diseases, mostly gonorrhea, has been the single greatest cause of morbidity, with the rate of about 300/thousand/year.

(3) Environmental Sanitation.

(a) The quality of potable water supplied by the engineers' water points has been excellent.

(b) Insects and rodents are being controlled by use of the standard measures; residual insecticide is sprayed regularly in mess, latrine and billet areas, and bait traps for use of rodenticides are being installed.

(c) Permanent mess facilities are being constructed at present. Prior to this, unit tent-type messes have been utilized.

(4) Other Medical Services.

(a) The Dental Clinic in the medical company staffed with three dentists has maintained an excellent level of dental hygiene within the troops.

(b) Veterinary support for vaccination of animals, etc., has been provided by the 25th Infantry Division.

j. Signal.

(1) General. The signal section of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade is responsible for Brigade base camp and tactical communications operations. The signal platoon of Headquarters and Headquarters 196th Lt Inf Bde, the provisional platoon from B Company 36 Signal Battalion and 156 Forward Area Signal Platoon are all under the operation control of the Brigade Signal Officer.

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remain in hiding while the armed helicopters are on station and when the helicopters are forced to withdraw to rearm or refuel the VC will quickly break for safety.

Observation: A technique successfully used is to have the armed helicopters accompany the combat assault helicopters and then orbit on station as the unit organizes and begins its search. Then at a time determined by the airmobile force commander the gunships withdraw from the operational area and orbit in an area three to five KM distance and then after a five minute interval return to the operational area at low level. This has resulted in the sighting of VC who attempt to flee the area believing that the armed helicopters had been withdrawn from the area.

(6) Item. Operations during road security missions

Discussion: During road security operations it has been observed that although the road is patrolled during the daylight hours and ambushes are sited at critical points at night, the VC have still been successful in mining the road.

Observation: Units having road security operations must conduct active patrolling, search and destroy, and Eagle Flight operations against known and suspected VC areas away from the road itself. Using these techniques in addition to securing the road keeps the VC defending his installations thus he loses time to interdict the roads.

(7) Item. Daylight Ambushes

Discussion: During operations in areas by the VC it has been observed that the VC habitually move in small groups along well used trails during the daylight hours.

Observation: Units should plan and conduct daylight ambushes along well used trails. This is particularly effective immediately upon entry into VC controlled areas.

(8) Item. Use of Scout Dogs teams

Discussion: Scout dog teams were employed on several occasions with ambush and daylight patrols in AO BLUE. These teams traveled with the point man during movement and were strategically placed during ambushes.

Observation: Proof of the effectiveness of the dog teams was their detection of recently manned VC positions up to four days old on several occasions, and detection of two VC during a daylight patrol. The dogs are well trained and easily able to find VC and VC locations before humans. In several instances the patrol would have passed by unknowing.

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(2) Item. Tracer Ammunition Used at Night.

Discussion: It is difficult to accurately engage a fleeting VC target during the daylight hours and this difficulty is compounded during the hours of darkness when an individual cannot observe the strike of the bullet.

Observation: The use of tracer ammunition at night enables the soldier to accurately engage a VC target because he can see the trajectory of the bullet. During Operation Cedar Falls, two VC KIA (BC) and one VC KIA (poss) were inflicted on the enemy by an ambush patrol. This success is attributed to the use of the tracer ammunition at night.

(3) Item. Employment of Claymore mines.

Discussion: The employment of the claymore mine has proved to be one of the most effective defensive weapons. This is especially true when the claymore is employed as security around perimeters or when conducting extractions.

Observation: Following a firing demonstration of the claymore to determine its effect on ground forces, it was discovered that the mine when aimed at waist height and fired from a distance of 25 meters missed the personnel targets. In order to insure that the claymore will strike its target, the mine must be sighted near the base of the target to achieve maximum effect.

(4) Item. Search of VC structures

Discussion: On several occasions, units have sustained multiple casualties from booby traps while searching a VC structure for caches. Proper techniques were used initially, one man inspecting the entrances for booby traps while other personnel provided security from safe distances outside of the structure. After the structure was thought to be safe and a cache was found, the rest of the personnel moved inside to help remove the items. A booby trap hidden in the cache was detonated causing multiple casualties.

Observation: Units must stress the continuing danger from booby traps while searching VC structures. After the initial search and clearing of entrances, one man should be designated to continue the search and if a cache is found each item must be inspected for booby traps and then removed from the structure. If a booby trap is detonated the use of this method will minimize casualties.

(5) Item. Use of armed helicopter to interdict VC escape routes.

Discussion: Armed helicopters have been used successfully to observe VC attempting to flee operational areas during search and destroy operations. Recently it has been observed that the VC have been trained to

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(9) Item. Ambush Technique

Discussion: During recent operations in Tay Ninh Province the Brigade made its first confirmed VC kills by use of the night ambush. Six VC were allowed to proceed to within ten meters of a command detonated M-18 claymore mine when the patrol leader gave the order to spring the ambush. Results were four VC KIA (EC) and two VC KIA (poss).

Observation: Personnel on ambush patrols and combat outposts must exercise extreme fire control until the enemy is well inside the killing zone, ten to thirty meters from the ambush site. Prior experience with the M-18 claymore mine has proven that effective casualties are not produced at ranges beyond 40 meters due to vegetation and terrain features. Immediate search of the killing zone is necessary to preclude the bodies being carried off.

(10) Item. Use of daylight feint and after dark movement for ambushes.

Discussion: On two different occasions a unit has prepared a position seemingly for night occupation late in the afternoon then move their location several hundred meters shortly after dark. This was done on the first phase of operation Attleboro in AO-3 and again on the last phase of Lancaster in AO BLUE. Both times enemy contact was made by the element which moved while other battalion elements had activity. Due to the VC pattern of movement and clandestine intelligence gatherings, permanent positions seems to be easily spotted and avoided.

Observation: Moving the ambush site on a pre-rehearsed plan shortly after dark has produced VC encounter on two different occasions listed above. The VC in both instances exhibited actions which indicated a complacent belief that no friendly forces were near the area of the encounters.

(11) Item. Close and continual surveillance on road security

Discussion: While on security of Highway 26, several times vehicles were caught by enemy mines after the road had been cleared. VC under the guise of friendly civilians mingle with the indigenous personnel working in the area. Several vehicles have been lost due to the false assumption that, once cleared, a road remains safe.

Observation: Road clearance should be continual process during daylight hours, especially prior to vehicular movements. Screening patrols should concentrate on surveillance of groups of civilians along routes.

(12) Item. Closer coordination between friendly elements.

Discussion: On two occasions there have been fire fights between friendly units. One instance, was an ambush patrol was mistaken for

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(2) Base Camp Operations.

(a) The provisional platoon has installed 200 telephones, strung 28 miles of trunk line cable and rewired the main distribution frame.

(b) Operation of the Brigade base camp three position switchboard (MTC-1) is accomplished by the provisional platoon. During their busy period the operator handles an average of 720 calls per hour.

(3) Tactical Operations.

(a) On 2 November 1966, two four channel Very High Frequency (VHF) radio relay systems were in support of the Brigade forward Command Post, Dau Tieng at the start of Operation Attleboro. The systems were trailer mounted components of Radio Terminal AN/MRC-69, and each was built up to 12 channel capacity during the operation. One system was utilized during the later stages of Attleboro to provide a terminate link between the 25th Division Forward Command Post at Tay Ninh and the 1st Division Command Post at Dau Tieng after the departure of the Brigade.

(b) During Phase III of Operation Lancaster the Bde Signal Section executed its first heliborne move from the Bde base camp to a Forward Command Post. This operation proved to be an excellent training vehicle in planning aircraft loads and correct grouping of mutually supporting equipment. Those items of equipment lifted into the forward command post were: a 3/4 ton trailer mounted 12 channel radio relay terminal; equipment for operation of secure teletype circuit; switchboard; FM radio with speech security attachments; and generator sets.

(c) Three VHF radio relay systems were operated in support of Cedar Falls, one to 25th Div headquarters, one to the Brigade base camp and one to Artillery Fire Support base 2. Other facilities in use were radio teletype stations and teletype terminals. An AN/MTC-7 was utilized for switchboard service at the Brigade Forward Command Post.

k. Training.

(1) General: The Bde conducts a program of replacement training at the Charger Academy. The 25th Div supports the Bde with allocations to its various schools. From within the Brigades' own resources, a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was organized and trained. On the job training is being given to enlisted personnel selected for jobs not encountered until deployment. Units not engaged in operations conduct training in basic military and technical subjects.

(2) Replacement Training. During the period 1054 replacements were processed thru the Charger Academy. All officers in the grade of O-1 and O-2, and all enlisted personnel thru the grade of E-7 received a program of instructions designed to refresh the individual with basic combat skills and those peculiar to Vietnam. Before leaving the Academy, each replacement

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VC and fired upon by ARVN troops. The other instance, was a fire fight which broke out between our units and an RF/PF company because neither was aware of the others proximity.

Observation: Closer coordination before and during operations should be handled at all echelons, and contact should be maintained between friendly units working together or in the proximity of other friendly units.

(13) Item. Conduct of mobile checkpoints operation for screening the indigenous traffic.

Discussion: The VC hire members of the local population to transport foodstuff, ammunition and equipment along major LOC's in the TAOR. Spot checks of traffic by Military Police and Counter Intelligence personnel from the MID can greatly hinder and sometime eliminate the use of this means by the enemy.

Observation: The establishment of mobile checkpoints for screening the indigenous traffic can greatly hinder the VC resupply effort.

c. Training and Organization - NONE

d. Intelligence

(1) Item. Necessity of keeping card files that update the Automatic Data printout in Order of Battle analysis.

Discussion: Automatic Data Processing Letter Box Numbers, cover designation, and personalities are very helpful as Order of Battle references. However, because of the time involved in producing the print-outs, they are usually outdated in two months. Since VC unit cover designations and Letter Box Numbers change approximately every three months, it is necessary to maintain a file system which includes the most recent designations not found in the printouts.

Observation: A file system which corresponds to the system of Automatic Data Processing Print outs contains all information necessary for the ADP and allow for more rapid transfer of data to the ADP feeder sheets. Information for this system can come from CDEC readouts, agent reports, and captured documents translation.

(2) Item. Necessity of preparing spot report incident cards in duplicate

Discussion: To insure that rapid dissemination of intelligence information is disseminated to the Military Intelligence Detachmnt from the S-2 section; Spot report incident cards are prepared in duplicate. Periodically throughout the day, an MID representative obtains the cards from the S-2. When the Daily INTSUM is published and distributed the MID

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confirms the zeros of his personnel weapon. (See Appendix 2, Replacement Training Program.).

(3) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol.

(a) In order to increase the Brigades' intelligence collection capability, organic highly trained reconnaissance teams were needed. On 2 January 1967, the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment (LRRP) was organized under the operation of the Brigade S2 and administrative control of F Troop 17th Cavalry. The current strength of the LRRP is two officers and 28 enlisted men. The proposed TOE strength for the detachment will be two officers and 66 enlisted men.

