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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96217

AVDF-BH-CF

9 March 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General
Americal Division
ATTN: AVDF-GC DOT
APO San Francisco 96374

TO: Commanding General
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MACJ 343
APO San Francisco 96222

1. (U) OPERATION: VERNON LAKE I.
2. (C) DATES OF OPERATION: 25 Oct 68 to 2 Nov 68.
3. (C) LOCATION: Phase I: Song Va Valley; Phase II: DA LO-HO DINH Mountain area West of Quang Ngai City. (Map Sheets: 6738I and 6639I, Series L7014).
4. (C) COMBAT HEADQUARTERS: 11th Inf Bde, Americal Division.
5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER: Col John W. Donaldson.
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

Phase I:	3d Battalion, 1st Infantry	Flt C-26 Engr
	4th Battalion, 3d Infantry	
Phase II:	3d Battalion, 1st Infantry (-) B Co	
	4th Battalion, 3d Infantry	
	1st Battalion, 20th Infantry (-) C Co	
	A, B, and C Troops, 1st Cavalry Squadron (+) D Co,	
	3d Battalion, 1st Infantry.	

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7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery:

(1) Direct Support Artillery for Vernon Lake I.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO:</u>
25 OCT	B-6-11	LZ DOTTIE	LZ BULLDOG (BS633557)
25 OCT	D-6-11	LZ DOTTIE	LZ DANCER (BS675402)
29 OCT	B-6-11	LZ BULLDOG	LZ PEPPER (BS495716)
30 OCT	D-6-11	LZ DANCER	LZ PEPPER (BS495716)

(2) The direct support artillery batteries of the 6-11th Artillery deployed on 25 Oct 1968. D Battery moved from LZ DOTTIE (BS631854) at 0800 hrs and closed LZ DANCER by 1200 hrs. B Battery moved from LZ DOTTIE at 1200 hrs to LZ BULLDOG and closed 1600 hrs. On 29 Oct at 0800 hrs B Battery moved by CH-47 to LZ PEPPER and closed by 1200 hrs. On 30 Oct at 1300 hrs, D Battery was airlifted to LZ PEPPER and closed at 1800 hrs.

(3) ROUNDS EXPENDED:

(a) Battery B 1172

(b) Battery D $\frac{847}{2019}$

(4) NATURE OF TARGETS: Scheduled fires and support targets were fired by both batteries of 105 Howitzers throughout the operation. Support missions were in the form of LZ preps and contact missions. Acquired targets were plotted by the Brigade S2 on known and suspected enemy base camps and on infiltration and exfiltration routes leading into the plains area west and southwest of Quang Ngai City.

(5) TIMELINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS:

(a) Response to calls for fire and forward observer adjustments to include adjustments made by aerial observers was accurate and rapid throughout the operation. Quang Ngai airfield was used as a forward supply point, and ammunition was moved by CH-47 from this location to the Fire Support Bases thereby reducing resupply time. Because of the adequate amounts of ammunition maintained on the Fire Support Bases (FSB) there were no emergency resupplies flown during the operation. There were no friendly casualties caused by artillery fire during Vernon Lake I.

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(b) The only difficulty arose when two batteries were co-located on FSB PEPPER. Due to the fact that each battery was in direct support of different infantry battalions, check fires were frequent, and at times, increased the rounds on target time.

b. AIR SUPPORT: 7th Air Force.

(1) Air support consisted of 6 B-52 Strikes and 69 forward air controlled preplanned and immediate air strikes.

(2) The 11th Bde's Tactical Air Control Party consisted of Forward Air Controllers of the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron.

(3) Both preplanned and immediate air strikes were timely and effective assisting immensely in the success of the Operation.

(h) Results: KBA 20, structures destroyed 23, secondary explosions 10, bunkers destroyed 28, tunnels 5, fox holes destroyed 53.

c. ARMY AVIATION:

(1) The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion provided helicopter support for Operation Vernon Lake I. 17th Assault Helicopter Company supported the operation with lift helicopters (UH1H) for air assault and command and control helicopters for each battalion throughout the operation. CH-47 aircraft were used extensively for troop movement, artillery movement and resupply of fire support bases (FSB). These aircraft provided the mobility and flexibility essential to the operation.

(2) Aero Scouts of the 123d Aviation Bn were used extensively for reconnaissance.

8. (c) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex C.

9. (c) MISSION: 11th Inf Bde realigns forces in the DUC PHO AO and employs two infantry battalions in the Song Ve Valley and subsequently in the mountain area west of Quang Ngai City to find, fix and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Division.

10. (c) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

Phase I: (250600H Oct 68 to 290700H Oct 68) Following six B-52 Strikes on 24 Oct the 11th Bde attacks at 250815 Oct 68 with 3-1 Inf conducting multiple combat assaults (CA) into LZ VOLUNTEER, LZ MOUNTAINEER, LZ WILDCAT and LZ BULLDOG and establishes FSB on LZ BULLDOG. 4-3 Inf conducts multiple combat assaults (CA) 250700H Oct 68 into LZ LONGHORN, LZ RAZORBACK and LZ DANCER to exploit B-52 Strikes and establish FSB on LZ DANCER. 2d ARVN Division

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blocks north end of Song Ve Valley with one Infantry battalion vicinity BS590585. All LZ's prepped with air strikes and artillery fires (See Overlay 1, Annex A).

Phase II: (290700H to 012400H Nov 68) A-3-1 Inf conducts CA into LZ PEPPER to secure for PSB. Companies C and D, 3-1 Inf conduct CA's into LZ APPLE and sweep east. B-3-1 Inf OPCON to 1-1 Cav. 4-3 Inf conducts multiple CA's into LZ GRAPE, LZ PLUM, LZ PEAR and sweep east. 1-1 Cav and B-3-1 OPCON to 11th Bde sweeps west in zone. 2d ARVN Division cooperates by conducting operations south of 1-1 Cav. All LZ's prepped with air strikes and artillery fires (See Overlay 2, Annex A).

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. 25 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from LZ DRAGON to LZ BULLDOG (BS633557). The LZ was cold and A Co remained as security for PSB BULLDOG. B Co conducted a CA from LZ LIZ to LZ MOUNTAINMAN (BS620540). The LZ was cold and B Co started to sweep north. At 1112 hrs via BS611551 B Co engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. B Co had no further contact throughout the day and established a Night Defense Position (NDP) at BS623522. C Co conducted a CA from LZ LIZ to a cold LZ VOLUNTEER (BS655505) then conducted a search mission SW to their Night Defense Position (NDP) via BS630527 with negative contact. D Co conducted a CA from LZ DRAGON to LZ MOUNTAIN (BS657529), which was cold and conducted a search mission west to a Night Defense Position (NDP) BS643527 with negative contact. RCH Plt moved by air from LZ LIZ to PSB BULLDOG and assisted in the security of the Fire Support Base.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from LZ BRONCO to LZ LONGHORN (BS665475). The LZ was cold and A Co swept NW to a NDP via BS655475 with negative contact. B Co conducted a CA from LZ BRONCO to LZ DANGER (BS675402). The LZ was cold and B Co established a perimeter securing the area for the establishment of PSB DANGER. C Co conducted an air move from LZ BRONCO into the secured LZ LONGHORN, then moved south to a NDP via BS665466 with negative contact. D Co conducted a CA from LZ BRONCO into LZ RAZORBACK (BS635445). The LZ was cold, but as the lift ships were leaving the area they received some ground fire from an undetermined location. D Co's subsequent move to a NDP via BS630435 produced no contact. RCH Plt was flown into LZ RAZORBACK while D Co was securing it then patrolled south to BS620430 with negative contact.

b. 26 Oct 68:

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(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co remained as security of FSB BULLDOG. D Co conducted a recon in force to BS615540 then conducted a CA to a cold LZ vic BS615483. From the LZ, D Co moved west to a NDP vic BS602482 with negative contact. C Co moved SW from previous NDP. At 1150 hrs vic BS624505, C Co engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 VC Flag and some documents captured. At 1255 hrs vic BS626507, C Co engaged 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA and the capture of more documents. Continuing to search the general area, C Co engaged 1 VC evading at 1311 hrs vic BS625508 resulting in 1 VC KIA. Moving on toward the West, C Co engaged 4 VC vic BS613503 resulting in 4 VC KIA and the discovery of 2,000 lbs of rice. C Co burned the huts in the area experiencing two secondary explosions. Shrapnel from the secondary explosions wounded (minor) one soldier in C Co. C Co closed into a NDP vic BS602502. D Co moved west from the previous NDP vic BS644528. At 1510 hrs vic BS623530 D Co found what appeared to have been an enemy base camp with 40 foxholes. They also found several rounds of 60mm Mortar ammunition in canisters in the area but made negative contact. D Co closed into a NDP vic BS633528. RCN Plt provided security for FSB BULLDOG and conducted localized patrols with negative contact.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved NW from BS655475 to a NDP vic BS632483 with negative contact. D Co continued security mission of FSB DANGER. C Co moved SE from BS665466. At 1300 hrs D Co and RCN Plt conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BS613474 and then continued the combat sweep. At 1755 hrs vic BS632479 D Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. The VC was wearing a green uniform, pistol belt and carried 3 AK-47 magazines. D Co and RCN Plt occupied a NDP vic BS635477.

c. 27 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co continued the security mission at FSB BULLDOG. B Co moved east to assist in the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) of B-52 (Arc Lite) strikes with negative results then moved to a NDP vic BS612499. C Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. C Co continued to move with no further contact and established a NDP vic BS612492. D Co moved NW along a stream bed from BS634528 to a NDP vic BS625535 without making contact. RCN Plt continued local patrolling and security of FSB BULLDOG. The CC helicopter at 1325 hrs vic BS660576 engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA and at 1550 hrs vic BS658484 found 1 VC KIA and one M-16 Rifle.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A, C, D Co's and RCN Plt conducted sweeps to determine BDA from B-52 strikes. The following was found:

0920 Hrs vic BS630477 D Co found 1 VC KIA
0930 Hrs vic BS628473 D Co found 1 VC KIA in a grave
0935 Hrs vic BS630478 RCN Plt found 1 VC KIA

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1100 Hrs vic BS628473 A Co found 6 NVA KBA and 3 VC KBA
1200 Hrs vic BS634479 A Co found one K-44 Rifle
1515 Hrs vic BS634479 A Co found 8 NVA KBA
1516 Hrs vic BS627424 AERO Scouts found 3 NVA KBA and 1 VC KIA
1530 Hrs vic BS634476 D Co found 3 NVA KBA

B Co continued security of FSB DANGER.

d. 28 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co continued security of FSB BULLDOG. B Co moved to a PZ vic BS615505 then air moved to Quang Ngai and became OPCON to 1-1 Cav. C Co searched North from BS612496 to BS615514 with negative contact. D Co moved south from BS625536 to BS615517 with negative contact. RCN Plt conducted localized patrolling and security of FSB BULLDOG. At 0945 hrs vic BS649560, RCN Plt engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co continued DDA of D-52 striders moving southwest from BS633483. At 0845 hrs vic BS639404 A Co found 1 NVA KBA in a cave, and 1530 hrs vic BS638467 discovered 1 NVA KBA in a shallow grave with miscellaneous SA ammo and equipment. B Co continued security mission of FSB DANGER. C Co moved NW from BS637459 along the river with negative contact. D Co and RCN Plt moved together initially NW to BS629482 then changed the direction of their search to the Southwest. At 1110 hrs vic BS637476, RCN Plt found a weapon cache containing 8 SKS Rifles, 6 M-1 Carbines, 2 French Submachine guns, and 1 AK-47.

