

FIGURE B-16

SUMMARY OF STRATA TEAM OPERATIONS (U)

Target		Team		Date		Comments
Designation	Location	Designation	Strength	Infiltrated	Exfiltrated	
S5	XE 1353	111	7	24 Sep 67	28 Sep 67	Emergency exfiltration due to lack of water and illness.
S1	WE 8780	112	10	23 Oct 67		Night parachute infiltration. Team made unexpected contact with enemy. Last contact 7 Nov 67. Stricken from active rolls 10 Jan 68.
ST	XE 452009	111	8	17 Mar 68	23 Mar 68	No significant activities.
STA	XE 436125	113	8	31 Mar 68	7 Apr 68	No significant activities.
STB	XD 484985	114	8	7 Apr 68	15 Apr 68	Enemy contact; no friendly casualties; enemy unknown. Emplaced M-14 mines. PRC-74 voice and CW contact maintained throughout entire operation.
STC	XE 4404	111	7	14 May 68	29 May 68	No significant activities; no enemy contact.
STD	XE 5206	120	6	14 May 68		As of 17 May, negative enemy contact. No contact since 170910Z May, vicinity XE 536064. Team missing.
S2	XE 363215	122	4	15 May 68	22 May 68	No enemy contact. Team extracted due to illness of one team member.
S2A	XE 2631	113	8	22 May 68	7 Jun 68	Resupplied by O-2 (free-fall bundle drop). Mission extended five days for recon of Rte 1961. No significant activities; no enemy contact.
S13	XD 569869	114	7	6 Jun 68	18 Jun 68	No contact established 7 June. No enemy contact. "No bomb line" established to protect team. Team leader, assistant team leader and radio operator missing since 12 June. Team conducted roadwatch on Rte 1036. Team observed convoys on Rte 1036 and located truck park and motor pool at XD637842.
S11	WE 715900	115	7	19 Jun 68	29 Jun 68	Resupplied 26 June, VRAF A-1. Enemy contact 28 June; no friendly casualties; enemy casualties unknown. Team location compromised; exfiltrated 29 June.
S13A	XD 557921	111	8	20 Jun 68	30 Jun 68	Enemy contact on 24 June. No friendly casualties; enemy casualties unknown. Enemy contact on 29 June; one team member WIA; enemy casualties three WIA possible KIA. Team extracted 30 June. Circumstances surrounding the wounding of one team member and inconsistencies noted during debriefing have lead to the removal of this team from the STRATA Program. Further investigation underway.

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FIGURE B-16 (Cont'd)

Target		Team		Date		Comments
Designation	Location	Designation	Strength	Infiltrated	Exfiltrated	
87E	XD 440932	117	7	27 Jun 68	6 Jul 68	No enemy contact. Roadwatch site established Rte 196. No enemy traffic of any description observed during period 1-5 July. Team actually patrolled road and saw no evidence of recent use. Upon completion of debriefing, it was decided that the portion of Rte 196 designated as STRATA Target TE is no longer considered a lucrative target for STRATA operations.
82B	XE 297376	8118	7	7 Jul 68	14 Jul 68	Mission: Roadwatch of Rte 137. Enemy contact 10 July; M-14 mines emplaced; no casualties. Team pursued by enemy 10-13 July; successfully evaded and extracted 14 July. No casualties; roadwatch mission not accomplished.
813B	XD 594824	894	7	13 Jul 68	28 Jul 68	Mission: Roadwatch of Rte 103. Team unable to establish roadwatch site because of enemy security in the area. Team identified two other enemy-used trails in area, distributed SSPL material and took photo of area in vicinity of Rte 1036. Team failed to accomplish primary mission of roadwatch. Extracted 28 July.
84	XE 202458	893	7	15 Jul 68	23 Jul 68	Mission: Roadwatch of Rte 101. On 16 July, one team member sustained leg injury; on 17 July, team reported a shortage of water. On 18 and 20 July, aerial resupply of water attempted in both instances resupply unsuccessful when water containers were broken on impact. Team extracted 28 July; team failed to accomplish assigned mission.
811A	WE 735891	8115	7	21 Jul 68	14 Aug 68	Mission: Roadwatch on unnumbered routes vicinity WE 810923. Team observed movements of 15 enemy groups (20-30 men each) moving in vicinity WE 742890 on 6 August. Team engaged in firefight with enemy platoon on 7 August. Three team members MIA as result of firefight. Team accomplished primary mission of locating terminus unnumbered road vicinity WE 711923. Secondary mission of locating truck park, vicinity WE 728913 accomplished. Additional mission of distributing SSPL material accomplished at WE 711923. Reports of debrief indicate that three missing team members are still evading; aerial search will be continued.