(b) Six personnel have completed the MACV Recondo School during the period, and 12 are scheduled for the school in February. When not engaged in operations, the teams receive concentrated advance training in such subjects as: Land Navigation; Patrolling; Repelling Techniques; Adjustment of Artillery Fire and TAC Air Strikes; Communications; and Intelligence Reporting Procedure.

(4) Scout Dog.

(a) The 48th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon joined the Bde, 22 Jan 67. The platoon has a strength of one officer, 19 enlisted men, and 16 scout dogs.

(b) An in-country training program of conditioning and proficiency was completed by the platoon.

(c) Classes were presented in the techniques and utilization of scout dogs to the infantry battalions and the cavalry troop.

(5) 25th Division Training Support. During the period eight rifle platoons have attended the 25th Division Lighting Ambush Academy. Bde personnel have attended courses in: Mess management; Generator Operation; Small Arms Maintenance; and Demolitions.

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can discard their copies of the cards.

Observation: The duplication of Spot report Incidents cards facilitates the rapid dissemination of information to other organic intelligence processing agencies.

e. Logistics

(1) Item. Operation and location of the Brigade Logistical Operations Center.

Discussion: During tactical operations the necessity for close coordination between unit S4's, supply officers, aviation personnel, and direct support unit personnel was quite apparent and difficult to maintain. The daily supply problems, availability of helicopters, scheduling of sorties to include times, were all items that needed close coordination and supervision. These problems were solved by conducting a nightly logistical meeting with all S4's, aviation personnel, and support type personnel. All reports are submitted at this time and resupply plans for the following day are coordinated and finalized.

Observation: A brief nightly meeting of all supporting and supported logistical personnel is a very effective means of solving problems and finalizing future supply plans and operations.

(2) Item. Lanes for helicopter resupply.

Discussion: Lanes should be established in LCC areas for helicopter resupply. A lane should be assigned to a unit for the duration of the operation so as to avoid congestion at any one point.

Observation: Use of unit designated lanes will allow each unit to know where all their lifts will take place, and will aid the path finders in spotting the aircraft.

(3) Item. Communications for recovery operations

Discussion: The TOE for the Support Battalion does not provide radios for the service section recovery equipment. Many recovery operations require travel over insecure roads or through areas not pacified. Evacuation of vehicles damaged by mines is prevalent. All recovery operations require an escort to accompany recovery vehicles. Escort vehicles with radios are not always available. Radios should be mounted in each recovery vehicle and in the Service Section office to permit direction and coordination of the recovery effort and to permit calls for assistance by the recovery crew in case of attack or a recovery situation beyond their capability.

Observation: Addition of four each AN/VRC-46 radios to the MTOE prior to deployment of Light Infantry Brigade Support Battalions

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would resolve this problem.

(4) Item. Lack of evacuation capability for unserviceable major items.

Discussion: The Support Battalion of the Light Infantry Brigade has no capability to evacuate major items which cannot be transported in 2½ ton trucks. The employment of Light Infantry Brigades is normally in a location remote from other supporting units. The VC tactic of mining roads paved with iron bearing material, produces an unusually large quantity of mine damaged vehicles. Some of these vehicles can be towed - many cannot. Only two vehicles are authorized in a Light Infantry Brigade which can transport items of this type. Both vehicles are provided in the Engineer Company for the purpose of transporting large construction equipment. Due to other missions the availability of the engineer vehicles is almost non-existent.

Observation: Inclusion of a truck, tractor, wrecker, five ton and a semitrailer, low bed, in the MTOE of support battalions prior to deployment would resolve this problem.

(5) Item. Use of Logistics Liaison Personnel.

Discussion: The flow of supplies from Saigon and Cu Chi was expedited through the use of liaison personnel at both locations with adequate transportation.

Observation: Establishment of liaison teams at higher headquarters logistics offices resulted in expediting the flow of Class II and IV supplies.

(6) Item. Prevention of mis-shipment

Discussion: For about four or five months, we were using a transportation code that was assigned to us: as a result, there were cases of our supplies being forwarded to another unit. Upon return to the unit identification code (UIC), there have been fewer mis-shipments.

1. Always use the UIC. 2. Discourage use of transportation codes.

Observation: The utilizing of unit identification codes (UIC) rather than transportation codes on DA Form 2765-1 has resulted in fewer mis-shipments.

f. Others

(1) Item. Utilization of MEDCAP team

Discussion: A MEDCAP team under the control of the CA section proved highly effective during Operation Cedar Falls. The number of patients assisted by the team was the highest number to be seen by any team of the Brigade since arriving in-country.

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Observation: The above technique for employment of MEDCAP resources proved invaluable during Cedar Falls. The rapport obtained and aid given to the people proved once more that MEDCAP is our quickest means of winning the people while providing them with a much-needed relief.

(2) Item. Propaganda and Civic Action.

Discussion: The use of leaflets and loudspeakers in conjunction with MEDCAP and other CA activities proved, during Cedar Falls, indispensable to the intelligence effort of the Brigade. Skillfully employed, they can help in the education of the people in health matters as well as political indoctrination, thereby assisting in winning the people.

Observation: Placing posters in the entrances to the dispensary with appropriate themes as well as hand distribution of reward and information-seeking leaflets should be utilized with Civic Affairs activities or wherever a large crowd gathers.

(3) Item. Imposition of Article 15's

Discussion: Unit commanders had been imposing Article 15 forfeitures in excess of the maximum authorized by AR 27-15 and the Addendum to the Manual for Courts-martial, 1951. Due to operation requirements and limited administrative communication, Unit commanders were not always able to consult the Brigade Staff Judge Advocate on matters of Military Justice.

Observation: A training program was initiated by the Staff Judge Advocate. Personal contact was made with Battalion adjutants and unit commanders, when they were not on operations, and the provisions of AR 27-15 were explained.

(4) Item. Preparation of a Charge Sheets

Discussion: Charge Sheets are often prepared and completed at the unit level prior to consulting the Staff Judge Advocate as to the legal sufficiency of the charge.

Observation: After the statement of the witnesses have been accumulated, the individual responsible for the preparation of the charges should contact the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate so that assistance can be given as to the appropriate charge based upon the availability evidence. This procedure will prevent unnecessary duplication of paperwork.

(5) Item. Unit coverage.

Discussion: Assigning a reporter/photographer to each of the maneuver units has proven to be the most effective way to provide timely publicity of the units.

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7 March 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1967.
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)


Observation: Having a reporter/photographer with the units provides on the spot coverage and eliminates the loss in time caused by the lack of transportation in getting to the area.

(6) Item. Hometown News Program

Discussion: The hometown news program is the best and most effective way of telling about the individual soldier. Not only does it inform the public about the soldier's accomplishments but also gains favorable support for the unit and Army.

Observation: The prompt completion of DA Form 1526 (Information for Hometown News Release) on all news worthy events (awards, promotions, arrivals, participation in operations, etc.) will insure maximum publicity is received by the individual and the unit.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


H. L. COOP
MAJ, AG
AG

DISTRIBUTION:

B for 1 thru 23
D for 26 thru 40
ACofS for Force Dev, DA (thru channels) (3 cys)
ACofS for Force Dev, DA (thru IIFFORCEV) (3 cys)
C/OG, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH (direct) (2 cys)
C/OG, USARV, ATTN: AVC-DH (direct) (2 cys)
C/OG, IIFFORCEV, ATTN: ACofS G3 (2 cys)
C/OG, U.S. Army Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga (2 cys)
C/OG, U.S. Army Armor Sch, Ft Knox, Ky (2 cys)
CC, U.S. Army Human Rsch Unit, Ft Benning, Ga (2 cys)
USACDC Ln Off, APO 96558 (2 cys)
CO, USAAMS, Ft Sill, Okla. (2 cys)
C/OG, C/GS, Ft Leavenworth, Kan (2 cys)
CG, 25th Inf Div, ATTN: 18 MHD, APO 96225 (9 cys)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHARGER ACADEMY TRAINING SCHEDULE
REPLACEMENT CENTER

SUBJECT: Training Schedule

Class No. _____

Date: From: _____ To: _____

1st Day	Time	Subject	Instructor	Location
	0930-1020	Welcome-Bde History	Lt Henneberry	BC
	1030-1120	Enemy, Friends, & Area	S-2	BC
	1300-1430	First Aid, Fld San, Evac	SSG Parker	BC
	1445-1530	Chieu-Hoi Program Bunkerline Duty	Sgt Lee	BC
	1540-1630	Rules of Engagement	Sgt Hurlbert	BC
	1830-2000	Special Equip	SSG Carmichael	BC
2nd Day	0730-0820	Air Mobility	Capt Johnston	BC
	0830-1000	M-16	Sgt Hurlbert	BC
	1000-1020	Grenades	Sgt Mc Crory	BC
	1030-1120	M-79	SSG Carmichael	BC
	1300-1450	Prep Fld Pos-Night Firing Tech	Sgt Mc Crory	BC
	1500-1700	Compass & Pacing	Sgt Jones	BC
3rd Day	0730-0920	Map Reading	Sgt Jones	BC
	0930-1120	RTO Procedures PRC 25 Operations	Sgt Lee	BC
	1300-1350	M-60 Machine Gun	Sgt Hurlbert	BC
	1400-1450	Military Justice	Lt Henneberry	BC
	1500-1550	Code of Conduct	Sgt Mc Crory	BC
4th Day	0730-1120	Mines & Booby traps	Lt Gutilla	BC
	1300-1450	Demo	Lt Gutilla	BC
	1500-1900	Arty Orient	Capt Meade	BC
5th Day	0800-0950	Patrolling	Lt Henneberry	NBD
	1000-1050	Combat Patrols	Sgt Jones	NBD
	1100-1150	Ambush	Sgt Jones	NBD
	1300-1350	Ambush	Sgt Jones	NBD
	1400-1550	Patrol, Plan & Reh	Lt Henneberry	NBD
	1600-1630	Critique	Lt Henneberry Sgt Jones	NBD
	1800-1900	M-60 Machine Gun Firing	Sgt Hurlbert w/AI's	NBD

DAY	TIME	SUBJECT	INSTRUCTOR	LOCATION
6th Day	0730-0920	KD. Famili...	Sgt Hurlbert Sgt Mc Crory Sgt Jones Lt Henneberry	NBD
	0930-1020	M-79 Firing	SSG Carmichael	NBD
	1030-1700	Reaction Range Claymore Mines Hand Grenades	Sgt Hurlbert SSG Carmichael Sgt Mc Crory	NBD
	1700	Return to BC		

Russell De Vries
RUSSELL De VRIES
Cpt. Inf
Commandant

DAY	TIME	SUBJECT	INSTRUCTOR	LOCATION
6th Day	0730-0920	KD. Famili...	Sgt Hurlbert Sgt Mc Crory Sgt Jones Lt Henneberry	NBD
	0930-1020	M-79 Firing	SSG Carmichael	NBD
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Russell De Vries
RUSSELL De VRIES
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Commandant

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	1030-1700	Reaction Range Claymore Mines Hand Grenades	Sgt Hurlbert SSG Carmichael Sgt Mc Crory	NBD

MA
#15.1

CONFIDENTIAL

196th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep)

