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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 6700 San Francisco 96237

AFM-P-BA-08

SUBJECT: Combined Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
 Medical Division
 AFM: AFM-P-BA-08
 AFM San Francisco 96314

FROM: Commanding General
 United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 AFM: AFM-P-BA-08
 AFM San Francisco 96222

1. (U) OPERATION: CHAMPAIGN GROVE
2. (C) DATES OF OPERATION: 1 Sep - 24 Sep 1968.
3. (C) LOCATION: SONG TRA KHOC Valley west of QUANG NGAI City, GI PHANG
 Special Forces Camp, LZ CHEVY (BSB20715).
4. (C) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Task Force CALLAWAY, Americal Division.
5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Owen K. Henderson.
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
 - a. Headquarters, Task Force CALLAWAY Command Group.
 - b. 11th Inf Bde (-):

1-1 Inf	1-26 Regt	6th Bn 11th Arty
1-2 Inf	1-1 Cav	B Battery 1-82 Arty (IG)
1-20 Inf		252d Radar Det
1-1 Cav (-)		HC Section, 1-55th Arty
7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

GROUP 4
 Declassified 64, 1 Year Extension
 Declassified after 12 Years

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A 6.7.14. DP

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Artillery:

(2) Direct support artillery to TF GALLAGHER areas of operation:

<u>DATES SUPPORTED TF</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
31 Aug to 23 Sep 68	D/6-11 Arty	LZ CHEVY (BS428718)
3 Sep to 13 Sep 68	C/6-11 Arty	QUANG NGAI Airfield
5 Sep to 13 Sep 68	A/6-11 Arty	LZ BUFF (BS540825)
10 Sep to 23 Sep 68	B/1-82 Arty	LZ CHEVY (BS428718)
20 Sep to 23 Sep 68	B/6-11 Arty	LZ CONK (BS448612)

The direct support artillery units deployed starting 31 Aug 68. B/1-82 Arty was moved from LZ GAYOR (BS573963) by CH-47 to LZ CHEVY (BS428718) to support the initial phases of CAMPAIGN GROVE in the vicinity of HA THANH Special Forces Camp. On 3 Sep 1968 C/6-11 Arty moved from LZ CENTER (AT552243) to firing positions near the QUANG NGAI Airfield by CR-47. A/6-11 Arty was moved from LZ PLEASANTVILLE (AT862202) to LZ BUFF (BS540825). On 11 Sep 68 B/6-11 Arty was moved by CH-47's to the Ban Pho AO. On 20 Sep 68 D/6-11 Arty was moved by CH-47's to LZ COOL (BS448612).

2) General support artillery to TF GALLAGHER:

UNIT	LOCATIONS
D/L-82-6(SF)	LZ BOTTLE(US/631852)
C/3-18-175(SF)	LZ DOTTIE(US/631852)
	LZ DRAGON(US/25517)

3) Rounds expended:

GS, GS(R) No records available	18 10,555 rds HK
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(b) Nature of targets:

(a) ASY: A vigorous SAT program was established throughout the operation. Targets were selected by Battalion S2's and Brigade C2 on intelligence reports obtained from prisoner and document readouts.

(2) Support missions: The bulk of the ammunition expenditure was in support of troops in contact, fires on objective areas, targets of opportunity and preparatory fires.

(3) Timeliness and effectiveness: Response to calls for fire and for read observer adjustments were accurate and opposition to request CASHMERE GROUP, ammunition resupply of all batteries supporting the operation was timely with no requirement for emergency resupply. Good fire

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control was exercised throughout the operation in conjunction with air support. No known incidents of casualties by friendly fire occurred during the operation. 6-11 Arty was required to maintain two complete Fire Direction Centers (FDC's); one for CHAMPAIGN GROVE and another for the Duc Hu 40. 6-11 Arty is not authorized sufficient personnel under TOE to accomplish this task necessitating the augmentation of the FDC's with personnel from the firing batteries. This was a suitable solution due to the presence of trained personnel; however, this practice is not always acceptable. There is a need for support of qualified personnel from Div Arty to augment operations of this nature.

b. Tactical Air Support:

(1) Tactical air support consisted primarily of forward air controlled preplanned and immediate air strikes. In addition, Sky Spots and B-52 strikes were employed. Preplanned air strikes were primarily employed on suspected enemy base camps and unit objectives.

(2) Forward air controllers of the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, comprising the 11th Bde's Tactical Air Control Party, were available to 1st BATTALION on a daily basis. They performed as follows:

(a) Participating FAC's:

DELIX 32	Mag Anderson, William
DELIX 33	Cpt Stitzel, John
DELIX 37	Cpt Verdier, Paul
DELIX 39	Cpt Nemlick, Anthony

(b) Results: 32 KPA, incl. 180 structures and 30 bunkers destroyed, 30 secondary fires, 6 active mortar positions destroyed, 3 active AGF and 10 positions destroyed, 21 sampans destroyed.

c. US Army Aviation:

(1) The 14th Aviation Battalion provided the helicopter support for the entire operation. UH1H Aircraft were available for each battalion commander for both command and control helicopter and utility helicopter support. In addition, all lift aircraft for combat assaults were made available by Division from the assets of the 14th Aviation Battalion. CH-47 aircraft were used primarily for bulk resupply missions and movement of artillery batteries. Additionally CH-47's were used as troop carriers in some instances. These aircraft provided a high degree of mobility and flexibility.

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(2) F/8 Cav and Division Aero Scouts were made available on a mission basis.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: ANNEX C.

9. (C) MISSION: TF GALLOWAY conducted combat operations in area of responsibility to find, fix and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Div, interdict supply routes to QUANG NGAI and to eliminate threat of an attack on QUANG NGAI City.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. PHASE I: (4-12 Sep 68) Task Force GALLOWAY attacks 040600 Sep 68 with 4-3 Inf, conducting combat assaults into LZ's north of TRA KIUC River and drives east to link up with elements of the 6th ARVN Regt (TF LUAT). 3-1 Inf attacks east to link up with elements of the 4th ARVN Regt (TF LUAT). Upon linkup, 3-1 Inf conducts multiple air assaults west of HA THANH Special Forces Camp.

b. PHASE II: (13-14 Sep 68) TF GALLOWAY assumes OPCON of the 1/1 Cav, and attacks west with 1/1 Cav and 4-3 Inf on two axis. 1-20 Inf moves by airlift to HA THANH Special Forces Camp and commences operations to the west in conjunction with 3-1 Inf. 3-1 Inf continues operations to the west.

c. PHASE III: (14-24 Sep 68) continues operations west and south of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp. Release OPCON of the 1/1 Cav. 4-3 Inf moves by air to LZ BRONCO. 3-1 Inf and 1-20 Inf continue operations west and south of HA THANH. Operation CHAMPION GROVE terminated 242400H Sep 68.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. 4 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: 041158H Sep 68, A, C and D Companies conducted CA's from QUANG NGAI Airfield to LZ's via BSL439764 and BSL46752 respectively. The CA's were completed by 1242 hrs, and both LZ's were cold. C Co conducting recon in force to the NE of the LZ engaged and killed one VC evading north. A and D Co's made no contact through the day. At 1530 hrs the C&C ship of the 4-3 Inf spotted 3 VC with packs attempting to evade across the river (BSL489750). The C&C engaged with M-60's at 100 ft and killed 3 VC. The bodies and packs were not recovered.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a CA to BSL40716. B Co was airlifted into the same LZ. C Co conducted a CA into BSL425715 to establish PSU CHEVY.

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D Co reinforces with E-1 Cav (-) crossed LD vic BS570710 and moved west to join with elements of the 1/1 Cav, operating separately west of QUANG NGAI City. All LZ's were cold and no casualties were sustained. At 1540 hrs at BS555722 B Co discovered four VC in graves dressed in black and with web gear. The 4 VC KIA were killed earlier by gunships. A, C, D, and Recon reported no contact.

b. 5 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a recon in force operation to BS483767 with negative contact. B Co conducted a CA into a LZ at BS514816 and conducted patrolling with negative contact. C Co moved SE and at BS449755 detained 1 NVA attempting to hide in a spiderhole. The NVA was evacuated to LZ WRONCO for interrogation. D Co moved SE on a sweep mission. At 1145 hrs at BS478725 the lead element of D Co became heavily engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Aero Scouts were called and expended on the area from which the fire was received. The C&C helicopter attempted to extract a wounded man but was shot down by heavy AW fire from BS472723. D Co moved to and secured the downed helicopter. 1 US was killed and 2 WHA from the helicopter. Artillery was directed on all suspected enemy locations and the unit maneuvered to destroy the enemy force. The enemy broke contact at 1745 and withdrew to the NW. At 1145 hrs Recon Plt reported heavy contact at BS545788. The fire was returned and artillery called on the enemy location. The enemy force broke contact and evaded SW.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted clover leaf patrols out from their NDP. B Co conducted recon in force operation west of their NDP and returned. C Co and Recon Plt continued patrolling vic BS425704 and maintained security of FSB CMEVY. D Co and E-1/1 (-) conducted a sweep west of their NDP. At 0235 hrs A Co received fire from west of their NDP resulting in 1 WHA. Artillery was fired into the area with unknown results.

c. 6 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co swept from BS482773 to BS494765 then south to vic BS495759 with negative contact. B Co continued operations SW. At 2225 hrs an ambush from B Co engaged and killed 1 VC at BS537776. C Co swept north with negative contact. D Co swept north with negative contact. RCN Plt swept north from BS540715 and at 1410 hrs vic of BS548773 engaged an estimated NVA Co. Artillery and gunships were called and the fight continued for 2 hours. Results: 43 NVA KIA, 11 US KIA 4 WHA. Aero Scouts working for the 4-3 Inf engaged 10 VC with weapons in vic of BS552772. Their organic infantry platoon was inserted and captured 1 AK-50, 1 RFG and 1 US Carbine. Results: 10 VC KIA, 3 weapons captured. At 1718 a lift ship working for the 4-3 Inf received .50 cal fire vic BS505765 resulting in 1 WHA. At approx 1700 hrs gunships engaged an unk number of VC with weapons vic BS557778 resulting in 1 VC KIA, 2 US WHA.

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(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co continued a recon in force south from BS540715. At 1230 hrs A Co received AN fire & 4 60mm mortar rounds vic BS533703 resulting in 1 WHA by SA fire. At 1400 hrs A Co engaged 3 VC near a tunnel complex vic BS538697 resulting in 2 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's captured. B Co moved from their NDP and swept SW to vic BS535711. At 1605 vic BS524712 B Co engaged 2 VC attempting to evade resulting in 2 VC KIA. C Co and Rcn Plt continued security of LZ CHEVY and local patrolling. D Co and E-1 Cav conducted a sweep from BS578708 SE to BS609671 then SE to BS622622. At 0650 E-1 Cav engaged 1 VC attempting to evade resulting in 1 VC KIA.

(3) Aircraft working in the AO made these separate contacts. At 1020 hrs a helicopter of the 174th AVN engaged 1 VC killing him. At 1330 hrs an Aero Scout observed a VC attempting to evade; engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA.

d. 7 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co swept NE from BS495578 to BS544787. B Co moved from BS495758 to BS544787. C Co conducted a CA from PZ vic BS474765 to LZ vic BS548783. D Co conducted a CA from vic BS475755 to LZ vic BS562762. No 4-3 Inf units made contact. The only contact was made by an Aero Scout supporting the 4-3 Inf in the vic BS560787 when at 0950 hrs they observed 2 VC evading; engaged resulting in 2 VC KIA. Rcn Plt returned to Chu Lai.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A & B Co moved NE from BS540715 on a two company sweep operation. At 0850 vic BS550758 contact was made with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of a tunnel complex. A & B Co engaged the enemy and with the aid of Aero Scouts maintained contact until 1700 hrs at which time the enemy broke contact. The fight resulted in 26 VC KIA, 1 US Carbine, 1 AK-47, 1 82mm mortar base plate, 2 82mm bipods and misc equipment captured. US losses were 1 KHA, 13 WHA(E), 1 WHA(M), and 1 gunship shot down (recovered). C Co secured LZ CHEVY. D Co moved with E-1 Cav north through QUANG NGAI then west to vic BS556771 with negative contact. Rcn continued patrolling vic LZ CHEVY. At 2304 hrs D Co received 6 rds of 60mm mortar vic BS560763 resulting in 1 WHA(E).

e. 8 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved from BS546788 to BS492776. B Co swept west from BS545784 to BS484775. C Co moved west from BS560773 to BS522778. D Co moved west from BS555782 to BS524783. Rcn Plt located in Chu Lai. Negative contact was made by the ground units. At 1150 hrs the C&C helicopter spotted 1 VC killed by artillery at BS474777. At 1210 hrs, gunships working for the 4-3 Inf engaged 3 VC evading resulting in 3 VC KIA.

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(2) 3-1 Inf: A, B, and C Co's conducted sweeps around NDP locations and closed back on NDP sites. D Co was airlifted from QUANG NOAI Airfield to LZ CHEVY. Ren Plt continued patrolling west of LZ CHEVY. The 3-1 Inf had negative contact.

f. 9 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved from BSH92776 west to BSH73776 then SE to BSH89775. At 1258 hrs vic BSH83775. A Co found 1 Soviet 7.62mm Pistol under the floor of a burned hootch. At 1845 hrs vic BSH93784 A Co engaged 7 VC with weapons evading north killing two. No weapons were found. B Co moved SW from BSH45784 to BSH65778 then south to BSH65768. At 1105 B Co received sniper fire vic BSH65777. They returned fire resulting in 3 VC KIA. C Co moved SW from BSH22778 to BSH09775 then south to BSH93754 with negative contact. D Co moved SW from BSH55782 to BSH10760. Ren Plt located at Chu Lai. At 1745 the C&C helicopter of the 4-3 Inf was shot down by SA fire at BSH88775 with negative casualties. The helicopter was secured by A & B Co's.

(2) 3-1 Inf: At 0030 hrs A & B Co's received 7 or 8 rounds of 82mm mortar and SA fire in their NDP's vic BSH48739 resulting 1 US WHA (M). They observed 1 VC near the perimeter and engaged resulting 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. At daylight, A Co moved SW from BSH50750 to establish a blocking position at BSH23719. B Co moved from BSH52758 to establish a blocking position vic BSH4734. At 1100 B Co engaged 1 VC hiding in a spider hole vic BSH23740 resulting in 1 VC KIA. C Co moved from LZ CHEVY to establish a blocking position at BSH43726. D Co secured LZ CHEVY. Ren Plt continued patrolling vic LZ CHEVY.

g. 10 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from vic BSH88775 to a cold LZ vic BSH95718 and made negative contact on their recon in force throughout the day. B Co conducted a CA from vic BSH65767 to a cold LZ vic BSH95718 also making negative contact. C Co conducted a CA from BSH94754 to LZ vic BSH70710. D Co conducted a CA into the same LZ. The LZ was cold but C Co did receive some sniper fire on their PZ with negative casualties. On the subsequent sweep of the area, C Co had 2 WHA from punji stakes vic of BSH70710. At 0800 C Co found 1 VC killed by artillery during the LZ preparation. At 1545 hrs vic BSH76717 C Co found 1 K-44 Rifle and at 1630 hrs vic BSH74718 they found 2 .45 cal sub-machine guns in the brush behind a hut. D Co had negative contact all day. The Ren Plt remained located at Chu Lai.

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(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from BS522719 to an LZ BS340685. Some sniper fire was received on the LZ but negative US casualties. In a sweep of the area, A Co engaged 5 NVA at 1515 hrs vic BS340760 resulting in 3 NVA KIA. B Co conducted a CA from BS513734 to a cold LZ vic BS344675. Although the LZ was cold, at 1310 hrs B Co had 1 WHA(E) and 1 WHA(M) from punji stakes located in the vic of the LZ (BS344676). During their sweep operation, B Co at 1735 hrs vic BS390700 found 1 VC body and 1 AK-47. At 1920 hrs B Co observed 15 NVA in the open vic BS392705. Aero Scouts were called and engaged the enemy resulting in 8 NVA KIA. C Co conducted a CA from BS444728 to LZ vic BS350674. The LZ was hit by small arms fire killing 1 helicopter pilot and wounding 2 doorgunners, (1 KHA & 2 WHA). An airstrike was placed on the enemy resulting in 3 KBA vic BS353672. In sweeping the area, C Co had 1 WHA from punji stakes vic BS358680. C Co made no further contact. D Co had remained at LZ CHEVY for security and Rcn Plt continued patrolling vic LZ CHEVY with negative contact.

(3) In other actions in the AO, the Aero Scouts at 1630 hrs vic BS345690 found 1 NVA KIA in a river.

h. 11 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved west from BS495716 to BS484716 with negative contact. B Co swept from BS495716 NW to BS484723. At 1100 hrs B Co found 3 VC KBA in the vic BS480711. At approx 1230 hrs B Co conducted a CA from BS484723 into a cold LZ at BS504697 then moved S with negative contact. C Co moved NE from BS470710 to BS475720. Negative contact was made but at 0920 hrs vic BS475720 C Co found 1 BAR hidden in bushes beside a trail. D Co swept from BS470710 to BS472716 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained in Chu Lai.

(2) 3-1 Inf: At 0420 hrs A & B Co received a probe on the northern perimeter of their joint NDP. Four to five HQ were thrown by the enemy but landed outside of the perimeter. Fire was returned with HQ and Claymore mines with negative results. There were no friendly casualties. At approx 0630 hrs A & B Co's received 8 to 10 rds of 82mm mortar in their joint NDP resulting in 2 KIA 25 WHA. Artillery returned fire on suspected enemy mortar positions with negative results. At daylight, A & B Co's swept NE from BS353689 to BS355699 with negative contact. C Co searched from BS350674 NE to BS390691 with negative contact. D Co and Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

i. 12 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co swept from BS484717 to BS495716 with negative contact. B Co moved from BS504698 NE following two Chlar Noi's who claimed knowledge of a large caliber artillery piece buried by the VC. At 0930 hrs in the vic of BS517711 B Co found a complete 105mm Howitzer (SN100228) buried. The howitzer was evacuated and B Co continued the sweep to BS522708

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with negative contact. C Co conducted a CA from BS472728 to a cold LZ via BS500705 then searched south to BS505692 with negative contact. D Co conducted a CA from BS472717 to the same LZ and swept the area with negative results. C & D Co were following up on an intelligence report of a possible VC base camp with well camouflaged huts. Rcn Plt was airlifted from Chu Lai to LZ BUFF.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved from NDP via BS355699. At 1210 in vic of BS372686 A Co engaged an unknown size enemy force at about 100 - 150 meters. A Co quickly picked up a base of fire and maneuvered against the enemy force. The enemy force broke contact which resulted in 3 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. Friendly losses were 1 KIA and 2 WHA. A Co continued to sweep the area and, at 1645 hrs via BS373698 found 1 AK-47 and 1 RPG hidden in some bushes. A Co had no further contact. B Co moved SE from BS355699 to BS371683 with negative contact. C Co ran cloverleaf patrols in the vic of BS380691 with negative contact. At 1845 hrs C Co received 3 122mm rockets in their NDP via BS380691 resulting in 1 KIA and 3 WHA. Artillery returned fire on suspected enemy location at BS368684 with negative assessment. D Co continued security of LZ CHEVY. Rcn Plt continued security of LZ CHEVY and conducted local patrols around the fire base.

(3) Aero Scouts made most of the contacts in the AO on 12 Sep 68. At 0840 hrs via BS556782 engaged 3 VC evading resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 0853 hrs they engaged an evading VC in vic BS543746 results - 1 VC KIA. A VCS was snatched at 1100 hours via of BS558782. The VCS, wearing black shorts with blood on them, was trying to evade. The VCS himself was not wounded and was moved to the rear for questioning. At 1230 hrs via BS473697, five evading VC were engaged resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 1505 hrs in vic of BS370693 another evading VC was engaged adding another 1 VC KIA. The Aero Scouts received fire at 1645 hrs in vic of BS373698. They returned fire with the results of 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA.