FIGURE B-16 (Cont'd)

Target		Team		Date		Comments
Designation	Location	Designation	Strength	Infiltrated	Exfiltrated	
S13C	XD 575921	S119	6	29 Jul 68	14 Aug 68	Mission: Roadwatch of Rte 1036, vicinity XD 660945. On 10 August, team leader and scout moved out on recon mission; shortly after, enemy force moved into base camp area and remainder of team evaded. Recon party never rejoined team. While evading main body of enemy troops, team observed new trails in area; two trucks, vicinity XD 688934; two new roads suspected as being by-pass routes for Rte 1036; and observed many woodcutters clearing area. Team emplaced M-14 mines, vicinity XD 659940 and took photo of area, vicinity XD 575924, XD 585919, XD 590923 and XD 635935. Search will be conducted for two missing members.
S13D	XD 585845	S116	7	5 Aug 68	16 Aug 68	Mission: Capture NVA prisoner and place M-14 mines on routes of military traffic. Team had no visual or physical enemy contact. Located deserted enemy site containing several ammo, personnel, combo bunkers and several buildings. Team booby-trapped combo bunker with claymore mines. Team did not accomplish primary mission.
S2C	XE 264313	S118	6	6 Aug 68	21 Aug 68	Mission: Roadwatch of Rte 137. Enemy contact on 16 August; after short firefight with four enemy, team withdrew. On 18 August, while three team members were photographing area, a company of enemy appeared; after short firefight, team withdrew and emplaced M-14 mines along route of withdrawal. During night of 17-18 August, team observed company of enemy (270 by count) moving SE, vicinity XE 298294, on trail parallel Rte 137. Troops were dressed in black and carried MGs, AK-47s, mortars, and larger, unidentified weapons. Due to heavy enemy activity in area, team not able to conduct roadwatch on Rte 137; observed several unusable trails paralleling Rte 137.
S13E	XD 568868	894	7	14 Aug 68	18 Aug 68	Mission: Roadwatch of Rte 1036. On 14 August, four NVA soldiers armed with AK-47s, entered base camp; during a three-minute verbal exchange, NVA personnel urged STRATA team to surrender. Team then opened fire and killed all four enemy personnel. Team then withdrew from base camp after receiving heavy small arms fire from estimated enemy platoon. During withdrawal, team emplaced 13 M-14 AP mines along withdrawal route. Roadwatch mission not accomplished.

-b-7c

Annex B to
Appendix C

FIGURE B-16 , (Cont'd)

Target		Team		Date		Comments
Designation	Location	Designation	Strength	Infiltrated	Exfiltrated	
4A	XE 247483	893	7	31 Aug 68	14 Sep 68	Mission: Roadwatch of Rte 101. On 3 September from roadwatch site established, XE 249512, team reported observing 16 trucks moving E to W, 30 kmph traveling 10 minutes apart; also reported enemy squad patrols on Rte 101 daily. On 8 September, team withdrew from roadwatch site due to enemy activity in area. On 9 September, team reported two trucks moving E to W on Rte 101. Team further reported on enemy patrols throughout area; no contact with enemy. Team extracted from vicinity XE 268513 at 140635Z Sep. No reports on tactical reaction or exploitation of targets reported by team.
13F	XD 557921	8116	8	9 Sep 68	23 Sep 68	Mission: Capture of prisoner. On 14 September, ambush site established vicinity XD 557921. On 17 September, team terminated ambush because of no enemy activity in area. From 17-22 September, team patrolled area in attempt to locate enemy. No enemy contact or activity reported. Team extracted from vicinity XD 557923 at 230710Z Sep. Mission of prisoner capture not accomplished.
811B	WE 714777	892	8	15 Sep 68	28 Sep 68	Mission: Area reconnaissance. Team established cache site, vicinity WE 715799; reported slow movement because of difficult terrain. On 19 September, reported location, vicinity WE 712793 of heavily used trail. On 21 September, team successfully evaded enemy patrol. On 22 September, team reported two enemy companies using trail in area; team placed M-14 AP mines on trail and heard subsequent explosions; no enemy contact. Team extracted from vicinity WE 713825 at 280517Z Sep.
32D	XE 384183	894	6	4 Oct 68	28 Oct 68	Mission: Roadwatch of Rte 137. Roadwatch site established at XE 295192 on 10 October; pictures taken of Rte 137 from vicinity XE 284197 to XE 299123. Heavy fog and rain prevented observation during period 11-14 October. New roadwatch site established on 15 October, vicinity XE 285105; more pictures taken of Rte 137 from XE 279176 to XE 284197. Negative enemy contact or sightings.