(3) Supporting Aircraft: At 0930 hrs vic BS570421, the Aero Scouts engaged 5 NVA evading resulting in 5 NVA KIA. At 1255 hrs vic BS525750 F/0 Cav received SA fire from several positions. Fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA.

e. 29 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BS447715 and established FSB PEPPER. B Co OPCON to 1-1 Cav. C Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BS445745 and began a combat search of the area. At 1400 hrs vic BS445742, C Co engaged 2 VC hiding in a hole resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1602 hrs vic BS440755 an element of C Co engaged a VC in a tunnel resulting in 1 VC KIA. An hour later at BS4454763 an evading VC was engaged by C Co resulting in 1 VC KIA. D Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ at BS445765. At 1600 hrs vic BS4453757, D Co engaged a VC in a tunnel resulting in 1 VC KIA. RCN Plt air moved to FSB PEPPER to provide security.

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(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved from BS623474 Southeast on a combat search. At 1100 hrs vic BS634452, A Co found 1,000 lbs of rice and miscellaneous equipment which they destroyed. B Co conducted security of FSB DANGER. C Co conducted an airmove to BS445745 and was placed OPCON to 3-1 Inf. D Co & RCH Plt moved from BS623474 South to BS624469 then SE along the river with negative contact.

(3) 1-1 Cav: A, B and C Trps with D-3-1 Inf OPCON crossed LD vic Hill 10(BS6972) at 0830 hrs and conducted a combat sweep to the West. The following contacts were made:

1215 hrs D-3-1 vic BS556753 engaged 2 VC evading 2 VC KIA

1250 hrs D-1-1 vic BS584751 engaged 1 VC evading 1 VC KIA

1315 hrs D-1-1 vic BS584751 engaged 1 VC evading 1 VC KIA

1330 hrs C-1-1 vic BS569752 engaged 1 VC evading 1 VC KIA

1535 hrs D-3-1 vic BS541760 found 1 BAR

1615 hrs A-1-1 vic BS528715 engaged 1 VC evading 1 VC KIA

1645 hrs D-1-1 vic BS550742 found 1 homemade mortar tube.

1743 hrs D-3-1 vic BS546543 engaged 1 VC evading 1 VC KIA

(4) Supporting Aircraft: At 0840 hrs, F/8 Cav vic BS585738 had a helicopter shot down by SA fire. Gunships provided air cover immediately and the crew was extracted with no casualties. The Infantry Platoon of F/8 Cav was inserted to secure the aircraft and at 1206 hrs the aircraft was extracted without complications. At 1015 hrs vic BS575572, gunships of F/8 Cav engaged 10 VC with weapons resulting 1 VC KIA. At 1040 hrs Aero Scouts engaged 1 VC evading vic BS488766 resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1105 hrs the Aero Scouts engaged another VC evading vic BS445772 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

f. 29 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co and RCH plt continued to secure FSB Pepper. C and D Co's with C-4-3 Inf OPCON conducted a combat sweep east through grids BS4575 and BS4576. At 1045 hrs vic BS454763 C-3-1 Inf engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. C-3-1 Inf engaged another evading VC at 1107 hrs

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resulting in 1 VC KIA. C-4-3 Inf engaged a VC vic BS451763 resulting in 1 VC KIA and at 1140 hrs vic BS452763 D-3-1 Inf discovered 4 VC KRA. No further action was experienced on the combat sweep. At 1001 hrs the C-2C helicopter of 3-2 Inf engaged 2 evading VC vic BS459743 resulting in 2 VC KIA.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a CA to a cold LZ at BS45795 then conducted a combat sweep to the East. At 1617 hrs vic BS457782, A Co detained 14 VCS, one of which was wounded. B Co conducted a CA from FSB DANCER to a cold LZ at BS447772 then conducted a combat sweep SE. At 1214 hrs vic BS447768 B Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1505 hrs vic BS446776, B Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. D Co conducted a CA from BS637443 to a cold LZ at BS443787 then conducted a combat sweep east with negative contacts. RCN Plt was air moved from BS637443 to FSB DANCER for security during the day. At 1830 hrs RCN Plt was airlifted to LZ BRONCO thus, terminating operations at FSB DANCER.

(3) 1-1 GAV: A Trp conducted a combat sweep from BS520725 through grids BS5273 and 5373. At 1730 hrs vic BS535731, A Trp engaged 3 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. B Trp conducted a combat sweep from BS57746 to grid BS5474. At 1546 hrs vic BS540746, D Trp engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA and at 1645 hrs vic BS535745 had 2 US MIA from enemy SA fire. C Trp, with D-3-1 Inf, conducted a combat sweep from BS544751 through grids BS5275 and 5274. At 1040 hrs vic BS520751, C Trp engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1122 hrs vic BS522753 engaged another evading VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. C Trp engaged 2 VC trying to evade at 1045 hrs vic BS532753 resulting in 2 VC KIA.

(4) Supporting Aircraft: At 0900 hrs vic BS457768 the Aero Scouts discovered 1 VC KRA. At 1005 hrs at BS518753, F/O Cav engaged 2 VC evading resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1040 hrs the Aero Scouts engaged 1 VC evading vic BS453762 resulting in 1 VC KIA. F/O Cav engaged an evading VC at 1547 hrs vic BS525753 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

G. 31 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co and RCN Plt secured FSB PEPPIER. B Co was released from OFCS to 1-1 Cav and was airlifted from BS505740 to LZ BRONCO. The airlift was complete at 1750 hrs. C Co conducted a combat sweep east through grids BS4473, 4772, 4872, 4873. At 1530 hrs vic BS480725, C Co received SA fire resulting in 1 US MIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. D Co conducted a combat sweep through grids BS4674, 4672, 4775. At 1158 hrs vic BS480725, D Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA.

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(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a combat sweep through grids BSh577, 4870 and 4978. At 1035 hrs vic BSh60779 A Co captured a wounded VCS. At 1855 hrs, A Co received SA fire from BSh94779 resulting in 1 US KIA. D Co conducted a combat sweep through grids BSh577 and 4777 with negative contact. C Co conducted a combat sweep through grids BSh574 and 4775. At 1235 hrs, vic BSh68722, C Co received SA fire resulting in 1 US KIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. D Co conducted a combat sweep in grid BSh777 and at 1420 hrs vic BSh72704 detonated a booby trapped hand grenade resulting in 1 US KIA. No further contact was made. The RCL Plt was airlifted from LZ BROICO to FSD PEPPER, then conducted a CA into a cold LZ at BSh53773. A combat sweep was made of the area with negative contact.

(3) 1-1 Cav: A Trp conducted a combat sweep from BSh515734 to the Vic of BSh5373 with negative contact. D Trp conducted a combat sweep from BSh525755 to grid BSh5375. At 0806 hrs vic BSh18752 B Trp engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. C Trp conducted a combat sweep from BSh65745 to grid BSh5174 with negative contact. 1-1 Cav terminated operations in Vernon Lake I as of 1900 hrs.

h. 1 Nov 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: 3-1 Inf concluded operations in Vernon Lake I and conducted an airlift to the DUC PHO AO to assume responsibility for that AO.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a combat sweep from BSh92784 to BSh505760 with negative contact. B Co conducted a combat sweep from BSh72779 to BSh98760 with negative contact. C Co conducted a combat sweep from BSh72750 to BSh500764. At 1930 hrs vic BSh98762, C Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. D Co conducted a combat sweep from BSh72776 to BSh505760 with negative contact. The RCL Plt conducted a combat sweep from BSh72776 to BSh98760 with negative contact.

(3) 1-20 Inf: The 1-20 Inf conducted an airlift from DUC PHO AO into the Vernon Lake I AO ceasing responsibility for the DUC PHO AO and commencing operations Vernon Lake I. The battalion minus C Co was airlifted into LZ PEPPER and the movement was complete 1500 hrs. All units of 1-20 Inf prepared for future operations. At 1642 hrs vic BSh75765, B Co engaged several VC evading resulting in 2 VC KIA. There was no further contact in the 1-20 Inf Area.

i. 2 Nov 68:

Operation Vernon Lake I terminated 020600 Nov 1968.

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12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly casualties for Vernon Lake I:

3-1 Inf		1 WHA (E)
4-3 Inf	1 KIA	3 WHA (E)
1-1 Cav		2 WHA (E)

b. Enemy cumulative results for Vernon Lake I. (See Annex C, Intelligence)

13. (C) LOGISTICS: See Annex B.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: TOE Equipment, standard tactics and techniques normally related to airmobile counterinsurgency warfare were used during this operation.

15. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: Operation VERNON LAKE I was envisioned as a spoiling attack against a concentration of enemy forces who's apparent mission was an attack aimed at Quang Ngai City. Intensification of intelligence seeking operations in the form of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols and Sniffer missions narrowed the area of troop concentration and enabled the selection of primary targets for B-52 ARC LITE strikes. VERNON LAKE I commenced immediately following the completion of the final ARC LITE, by combat assaulting elements of two battalions into the area suspected of being the enemy troop locations. It was apparent that the enemy was staging in a forward base for deployment in the immediate future. The ARC LITE Strikes were well plotted and one of the bases almost completely destroyed an occupied enemy battalion base camp. After completely evaluating the ARC LITE area both battalions pressed on to find and fix the remaining enemy forces. However, the enemy elected to avoid contact and only sparse contacts were made throughout the remainder of the operation.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is highly recommended that when intelligence sources indicate a buildup of enemy force in a given area extensive intelligence gathering operations such as LREP or Sniffer flights be immediately employed to pin-point the enemy location and then systematically employ ARC LITE Strikes followed by troop employment in the area to assess the effect. It is further recommended that if enemy forces concentrate

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
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in a given area spoiling attacks be employed to destroy his forces and to disrupt his schedule. The maximum use of mobility through combat assaults enables US Forces to outmaneuver the enemy whenever he can be located.

4 Incl
ANNEXES:
A-Opn Overlay
B-Logistics
C-Intelligence
D-Signal


JOHN W. DONALDSON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(VERNON LAKE I)

1. (C) The logistical support for Operation VERNON LAKE I is best understood if broken down into three general areas:

- a. Establishment and stockage level for the FSE located at Quang Ngai.
- b. Resupply of infantry battalions and artillery batteries.
- c. Establishment and maintenance of 11th Infantry Brigade CP at LZ Bulldog and LZ Pepper.