OPERATIONS REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

1 November 1966 - 31 January 1967

REF ID: A22024
FBI - DC

196th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep)

12 units
2. 1000 5200.10
NND 403621 AN NARA 3/31/90

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Op 532

ATTACH-107 (7 Mar 67)

26 Incl

Subject: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS G3/GR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 4 MAY 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GRC
APO 96307

1. This Headquarters has received the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 1968 Motor Infantry Brigade as follows:

2. Findings and Actions:

a. Reference paragraph 1c (3) (b) 2, 3, and 5, page 9 concerning shortage of equipment. USAV Form 47 has been discontinued and the provisions of USAF message (3) AVHQ-10773, 1967 251322 March 67, subject Change in Equipment Authorizations, are applicable. Reporting units have no current requisitions for the items listed, because USAV Form 47 has been discontinued without action. The proper course of action for obtaining the required lighting set is to submit an RGR for the required number of electrical floodlight sets L15 177227. Additionally, any valid requisitions held by the unit should be checked with the servicing BSC for updating and current status.

b. Reference paragraph 2a (6), page 27, concerning removal of supplies: Same with comment. USAF Regulation 725-3 requires that the USAF identification code be used on all supply requests. Since implementation of this policy, fewer mis-shipments have occurred.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Replies to

COL BROWN
G3 A-362

13 MAY 1967

4 Incl
nc

E. L. KENNEDY
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

12 May

CH	208
D&H	
DIV	
C&R	
BR	
CH	208
VEEA	13 May
CH	
HIST	
A/O	208

MEMO FOR RECORD

ORLL staffed through:

SA GPT Bisson/439
Copy not indicated

No further coord necessary. Back up papers are attached to record copy. Action Officer: LTC Watson

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FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

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COL BROWN, RECORD COPY, RETURN TO AVHCC-DST
G3
A-362

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVD(DHD) (7 March 1967)

1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 196th Lt Inf Bde

HQ, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO San Francisco 96225, 16 March 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: ACoS G3
APO 96227

Commanding General, U.S. Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVC-DH, APO 96307

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Dev, Department of the ARMY
(ACSFOR DA) Washington, D.C. 20310

Forwarded.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
1 cy ORLL, 196th Lt
Inf Bde

JAMES D. DETHLEFSEN
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
INCLUSION

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AVFBC-II (7 Mar 67)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967, 196th Infantry Brigade (Lt)(Sep)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 22 MAR 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVFBC-DH, APO 96307

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CINCPAC-DH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade for the quarter ending 31 January 1967 is considered adequate and is forwarded herewith.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the comments, recommendations and actions taken as stated in the basic report with exception of the following:

a. Para 2a(1), page 21: This problem is being studied by this headquarters prior to making a recommendation.

b. Para 2e(3) page 26: Concur in this recommendation. This headquarters plans to initiate action on the subject in the near future.

c. Para 2e(4) page 27: Concur in this recommendation. A study on this subject is being conducted by this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl


nc

JAMES A. ULVANES
Capt, AGC
Asst. AG

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Classified Inclosures

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Fin Socs *MP*


MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS	ACTION
1 TO <i>Compt S-1 (to C3 Bde) 1 May</i>		INITIALS	CIRCULATE
		DATE	COORDINATION
2 <i>G-3 no (compt) requris</i>			FILE
			INFORMATION
3 <i>A32</i>			NOTE AND RETURN
			PER CON- VERSATION
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE
REMARKS <i>ORLL for 196th Light Inf Bde</i>			
FROM <i>LTC WATSON</i>		DATE <i>Apr 67</i>	
		PHONE <i>A-341</i>	

DD FORM 1 OCT 60 95

Replaces DD Form 94, 1 Feb 50 and DD Form 95,
1 Feb 50 which will be used until exhausted.

PPC-Japan

A32



AVHGD-PO

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL)

TO: G3DH

FROM: G4


DATE: 7 APR 1967 CMT 2 (U)

CPT Bisson/jw/439

1. Reference Paragraph 1e (3) (b) 2, 3, and 4, Page 9, reference receipt of equipment. Concur with unit comments. USARV Form 47 has been discontinued and the provisions of USARV message (U) AVHGC-OT 19073, DTG 251132Z March 67, subject: Changes in Equipment Authorizations, are applicable. Reporting unit has no due-out requisitions for the items listed, because USARV Form 47 has been returned without action. The proper course of action for obtaining the required lighting set is to submit an MTOE for the required number of floodlight set electrical LIN H79221. Additionally, any valid requisitions held by the unit should be checked with the servicing DSO for updating and current status.

2. Reference Paragraph 2e (b), Page 27, reference mis-shipment: Concur with comments. USARV Regulation 725-3 requires compliance with AR 735-35 in that the UIC must be used on all supply requests. Implementation of the use of UIC's by this Headquarters has resulted in fewer mis-shipments.

1 Incl
nc


J. A. GRAF LTC G5
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G4

1967-1 LIGHT INF BDE ORU 7720 31 MAR 1967

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12356, Sec. 3.3

By PA NND 903621
, NARA Date 5/31/90

DAY	TIME	SUBJECT	INSTRUCTOR	LOCATION
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	1030-1700	Reaction Range Claymore Mines Hand Grenades	Sgt Hurlbert SSG Carmichael Sgt Mc Crory	NBD
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Russell De Vries
RUSSELL De VRIES
Cpt. Inf
Commandant

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Russell De Vries
RUSSELL De VRIES
Cpt. Inf
Commandant

CHARGER ACADEMY TRAINING SCHEDULE
REPLACEMENT CENTER

SUBJECT: Training Schedule

Class No. _____
Date: From: _____ To: _____

1st Day	Time	Subject	Instructor	Location
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	1600-1630	Critique	Lt Henneberry Sgt Jones	NBD
	1800-1900	M-60 Machine Gun Firing	Sgt Hurlbert w/AI's	NBD

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196th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep)

OPERATIONS REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

1 November 1966 - 31 January 1967

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196th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep)

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE
San Francisco 96250

AVBFHO

7 March 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967.
(RCS CSFOR - 65) (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Operational Report for Quarterly Period (RCS CSFOR-65)
Location: Vicinity, Tay Ninh (XT165522), RVN
Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles
Prepared by: Captain Andre F. Le Blanc, Brigade Staff Historian

1. (C) Significant Organizational Activities:


a. Operations:

(1) General. There were three Brigade operations, 14 Battalion size operations, eight company sized BUSHMasters, 26 platoon sized BUSHMasters and 317 small unit actions. Significant enemy contact was made on all of the Brigade operations. (Boundaries of the areas of operation- See Appendix 1.)

(2) ATTLEBORO: (14 Sep - 25 Nov 66). Phase I of ATTLEBORO ended on 22 Sep 66. Phase II commenced on 18 Oct when the 2d Bn 1st Inf was airlifted to DAU TIENG Air Base vicinity (XT495474). Phase II still in progress at the start of the reporting period.

(a) Phase II - continuing. (18 Oct 66 - 12 Nov 66). On 1 Nov 66 the concept and size of the operation changed from two battalions (2/1st and 4/31st Inf), to a brigade operation, with the 196th concurrently assuming OPCON of the 1st Bn 27th Inf. On 3 Nov 66 1/27 conducted a two company airmobile assault and established blocking positions. At 031040 Company C, 1/27 became heavily engaged with a reinforced VC company - armed with AW and SA. At 031148 Company B, 2/1 became engaged with an estimated VC company using SA and AW and claymores. The 2/27th was committed as a RRF to reinforce engaged elements of 1/27. The 3/21st Inf airlifted to battle area on 031215 (approx time). Enemy contact continued throughout the day. By 041800 the Brigade had committed: 1/27; Company A and C, 2/27; 2/1st; Company C, 3/21st and 4/31st. Company B, 2/27 remained at DAU TIENG Air Base on stand-by as RRF. A Btry, 3/82d Arty and A Btry 1/8th Arty continued in DS from DAU TIENG with four 155 Hows supporting from SOUI DA. On 4 Nov 66, A and C Companies, 2/27 and B and C Companies, 2/1st were heavily engaged with a dug-in VC main force unit, estimated to be battalion size vicinity (XT410538). Elements of 1/27 engaged the VC unit from the Southwest to relieve pressure on engaged units. Contact broken. No enemy

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AVRFHO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7 March 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1967.
(RCS CSFOR - 65) (U)

activity during the evening hours. Heavy fighting again broke out the morning of the fifth as 1/27 and 2/27 began attacking with the 1/27 repulsing six mass attacks, causing the VC heavy casualties. In the afternoon of the fifth Company A and B, 3/21 was committed to aid in securing LZ for extraction of 1/27 and 2/27. Extraction completed that day. On 5 Nov 66, the Brigade came under OPCON of the 1st Inf Div, with attachment being effected on 6 Nov 66. Fighting from this day to 11 Nov 66 was sporadic with friendly casualties being light. Enemy casualties not determined. Brigade (less 2/1st Inf) detached from 1st Inf Div and returned to Base Camp on 11 Nov 66. The 2/1st Inf released from attachment on 12 Nov 66 and airlifted to TAY NINH Base Camp.

(b) Phase II - Continuing. (12-25 Nov 66):

1. Brigade (-) in defense of Base Camp.

2. The 3/21st Inf remained in security of Base Camp, alternating companies for conduct of BUSHMASTER operations in Brigade TAOR.

3. The 2/1st Inf during period 14-25 Nov 66 conducted road security (ROADRUNNER) along Highway 26 and limited search and destroy operations in AO BLUE, Brigade TAOR. Contact made on four occasions resulting in one VC KIA (BC) and the capture of one Chicom pistol and one 7.62 Chicom rifle, and the destruction of two bunkers and one tunnel.

4. The 4/31st Inf during period 12-18 Nov 66 conducted highway security (ROADRUNNER) and search and destroy operations vicinity NUI BA DEN Mountain (XT2758). VC contact occurred on two occasions during this period. Results to VC unknown. Friendly casualties very light.


(3) LANCASTER (25 Nov - continuing). (Reference OPLAN 25th Div Title: FITCHBURG). LANCASTER has been divided into phases and each phase covers the unit (s) and their area of operation. With the exception of Phase III which was a brigade operation, the remainder were battalion or company size operations. Areas utilized were within the Brigade Tactical Area of Operation (TAOR), the rock quarry vicinity of NUI BA DEN and Hwy 26 located in AO BLUE.

(a) Phase I (25-29 Nov 66). The 4/31st Inf relieved 2/1st Inf of Hwy 26 route security mission in AO BLUE. VC contact on two occasions with unknown results.

(b) Phase II (28-30 Nov 66). Task Force 3/21st Inf with Company C, 1/5th (M) Inf attached, conducted search and destroy operations in THANH DIEN forest south of the TAY NINH base camp in AO 2. The operation was in conjunction with the PHILCAG and ARVN for the purpose of clearing the forest prior to PHILCAG beginning their New Life Hamlet. Contact with the VC was established twice during the operation with unknown results.