J. 13 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from BS494717 to a cold LZ at BS721757. The area was swept but negative contact was made. B Co moved NW to BS515711 then SW to BS510707 then east BS522707. Several tunnels were found, but they were empty. B Co did find 1 81mm rocket rd, 1 60mm mortar rd, 1 mine, and misc equip in a hole via BS510707. C Co conducted a CA from BS504698 to a cold LZ BS505677. A search of the area was made with negative contact. D Co swept from BS513713 north to BS511731 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained at LZ BUFF for security.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved from BS383685 south to BS383675. B Co moved from BS383686 southeast to BS389679 then south to BS389665. C Co moved from BS380692 south to BS372673 then SE to BS374668. D Co provided security of LZ CHEVY. Rcn Plt provided security of LZ CHEVY and conducted patrols in the area around LZ CHEVY. None of the 3-1 Inf units made contact with the enemy.

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(3) 1/1 Cav: On 12 September 1968, the 1/1 Cav with B/1-46 Inf attached became OPCON to TF GALLOWAY. They road marched to QUANG NGAI based on intelligence reports which indicated the city would be attacked by elements of the 3d NVA Div. On 13 Sep 68 at 1200 hrs, A Trp with B/1-46 Inf began a zone recon west of QUANG NGAI. At 1430 hrs a plt of A Trp made contact with a well entrenched NVA force vic BS566715 supported by MW, AT and AA weapons. Immediately the remainder of A Trp assaulted the enemy positions right flank. In the assault, A Trp became mired in untrafficable terrain but continued to place effective fire into the enemy's positions. C Trp was ordered to attack through the south flank of A Trp and assume OPCON of B/1-46. F Trp 8th ACAV provided an aerial block to south and west; immediate airstrikes were called on the enemy position as C Trp moved into position. C Trp and B/1-46 Inf assaulted the enemy position, overrunning the forward trenches and penetrating the major defenses. By 1830 hrs the position was consolidated and secured, but darkness prevented further exploitation or complete reports of results.

(4) Aero Scouts working in support throughout the AO had the following contacts:

0830 - Vic BS492755 engaged 4 VC evading - 4 VC KIA

1135 - Vic BS389679 engaged 1 VC evading - 1 VC KIA

1158 - Vic BS392668 engaged 15 to 20 NVA in green uniforms - 3 NVA KIA

1415 - vic BS392669 engaged 1 NVA in green uniform evading - 1 NVA KIA.

k. 14 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved NW with B/1-1 Cav to BS604786 then SW to BS525764. At 0930 hrs vic BS604785 A Co engaged 1 VC attempting to evade resulting in 1 VC KIA. In vic of BS547766 at 1500 hrs a shallow grave was found containing 4 NVA KIA. B Co moved north to BS510731 then conducted a CA to a cold LZ at BS482778 and moved south to BS508668 making negative contact. C Co conducted a search east from BS502676 to BS512673 then SW to BS508668 where they found the entrance of a large well-camouflaged cave. Upon searching the cave the following enemy equipment was captured: 8 EM, 1 CSW, 5 122mm Rockets, 22 60mm mortar rounds, 115 B40 Rocket rds, 22 RPN rds, 1 mortar sight, 98 57mm RR rds, 24 82mm mortar rds, 152 blasting caps, 1 US made Collins Radio, 1 US Starlight Scope, misc small arms ammo and medical supplies. C Co continued SW to a MDP at BS502678 with negative contact. D Co moved N across the river from BS517745 to BS504777. At 0945 hrs vic BS514744 a man stepped on a M-16 anti-personnel mine resulting in 1 WHA. D Co had no further contact. Ron Plt remained at LZ BUFF for security.

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(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved south from BS384675 to BS375655. B Co swept south along the river from BS389665 to BS385617. C Co searched SW from BS374668 to BS369645. D Co continued security of LZ CHEVY and Rcn Plt conducted local patrols around LZ CHEVY. 3-1 Inf units made no contact.

(3) 1/1 Cav: On 14 Sep 68, A Trp and C Trp with B/1-46 Inf continued recon in zone toward the west and northwest along probable avenues of withdrawal as a follow-up to the contact of the previous day. At 1410 hrs, A Trp was engaged by an NVA force vic BS522750 supported by AW and AT weapons. A Trp immediately assaulted the enemy's position and C Trp with B/1-46 Inf was ordered to assist A Trp by attacking along A Trp's eastern flank. The attacks dispersed or destroyed the enemy and A Trp, C Trp with B/1-46 Inf established night blocking positions along a line from BS493745 to BS532764. Results of the contacts on the 13th and 14th of Sep were as follows:

Friendly - 3 KHA, 22 WIA, 1 Track destroyed, 2 Tracks damaged.

Enemy - 112 KIA, 1 CIA, 17 IW, 11 CSW.

1. 15 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A, B and D Co's converged on a staging area located in vic BS492762 for subsequent airlift to the Duc Pho AO on 16 Sep and release from Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE. C Co was airlifted to LZ THUNDER and Rcn airlifted to LZ BRONCO.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A, B, and C Co's moved to the vic of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp for a short stand down before continuing Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE. D Co and Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security. At 1910 hrs B Co received 15 rds of 82mm mortar inside their perimeter resulting in 4 KHA.

(3) 1/1 Cav: No contact was made with enemy and at 1500H 1/1 Cav and B/1-46 were ordered to move to assembly areas vic BS645763 preparatory to movement to their base camp at HAWK HILL and release from Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE.

(4) 1-20 Inf: D Co was airlifted into the HA THANH Special Forces and became OPCON to Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE.

m. 16 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: Completed airlift to Duc Pho AO and was released from OPCON to Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A, B, and C Co's continued stand down at HA THANH SF Camp in preparation for continuing operation. D Co and Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

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(3) 1-20 Inf: The remainder of the battalion was airlifted into HA THANH SF Camp to join D Co in preparation for operations under TF GALLOWAY.

n. 17 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a recon in force SW from HA THANH to BS356686 with negative contact. B Co airlifted to LZ CHEVY to replace D Co and provide security. C Co conducted a CA from HA THANH to a cold LZ vic BS356648 then swept northwest. At 1710 hrs vic BS303717 they received heavy AW fire and received 1 WHA. Fire was returned resulting in 5 NVA KIA and contact was broken. C Co then moved to vic BS364655 and set up their NDP. D Co after being airlifted to HA THANH swept to BS366687 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0541 hrs a squad ambush from A Co was hit by an estimated enemy platoon near the A Co NDP vic BS383717. The ambush called for help and A Co moved to reinforce but did not reach the location in time. Arriving at 0645 hrs A Co found that the ambush had been overrun leaving 4 KHA and 3 WHA. A Co pursued the enemy to the southwest. At 1215 hrs vic BS378736 an evading NVA was engaged at 50 meters resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47. Five minutes later 2 more NVA threw a HQ and tried to evade but were engaged resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 RPG KIA. A Co had 1 WHA from the thrown grenade. A tunnel was discovered at this location, BS378736, containing 1 RPD, 2 AK-47, 6 RPG rds and 2,200 rds small arms ammunition. A Co continued the search of the area with negative results. B Co swept NW from vic HA THANH to BS385730 with negative contact. C Co swept from vic of HA THANH north to BS395754 with negative contact. D Co conducted a recon in force to the southeast. At 1759 hours vic BS368653 D Co received sniper fire resulting in 1 WHA. Fire was returned with negative results and they moved on to their NDP.

(3) Aero Scouts working in the AO had two contacts:

0900 hrs vic BS431772 engaged 1 VC evading, res: 1 VC KIA, 1 Carbine CIA.

1330 hrs vic BS420758 engaged 1 VC evading, res: 1 VC KIA.

o. 18 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved SW from BS456688 to vic BS342654. At 0845 hrs vic BS338653 A Co engaged 4 VC at approx 75 meters. The enemy quickly broke contact and tried to evade but were brought under effective fire. The results of the skirmish was 4 VC KIA and 2 US WHA. B Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security. C Co swept from BS363655 NW to BS352670 with negative contact. D Co made no contact on a recon in force from BS367688 SW to BS352670. The Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

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(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0120 hrs vic BS349709 a LP from D Co received 2 bursts of AW fire resulting in 2 WHA. The LP pulled back into the D Co perimeter. At first light A, B, and D Co conducted a recon in force SW to the built up area in the valley vic BS3467. C Co and Ron Plt conducted a CA to BS323702 then swept SE toward the valley. At 0730H vic BS348708 D Co engaged two evading NVA at 100 meters resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. At 1255 hrs vic BS352691, A Co received AW fire resulting in 3 WHA. Fire was returned but the enemy broke contact. At 1336 vic BS35702 the Ron Plt found a tunnel, heard voices and threw in grenades resulting in 2 VC KIA and 2 VCS CIA. At 1355 hrs vic BS339690 C Co engaged 1 NVA evading resulting in 1 NVA KIA. All units continued to converge toward the built up area in the valley. At 1421 vic BS351701, D Co received mortar and AW fire resulting in 2 US WHA. Fire was returned but the enemy broke contact. At 1445 hrs vic BS358692, the point man of A Co was wounded and contact was made with an unknown size enemy force. Fire was returned and artillery called. The contact continued until dark when the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Darkness prevented assessment of enemy losses and A Co set up their NDP. A Co's losses were 3 KHA 6 WHA. In the meantime, D Co continued to sweep toward the valley. At 1605 hrs vic BS350695, D Co received heavy SA and AW fire from an unknown size enemy force well dug in along the base of the hills on the eastern side of the valley. Fire was returned and maximum use made of supporting fires. The enemy broke contact during darkness and D Co held in position for further exploitation at daylight. US losses were 10 KHA, 19 WHA. Four of the KHA could not be recovered at this time. Darkness prevented enemy assessment.

p. 19 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved NE from BS342655 to BS368674 with negative contact. At 1400, B Co conducted a CA into multiple LZ's at BS443763, BS443743 and BS445754 and conducted a sweep of the area adjacent to the LZ's. At 1505 hrs an element of B Co engaged 1 VC in a spider hole resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1700 hrs, B Co was extracted back to LZ CHEVY for security. C Co conducted search operations SE from BS352670 to BS355668 without contact. D Co moved NW from BS362660 to BS355670 with negative contact. Ron Plt remained at LZ CH VY for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: A Co swept the area of the previous day's contact with negative results. B Co also swept the area adjacent to A Co's contact and found 21 NVA KIA at BS349693 which had been killed by artillery and airstrikes. C Co sweeping in the same general area found 60 spider holes vic BS346694 containing 10 NVA KIA. D Co began sweeping the area of their contact of the previous afternoon. At 0915 hrs vic BS345695, D Co received 2 rds of mortar fire resulting in 2 WHA. D Co continued to search the area and at 1045 hrs vic BS349692 found 5 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47. At 1320 hrs vic BS346690 they found 5 NVA KIA killed by SA floating in a river. Ron Plt swept the area via BS345694 with negative contact.

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q. 20 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A, C and D companies were airlifted back into HA THANH SF Camp. A Co was picked up at HA THANH and B Co was picked up at LZ CHEVY and conducted a two company CA into BS448612 to establish FSB Cork. The LZ was cold enabling the airlift of C & D Co's from HA THANH into LZ Cork. A Co remained LZ Cork for security. B Co moved west BS442612. C Co moved SE to BS463595. D Co moved south to BS450595 and at 1645 hrs received sniper fire resulting in 1 KHA. All companies established NDP's in their respective areas around LZ Cork and prepared for further operations. The Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: A, B, C & Rcn Plt were airlifted into HA THANH SF Camp to prepare for future operations. D Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(3) Aero Scouts working in the AO engaged 1 VC evading vic BS390648 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

r. 21 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co continued security of LZ Cork. B Co conducted patrols in the vic of their NDP (BS442613) with negative contact. C Co moved from BS462595 southeast to BS468583 with negative contact. D Co moved SW from BS455595 to BS452583 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0737 hrs A Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BS459665. A recon in force was conducted east to a PZ at BS495665. At 1505 hrs A Co was extracted and airlifted back to HA THANH with negative contact. At 0922 hrs, B Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BS388601. C Co was then airlifted into the secure LZ. B Co swept to the southwest and C Co swept to the southeast of the LZ. At 1110 hrs vic BS395593, C Co found 1 VC in a hole who would not come out. A RO was thrown in resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1432 hrs vic BS378580, D Co engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1515 hrs vic BS382592, B Co engaged 3 VC in a tunnel resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 1640 vic BS375586, they engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. B & C Co's established NDP's as darkness fell on their operation. D Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security and Rcn Plt was airlifted to HA THANH SF Camp for security.

s. 22 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: All units airlifted from field locations back to LZ Cork then airlifted back to Duc Pho AO to LZ's LIZ, DRAGON and BRUNCO. 3-1 Inf has terminated operations in CHAMPAIGN GROVE AO and is preparing for future operations.

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(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0440 hrs, three OP's in the vicinity of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp came under fire and enemy ground attack. A Co in a NDP adjacent to the SF Camp was given the mission to move to the OP's as a relief force. At 0625 hrs vic BS376695, A Co engaged 1 NVA evading west west, could not see the body but would try to find when the fire lifts. HA THANH was occasionally receiving B-40 rocket fire at this time and A Co would try to locate the fire. At 0710 hrs when A Co approached the area where they engaged the NVA they found 1 NVA playing dead. The NVA attempted to evade, were engaged resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 1 carbine CIA. A Co continued to move toward the OP. At 0727 hrs vic BS376694, A Co engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. They continued to move toward OP 7 and upon approaching the hill location of the OP at 0813 hrs vic BS377698 they were taken under SA fire and had HQ's thrown at them. A Co had 1 KHA and 4 WHA but returned fire and assaulted the hill. At 0813 hrs, the C&C Helicopter for 1-20 Inf received an RPG round which hit the tail rotor resulting in 4 WHA(M). The helicopter was forced to set down at HA THANH. A Co continued their assault to regain the hill and succeeded in pushing the enemy off of the hill. At 0846, while pursuing the enemy into a small group of huts at the northern base of the hill (BS380696) 3 NVA who were evading were taken under fire resulting in 3 NVA KIA. A few minutes later, A Co found 1 NVA hiding in a hole at the same location: 1 NVA CIA. Fifteen minutes later, in the same area, A Co was taken under fire by an unknown size enemy force in bunkers and tunnels. Fire was returned and the fire fight continued for approx 2 1/2 hrs. A Co dispersed the enemy and found 10 NVA KIA, 3 AK-47's, 1 RPD PD and 1 57mm RR. A Co had one WHA(E). A Co searched the area of contact then started to sweep further east through the huts. At 1430 hrs vic BS382695 they again engaged an NVA force in bunkers and tunnels and were very successful in routing the enemy without friendly casualties. Enemy losses were 15 NVA KIA and captured equipment is as follows: 1 US M16 col Pistol, 2 Chi Com flare pistols, 8 AK-47's, 1 RPG-2 Rocket Launcher, 1 field telephone, 1 PA set, 1700 AK-47 rds, 15 57mm RR rds, 28 Chi Com HG's, 1 Bangalore Torpedo, 6 B40 Rockets and 5 boosters for B-40 Rockets. A Co set up their NDP at the base of the hill. B Co conducted a CBT sweep from BS390579 to vic BS394625 with negative contact. D Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security. Ren Plt conducted a combat sweep to vic BS3770 then returned to HA THANH for security.

t. 23 Sep 68:

(1) 1-20 Inf: A Co moved back to HA THANH and along with RGN Plt were airlifted to LZ DOTTIE. B & C Co's were airlifted from BS395625 to LZ DOTTIE. D Co secured LZ CHEVY until all Brigade elements had departed, then was airlifted to LZ DOTTIE. 1-20 Inf terminated operations in the CHAMPAIGN ORIGIN AO and assumed responsibility for the southern Dec Pz AO at 1445 hrs.

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(2) At 1045 hrs vic BS380560 a gunship flying air cover in the AO was shot down. The Aero Scouts were scrambled to give covering fire and engaged the enemy resulting in 6 VC KIA.

(3) TF GALLOWAY was disbanded and all elements airlifted out of LZ Chevy. At 1925 hrs TF GALLOWAY had been evacuated and control of the Brigade units assumed by CO, 11th Inf Bde.

u. 24 Sep 68: Request to Division for termination of Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE. Permission granted - 242400 hrs Sep 68 Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE terminated.

12. (C) RESULTS:

- a. Friendly: 41 KHA, 166 WHA.
- b. Enemy: (Annex C, Intelligence).

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

- a. Logistics: (See Annex B).
- b. Communications: (See Annex D).

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: TOE equipment, standard tactics and techniques normally related to counterinsurgency warfare were used during this operation.

15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE was designed initially as a relief operation of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp. Due to the threat on QUANG NGAI and the impending attack on HA THANH, the concept of the operation was broadened and changed to an operation designed to fix and destroy all enemy forces in the West QUANG NGAI area. By employing ARVN Forces in the mountain areas, enemy forces were cut off and prevented from massing for attacks on HA THANH and QUANG NGAI City.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: Operations of this nature should be initiated immediately whenever sizeable enemy forces are defined and located and intelligence indicates the enemy plans an attack on a major RVN installation or city. By denying the enemy the opportunity to consolidate his forces and mount an offensive, he is denied the military and propaganda benefits derived from a successful offensive.

4 Incl
 ANNEXES:
 A-Opn Overlay
 B-Logistics (6th Spt Bn)
 C-Intelligence
 D-Signal

John W. Donaldson
 JOHN W. DONALDSON
 Colonel, Infantry
 Commanding

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report (CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

1. (C) The logistical support for Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE is best understood if broken down into four general areas:

- a. Establishment and stockage level for the FSE located at Minh Long.
- b. Establishment and stockage level for the FSE located at Quang Ngai.
- c. Resupply of rifle battalions and artillery batteries.
- d. Establishment and maintenance of Brigade CP at LZ CHEVI.

2. (C) MINH LONG:

a. The FSE at Minh Long was established on or about 15 July in anticipation of CHAMPAIGN GROVE. It was established primarily to provide refueling and rearming of helicopters and for emergency resupply of C-Rations. Provisions were made to establish a Forward Clearing Station, if required, utilizing fixed wing aircraft to evacuate mass casualties. The stockage objectives at Minh Long were as follows:

<u>DODAC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE</u>
A137	CTG 7.62mm MLE 4-1	100,000
A165	CTG 7.62 Mini	100,000
H490	RKT 2.75"	1,000
B572	CTU 40mm Linked	800
G955	Green HD Smk (Violet)	144
G950	Green HD Smk (Red)	144
L407	Wings Acft (MB-24)	100
N/A	TP-4	20,000 gallons
N/A	AVDAS	500 gallons
N/A	C-Rations	6,000 meals
N/A	Water	500 gallons

b. S-4, 6th Support Battalion, monitored the stockage on hand at Minh Long and effected necessary coordination to maintain the stockage objectives until the FSE was closed 24 September 1968. Twenty-four (24) hook sorties were required to back haul remaining items to Duc Phu.

3. (C) QUANG NGAI:

a. The FSE at Quang Ngai was established on 25 August 1968. This FSE received replenishment of stockage objectives and its initial stockage from Chu Lai. A Forward Clearing Station was established on the air strip and was utilized effectively. A water purification point was established by the 26th Engineer Battalion at this location. Division Support Command

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) continued.

maintained the stockage at Quang Ngai transporting supplies from Chu Lai by road. The stockage objectives at Quang Ngai were as follows:

<u>DODAC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES</u>
A137	CTG 7.62mm M16 4-1	100,000
A165	CTG 7.62mm Mini	100,000
H490	RKT 2.75"	1,000
B572	CTG 40mm Linked	1,000
G955	Gren H2 Smk (Violet)	114
G950	Gren H2 Smk (Red)	114
L407	Flare Acft (M1-24)	96
N/A	CTG 105 HE	3,400
N/A	CTG 105 WP	200
N/A	CTG 105 Illum	200
N/A	CTG 105 Smoke	100
N/A	JP-4	30,000 gallons
N/A	C-Rations	6,000 meals

b. The stockage objectives at Quang Ngai were maintained by coordination of Brigade S-4 with Division Transportation Office and Division Ammunition Office.

4. (C) The rifle battalions were supported logistically primarily from LZ Bronco, FSB Chevy, FSB Cork for 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, and from Chu Lai and LZ Dottie for the 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry.

a. The material requirements for the establishment of an Infantry Battalion Fire Support Base were as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Sandbags	50,000 each
Engr Stakes 8'	555 each
Engr Stakes 6'	555 each
Culverts 60"	10 each
Concertina Wire	12 rolls

b. The daily average requirements for resupply of Infantry Battalions were as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
C-Rations	125 cases
Water	1,000 gallons
A-Rations	5,000 pounds

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) continued.