2. (C) QUANG NGAI:

a. The FSE at Quang Ngai was established on 14 October in anticipation of Operation VERNON LAKE I. The FSE received replenishment of stockage objectives and its initial stockage from Chu Lai. A water purification point was established by Company C, 26th Engineer Battalion. Also, a brigade clearing station was planned for should it be required. The stockage objectives at Quang Ngai were as follows:

<u>DODAC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE</u>
A131	CTG 7.62mm MLB 4-1	100,000
A165	CTG 7.62mm Mini	200,000
H490	Rkt 2.75mm	500
B572	CTG 40mm/Linked	18,000
G955	Gren Hd Smk (Violet)	144
G950	Gren Hd Smk (Red)	144
I407	Flare Acft (MK24)	96
C445	CTG 105 HE	3,400
C449	CTG 105 ILL	200
C452	CTG 105 Smoke	200
C454	CTG 105 WP	200
D544	CTG 155 HE	1,200
D550	CTG 155 WP	100
D505	CTG 155 ILL	100
N/A	CTG 155 ILL	100
N/A	JPL	20,000 Gal
N/A	MOGAS	1,000 Gal
N/A	C-Rations/LRP Rations	9,000 meals

b. The stockage objectives at Quang Ngai were maintained by coordination of the 6th Support Battalion with Americal Division Transportation and Ammunition Officers.

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) Continued.

3. (C) The infantry battalions were supported logistically, primarily from LZ Bronco; FSB LZ Dancer for 4th Bn, 3d Inf and FSB LZ Bulldog for 3d Bn, 1st Inf.

a. The material requirements for establishing an infantry battalion fire support base were as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Sandbags	25,000 ea
Concertina	3 sleeves ea
Pickets 8'	555 ea
Pickets 3'	222 ea
Culverts 60"	60 ea

b. The average daily resupply for each infantry battalion was as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
C-Rations	127 cases
A-Rations	1,000 lbs
Water	1,000 gal

c. Ammunition resupply for the two artillery batteries (D, 6/11 at LZ Dancer and B, 6/11 at LZ Bulldog) was accomplished primarily from the Quang Ngai FSE by Chinook sling load. Back-up resupply for the units was handled from the 1st Logistical Command ASP located at LZ Bronco (these figures are not available). However, the daily average resupply for the artillery battalion from the Quang Ngai FSE was as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Ammo	480 rounds
C-Rations	32 cases
Water	1,000 gal

4. (C) Brigade CP at LZ Bulldog:

a. The 11th Infantry Brigade CP was established at LZ Bulldog on 25 October by elements of HHC, 11th Infantry Brigade and other designated individuals.

b. The 11th Infantry Brigade CP was moved from LZ Bulldog to LZ Pepper on 29 October 1968, by elements of HHC, 11th Infantry Brigade.

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) continued.

d. HHC was responsible for resupply of C-Rations for personnel of the 11th Infantry Brigade CP. Other supplies were furnished by the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade.

5. (C) Individuals were required to deploy with $1\frac{1}{2}$ basic load of ammo and battalions were required to transport a modified basic load to new firebases (modified by unit, based on experience factor).

6. (C) No major logistical problems were experienced during Operation VERTON LAKE I. However, continued use of pre-packaging materials and pre-cut bunkers reduces waste as well as helicopter sorties. Blivits (500 gal and 250 gal) are indispensable on fire bases, especially during inclement weather conditions. Every effort should be made to pre-stock a minimum of seven (7) days of supply on all fire bases.

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(C) ANNEX C (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Vernon Lake #1)

1. (C) WEATHER AND TERRAIN:

a. Weather: The weather during the operation was generally favorable from mid morning to dusk. Skies were generally cloudy to partly cloudy and visibility was good. Precipitation occurred as follows: on 26 Oct very light rainshowers from 0600H to 1000H; on 27 Oct occasional very light drizzle from 0900H to 1000H; on 31 Oct very light drizzle from 0600H to 0700H and light rainshowers from 1300H to 1800H; on 1 Nov very light drizzle from 0600H to 1000H and occasional very light rain from 1300H to 1800H.

b. Terrain:

(1) First phase of Vernon Lake #1 (exploitation of Arc Light boxes vicinity BS6347).

(a) The major portion of the operational area was composed of rugged mountains with steep ravines covered by dense undergrowth and single and double canopy forest. Movement was restricted except in the valleys and along trails.

(b) Effect on enemy courses of action: The operational area afforded the enemy the capability of movement relatively free from observation. The dense undergrowth and sharp ravines provided the enemy numerous areas in which to hide to avoid contact.

(c) Effect on friendly courses of action: The nature of the terrain restricted ground movement of friendly forces. Movement was necessarily slow and visibility, observation and fields of fire were restricted by the nature of the terrain.

(2) Second phase of Vernon Lake #1 (attempt to make contact with the 2nd Regiment vicinity BS5270).

(a) The terrain in this area is flat and broken by dense hedgerows in the vicinity of hamlets. There are large numbers of rice paddies, many of them abandoned, which makes rapid movement in the area possible.

(b) Effect on enemy course of action: Due to the flat and relatively open terrain enemy movement during daylight hours was extremely restricted. Hedgerows around hamlets provided excellent cover and defensive positions for units.

(c) Effect on friendly courses of action: The terrain offered no major obstacle to friendly movement; however, the numerous hedgerows made sweeping operations through villages difficult to control and tended to force actions into numerous equal size engagements.

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2. PRELIMINARY INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence indicated the presence of several VC/NVA units (see 2d below) in this area prior to the initiation of the operation. It is probable that these units were effecting resupply and consolidation in preparation for operations along the coastal plains to their east and north during the monsoon season. Probable objectives were Quang Ngai city and Nghia Hanh city.

b. Intelligence indicated the presence of fortified positions and base camps within the general area. Heavy trail activity leading into the area was observed 7 - 10 days prior to the operation.

c. Enemy Capabilities:

(1) Conduct resupply and consolidation in preparation for attacks on Quang Ngai and Nghia Hanh.

(2) Conduct attacks and ambushes against friendly forces and LFs.

(3) Evade friendly forces and avoid contact.

d. Enemy disposition and strength:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
2nd VC Regt., 3d NVA Div	BS5269	1325
81st LF VC Battalion	BS6154	210
83rd LF VC Battalion	BS6451	250
CLB LF VC Company	BS6560	100
506B LF VC Sapper Company	BS6653	65

3. (C) Development of Intelligence:

a. The first phase of Vernon Lake #1 (25 Oct to 28 Oct) consisted of the exploitation of six Arc Light boxes which were struck in the Song Va Valley vicinity BS6347 on 24 Oct. The boxes were struck because intelligence sources during the previous four (4) weeks indicated the presence of a VC/NVA base camp in the area. A VC/NVA base camp located in the target area was 95% destroyed. 170 four to five man bunkers, 50 foxholes, and numerous tunnels were destroyed. The ledge on a mountain was sheared off and buried porticos of the base camp under tons of rock and soil. 18 NVA and 6 VC bodies were found in the base camp.

b. The second phase of Vernon Lake #1 (29 Oct to 2 Nov) consisted of an attempt to make contact with major elements of the 2nd regiment, 3rd NVA Division believed to be located in the Dong Tra Khuc river valley vicinity BS5270. No significant contacts were made.

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4. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Though Operation Vernon Lake #1 was conducted in an area which intelligence indicated to be an enemy resupply and consolidation area, there were no significant contacts established nor were large food or weapons caches discovered.

b. The willingness of VC/NVA forces to allow sweep operations to be conducted in such an area indicated an overriding desire on his part to avoid contact.

c. This operation caused the VC/NVA to relocate large numbers of troops and supplies thereby disrupting his timetable for offensive actions along the coastal area during the monsoon season.

5. (C) ENEMY LOSSES:

a. Personnel:

NVA/VC KIA	27/68
NVA/VC PW	2/0
Civil Defendants	6

b. Equipment:

(1) Captured:

Weapons:

Individual	23
Crew Served	1

Miscellaneous:

82MM Mortar Sight	1
82MM Bipod	1
82MM Rounds	8
Rice	5000 lbs
Documents	50 lbs

(2) Destroyed:

Weapons: 1 Homemade Mortar Tube

Clothing:

Ammunition:

105MM Rounds	2
82MM Rounds	10
75RR Rounds	2
AK-47 Rounds	1017
M-60 Rounds	4
CHICOM H/Gren	23
M-26 H/Gren	1

NVA Uniforms	5
Black Pajamas	17

Food: Rice	5300 lbs
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Miscellaneous:

Ammunition Boxes	4	AK-47 Ammunition Pouches	3
Pistol Belts	2	AK-47 Magazines	6
NVA Canteens	3	M-16 Magazines	3
NVA Mess Kits	3	57RR Canisters	13
NVA Packs	5	60MM Canisters	6
NVA Helmets	2	Hammocks	3
Ponchos	2	Shovels	12
Rucksacks	10	Sampans	1

c. Structures:


Huts Destroyed	23	Bankers Destroyed	98
Tunnels Destroyed	5	Poxholes Destroyed	53

d. Secondary Explosions/Fires from Airstrikes or Artillery:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
25 Oct	BS621458	2 Secondary Explosions
25 Oct	BS615460	2 Secondary Explosions/2 Secondary Fires
26 Oct	BS613503	2 Secondary Explosions
27 Oct	BS662405	1 Secondary Explosions with white smoke
30 Oct	BS664766	1 Secondary Explosion
31 Oct	BS454803	1 Secondary Explosion/1 Secondary Fire
01 Nov	BS498782	1 Secondary Explosion

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(D) ANNEX D (Signal) to Combat Operations Communications Mission (After Action Report, VERNON LAKE I)

1. (C) COMMUNICATIONS MISSION: Install, operate, and maintain communications facilities in support of the 11th Inf Bde during conduct of VERNON LAKE I.

2. (C) THE COMMUNICATIONS MEANS:

a. Phase I: FM was the means of communications to 11th Inf Bde Main, and to the Inf Bns. The C&C aircraft augmented FM radio by providing courier service as required.

b. Phase II: Telephone via VHF was the primary means of communications to 11th Inf Bde Main, with FM radio as the secondary means. FM was the means to the Inf Bns. C&C aircraft were used by all echelons to augment previously stated communications.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Phase I: A signal recon was not conducted. The Bde Radio Officer and 2 EM from MHC Radio Section arrived LZ Bulldog at 290600 Oct 68 and assisted in installing the TOC radios. Bde Fwd operated in the following FM radio nets:

- (1) Bde Cmd.
- (2) Bde Secure.
- (3) Inf Bn as Required.

b. Phase II:

(1) FM: All FM nets from Bde Fwd at LZ Pepper were operational to Div, Bde Main, and to the Inf Bns by 290500 hrs Oct 68. An FM retransmission team was airlifted to LZ Buff on 240300 Oct in order to insure the reliability of FM communication from Bde Main to Bde Fwd. The following nets were in operation at LZ Pepper:

- (a) Div Cmd.
- (b) Div Secure
- (c) Bde Cmd.
- (d) Bde Secure.