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Page 2 of 29 pages



AVBFHO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7 March 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(c) Phase III (1-6 Dec 66). The Brigade conducted search and destroy operations in AO 3 with three battalions: 2/1 Inf, 3/21 Inf, and 4/31 Inf. Concurrently three CIDG companies, under the control of Team B-32, United States Special Forces (USSF), conducted search and destroy operations vicinity (XT0358), with no VC contact.

(d) Phase IV (7-14 Dec 66) The 4/31 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of NUI BA DEN. The operation began with Company A conducting airmobile assault vicinity (XT257555), to secure a Fire Support Base. The remainder of the battalion followed in convoy to conduct search and destroy operations in the area. No significant VC contact was made.

(e) Phase V (1-11 Dec 66). The 3/21 conducted a search and destroy operation in AO BLUE and secured Highway 26 vicinity (XT3445) with Company A, Company C and the Anti Tank platoon from Company D. The operation resulted in 11 VC KIA (BC), two VC KIA (poss), three VC KBA, one rifle, and eight 60mm mortar rounds captured.

(f) Phase VI (7-22 Dec 66) & Phase X (22-26 Dec 66). Task Force 2/34 Armor (Company A and C, 2/34 Armor, F Troop, 17th Cavalry, Company A, 4/31 Inf and Battery A, 3/82 Artillery) was attached to the Brigade on 7 December 1966, and conducted search and destroy operations in AO BLUE, and secured Highway 26. Phase X began when 4/31 Inf relieved task force 2/34 Armor in place and assumed the security mission along Highway 26 in AO BLUE from (XT308487) to (XT376425). The operation terminated with limited VC contact.


(g) Phase VII (8-12 Dec 66). 2/1 Inf was airlifted to vicinity (XT168608) (AO WHITE) to conduct search and destroy operations vicinity (XT171610). No enemy contact was made during the operations.

(h) Phase VIII (14-23 Dec 66). 4/31 Inf conducted a search and destroy operation along both sides of the Oriental River sweeping southeast from vicinity (XT1046) to (XT1940). The operation resulted in one VC KIA (BC), two VC KIA (poss), one 7.92 submachine gun, one Chicom claymore mine and 1600 pounds of polished rice captured.

(i) Phase IX (16-23 Dec 66). 2/1 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in AO BLACK vicinity (WT996485). Company A conducted an airmobile assault on LZ X-RAY, vicinity (WT996485) and established a forward Command Post vicinity (XT010504). Daily search and destroy operations were conducted. The battalion was airlifted to base camp with no enemy contact made.

(j) Phase Xa (26-30 Dec 66) 4/31 Inf conducted a search and destroy operation in conjunction with one RF/PF company in the southeastern portion of AO BLUE. The operation resulted in three VC KIA (BC).

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(k) Phase XI (1-4 Jan 67). 3/21 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in AO GREEN, vicinity (XT226572). The battalion CP moved forward with Battery B, 3/82 Arty. Companies A, B, and C conducted local patrolling vicinity NUI BA DEN. No significant VC contact was made.

(l) Phase XII (1-7 Jan 67). 2/1 Inf conducted route security of Highway 26 in AO BLUE and rock quarry security vicinity NUI BA DEN. The rifle companies (B&C), Recon & Mortar Platoons with elements of Headquarters Company (CP Group), established forward CP vicinity (XT340423), with the mission of securing Highway 26 from coordinates (XT308486) to (XT373423). Concurrently, they conducted surveillance patrols in area 4,000 to 5,000 meters North and South of the Highway. Company A, 2/1 Inf, with an Anti-Tank platoon attached, located at forward CP vicinity (XT267572) and continued security of quarry (rock crusher site) on NUI BA DEN vicinity coordinates (XT266577)/(XT263587). No significant VC contact was made.

(m) Phase XIII (7-25 Jan 67). 4/31 Inf conducted route security of Highway 26 in AO BLUE and rock quarry security vicinity NUI BA DEN. No significant VC contact was made.


(n) Phase XIV (26 January - 1 February 67) 4/31 Inf moved to AO BLUE, vicinity (XT305483), to secure Highway 26. Company B was dispatched to secure the rock crusher site. The battalion conducted route security of Highway 26 in AO BLUE and rock crusher security vicinity NUI BA DEN. No significant VC contact was made.

(o) Phase XV (27-31 Jan 67). Task Force 3/21 Inf conducted a joint operation with PHILCAG. Company A 3/21 Inf and B Battery, 3/82 Artillery departed base camp 281235 hrs and closed FSB vicinity (XT160467) at 1340 hrs. The Battalion Command Post, Company B and 2nd platoon A Troop, 3/4 Cavalry, departed base camp 280858 hrs and closed FSB vicinity (XT160467) at 0946 hrs. The battalion conducted search and destroy operations in zone and supported the PHILCAG engineer effort. No significant VC contact was made.

(4) CEDAR FALLS (5-25 January 67) The Brigade Task Force consisted of: 2/1 Inf, 3/21 Inf, 3/82 Arty, F Troop, 17th Cavalry, 175th Engineers Company, 2/22 (M) Inf, 1/5 (M) Inf, B Troop, 3/4 Cavalry, 2/13 Arty (-) and A Btry 2/77 Arty. The mission of the Brigade was to locate and destroy key VC installations and fortifications, deny the VC the use of the area as a logistical base and headquarters and to establish blocking positions to prevent exfiltration by the VC across the Saigon River. The operation began when the Brigade Command Post moved overland to TRUNG LAP. On 6 January 1/5 (M) Inf moved to secure LZ's vicinity FSB #2 (XT6023) and FSB #3 (XT5925) for an airmobile assault by companies A and B, 3/21 Inf. These two companies provided security for the FSB's and the eventual air-lift by CH-47 of Btry B, Btry C and Btry A, 3/82 Arty to FSB #2 and FSB #3 respectively. Battery A, 3/82 Arty and A 2/77 Arty were located at FSB #3.

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Battery A, 3/13 Arty was located at FSB #1 and secured by Company C, 3/21 Inf. On 7 January 1/5 (M) Inf moved and secured LZ Victor for an airmobile assault by 2/1 Inf. The 2/22 (M) Inf attacked toward Obj C vicinity (XT5631). During the remainder of the operation 3/21 Inf secured FSB #1, FSB #2 and FSB #3 and conducted company sized airmobile assaults to search and clear villages, acting mainly on information received from Returnees. F Troop, 17th Cavalry and 175th Engineers Company cleared and secured roads for necessary resupply convoys. The remaining Brigade elements conducted search and destroy operations in zone and established blocking positions along the Saigon River. The 175th Engr Co improved roads from TRUNG LAP and constructed new roads to FSB 2 and 3, permitting ground resupply. The occupation of blocking positions proved highly successful as large number of VC were killed attempting to flee from the area North of the river and the Iron Triangle. Information from "Returnees" assisted the Brigade in locating cache sites and large tunnel complexes. It was in these tunnel complexes that the most valuable intelligence information was gained. Significant results achieved during Operation CEDAR FALLS by the Brigade included: 220 VC KIA (BC), 66 VC KIA (poss), 21 VC (POW), 357.1 tons of rice and 73 weapons captured, and numerous documents of vital interest to Army Intelligence, including key maps of the battle area, and VC After Action Battle Reports.

b. Artillery: There were 50,201 rounds fired during the period with the following results: 59 VC KIA (BC), 69 VC KIA (poss), 50 structures destroyed, 14 sampans destroyed, 33 bunkers destroyed, and 20 secondary fires & explosions.

c. Air Support:


(1) There were 721 air sorties during the period with the following results: 24 VC KIA (BC), 172 VC KIA (poss), 126 structures destroyed, 193 bunkers destroyed, 45 sampans destroyed, and 30 secondary fires & explosions.

(2) On more than half of the 721 sorties no bomb damage assessment was available due to the nature of the mission, the nature of the target, or because no information was available by friendly troops assessing the damage.

d. Intelligence:

(1) General: During the months of November and December Viet Cong initiated incidents against the 196th Light Infantry Brigade Base Camp and within Tay Ninh Province increased. However, in January the VC shifted their emphasis to their own resupply and procurement of rice during the harvest.

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(2) November.

(a) 1 November 196th Brigade elements were engaged in the vicinity of BAU GON (XT438500) evacuating and destroying the large rice cache of approximately 870 tons that had been discovered during the previous month. VC reaction consisted of sniper and mining incidents.

(b) The area in the vicinity of (XT438500) north to SOUI BA HOA (XT4156) was part of a large VC logistical base controlled by Group 82, Forward Rear Service, COSVN an analysis of captured documents revealed,

(c) 4 November the VC launched two diversionary attacks in an attempt to draw US Forces away from SOUI BA HOA. Elements of 272d VC Main Force Regiment attacked the RPPF outpost at SOUI CAU (XT438352) and suffered heavy casualties. At 0208 and 0545 the Brigade Base Camp received two mortar attacks. One hundred and three craters were located and crater analysis were performed. Firing positions for six 82mm mortars, 110 fuze caps and defensive positions for 71 personnel were found vicinity (XT152526). This site is now given a daily visual reconnaissance.

(d) The 273d VC Main Force Regiment vicinity (XT410539) made contact with elements of the Brigade during 4 November. The VC were well disciplined and supplied with ammunition. They defended tenaciously from reinforced log and concrete bunkers.

(e) Elements of the Brigade with the 1st Division Command Post at DAU TIENG (XT495475) and the Brigade base camp received mortar attacks the night of 11-12 November. Eighty 82mm mortar craters were found in the Brigade base camp. The results were three US KHA and 57 WHA.

(f) Two VC platoons encountered elements of 4/31 Inf on the eastern side of NUI BA DEN (XT285599). The VC conducted a deliberate defense from fortified caves.

(g) Between Tay Ninh City and SUOI DA elements of the Brigade detected and destroyed 14 anti-vehicle mines. Four mines caused the destruction of four vehicles, three US KHA and eight US WHA.

(h) Throughout November the VC harassed the Brigade-base camp perimeter nightly with small incidents. There were no US casualties sustained and little evidence was found of VC losses.

(i) The VC initiated 23 small action against RPPF outposts and six against Special Forces Camps.

(j) Two VC main force elements made contact with Special Forces CIDG elements on 21 November vicinity (XT038538). A VC battalion made contact with a BEN SOI CIDG company and on 23 November vicinity (XT404544) two VC companies engaged two SOUI DA CIDG companies.

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(3) December.

(a) Brigade elements encountered attempts to interdict the CAU KHOI Plantation roads with mines.

(b) Two Brigade unit base camps in the CAU KHOI Plantation were mortared.

(c) Brigade elements conducting search and destroy operations in the CAU KHOI Plantation, noted the VC continued to utilize sniper tactics and command detonated claymore mines.

(d) The VC on NUI BA DEN made contact with Brigade squad size elements on five occasions between 15 and 17 December.

(e) Elements of the 9th VC Div 271 Regiment attacked TRANG SUP on 20 December.

(f) Agent reports and visual reconnaissance indicated preparation for an attack on TRAI BI Special Forces Camp.

(4) January.

(a) VC activity in reaction to operation CEDAR FALLS was evasive in nature. The VC exfiltrated their main force units from the area of operation. The majority of contacts consisted of ambushing small VC groups attempting to leave the IRON TRIANGLE area via the Saigon River.