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Annex B to
Appendix C

FIGURE B-16 (Cont'd)

Target		Team		Date		Comments
Designation	Location	Designation	Strength	Infiltrated	Exfiltrated	
STP	XE 509098	8118	7	6 Oct 68	28 Oct 68	Mission: Reconnaissance of Long Dni River for enemy river traffic. Negative enemy contact through 15 October. Adverse weather in OPAREA affected radio communication and visual observation. On 16 October, team directed to move to exfiltration LZ for extraction on 17 October. Due to adverse weather, extraction not accomplished until 23 October. During initial debrief, team reported that during several radio transmissions, another station kept coming on air speaking Chinese. This unidentified station attempted to "jam" team transmission. Team reported the Song Long Dni was at flood stage and not used for transportation.

C-b-76a

Annex H to
Appendix C

FIGURE B-17

STRATA TARGETS (U)

Target 1^A

Target justification: The target is located vicinity WE 8579 at the junction of NVN National Rte 15 and 101. This is a major fork in the infiltration routes leading from NVN into Laos and SVN. The target area is north of the Mu Gia Pass and contains numerous truck parks, storage and staging areas. SICRs D-133 12429, dated 3 May 66, and U-GAP-13500, dated 30 March 66, requested information regarding enemy infiltration, LOC and transportation. Additionally, 7AF desires information on this target inasmuch as it is a major target for air strikes. A STRATA team operating in Target 1 will be able to provide a comparison of traffic density moving along LOC. Further, it is expected that valuable targeting data can be provided for air strikes. A 15-man STRATA team will infiltrate this target by H-3 type helicopters and remain for approximately 15 days.

Target 2^B

Target justification: The target is located vicinity XE 3435 and is situated along NVN National Rte 137. NVN National Rte 137 is a major supplement to NVN National Rte 15. 7AF is interested in this area. Target 2 is considered a suitable target for STRATA team because of the extremely difficult terrain, which attributes to the scarce habitation in the area and an apparent lack of enemy forces in the vicinity of the target. A 10-man STRATA team will infiltrate this target by H-3 type helicopters and remain for approximately seven days.

Target 3^A

Target justification: The target is located vicinity XD 8388 and is situated along NVN National Rte 103. This area is believed to be an enemy rest area and storage area. Two bridges are located in the target area; however, no truck parks have been noted. Indications are that NVN National Rte 103 is heavily travelled and that trucks are parked at designated sites along the route. A STRATA team can report traffic density along NVN National Rte 103 and provide valuable targeting data for air strikes. A 10-man STRATA team will infiltrate this target by H-3 type helicopters and remain for approximately five days.

a/ COMUSMACV MACSOG 2167/230147Z May 67 (CINCPAC 300117Z May 67)

Target 4^a

Target justification: The target is located vicinity XE 2350 and is situated along Rte 101. It provides the principal transportation link between Rtes 15 and 137, both of which are principal road infiltration routes into Laos. Surveillance of Rte 101 will provide intelligence on the volume and direction of flow of traffic on a principal interior route. In addition, valuable targeting data can be developed for 7AF.

Target 5^a

Target justification: The target is located vicinity XE 1353 along Rte 101. It is considered to be one of the most heavily used routes in NVN. It provides the principal transportation link between Rtes 15 and 137, both of which are principal road infiltration routes into Laos. Surveillance of Rte 101 will provide intelligence on the volume and direction of flow of traffic on principal interior route. In addition, valuable targeting data can be developed for 7AF.

Target 6^a

Target justification: The target is located vicinity XE 3841 and is situated along NVN National Rte 137. DIA intelligence bulletin lists Rte 137 as one of the most heavily traveled routes in NVN, and is a major vehicle concentration area. It is the second major inland infiltration route for supplies to Laos and RVN. At this point, it is fed by Rte 101 from the North. Surveillance of this route will provide information on the volume and direction of traffic flow. In addition, valuable targeting data can be developed for 7AF.

Target 7^a

Target justification: The target is located vicinity XE 5505 west on Rte 196. The condition, status of Rte 196 is not known. Use of the DIA Giang River for movement of supplies and equipment is also unknown. Surveillance of this area will provide information on the status and use of these two routes of movement. In addition, valuable targeting data can be developed for 7AF.

^a/ COMUSMACV MACV 4057/230725Z Aug 67 (CINCPAC 312216Z Aug 67)

Target 8^{a/}

Target justification: The target is located vicinity XE 5528 and consists of a series of truck parks along Song Dun, approximately 14 nm from the Laos/NVN border; not associated with any known road. This could be a major storage area or the beginning of a new overland route to Laos. Surveillance of the area will provide information on the size, use and content of the truck park/storage areas. In addition, valuable targeting data can be developed for 7AF.