5. (C) Ammunition resupply for the Artillery Batteries was accomplished from Quang Ngai Air Strip via Chinook sling load to separate battery locations. Artillery Battalions average daily requirements for resupply were as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Ammunition	600 rounds
C-Rations	83 cases
Water	1,000 gallons

6. (C) Brigade CP at LZ Chevy:

a. Establishment of the FSB was initiated on D-1. HHC Executive Officer and designated individuals and 15 Chinook loads of equipment and materials were dispatched from LZ Bronco to LZ Chevy.

b. The HHC Commanding Officer coordinated the resupply of one hot meal a day flown from LZ Bronco. Sixty (60) cases of C-Rations and 1500 gallons of water were flown from Quang Ngai to LZ Chevy on daily basis. These C-Rations and water were utilized by both HHC and the unit providing security of LZ Chevy.

7. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. When a unit having organic track vehicles is attached/opcon to an infantry unit, the unit having track vehicles must make provisions for Class III and unusual Class V resupply as well as maintenance of the track vehicles.

b. A conscientious effort must be made by individuals on forward LZ's to insure that empty water blivits, water trailers and sling equipment are handled carefully and expeditiously back hauled to the source of resupply.

c. All units must continually inspect slinging equipment for serviceability and quantity available. A shortage of slinging equipment can slow down an otherwise efficient operation.

d. There were no significant changes to the normal combat loads, ammunition or weapons carried by line units.

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20 December 1968

(C) ANNEX C (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Task Force Galloway)

1. (C) WEATHER AND TERRAIN.

a. Weather: During the course of the operation, weather was generally favorable from mid morning until dusk. Skies were generally clear, though there were occasional cloudy periods, and visibility was good. Visibility was temporarily restricted on several days by rainstorms and ground fog in the early morning.

b. TERRAIN:

(1) The major portion of the operational area was composed of mountains, hill masses covered by dense underbrush, and single conical peaks. The low hills, draws and valleys were covered mainly by undergrowth, grassland, and rice crops.

(2) Effects of enemy course of action: The operational area on the mountains and the foothills offered the enemy the capability of conducting safe movement free from observation. Natural cover and concealment in the area added to the enemy's capability to avoid friendly forces. In the lowland areas, cover and concealment was only available to a limited extent along dikes, road embankments, and river banks.

(3) Effects on friendly course of action: In the mountains and foothills, the terrain restricted movement of friendly forces. Movement in this area was necessarily slow and visibility, observation and fire were also severely restricted. In the lowland areas friendly forces could move with ease and visibility was good to excellent.

2. (C) PRELIMINARY INTELLIGENCE:

a. Available intelligence, based on PW reports, indicated that the 3rd NVA Division was in the area of operations with the capability of launching an attack on friendly military installations in the area.

b. Agent reports, VR, SIAE, and IR indicated a concentration of enemy units in the Song Ho Valley and south of the Song Tra Bong base area.

c. Available intelligence indicated the possibility that a VC base camp in vicinity of Quang Ngai city would attack that city. In such an event, the 3rd NVA Division could be used to reinforce the attacking VC force.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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1. Intelligence Intelligence (as per ...)
 mission: ...
 mission: ...
 mission: ...

2. Policy Considerations:

(a) ...

(b) ...

(c) ...

(d) ...

3. Policy Considerations and Strategy:

22/10/1971	22/10/1971
22/10/1971	22/10/1971
22/10/1971	22/10/1971
22/10/1971	22/10/1971

4. Policy Considerations and Strategy:

...
 ...

...
 ...

...
 ...

5. Policy Considerations:

a. ...

22/10/1971	22/10/1971
22/10/1971	22/10/1971
22/10/1971	22/10/1971
22/10/1971	22/10/1971

b. ...

c. ...

22/10/1971	22/10/1971
22/10/1971	22/10/1971
22/10/1971	22/10/1971

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Commo Equipment:

Field Phone	1
Portable PA Set	1
Collins Type Radiol	
BA-30 Batteries	56
VC-Radio	1

Miscellaneous:

SVBR Sight	1	NVA Packs	7
NVA Helmet	4	Ponchos	3
Soviet Gas Mask	3	Billfold	1
1st Aid Packets	4	US Poncho	1
Sniper Scope	1	Poncho Liner	1
Starlight Scope	1	RPG Carrying Case	4
Mortar Sight	1	RFD MG Drums	3
Binoculars	5pr	AK 47 Ammo Pouches	2
MG Mount 12.7	1	US Ammo Pouches	2
US Steel Helmet	3	Aust. Poncho	1
Piasters	2,720	Marijuana	47 sticks
Wire Cutters	2pr	Japanese Camera	1
Lighters	2	82MM Base Plate	1
Med Supplies	50lbs	82MM Mortar Bipods	2
VC Pack	1	Entrenching Tools	3
Pistol Belts	2	Documents	500lbs
NVA Canteens	8		

(2) Destroyed

Ammo:

AK-47	4550
M-60	1100
M-79	1
B-40	144
82MM	15
Carbine	2090
SVBR	119
60mm	34
RPG-7	138
M-16	816
122MM Rockets	5
Cal 50	400
Mixed S/A	2300
12.7MM	450
7.62 CHICOM	500
Bangalore	4
Xrip Flares	2
CHICOM B/Cron	104

Food:

Rice	8501lb
------	--------

Clothing:

NVA Uniforms	30
PJ'S	1
Trousers	3

Miscellaneous:

Sampans	42
Picks	2
Packs	3
NVA Packs	7
Mina, CHICOM AP	1
B/T Kit	1
Pistol Belts	9
Holsters	1

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M-26 H/Gren	1
60MM Fuses	24
60MM Charges	28
B-40 Boosters	5
Blasting Caps	567
82MM Fuses	6

Ponchos	6
VC Sundry Pack	1
AK-47 Mags	24
Canteens	4
M-16 Mags	3
82MM Cleaning Kit	1
82MM Aiming Stakes	2
VC Gas Masks	4
Sewing Machines	2
Cal 45 Mags	1
Hammock	1
Entrenching Tools	5

c. Structures:

Huts and Bunkers Destroyed
Trenches

228
612 Meters

Secondary Explosions/Fires from Airstrikes or Artillery:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
21 Sep	BS346587	2 Secondary Fires
20 Sep	BS450595	1 Secondary Expl
20 Sep	BS434634	1 Secondary Expl w/gray smoke 250'
		1 Secondary Expl w/ orange smoke
20 Sep	BS335639	1 Secondary Expl
17 Sep	BS364653	2 Secondary Expl
		2 Secondary Fires
16 Sep	BS469678	1 Secondary Fire w/gray-white smoke
16 Sep	BS326646	1 Secondary Fire
15 Sep	BS449750	1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire
15 Sep	BS554784	1 Secondary Fire
15 Sep	BS557783	2 Secondary Fires & 4 Secondary Expl
14 Sep	BS473682	1 Secondary Expl
14 Sep	BS473728	1 Secondary Expl w/orange smoke
14 Sep	BS394644	1 Secondary Expl
14 Sep	BS526756	1 Secondary Expl
12 Sep	BS435815	1 Secondary Fire w/white smoke
12 Sep	BS370698	1 Secondary Expl w/gray-white smoke
11 Sep	BS360730	2 Secondary Expl w/white smoke
11 Sep	BS479729	1 Secondary Fire
10 Sep	BS353672	1 Secondary Expl 100'
8 Sep	BS434828	1 Secondary Fire
8 Sep	BS444796	1 Secondary Fire
8 Sep	BS452817	1 Secondary Expl w/white smoke 250'
6 Sep	BS552782	1 Secondary Expl (200' - 300')
6 Sep	BS476713	1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire
6 Sep	BS476711	1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire
6 Sep	BS478711	1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire
4 Sep	BS557722	2 Secondary Fires

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G-3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Task Force Callaway, 11th Air Division, Vietnam
6th Air Force, 1968

AFDP-BA-05

SUBJECT: Casual Operations After Action Report

FROM: Commanding General
Aerial Division
AFDP-BA-05
APO San Francisco 96314

TO: Commanding General
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
AFDP-BA-05
APO San Francisco 96222

1. (U) OPERATION: CHAMPAIGN GROVE.
2. (C) DATE OF OPERATION: 1 Sep - 24 Sep 1968.
3. (C) LOCATION: SONG TRA KHUC Valley west of QUANG NGAI City, B. PHAM
Special Forces Camp. LZ CHEVY (BSH28715).
4. (C) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Task Force CALLAWAY, Aerial Division.
5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Owen K. Henderson.
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
 - a. Headquarters, Task Force CALLAWAY Command Group.
 - b. 11th Inf Bde (-):

3-1 Inf	6-26 Regt	6th Bn 11th Arty
4-3 Inf	1-1 Cav	B Battery 1-82 Arty (CS)
1-20 Inf		252d Radar Det
1-1 Cav		MG Section, 4-55th Arty
7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

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Declassified 17. 1 Year Extension
Declassified After 12 Years

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A 10-14-68

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

a. Artillery:

(1) Direct support artillery to TF GALLOWAY areas of operations:

DATES SUPPORTED BY	UNIT	LOCATION
31 Aug to 23 Sep 68	D/6-11 Arty	LZ CHEVY (BS428718)
3 Sep to 13 Sep 68	C/6-11 Arty	QUANG NGAI Airfield
5 Sep to 13 Sep 68	A/6-11 Arty	LZ BUFF (BS540825)
10 Sep to 23 Sep 68	B/1-82 Arty	LZ CHEVY (BS428718)
20 Sep to 23 Sep 68	B/6-11 Arty	LZ CORK (BS448612)

The direct support artillery units deployed starting 31 Aug 68. B/1-82 Arty was moved from LZ GAYOR (BS573963) by CH-47 to LZ CHEVY (BS428718) to support the initial phases of CHAMPAIGN GROVE in the vicinity of HA THANH Special Forces Camp. On 3 Sep 1968 C/6-11 Arty moved from LZ CENTER (AT852213) to firing positions near the QUANG NGAI Airfield by CH-47. A/6-11 Arty was moved from LZ PLEASANTVILLE (AT862299) to LZ BUFF (BS540825). On 10 Sep 68 B/1-82 Arty was moved by CH-47's to the Duc Pho AO. On 20 Sep 68 B/6-11 Arty was moved by CH-47's to LZ CORK (BS448612).

(2) General support artillery to TF GALLOWAY:

UNIT	LOCATIONS
D/1-82-8" (SF)	LZ BOTTLE (BS631852)
C/3-18-175 (SF)	LZ DOTTIE (BS631852)
	LZ DRAGON (BS725517)

(3) Rounds expended:

CS, CS(R)	DS
No records available	16,955 rds HK

(4) Nature of targets:

(a) ASX: A vigorous ASX program was established throughout the operation. Targets were selected by Battalion S2's and Brigade C2 on intelligence gathered from prisoner and document readouts.

(b) Support mission: The bulk of the ammunition expenditure was in support of troops in contact, fires on objective areas, targets of opportunity and preparatory fires.

(c) Timeliness and effectiveness: Response to call for fire and forward observer adjustments were accurate and expeditious throughout CHAMPAIGN GROVE. Ammunition resupply of all batteries supporting the operation was timely with no requirement for emergency resupply. Good fire

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control was exercised throughout the operation in conjunction with air support. No known incidents of casualties by friendly fire occurred during the operation. 6-31 Arty was required to maintain two complete Fire Direction Centers (FDC's); one for CHANPAIEN GROVE and another for the Duc Phu 40. 6-31 Arty is not authorized sufficient personnel under TOE to accomplish this task necessitating the augmentation of the FDC's with personnel from the firing batteries. This was a suitable solution due to the presence of trained personnel; however, this practice is not always acceptable. There is a need for support of qualified personnel from Div Arty to support operations of this nature.

b. Tactical Air Support:

(1) Tactical air support consisted primarily of forward air controlled preplanned and immediate air strikes. In addition, Sky spots and B-52 strikes were employed. Preplanned air strikes were primarily employed on suspected enemy base camps and unit objectives.

(2) Forward air controllers of the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, comprising the 13th Bde's Tactical Air Control Party, were available to 1st BATTALION on a daily basis. They performed as follows:

(a) Participating FAC's:

DEMUX 31	Mag Anderson, William
DEMUX 31	Cpt Stitzel, John
DEMUX 37	Cpt Verdier, Paul
DEMUX 37	Cpt Nemlick, Anthony

(b) Results: 32 REA, minor 180 structures and 30 bunkers destroyed, 30 secondary fires, 6 active mortar positions destroyed, 3 enemy 40 Cal AA positions destroyed, 21 sampans destroyed.

c. US Army Aviation:

(1) The 14th Aviation Battalion provided the helicopter support for the entire operation. UH1H Aircraft were available for each battalion commander for both command and control helicopter and utility helicopter support. In addition, all lift aircraft for combat assaults were made available by Division from the assets of the 14th Aviation Battalion. CH-47 aircraft were used primarily for bulk resupply missions and movement of artillery batteries. Additionally CH-47's were used as troop carriers in some instances. These aircraft provided a high degree of mobility and flexibility.

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(2) F/8 Cav and Division Aero Scouts were made available on a mission basis.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: ANNEX C.

9. (C) MISSION: TF GALLOWAY conducted combat operations in area of responsibility to find, fix and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Div, interdict supply routes to QUANG NGAI and to eliminate threat of an attack on QUANG NGAI City.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. PHASE I: (4-12 Sep 68) Task Force GALLOWAY attacks 040600 Sep 68 with 4-3 Inf, conducting combat assaults into LZ's north of TRA KIUC River and drives east to link up with elements of the 6th ARVN Regt (TF LUAT). 3-1 Inf attacks east to link up with elements of the 4th ARVN Regt (TF LUAT). Upon linkup, 3-1 Inf conducts multiple air assaults west of HA THANH Special Forces Camp.

b. PHASE II: (13-14 Sep 68) TF GALLOWAY assumes OPCON of the 1/1 Cav, and attacks west with 1/1 Cav and 4-3 Inf on two axis. 1-20 Inf moves by airlift to HA THANH Special Forces Camp and commences operations to the west in conjunction with 3-1 Inf. 3-1 Inf continues operations to the west.

c. PHASE III: (14-24 Sep 68) continues operations west and south of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp. Release OPCON of the 1/1 Cav. 4-3 Inf moves by air to LZ BRONCO. 3-1 Inf and 1-20 Inf continue operations west and south of HA THANH. Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE terminated 242400H Sep 68.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. 4 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: 041158H Sep 68, A, C and D Companies conducted CA's from QUANG NGAI Airfield to LZ's via BS439764 and BS446752 respectively. The CA's were completed by 1242 hrs, and both LZ's were cold. C Co conducting recon in force to the NE of the LZ engaged and killed one VC moving north. A and D Co's made no contact through the day. At 1530 hrs the C&C ship of the 4-3 Inf spotted 3 VC with packs attempting to evade across the river (BS469750). The C&C engaged with M-60's at 100 ft and killed 3 VC. The bodies and packs were not recovered.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a CA to BS440716. B Co was airlifted into the same LZ. C Co conducted a CA into BS425715 to establish PSU CHEVY.

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D Co reinforced with E-1 Cav (-) crossed LD via BS570710 and moved west to join with elements of the 1/1 Cav, operating separately west of QUANG NGAI City. All LZ's were cold and no casualties were sustained. At 1540 hrs at BS555722 B Co discovered four VC in graves dressed in black and with web gear. The 4 VC KIA were killed earlier by gunships. A, C, D, and Recon reported no contact.

b. 5 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a recon in force operation to BS483767 with negative contact. B Co conducted a CA into a LZ at BS514816 and conducted patrolling with negative contact. C Co moved SE and at BS449755 detained 1 NVA attempting to hide in a spiderhole. The NVA was evacuated to LZ WRONCO for interrogation. D Co moved SE on a sweep mission. At 1415 hrs at BS478725 the lead element of D Co became heavily engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Aero Scouts were called and expended on the area from which the fire was received. The CMC helicopter attempted to extract a wounded man but was shot down by heavy AW fire from BS472723. D Co moved to and secured the downed helicopter. 1 US was killed and 2 WHA from the helicopter. Artillery was directed on all suspected enemy locations and the unit maneuvered to destroy the enemy force. The enemy broke contact at 1745 and withdrew to the NW. At 1415 hrs Recon Plt reported heavy contact at BS545783. The fire was returned and artillery called on the enemy location. The enemy force broke contact and evaded SW.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted clover leaf patrols out from their NDP. B Co conducted recon in force operation west of their NDP and returned. C Co and Recon Plt continued patrolling via BS425704 and maintained security of FSB CHEVY. D Co and E-1/1 (-) conducted a sweep west of their NDP. At 0235 hrs A Co received fire from west of their NDP resulting in 1 WHA. Artillery was fired into the area with unknown results.

c. 6 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co swept from BS482773 to BS494765 then south to via BS495759 with negative contact. B Co continued operations SW. At 2225 hrs an ambush from B Co engaged and killed 1 VC at BS537776. C Co swept north with negative contact. D Co swept north with negative contact. RCN Plt swept north from BS540715 and at 1410 hrs via of BS548773 engaged an estimated NVA Co. Artillery and gunships were called and the fight continued for 2 hours. Results: 43 NVA KIA, 11 US KHA 4 WHA. Aero Scouts working for the 4-3 Inf engaged 10 VC with weapons in via of BS552772. Their organic infantry platoon was inserted and captured 1 AK-50, 1 RPD and 1 US Carbine. Results: 10 VC KIA, 3 weapons captured. At 1718 a lift ship working for the 4-3 Inf received .50 cal fire via BS505765 resulting in 1 WHA. At approx 1700 hrs gunships engaged an unk number of VC with weapons via BS557778 resulting in 1 VC KIA, 2 US WHA.

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(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co continued a recon in force south from BS540715. At 1230 hrs A Co received AW fire & 4 60mm mortar rounds vic BS533703 resulting in 1 WHA by SA fire. At 1400 hrs A Co engaged 3 VC near a tunnel complex vic BS538697 resulting in 2 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's captured. B Co moved from their NDP and swept SW to vic BS535711. At 1605 vic BS524712 B Co engaged 2 VC attempting to evade resulting in 2 VC KIA. C Co and Rcn Plt continued security of LZ CHEVY and local patrolling. D Co and E-1 Cav conducted a sweep from BS578708 SE to BS609671 then SE to BS622622. At 0650 E-1 Cav engaged 1 VC attempting to evade resulting in 1 VC KIA.

(3) Aircraft working in the AO made these separate contacts. At 1020 hrs a helicopter of the 174th AVN engaged 1 VC killing him. At 1330 hrs an Aero Scout observed a VC attempting to evade; engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA.

d. 7 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co swept NE from BS495578 to BS544787. B Co moved from BS495758 to BS544787. C Co conducted a CA from PZ vic BS474765 to LZ vic BS548783. D Co conducted a CA from vic BS475755 to LZ vic BS562762. No 4-3 Inf units made contact. The only contact was made by an Aero Scout supporting the 4-3 Inf in the vic BS560787 when at 0950 hrs they observed 2 VC evading; engaged resulting in 2 VC KIA. Rcn Plt returned to Chu Lai.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A & B Co moved NE from BS540715 on a two company sweep operation. At 0850 vic BS550758 contact was made with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of a tunnel complex. A & B Co engaged the enemy and with the aid of Aero Scouts maintained contact until 1700 hrs at which time the enemy broke contact. The fight resulted in 26 VC KIA, 1 US Carbine, 1 AK-47, 1 82mm mortar base plate, 2 82mm bipods and misc equipment captured. US losses were 1 ICHA, 13 WHA(E), 1 WHA(M), and 1 gunship shot down (recovered). C Co secured LZ CHEVY. D Co moved with E-1 Cav north through QUANG NGAI then west to vic BS556771 with negative contact. Rcn continued patrolling vic LZ CHEVY. At 2304 hrs D Co received 6 rds of 60mm mortar vic BS560763 resulting in 1 WHA(E).

e. 8 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved from BS546788 to BS492776. B Co swept west from BS545784 to BS484775. C Co moved west from BS560773 to BS522778. D Co moved west from BS555782 to BS524783. Rcn Plt located in Chu Lai. Negative contact was made by the ground units. At 1150 hrs the C&C helicopter spotted 1 VC killed by artillery at BS474777. At 1210 hrs, gunships working for the 4-3 Inf engaged 3 VC evading resulting in 3 VC KIA.