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(D) ANNEX D (Signal) continued.

(2) Telephone Communications: Telecom via VHF was established by 291930 Oct 68 between Bde Main and Bde Fwd. Circuits were also established for 3/1 and 4/3 Inf Bns for telephone communications from the forward location and to the Bn Rear of each Bn and to Duc Pho Switch (see Appendix 1). On 31 Oct, 3/1 Inf Bn was replaced by 1/20 Inf Bn, and at 311300 hrs, the telephone circuits which were used by 3/1 Inf Bn were given to 1/20 Inf Bn. A Bde Fwd switchboard was not established. All circuits were dedicated (point to point), or long locals off the Duc Pho Switch.

4. (C) RESULTS: All systems were operational throughout the operation, and no significant problems were encountered. A Communications center was not used and was not needed.

a. A signal plan was not prepared prior to this operation. Time permitted only verbal instructions and notes. This did not have an adverse effect on communications support.

b. Signal maintenance support provided by the 6th Support Battalion was very effective.

4. Appendixes

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Appendix I (Signal) To Annex D Combat After Action Report, VERNON LAKE I

Phase I 281930 Oct

Channel:

1. Open *
2. Bde Fwd TOC to BDE TOC
3. Bde Fwd TOC to Duc Pho
4. Bde CO (van) to Bde TOC
5. Bde CO (van) to Duc Pho
6. 3/1 Fwd TOC to Bde TOC *
7. 3/1 Fwd TOC to 3/1 Rear -
8. 4/3 Fwd TOC to Bde TOC
9. 4/3 Fwd TOC to 4/3 Rear
10. B-6/11 FDC to 6/11 FDC
11. D-6/11 FDC to 6/11 FDC
12. Bde Fwd VEF to Bde Patch

pt/pt Fwd TOC to Bde CO (van)


*Phase II- 311300 Oct

Channel

1. 1/20 TOC to Duc Pho
6. 1/20 TOC to Bde TOC
7. 1/20 TOC to 1/20 Rear

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
APPENDIX II (Signal) To Combat Action Report, VERNON LAKE I



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
APPENDIX III (Signal) To Combat Action Report, V. P. NOW LAKE I



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Appendix IV (Signal) To Combat Action Report, Vernon Lake I



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Headquarters, 11th Infantry Division, Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96374

AFIP-IA-02

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (VERSION LAKE II) (U)

TO: Commanding General
Medical Division
ATTN: AVDF-UC DOT
APO San Francisco 96374

TO: Commanding General
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MACJ 343
APO San Francisco 96374

1. (U) OPERATION: VERNON LAKE II.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 2 Nov 68 to 28 Feb 69.

3. (U) LOCATIONS: Song Ha Valley and VACH Mountain area West and North
of Huey Long (Map Sheets: Series 17011; Sheets 67393, 67392, 67394,
67395).

4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS:

a. 1st BATTAL - 2 Nov 68 to 7 Jan 69

b. 1st BATTAL, 11th Infantry Division - 8 Jan 69 to 28 Feb 69

5. (U) COMMANDING OFFICER: Colonel John W. [Name]

6. (U) ORGANIZATION:

3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry
1st Battalion, 11th Infantry
1st Battalion, 11th Infantry
4th Battalion, 11th Infantry
5th Battalion, 11th Infantry

GROUP 1

Classified at 5 Year Interval
Declassified After 12 years

COMANDANT

2-01

[Signature]

AVR 11 0P

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (VERNON LAKE II) (U)

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery:

(1) Direct Support Artillery for VERNON LAKE II:

(a) On 2 Nov 68 Batteries B and D (105MM) 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery displaced from LZ PEPPER (BS495716) to LZ CORK (BS448612).

(b) On 5 Nov 68 the 251st Radar Detachment under operational control of the 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery emplaced an MPQ-4A countermortar radar on Radar Hill (BS450609). The Radar Detachment remained in this position for the duration of the operation.

(c) On 12 Nov 68 D Battery, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery displaced from LZ CORK to LZ AMY (BS474527).

(d) On 16 Nov 68 one platoon of A Battery (155MM) 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery, under the operational control of the 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery emplaced on LZ CORK. The platoon remained in that position for the duration of the operation.

(e) On 19 Nov 68 one platoon of A Battery (105MM) 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery displaced from LZ DRAGON (BS725515) to LZ CAM (BS393501). The platoon remained in that position until 21 Nov 68 at which time it displaced from LZ CAM to Minh Long in conjunction with the displacement of the remainder of A Battery from LZ DRAGON to Minh Long. A Battery supported the operation from Minh Long until 28 Nov 68 at which time it displaced to LZ DRAGON.

(f) On 2 Dec 68 one platoon of B Battery (105MM) 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery displaced from LZ CORK to LZ VOLUNTEER (BS347593). The platoon supported the operation from this position until 13 Dec 68 at which time it returned to LZ CORK.

(g) On 2 Jan 69 one platoon from C Battery (155MM) 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery under operational control of the 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery displaced to LZ AMY. These howitzers remained on LZ AMY until 4 Feb 69 at which time one howitzer was displaced to LZ LIZ (BS754433) and the other to LZ THUNDER (BS872323).

(h) On 7 Feb 69 four howitzers of B Battery (105MM), 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery displaced from LZ CORK TO HA THANH. These howitzers supported the operation from that location until 11 Feb 69, at which time they returned to LZ CORK.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (PARAGRAPH II)

(1) On 23 Feb 69, one machine gun section of Battery G, 54th Artillery employed on Radar Hill and remained at that location for the duration of the operation.

(2) Rounds Expended:

(a) A/6-11 Artillery (105MM)	622 Rds
(b) B/6-11 Artillery (105MM)	19,439 Rds
(c) D/6-11 Artillery (105MM)	13,468 Rds
(d) A/1-82 Artillery (155MM)	4,137 Rds
(e) C/1-82 Artillery (155MM)	317 Rds
TOTAL	38,183 Rds

(3) Nature of Targets: Scheduled fires and support targets were fired by all batteries of 105 and 155 howitzers throughout the operation. Support missions were in the form of LZ prep and contact missions. Required targets were plotted by the Brigade S-2 on known and suspected enemy base camps and on points of infiltration in the DM VAOI Namboan area and infiltration routes leading into the Pleiku area west and south of Quang Ngai City.

(4) Timeliness and Effectiveness:

(a) Response to calls for fire and forward observer adjustments so include adjustments made by aerial observers was accurate and rapid throughout the operation. Quang Ngai Airfield was used as a forward supply point and ammunition was moved by CH-47 from this location to the fire support bases thereby reducing resupply time. Because of the adequate amount of ammunition stored on the Fire Support Bases (FSB) there were no emergency resupply missions during the operation. There were no artillery casualties caused by artillery fire during PARAGRAPH II.

(b) Due to the distances between the area of operation and the batteries Fire Direction Center (FDC) located on LZ PRONCO (D981738), it was extremely difficult to effect communications control of forward fire support elements. A battery forward FDC element was established on the FDC, thus greatly improving communications and operational control of the batteries over the forward elements in the DM VAOI Namboan area of operations.

b. Air Support: 7th Air Force.

(1) Air support consisted of 24 B-52 Strikes and 234 forward air controlled preplanned and immediate air strikes.

(2) The 24th Air Force Tactical Air Control Party consisted forward Air Controllers (FAC) of the 24th Tactical Air Support Squadron.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (VERNON LAKE II) (U)

(3) Both preplanned and immediate air strikes were timely and effective assisting immensely in the success of the operation.

(4) Results: KBA 62, structures destroyed 304, secondary explosions 31, bunkers destroyed 132, trenchlines destroyed 635 meters, foxholes 138.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion provided helicopters for Operation VERNON LAKE II. The 17th Assault Helicopter Company supported the operation with lift helicopters (UH1H) for air assault and command and control helicopters for each battalion throughout the operation. CH-47 Aircraft were used extensively for troop movement, artillery movement and resupply of fire support bases (FSB). These aircraft provided the mobility and flexibility essential to the operation.

(2) Aero Scouts of the 123d Aviation Battalion were used extensively for reconnaissance.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex C.

9. (C) MISSION: 11th Inf Bde realigned forces in the Dug Pho AO and employed ground forces in the DA VACH Mountains and subsequently in the Song Re and Song Ve Valleys to find, fix and destroy (elements of) the 3d NVA Division.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The concept of operation for VERNON LAKE II was to combat assault two Infantry Battalions into the DA VACH Mountains, establish two fire support bases (FSB CORK and FSB ALIX) from which extensive Recon in force and multiple combat assault operations could be conducted in the surrounding mountains and valleys to interdict the movement of the 3d NVA Division and destroy their base camps. The length of the operation and commitments in other parts of the 11th Bde AO, at times, necessitated the increasing or decreasing of the forces available to support the concept, but the original concept of operation was maintained throughout the operation. The following operational moves were made in support of the concept of operation for VERNON LAKE II:

02 Nov 68: D/1-20 Inf conducted a combat assault from FSB PEPPER (491729) into LZ CORK (BS448612) to establish FSB CORK and secured the LZ until the arrival of B and D Batteries 6-11 Artillery and the GP Groups of 1-20 Inf and 4-3 Inf. A Co remained on LZ PEPPER as security. B & C Companies conducted a combat assault to BS446632 and established a blocking position. 4-3 Inf conducted multiple CA's from LZ PEPPER to LZ CROWN BS395594 then moved SE. Recon Plt airlifted into LZ CORK to secure the FSB.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (VERNON LAKE II) (U)

03 Nov 68: A/1-20 Inf airlifted from LZ PEPPER to FSB CORK and FSB PEPPER was closed out. A Co departed CORK to conduct a combat sweep to the north.

06 Nov 68: 1/46 Inf became OPCON and conducted a combat assault from Quang Ngai Airfield into an LZ via BS455588. At the completion of the CA the 1/46 Infantry conducted a combat sweep to the NW.

09 Nov 68: D/4-3 conducted a combat assault into LZ ANY (BS473525) to secure it for future use as a fire support base.

10 Nov 68: 1/46 Inf airlifted from VERNON LAKE II AO into Quang Ngai Airfield ceasing operations in VERNON LAKE II and returned to OPCON of the 196th Inf Bde effective 101800 Nov 68. D/4-21 was airlifted from Quang Ngai Airfield to LZ ANY to secure the LZ. D/4-3, after being replaced conducted a CA to LZ WARRIOR (BS383528) to secure the LZ for the 4/3 Inf for further operations.

11 Nov 68: 4/21 (-) D Co air moved from Quang Ngai Airfield to Minh Long SF Camp to prepare for deployment into the VERNON LAKE II AO.

12 Nov 68: 4/21 (-) D Co conducted a CA into VERNON LAKE II AO to commence operations. The following LZ's were used: A Co-BS435518, B Co-BS445519, C Co-BS409527. D Co continued to secure LZ ANY for the emplacement of the 4/21 CP Group and D/6-11 Artillery. LZ ANY was now established as Fire Support Base (FSB) ANY.