Target 9^{a/}

Target justification: The target is located vicinity VG 7010 and is situated along Rte 7. It connects NVN Rte 1A and Laotian Rte 13 via the Col Barthelemy Pass and is the primary supply route in support of Pathet Lao operations in the Plaine Des Jarres area. Surveillance of this route will provide information on the volume and direction of traffic flow. In addition, valuable targeting data can be developed for 7AF.

Target 10^{b/}

Target justification: The target is located within the quadrant WE 6095-7095 and F 6005-7005. Reconnaissance of this area is desired to locate unnumbered routes which branch off of Rte 151.

Target 11^{b/}

Target justification: The target is located within the quadrant WE 6585-7585 and W 6595-7595. Reconnaissance is desired to locate an unnumbered route which terminates at WE 713936.

Target 12^{b/}

Target justification: The target is located within the quadrant WE 8365-9265 and WE 8349-9249. Main target is Khe La Mong Road as reported in NIC Interrogation Report (164/68-DOI: June 1966). Road supposedly begins at Rte 101 and crosses the Laotian border southeast Mu Gia Pass.

^{a/} COMUSMACV MACSOG 4057/230725Z Aug 67 (CINCPAC 312216Z Aug 67)

^{b/} COMUSMACV MACSOG 1985/140412Z Apr 68 (CINCPAC 160524Z Apr 68)

Target 13^{a/}

Target justification: The target is located within the area XD 5991-6991 and XD 6981-5981. Reconnaissance of this area is desired to determine enemy motorized and foot traffic on Rte 1038, known at Bat Lake (IAC XA) road which extends from XE 808063 (Rte 101) to XD 664782. Aerial photography does not reveal any further extension of this road South or West. Road is reported serviceable and heavily traveled. Tracked and wheeled vehicle tracks are very apparent from photo read-outs. Target is within helicopter range of

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Target 14^{b/}

The target is located within the area of WF 2645-4025 and WF 2627-4027.

Target 15^{b/}

The target is located within the area of WF 2053-3553 and WF 2037-3537.

Both target areas are located near the Laotian border and are approximately 40 kilometers southwest of Vinh (WF 7164). Each area measures 14 x 18 km with about one-third of each area overlapping the principal roadwatch target Rte 8. Targets areas are between 18° 20 minutes and 18° 34 minutes parallels and are not affected by present overflights and ordnance restrictions. Both target areas are within helicopter flight range from

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
a/ COMUSMACV MACSOG 2625/200200Z May 68 (CINCPAC 220409Z May 68)
b/ COMUSMACV MACSOG 3792/210720Z Jul 68 (CINCPAC 232118Z Jul 68)

FIGURE B-18
STRATA MISSION DATA (U)

Seq No.	Team	Tgt Area	Dates	Mission	Remarks
1	111 (8 VN)	7	17-23 Mar	Roadwatch	Enemy contact 18 Mar
2	113 (8 VN)	7	31 Mar-7 Apr	Recon/Roadwatch	N/A
3	114 (8 VN)	7	7-15 Apr	Roadwatch	Enemy contact 9 Apr
4	120 (6 VN)	7	14-17 May	Riverwatch	Contact lost 17 May; TM declared MIA.
5	111 (7 VN)	7	14-29 May	Roadwatch	N/A
6	122 (4 VN)	2	15-22 May	Roadwatch	N/A
7	113 (8 VN)	2	22 May-7 Jun	Roadwatch	N/A
8	114 (7 VN)	13	6-17 Jun	Roadwatch	3 MIA on 12 Jun
9	115 (7 Comb.)	11	20-29 Jun	Recon	Enemy contact 27 Jun
10	111 (7 VN)	13	20-30 Jun	Recon/Road- watch	1 self-inflicted wound; extracted
11	117 (6 Comb.)	7	27 Jun-6 Jul	Roadwatch	N/A
12	118 (7 VN)	2	4-14 Jul	Roadwatch	Enemy contact 10 Jul
13	94 (8 VN)	13	13-28 Jul	Recon/Road- watch	Enemy contact 17 & 21 Jul
14	93 (8 VN)	4	15-23 Jul	Roadwatch	N/A
15	115 (7 Comb.)	11	21 Jul-14 Aug	Recon	Enemy contact 7 Aug; 4 MIA
16	119 (6 VN)	13	29 Jul-14 Aug	Roadwatch	2 MIA
17	116 (7 Comb.)	13	5-16 Aug	FW	N/A
18	118 (6 Comb.)	2	6-21 Aug	Roadwatch	Enemy contact 16 & 18 Aug
19	94 (7 VN)	13	14-19 Aug	Recon/FW	Enemy contact 14 Aug
20	93 (7 VN)	4	31 Aug-14 Sep	Roadwatch	N/A
21	116 (8 Comb.)	13	9-23 Sep	FW	N/A
22	92 (8 VN)	11	15-28 Sep	Recon	N/A
23	94 (6 VN)	2	4-23 Oct	Roadwatch	Enemy contact 17 Oct
24	118 (7 Comb.)	7	6-23 Oct	Riverwatch	N/A