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(2) 3-1 Inf: A, B, and C Co's conducted sweeps around NDP locations and closed back on NDP sites. D Co was airlifted from QUANG NOAI Airfield to LZ CHEVY. Ren Plt continued patrolling west of LZ CHEVY. The 3-1 Inf had negative contact.

f. 9 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved from BS492776 west to BS473776 then SE to BS489775. At 1258 hrs vic BS483775. A Co found 1 Soviet 7.62mm Pistol under the floor of a burned hootch. At 1845 hrs vic BS493784 A Co engaged 7 VC with weapons evading north killing two. No weapons were found. B Co moved SW from BS45784 to BS465778 then south to BS465768. At 1105 B Co received sniper fire vic BS465777. They returned fire resulting in 3 VC KIA. C Co moved SW from BS522778 to BS509775 then south to BS493754 with negative contact. D Co moved SW from BS555782 to BS510760. Ren Plt located at Chu Lai. At 1745 the C&C helicopter of the 4-3 Inf was shot down by SA fire at BS488775 with negative casualties. The helicopter was secured by A & B Co's.

(2) 3-1 Inf: At 0030 hrs A & B Co's received 7 or 8 rounds of 82mm mortar and SA fire in their NDP's vic BS548739 resulting 1 US WHA (M). They observed 1 VC near the perimeter and engaged resulting 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. At daylight, A Co moved SW from BS550750 to establish a blocking position at BS523719. B Co moved from BS552758 to establish a blocking position vic BS514734. At 1100 B Co engaged 1 VC hiding in a spider hole vic BS523740 resulting in 1 VC KIA. C Co moved from LZ CHEVY to establish a blocking position at BS443726. D Co secured LZ CHEVY. Ren Plt continued patrolling vic LZ CHEVY.

g. 10 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from vic BS488775 to a cold LZ vic BS495718 and made negative contact on their recon in force throughout the day. B Co conducted a CA from vic BS465767 to a cold LZ vic BS495718 also making negative contact. C Co conducted a CA from BS494754 to LZ vic BS470710. D Co conducted a CA into the same LZ. The LZ was cold but C Co did receive some sniper fire on their PZ with negative casualties. On the subsequent sweep of the area, C Co had 2 WHA from punji stakes vic of BS470710. At 0800 C Co found 1 VC killed by artillery during the LZ preparation. At 1545 hrs vic BS476717 C Co found 1 K-44 Rifle and at 1630 hrs vic BS474718 they found 2 .45 cal sub-machine guns in the brush behind a hut. D Co had negative contact all day. The Ren Plt remained located at Chu Lai.

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(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from BS522719 to an LZ BS340685. Some sniper fire was received on the LZ but negative US casualties. In a sweep of the area, A Co engaged 5 NVA at 1515 hrs vic BS340760 resulting in 3 NVA KIA. B Co conducted a CA from BS513734 to a cold LZ vic BS344675. Although the LZ was cold, at 1310 hrs B Co had 1 WHA(E) and 1 WHA(M) from punji stakes located in the vic of the LZ (BS344676). During their sweep operation, B Co at 1735 hrs vic BS390700 found 1 VC body and 1 AK-47. At 1920 hrs B Co observed 15 NVA in the open vic BS392705. Aero Scouts were called and engaged the enemy resulting in 8 NVA KIA. C Co conducted a CA from BS444728 to LZ vic BS350674. The LZ was hit by small arms fire killing 1 helicopter pilot and wounding 2 doorgunners, (1 KHA & 2 WHA). An airstrike was placed on the enemy resulting in 3 KBA vic BS353672. In sweeping the area, C Co had 1 WHA from punji stakes vic BS358680. C Co made no further contact. D Co had remained at LZ CHEVY for security and Rcn Plt continued patrolling vic LZ CHEVY with negative contact.

(3) In other actions in the AO, the Aero Scouts at 1630 hrs vic BS345690 found 1 NVA KBA in a river.

h. 11 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved west from BS495716 to BS484716 with negative contact. B Co swept from BS495716 NW to BS484723. At 1100 hrs B Co found 3 VC KBA in the vic BS480711. At approx 1230 hrs B Co conducted a CA from BS484723 into a cold LZ at BS504697 then moved S with negative contact. C Co moved NE from BS470710 to BS475720. Negative contact was made but at 0920 hrs vic BS475720 C Co found 1 BAR hidden in bushes beside a trail. D Co swept from BS470710 to BS472716 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained in Chu Lai.

(2) 3-1 Inf: At 0420 hrs A & B Co received a probe on the northern perimeter of their joint NDP. Four to five HQ were thrown by the enemy but landed outside of the perimeter. Fire was returned with HQ and Claymore mines with negative results. There were no friendly casualties. At approx 0630 hrs A & B Co's received 8 to 10 rds of 82mm mortar in their joint NDP resulting in 2 KIA 25 WHA. Artillery returned fire on suspected enemy mortar positions with negative results. At daylight, A & B Co's swept NE from BS353689 to BS355699 with negative contact. C Co searched from BS350674 NE to BS350691 with negative contact. D Co and Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

1. 12 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co swept from BS484717 to BS495716 with negative contact. B Co moved from BS504698 NE following two Chlar Noi's who claimed knowledge of a large caliber artillery piece buried by the VC. At 0930 hrs in the vic of BS517711 B Co found a complete 105mm Howitzer (SN100228) buried. The howitzer was evacuated and B Co continued the sweep to BS522708

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with negative contact. C Co conducted a CA from BS472728 to a cold LZ via BS500705 then searched south to BS505692 with negative contact. D Co conducted a CA from BS472717 to the same LZ and swept the area with negative results. C & D Co were following up on an intelligence report of a possible VC base camp with well camouflaged huts. Rcn Plt was airlifted from Chu Lai to LZ BUFF.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved from NDP via BS355699. At 1210 in vic of BS372686 A Co engaged an unknown size enemy force at about 100 - 150 meters. A Co quickly picked up a base of fire and maneuvered against the enemy force. The enemy force broke contact which resulted in 3 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. Friendly losses were 1 KIA and 2 WHA. A Co continued to sweep the area and, at 1645 hrs via BS373698 found 1 AK-47 and 1 RPG hidden in some bushes. A Co had no further contact. B Co moved SE from BS355699 to BS371683 with negative contact. C Co ran cloverleaf patrols in the vic of BS380691 with negative contact. At 1845 hrs C Co received 3 122mm rockets in their NDP via BS380691 resulting in 1 KIA and 3 WHA. Artillery returned fire on suspected enemy location at BS368684 with negative assessment. D Co continued security of LZ CHEVY. Rcn Plt continued security of LZ CHEVY and conducted local patrols around the fire base.

(3) Aero Scouts made most of the contacts in the AO on 12 Sep 68. At 0840 hrs via BS556782 engaged 3 VC evading resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 0853 hrs they engaged an evading VC in vic BS543746 results - 1 VC KIA. A VCS was snatched at 1100 hours via of BS558782. The VCS, wearing black shorts with blood on them, was trying to evade. The VCS himself was not wounded and was moved to the rear for questioning. At 1230 hrs via BS472697, five evading VC were engaged resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 1505 hrs in vic of BS370693 another evading VC was engaged adding another 1 VC KIA. The Aero Scouts received fire at 1645 hrs in vic of BS373698. They returned fire with the results of 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA.

1. 13 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from BS494717 to a cold LZ at BS721757. The area was swept but negative contact was made. B Co moved NW to BS515711 then SE to BS510707 then east BS522707. Several tunnels were found, but they were empty. B Co did find 1 D40 rocket rd, 1 60mm mortar rd, 1 mine, and misc equip in a hole via BS510707. C Co conducted a CA from BS504698 to a cold LZ BS505677. A search of the area was made with negative contact. D Co swept from BS513719 north to BS511731 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained at LZ BUFF for security.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved from BS383685 south to BS383675. B Co moved from BS383686 southeast to BS389679 then south to BS389665. C Co moved from BS380692 south to BS372673 then SE to BS374668. D Co provided security of LZ CHEVY. Rcn Plt provided security of LZ CHEVY and conducted patrols in the area around LZ CHEVY. None of the 3-1 Inf units made contact with the enemy.

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(3) 1/1 Cav: On 12 September 1968, the 1/1 Cav with B/1-46 Inf attached became OPCON to TF GALLOWAY. They road marched to QUANG NGAI based on intelligence reports which indicated the city would be attacked by elements of the 3d NVA Div. On 13 Sep 68 at 1200 hrs, A Trp with B/1-46 Inf began a zone recon west of QUANG NGAI. At 1430 hrs a plt of A Trp made contact with a well entrenched NVA force vic BS566715 supported by MW, AT and AA weapons. Immediately the remainder of A Trp assaulted the enemy positions right flank. In the assault, A Trp became mired in untraversable terrain but continued to place effective fire into the enemy's positions. C Trp was ordered to attack through the north flank of A Trp and assume OPCON of B/1-46. F Trp 8th ACAV provided an aerial block to south and west; immediate airstrikes were called on the enemy position as C Trp moved into position. C Trp and B/1-46 Inf assaulted the enemy position, overrunning the forward trenches and penetrating the major defenses. By 1830 hrs the position was consolidated and secured, but darkness prevented further exploitation or complete reports of results.

(4) Aero Scouts working in support throughout the AO had the following contacts:

0830 - Vic BS492755 engaged 4 VC evading - 4 VC KIA

1135 - Vic BS389679 engaged 1 VC evading - 1 VC KIA

1158 - Vic BS392668 engaged 15 to 20 NVA in green uniforms - 3 NVA KIA

1415 - vic BS392669 engaged 1 NVA in green uniform evading - 1 NVA KIA.

k. 14 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved NW with B/1-1 Cav to BS604786 then SW to BS525764. At 0930 hrs vic BS604785 A Co engaged 1 VC attempting to evade resulting in 1 VC KIA. In vic of BS547766 at 1500 hrs a shallow grave was found containing 4 NVA KIA. B Co moved north to BS510731 then conducted a CA to a cold LZ at BS482778 and moved south to BS508668 making negative contact. C Co conducted a search east from BS502676 to BS512673 then SW to BS508668 where they found the entrance of a large well-camouflaged cave. Upon searching the cave the following enemy equipment was captured: 8 IW, 1 CSW, 5 122mm Rockets, 22 60mm mortar rounds, 115 B40 Rocket rds, 22 RPN rds, 1 mortar sight, 28 57mm RR rds, 14 82mm mortar rds, 562 blasting caps, 1 US made Collins Radio, 1 US Starlight Scope, misc small arms ammo and medical supplies. C Co continued SW to a MDP at BS502678 with negative contact. D Co moved N across the river from BS517745 to BS504777. At 0945 hrs vic BS514744 a man stepped on a M4 anti-personnel mine resulting in 1 WHA. D Co had no further contact. Ren Plt remained at LZ BUFF for security.

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(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved south from BS384675 to BS375655. B Co swept south along the river from BS389665 to BS385617. C Co searched SW from BS374668 to BS369645. D Co continued security of LZ CHEVY and Rcn Plt conducted local patrols around LZ CHEVY. 3-1 Inf units made no contact.

(3) 1/1 Cav: On 14 Sep 68, A Trp and C Trp with B/1-46 Inf continued recon in zone toward the west and northwest along probable avenues of withdrawal as a follow-up to the contact of the previous day. At 1410 hrs, A Trp was engaged by an NVA force vic BS522750 supported by AW and AT weapons. A Trp immediately assaulted the enemy's position and C Trp with B/1-46 Inf was ordered to assist A Trp by attacking along A Trp's eastern flank. The attacks dispersed or destroyed the enemy and A Trp, C Trp with B/1-46 Inf established night blocking positions along a line from BS493745 to BS532764. Results of the contacts on the 13th and 14th of Sep were as follows:

Friendly - 3 KHA, 22 WIA, 1 Track destroyed, 2 Tracks damaged.

Enemy - 112 KIA, 1 CIA, 17 IW, 11 CSW.

1. 15 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A, B and D Co's converged on a staging area located in vic BS492762 for subsequent airlift to the Duc Pho AO on 16 Sep and release from Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE. C Co was airlifted to LZ THUNDER and Rcn airlifted to LZ BRONCO.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A, B, and C Co's moved to the vic of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp for a short stand down before continuing Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE. D Co and Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security. At 1910 hrs B Co received 15 rds of 62mm mortar inside their perimeter resulting in 4 WIA.

(3) 1/1 Cav: No contact was made with enemy and at 1500H 1/1 Cav and B/1-46 were ordered to move to assembly areas vic BS645763 preparatory to movement to their base camp at HAWK HILL and release from Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE.

(4) 1-20 Inf: D Co was airlifted into the HA THANH Special Forces and became OPCON to Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE.

2. 16 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: Completed airlift to Duc Pho AO and was released from OPCON to Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A, B, and C Co's continued stand down at HA THANH SF Camp in preparation for continuing operation. D Co and Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

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(3) 1-20 Inf: The remainder of the battalion was airlifted into HA THANH SF Camp to join D Co in preparation for operations under TF GALLOWAY.

n. 17 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a recon in force SW from HA THANH to BS356686 with negative contact. B Co airlifted to LZ CHEVY to replace D Co and provide security. C Co conducted a CA from HA THANH to a cold LZ vic BS365648 then swept northwest. At 1710 hrs vic BS383717 they received heavy AW fire and received 1 WHA. Fire was returned resulting in 5 NVA KIA and contact was broken. C Co then moved to vic BS364655 and set up their NDP. D Co after being airlifted to HA THANH swept to BS366687 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0541 hrs a squad ambush from A Co was hit by an estimated enemy platoon near the A Co NDP vic BS383717. The ambush called for help and A Co moved to reinforce but did not reach the location in time. Arriving at 0645 hrs A Co found that the ambush had been overrun leaving 4 KHA and 3 WHA. A Co pursued the enemy to the southwest. At 1215 hrs vic BS378736 an evading NVA was engaged at 50 meters resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47. Five minutes later 2 more NVA threw a HO and tried to evade but were engaged resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 RPG KIA. A Co had 1 WHA from the thrown grenade. A tunnel was discovered at this location, BS378736, containing 1 RPD, 2 AK-47, 6 RPG rds and 2,200 rds small arms ammunition. A Co continued the search of the area with negative results. B Co swept NW from vic HA THANH to BS385730 with negative contact. C Co swept from vic of HA THANH north to BS395754 with negative contact. D Co conducted a recon in force to the southeast. At 1759 hours vic BS368653 D Co received sniper fire resulting in 1 WHA. Fire was returned with negative results and they moved on to their NDP.

(3) Aero Scouts working in the AO had two contacts:

0900 hrs vic BS431772 engaged 1 VC evading, res: 1 VC KIA, 1 Carbine CIA.

1330 hrs vic BS420758 engaged 1 VC evading, res: 1 VC KIA.

o. 18 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved SW from BS456688 to vic BS342654. At 0845 hrs vic BS338653 A Co engaged 4 VC at approx 75 meters. The enemy quickly broke contact and tried to evade but were brought under effective fire. The results of the skirmish was 4 VC KIA and 2 US WHA. B Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security. C Co swept from BS363655 NW to BS352670 with negative contact. D Co made no contact on a recon in force from BS367688 SW to BS352670. The Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

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(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0120 hrs vic BS349709 a LP from D Co received 2 bursts of AW fire resulting in 2 WHA. The LP pulled back into the D Co perimeter. At first light A, B, and D Co conducted a recon in force SW to the built up area in the valley vic BS3467. C Co and Ron Plt conducted a CA to BS323702 then swept SE toward the valley. At 0730H vic BS348708 D Co engaged two evading NVA at 100 meters resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. At 1255 hrs vic BS352691, A Co received AW fire resulting in 3 WHA. Fire was returned but the enemy broke contact. At 1336 vic BS335702 the Ron Plt found a tunnel, heard voices and threw in grenades resulting in 2 VC KIA and 2 VCS CIA. At 1355 hrs vic BS339690 C Co engaged 1 NVA evading resulting in 1 NVA KIA. All units continued to converge toward the built up area in the valley. At 1421 vic BS351701, D Co received mortar and AW fire resulting in 2 US WHA. Fire was returned but the enemy broke contact. At 1445 hrs vic BS358692, the point man of A Co was wounded and contact was made with an unknown size enemy force. Fire was returned and artillery called. The contact continued until dark when the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Darkness prevented assessment of enemy losses and A Co set up their NDP. A Co's losses were 3 KHA 6 WHA. In the meantime, D Co continued to sweep toward the valley. At 1605 hrs vic BS350695, D Co received heavy SA and AW fire from an unknown size enemy force well dug in along the base of the hills on the eastern side of the valley. Fire was returned and maximum use made of supporting fires. The enemy broke contact during darkness and D Co held in position for further exploitation at daylight. US losses were 10 KHA, 19 WHA. Four of the KHA could not be recovered at this time. Darkness prevented enemy assessment.

p. 19 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved NE from BS342655 to BS368674 with negative contact. At 1400, B Co conducted a CA into multiple LZ's at BS443763, BS443743 and BS445754 and conducted a sweep of the area adjacent to the LZ's. At 1505 hrs an element of B Co engaged 1 VC in a spider hole resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1700 hrs, B Co was extracted back to LZ CHEVY for security. C Co conducted search operations SE from BS352670 to BS355668 without contact. D Co moved NW from BS362660 to BS355670 with negative contact. Ron Plt remained at LZ CH VI for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: A Co swept the area of the previous day's contact with negative results. B Co also swept the area adjacent to A Co's contact and found 21 NVA KIA at BS349693 which had been killed by artillery and airstrikes. C Co sweeping in the same general area found 60 spider holes vic BS346694 containing 10 NVA KIA. D Co began sweeping the area of their contact of the previous afternoon. At 0915 hrs vic BS345695, D Co received 2 rds of mortar fire resulting in 2 WHA. D Co continued to search the area and at 1045 hrs vic BS349692 found 5 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47. At 1320 hrs vic BS346690 they found 5 NVA KIA killed by SA floating in a river. Ron Plt swept the area vic BS345694 with negative contact.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

q. 20 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A, C and D companies were airlifted back into HA THANH SF Camp. A Co was picked up at HA THANH and B Co was picked up at LZ CHEVY and conducted a two company CA into BSH48612 to establish FSB Cork. The LZ was cold enabling the airlift of C & D Co's from HA THANH into LZ Cork. A Co remained LZ Cork for security. B Co moved west BSH42612. C Co moved SE to BSH63595. D Co moved south to BSH50595 and at 1645 hrs received sniper fire resulting in 1 KRA. All companies established NDP's in their respective areas around LZ Cork and prepared for further operations. The Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: A, B, C & Rcn Plt were airlifted into HA THANH SF Camp to prepare for future operations. D Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(3) Aero Scouts working in the AO engaged 1 VC evading vic BS390648 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

r. 21 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co continued security of LZ Cork. B Co conducted patrols in the vic of their NDP (BSH42613) with negative contact. C Co moved from BSH62595 southeast to BSH68583 with negative contact. D Co moved SW from BSH55595 to BSH52583 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0737 hrs A Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BSH59665. A recon in force was conducted east to a PZ at BSH95665. At 1505 hrs A Co was extracted and airlifted back to HA THANH with negative contact. At 0922 hrs, B Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BS388601. C Co was then airlifted into the secure LZ. B Co swept to the southwest and C Co swept to the southeast of the LZ. At 1110 hrs vic BS395593, C Co found 1 VC in a hole who would not come out. A HQ was thrown in resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1432 hrs vic BS378580, D Co engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1515 hrs vic BS382592, B Co engaged 3 VC in a tunnel resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 1640 vic BS375586, they engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. B & C Co's established NDP's as darkness fell on their operation. D Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security and Rcn Plt was airlifted to HA THANH SF Camp for security.

s. 22 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: All units airlifted from field locations back to LZ Cork then airlifted back to Duc Pho AO to LZ's LIZ, JACON and DRONCO. 3-1 Inf has terminated operations in CHAMPAIGN GROVE AO and is preparing for future operations.