19 Nov 68: A/6-11 Artillery air moved to LZ CAM (BS393501), secured by RCN Co, 22d Bn, 2d ARVN Div to establish an FSB for future operations.

20 Nov 68: B, D and Ren 3/1 Inf participated in VERNON LAKE II for a one day operation by conducting a CA into multiple LZ via BS3547 to conduct a recon in force in the Song Re Valley. C Co moved to LZ CAM as a reaction force while A Co remained at Minh Long as a reaction force. Upon termination of the operation at the end of the day all elements of the 3-1 Inf were extracted to Minh Long SF Camp terminating their operation in VERNON LAKE II at that time.

21 Nov 68: A/6-11 Arty displaced from LZ CAM to Minh Long SF Camp closing out LZ CAM as a Fire Support Base.

2 Dec 68: B/1-20 Inf conducted a CA to BS320593 and C/1-20 Inf conducted a CA to BS317593 to conduct a recon in force in the upper Song Re Valley. Ren Plt conducted a CA into LZ VOLUNTEER (BS348594) and secured the LZ for the 1/20 Inf CP Group. D Co airlifted into LZ VOLUNTEER. A Co remained at FSB CORK for security.

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✓ 10 Dec 68: 4/21 Inf (-) B Co ceased operations in VERNON LAKE II AO being extracted to Minh Long SF Camp for future deployment in the western DUC PHO AO. B Co remained on FSB AMY for security.

13 Dec 68: 1/20 Inf ceased operations in the Song Re Valley, closing out their CP at LZ VOLUNTEER and moving back to FSB CORK continuing operations in that area.

17 Dec 68: 1-20 Inf concluded ops in the VERNON LAKE II AO and conducted an airlift into the northern DUC PHO AO to assume responsibility of the AO. 3-1 Inf replaced 1-20 Inf at FSB CORK and commenced operations in Operation VERNON LAKE II assuming responsibility for the area around FSB CORK. B/4-21 Inf remained at FSB AMY for security.

✓ 19 Dec 68: 4/21 Inf (-) B Co redeployed into the VERNON LAKE II AO with a combat assault into an LZ vic BS488441 and conducted a recon in force in the area. B Co continued to secure LZ AMY.

✓ 18 Dec 68: 4/21 (-) D Co ceased operations in the VERNON LAKE II AO and was airlifted to LZ BUFF (DS540825) for further operations. 3-1 Inf (+) D/4-21 continued operations in the area around FSB CORK and FSB AMY.

✓ 11 Feb 69: 4/21 (-) rejoined VERNON LAKE II conducting a CA into LZ CEDAR MOUNTAIN (DS580655) for Recon in Force Operations in the AO extension to VERNON LAKE II and the establishment of FSB CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 4/21 Inf retained FSB AMY with A Co for security.

14 Feb 69: 4/21 Inf (-) ceased operations in the VERNON LAKE II AO extension conducting a CA into the DUC PHO AO and closing FSB CEDAR MOUNTAIN. A/4-21 Inf became OPCON to 3-1 Inf and remained on FSB AMY for security. 3-1 Inf (+) A/4-21 continued limited operations throughout the VERNON LAKE II AO securing both FSB CORK and FSB AMY until the termination of the operation, 28 Feb 1969.

11. (U) EXECUTION: See Annex E.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly casualties for VERNON LAKE II:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)
22	109	24

b. Enemy cumulative results for VERNON LAKE II (See Annex G, Intelligence).

13. (U) LOGISTICS: See Annex B, Logistics.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (VERNON LAKE II) (U)

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: TCE equipment normally related to airborne counterinsurgency warfare was used during this operation. The following techniques, although not revolutionary, were employed and greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the operation.

a. Companies were given their own areas of operations and liberty to operate by platoon sized or smaller if sufficient radios were on hand for each unit. This gave commanders and platoon leaders the opportunity to use their imagination, created a diversified overall effort, and stimulated interest at all levels within the battalions.

b. Stay behind patrols/ambushes were used effectively throughout the AO.

c. LRP's were used to locate enemy routes of movement and either a Recon Platoon or another element was maneuvered into position to ambush the area.

d. Combat Assaults back into areas where enemy concentrations or base camps had been found produced excellent results.

15. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: During VERNON LAKE II, the 11th Inf Bde on a broad scale accomplished three objectives. First, the enemy's already massive logistical problems have been compounded by the destruction of supplies and disruption of bases. Second, the enemy has been constantly on the move throughout the operational area thus limiting his ability to consolidate for widespread attacks along the coastal plains. Third, by denying the enemy free and unlimited access to an area which formerly had been a VC/CVA sanctuary, the 11th Brigade demonstrated to the people of Southern Quang Ngai Province, as well as to the VC/NVA that friendly military forces can and will operate throughout Southern Quang Ngai Province.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. At an early date, as soon as the Tet Offensive has burned itself out, US forces should push out again in force into the enemy main base areas--not only in the VERNON LAKE II area, but also north and south--to deny him these sanctuaries and make it impossible to stage attacks on the coastal plain.

b. Maximum use should be made of highly trained Long Range and Short Range Patrols to detect enemy movement and bring in effective artillery fire.

c. Enemy base camp locations should be carefully plotted and interdicted on a carefully planned basis, to prevent reoccupation of these base camps.

d. All helicopters operating in terrain such as this should be specially equipped with 150 ft rope, extra smoke grenades, and other equipment for operating over triple-canopied jungle.


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AVD7-11-01

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (PERIOD LATE II) (U)

ATTACHES:
A-Opn Overlay
B-Logistics
C-Intelligence
D-Signal
E-Rescue


J. W. DUHALSON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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(C) ANNEX B (LOGISTICS) To Combat Operations After Action Report (VERNON LAKE II) (U)

1. (C) The logistical support for Operation VERNON LAKE II was, in general, a continuation of the support base established for the support of VERNON LAKE I with the addition of one FSE established at Minh Long SF Camp.

2. (C) Quang Ngai FSE:

a. The FSE at Quang Ngai was continued with no change in the stockage objectives and service provided during VERNON LAKE I. Stockage objectives were as follows:

ITEM	STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE
CTG 7.62mm NLB	100,000
CTG 7.62mm Mini	100,000
RKT 2.75mm	500
CTG 40mm linked	900
Gren Hd Smk (Colored)	288
Flare, Aircraft	96
CTG 105 HE	3,400
CTG 105 Ill	200
CTG 105 Smk	200
CTG 105 WP	200
JP/4	20,000 Gallons
MOGAS	1,000 Gallons
Rations, C/LMRP	18,000 Meals

b. The stockage objectives at Quang Ngai were maintained through the coordination of the 6th Support Battalion at LZ DRONCO and the Americal Division Transportation and Ammunition Officers.

c. Supplies were moved from Quang Ngai to the unit LZs by road or sling load depending on the road and weather conditions.

3. (C) Minh Long FSE.

a. The FSE at Minh Long was established on 8 November 1968. The primary purpose of this FSE was to refuel and re-arm helicopters. Stockage objectives at Minh Long were as follows:

ITEM	QUANTITY
Rations C/LMRP	10,000 meals
JP/4	20,000 gallons
AVGAS	1,200 gallons
Rocket 2.75mm	500
7.62 Mini	50,000
7.62 Linked	50,000
CTG 40mm	800
Gren Hd Smk (Colored)	96

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Declassified After 12 Years

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ANNEX (Logistics) Continued

b. The shortage objectives at Binh Long were satisfied by the 1st Support Battalion from supplies at LZ 160400.

c. Stockages were moved to Binh Long by using loads.

4. (C) Material requirements and resupply status.

a. Requirements to establish an infantry battalion fire support base were as follows:

ITEM	QUANTITY
Sandbags	25,000 ea
Concertina	6 miles
Pickets B'	555 ea
Pickets J'	555 ea
Culvert 60"	100 ea

b. Average daily resupply for an infantry battalion was as follows:

ITEM	QUANTITY
100 Tons C/A	30.7 (30.7/1,000 lbs)
Water	1,000 gallons
Class V	1,300 lbs
Class II & IV	500 lbs

5. (C) The Brigade CP was established at LZ 160400 on 2 November 1968 by elements of 11th, 11th Infantry Brigade and other designated individuals. Support was provided through coordination with other 11th Infantry Brigade elements on the LZ.

6. (U) No major logistical problems were experienced. The shortage of blivits was overcome during this period; thus, resupply of water and POL improved.

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(C) ANNEX C (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(VERNON LAKE II) (U)

1. (C) WEATHER AND TERRAIN:

a. Weather.

(1) From 2 November to 30 November 1968: The northeast (winter) monsoon was unusually weak during November. Although the rain fell during 20 days, the accumulation was considerably less than normal. Most of the rain fell during the nights and morning hours with very little falling during the afternoons and evenings. Ceilings averaged 2,000 to 3,000 feet during periods of heavy precipitation. Afternoons and evenings were characterized by ceilings of 6,000 to 8,000 feet or clear skies. Maximum temperatures during the month averaged about 72 degrees. Precipitation during the month of November was as follows: On 5 Nov, drizzle from 0845H to 1055H (.04 inch); 6 Nov, drizzle from 1505H to 1555H (trace); 9 Nov, drizzle from 1045H to 1455H (.34 inch); 10 Nov, drizzle from 0555H to 0955H (.48 inch); 11 Nov, rainshowers from 1513H to 1555H and drizzle from 1555H to 1755H (.32 inch); 15 Nov, rainshowers from 0555H to 0625H and from 1045H to 1055H (.92 inch); 16 Nov, showers from 0645H to 0750H (.21 inch); 17 Nov, showers from 0625H to 0655H (.11 inch); 18 Nov, showers from 1655H to 1755H (.51 inch); 19 Nov, showers from 1050H to 1121H (.05 inch); 21 Nov, showers from 0655H to 0750H (.47 inch); 22 Nov, showers from 0805H and 1455H to 1600H (.32 inch); 23 Nov, showers from 0713H to 1200H (.45 inch); 24 Nov, showers from 0755H to 0900H and from 1225H to 1800H (.70 inch); 25 Nov, showers from 0748H to 1000H and 1230H to 1400H and drizzle from 1400H to 1500H (.22 inch); 26 Nov, drizzle from 0810H to 1000H (.02 inch); 27 Nov, showers from 1000H to 1030H and from 1230H to 1400H, and drizzle from 1400H to 1500H (.22 inch); 29 Nov, showers from 0555H to 0755H, rain from 0955H to 1055H, and drizzle from 1255H to 1355H (.28 inch); 30 Nov, rain from 0655H to 0755H, from 0942H to 1155H and from 1750H to 1845H (.38 inch).