FIGURE B-19

STRATA TARGET AREAS AND MISSIONS (U)



- F. SINGLETON OPERATIONS 1
1. Policy. Singleton agent operations, under the agent 2
team program rules, required case-by-case approval at the 3
Washington level. 4
2. GOLDFISH and PERGOLA 5
- a. Background. The concept of operations* as submitted in 6
July 1967 by COMUSMACV was to utilize two PLOWMAN detainees 7
as returnees to their former fishing occupation to collect 8
intelligence information. No communications were planned 9
during the 60-90 day mission. Exfiltration would be by 10
SOG/STD PTF pickup on initiation of the proper recognition 11
signal by the agents. Debriefing would then follow. This 12
initial insertion was the forerunner of the maritime 13
diversionary program; Project URGENCY, which was conducted 14
in 1968. Authority to infiltrate GOLDFISH and PERGOLA was 15
forwarded by JCS in August 1967.** 16
- b. Operations. The two agents were trained at Paradise 17
Island (see Annex on psychological operations) for low- 18
level intelligence collection in their home areas, and were 19
returned to NVN by PLOWMAN mission 327 on 13 September 20
1967. No contact was expected for 60-90 days; however, there 21
is no record that either of the agents ever made an attempt 22
to be retrieved as planned. 23
3. Gray-Singleton Operations 24
- a. Background. In August 1968, MACSOG proposed to CINCPAC 25
JCS a concept*** for using gray singleton agents to collect 26
information in selected populated centers in NVN. The agents 27
selected were to be documented as NVN soldiers and were to 28
remain in the selected center of operations for one to two 29
weeks only. Two agents, ROMA and AURORA, were recruited in 30
1968 from the National Chieu Hai Center in Gia Dinh. The 31

* (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 250812Z Jul 67
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 141905Z Aug 67 (SACSA)
*** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 180520Z Aug 68 (SACSA)

proposed target areas in order of priority were: Vinh, Thai Tru, Anh Son, Dong Hoi, Thanh Hoa, Ha Tinh, and Sam Son. The proposal as outlined above was approved by CINCPAC*, but the imminence and final promulgation of the bombing halt decision of 1 November delayed JCS approval until the possibility of conducting the operations was overtaken by events.**

b. ROMA. Subsequently, the target area for ROMA was changed to an intelligence mission [DATA] ROMA was launched on this mission on 1 December 1968, but was not heard from again. He was declared missing in action on 15 December 1968.

c. AURORA. Agent AURORA was infiltrated [DATA] for a short-term observation mission. The agent carried a beeper radio which enabled central contact to monitor his progress. The agent moved to the target area and returned to the exfiltration LZ; however, there was no further contact and the agent was not recovered.***

d. DIE HARD. This agent was to carry out a mission in Cambodia in two phases. Phase I commenced on 9 April 1969 and had as its objective to determine whether placement was feasible in the target area, [DATA] Because of the inadequacy of the documentation provided, the agent was stopped and arrested during a cursory check [DATA]

[DATA] By bribing the local police official, DIE HARD was able to return to South Vietnam. It was planned to attempt Phase I again, beginning on 12 July 1969.***

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* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 080032Z Sep 68 (SACSA)
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV Command History, 1968," p. F-III-4-3 (SACSA)
*** (TS) Memo, MACSOG-36, "Status of Singleton Agent Program," 12 July 1969 (SACSA)

G. DIVERSIONARY OPERATIONS

As mentioned briefly in Part I of this Annex
diversionary operations were conceived in late 1967 and were
well underway in 1968 when the bombing halt in November
limited all activities except certain psychological aspects
of the operations. The formal program initially consisted of
six projects as approved verbally by COMUSMACV on 14 March 1968.
The program was to be conducted primarily within the authorities
for FOOTBOY already in approved at the JCS or CINCPAC level.
Those operations that exceeded established authorities/^{were}submitted
to CINCPAC for approval on a case-by-case basis.* Three of the
six projects were transferred from DATA to HUMIDOR
for implementation. The three remaining programs in DATA
are described below.