(b) 2/22 (M) Inf made two contacts with squad size VC units who employed anti-tank weapons. Three APC's were destroyed and six US WHA.


(c) VC mining increased along the routes of communication between CU CHI-TRUNG LAP and from TRUNG LAP into the operational area. A total of forty-eight anti-tank mines were recovered. Mine activities accounted for 70% of the casualties.

(d) Eleven VC rallied to elements of the Brigade and to TRUNG LAP district officials during CEDAR FALLS. Their reasons for rallying were: the prolonged presence of US troops in the area; the fear of US artillery and air power; and the continued hardships of VC life.

(e) Visual reconnaissance and agent reports indicated VC resupply and infiltration in the northern areas of War Zone C continue. The area from XOM GIUA (WT969700) to (WT950780) has been heavily traveled and off loading points along the RACH BENG GO show heavy use. On three occasions, truck convoys in Cambodia have been sighted proceeding south along Route 22 toward the border. Aircraft on VR missions continued to receive ground fire. The increased activity in the area indicates the 271st VC Main Force Regiment

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is in Northwestern War Zone C.

(f) VC activity in opposition to Operation RELIEF in the THANH DIEN forest area continued. Friendly positions and installations in the area received mortars and rifle grenades on five occasions. One PHILCAG soldier was killed and one wounded.

(g) The major VC initiated incidents was the mortar attack against the Brigade base camp, 290120 January 1967. Eighty-eight 82mm mortar rounds were received in the base camp and an additional 70-100 rounds fell outside the perimeter. Crater analysis revealed all rounds fired were 82mm. Nine firing positions and thirty security positions were discovered vicinity (XT194548).

(5) VC Personnel and Equipment Losses 1 Nov - 31 Jan 67.

VC KIA (BC)	441
VC KIA (poss)	338
VCC	24
Small arms	138
Grain & rice	774 tons
Returnees	12

e. Logistics.

(1) The First Logistical Command supports the 196th Light Infantry Brigade utilizing a fixed base camp area forward supply distribution point within the Brigade base camp. All stockage levels of Class I, II, (selected repair parts), III, IV (engineer) and V are maintained by the 266 Supply and Service Bn (SS).


(2) Class I Supply:

Type Ration	Stockage objective	O/H (days)
A	First Log	First Log
B	First Log	First Log
C	10	10

(a) Fresh fruits and vegetables are being received dependent upon availability of these perishables in-country. The Brigade has received adequate amounts in a satisfactory condition.

(b) Ice cream is issued three times a week at the rate of 2.5 gallons per 100 men.

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(c) Ice: Potable ice is shipped by refrigerator van from the 25th Division. A potable ice plant within the Brigade base camp is scheduled for completion in February 1967. The plant will have a capacity of 30,000 pounds of potable ice per day.

	Pounds per mess hall
Potable	25 average per day
Non-potable	100 average per day

(3) Class II & IV:

(a) The 8th Support Battalion maintains a central supply point and issues TA 50-902.

(b) Items in critical demand and action taken.

1. Twenty six 10 KW generators. The generators are on valid due out, document number 6262-1026. At the end of the period it was found that 800 generators are available for shipment from CONUS and lift data will be furnished by Hq, 1st Log Command as soon as possible.

2. Lighting Set 6230-299-5642. This item was requested on USARV Form 47 but disapproved stating that the request should be submitted to PA&E for installation. A subsequent request was submitted requesting temporary loan of this item. As of the end of the report period no reply has been received on the status of this item.

3. A semi-trailer tank, potable water 5,000 gallons with prime mover, was requisitioned on DSO Doc. No. 6305-1004 and 6305-1005. Item status at the end of the period no reply.


4. Four each trucks, tank, fuel servicing, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton 6x6 have been requested to augment the bulk POL transport capability of the 8th Support Battalion. These items have been requested on DSO Doc. No. 6305-1003, IPD 05. At the end of the report period the status was no reply.

(4) Class III: Issues during the period.

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Daily (average)</u>
Diesel	2000 (gals)
Mogas	2500 (gals)
JP-4	15000 (gals)
Avgas	740 (gals)

(5) Class V: The Brigade issue total was 7,849 tons for the period, average per day was 87.9 tons.

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(6) Maintenance.

(a) The maintenance platoon of the 8th Support Battalion supported many non-brigade units, however, the 548th Lt Equipment Company will phase into operation on 1 Feb 67, taking over the support of non-Brigade units.

(b) The maintenance platoon completed its move to a permanent location during January 1967. Operation at complete capacity was realized on 21 January 1967.

(c) The following is a completion of job orders for the reporting period by type: wheeled vehicles 95, artillery 69, small arms 302, signal 652, fire control 281, engineer equipment 93, office machines 31, service and evacuation 277.

(7) Engineer Section:

(a) General: The Brigade engineer section has operational control of the organic 175th Engineers Company (GS), and gives priority guidance for base camp constructions to B Company 588th Engineer Battalion and the 507th Engineer Detachment (R&U). Throughout operations Attleboro and Cedar Falls, the Brigade received general support in the form of construction, mine clearing and water point operations.

(b) Base Camp Support: During the period, the three Engineer units supported the Brigades' base camp development projects in addition to the requirements of lodger (1st Logistical Command) units.

1. Seventeen permanent type buildings were constructed within the Brigades' area.

2. Working at times 24 hours a day, over 75,000 cubic yards of laterite were trucked into the base camp.


3. On 4 January, the Brigade engineer effort began receiving limited small amounts of rough rock from the quarry site at the base of NUI BA DEN.

4. During the period, the dry season began and so did the dust problem. Tencurite and a mixture of diesel and pentylime have been spread on road surfaces and held rector gauze.

(8) Medical Section:

1. Each of the Brigades' infantry battalions, when on operations, has attached one medical from the 175th Engineers Company.

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2. Over 300,000 gallons of water was processed during operation Attleboro and Cedar Falls by the 175th.

3. On operation Cedar Falls, eight miles of two lane scrapped and shaped roads were constructed between the Brigades' forward base camp and two fire support bases.

4. One timber trestle bridge was constructed at (XT366458) and an elderly French Eiffel bridge located at (XT213542) had the decking replaced.

f. Administration.

(1) Personnel. During the period the personnel posture of the Brigade has been excellent. Assigned strength (approximately 105.8%) exceeds the authorized strength. There are no major shortages. The eligibility of E4's for promotion will help the E5 strength in MOS 11B4 and 11C4. Fill action for casualties has been adequate except in specific MOS (such as 67W). In some instances, on the job training is being taken to retain enlisted men in jobs not encountered until deployment. Approval of new Table of Organization and Equipment positions would relieve both the overage of 5.8% and the inability to promote enlisted men being retrained. During December 1966 and early January 1967, the first step to partially relieve the July 1967 rotational hump was taken by the infusion of 426 personnel with the 25th Infantry Division. The program was highly successful, and accounts for the large number of replacements received during the period.

(2) Key losses/gains:

(a) 1 November 1966, Colonel Francis S. Jonaty Jr, Deputy Commander, assigned to HHC 1st Bde 25th Inf Div APO 96225

(b) 10 November 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Hugh J. Lynch, Battalion Commander 4th Bn, 31st Inf reassigned to HQ USARV, APO 96307


(c) 11 November 1966, Lieutenant Colonel James P. Coley assumed command of 4th Bn, 31st Inf.

(d) 13 November 1966, Brigadier General Edward De Saussure Jr, Brigade Commander, reassigned to I FFORCEN Arty APO 96240

(e) 14 November 1966, Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles, assumed command of 196th Lt Inf Bde

(f) 18 November 1966, Major Stephen E. Nichols assumed command of 2d Bn, 1st Inf.

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(g) 19 November 1966, Colonel Charles P. Murray Jr, assumed duties of Deputy Commander.

(h) 19 November 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Weddle assumed duties of Executive Officer.

(i) 24 November 1966, Major Daniel K. Hall, Bde Chaplain assigned to I Field Force Vietnam APO 96240

(j) 5 December 1966, Lieutenant Colonel John F. Russell assumed the duties of the Bde Chaplain.

(k) 13 December 1966, Major Cedric L. Blackwell, Bde S2, reassigned to Georgia Sector Command XII USA Corps

(l) 14 December 1966, Major Derrell J. Savage assumed duties of Brigade S2.

(m) 7 January 1967, Major William E. Koerher assumed duties of Brigade S4.

(n) 27 January 1967, Major Derrell J. Savage, Bde S2, assumed duties of Bn S3, 4th Bn, 31st Inf

(o) 27 January 1967, Major Thomas A. Seale assumed duties of Brigade S2.

(3) Strengths as of 31 January 1967

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Auth	233	21	3563	3817
Asg	248	16	3889	4153
PDY	232	16	3644	3892

(4) Losses (1 Nov 66 - 31 January 67)

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
KHA	3	0	63	66
WHA	11	0	222	233
MHA	0	0	0	0

(5) Gains (1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67)

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
27	2	1009	1038

(6) The following awards were approved: DSC-1, SS-7, BS "V"-52, BS "M"-41, SM-1, ARCOM "V"-60, ARCOM "M"-28, PH-548.

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(7) Provost Marshal operations.

(a) General. The Provost Marshal section of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade is responsible for Military Police support of base camp and Brigade tactical operations.

(b) Base Camp operations.

1. Daily commitments during the reporting period included four roving patrols and three stationary posts. The roving patrols are responsible for the enforcement of regulations within the base camp area, villages surrounding the base camp, and Tay Ninh City. The three stationary posts are the Brigade Tactical Operation Center, and one post at each of the two base camp entrances.

2. Processing Indigenous Personnel. The processing of local Vietnamese civilians by the Military Police, in close coordination with the Vietnamese National Police, began 5 December 1966. The processing is done twice a day except on Sundays. There is an average of 3240 civilians processed weekly for labor within the base camp.

3. Prisoner of War Collection Point.

a. Due to the inadequacy of the old collection point, construction of a new POW complex began on 2 January 1967 and was operational on 29 January 1967.

b. During the period there were 86 detainees processed through the collection points: 84 through the old and two through the new. Of the 84, 59 were released, 19 were civilian defendants and six were VC POW's. Of the two processed in the new complex, one was released and one was a civilian defendant.

4. Convoy Escorts. Convoy are escorted 7.6 miles from a check point east of Tay Ninh City to the Brigade base camp. Convoy arrive from both Cu Chi and Dau Tieng. There are, during convoy movement, two traffic control post operated in Tay Ninh. Three hundred and nine convoys composed of 28,689 vehicles were escorted.


5. Registration. Two privately owned firearms were registered during the period.

6. Discipline, Law and Order. There were 228 non-traffic violations, including minor offenses during the period, and of these six were unfounded. Seventy one cases were investigated with seven becoming CID cases. One hundred and fifty-five offenders were indentified. Thirty-eight minor traffic offenses and 41 motor vehicle accidents were processed. The Brigade had one motor vehicle fatality.

(c) Brigade Tactical Support.