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(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0440 hrs, three OP's in the vicinity of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp came under fire and enemy ground attack. A Co in a NDP adjacent to the SF Camp was given the mission to move to the OP's as a relief force. At 0625 hrs vic BS376695, A Co engaged 1 NVA evading west west, could not see the body but would try to find when the fire lifts. HA THANH was occasionally receiving B-40 rocket fire at this time and A Co would try to locate the fire. At 0710 hrs when A Co approached the area where they engaged the NVA they found 1 NVA playing dead. The NVA attempted to evade, were engaged resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 1 carbine CIA. A Co continued to move toward the OP. At 0723 hrs vic BS376694, A Co engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. They continued to move toward OP 7 and upon approaching the hill location of the OP at 0813 hrs vic BS377698 they were taken under SA fire and had HO's thrown at them. A Co had 1 KHA and 4 WHA but returned fire and assaulted the hill. At 0813 hrs, the C&C Helicopter for 1-20 Inf received an RPG round which hit the tail rotor resulting in 4 WHA(M). The helicopter was forced to set down at HA THANH. A Co continued their assault to regain the hill and succeeded in pushing the enemy off of the hill. At 0846, while pursuing the enemy into a small group of huts at the northern base of the hill (BS380696) 3 NVA who were evading were taken under fire resulting in 3 NVA KIA. A few minutes later, A Co found 1 NVA hiding in a hole at the same location: 1 NVA CIA. Fifteen minutes later, in the same area, A Co was taken under fire by an unknown size enemy force in bunkers and tunnels. Fire was returned and the fire fight continued for approx 2 1/2 hrs. A Co dispersed the enemy and found 10 NVA KIA, 3 AK-47's, 1 RPG-2 and 1 57mm RR. A Co had one WHA(E). A Co searched the area of contact then started to sweep further east through the huts. At 1430 hrs vic BS382695 they again engaged an NVA force in bunkers and tunnels and were very successful in routing the enemy without friendly casualties. Enemy losses were 15 NVA KIA and captured equipment is as follows: 1 US .45 cal Pistol, 2 Chi Com flare pistols, 8 AK-47's, 1 RPG-2 Rocket Launcher, 1 field telephone, 1 PA set, 1700 AK-47 rds, 15 57mm RR rds, 28 Chi Com HG's, 1 Bangalore Torpedo, 6 B40 Rockets and 5 boosters for B-40 Rockets. A Co set up their NDP at the base of the hill. B Co conducted a CBT sweep from BS390579 to vic BS394625 with negative contact. D Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security. Ron Plt conducted a combat sweep to vic BS3770 then returned to HA THANH for security.

t. 23 Sep 68:

(1) 1-20 Inf: A Co moved back to HA THANH and along with RCN Plt were airlifted to LZ DOTTIE. B & C Co's were airlifted from BS395625 to LZ DOTTIE. D Co secured LZ CHEVY until all Brigade elements had departed, then was airlifted to LZ DOTTIE. 1-20 Inf terminated operations in the CHAMPAIGN CROSS AO and assumed responsibility for the southern Dec Foe AO at 1415 hrs.

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(2) At 1045 hrs vic BS380560 a gunship flying air cover in the AO was shot down. The Aero Scouts were scrambled to give covering fire and engaged the enemy resulting in 6 VC KIA.

(3) TF GALLOWAY was disbanded and all elements airlifted out of LZ Chevy. At 1925 hrs TF GALLOWAY had been evacuated and control of the Brigade units assumed by CO, 11th Inf Bde.

u. 24 Sep 68: Request to Division for termination of Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE. Permission granted - 242400 hrs Sep 68 Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE terminated.

12. (C) RESULTS:

- a. Friendly: 41 KHA, 166 WHA.
- b. Enemy: (Annex C, Intelligence).

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

- a. Logistics: (See Annex B).
- b. Communications: (See Annex D).

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: TOE equipment, standard tactics and techniques normally related to counterinsurgency warfare were used during this operation.

15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE was designed initially as a relief operation of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp. Due to the threat on QUANG NGAI and the impending attack on HA THANH, the concept of the operation was broadened and changed to an operation designed to fix and destroy all enemy forces in the West QUANG NGAI area. By employing ARVN Forces in the mountain areas, enemy forces were cut off and prevented from massing for attacks on HA THANH and QUANG NGAI City.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: Operations of this nature should be initiated immediately whenever sizeable enemy forces are defined and located and intelligence indicates the enemy plans an attack on a major RVN installation or city. By denying the enemy the opportunity to consolidate his forces and mount an offensive, he is denied the military and propaganda benefits derived from a successful offensive.

4 Incl
ANNEXES:
A-Opn Overlay
B-Logistics (6th Spt Bn)
C-Intelligence
D-Signal

John W. Donaldson
JOHN W. DONALDSON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report (CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

1. (C) The logistical support for Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE is best understood if broken down into four general areas:

- a. Establishment and stockage level for the FSE located at Minh Long.
- b. Establishment and stockage level for the FSE located at Quang Ngai.
- c. Resupply of rifle battalions and artillery batteries.
- d. Establishment and maintenance of Brigade CP at LZ CHEVI.

2. (C) MINH LONG:

a. The FSE at Minh Long was established on or about 15 July in anticipation of CHAMPAIGN GROVE. It was established primarily to provide refueling and resupply of helicopters and for emergency resupply of C-Rations. Provisions were made to establish a Forward Clearing Station, if required, utilizing fixed wing aircraft to evacuate mass casualties. The stockage objectives at Minh Long were as follows:

<u>DODAC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE</u>
A137	CTG 7.62mm MLE 4-1	100,000
A165	CTG 7.62 Mini	100,000
H490	RKT 2.75"	1,000
B572	CTG 40mm Linked	800
G955	Green HD Smk (Violet)	144
G950	Green HD Smk (Red)	144
L407	Fixed Acft (ME-24)	100
N/A	TP-4	20,000 gallons
N/A	LYOAS	500 gallons
N/A	C-Rations	6,000 meals
N/A	Water	500 gallons

b. S-4, 6th Support Battalion, monitored the stockage on hand at Minh Long and effected necessary coordination to maintain the stockage objectives until the FSE was closed 24 September 1968. Twenty-four (24) hook sorties were required to back haul remaining items to Duc Pho.

3. (C) QUANG NGAI:

a. The FSE at Quang Ngai was established on 25 August 1968. This FSE received replenishment of stockage objectives and its initial stockage from Chu Lai. A Forward Clearing Station was established on the air strip and was utilized effectively. A water purification point was established by the 26th Engineer Battalion at this location. Division Support Command

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) continued.

maintained the stockage at Quang Ngai transporting supplies from Chu Lai by road. The stockage objectives at Quang Ngai were as follows:

<u>DONAC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES</u>
A137	CTG 7.62mm MLB 4-1	100,000
A165	CTG 7.62mm Mini	100,000
H490	RKT 2.75"	1,000
B572	CTG 40mm Linlead	1,000
0955	Gren H2 Smk (Violet)	144
0950	Gren H2 Smk (Red)	144
L407	Flare Acft (M3-24)	96
N/A	CTG 105 HE	3,400
N/A	CTG 105 WP	200
N/A	CTG 105 Illum	200
N/A	CTG 105 Smoke	100
N/A	JP-4	30,000 gallons
N/A	C-Rations	6,000 meals

b. The stockage objectives at Quang Ngai were maintained by coordination of Brigade S-4 with Division Transportation Office and Division Ammunition Office.

4. (C) The rifle battalions were supported logistically primarily from LZ Bronco, FSB Chevy, FSB Cork for 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, and from Chu Lai and LZ Dottie for the 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry.

a. The material requirements for the establishment of an Infantry Battalion Fire Support Base were as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Sandbags	50,000 each
Engr Stakes 8'	555 each
Engr Stakes 6'	555 each
Culverts 60"	10 each
Concertina Wire	12 rolls

b. The daily average requirements for resupply of Infantry Battalions were as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
C-Rations	125 cases
Water	1,000 gallons
A-Rations	5,000 pounds

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) continued.

5. (C) Ammunition resupply for the Artillery Batteries was accomplished from Quang Ngai Air Strip via Chinook sling load to separate battery locations. Artillery Battalions average daily requirements for resupply were as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Ammunition	600 rounds
C-Rations	83 cases
Water	1,000 gallons

6. (C) Brigade CP at LZ Chevy:

a. Establishment of the FSE was initiated on D-1. HHC Executive Officer and designated individuals and 15 Chinook loads of equipment and materials were dispatched from LZ Bronco to LZ Chevy.

b. The HHC Commanding Officer coordinated the resupply of one hot meal a day flown from LZ Bronco. Sixty (60) cases of C-Rations and 1500 gallons of water were flown from Quang Ngai to LZ Chevy on daily basis. These C-Rations and water were utilized by both HHC and the unit providing security of LZ Chevy.

7. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. When a unit having organic track vehicles is attached/opcon to an infantry unit, the unit having track vehicles must make provisions for Class III and unusual Class V resupply as well as maintenance of the track vehicles.

b. A conscientious effort must be made by individuals on forward LZ's to insure that empty water blivits, water trailers and sling equipment are handled carefully and expeditiously back hauled to the source of resupply.

c. All units must continually inspect slinging equipment for serviceability and quantity available. A shortage of slinging equipment can slow down an otherwise efficient operation.

d. There were no significant changes to the normal combat loads, ammunition or weapons carried by line units.

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20 December 1979

(C) ANNEX C (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Tuan Phuoc Golf Course)

1. (C) WEATHER AND TERRAIN.

a. Weather: During the course of the operation, weather was generally favorable from mid morning until dusk. Skies were generally clear, though there were occasional cloudy periods, and visibility was good. Visibility was temporarily restricted on several days by rain showers and ground fog in the early morning.

b. TERRAIN:

(1) The major portion of the operational area was composed of mountains, hill masses covered by dense underbrush, and single conop. forests. The low hills, draws and valleys were covered mostly by undergrowth, grassland, and rice crops.

(2) Effects of enemy course of action: The operational area in the mountains and the foothills offered the enemy the capability of relatively safe movement free from observation. Natural cover and concealment in the area added to the enemy's capability to avoid friendly forces. In the lowland areas, cover and concealment was only available to a limited extent along dikes, road embankments, and river banks.

(3) Effects on friendly course of action: In the mountains and foothills, the terrain restricted movement of friendly forces. Movement in this area was necessarily slow and visibility, observation and fire were severely restricted. In the lowland areas friendly forces could move with ease and visibility was good to excellent.

2. (C) PRELIMINARY INTELLIGENCE:

a. Available intelligence, based on PW reports, indicated that the 3rd NVA Division was in the area of operations with the capability of launching an attack on friendly military installations in the area.

b. Agent reports, VR, SLAK, and IR indicated a concentration of enemy units in the Song Ho Valley and south of the Song Huu River hamlet.

c. Available intelligence indicated the possibility that a VC battalion in vicinity of Quang Ngai city could attack that city. In such an event, the 3rd NVA Division could be used to reinforce the attacking VC force.

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2. Develop intelligence that includes:
 (a) Location of VC bases, command posts, and
 (b) VC logistical and administrative
 facilities for the force assembly areas.

3. Develop capabilities:

- (a) Develop a network of informants in the area.
- (b) Develop contacts by VC activities in the area.
- (c) Develop friendly forces.
- (d) Develop a network of informants in the area, including
 informants and sources of communications.

4. Develop the system and strategy.

2200	2200
2200	2200
2200	2200
2200	2200

5. Develop the Operation Group sign system.

6. Develop the Operation Group sign system and develop the
 system of communication to be used in the area.

7. Develop the system of communication to be used in the area.

8. Develop the system of communication to be used in the area.

9. Develop the system of communication.

10. Develop the system of communication.

2200	2200
2200	2200
2200	2200
2200	2200

11. Develop the system of communication.

12. Develop the system of communication.

2200	2200
2200	2200
2200	2200

L. DMF 2 DEPT - 42

Comms Equipment:

Field Phone	1
Portable PA Set	1
Collins Type Radiol	
BA-30 Batteries	36
VC-Radio	1

Miscellaneous:

SVBR Sight	1	NVA Packs	7
NVA Helmet	4	Ponchos	3
Soviet Gas Mask	3	Billfold	1
Lat Aid Packets	4	US Poncho	1
Sniper Scope	1	Poncho Liner	1
Starlight Scope	1	RPG Carrying Case	4
Mortar Sight	1	RFD MG Drums	3
Binoculars	3pr	AK 47 Ammo Pouches	2
MG Mount 12.7	1	US Ammo Pouches	2
US Steel Helmet	3	Aust. Poncho	1
Pistons	2,720	Marijuana	47 sticks
Wire Cutters	2pr	Japanese Camera	1
Lighters	2	82MM Base Plate	1
Med Supplies	50lbs	82MM Mortar Bipods	2
VC Pack	1	Entrenching Tools	3
Pistol Belts	2	Documents	500(b)
NVA Canteens	8		

(2) Destroyed

Ammo:

AK-47	4550
M-60	1100
M-79	1
B-40	144
82MM	15
Carbina	2090
SVBR	119
60MM	34
RPG-7	138
M-16	816
122MM Rockets	5
Cal 50	400
Mixed S/A	2300
12.7MM	450
7.62 CHICOM	500
Mangalore	4
Xrip Flares	2
CHICOM B/Gren	104

Food:

Rice	8501lb
------	--------

Clothing:

NVA Uniforms	30
PJ'S	1
Trousers	3

Miscellaneous:

Sompans	42
Picks	2
Packs	3
NVA Packs	7
Mine, CHICOM AP	1
B/T Kit	1
Pistol Belts	9
Holsters	1

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M-26 H/Gren	1
60MM Fuses	24
60MM Charges	28
B-40 Rockets	5
Blasting Caps	367
82MM Fuses	4

Ponchos	6
VC Sundry Pack	1
AK-47 Mags	24
Canteens	4
M-16 Mags	3
82MM Cleaning Kit	1
82MM Aiming Stakes	2
VC Gas Masks	4
Sewing Machines	2
Cal 43 Mags	1
Hammock	1
Entrenching Tools	5

c. Structures:

Huts and Bunkers Destroyed

228

Trenches

612 Meters

Secondary Explosions/Fires from Airstrikes or Artillery:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
21 Sep	BS346587	2 Secondary Fires
20 Sep	BS450595	1 Secondary Expl
20 Sep	BS434634	1 Secondary Expl w/gray smoke 2x2'
		1 Secondary Expl w/ orange smoke
20 Sep	BS335639	1 Secondary Expl
17 Sep	BS364653	2 Secondary Expl
		2 Secondary Fires
16 Sep	BS469678	1 Secondary Fire w/gray-white smoke
16 Sep	BS326646	1 Secondary Fire
15 Sep	BS449750	1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire
15 Sep	BS554784	1 Secondary Fire
15 Sep	BS557783	2 Secondary Fires & 4 Secondary Expl
14 Sep	BS473682	1 Secondary Expl
14 Sep	BS473728	1 Secondary Expl w/orange smoke
14 Sep	BS394644	1 Secondary Expl
14 Sep	BS526756	1 Secondary Expl
12 Sep	BS435815	1 Secondary Fire w/white smoke
12 Sep	BS370698	1 Secondary Expl w/gray-white smoke
11 Sep	BS360730	2 Secondary Expl w/white smoke
11 Sep	BS479729	1 Secondary Fire
10 Sep	BS353672	1 Secondary Expl 100'
8 Sep	BS434828	1 Secondary Fire
8 Sep	BS444796	1 Secondary Fire
8 Sep	BS452817	1 Secondary Expl w/white smoke 250'
6 Sep	BS552782	1 Secondary Expl (200' x 300')
6 Sep	BS476713	1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire
6 Sep	BS476711	1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire
6 Sep	BS478711	1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire
4 Sep	BS557722	2 Secondary Fires

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(D) ANNEX D (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

1. (D) Communication Mission.

The Communication Mission was to install, operate, and maintain communications facilities in support of TF Galloway and 11th Inf Bde during conduct of Champaign Grove.

2. (D) The Communications Means.

a. The primary means of communications to higher Headquarters and to the 11th Inf Bde Main was via telephone over VHF systems. The primary means of communications to subordinate units within the Bde was via FM Radio.

b. The secondary means of communications to higher Headquarters and the 11th Inf Bde Main was via radio teletype and teletype. The secondary means to subordinate units within the Bde was via single side band.

3. (D) Execution.

The Bde Sig Officer and the Radio Officer conducted a communications reconnaissance at LZ Chevy at 041100 Sep 68 in order to determine locations for signal facilities (including 523rd Sig site). At 050700 the Radio Officer arrived at LZ Chevy as the advance signal element. His purpose was to guide hooks with signal loads to the appropriate site. 523rd Sig VHF and SSB secure teletype teams arrived on the afternoon of the 5th and proceeded to ready equipment for operation. The 11th Bde communications equipment arrived between 0800 and 1300 hrs on the 6th. VHF equipment, switchboard, and the communications center were operational by 1800 hrs. There were no major outages of equip related to the telephone system (Swbd, VHF). FM nets, including secure, were also operational by 1800 hrs on the 6th and remained operational throughout the operation. SSB secure teletype presented a problem initially. The team was not able to establish communications with Americal with the issued whip antenna. On the morning of the 9th a double antenna was improvised and communications were established. The Communications Center (secure teletype via VHF) was closed out on the 18th because it was not needed. Approximately three messages were sent and received by it each day. The SSB secure radioteletype provided the same service as the Comm Ctr, and took over the additional load when the Comm Ctr closed. All communications systems were closed by 1400 hrs on the 24th.

4. (D) The following appendixes will indicate telephone circuitry and type of system utilization in the Champaign Grove exercises.

Appendix 1-VHF Systems Diagram

- 2-Carrier System Record Charts and Circuit Register
- 3-Telephone Traffic Diagram
- 4-Telephone Routing Diagram
- 5-Dedicated Circuits
- 6-Americal Radio Nets
- 7-TF/Brigade Radio Nets
- 8-Retransmission Facility

5. (D) Results

5. All systems were operational throughout the operation. There were only two deviations from the plan. First the Comm Ctr closed out on the 10th as previously stated, and secondly circuit 5606 (Incl 2) from WFOC added to TF Gallows G-3/avn Officer was cancelled on 12 Sep 68 because the AVN Officer conducted his operations from 11th Inf Bde Main at LZ Brown. This circuit was reactivated on the 14th to provide a path for telephone communication between 3/1 Inf Bn Real and 3/1 Inf rear.

b. Signal plans provided by 523rd Signal Battalion were very effective.

c. Signal maintenance support provided by the 6th Support Battalion was also very effective.

6. (D) Lesson Learned

a. Personnel on the various wire team with in the Brigade and other joining units need more training on the installation of 26 pair cables.

b. Operation Campaign Grove greatly enhanced the state of proficiency and preparedness of all signal personnel.

c. That continuing emphasis must be placed on the readiness posture of signal equipment and capability.

Administration:

a) During operation Champagne Grove the following recommendations for awards were submitted:

- 3 Distinguished Service Cross
- 7 Silver Star
- 11 Distinguished Flying Cross
- 5 Bronze Star for Valor
- 12 Bronze Star for Service
- 2 Army Commendation Medal
- 4 Air Medal for Valor

b) The Battalion received a total of 2 officer and 18 Enlisted replacements.

c) During their operation the Battalion lost the following personnel:

KHA	WHA	DEROS
13	20	19

d) This period saw a return of the Battalion to the operational control of the 11th LIB. All administration actions normally going through Brigade were forwarded to the 11th LIB.

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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 1 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

CARRIER SYSTEM RECORD CHART

SYSTEM	CHANNEL											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
50A-56	5601	5622	5616	9129	5644	5643	5671	5641	5642	5654		5600
56A-70	5606	5615	5621	5623		5651		5652	5653		5699	

CIRCUIT REGISTER

CIRCUIT NO, TYPE CKT		FROM	TO
5600	s/u	DIV SYSCON, PATCH TO SYSCON 26 Pr. cable Pr. 21	TF GALLOWAY SIG O
5601	u/u	DIV DTOC, PATCH TO DTOC 200 Pr. cable Pr. _____	TF GALLOWAY TOC
5606	s/u	DIV DTOC SWBD, PATCH TO DTOC 200 Pr. cable Pr. _____	TF GALLOWAY G-3/AVN O
5615	s/u	DIV FST S-BD, PATCH TO DTOC 200 Pr. cable Pr. _____	TF GALLOWAY FSCC
5616	s/u	DIV TACP, PATCH TO DTOC 200 Pr. cable Pr. _____	TF GALLOWAY ALO
5621	s/u	TF GALLOWAY TOC	11TH BDE TOC, PATCH TO 50 Pr. cable Pr. _____

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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 1 (cont.) (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report (CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

CIRCUIT REGISTER, Cont.