(2) 1 December to 31 December 1968: The northeast (winter) monsoon continued to be unusually weak during December. Precipitation occurred on twelve days, but it was generally very light and of short duration. The total accumulation for the month was less than three inches. Most of this precipitation occurred during the late night and early morning hours. Sky conditions were characterized by scattered clouds based from 2,000 to 3,000 feet. Ceilings less than 3,000 feet occurred on 7 to 10 days, but usually for short periods of time. Morning fog in the valleys was generally light and dissipated by 0900H. Precipitation during the month of December was as follows: 3 Dec, rain from 1155H to 1255H (.94 inch); 12 Dec, showers from 0755H to 0855H (.09 inch); 13 Dec, showers from 0555H to 0655H (.02 inch); 15 Dec, rain from 0755H to 0855H and from 1047H to 1155H (.81 inch); 16 Dec, rain from 0555H to 0655H (.06 inch); 17 Dec, showers from 0655H to 0755H

GROUP 4

Downgraded At 3 Year Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years

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ANNEX C (Intelligence) Continued

(trace); 21 Dec, showers from 0555H to 0655H (.38 inch); 22 Dec, showers from 1555H to 1655H (.43 inch); 23 Dec, showers from 0734H to 0855H (.07 inch); 24 Dec, rain from 0655H to 0828H (.13 inch); and on 28 Dec, showers from 1155H to 1255H (trace).

(3) 1 January to 31 January 1969: During the first half of the month, conditions were typical for the northeast (winter) monsoon with rain falling on nine of fifteen days. Sky conditions were generally cloudy with ceilings from 1500 to 2500 feet, lowering frequently to 500 to 1500 feet in the hours before sunrise. During the last half of the month of January was as follows; 3 Jan, showers from 1355H to 1655H (.45 inch); 4 Jan, drizzle from 0555H to 0655H and rain from 0655H to 1010H (1.18 inches); 5 Jan, rain from 0855H to 0916H, drizzle from 0916H to 1010H, and rain from 1010H to 1255H (.15 inch); 6 Jan, showers from 1307H to 1319H (trace); 7 Jan, drizzle from 0555H to 0655H and rain from 0755H to 1755H (2.97 inches); 10 Jan, showers from 1005H to 1055H, drizzle from 1216H to 1255H, and showers from 1504H to 1532H (.62 inch); 11 Jan, showers from 155H to 1255H (.24 inch); 17 Jan, showers from 0555H to 0755H and rain from 0906H to 0955H (.11 inch); 18 Jan, rain from 1155H to 1221H and drizzle from 1221H to 1455H (.14 inch); and 31 Jan, showers from 1205H to 1247H and rain from 1247H to 1455H (.14 inch).

(4) 1 February to 28 February 1969: The northeast (winter) monsoon continued unusually weak during February. Skies were generally partly cloudy and visibility was good. Precipitation during the month of February was as follows: 1 Feb, showers from 0810H to 0955H and rain from 0955H to 1755H (1.09 inches); 2 Feb, rain 0555H to 0805H, drizzle from 0850H to 0900H, and rain from 0900H to 1655H (.41 inch); 4 Feb, rain from 0855H to 1055H (.10 inch); 5 Feb, rain from 1155H to 1255H and from 1555H to 1655H, and drizzle from 1745H to 1755H (.24 inch); 6 Feb, rain from 0600H to 0655H, from 0755H to 0855H, and from 1055H to 1155H (trace); 7 Feb, drizzle from 0755H to 0845H, rain from 0845H to 0936H, and drizzle from 1055H to 1155H (trace); and 8 Feb, rain from 0555H to 0655H and drizzle from 1055H to 1155H (trace).

b. TERRAIN:

(1) Hills and Mountains.

(a) The coastal plains grade very abruptly into hills and low to intermediate mountains. The hills and mountains are rugged, steeply sloped, and severely dissected. In the hills, elevations vary from 164 to 650 meters, while slopes vary from 10 to 30 percent, with some as high as 50 percent. In the mountains, elevations vary from 650 to 962 meters and slopes vary from 30 to 40 percent, with some as high as 60 percent. Major streams and river valleys are the Ve and the Re and Tra Khac Rivers. The valleys of these rivers have a minimum width of 0.5 kilometers, with maximum widths ranging from 2 to 3 kilometers. These lowland river valleys are generally flat plains with an average elevation of 30 meters. Mountain peaks and ridges are

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ANNEX C (Intelligence) Continued

commonly 600 to 800 meters above the valley. The hills and mountains are primarily covered with dense undergrowth, forests and brushlands. Brushlands predominate in the northwest portion of the AO, vicinity DS4072. Small patches of single canopy light undergrowth forest are scattered randomly throughout the area. The mountains are well drained by tributary streams and rivers.

(b) The operational area afforded the enemy the capability of movement relatively free from observation. The dense undergrowth and sharp ravines provided the enemy numerous areas in which to avoid contact.

(c) Effect on friendly courses of action: The nature of the terrain restricted ground movement of friendly forces. Movement was necessarily slow and visibility, observation, and fields of fire were restricted.

(2) Coastal Plain.

(a) West of Highway #1, the coastal plain is gently rolling with numerous hill masses rising 50 to 150 meters above the plains. This area is characterized by single and double crop rice farming. The streams and rivers exit the mountains and feed a network of small streams, irrigation canals and ditches. The area is poorly drained due to impervious soils and many rice land dikes. During the northeast monsoon, recession of water is quite slow. The terrain is primarily flat and broken by dense hedgerows in the vicinity of hamlets.

(b) Effect on enemy course of actions: Due to the flat and relatively open terrain enemy movement during daylight hours was extremely restricted. Hedgerows around hamlets provided excellent cover and defensive positions for the enemy units.

(c) Effect on friendly courses of action: The terrain afforded no obstacle to friendly movement; however, the numerous hedgerows made sweep operations through villages difficult to control and tended to force actions into numerous squad-size engagements.

2. (C) PRELIMINARY INTELLIGENCE:

a. Agent reports, aerial reconnaissance, and usually reliable intelligence indicated that major VC/NVA units from Quang Ngai Province were using the triple canopy jungle area bounded by the Ba River to the west, the Vu River to the east, the Tra Khuc River to the north, and the Dinh Dinh-Quang Ngai boundary to the south as a massive resupply and consolidation area.

b. Intelligence further indicated that battalion sized and larger VC/NVA units were positioning themselves throughout the area in preparation for major offensive action with the major target being Quang Ngai City and Nghia Hanh City.

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ANNEX C (Intelligence) Continued

c. Information received indicated that there were numerous VC/NVA base camps and resupply points throughout the operational area which would have to be neutralized because they posed a constant threat to the security of the coastal plains of Quang Ngai Province.

d. Enemy Capabilities:

(1) Conduct attacks against urban areas throughout the coastal plains, particularly against district headquarters and Quang Ngai City (Province HQ).

(2) Resupply and consolidation for attacks along the coastal plains.

(3) Ambush friendly forces and conduct attacks against LZs, while continuing interdiction of Highway #1.

(4) Evade friendly forces and avoid contact.

e. Enemy disposition and strength:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
3d NVA Div Headquarters and Subordinate Supporting Units	BS4561	2500
22d NVA Regiment	BS3668	1000
2d MF Regiment	BS5269	1125
81st LF Battalion	BS6154	210
83d LF Battalion	BS7360	250
C-18th LF Company	BS6560	100
C-212 LF Company	BS4048	100
506B Sapper Company	BS6152	65
Rear Service Section (MR-5)	Quang Tin Prov	650
120 Montagnard Battalion	BS2976	310
406th Sapper Battalion	BS5878	325
107th NVA AA Battalion	BS5275	225
C-25 Son Ha District Unit	BS3365	80

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3. (C) DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE: Significant intelligence developments during VERMION LAKE II consisted of the exploitation of base camps, captured documents and prisoners of war, in conjunction with visual reconnaissance by fixed wing aircraft, aerial scouts, infra red readings, and sniffer missiles.

a. During the course of Operation VERMION LAKE II, eighty one (81) company size or larger base camps were discovered and destroyed. Normally these base camps were situated in areas with extensive overhead cover in close proximity to running water. In neutralizing these resupply and consolidation points within an area which the VC/NVA forces had previously considered secure, the 11th Brigade has accomplished three objectives. First, the enemy's already massive logistical problems have been compounded by the destruction of supplies (See 5 below) and the disruption of bases. Second, the enemy has been kept constantly on the move throughout the operational area thus limiting his ability to consolidate for widespread attacks along the coastal plains. Third, by denying the enemy free and unlimited access to an area which formerly had been a VC/NVA sanctuary, the 11th Brigade demonstrated to the people of Southern Quang Ngai Province, as well as to the VC/NVA that friendly military forces can and will operate throughout Southern Quang Ngai Province.

✓ (1) On 15 Nov, C/4-21 discovered a regimental size base camp at BSH31533. The camp contained 17 huts and 15 bunkers, several training aids to include a mock-up of a helicopter, several NVA uniforms, miscellaneous small arms ammunition, 6 NVA canteens and 4 NVA packs.

✓ (2) On 16 Nov, C/4-21 discovered a weapons cache at BSH29533. The cache contained 10 SKS, 3 SMO, 1 BAR, 2 Cal 45 pistols, 1 Chicom Machinegun, 6 VC uniforms, 1 first aid packet and 1 Chicom gas mask.

(3) On 18 Nov, B/1-20 found a battalion size hospital at BSH49578. The hospital contained a complex of huts, 75 pounds of medical gauze, one blood pressure gauge, and several NVA uniforms. The complex was large enough for 500 personnel.

(4) On 18 Nov, D/1-20 found an ammunition cache at BSH37583. The cache contained one round 175MM, 12 rounds RFG-7, 449 rounds 82MM, one round 81MM, 108 rounds 57RR, 22 rounds RFG-2, 180 rounds 60MM, and 10,550 rounds of mixed small arms ammunition.

(5) On 19 Nov, RCN and B/1-20 discovered a regimental size hospital at BSH55583. The hospital contained 100 sheets, 94 surgical masks, 9 surgical gowns, 29 nurses uniforms, 84 spools of thread, 248 black uniforms, 23 black blouses, 4 pair wool underwear, 12 pair wool trousers, 4 wool coats, 25 sweat shirts, 60 packs, 4 hammocks, 4 hand grenades, 100 mosquito nets, 4 cots, and 4 Ho Chi Minh posters.

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ANNEX C (Intelligence) Continued

(6) On 1 Dec, B/4-1 discovered a bicycle shop at BS417503. The shop contained 100 handlebars, 2 bags of sprockets and pedals, 500 innertubes, 200 tires, 2 air pumps, 2 reflectors, and 35 gallons of grease. ✓

(7) On 2 Dec, A/4-21 discovered a POW compound that contained 8 huts at BS412484. ✓

(8) On 2 Dec, RCN/4-21 discovered a battalion size base camp at BS502435. ✓ The camp contained 17 huts and 12 tons of rice.

(9) On 3 Dec, D/1-20 found an ammunition cache at BS343604. The cache was in 2 huts and contained 21 rounds RPG-7, 171 rounds RPG-2, 211 rounds 82MM, 3200 rounds AK-47, 3000 pounds of rice, and 7 green uniforms.