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1. Military Police participated in two Brigade and one battalion sized operations. In both Operation Attleboro and Operation Cedar Falls, thirty Military Police operated a POW collection point and secured the Brigade Command Post.

2. There were 99 detainees processed during two Brigade operations: 55 during Operation Attleboro and 44 during Operation Cedar Falls. Of the 55 during Attleboro, 14 were released, five were POW's, one was a returnee, and 35 suspects were released to other headquarters for final determination. During Cedar Falls there were 13 released, 11 returnees, 16 civilian defendants, and four VC POW's.

3. The 544th MP Platoon was attached to the 4/31 Inf during a search and destroy operation on NUI BA DEN. The platoon has the only 90mm recoilless rifles in the Brigade. These weapons were successfully employed in direct support of the Battalion.

(8) Staff Judge Advocate.

(a) During the report period, the Staff Judge Advocate has continued operating in its principal activities of military justice, legal assistance, and claims.

(b) In the field of military justice, there have been five summary courts-martial, and eight special courts-martial. Two special courts and one general court are pending trial. Recurring offenses have been disobedience and disrespect.

(c) In the area of legal assistance 93 clients were counseled, who required the following services: 46 Powers of Attorney; six Notarizations; 11 Wills; 30 domestic relations; debts and taxation.


(d) The claims function has resulted in the payment of nine solatium gratuities, the payment of five foreign national claims, and the processing of four military personnel claims. The largest problem in this area has been the length of time required by the MACV Claims Commission to settle meritorious claims; however exceptional claims will be expedited.

(9) Finance Section.

(a) During this period the finance section in addition to the normal activities of paying the Brigade in-processed and paid over 500 personnel during the current infusion program as well as out-processing a similar number of Brigadesmen.

(b) Federal Withholding Statements (W-2) were prepared and distributed to members of the Brigade and the sale of U.S. Treasury Checks and Piasters was extended to all personnel in the Tay Ninh area.

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(10) Public Information Office: The following activities took place in the 196th Light Infantry Brigade Information Office during the report period. There were 173 News releases, 147 Press visits, 80 Press accommodations, 1340 Home town news releases, 67 Home town tapes, and 56 Home town pictures.

(11) Post Exchange.

(a) Construction of the main Brigade Exchange was completed by the Brigade Engineers on 26 November 1966. Opening day sales on 15 December 1966 totaled \$20,994.80.

(b) Of the nine annex exchanges, from 26 December 1966 to 11 January 1967 six were closed leaving three infantry exchanges in operation.

(c) The Class VI store was officially opened 26 Dec 66.

(d) The results of the Quarterly Inventory taken 10 Jan 67 reflected an authorized droppage of \$5554.71; however, the actual droppage was \$194.99.

(e) A mobile exchange was sent to the field in support of Operation Cedar Falls, and on 14 January 1967 exchange supplies were being lifted by helicopters from the Trung Lap base to troops in the forward areas.

(f) The Brigade Exchange staff has a strength of two officers, six non-commissioned officers and 32 enlisted men.

(g) Sales by monthly report period were: 11 Nov 66 - 25 Nov 66 -- \$81,182.90; 26 Nov 66 - 10 Dec 66 -- \$61,565.70; 26 Dec 66 - 10 Jan 67 -- \$172,922.94; 11 Jan 67 - 25 Jan 67 -- \$123,490.05.

(12) Postal Section.


(a) General. The 196th Light Infantry Brigade Postal Section has increased in strength and responsibility, successfully processed the Christmas mail and moved to a new location during the period.

(b) The Brigade Postal Section (APO 96256) had been processing mail in two G.P. Medium tents. On 20 November 1966, APO 96256 became operational in a 20x96 foot quonset hut.

(c) During the period APO 96256 began processing mail for all U.S. Army activities and the 1st PHILCAG in Tay Ninh Province. The record volume of mail received during the Christmas season was 17,603 pounds on 19 December 1966. A record amount of money orders was sold, \$63,525.16, 30 Nov 66. Throughout the period, over 370,000 pounds of mail was received and 180,000 pounds of mail was dispatched. A total of \$975,486.66, in money

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orders and stamps were sold.

(d) The original one NCO and six enlisted men TOE strength was designed to give mail room type service for a Brigade of 3500 individuals. APO 96256 is rendering complete servitude: mail distribution and dispatch, money orders, parcel, stamp, accountability and APO directory services. As a result, the Brigade Postal Section now has a strength of one officer, two NCO's and twelve enlisted men.

(13) Chaplain Section.

(a) General: During the period, the Brigade Chaplain Section's operational organization was changed and the Brigade Base Camp Chapel completed.

(b) After 6 December, the chaplains began living in each of the battalion areas and taking a special interest in that battalion. The chaplain remains an assistant Brigade Chaplain and will provide coverage where needed.

(c) Under a self help program and assistance provided by the Brigade Engineers, construction of the Brigade Chapel was begun on 20 November and completed 23 December.

(d) The five Brigade Chaplains conducted 441 services with a total attendance of 14,321 both in base camp and on operations.

g. Civic Action.

(1) General. The 8th AA Platoon, 2d Civil Affairs Company was attached to the Brigade, and put under the operational control of the Brigade Civil Affairs Section. During the period, the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), construction, commodities distribution, education and training, and community relations projects grew in importance with time, experience and additional personnel.


(2) The 8th AA Platoon 2d Civil Affairs Company was attached to the Brigade 22 Dec 66. The platoon has a strength of two officers and four enlisted men which are undergraded, inexperienced, and untrained in their area of operation; however, the platoon has grown effective in surveying all available agencies. The basic data on health, education and economic status is being gathered by the platoon which will be the basis for future civil affairs activities.

(3) MEDCAPS: Fifty-eight MEDCAPS were conducted by the medical section of the different battalions. The battalions' doctors treated 5822 patients.

(4) Construction: The Brigade engineers completed seven miles of laterite surfaced double lane roadways within Tay Ninh Province. The market place in Cao Xa hamlet was resurfaced with 96 cubic yards of laterite. The

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schools in Trang Sup and Thai Binh received much needed repair and additions.

(5) Commodities: The following either captured or U.S. produced commodities were distributed within Tay Ninh Province.

Food stuffs	250 tons
Clothes	5000 pounds
School kits	2083
Toys	1700 pounds

(6) Education and Training: Three instructors taught 236 hours of English and art to 112 students.

(7) Community Relations: At the request of the 25th Div G-5, the Brigade organized and sponsored a victory celebration for the Suci Cao hamlet that had withstood a seven hour attack by the VC during Operation Attleboro. During Thanksgiving and Christmas, school children from surrounding hamlets were treated to the holiday meals in unit mess halls. The Commander and members of the staff have represented the Brigade at various social festivities.

(8) Tactical Operations. Civil Affairs as a major participant in Revolutionary Development was proven during Operation Cedar Falls. Rapport with the population in an unpacified area was gained by aiding the villagers with medical attention and with the distribution of much needed commodities. Fourteen hundred and thirty patients were treated while aid was also given to over four hundred refugee families in resettlement moves. A favorable change in the attitude of the people was noted, which will prove beneficial to the advisory group stationed in the area.

h. Psychological Operation: Leaflet drops, and loudspeaker missions increased as did the number of returnees. The 246 Psychological Company supported the Brigade with C-47 leaflet drops and U-10 loudspeaker missions. During the period 4,973,000 leaflets were dropped, 52½ hours of loudspeaker missions were flown, and Tay Ninh Province had 94 returnees.

i. Medical


(1) Personnel and Supporting units:

(a) There are nine out of ten authorized medical officers in the Brigade. All battalions have a surgeon who not only takes care of the sick call and other medical requirements, but also holds MEDCAP missions. An average of 2000 MEDCAP patients per month have been seen.

(b) Since the 45th Surgical Hospital became operational in Nov 66, most serious casualties have been evacuated directly to it. Company C (Med), 8th Support Battalion has handled the less serious casualties and illness, and any overflow of serious casualties from the 45th Surgical Hospital that need resuscitation and then evacuation to other hospitals. This arrangement has afforded a very high grade of medical care for the Brigade.

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(2) Preventive Medicine and Health of the Command:

(a) Personal hygiene is excellent. Adequate clothing, showering, and laundry facilities are available.

(b) Physical condition and nutrition of the troops is excellent.

(c) Skin and foot diseases have been encountered, but major problems have been circumvented by insuring adequate supplies of dry socks, underwear, and use of footpowder.

(d) The fighting strength has not been appreciably affected by diseases. The average daily non-effectiveness rate has been 2.5/1000 average strength/day. Venereal diseases, mostly gonorrhea, has been the single greatest cause of morbidity, with the rate of about 300/thousand/year.

(3) Environmental Sanitation.

(a) The quality of potable water supplied by the engineers' water points has been excellent.

(b) Insects and rodents are being controlled by use of the standard measures: residual insecticide is sprayed regularly in mess, latrine and billet areas, and bait traps for use of rodenticides are being installed.

(c) Permanent mess facilities are being constructed at present. Prior to this, unit tent-type messes have been utilized.

(4) Other Medical Services.

(a) The Dental Clinic in the medical company staffed with three dentists has maintained an excellent level of dental hygiene within the troops.

(b) Veterinary support for vaccination of animals, etc., has been provided by the 25th Infantry Division.

j. Signal.

(1) General. The signal section of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade is responsible for Brigade base camp and tactical communications operations. The signal platoon of Headquarters and Headquarters 196th Lt Inf Bde, the provisional platoon from B Company 36 Signal Battalion and 156 Forward Area Signal Platoon are all under the operation control of the Brigade Signal Officer.

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(2) Base Camp Operations.

(a) The provisional platoon has installed 200 telephones, strung 28 miles of trunk line cable and rewired the main distribution frame.

(b) Operation of the Brigade base camp three position switchboard (MTC-1) is accomplished by the provisional platoon. During their busy period the operator handles an average of 720 calls per hour.

(3) Tactical Operations.

(a) On 2 November 1966, two four channel Very High Frequency (VHF) radio relay systems were in support of the Brigade forward Command Post, Dau Tieng at the start of Operation Attleboro. The systems were trailer mounted components of Radio Terminal AN/MRC-69, and each was built up to 12 channel capacity during the operation. One system was utilized during the later stages of Attleboro to provide a terminant link between the 25th Division Forward Command Post at Tay Ninh and the 1st Division Command Post at Dau Tieng after the departure of the Brigade.

(b) During Phase III of Operation Lancaster the Bde Signal Section excecuted its first heliborne move from the Bde base camp to a Forward Command Post. This operation proved to be an excellent training vehicle in planning aircraft loads and correct grouping of mutually supporting equipment. Those items of equipment lifted into the forward command post were: a 3/4 ton trailer mounted 12 channel radio relay terminal; equipment for operation of secure teletype circuit; switchboard; FM radio with speech security attachments; and generator sets.


(c) Three VHF radio relay systems were operated in support of Cedar Falls, one to 25th Div headquarters, one to the Brigade base camp and one to Artillery Fire Support base 2. Other facilities in use were radio teletype stations and teletype terminals. An AN/MTC-7 was utilized for switchboard service at the Brigade Forward Command Post.

k. Training.