CIRCUIT NO,	TYPE	CKT	FROM	TO
5622	c/u		DIV SWBD, Long Local 416	TF GALLOWAY
5623	c/u		TF GALLOWAY FSGC	11TH BDE FDC
5641	c/u		DIV SWBD	TF GALLOWAY SWBD
5642	c/u		DIV SWBD	TF GALLOWAY SWBD
5643	c/u		DIV SWBD	TF GALLOWAY SWBD
5644	c/u		DIV SWBD	TF GALLOWAY SWBD
5651	c/u		TF GALLOWAY SWBD	11TH BDE SWBD
5652	c/u		TF GALLOWAY SWBD	11TH BDE SWBD
5653	c/u		TF GALLOWAY SWBD	11TH BDE SWBD
5654	c/u		TF GALLOWAY SWBD	AMERICAN SPT SWBD PATCH TO 26 Fr. esbia Pr. total patch to cbl. Pr. at T-1 TF GALLOWAY C/C D 1/82 ARMY FDC
5671	TF		DIV C/C	
9121	n/u		1/82 ARMY FDC, Patch to Sys. 50A-92/s ch. 5ex- tend on present apch cbl. from arty to 1/82 army	
5699	s/u		DIV SYSCON, PATCH TO SYS C/C, 26pr. cbl. pr. 16 Patch to Sys. 50A-70 ch 3	TF GALLOWAY VHF GUP


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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 2 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)




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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 3 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

Telephone Traffic Diagram




GROUP 4
Downgraded At 3 Year Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years

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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 5 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

DEDICATED CIRCUITS

- (1) TF GALLOWAY TOC to DTOC
- (2) TF GALLOWAY AVMO & G-3 AIR to DTOC SWBD
- (3) TF GALLOWAY FSCG to DTOC FSE SWBD
- (4) TF GALLOWAY ALO to DIV TACP
- (5) TF GALLOWAY TOC to 11TH BDE TOC
- (6) LONG LOCALS DIV SWBD (AMERICAL) to TF GALLOWAY, CG (AMERICAL 416 FWD)

GROUP 4


Downgraded at 5 Year Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years

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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 6 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

AMERICAN CMD AND DIVISION SECURE (FM)




DIV CMD OPNS/INTEL(SSD/RATT) (SECURE)

FREQ.#1 3308.5 #3 10591.5
#2 7994.5 #4 13436.5




NOTE: OTHER STATIONS WILL ENTER
NET AS DIRECTED IN CURRENT SOI



DIV SPECIAL PURPOSE (SSB/VOICE) (ON CALL)

FREQ.: (P) 7045
(A) 2383.5



NOTE: UNITS WILL USE VOICE CALLWORDS ASSIGNED
IN SOI ITEM 22A 1-(). ACTIVATED WHEN REQUIRED.


GROUP 4
Downgraded At 3 Years Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years

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
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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 7 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPION GROUP)

TF/BRIGADE: CDR AND SECURE (FM)



TF/BDE: SPECIAL PURPOSE (SSB/VOICE)
FREQ.: 13461.5



NOTE: UNITS WILL USE VOICE CALLWORDS ASSIGNED IN SOL ITEM 22A (1)

GROUP 4
Declassified At 3 Year Intervals
Declassified After 10 Years


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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX B (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

BDE CMD NET RETRANSMISSION FACILITY
(USE AS REQUIRED)



GROUP 4
Downgraded At 3 Years Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH BATTALION 3D INFANTRY
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE, AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96217

BA-ED-OP

20 June 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Operation MUSCATINE)

TO: Commanding Officer
11th Infantry Brigade (Light)
ATTN: AVDF-BA-OP
APO San Francisco 96217

1. GENERAL:

- a. Name of Operation: MUSCATINE
- b. Date of Operation: 10 Jan to 10 Jun 1968
- c. Location: QUANG NGAI Province
- d. Control Headquarters: 4th Bn 3d Inf
- e. Reporting Officer: MAJ James D. Davidson

2. TASK ORGANIZATION:

Co A	Bn Control
	B/6-11 Arty (DS)
Co B	D/6-11 Arty (DS)
	B/39 Engr
Co C	3rd/C/26 Engr
	1/E-1 Cav
Co D	3/E-1 Cav
	Acro Scout Plat/123 Avn-Co (OS)
Co E	

3. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: Artillery support for the operation was timely, massive, and very effective. B/6-11 Arty, which was collected with the Forward Tactical Operations Center, exhibited a high degree of competence and professionalism during the reporting period. Also, D/6-11 Arty, which was located at LZ BUET (USF30825) performed the mission of supporting the battalion in a highly commendable manner.

b. The support of the 11th Aviation Battalion, primarily the 17th and 123d Aviation Companies, was highly satisfactory. Particularly commendable was the devotion to duty displayed by the pilots and co-pilots of these aviation companies.

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c. US Air Force: Employment of USAF Tactical Air and the USAF Forward Air Controllers was outstanding. The responsiveness of the FACs contributed to the effective fixing of the enemy in place and the prevention of his escape prior to the maneuvering of units.

4. INTELLIGENCE: See Inclosure 1.

5. MISSION: 4th Bn 3d Inf conducts combat operations commencing 101200H Jan 68 to locate and destroy the enemy forces in zone.

6. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION:

a. Phase 1 - 4th Bn 3d Inf assumed its mission of Operation MUSCATINE 101200H Jan 68. Bn CP established on LZ SUE, BS66477. Bn conducted company size operations from LZ SUE, utilizing four rifle companies.

b. Phase 2 - 250700H Jan 68 Co B OPCON to TF BARKER; Bn continued Co size operations from LZ SUE, utilizing three rifle companies.

c. Phase 3 - 081216H Apr 68 Co C OPCON 1-20 Inf; Bn conducted company size operations with two rifle companies.

d. Phase 4 - 091400 Apr 68 Bn CP relocated at LZ DOTTIE, BS629854. Co B released from OPCON TF BARKER to OPCON 4-3 Inf. Bn conducted company size operations with three rifle companies.

e. Phase 5 - 11 Apr 68 Co C released from OPCON 1-20 Inf; Bn conducted company size operations with four rifle companies.

f. Phase 6 - 23 Apr 68 Co C began construction of LZ DUFF, BS538825; 29 May 68 LZ SUE closed.

g. Phase 7 - 301204H May 68 Co B OPCON 198 LBN; 05 Jun 68 all Bn elements departed OP GEORGE, BS474863. Bn conducted company size operations with three rifle companies. Operation MUSCATINE terminated 101200H Jun 68.

7. EXPOSITION: The following is a chronological resume of Operation MUSCATINE:

10 Jan 68, Co B and 4th Bn 3d Inf airlifted to LZ SUE to commence Operation MUSCATINE, effective 1200 hrs.

11 Jan

1138 hrs Co D vic BS590907 VN jumped out of bushes, knocked wpn from US hands. US stabbed VN in back. VN last seen running with knife in back.

12 Jan

0804 hrs Co D vic BS560091 engaged and KIA 3 VC.

1345 hrs Co C vic BS580044 discovered 1 abandoned hut with 1 concealed MAT-49 IG in rafters.



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13 Jan

1056 hrs Recon Plat was airlifted to OP GEORGE, BS471061; airlift complete at 1055 hrs.

1243 hrs Co C vic BS58833 sustained 2 US KIA, 8 US WHA by booby-trap; evacuated at 1315 hrs.

14 Jan

2315 hrs Co A vic BS536816 rec 6 rounds AW fire resulting in 1 US WHA(M).

15 Jan Neg contact

16 Jan Neg contact

17 Jan

1045 hrs Co A vic BS575791 destroyed 3 tons rice.

18 Jan

1244 hrs Co D vic BS595854 cptr 1 Communist flag.

19 Jan Neg contact

20 Jan

1430 hrs GSG acft vic BS522863 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

21 Jan

2011 hrs Co A vic BS602826 sustained 1 US KIA by hostile sniper fire.

22 Jan

1143 hrs Co A vic BS596834 engaged 4 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA.

23 Jan

1420 hrs Co B vic BS630855 was airlifted to LZ UPTIGHT, OPCON 1-14 Inf.

24 Jan Neg contact.

25 Jan

0700 hrs 4-3 Inf OPCON 198th LIB.

0700 hrs Co B OPCON TF BARKER.

26 Jan

0810 hrs Recon Plat vic BS473852 detonated booby-trap, resulting in 1 US WHA; evacuated at 0823 hrs.

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1240 hrs Recon Plat vic BS456844 detonated booby-trap resulting in 3 US WIA; evacuated 1310 hrs.

27 Jan

0700 hrs Co C conducted CA into LZs vic BS531882, 528894 & 543890; all LZs were cold.

0945 hrs Co D closed IZ SUE.

1147 hrs Recon Plat vic BS455865 detained 1 VCS.

28 Jan Neg contact

29 Jan

1147 hrs Co A vic BS604813 engaged 1 VCS evading, resulting in 1 VC WIA/CIA.

1315 hrs Recon Plat vic BS493844 engaged 2 KIA 1 VC evading.

2000 hrs Tet cease fire cancelled.

30 Jan Neg contact

31 Jan Neg contact

01 Feb

2221 hrs Co D at IZ SUE sustained 1 US WIA(t) by incoming hand grenade.

02 Feb

1026 hrs Co C vic BS525873 found 1 ea MAS-36 in poor condition.

1027 hrs Recon Plat vic BS459868 detained 2 VCS for interrogation.

03 Feb

1147 hrs Co C vic BS518879 engaged & KIA 1 VC, cptr 1 US hand gren & 1 VN pack.

1600 hrs Co C vic BS518879 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC WIA/CIA.

04 Feb

0925 hrs C&C a/cft vic BS519812 engaged 7 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA & 6 VC CIA.

1035 hrs Co A vic BS511838 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA.

1200 hrs 4-3 Inf released from OPCON 19th LTB, revert to OPCON 11th LTB.

05 Feb

1145 hrs Co C vic BS514875 detained 1 mil age male VCS.

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06 Feb

0831 hrs Co C vic BS503863 detained 1 NAM VCS.

1850 hrs Co C closed LZ SUL.

07 Feb Neg contact

08 Feb

1518 hrs Co A at BS499810 detained 4 mil age females.

09 Feb

0803 hrs Co A vic BS490813 detained 1 NAM & 1 HAF.

1017 hrs Co A vic BS486815 detained 1 NAM.

1750 hrs Co D vic BS596909 sustained 4 US WIA by booby trap; evacuated.

1920 hrs Co A vic BS511810 engaged & KIA 1 VCS evading.

10 Feb

0945 hrs Co A vic BS498788 apprehended 1 VCS hiding in tree.

1031 hrs Co A vic BS498788 detained 1 NAM VCS.

1345 hrs Co D vic BS602867 sustained 3 US WIA by booby trap.

1715 hrs Co A vic BS498798 discovered cache of 4,000 lbs rice.

1725 hrs Recon Plat vic BS527870 engaged 4 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2 VC CIA.

11 Feb

1325 hrs Co A vic BS545796 detained 1 VCS.

1900 hrs Recon Plat vic BS578875 engaged 2 VC, resulting in 1 VC CIA.

12 Feb Neg contact

13 Feb Neg contact

14 Feb

1210 hrs Co D vic BS560837 engaged 1 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA.

1335 hrs Co A vic BS405826 engaged 2 VC evading resulting in 2 VC WIA/CIA.

15 Feb

1455 hrs Co D vic BS543766 engaged 6 VC evading, resulting in 2 VC KIA,
1 VC WIA/CIA & 3 VC CIA.

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16 Feb

0946 hrs Co D vic BS599817 sustained 3 US WIA by booby trap.

17 Feb

1025 hrs Co D vic BS575834 sustained 2 US WIA by booby trap.

18 Feb Neg contact

19 Feb Neg contact

20 Feb

1503 hrs Co A vic BS530853 engaged 10 VC resulting in 7 VC KIA, 3 VC CIA;
1 ea M-16 rifle, 1 ea M-2 carbine, 1 ea M-1 carbine & misc equip cptr.

21 Feb

1445 hrs Co D vic BS525816 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA.

22 Feb Neg contact

23 Feb

1930 hrs Co A vic BS521855 rec 11 hand gren resulting in 2 US KIA & 4 US WIA.

24 Feb Neg contact

25 Feb Neg contact

26 Feb

1530 hrs Co D vic BS519848 detonated booby trap resulting in 1 US KIA,
4 US WIA.

27 Feb

1550 hrs Co C vic BS552849 detonated booby trap resulting in 7 US WIA.

28 Feb - 01 Mar Neg contact

05 Mar

0711 hrs Co D vic BS505877 detonated booby trap resulting in 3 US WIA.

0821 hrs 174th Avn gunship vic BS529810 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC WIA/CIA.

1520 hrs Co C vic BS593849 detained 3 NAM VCS.

06 Mar

1014 hrs Co A vic BS462796 engaged 7 VC resulting in 2 VC CIA.

1313 hrs C&C acft vic BS448767 engaged 6 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA, 1 VC CIA.

1740 hrs fwd CP located BS535805.

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07 Mar

0230 hrs Co A vic BS5142773 sustained 2 US WHA by hostile 82mm mortar fire.

0834 hrs commenced Operation SHOW LOW.

08-14 Mar See Operation SHOW LOW After Action Report

15-16 Mar Neg contact

17 Mar

0946 hrs Co C vic BS529888 rept 1 US DOW as result of booby trap detonation.

1021 hrs Co C vic BS536862 detained 1 MAN.

1721 hrs Co C vic BS532889 engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA.

18 Mar

0942 hrs Co C vic BS527881 detonated booby trap resulting in 2 US KIA,
2 US WHA.

19 Mar

0800 hrs Co A vic BS591837 detonated booby trap resulting in 2 US WHA.

20 Mar

1050 hrs Co C vic BS513887 sustained 1 US KIA by sniper fire.

21 Mar

0740 hrs 17th Avn gunship vic BS518791 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

0840 hrs Co D vic BS581791 apprehended 1 MAN VCS.

0846 hrs Co A vic BS585816 detained 4 VCS.

Co D conducted CA into LZs BS571793, 579791, 588791; all LZs cold; 0733 hrs.

0926 hrs Co A vic BS605815 detained 4 MAN.

22 Mar Neg contact

23 Mar

0937 hrs Co D vic BS514836 detained 3 VCS.

1325 hrs Co D vic BS502836 engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA.

24 Mar Neg contact

25 Mar

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1455 hrs Co D vic BS515804 sustained 1 US WHA by sniper fire.

1050 hrs Recon Plat vic BS471840 engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC WIA/CIA.

26 Mar

1505 hrs 123d Avn vic BS610014 cptr 2 VCS hiding.

1530 hrs Co D vic BS521808 detonated booby trap resulting in 2 US WHA.

1550 hrs Co D vic BS523808 found VC body 2 wks old w/.38 Cal S&W pistol.

1715 hrs Co D vic BS517876 engaged 3 VC who were firing at Co D from a bunker resulting in 2 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA/CIA & 1 ea .38 Cal S&W pistol cptr.

27 Mar

1100 hrs Co D vic BS501828 engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC WIA/CIA.

1906 hrs Co A vic BS559901 engaged 10 VC evading resulting in 5 VC KIA.

28 Mar

1324 hrs Co D vic BS504795 detonated booby trap resulting in 2 US KHA, 3 US WHA.

1345 hrs Co C vic BS555855 detonated booby trap resulting in 2 US KHA, 2 US WHA.

1935 hrs Co A vic BS546886 detonated booby trap resulting in 3 US WHA.

2040 hrs Co A vic BS564904 engaged & KIA 1 VC evading.

29 Mar

1115 hrs Co D vic BS515805 engaged 1 VC hiding in hut resulting in 1 VC WIA/CIA.

30 Mar Neg contact

31 Mar

0246 hrs Co C, LZ SUE, rec incoming hand gren resulting in 1 US WHA.

1826 hrs Recon Plat vic BS473847 engaged & KIA 1 VC evading.

01 Apr

0704 hrs Co A conducted CA into LZs BS615816, 601809 & 616798; all LZs cold.

0825 hrs 123d Avn vic BS593810 KIA 1 VC evading.

0825 hrs 174th Avn gunships vic BS583811 KIA 3 VC evading.

0925 hrs Co D vic BS507813 apprehended 1 VCS hiding.

1101 hrs 123d Avn vic BS592805 WIA/CIA 2 VC evading.

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1658 hrs Co A extracted to vic BS564888.

1715 hrs Recon Plat vic BS478835 apprehended 1 VC hiding.

1910 hrs Recon Plat vic BS458844 KIA 2 VC evading.

2218 hrs Recon Plat vic BS476842 KIA 2 VC by ambush.

02 Apr

0700 hrs 4-3 Trains relocated at BT533040.

1625 hrs Co D vic BS559830 apprehended 1 MAM VCS.

03 Apr

0810 hrs Co A vic BS525888 detonated booby traps (2) resulting in 1 US KIA & 10 US WIA.

04 Apr

2346 hrs Co A vic BS570902 sustained 1 US WIA (DOW) as a result of accidental shooting.

05 Apr

1410 hrs 123d Avn vic BS502805 CIA 1 VC evading.

1650 hrs Recon Plat vic BS531791 detained 1 VCS.

1652 hrs 123d Avn vic BS525871 CIA 1 VCS evading.

06 Apr

0755 hrs B/6-11 Arty, 12 Sue, airlifted to assist 11th Bde in Operation NORFOLK VICTORY vic BS534803.

1545 hrs Aero Scouts* vic BS444771 engaged & KIA 5 VC, cptr 1 SES.

1936 hrs Co D vic BS465774 engaged 1 VC in sampans resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 sampan sunk.

07 Apr

0857 hrs A/S vic BS468872 KIA 1 VC, CIA 1 VC.

0905 hrs A/S vic BS457750 KIA 1 VC w/pack & bayonet.

0945 hrs A/S vic BS549799 CIA 1 VCS.

0948 hrs A/S vic BS552788 CIA 1 VCS.

0952 hrs Recon Plat vic BS543797 engaged & KIA 1 VC, cptr 1 ea M-1 carbine.

*Aero Scout Plat, 123d Avn Co hereafter referred to as A/S.

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1045 hrs Recon Plat vic BS543797 detained 1 VCS.
1155 hrs Co D vic BS480764 apprehended 2 VCS.
1240 hrs A/S vic BS481751 KIA 1 VC evading.
1245 hrs Co D vic BS476754 engaged unk size enemy force resulting in 4 VC KIA, 7 VC CIA.
1322 hrs Co D vic BS476754 engaged & KIA 1 VC in tunnel.
1345 hrs Co D vic BS489754 engaged & KIA 1 VC.
1400 hrs Co D vic BS489754 found 1 ea P-38 9mm Chinese pistol & 1 VCS hiding.
1508 hrs Co D vic BS476754 extracted 3,000 lbs of rice from cache.
2230 hrs Co A, LZ Sue, rec 22 rounds 82mm mortar w/neg casualties.

08 Apr

0815 hrs A/S vic BS516715 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA.
0830 hrs A/S vic BS514732 engaged & KIA 1 VC.
0840 hrs A/S vic BS520735 engaged & KIA 1 VC.
1115 hrs Recon Plat vic BS534803 engaged 15 VC resulting in 7 VC KIA.
1216 hrs Co C OPCON 1-20 Inf.
1318 hrs Co D vic BS503738 rec SA fire resulting in 2 US WHA; fire returned resulting in 7 VC KIA, 1 ea arms/equip cptr; 1 ea SRS, 3 ea Chicom carbines, 1 ea AK-47.

09 Apr

0826 hrs Co D vic BS521708 detained 2 VCS.
1100 hrs 4-3 Inf CP relocated to LZ DOTTE; Co B released fr OPCON TF DARKER to OPCON 4-3 Inf.
1526 hrs Co D rec lvy AW & SA fire from vic BS518708.
1550 hrs Co D sustained 1 US WHA by sniper fire.
1830 hrs Co D sustained 2 US WHA by sniper fire. Enemy ceased fire at 1945 hrs.
2115 hrs Co B vic BS620834 KIA 3 VC by ambush.