(10) On 6 Dec, C/1-20 found a supply cache at BS330527. The cache contained 1 M14, 100 pounds of rice, 1000 pounds of salt, 10 new cooking pots, and 4 shovels.

(11) On 20 Dec, RCN/4-21 found 7 huts with 7 tons of rice at BS504438.

(12) On 21 Dec, RCN/4-21 found 10 huts with 5 tons of rice at BS507429.

(13) On 21 Dec, RCN/4-21 found 5 huts with 4 tons of rice at BS509429.

(14) On 22 Dec, C/4-21 discovered a battalion size base camp at BS416442. The camp contained 60 bunkers with overhead cover.

(15) On 22 Dec, C/4-21 discovered a company size base camp at BS419450. The camp contained 8 huts, a hospital and a blacksmith shop. The supplies found in the camp were 1 SMG, 1 French rifle, miscellaneous parts for weapons, a bipod for a 60MM mortar, a shotgun rack, 2 rounds of 60MM, 200 rounds of mixed small arms ammunition, several blacksmith tools and metal, 40 shovel blades, 2 tons of rice, 250 engineer stakes, 300 pounds of charcoal, and 100 pounds of salt.

(16) On 26 Dec, C/4-21 discovered a battalion size base camp at BS417463. ✓ The camp consisting of 10 huts contained one 12 gauge shotgun, one M-1 rifle, 20 rounds of small arms ammunition, 1 aircraft flare, 6 pounds of explosive, 2 bundles of punji stakes, several magazines for M-16 and M-1, 2 AM radios, 2 tons of rice, 40 pounds of salt, and cooking utensils.

(17) On 28 Dec, D/3-1 discovered a company size base camp at BS513653. The camp had 6 huts and contained 2 VC RDA, 1 French M14, 1 UK Sten Mark-2, two 12 gauge shotguns and leg chains.

(18) On 1 Jan, B/4-21 found a battalion size base camp at BS410445. The camp consisting of 12 huts and 1 mess hall, contained 2 K44, 2 French M14, 1 M-1 Carbine, 1 M-1 rifle, 100 rounds mixed small arms ammunition, 4 packs, and web gear.

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ANNEX C (Intelligence) Continued

b. During the course of Vernon Lake II, the 11th Brigade captured approximately two tons of VC/NVA documents. Included among these documents were personnel rosters, pay rosters, and lists of equipment issued, the loss of which will create serious logistical problems for VC/NVA units operating in Southern Quang Ngai Province. Of particular interest from the intelligence point of view were the documents summarized below. These documents contained code names, code numbers, and letter box numbers for VC/NVA units operating in Quang Ngai Province. Through the use of these captured names and numbers, it is possible to discover the source of captured documents even when code words, code numbers, and code names have been employed.

(1) On 4 Nov, B/1-20 at BSh43611 captured a list giving code numbers for various positions within the South Vietnamese Communist Party.

(2) On 15 Nov, C/4-21 captured several documents at BSh432533. The documents belonged to Quang Ngai Province National Liberation Front Headquarters and outlined methods of shooting down airplanes and helicopters.

(3) On 5 Nov, C/4-3 captured several documents at BSh43586. The documents belonged to MR-5 and gave code names and letter box numbers for sections subordinate to MR-5.

(4) On 18 Nov, 1-20 captured several documents at BSh425582. The documents gave weapons rosters dated 1967 for many military units subordinate to Quang Ngai Province Headquarters.

(5) On 27 Nov, A/1-20 captured miscellaneous documents at BSh472613. The documents gave estimates of troop strength and artillery capability of the Americal Division and the 11th Infantry Brigade.

(6) On 26 Dec, 4-21 captured documents at BSh444463. The documents gave secret names of Quang Ngai Province local force units including the 83d and 84th battalions.

(7) On 2 Jan, B/4-21 captured several documents at BSh40445. The documents contained an extensive list of code numbers of numerous VC units subordinate to Rear Service Section Quang Ngai Province.

(8) On 3 Jan, A/3-1 captured miscellaneous documents at BSh456657. The documents gave the strength of the 22d Regiment as of Nov 68 and code names for major units subordinate to the 22d Regiment.

(9) On 16 Jan, C/3-1 captured several documents at B3570630. The documents contained code names and strengths of elements of the 7th Battalion, 22d Regiment as of July 1968; weapons list of the signal company, 22d Regiment as of 15 Dec 1968; an undated sketch giving locations of the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 22d Regiment.

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ANNEX C (Intelligence) Continued

(10) On 26 Jan, D/3-1 captured documents at BS436652. The documents contained code name, strength, and composition of 244th Transportation Battalion as of late 1968.

c. During the course of VENISON LAKE II, the 11th Infantry Brigade detained 18 civil defendants, 6 NVA and 5 VC prisoners of war, and 3 NVA Hoi Chanh. Of particular interest from the intelligence point of view, were the prisoners of war and Hoi Chanh listed below.

(1) On 20 Nov, RCN/3-1 captured an NVA PW at BS349489. The PW was from the 70th Production Unit, 3d Battalion, 3d NVA Division. He stated that his unit had a strength of 20 men and had operated in the vicinity of BS3353 since July 1968.

(2) On 21 Nov, the 2d ARVN Division Reconnaissance Platoon captured an NVA PW at BS379487. The PW was from the 36th Company, 9th Battalion, 22d Regiment. He stated that the 36th Company was located in the vicinity of BS1635.

(3) On 21 Nov, C/4-21 captured an NVA PW at BS379487. The PW was from the 36th Company, 9th Battalion, 22d Regiment. He stated that his company was composed of 87 men and normally operated in the vicinity of BS2045.

(4) On 26 Nov, A/1-20 captured an NVA PW at BS475615. The PW was from the 7th Squad, 2d Platoon, 3d NVA Signal Company. He stated that his company had a strength of 100 men and was about to be sent to the 18th NVA Regiment (Dinh Dinh Province).

(5) On 7 Jan, D/4-21 received an NVA Hoi Chanh from the 1st Company, 7th Battalion, 42d Regiment, 2d NVA Division at BS484455. He stated that he left the unit on 31 October at which time it was located west of the Ba River in the Ba Dien Mountains.

(6) On 16 Jan, C/3-1 captured an NVA PW at BS559639. The PW was from a supply company subordinate to the 22d Regiment. He stated that his company presently had 45 men and was located in the vicinity of BS5364.

(7) On 16 Jan, C/3-1 captured an NVA PW at BS568627. The PW was from the 3d Company, 4th Battalion, 22d Regiment. He stated that his battalion's strength was approximately 300 men.

(8) On 28 Jan, D/3-1 received an NVA Hoi Chanh from C-40 Company, 406th Sapper Battalion at BS435641. He stated that as of 15 December 1968, his company had a strength of 100 men and was operating vicinity BS8223.

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ANNEX E (Intelligence) Continued

(9) On 28 Feb, A/3-1 received an NVA Hol Chanh from the 3d Battalion, 4th Regiment, 5th Division at BS521623. He stated that his company had six mortars and was located one day's walk west of the point of his capture.

d. On 20 December at 1600H, D/3-1 made contact with an estimated company of NVA dug in along a ridgeline in the vicinity of BS513598. In the heavy fighting that followed D Company suffered 4 KIA and 6 WIA. With darkness approaching, and unable to drive the enemy from their well concealed positions, D Company withdrew under the cover of artillery and airstrikes. On 22 December, D Company moved through the area and discovered 15 NVA killed by small arms and by airstrikes. The fact that the NVA units, which had been avoiding contact for six weeks during VERNOI LAKE II, chose to stand and fight indicated the importance they attached to stopping delaying the successful penetration into NVA base areas and transportation routes in the Northern VERNOI LAKE area.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. The operation was conducted in an area which preliminary intelligence correctly indicated was a massive VC/NVA resupply and consolidation region.

b. The operation resulted in the capture of a vast quantity of VC/NVA supplies (see 5 below) which has put an additional burden on an already overburdened supply system.

c. The operation resulted in the capture of large amounts of enemy ammunition and weaponry (see 5 below) thereby reducing the enemy's short-run combat effectiveness and increasing his long-run logistical problems.

d. VC/NVA supply and consolidation positions which had previously been virtually uncontested were subject to systematic harassment and attack. This action demonstrated to the enemy, as well as to the general population of Southern Quang Ngai Province, the ability of friendly forces to conduct operations in what had been considered VC/NVA sanctuaries in the mountains of Southern Quang Ngai Province.

e. The operation sufficiently disrupted VC/NVA operations to preclude or at least delay widespread VC/NVA attacks along the eastern coastal plains of Quang Ngai Province.

5. (C) ENEMY LOSSES:

a. Personnel

NVA/VC KIA	143/313
NVA/VC PW	1/7
NVA/VC HOI CHANH	3/0
CD	18

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ANNEX C (Intelligence) Continued

b. Equipment:

Weapons

Individual: 139

AK-47	36	Pistol	4
R-44	28	CHICOM, Type 56	3
SKS	21	Crossbow	3
Sub Machinegun	16	12 Gauge Shotgun	2
US Carbine	9	M-16 Rifle	2
MAS 36	6	German Rifle	1
M-1 Rifle	6	LAW	1
		DAR	1

Crew Servod: 3

B-41 Rocket Launcher 2	RFD	1
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Ammunition

Recoilless Rifle Rounds

75MM	17
57MM	115
3.5 inch	3
	135

Rocket Rounds

B-41	43
B-40	197
	240

Mortar Rounds

82MM	824
81MM	19
60MM	410
	1253

Bicycles and Parts

Bicycles	76
Bicycle Frames	15
Tires	230
Inner Tubes	530
Handlebars	100
Sprockets and Pedals	2 Bags
Reflectors	2

Documents 4000 pounds

Small Arms Rounds

AK-47	10,507
30 Cal	4,580
R-44	4,060
7.62 (link)	3,000
5.56	1,118
5.1 Cal	400
	23,665

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ANNEX C (Intelligence) Continued

Medical Supplies

Medicine	578 Assorted Containers
First Aid Dressings	254
Plasma	28 Bottles
Surgical Masks	8
Medical Cases	75 pounds
Instruments	

Commo Equipment

Transistor Radios	4
Panasonic AM Radios	2
Amplifier	1
Antenna Base for FRO-25	1
TA 312 Telephones	3
Radio Power Packs	2

Material

Gray Cloth	550 Yards
Chosse Cloth	400 Yards
Black Cotton	1140 Yards
Black Linen	75 Yards
Green Plastic	75 Yards
	<u>1240 Yards</u>

Sewing Machines

Singer	3
Mitsubishi	4
	<u>7</u>

Uniforms

Black Pajamas	592
Green	123
Khaki	137
Gray	61
Burzas	50
Rain Suit	1
	<u>964</u>

Miscellaneous

Binoculars (Czech)	2
Periscopes (German)	1
Flashlights	5
Typewriters	2
60MM Mortar Bipod	1
Spears	11
Long Bows	1
M-16 Cleaning Kits	3
Holsters	2
Vicos	2
Air Pumps	2
Grease	35 Gallons
Oil	5 Gallons
Towels	13 Bundles
Shirts	48
NVA Flags	7
VC Flags	2
Russian Flags	1
NVA Banners	2