(1) General: The Bde conducts a program of replacement training at the Charger Academy. The 25th Div supports the Bde with allocations to its various schools. From within the Brigades' own resources, a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was organized and trained. On the job training is being given to enlisted personnel selected for jobs not encountered until deployment. Units not engaged in operations conduct training in basic military and technical subjects.

(2) Replacement Training. During the period 1054 replacements were processed thru the Charger Academy. All officers in the grade of O-1 and O-2, and all enlisted personnel thru the grade of E-7 received a program of instructions designed to refresh the individual with basic combat skills and those peculiar to Vietnam. Before leaving the Academy, each replacement

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confirms the zeros of his personnel weapon. (See Appendix 2, Replacement Training Program.).

(3) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol.

(a) In order to increase the Brigades' intelligence collection capability, organic highly trained reconnaissance teams were needed. On 2 January 1967, the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment (LRRP) was organized under the operation of the Brigade S2 and administrative control of F Troop 17th Cavalry. The current strength of the LRRP is two officers and 28 enlisted men. The proposed TOE strength for the detachment will be two officers and 66 enlisted men.

(b) Six personnel have completed the MACV Recondo School during the period, and 12 are scheduled for the school in February. When not engaged in operations, the teams receive concentrated advance training in such subjects as: Land Navigation; Patrolling; Repelling Techniques; Adjustment of Artillery Fire and TAC Air Strikes; Communications; and Intelligence Reporting Procedure.

(4) Scout Dog.


(a) The 48th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon joined the Bde, 22 Jan 67. The platoon has a strength of one officer, 19 enlisted men, and 16 scout dogs.

(b) An in-country training program of conditioning and proficiency was completed by the platoon.

(c) Classes were presented in the techniques and utilization of scout dogs to the infantry battalions and the cavalry troop.

(5) 25th Division Training Support. During the period eight rifle platoons have attended the 25th Division Lighting Ambush Academy. Bde personnel have attended courses in: Mess management; Generator Operation; Small Arms Maintenance; and Demolitions.

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2. Commanders Observations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Item. Payment of hospitalized personnel.

Discussion: A two man team consisting of a cashier and guard toured the hospitals and paid all hospitalized members of the Bde. This system proved to be too costly in man hours lost. A limited depository was opened. All hospitalized personnel are paid by Military Payment Certificate Check which can be cashed at the hospitals.

Observation: Finance sections in RVN should open a limited depository account and pay all hospitalized personnel by Military Payment Certificate Checks.

(2) Item. Rest and Recuperation partial pay.

Discussion: Enlisted personnel leaving for Rest and Recuperation were required to submit a copy of DA Form 2142 (Request for pay action) signed by their commanding officer prior to receiving a partial payment. An agreement was reached between the finance section and unit commanders. Enlisted personnel departing for Rest and Recuperation would present a copy of the R&R orders in lieu of DA Form 2142 and thereby reducing the administrative burden of unit commanders on combat operations.

Observation: By requiring one copy of R&R orders for a partial payment, the administrative burden on unit commanders' has been reduced.

b. Operations.

(1) Item. Failure of Ambush Patrols to Observe Basic Principles.

Discussion: When an ambush patrol reaches the preplanned ambush site, the patrol leader must reconnoiter the site for possible enemy activity and, concurrently, select positions for security teams, fire support teams and the killer teams within the ambush limits. Following the accomplishment of these tasks, the patrol leader must position his teams and insure that they remain in position.

Observation: An ambush patrol conducted during Operation Cedar Falls failed to observe the principle of requiring individuals to remain in place once positioned and, further, apparently failed to make a thorough reconnaissance of the area. The resultant effect was that three VC armed with AW's took the patrol under fire inflicting two casualties. Strict adherence to principles of patrolling is an absolute necessity if the patrol is to be successful.

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(2) Item. Tracer Ammunition Used at Night.

Discussion: It is difficult to accurately engage a fleeting VC target during the daylight hours and this difficulty is compounded during the hours of darkness when an individual cannot observe the strike of the bullet.

Observation: The use of tracer ammunition at night enables the soldier to accurately engage a VC target because he can see the trajectory of the bullet. During Operation Cedar Falls, two VC KIA (BC) and one VC KIA (poss) were inflicted on the enemy by an ambush patrol. This success is attributed to the use of the tracer ammunition at night.

(3) Item. Employment of Claymore mines.

Discussion: The employment of the claymore mine has proved to be one of the most effective defensive weapons. This is especially true when the claymore is employed as security around perimeters or when conducting extractions.

Observation: Following a firing demonstration of the claymore to determine its effect on ground forces, it was discovered that the mine when aimed at waist height and fired from a distance of 25 meters missed the personnel targets. In order to insure that the claymore will strike its target, the mine must be sighted near the base of the target to achieve maximum effect.

(4) Item. Search of VC structures

Discussion: On several occasions, units have sustained multiple casualties from booby traps while searching a VC structure for caches. Proper techniques were used initially, one man inspecting the entrances for booby traps while other personnel provided security from safe distances outside of the structure. After the structure was thought to be safe and a cache was found, the rest of the personnel moved inside to help remove the items. A booby trap hidden in the cache was detonated causing multiple casualties.

Observation: Units must stress the continuing danger from booby traps while searching VC structures. After the initial search and clearing of entrances, one man should be designated to continue the search and if a cache is found each item must be inspected for booby traps and then removed from the structure. If a booby trap is detonated the use of this method will minimize casualties.

(5) Item. Use of armed helicopter to interdict VC escape routes.

Discussion: Armed helicopters have been used successfully to observe VC attempting to flee operational areas during search and destroy operations. Recently it has been observed that the VC have been trained to

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remain in hiding while the armed helicopters are on station and when the helicopters are forced to withdraw to rearm or refuel the VC will quickly break for safety.

Observation: A technique successfully used is to have the armed helicopters accompany the combat assault helicopters and then orbit on station as the unit organizes and begins its search. Then at a time determined by the airmobile force commander the gunships withdraw from the operational area and orbit in an area three to five KM distance and then after a five minute interval return to the operational area at low level. This has resulted in the sighting of VC who attempt to flee the area believing that the armed helicopters had been withdrawn from the area.

(6) Item. Operations during road security missions

Discussion: During road security operations it has been observed that although the road is patrolled during the daylight hours and ambushes are sited at critical points at night, the VC have still been successful in mining the road.

Observation: Units having road security operations must conduct active patrolling, search and destroy, and Eagle Flight operations against known and suspected VC areas away from the road itself. Using these techniques in addition to securing the road keeps the VC defending his installations thus he loses time to interdict the roads.

(7) Item. Daylight Ambushes

Discussion: During operations in areas by the VC it has been observed that the VC habitually move in small groups along well used trails during the daylight hours.

Observation: Units should plan and conduct daylight ambushes along well used trails. This is particularly effective immediately upon entry into VC controlled areas.

(8) Item. Use of Scout Dogs teams

Discussion: Scout dog teams were employed on several occasions with ambush and daylight patrols in AO BLUE. These teams traveled with the point man during movement and were strategically placed during ambushes.

Observation: Proof of the effectiveness of the dog teams was their detection of recently manned VC positions up to four days old on several occasions, and detection of two VC during a daylight patrol. The dogs are well trained and easily able to find VC and VC locations before humans. In several instances the patrol would have passed by unknowing.

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(9) Item. Ambush Technique

Discussion: During recent operations in Tay Ninh Province the Brigade made its first confirmed VC kills by use of the night ambush. Six VC were allowed to proceed to within ten meters of a command detonated M-18 claymore mine when the patrol leader gave the order to spring the ambush. Results were four VC KIA (PG) and two VC KIA (poss).

Observation: Personnel on ambush patrols and combat outposts must exercise extreme fire control until the enemy is well inside the killing zone, ten to thirty meters from the ambush site. Prior experience with the M-18 claymore mine has proven that effective casualties are not produced at ranges beyond 40 meters due to vegetation and terrain features. Immediate search of the killing zone is necessary to preclude the bodies being carried off.

(10) Item. Use of daylight feint and after dark movement for ambushes.

Discussion: On two different occasions a unit has prepared a position seemingly for night occupation late in the afternoon then move their location several hundred meters shortly after dark. This was done on the first phase of operation Attleboro in AO-3 and again on the last phase of Lancaster in AO BLUE. Both times enemy contact was made by the element which moved while other battalion elements had activity. Due to the VC pattern of movement and clandestine intelligence gatherings, permanent positions seems to be easily spotted and avoided.

Observation: Moving the ambush site on a pre-rehearsed plan shortly after dark has produced VC encounter on two different occasions listed above. The VC in both instances exhibited actions which indicated a complacent belief that no friendly forces were near the area of the encounters.

(11) Item. Close and continual surveillance on road security


Discussion: While on security of Highway 26, several times vehicles were caught by enemy mines after the road had been cleared. VC under the guise of friendly civilians mingle with the indigenous personnel working in the area. Several vehicles have been lost due to the false assumption that, once cleared, a road remains safe.

Observation: Road clearance should be continual process during daylight hours, especially prior to vehicular movements. Screening patrols should concentrate on surveillance of groups of civilians along routes.

(12) Item. Closer coordination between friendly elements.

Discussion: On two occasions there have been fire fights between friendly units. One instance, was an ambush patrol was mistaken for

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VC and fired upon by ARVN troops. The other instance, was a fire fight which broke out between our units and an RF/PF company because neither was aware of the others proximity.

Observation: Closer coordination before and during operations should be handled at all echelons, and contact should be maintained between friendly units working together or in the proximity of other friendly units.

(13) Item. Conduct of mobile checkpoints operation for screening the indigenous traffic.

Discussion: The VC hire members of the local population to transport foodstuff, ammunition and equipment along major LOC's in the TAOR. Spot checks of traffic by Military Police and Counter Intelligence personnel from the MID can greatly hinder and sometime eliminate the use of this means by the enemy.

Observation: The establishment of mobile checkpoints for screening the indigenous traffic can greatly hinder the VC resupply effort.

c. Training and Organization - NONE

d. Intelligence

(1) Item. Necessity of keeping card files that update the Automatic Data printout in Order of Battle analysis.

Discussion: Automatic Data Processing Letter Box Numbers, cover designation, and personalities are very helpful as Order of Battle references. However, because of the time involved in producing the printouts, they are usually outdated in two months. Since VC unit cover designations and Letter Box Numbers change approximately every three months, it is necessary to maintain a file system which includes the most recent designations not found in the printouts.


Observation: A file system which corresponds to the system of Automatic Data Processing Print outs contains all information necessary for the ADP and allow for more rapid transfer of data to the ADP feeder sheets. Information for this system can come from CDEC readouts, agent reports, and captured documents translation.

(2) Item. Necessity of preparing spot report incident cards in duplicate

Discussion: To insure that rapid dissemination of intelligence information is disseminated to the Military Intelligence Detachment from the S-2 section; Spot report incident cards are prepared in duplicate. Periodically throughout the day, an MID representative obtains the cards from the S-2. When the Daily INTSUM is published and distributed the MID

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can discard their copies of the cards.