1. "Project OODLES . This project is designed to
portray an apparently extensive and successful clandestine agent
network in selected areas of NVN. Conduct of this project
parallels conduct of the in-place long-term agent team operations
and becomes more credible by NVN knowledge of captured actual
teams. Family messages are sent via HUMIDOR SSPL one-way
voice link and the notional teams are resupplied in the same
manner as actual teams.]

DATA


~~were authorized by CINCPAC for activation in 1968.~~ Eighteen notional teams
Fourteen of them have been activated via message traffic. Of the fourteen
activated teams, eight have been geographically located by bundle
and notional personnel parachute drops. Two teams have been
notionally reinforced by the actual infiltration of pseudo-
agents.*** Following the bombing halt messages were sent to each
team every other month. The messages were comprised mainly of
family news and code instructions. The name of the notional
team was given, but not its location (see Figure B-20).

2. "Project URGENCY... This project involves the use
of fishermen captured during PLOWMAN operations as pseudo-
agents and, where possible, actual agents. The objectives are
to divert NVN security forces to apprehend, detain, interrogate,
and investigate fishermen implicated as agents and, if not dis-
covered, to collect intelligence. During HUMIDOR s SSPL
orientation of those fishermen captured, the cooperative, more
intelligent were recruited and trained as low-level agents, then

* (TS) Historical Summary, Airborne Studies Group, "SOG Annual
Historical Summary," 5 Jan 69, p. 12 (SACSA)

** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV 1968 Command History,"
p. III-4-5 (SACSA)

FIGURE CB-20
PROJECT OODLES:



returned to NVN to be recontacted at a later date. NVN cadre, militia, or other fishermen who will not benefit the SSPL and/or are uncooperative are returned to NVN far from their homes with money or messages planted in their clothing, or are obviously implicated as agents in other ways. To date, there have been eleven low-level agents and two pseudo-agents launched into NVN. The PLOWMAN restrictions on capturing fishermen suspended all URGENCY operations in May, but the partial lifting of restrictions in July allowed a limited resumption until 1 November at which time restrictions imposed suspended the URGENCY program."* (See Figure CB-21.)

3. "Project BORDEN . This project employs NVA ralliers and prisoners of war to convince NVN that a successful penetration of the NVA is being conducted with the mission of inducing defection and collecting intelligence. The project is designed to divert military resources to counter this penetration, harass and alienate NVA troops from their leaders, strain NVN ideological control, induce defection and collect intelligence. NVA soldiers are collected from division level detention facilities as soon after capture as possible, oriented for two weeks on the freedom and prosperity of RVN at a centralized security facility, and in other ways convinced to support the RVN; trained one week as agents; and infiltrated into NVA-controlled territory of RVN, Laos, Cambodia and NVN. The agent's mission is to return to the NVA as an escapee or under other appropriate cover, collect intelligence, recruit dissatisfied soldiers through the use of a secret 'CHIEU HOI' pass (ultra-violet mark on the prospective rallier) and exfiltrate through defection. It is fully expected and intended that many of the recruited agents will reveal their assigned mission to the NVA of their own volition or under interrogation. Those NVA soldiers not recruited as agents during the orientation period are returned to normal detention facilities to spread specifically revealed project information to these detainees for eventual transmission to NVA intelligence analysts. For CY 1968, 98 detainees have been collected for this project. Fifty of them were returned to detention facilities, 44 were inserted as agents into NVN- and NVA-controlled territory of RVN, Laos and Cambodia. Four agents are scheduled for insertion in January 1969. Five agents have been recovered and three reinserted; one in NVN in support of both Project OODLES and Project BORDEN' and two in Laos."** This project was continued into 1969 with agents dropped into both Laos and Cambodia. During the spring months, 12 agents per month were dropped; at mid-year, the number was reduced to three per month. (See Figure CB-22.)


H. EARTH ANGEL

The EARTH ANGLE program was conceived in the spring of 1969 to indoctrinate carefully selected Chieu Hoi personnel as intelligence agents for insertion into Laos. The authority for and operations conducted in this program are covered in the appendix on operations in Laos. The training and control of these agents were under the direction of CP-36 (Airborne Studies Group).

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV 1968 Command History," p. III-4-5 (SACSA)

** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV 1968 Command History," p. III-4-6 (SACSA)

FIGURE CB-22
PROJECT BORDEN



PART IV. PROBLEM AREAS (U)

A. PROBLEM AREAS - AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

The problem areas that have plagued airborne operations from 1964 through 1968 are codified chronologically below:

B. CHRONOLOGY

1. 1964

a. "Ground rules which limit Airborne Operations ability to increase pressure on DRV:

(1) "Deployed teams are restricted from contacting population or starting resistance.