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ANNEX C (Intelligence) Continued

(2) Destroyed:

Foods		Commo Equipment	
Rice	121 Tons	Commo Wire	5.5 Miles
Salt	1 Ton	Radio Tubes	10
Sugar	1 Pound	PGC-25 Batteries	12
		BA-30 Batteries	47
Military Equipments			
Packs	170	Canteens	17
Helmets	17	Canteen Caps	13
Pistol Belts	49	Canteen Covers	12
Ammunition Pouches	16	Mess Kits	22
Ammunition Belts	12	Entrenching Tools	23
Ammunition Magazines	67	Gas Masks	6
		Ponchos	15
Miscellaneous:			
Grenades	83	Cooking Pots	32
82MM Base Brush	1	Water Cans	3
Nail Balls	1	Saxpans	109
Mines	2	Canoes	3
Beet Traps	1	Fishing Poles	5
Explosives	510 Pounds	Blankets	10
Tele Wire	75 Feet	Concertina Wire	1 Roll
Wire for Claymores	100 Feet	Panmochs	34
Flora	1	Hats, Bush	22
Shovel Blades	44	Smoking Jackets	2
Engineer Stakes	250	Barber Clippers	1
Leg Chairs	1 Set	Cigarette Lighters	2
Stoves	6	Cotton	1 Box
Gas	50 Gallons	Feed Bags	11
Charcoal	200 Pounds		

a. Structures:

Base Camp Destroyed

Regt Size	2	Surgical Hospitals	3
Bn Size	31	PW Camps	2
Co Size	48	Forholes	278
	81	Huts	1359
		Dunbays	257
		Tranchlines	1040 Meters

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ANNEX C (Intelligence) Continued

d. Secondary Explosions/Fires from Airstrikes or Artillery:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SECONDARY FIRES</u>	<u>SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS</u>
01 NOV	BS472506	1	
01 NOV	BS421610	2	
05 NOV	BS400580	2	
06 NOV	BS440572	1	
06 NOV	BS437616		1
07 NOV	BS383575		1
07 NOV	BS383576		1
07 NOV	BS356598	1	
12 NOV	BS465511		1
12 NOV	BS499452		2
13 NOV	BS407511		1
13 NOV	BS407511		3 (Large)
14 NOV	BS340536	2	
16 NOV	BS338525	1	
17 NOV	BS347785	2	
17 NOV	BS347185	1	
20 NOV	BS357473		1
20 NOV	BS347476	1	
21 NOV	BS325555	1	
21 NOV	BS333528		2
22 NOV	BS333548		1
26 NOV	BS331542		1
27 NOV	BS338534		2
27 NOV	BS338532	1	
28 NOV	BS367564	1	
01 DEC	BS325591	1	
01 DEC	BS322592	1	
02 DEC	BS308540	1	
03 DEC	BS439468		1
03 DEC	BS313538	1	
04 DEC	BS369564		1
10 DEC	BS353474	1	
10 DEC	BS353475	1	
10 DEC	BS281557	1	
12 DEC	BS374610		1
21 DEC	BS418633		1
24 DEC	BS642587	2	2
26 DEC	BS474474		1
26 DEC	BS499466		1
05 JAN	BS431534	1	
05 JAN	BS423432	1	
05 JAN	BS356425	1	
09 JAN	BS373534	3	
11 JAN	BS415420	1	2
14 JAN	BS500589	2	
14 JAN	BS521588		1
29 JAN	BS394700	2	
30 JAN	BS385578		1
14 FEB	BS339555		1

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ANNEX B (Signal.) to Combat Operations After Action Report (VERNON LAKE II) (U)

1. (C) The Communications Mission: The Communications Mission was to install, operate, and maintain communications facilities in support of TF COCKNEY and 11th Inf Bde during conduct of VERNON LAKE II.

2. (C) Communications Means:

a. Telephone via VHF was the primary means of communications to higher headquarters, to 11th Inf Bde Main, and to the Inf Bns, except for telephone comm to the Inf Bn at LZ CORK, which was provided by land lines.

b. FM Radio was the secondary means of communications. Initially, TF Hq entered the Div Secure Teletype SSB Ops Intell Net, however, this facility was not used and closed down. CAC aircraft from higher and lower echelons were used for air courier service to augment communications facilities.

3. (C) Execution:

a. The Bde Radio Officer arrived at LZ CORK at 020600 Nov 68 with the Bde TOC and assisted in installing the FM radio equipment for operation. FM radio nets were operational by 020800 Nov. At 021000 an FM Retrans team was airlifted to LZ BUIF in order to insure reliable FM Comm at 021100 the Bde Sig Co arrived and selected sites for the additional signal facilities which were scheduled to arrive on the following day. By 021400 Nov dedicated and common user circuits via land lines were installed to 1st Inf Bn at LZ CORK. All additional signal equipment had arrived 031100 Nov. Dedicated and common user telephone circuits, via VHF, were operational by 031800 Nov 68. See Appendix One (1) and Three (3) for the two basic VHF plans which were used. TF COCKNEY entered the Div Ops Intell Net (SSB Secure Radioteletype) at 041100 Nov 68. Very little traffic was sent or received by this station. LZ ANK was secured by 4/3 Inf Bn on 9 Nov 68 and immediate FM Comm was established with this Bn TF at LZ CORK. 4/3 Inf was relieved by 4/21 Inf on 10 Nov 68. Telephone Comm via VHF from 4/21 Inf at LZ ANK to TF at LZ CORK, and to 11th Inf Bde Main at LZ BRONCO was installed at 140300 Nov 68, when a new VHF plan was put into effect. At 171400 Nov, the Retrans Team at LZ BUIF was closed and airlifted out because it was not being utilized. At 050100 Dec 68, authority was granted to inactivate Longfellow Switchboard at LZ CORK. It was determined that this facility was not needed. Basic telecom capabilities were retained by a slight increase in dedicated circuits. At 071200 Dec 68, TF COCKNEY was inactivated. The operation continued under the Bde CO, and TF Hq became Bde Fnd. At 103000 Dec 68, Bde Fnd at LZ CORK closed out of the Div Ops Intell Net and the CRC-142 was hooked back to LZ BRONCO. This facility was not being utilized. All systems continued to operate in the same posture as under TF COCKNEY with the exception of those communications means which were deleted and returned to Division and Brigade resources.

GROUP 1

Downgraded At 3 Year Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years

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ANNEX B (Signal) Continued

b. Communications to the Brigade Forward was not disrupted by the attacks encountered in January. However, the communication employed in the 3/1 Bn Hq was disrupted for about three hours due to the hostile action. Initially during the attack it was reported that all radios were blown or destroyed, but it was later found that a power problem occurred during the attack and was not restored until activities slowed down. During this same attack, telephone lines going to the 3/1 Inf were cut and destroyed by Sappers. Communications systems continued and VERNON LAKE II operations closed out on 28 February 1969.

4. (C) The following Appendixes will indicate VHF systems utilized, telephone channel utilization of systems, and utilization of radio nets:

1. VHF Systems Diagram - 031800 Nov 68 Thru 140300 Nov 68.
2. VHF Channel Utilization - 031800 Nov Thru 140300 Nov 68.
3. VHF Systems Diagram - 140300 Nov 68 Thru 28 Feb 69.
4. Telephone Traffic Diagram.
5. Telephone Routing Diagram.
6. Americal Radio Nets.
7. TF/Brigade Radio Nets.
8. Retransmission Facility.

5. (C) Results:

a. All VHF systems were operational throughout the operation. Periodic outages were experienced with FM equipment. FM down time was kept to a minimum by insuring that sufficient back-up equipment was readily available at all times.

b. Signal maintenance support provided by the 6th Support Battalion was effective throughout the operation.

6. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques: The only special technique was the utilization of a 3/4 ton tank Battery/Generator charge meter at LZ CORN. This meter was attached to the batteries which were used to power the FM Radio Sets. This technique provided constant information as to the charge state of the Batteries. Outages were thereby reduced, because the operators knew when battery problems were developing.

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DATE	TIME	FROM	TO	SUBJECT	CLASS	STATUS	REMARKS
1/10/60	10:00	101-101	1	101-101	1		101-101
1/10/60	10:00	101-101	2	101-101	2		101-101
1/10/60	10:00	101-101	3	101-101	3		101-101
1/10/60	10:00	101-101	4	101-101	4		101-101
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1/10/60	10:00	101-101	6	101-101	6		101-101
1/10/60	10:00	101-101	7	101-101	7		101-101
1/10/60	10:00	101-101	8	101-101	8		101-101
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1/10/60	10:00	101-101	10	101-101	10		101-101
1/10/60	10:00	101-101	11	101-101	11		101-101
1/10/60	10:00	101-101	12	101-101	12		101-101

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DATE	TIME	FROM	TO	SUBJECT	CLASS	STATUS	REMARKS
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1/10/60	10:00	101-101	2	101-101	2		101-101
1/10/60	10:00	101-101	3	101-101	3		101-101
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1/10/60	10:00	101-101	11	101-101	11		101-101
1/10/60	10:00	101-101	12	101-101	12		101-101

- (1) 101-101
- (2) 101-101
- (3) 101-101
- (4) 101-101
- (5) 101-101
- (6) 101-101
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
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APPENDIX 1, ANNEX D (Signal) Combat Operations After Action Report
(VERSION 1.1) (U)


VHF Systems Diagram - 031800 Nov 68 thru 110300 Nov 68



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APPENDIX 3: ANNEX B (Signal) Combat Operations Action Report
(VERSION PAGE II) (U)


VHF Systems Diagram - 140300 Nov 68 thru 28 Feb 69



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ATTACHMENT 4, ANNEX B (Signal) Combat Operations After Action Report (VERNON LAKE II) (U)


Telephone Traffic Diagram



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AFIENGA 5, AMEX D (Signal) Contact Operations After Action Reports
(VERUEN LANE II) (U)

Telephone Rerouting Diagram



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COALITION WITH

Americal Radio Nets

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graph LR
    196TH((196TH)) --- Z1[ ]
    198TH((198TH)) --- Z2[ ]
    11TH((11TH)) --- Z3[ ]
    11TH_FWD_TF((11TH FWD/TF)) --- Z4[ ]
    1_1_CAV((1/1 CAV)) --- Z5[ ]
    Z1 --- DIV((DIV))
    Z2 --- DIV
    Z3 --- DIV
    Z4 --- DIV
    Z5 --- DIV
  
```

ations will
at as directed

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
APPENDIX 7, APPENDIX E (Signal) to Central Operations Action Report
(Security Level: II) (U)

IF/ED/PS Designation

BRIGADE (AND LAD) DESIGNATION



SECTOR SIGNAL, FILIPPO (AND/OTHER)



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