Observation: The duplication of Spot report Incidents cards facilitates the rapid dissemination of information to other organic intelligence processing agencies.

e. Logistics

(1) Item. Operation and location of the Brigade Logistical Operations Center.

Discussion: During tactical operations the necessity for close coordination between unit S4's, supply officers, aviation personnel, and direct support unit personnel was quite apparent and difficult to maintain. The daily supply problems, availability of helicopters, scheduling of sorties to include times, were all items that needed close coordination and supervision. These problems were solved by conducting a nightly logistical meeting with all S4's, aviation personnel, and support type personnel. All reports are submitted at this time and resupply plans for the following day are coordinated and finalized.

Observation: A brief nightly meeting of all supporting and supported logistical personnel is a very effective means of solving problems and finalizing future supply plans and operations.

(2) Item. Lanes for helicopter resupply.

Discussion: Lanes should be established in ~~LOC~~ areas for helicopter resupply. A lane should be assigned to a unit for the duration of the operation so as to avoid congestion at any one point.

Observation: Use of unit designated lanes will allow each unit to know where ~~all their~~ lifts will take place, and will aid the path finders in spotting the aircraft.

(3) Item. Communications for recovery operations

Discussion: The TOE for the Support Battalion does not provide radios for the service section recovery equipment. Many recovery operations require travel over insecure roads or through areas not pacified. Evacuation of vehicles damaged by mines is prevalent. All recovery operations require an escort to accompany recovery vehicles. Escort vehicles with radios are not always available. Radios should be mounted in each recovery vehicle and in the Service Section office to permit direction and coordination of the recovery effort and to permit calls for assistance by the recovery crew in case of attack or a recovery situation beyond their capability.

Observation: Addition of four each AN/VRC-46 radios to the MTOE prior to deployment of Light Infantry Brigade Support Battalions

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would resolve this problem.

(4) Item. Lack of evacuation capability for unserviceable major items.

Discussion: The Support Battalion of the Light Infantry Brigade has no capability to evacuate major items which cannot be transported in 2½ ton trucks. The employment of Light Infantry Brigades is normally in a location remote from other supporting units. The VC tactic of mining roads paved with iron bearing material, produces an unusually large quantity of mine damaged vehicles. Some of these vehicles can be towed - many cannot. Only two vehicles are authorized in a Light Infantry Brigade which can transport items of this type. Both vehicles are provided in the Engineer Company for the purpose of transporting large construction equipment. Due to other missions the availability of the engineer vehicles is almost non-existent.

Observation: Inclusion of a truck, tractor, wrecker, five ton and a semitrailer, low bed, in the MTOE of support battalions prior to deployment would resolve this problem.

(5) Item. Use of Logistics Liaison Personnel.

Discussion: The flow of supplies from Saigon and Cu Chi was expedited through the use of liaison personnel at both locations with adequate transportation.

Observation: Establishment of liaison teams at higher headquarters logistics offices resulted in expediting the flow of Class II and IV supplies.

(6) Item. Prevention of mis-shipment

Discussion: For about four or five months, we were using a transportation code that was assigned to us: as a result; there were cases of our supplies being forwarded to another unit. Upon return to the unit identification code (UIC), there have been fewer mis-shipments.

1. Always use the UIC. 2. Discourage use of transportation codes.


Observation: The utilizing of unit identification codes (UIC) rather than transportation codes on DA Form 2765-1 has resulted in fewer mis-shipments.

f. Others

(1) Item. Utilization of MEDCAP team

Discussion: A MEDCAP team under the control of the CA section proved highly effective during Operation Cedar Falls. The number of patients assisted by the team was the highest number to be seen by any team of the Brigade since arriving in-country.

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Observation: The above technique for employment of MEDCAP resources proved invaluable during Cedar Falls. The rapport obtained and aid given to the people proved once more that MEDCAP is our quickest means of winning the people while providing them with a much-needed relief.

(2) Item. Propaganda and Civic Action.

Discussion: The use of leaflets and loudspeakers in conjunction with MEDCAP and other CA activities proved, during Cedar Falls, indispensable to the intelligence effort of the Brigade. Skillfully employed, they can help in the education of the people in health matters as well as political indoctrination, thereby assisting in winning the people.

Observation: Placing posters in the entrances to the dispensary with appropriate themes as well as hand distribution of reward and information-seeking leaflets should be utilized with Civic Affairs activities or wherever a large crowd gathers.

(3) Item. Imposition of Article 15's

Discussion: Unit commanders had been imposing Article 15 forfeitures in excess of the maximum authorized by AR 27-15 and the Addendum to the Manual for Courts-martial, 1951. Due to operation requirements and limited administrative communication, Unit commanders were not always able to consult the Brigade Staff Judge Advocate on matters of Military Justice.

Observation: A training program was initiated by the Staff Judge Advocate. Personal contact was made with Battalion adjutants and unit commanders, when they were not on operations, and the provisions of AR 27-15 were explained.

(4) Item. Preparation of a Charge Sheets

Discussion: Charge Sheets are often prepared and completed at the unit level prior to consulting the Staff Judge Advocate as to the legal sufficiency of the charge.

Observation: After the statement of the witnesses have been accumulated, the individual responsible for the preparation of the charges should contact the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate so that assistance can be given as to the appropriate charge based upon the availability evidence. This procedure will prevent unnecessary duplication of paperwork.

(5) Item. Unit coverage.

Discussion: Assigning a reporter/photographer to each of the maneuver units has proven to be the most effective way to provide timely publicity of the units.

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
Observation: Having a reporter/photographer with the units provides on the spot coverage and eliminates the loss in time caused by the lack of transportation in getting to the area.

(6) Item. Hometown News Program

Discussion: The hometown news program is the best and most effective way of telling about the individual soldier. Not only does it inform the public about the soldier's accomplishments but also gains favorable support for the unit and Army.

Observation: The prompt completion of DA Form 1526 (Information for Hometown News Release) on all news worthy events (awards, promotions, arrivals, participation in operations, etc.) will insure maximum publicity is received by the individual and the unit.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


H. L. COOP
MAJ, AGC
AG

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C/CG, USARV, ATTN: AVC-DH (direct) (2cys)

C/CG, IIFFORCEV, ATTN: ACofS G3 (2 cys)

C/CG, U.S. Army Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga (2 cys)

C/CG, U.S. Army Armor Sch, Ft Knox, Ky (2 cys)

CO, U.S. Army Human Rsch Unit, Ft Benning, Ga (2 cys)

USACDC Ln Off, APO 96558 (2 cys)

CO, USAAMS, Ft Sill, Okla. (2 cys)

C/CO, C/GS, Ft Leavenworth, Kan (2 cys)

CO, 25th Inf Div, ATTN: 18 MHD, APO 96225 (9 cys)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECASSIFIED
100-142376-3
On _____ Date _____

AVIATION (7 May 67)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (100 0700-65) (U)

CB 532

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96303 4 MAY 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GRC
APO 96307

1. This Headquarters has received the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 196th Light Infantry Brigade as informed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference paragraph 1a (3) (a) 2, 3, and 4, page 9 concerning
discrepancy of equipment. USAV Reg 47 has been discontinued and the proper
method for these reasons (3) AVIATION 1967, USAV 500-722 dated 07, depicts
discrepancy in equipment authorizations, are available. Reporting unit has
no current requisitions for the items listed, because USAV Reg 47 has
been discontinued without action. The proper course of action for continuing
the existing lighting set is to submit an RMR for the required number of
standard floodlights sets USAV 57922. Additionally, any valid requisitions
held by the units should be checked with the reporting unit for updating and
current status.

b. Reference paragraph 2a (6), page 27, concerning receipt of
supplies: Consistent with command, USAV Regulation 500-3 requires that the
unit identification code be used on all supply requests. Since implementation
of this policy, fewer discrepancies have occurred.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl
nc

E. L. KENNEDY
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

MEMO FOR RECORD

ORLL staffed through:

G4 CPT Bisson/439
Compt not indicated

No further coord necessary. Back up papers are attached to
record copy. Action Officer: LTC Watson

for COL BROWN
G3 A-362


13 MAY 1967

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REFRAGED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



AVD QMHD (7 March 1967) 1st Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 196th Lt Inf Bde

HQ, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO San Francisco 96225, 16 March 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: ACofS G3
APO 96227

Commanding General, U.S. Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVC-DH, APO 96307

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Dev, Department of the ARMY
(ACSFOR DA) Washington, D.C. 20310

Forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
1 cy ORLL, 196th Lt
Inf Bde

JAMES D. DETHLEFSEN
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
INCLOSURE

3/7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVFBC-H (7 Mar 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967, 196th Infantry Brigade (Lt)(Sep)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 22 MAR 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 196th
Light Infantry Brigade for the quarter ending 31 January 1967 is con-
sidered adequate and is forwarded herewith.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs
with the comments, recommendations and actions taken as stated in the
basic report with exception of the following:

a. Para 2a(1), page 21: This problem is being studied by
this headquarters prior to making a recommendation.

b. Para 2e(3) page 26: Concur in this recommendation.
This headquarters plans to initiate action on the subject in the near
future.

c. Para 2e(4) page 27: Concur in this recommendation. A
study on this subject is being conducted by this headquarters.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc

JAMES A. ULVENES
Capt, AGC
Asst. AG

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated From
Classified Inclosures

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Fin Socs *MP*

MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS	ACTION
1	TO		INITIALS CIRCULATE
	Compt S- (to C2 DII) 1 May		DATE COORDINATION
2			FILE
	<i>G-3 (compt) no comment required</i>		INFORMATION
3			NOTE AND RETURN
	<i>A32</i>		PER CONVERSATION
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE

REMARKS

ORLL for 196th Light Inf Bde


FROM		DATE
LTC WATSON	<i>gaw</i>	Apr 67
		PHONE
		A-341

DD FORM 95
1 OCT 60

Replaces DD Form 94, 1 Feb 50 and DD Form 95,
1 Feb 50 which will be used until exhausted.

PPC-Japan

A32



AVHGD-PO

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL)

TO: G3DH

FROM: G4


DATE: 7 APR 1967 CMT 2 (U)

CPT Bisson/jw/439

1. Reference Paragraph 1e (3) (b) 2, 3, and 4, Page 9, reference receipt of equipment. Concur with unit comments. USARV Form 47 has been discontinued and the provisions of USARV message (U) AVHGC-OT 19073, DTG 251132Z March 67, subject: Changes in Equipment Authorizations, are applicable. Reporting unit has no due-out requisitions for the items listed, because USARV Form 47 has been returned without action. The proper course of action for obtaining the required lighting set is to submit an MTOE for the required number of floodlight set electrical LIN H79221. Additionally, any valid requisitions held by the unit should be checked with the servicing DSO for updating and current status.

2. Reference Paragraph 2e (b), Page 27, reference mis-shipment: Concur with comments. USARV Regulation 725-3 requires compliance with AR 735-35 in that the UIC must be used on all supply requests. Implementation of the use of UIC's by this Headquarters has resulted in fewer mis-shipments.

1 Incl
nc


J. A. GRAF LTC 65
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G4

19674 11417 INF 820E 0226 31 JUN 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

By AF NND 903621
MARA Date 5/31/90