10 Apr

1040 hrs Co D vic BS515710 found cache of 22 wps & misc equip.

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1213 hrs Co D vic BS512720 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA & 1 ea M-2 carbine cptr.

1218 hrs Co D vic BS512720 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

1314 hrs Co D vic BS515710 CIA 1 VC evading.

1501 hrs Co C CA 1 plat to vic BS515710 to assist Co D.

2150 hrs Co B vic BS639842 KIA 2 VC by ambush.

Cache discovered by Co D at BS515710 (wpns):

- 74 Soviet 7.62mm carbines, M1944
- 3 Soviet 7.62mm carbines, M1953
- 27 Cal .30 M-1
- 3 French 7.5mm
- 5 Cal .30 BAR
- 1 .45 Cal Sub-MG
- 3 Soviet 7.62mm Sub-MG
- 5 French 9mm Sub-MG
- 2 NVA Sub-MG
- 1 Japanese 7.7mm Lt MG
- 1 French 7.5mm AA MG
- 1 US 60mm Mortar & Bipod
- Much misc equip.

11 Apr

1203 hrs Co C CA to vic BS521724; all IZs cold.

1314 hrs Co D vic BS514712 found misc items in a tunnel.

1330 hrs Co D vic BS514712 found 1 VC KIA (1 day old body).

1440 hrs Co D vic BS515710 found 1 rifle, type unk, in tunnel.

1454 hrs Co D vic BS515710 found 2 wpns in tunnel.

1540 hrs Co D vic BS514714 found 50 60mm mort rounds, 63 82mm mort rounds, 100 B-40 rcts & 51 101 rounds (57mm).

1608 hrs Co C vic BS519732 engaged & KIA 1 VC, cptr 1 ea M-1 carbine.

12 Apr

0400 hrs Co C vic BS507741 sustained 1 US WIA(M) by hand grenade.

0930 hrs Co D vic BS516708 cptr 1 ea M-1 rifle.

1215 hrs Co A vic BS555093 apprehended 2 VCS.

1314 hrs Co D vic BS514718 found 1 NVA KIA (body).

1520 hrs Co D vic BS514718 found 2 NVA bodies,

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1530 hrs Co C vic BS41745 engaged & KIA 1 VC evading.

13 Apr

1126 hrs Co C vic BS465760 rec sniper fire resulting in 1 US WIA.

1228 hrs Co C vic BS465761 detained 2 VCS.

14 Apr

1000 hrs Co D vic BS481716 engaged & WIA/CIA 1 INVA (Pfc).

1345 hrs Co B vic BS606844 engaged 4 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA.

1725 hrs A/S vic BS457710 CIA 1 VC.

15 Apr

1027 hrs A/S vic BS472782 engaged & KIA 2 VC w/packs.

1052 hrs A/S vic BS502798 CIA 2 VC evading.

1631 hrs Co C vic BS476775 CIA 1 VCS.

16 Apr

0657 hrs Co B CA to LZs BS705020, 755825 & 760830; all LZs cold.

0910 hrs Co D extracted to LZs Dottie & Uptight.

1015 hrs A/S vic BS733785 KIA 2 VC evading.

1515 hrs Co B vic BS712805 rec sniper fire resulting in 1 US WIA.

17 Apr

0915 hrs 174th Avn gunship engaged & KIA 2 VC.

0958 hrs Co C vic BS759019 detained 2 male VCS.

1115 hrs Co C vic BS758018 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

1209 hrs Co C vic BS767818 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

1650 hrs Co C extracted from vic BS751820 to vic BS520840; LZs cold.

1655 hrs Co C engaged & KIA 1 VC evading.

18 Apr

1040 hrs Co B vic BS737818 rept 4 VC KIA by VC booby trap.

1110 hrs Co B vic BS729803 apprehended 2 VCS evading.

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19 Apr

0856 hrs Co C vic BS533853 detonated booby trap resulting in 3 US WHA.
1215 hrs A/S vic BS518862 CIA 6 VCS evading.
1422 hrs Co A vic BS560893 rept detonating booby trap while with 2/E-1 Cav resulting in 1 US KIA, 11 US WHA.

1626 hrs A/S vic BS517853 CIA 3 VCS evading.

20 Apr

0913 hrs Recon Plat vic BS487058 detonated booby trap resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US WHA.

0935 hrs Co C vic BS516868 CIA 1 VCS (throwing away document).

1025 hrs A/S vic BS715882 KIA 1 VC evading.

1045 hrs A/S vic BS715882 KIA 1 VC evading.

1100 hrs Co B vic BS715867 CIA 1 VC evading.

1435 hrs A/S vic BS729875 KIA 2 VC who were firing at A/S; cptr 1 M-1 rifle, 1 BAR.

21 Apr

0827 hrs Co D CA to vic BS696812; LZ cold.

0851 hrs AS vic BS708822 KIA 1 VC, CIA 4 VC evading.

0920 hrs 174th AVN gunship vic BS699795 KIA 1 VC evading; cptr 1 M-1 carbine.

0930 hrs Co B CA to vic BS677798; LZ cold.

1026 hrs A/S vic BS705805 detained 1 NAM VCS.

1115 hrs A/S vic BS724810 engaged 2 VC; 1 VC KIA, 1 VC CIA.

1357 hrs A/S vic BS712810 CIA 1 VC evading.

1405 hrs A/S vic BS712802 CIA 1 VC evading.

1725 hrs Co D extracted to LZ Dottie.

22 Apr

0715 hrs Co C vic BS504875 rec sniper fire; 1 US WHA.

0815 hrs A/S vic BS517875 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

0920 hrs Co C vic BS526880 ~~detonated booby trap~~ resulting in 1 US KIA & 1 US WHA.

1030 hrs Co B vic BS665823 apprehended 1 NAM VCS.

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1030 hrs A/S & Co D vic BS618887 apprehended 10 VCS evading.

1220 hrs Co D vic BS613898 rept 1 US WIA by accidental discharge of Cal .45 pistol.

23 Apr

0818 hrs Co D CA to vic BS777847; LZ cold.

0845 hrs Co B CA to vic BS777847; LZ cold.

1013 hrs Co B vic BS777844 apprehended 1 MAIWCS.

1054 hrs A/S vic BS765832 found a cache of 10 tons of salt.

1100 hrs Co D vic BS783846 apprehended 5 VCS.

1405 hrs Co C vic BS527853 detonated booby trap; 2 US WIA.

1511 hrs Co C vic BS527853 detonated booby trap; 2 US KIA.

1544 hrs Co D vic BS788844 found tunnel containing 2 ea M-1 carbines, 1 ea M-1 rifle, 1 US shotgun & misc equip.

1700 hrs Co D vic BS765832 extracted 3300 lbs salt.

1800 hrs Co C began construction of FSB LZ BUFF, BS538825.

1805 hrs Co D extracted to LZ Dottie.

24 Apr

0837 hrs Co B vic BS775842 detonated booby trap resulting in 9 US WIA.

1159 hrs Co B vic BS787843 found 1 ea M-1 carbine.

1836 hrs Co C vic BS535801 detonated booby trap; 3 US WIA.

25 Apr

1520 hrs Co C detonated booby trap vic BS533798; 3 US WIA.

1600 hrs Co B vic BS765832 rept total salt extracted - 26,010 lbs.

1645 hrs Co B(-) extracted to BS765845.

26 Apr

1410 hrs A/S vic BS518828 CIA 1 VCS evading.

1415 hrs A/S vic BS523849 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

1440 hrs A/S vic BS524849 CIA 1 VCS evading.

1607 hrs A/S vic BS732827 CIA 1 VCS evading.

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1650 hrs A/S vic BS663829 CIA 1 NAM VCS.

1720 hrs Co B vic BS765832 rept total salt extracted - 45,990 lbs.

27 Apr

1300 hrs A/S vic BS539876 CIA/WIA 1 VC evading.

1443 hrs A/S vic BS521839 CIA/WIA 1 VC evading.

1650 hrs Co B vic BS765832 rept total salt extracted to date 89,520 lbs.

1845 hrs Co D vic BS636837 engaged & WIA/CIA 1 VC; also detained 2 female VCS.

28 Apr

1000 hrs A/S vic BS526792 CIA 2 VC evading.

1050 hrs A/S vic BS551782 CIA 1 VC evading.

1150 hrs Co B vic BS760836 rec sniper fire; 4 US WIA.

1323 hrs Co B vic BS761839 apprehended 1 VC evading.

1500 hrs Co B vic BS765832 rept total salt extracted to date 99,960 lbs.

1635 hrs Co B vic BS765832 rept total salt extracted to date 131,280 lbs, to complete salt extraction from cache vic BS765832.

29 Apr

0757 hrs A/S vic BS525875 engaged, WIA/CIA 1 VC.

0809 hrs A/S vic BS525875 engaged 3 VC; 1 VC KIA.

0849 hrs Co B vic BS761836 detonated booby trap; 6 US WIA.

0923 hrs A/S vic BS524809 engaged 3 VC; 1 VC KIA.

0958 hrs Co B CA to vic BS727876; LZ cold.

1035 hrs Co B vic BS728870 detonated booby trap resulting in 1 US WIA.

1255 hrs A/S vic BS723866 CIA 1 VC evading.

1644 hrs Co B vic BS730874 CIA 1 female VCS evading.

1843 hrs Co D vic BS639827 engaged, WIA/CIA 1 VC evading.

30 Apr

0850 hrs Co A vic BS580905 apprehended 2 VCS.

0856 hrs A/S vic BS766894 engaged 2 VC; 1 VC KIA.

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0911 hrs A/S vic BS712873 engaged 1 VC; 1 VC KIA.

0920 hrs Co A vic BS587908 apprehended 1 VCS.

0950 hrs A/S vic BS712875 apprehended 3 male & 1 female VCS hiding.

1005 hrs 1/E-1 Cav vic BS609818 apprehended 1 VCS.

1030 hrs A/S vic BS700857 engaged & KIA 1 VC evading.

1115 hrs A/S vic BS561832 detained 2 male VCS evading.

01 May

0908 hrs Co C vic BS515827 detained 3 VCS.

1115 hrs A/S vic BS679810 found 1 VC in tunnel w/1 VC flag, pistol belt & ID card.

1536 hrs A/S vic BS730870 apprehended 1 VCS evading.

1612 hrs Co B vic BS726869 CIA 1 VC hiding in a tunnel.

1638 hrs Co B vic BS726869 CIA 1 VC evading.

1810 hrs Co A vic BS474863 detonated booby trap; 2 US WIA.

02 May

0733 hrs Co C vic BS541816 detonated booby trap; 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA.

1215 hrs 1/E-1 Cav vic BS502863 CIA 1 VCS hiding in a hole.

1315 hrs A/S vic BS484866 KIA 1 VC evading.

03 May

0812 hrs A/S vic BS710837 CIA 4 MAMVCS.

0720 hrs Co D CA into LZs BS717803, 720810 & 728823; all LZs cold.

0818 hrs Co B extracted to LZs Dottie and Uptight.

1001 hrs Co D vic BS726813 detained 1 female VCS.

1010 hrs Co A vic BS557900 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

1012 hrs Co D vic BS720811 detonated booby trap resulting in 1 US WIA.

1015 hrs A/S vic BS743827 apprehended 2 MAM evading.

1055 hrs Co D vic BS727816 detained 1 MAM VCS hiding.

1108 hrs Co C vic BS519833 apprehended 2 male VCS.

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1215 hrs Co D vic BS721813 apprehended 2 male VCS.
 1305 hrs A/S vic BS517833 CIA 1 VCS evading.
 1543 hrs A/S vic BS697810 CIA 8 NAM VCS.
 1645 hrs A/S vic BS740032 KIA 1 VC evading.
 1715 hrs Co D vic BS716002 engaged 1 VC evading; 1 VC WIA/CIA.
 1927 hrs Co A vic BS567905 detonated booby trap; 6 US WHA.

04 May

0902 hrs Co D vic BS762822 detained 2 male VCS.
 1043 hrs A/S vic BS740857 apprehended 1 NAM VCS.
 1417 hrs Co D vic BS728824 apprehended 1 NAM VCS.

05 May

0137 hrs at LZ Dottie, BS629054, rec 15 rounds 82mm mort fire resulting in 7 US WHA & 1 VN interpreter WIA.

0825 hrs A/S vic BS795048 CIA 1 NAM VCS.
 0831 hrs Co D vic BS720523 CIA 5 NAM VCS.
 0937 hrs Co C vic BS547833 engaged 5 VC; 1 VC WIA/CIA.
 1519 hrs A/S vic BS708892 apprehended 1 male VCS evading.
 1750 hrs A/S vic BS591003 apprehended 1 male VCS evading.

06 May

0201 hrs Co D vic BS722825 rec 10 rounds mort fire resulting in 3 US WHA.
 0815 hrs A/S vic BS555045 engaged 2 VC; 1 VC KIA, 1 VC CIA.
 0826 hrs Co D vic BS725822 apprehended 1 VCS.
 1110 hrs A/S vic BS706897 apprehended 3 NAM VCS.
 1528 hrs Co D vic BS718028 apprehended 2 male VCS.
 1530 hrs A/S vic BS610839 CIA 2 NAM VCS,
 1540 hrs A/S vic BS620849 apprehended 1 VCS evading.

07 May

0722 hrs Co D CA into LZs vic BS733092, 718099 & 720009; all LZs cold.

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0745 hrs A/S vic BS720902 apprehended 2 NAM VCS.

0834 hrs Co D vic BS718888 apprehended 1 NAM hiding.

0856 hrs A/S vic BS725871 apprehended 1 NAM evading.

0935 hrs Co D vic BS719890 found 3 VC hiding in tunnel; threw hand gren resulting in 3 VC WIA/CIA.

1051 hrs Co A vic BS555898 detonated booby trap resulting in 4 US WIA, 1 US KIA.

08 May

1143 hrs Co D vic BS711885 apprehended 6 VCS evading.

1200 hrs A/S vic BS596845 apprehended 1 NAM VCS.

1300 hrs 1/E-1 Cav vic BS551828 apprehended 2 VCS hiding in a hut.

1345 hrs Co A vic BS554896 detained 1 female VCS w/photograph of VC w/wpn.

1713 hrs A/S vic BS473877 engaged 6 VC (1 w/wpn) evading; 2 VC KIA, 4 VC CIA.

1917 hrs Co D vic BS720888 rec 4-5 rounds sniper fire; 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA.

09 May

0651 hrs Co C vic BS539031 apprehended 3 NAM & 3 female VCS.

0821 hrs Co A vic BS570903 apprehended 2 NAM.

1124 hrs 1/E-1 Cav vic BS688893 engaged & KIA 1 VC in tunnel; also, cptr 1 VCS w/o ID card.

1312 hrs Co A vic BS565902 apprehended 6 VCS.

1445 hrs A/S vic BS756819 apprehended 2 male VCS.

1935 hrs Co D vic BS720850 KIA 2 VC by ambush.

10 May

0830 hrs A/S vic BS473673 apprehended 1 NAM.

0916 hrs Co D vic BS725896 apprehended 2 male VCS.

11 May

0920 hrs 1/E-1 Cav vic BS670877 engaged 2 VC evading; 1 VC WIA/CIA.

1045 hrs Co D vic BS702879 rec sniper fire resulting in 1 US WIA.

1212 hrs Co D vic BS711879 detained 1 VCS evading.

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1610 hrs Co D vic BS726875 released to OPCON 190th LID.

1640 hrs Co B vic BS726875 apprehended 5 male VCS hiding in tunnel.

12 May

0810 hrs Co A CA into LZs BS551776, 554764 & 556775; all LZs cold.

0800 hrs A/S vic BS544759 engaged 6 VC; 4 VC KIA.

0815 hrs C&C acft vic BS544759 engaged & KIA 2 VC.

0915 hrs Co A vic BS566770 detonated booby trap resulting in 4 US WIA, 1 VN KIA.

1105 hrs O-2 acft vic BS580802 crashed resulting in 2 US KIA. 4-3 Inf C&C ship checked acft resulting in Bn SGM WIA by SA fire; engaged & KIA 1 VC. Co C 3d Plat CA to vic BS580802 to secure acft wreckage until extraction.

1250 hrs Co A vic BS557760 engaged 3 VC; 1 VC KIA, 2 VCS CIA, 1 .38 Cal pistol cptr.

1845 hrs Co A vic BS563769 rec 3-4 rounds 60mm mort fire; 1 US WIA(II).

13 May

0826 hrs Co A vic BS566766 detonated booby trap resulting in 2 US WIA.

0845 hrs 1/E-1 Cav vic BS606835 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

1920 hrs Co A vic BS564779 rec sniper fire resulting in 1 US WIA.

14 May

0914 hrs 1/E-1 Cav vic BS561823 CIA 3 VC in tunnel.

1153 hrs A/S vic BS620812 CIA 1 VC evading.

1200 hrs A/S vic BS609813 CIA 5 VC evading.

1240 hrs A/S vic BS667028 CIA 3 VC evading.

1320 hrs Co B vic BS626813 CIA 11 VC evading.

15 May

0915 hrs C&C acft vic BS544782 CIA 1 female VCS evading.

1635 hrs A/S vic BS713821 CIA 1 VC evading.

1744 hrs Co A & A/S vic BS544788 engaged 1 VC w/wpn; 1 VC KIA, 1 ea M-1 carbine & 1 ea M-2 carbine cptr.

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16 May

0735 hrs Co A CA; all LZs cold.
 0804 hrs A/S vic BS499839 CIA 1 MAM VCS.
 0835 hrs 174th Avn gunship vic BS515860 engaged 6 VC; 4 VC KIA.
 0835 hrs A/S vic BS515810 CIA 1 MAM CIA.
 0855 hrs A/S vic BS485813 CIA 1 MAM VCS.
 0905 hrs Co A vic BS516858 detained 1 female VCS.
 1220 hrs Co A vic BS518859 apprehended 1 VCS Evading.
 1342 hrs CAC acft vic BS629846 engaged 3 VC; 2 VC KIA.
 1436 hrs A/S vic BS688813 CIA 3 VC.
 1446 hrs Co B vic BS716864 detained 4 male, 1 female VC.
 1510 hrs A/S vic BS662834 CIA 1 male VC evading.
 1900 hrs Co A vic BS504836 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

17 May

0811 hrs A/S vic BS543708 apprehended 2 male VCS evading.
 1110 hrs A/S vic BS629854 detained 2 male VCS.
 1405 hrs Co A vic BS512852 detained 1 female VCS.

18 May

0820 hrs Co A vic BS508854 engaged 2 VC; 1 VC WIA/CIA.
 1258 hrs Co A vic BS504840 CIA 1 male VCS evading.

19 May

1010 hrs Co A vic BS500850 WIA/CIA 1 male VCS.
 1600 hrs A/S vic BS570770 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

20 May

0649 hrs Co A CA to BS782853; LZ cold.
 0800 hrs Co A vic BS786862 WIA/CIA 1 female VC.
 0810 hrs Co A vic BS786862 CIA 1 male VC.
 0950 hrs 1/E-1 Cav engaged 2 VC; 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA/CIA.

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1005 hrs Co A vic BS776862 detonated booby trap resulting in 5 US KIA,
10 US WIA.

1200 hrs Co A vic BS775862 detonated booby trap resulting in 1 US KIA,
2 US WIA.

1702 hrs A/S vic BS602842 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

21 May

0904 hrs A/S vic BS496832 CIA 1 MAM evading.

0926 hrs Co A vic BS776857 CIA 1 female VCS evading.

1115 hrs A/S vic BS719005 apprehended 1 MWI evading.

1200 hrs A/S vic BS733821 CIA 1 male VCS evading.

22 May

1015 hrs Aero Scout vic BS734888 CIA 1 MAM evading.

1025 hrs A/S vic BS694850 CIA 4 MAM evading.

1027 hrs A/S vic BS743830 engaged 1 VC evading; 1 VC KIA.

1208 hrs A/S vic BS755856 CIA 1 MAM evading.

1330 hrs A/S vic BS733891 engaged 1 VC evading; 1 VC KIA.

23 May

0659 hrs Co A CA to BS712821, 715834; LZs cold.

1431 hrs A/S vic BS684804 engaged 1 VC evading; 1 VC KIA.