(2) "Restriction on overflight of Laos (lifted 24 May 1964).

(3) "Restriction from using third country airfields for staging bases has caused extreme range, load, and weather problems.

(4) "Restriction from use of helicopters to emplace and resupply agent teams deprives SOG of operational flexibility and limits potential. Request was denied on 18 April 1964.

DATA

b. "Weather and Terrain

(1) "The DRV as a whole has some of the poorest flying weather in the world and some of the roughest terrain. These obstacles have held airborne operations at an unproductive level.

(2) "The mountains and fogs force the C-123 aircraft to operate only during light of moon periods, i.e., 10-12 nights a month.

(3) "The rugged terrain which aids the agents in maintaining their security produces little survival food and greatly hinders movement.

c. "Enemy

(1) "The DRV employs large numbers of AAA weapons which severely restricts resupply operations. Aircraft are not allowed to fly within range of these guns even if masking terrain is present.

d. "Counterpart Relations

(1) "SOG and STS Headquarters are distant physically. This makes direct liaison difficult. The telephone cannot be used because of security precautions. A liaison officer is assigned but much is still desired in the form of a closer relationship.

(2) "US security regulations render it impossible for STS personnel to visit SOG working areas.

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(3) "A few of STS officers are ineffective. However, it is difficult to have such individuals replaced.

e. "Equipment

(1) "Principal weakness of Airborne Operations is the lack of operational aircraft. The C-123 load capacity, operating range, and inability to fly in adverse weather greatly hampers airborne operations." *

2. 1965

"a. Limitations on Aircraft (numbers and types)

"(1) Airborne operations during the past year have been hampered by the limited numbers and the types of aircraft available for employment by this section. During any given launch period, no more than two C-123 aircraft are usually available at the same time. An additional four H-34 helicopters VNAF crews, currently supporting Shining Brass operations, are available for periodic employment in 34A programs. These helicopters however, are generally unsuitable to 34A operations because of range and cargo carrying limitations.

"(2) In order to adequately support the present in-place teams, and to have the capability of introducing and supporting additional teams in NVH, a combination of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft are needed. The helicopters, with a suitable range and lift capability, will insure the relatively safe delivery of an intact operational team to a pre-selected point. A fixed wing aircraft with a greater cargo load (ACL) than that of the C-123 aircraft, and possessing the capability of flying missions independent of the moon period will permit two or three resupply operations to be flown on one sortie.

"b. Inadequate Base Rights

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DATA

In addition, VNAF helicopters may be used to deploy teams into the NVN from bases in SVN. No authority exists, however, for deployment of agent teams by VNAF helicopter into the NVN; deployment of agent teams by VNAF helicopter from DATA into the NVN; use of intermediate staging areas [DATA] for refueling VNAF helicopters incident to infiltration of agent teams into NVN; use of US crews in support of 34A operations in the NVN; or use of DATA

"(2) Projected airborne operations during 1966 will place heavy demands on all available resources to emplace operational teams. Four new operational areas are scheduled for activation. Delivery techniques must offer the highest assurance of emplacing all team members in or near the operational area. Helicopter infiltration is considered the best method of doing this. Yet, all areas programmed for activation

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV Command History 1964," p #19-22 (SACSA)

are beyond the limits of missions which can be flown in the VNAF helicopters from bases in SVN. Additionally, all areas are beyond, or marginally close to, the practical limits of range and cargo capability of the H-24 helicopter operating from DATA. At the end of the year, consideration was being given to requesting CINCPAC views on expansion of base rights DATA

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3. 1966

"a. Aerial Photography Problems. Chief, SOG requires that aerial photography of the DZ/LZ be accomplished and interpreted not earlier than five days prior to a scheduled infiltration into NVN, before human resources may be committed. This is necessary in order to determine the most recent changes in vegetation, human habitation, or military activity in the operational area, as an added safety precaution for the infiltrating teams. Adverse weather conditions in NVN have delayed timely aerial photography of operational areas. Additionally, in several instances, SOG priority photography missions have had to give way to other priority missions. In either case, delay was caused in scheduled infiltrations.

"b. Exfiltration. Two attempts to exfiltrate several members from Team TOURBILLON ALFA in September and Team HECTOR in December were cancelled because Team TOURBILLON ALFA failed to establish radio contact prior to the scheduled exfiltration LZ. The inability so far to exfiltrate team members has had an adverse effect on the retention of agent trainees. Exfiltration attempts will continue to be made.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex N to MACV Command History 1965," p #A-19 (SACSA)

A concept to exfiltrate Team BELL was developed and forwarded to CINCPAC on COMUSMACV msg DTG 160720Z Jan 67. A successful team exfiltration will demonstrate dramatically to agent trainees that agents can be brought safely out of NVN. Further, agent losses will be curbed if exfiltrations can be accomplished successfully.