1432 hrs A/S vic BS683810 engaged 2 VC evading; 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA/CIA.

1440 hrs A/S vic BS685803 CIA 1 male VC evading.

2320 hrs Co A vic BS711818 had 2 US WIA from 2 M79 rounds.

24 May

0850 hrs A/S vic BS720819 CIA 1 male VCS evading.

0900 hrs A/S vic BS715818 CIA 1 male VCS evading.

0910 hrs A/S vic BS755834 CIA 6 VC evading.

1058 hrs Co A vic BS718819 has 3 US WIA as a result of a booby trap.

1100 hrs A/S vic BS720829 engaged 2 VC evading; 2 VC KIA.

1425 hrs Co A vic BS713819 engaged 1 VC evading; 1 VC WIA/CIA.

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1515 hrs A/S vic BS695845 apprehended 1 male VCS evading.

1645 hrs A/S vic BS682897 engaged 1 VC evading; 1 VC KIA.

1651 hrs Co A vic BS715819 found 1 VC KIA.

25 May

1624 hrs A/S vic BS502786 CIA 5 NAM VCS hiding.

26 May

0820 hrs Co A vic BS728824 had 1 US WIA as a result of SA sniper fire.

27 May

0720 hrs A/S vic BS514796 CIA 1 VCS evading.

0850 hrs Co D CA to BS497825, 501832 & 506827; LZs cold.

0909 hrs Co D vic BS501832 detained 3 female VCS.

0926 hrs Co A(-) extracted to LZ Dottie, completed 0930 hrs.

1145 hrs A/S vic BS756848 CIA 6 NAM evading.

1511 hrs A/S vic BS739825 KIA 1 VC.

28 May

1525 hrs A/S vic BS774835 apprehended 1 VC evading.

1550 hrs A/S apprehended 1 VC evading.

29 May

0941 A/S vic BS606857 CIA 1 male VCS evading.

1032 hrs D/6-11 Arty moved by CH-47 to LZ Buff.

1050 hrs A/S vic BS697825 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

30 May

1010 hrs A/S vic BS745843 CIA 3 NAM evading.

1204 hrs Co B became OPCON 198th LTB.

1607 hrs LTB Frank A. Barker Jr assumed command from LTC Alvin E. Adkins.

31 May

0810 hrs Co D vic BS499808 apprehended 1 VCS evading.

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1254 hrs Co C vic BS555823 detained 2 VCS hiding.
1331 hrs Recon Plat extracted from OP George to LZ Dottie.
1350 hrs Co C vic BS555823 apprehended 1 VCS evading.
1525 hrs at LZ Dottie 1 VC died of unknown causes.
1617 hrs C/C acft vic BS568878 engaged 2 VC - 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA/CIA.
1714 hrs A/S vic BS568878 engaged 2 VC; 2 VC KIA.

1 Jun

0610 hrs Co C vic BS545826 engaged 1 VC; 1 VC KIA.
1435 hrs A/S vic BS722828 apprehended 1 NAM VCS.

2 Jun

0957 hrs A/S vic BS559809 engaged 1 VC evading; 1 VC KIA.
1705 hrs A/S vic BS501799 CIA 2 NAM evading.

3 Jun

0215 hrs Co D vic BS458840 engaged 9 VC; 2 VC KIA.
1137 hrs Co D vic BS457814 had 1 US WIA as a result of a booby trap.
1610 hrs A/S vic BS540739 engaged 2 VC; 2 VC KIA.
1715 hrs A/S vic BS537733 engaged 2 VC; 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA/CIA.

4 Jun

0953 hrs A/S vic BS442733 engaged 1 VC evading; 1 VC KIA.
1010 hrs Co D vic BS458798 apprehended 1 VCS.
1055 hrs Recon Plat vic BS526776 engaged 1 VC; 1 VC KIA.
1140 hrs A/S vic BS515768 apprehended 2 VCS evading.
1440 hrs A/S vic BS501746 engaged 1 VC; 1 VC KIA.
1645 hrs Co C vic BS531828 CIA 1 NAM.

5 Jun

0800 hrs Co D CA to BS471761; LZ cold.
1016 hrs Co D vic BS477768 apprehended 4 NAM.
1030 hrs A/S vic BS499776 apprehended 1 NAM.

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1050 hrs Recon Plat vic BS482776 apprehended 2 male VCS.

1430 hrs A/S vic BS42734 apprehended 1 male VCS.

1610 hrs A/S vic BS529744 engaged & KIA 2 VC w/wpn; 1 SKS, 1 Carbine.

1705 hrs A/S vic BS532744 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

1803 hrs Co D vic BS527746 engaged 2 VC; 1 VC KIA & 1 AK47 cptr.

1903 hrs Co D vic BS474746 engaged 2 VC; 1 VC KIA/CIA.

6 Jun

0850 hrs Recon Plat vic BS530769 apprehended 3 VCS hiding.

1140 hrs Co C vic BS535765 had 1 male VC & 1 female VC turn themselves in.
Also 1 .45 Cal pistol cptr.

1159 hrs Co D vic BS524740 CIA 1 HAM evading.

1215 hrs Co D vic BS524740 CIA 2 HAM hiding.

1530 hrs 3/E-1 Cav vic BS538875 had 6 US KIA as a result of a booby trap.

1540 hrs Co D vic BS528745 engaged 3 VC evading; 3 VC KIA.

1646 hrs Co D vic BS522730 apprehended 1 VC evading.

7 Jun

0935 hrs A/S vic BS517739 apprehended 1 HAM.

0940 hrs Co D vic BS526755 had 1 US KIA as a result of a booby trap.

1005 hrs Co D vic BS528745 found in a tunnel five M-1 rifles, 1 BAR;
also 1 VC CIA.

1108 hrs Co C vic BS511014 detained 1 female VCS.

1340 hrs A/S vic BS706814 apprehended 1 HAM.

1425 hrs A/S vic BS704813 apprehended 6 male VCS.

1520 hrs Co C vic BS486814 detained 1 male & 1 female VCS.

1622 hrs A/S vic BS762852 CIA 2 male VCS.

8 Jun

1400 hrs Recon Plat vic BS531750 apprehended 5 VCS.

1617 hrs Co C vic BS528826 had 2 US KIA as a result of a booby trap.

1658 hrs Co D was extracted ~~CO, US, Pottie and Uptight.~~

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1650 hrs A/S vic B3521747 engaged & KIA 1 VC.

9 Jun Neg contact

10 Jun

1200 hrs Operation MUSCATINE terminated.

8. RESULTS:

Friendly Losses

KHA	WHA	DOW	NBD	NBI
53	257	9	3	20

Enemy Losses

KIA	VC/VCS	WPNS
240	414	60

9. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. Administration.

(1) During Operation MUSCATINE the following awards were presented:

Purple Heart	54
Army Comd Medal	8
Bronze Star	72
Silver Star	8
Soldiers Medal	4

(2) The 4th Bn 3d Inf received 34 Officer and 509 enlisted replacements during this operation.

b. Logistics.

(1) During Operation MUSCATINE the 4th Bn 3d Inf was resupplied by 4-3 Trains, established at Chu Lai. All classes of supply were available at 4-3 Trains.

(2) Units in the field were resupplied by air daily and received one hot meal per day. Rations were prepared in the trains area. Fire support bases had field mess kitchens and prepared two hot meals per day. Exceptions were 1Z Dottle, which prepared three hot meals daily, and 1Z Duff, which did not have mess facilities. One hot meal was lifted to 1Z Duff daily.

(3) The tonnage of cargo listed below by class was shipped by air and surface transportation during Operation MUSCATINE.

CLASS I	406.50 Tons
CLASS II	15.32 Tons
CLASS III	95.15 Tons
CLASS IV	284.66 Tons
CLASS V	213.23 Tons
CLASS I (Water)	827.05 Tons

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(4) The resupply system was efficient, characterized by very rapid response. Units in the field generally had direct communications with unit supply personnel in the Chu Lai Trains. The majority of resupply was conducted by air transport. Only LZ Dottie is accessible by road.

10. CIVIL AFFAIRS (See additional sheets)

11. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. During the initial weeks after the 4th Bn 3d Inf entered Operation MUSCATINE ground elements made sporadic contact with enemy forces of primarily squad size. However, contact was broken rapidly by the enemy in all instances indicating little desire to engage U.S. Forces. The frequency of ground contact diminished considerably during February and March. Ground contact became very rare during the latter months of the operation. Virtually every portion of the area of operations was intensively searched by the beginning of March and no units greater than platoon size were encountered, engaged or pursued.

b. The exceptionally flat and open terrain made concealed ground movement exceptionally difficult. Several elevated terrain features, notable along the western operational boundary, provide good vantage points for observation and are, no doubt, in frequent use by the enemy. Contact usually occurred during the first hours ground units entered a particular area. Sustained operations and the intensive search seldomly resulted in contact other than sniper fire, though numerous caches were discovered.

c. Enemy activities have been limited to emplacing mines and booby traps along likely avenues of movement, sniping at U.S. Forces and stand-off mortar attacks. Numerous abandoned ROK fire support bases provided the enemy with a very large supply of mines, especially the M16A1. Over 90% of friendly casualties resulted from detonated mines and booby traps. Very few of these were command detonated. It is imperative that all mines be removed or destroyed prior to the closing of a fire support base.

d. The Aero Scout Platoon has proven to be the most effective tactical unit for operations in this area, especially when used in conjunction with infantry mounted in armored personnel carriers. Ground and air elements were in direct communication. Mounted and foot troops could thereby exploit any contact to the utmost.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Incl: a3

Harvey K. Nakayama
 HARVEY K. NAKAYAMA
 2LT, MSG
 Asst Adjutant

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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence, Weather, Terrain, Enemy Activity) to After Action Report to Operation MUSCATINE

1. AREA OF OPERATION:

a. Weather

(1) Existing Situation: The Muscatine Area of Operation from January through June 1968 was subjected to the Northeastern monsoon (Jan-Apr) and the Southwest monsoon (May-Jun). January through April produced heavy fog during late evening and early morning hours and dissipating around 0900 hrs daily. Visibility during these periods of fog was limited, at times, to less than 100 meters. This occurred along ridges and in the low lands of the surrounding area. April and May produced a change in the weather with temperatures steadily rising as summer approached, cloud cover started to disappear resulting in clear skies and little haze. Visibility consequentially increased from 4-6 miles in Jan-Mar to 7-10 miles in May and early June. Temperatures were nearing their annual high as June arrived with highs of 102 degrees and the humidity around 82 percent.

(2) The weather had no adverse effects on enemy or friendly ground operations. However, two combat assaults were delayed (one in Feb and one in Mar) due to the heavy early morning fog.

b. Terrain

(1) Existing Situation: The Muscatine AO is basically a flat, much cultivated rice paddy basin interspersed with small rivers and streams which provide adequate irrigation for the entire area. There are a number of small hills scattered throughout the operational area ranging in elevation from a few meters to over 100 meters. Slopes of these hills vary between 10 and 30 degrees and provide no obstacle to ground operations. Along the western edge of the area of operation are found the foothills to the higher mountains to the west. These hills range in heights to 200 meters.

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire: Observation and fields of fire throughout the area were excellent, hampered only by scattered hedgerows and paddy dikes.

(3) Cover and Concealment: The lowlands offered only limited cover and concealment in the form of stream beds, groves of trees, hedgerows, and terrain irregularities. Conversely, the mountains to the west offered excellent cover and concealment.

(4) Obstacles: There were no major obstacles encountered throughout the Muscatine AO. All rivers and streams presented no fording problems and the hills were easily traversable.

(5) Key Terrain Features: Dominating terrain features within the area were insignificant in that all the terrain traversed presented no serious obstacles to advancing units.

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(6) Avenues of Approach: Cross country movement was generally good. Main trails ran east to west and north to south with numerous interconnecting trails throughout. The lowlands did not favor day movement or provide a defensive position for the enemy. Night movement was restricted and limited to ambush operations by friendly forces.

(7) Cultural Features: The population density ranged from 50 to 100 persons per square kilometer with the majority of the people scattered along the Song Tra Dong to the north, the Song Tra Khuc to the south, and the National Highway (IMV #1) to the east. Cultural features proved to be insignificant.

2. ENEMY SITUATION ANTICIPATED/ENCOUNTERED

a. Upon arrival in the Muscatine AO in Jan 68 there were no main force enemy units. However, enemy units that could enter the AO were: the 107th NVA AA Bn, the 120th NF Bn, the 81st LF Bn, the 48th NF Bn, the 506A and the 506B Sapper Companies.

b. Contacts during Jan-Feb were light with the enemy always breaking the contact and evading our sweeps. PWs captured were from various hamlet and villages and were either members of the NLF, the Farmer's Association, or Young Men's Association. In variable all PWs captured were hamlet or village guerrillas and not from a main force unit. Sniper activity prevailed throughout Jan and Feb with a few scattered mortar and grenade attacks on company NDPs.

c. 47 tunnels of mentionable dimensions were discovered and destroyed throughout the Muscatine area. Rice in excess of 99,00 pounds was captured along with over 46,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and miscellaneous items of clothes, medical supplies and food stuffs. Mines and booby traps have abounded in this area resulting in over 90% of this Battalion's casualties. Many other mines and booby traps have been discovered and destroyed.

d. Although main force enemy units were not encountered, continuous small contacts with guerrilla forces has resulted in over 240 VC killed and more than 400 VC/VCS captured and evacuated and over 60 weapons captured in combat (this excludes the weapons cache of Norfolk Victory).

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Civil Affairs After Action Report (Operation MUSCATINE)

1. Initially, Civil Affairs activities were limited to Medcaps and denial of food to the enemy.

a. During Operation MUSCATINE, 4th Bn 3d Inf treated the following patients: 1068 adult males, 1318 adult females, 2502 children, with a total of 4888.

b. Medcaps were conducted for the following reasons:

(1) To provide a means by which the battalion could assess the attitudes of the people toward the US and GVN, and living conditions of an area in a friendly atmosphere.

(2) To provide medical assistance in areas where the health standards are low.

(3) To provide information on the presence of diseases which would affect the battalion adversely, if operations were to be conducted in the same area.

c. During the operation, 99,441 lbs of rice, 131,151 lbs of salt and 900 lbs of potatoes were confiscated from the VC. 52,435 lbs of rice was extracted for use by cords in support of refugee camps located within the districts of the AO. The remaining rice was destroyed. The salt, found on the coast of the Batangan Peninsula (BS765834) was extracted to LZ DOTTIE and then to Binh Son.

2. In March and April, The Old Guard participated in Operation GOLDEN FLEECE, an Americal Division Operation with the objective of preventing the VC from collecting rice from GVN controlled or contested areas. 4-3 Inf was assigned to protect the rice in Binh Khan Village, coordinates BS550890, 587916, and 600910. Operations opened with a Psyops campaign informing the people that we proposed to prevent the rice from being taken by the VC and that they had to do their part by reporting to the troops operating in the area VC activities and the location of VC mines and booby traps. During this period a platoon or more operated in the area, employing nightly ambushes and daytime sweeps. This program resulted in the harvesting of 900 metric tons of rice by the citizens of Vietnam, while the VC were able to take 3000 kilograms. One RVN citizen approached members of Co A and thanked them for protecting his rice, stating that this was the first season that he was able to keep his rice in many years. There were other individuals who aided by reporting the locations of booby traps.

3. Civic Action projects: The 4-3 Inf provided 80 bags of cement and 100 sheets of tin to help build a new 3-room school building at An Phong (1), BS 476872. The school has not been completed as yet due to the unavailability of the lumber required to build the roof. All labor was provided by residents of the hamlet.

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4. Psyops activities were extremely successful. The HB Team (Loudspeaker), used during Operation GOLDEN PLAGE, was instrumental in the success of the Voluntary Informant Program. Under this program, the team broadcast the fact that we wanted to buy ammunition, mines, or weapons from the indigenous population. Most of the people who turned in ammunition initially were children; however, as more people discovered that a "great deal" of money could be made by turning in this ammunition, the age level increased first from 6-10 then 6-25 years old and older. At the completion of this operation, 404,541.00 \$VN had been spent on this program. See appendix 1 for a compilation of ammunition and weapons received during this period. Other Special Psyop activities include the use of the Vang Toc Vu Drama Team from Quang Tri. This team, through the medium of entertainment, attempted to instill Vietnamese nationalism into the minds of the audience by teaching songs that emphasize a "Fight the Viet Cong" spirit. 29,233,000 leaflets were dropped by aircraft and 32 hours 30 minutes spent in aerial broadcasting, while broadcasts on the ground added up to 189 hours 30 minutes. A total of 57 Hoi Chanh rallied to the GVN as a result of 21 million HUSCATHIE Psyops activities.

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CONFIDENTIALAppendix 1 (VTP Ammunition Collection) to Annex 1 to AUSA Report -
Operation INTCATUNE.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
M26 Frag Gren	1,513
M16A1 AP Mine	137
81mm AT	131
81mm WP	67
60mm HE	166
60mm WP	106
Claymore mine	92
3.5" Rocket	116
TNT	237 lb
5.56 rds	22,309
.30 cal rds	202,868
M1 carbine rds	21,137
Mixed rds, small arms	21,146
M72 LAW	81
M14A1 Frag Gren	13
40mm M79 rds	627
Chicom Frag Gren	133
M16 AP mine	18
60mm TLLun	3
105mm (dud)	62
Arty Mines	2
Trip Mines	3
2.75 Rocket Motor	5

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
.50 cal rds	1,069
HC Smoke	20
81mm Illum	11
7.62mm (104) rds	4,255
Hand Flares	1
M51A5 Fuze	1
Detcord Claymore	1
C-4 Tube	1
57mm RR rds	2
M6A1 Fuzes	15
Chicom Mines	17
Combination Fuzes	35
Rifle Smoke	27
175mm arty rds (dud)	8
106mm RR rds	16
AK-47 rds	1,320
T&E Mech	1
WP Gren	12
155mm Arty rd (dud)	11
Blasting Caps	24
Claymore Generator	15
81mm Fuzes	37
M60 Barrel	1
M12 Fuzes	1
M16 Rifle	1
4.2 Fuzes	14

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
M26 Fuzes	7
M3	20
Carbine (mag)	8
6V Battery	1
Bouncing Betty	2
M1 Rifle	1
.45 cal Sub-MG (mag)	4
M BX-1 Filler	2
Rocket Tail Assy.	1


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HEADQUARTERS
11th Infantry Brigade (LT)

DUC PHO RVN

OPERATION SHOW LOW

5-13 MARCH 1968



AMCL
RECON
ZONE

BRONCO

THUNDER

CHARLIE
BROWN


MO DUC - DUC PHO
AO

6-11(FLD)	3-1
105	1-20
1(-)	FLD
26(-) FSA	LOG
	1(4) (DS)

E 1-20
C 6-11(DS)
105

A 1-20
B 1-20
D 1-20

PROV 1-20




SPECIAL USE SE ASIA 1:100,000

EDITION 1 AME
XUAT-BAN LAN THU

MAP INFORMATION AS
BAN DO TIN TUC

Scale Tỷ lệ 1:100,000



Precis

Operation Show Low was conducted 5-11 Mar 68 approximately 35 kilometers northwest of the 11th Inf Bde headquarters at Duc Pho and 14 kilometers to the west of Quang Ngai City, vicinity of the "horseshoe" in the Tra Khuc River.

The purpose of the operation was to search out and destroy VC sapper, main and local force units believed to be staging in the "horseshoe" area for an attack on Quang Ngai City, during the second phase of the TET offensive.

The 4th Bn, 3d Inf (+) conducted the operation assisted by elements of the 2d ARVN Division. The exercise consisted of a series of combat assaults and sweeps in conjunction with the employment of blocking forces. A detailed description of the action is at TAB R.

The action resulted in 72 VC/NVA forces KIA and 2 U.S. and 6 ARVN KIA, a ratio of 1 friendly loss to 9 enemy killed.

TASK ORGANIZATION

OPERATION SHOW LOW

4-3 Inf (+)

A/4-3

B/4-3 (+)

C/4-3

D/4-3

E/4-3

A/1-20 (+)

Plat/E-1 Cav

A/6-11 Arty (DS)

B/6-11 Arty (DS)

Plat/C-26 Engr (DS)

Searchlight Plat. (-)

Rde Control

D/3-1 Inf (RRF)

Aero Scts/123 Avn Co