"c. Communications. Real-time road/rail and river watch reporting cannot be effected presently because the communications arrangement allows only one daily two-way contact between base radio DATA and in-place teams. Although this contact is supplemented with additional contacts when possible, adverse weather affecting wave propagation often prevents usable contact during certain periods. In addition, base radio station at present cannot handle all traffic simultaneously. The Radio, RS-1, the principal team radio, is unwieldy. Although it can be man-packed, it becomes ponderous when carried cross-country over difficult terrain for extended periods. Lightweight radios are being produced, and the DELCO Model 5300 Radio was requisitioned for field suitability testing. Two DELCO Model 5300 Radios, together with 16 transceiver crystals, antenna, carrying case, 10 batteries, battery charger with one-year supply of spare parts, valued at \$5,221.00 were requisitioned with a priority 5 from the Counterinsurgency Supply Office, Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands on 26 April. The radios and not been received at the end of the year.

"d. Resupply. Aerial resupply was one of the biggest problems in keeping in-place teams viable. High performance aircraft are employed to effect resupply to in-place teams whose operational zones are within the surface-to-air missile ring. This resupply technique has distinct limitations. DZ markings are imperceptible and delivery accuracy is not often achieved. Further, if delivery is effected in areas other than the intended drop zone, the dropped supplies will imperil the team if discovered by unfriendly citizenry or security forces. Adverse weather conditions continue to affect resupply deliveries to in-place teams. Additionally, some operational zones are located in areas where drop and landing zones are scarce and areas suitable for drop and landing zones are difficult to establish and operate.

"e: Contact with Enemy Forces. NVN Government has been and will continue to exert a concerted effort against the OPLAN 34A Program. Several in-place teams have encountered enemy forces on repeated occasions recently, resulting in the loss of several team members. Inasmuch as two-thirds of all OPLAN 34A Airborne have been listed as lost since the program's inception in early 1960, the current situation is not unprecedented; however, the pressure exerted by the enemy appears to be better organized and employed more universally throughout NVN. Efforts have been made to minimize communications between the base station and in-place teams, and currently deception and diversionary tactics are being employed in the resupply drops in an attempt to gain some relief for the teams." *

4. 1967

"a. Aerial Photography Problems. Chief SOG requires that aerial photography of the DZ/LZ be accompanied and interpreted not earlier than ten days prior to a scheduled infiltration

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex M to MACV Command History 1966," p. 74-76.

into NVN. This is necessary to determine the most recent change in vegetation, human habitation, or military activity in the operational area as an added safety precaution for the infiltrating teams. Adverse weather conditions in NVN have delayed timely aerial photography of operational areas. Also, in several instances SOG priority photography missions have had to give way to higher priority missions. In either case this caused delays in scheduled infiltrations.

"b. Exfiltration. Several attempts were made to exfiltrate long-term teams from NVN, but as in the past all efforts were unsuccessful. In February helicopters attempting to exfiltrate team BELL reached the LZ, but the team had departed and in March contact with the team was lost. In June the exfiltration of team VERSE was frustrated when a US aircraft was shot down near the LZ and contact with the team was lost, presumably as a result of increased enemy activity in the area. In June a concept to forcibly exfiltrate team ROMEO, suspected of being under enemy control, was disapproved by CINCPAC because the possible benefits to be derived did not warrant the hazards involved. A plan to exfiltrate two members of team REMUS via Fulton SKYHOOK was abandoned when enemy security patrols discovered the cached equipment. In spite of the difficulties experienced with long-term teams, the feasibility of recovering agents from NVN was sustained when team STRATA III was exfiltrated by USAF Ch-3 helicopters on 28 September 1967. This was the first successful exfiltration of a ~~DATA~~ team from NVN.

"c. Contact with Enemy Forces. The NVN government has intensified internal security measures and has employed all available communications media to make the population aware of the presence of SVN "spy-rangers" in their midst. In-place teams continued to encounter enemy forces and suffer casualties as a result. The current situation is not unprecedented in as much as many agent teams have been lost to the enemy since the program's inception in early 1961. However, the pressure now being exerted by the enemy appears to be well organized and employed throughout NVN. Recent actions to develop a wide ranging diversionary program are expected to diminish the effectiveness of the NVN security apparatus by provoking time consuming and fruitless counteractions.

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5. 1968

"a. Lack of adequate aerial photography. Prior to 1 November bombing halt which restricted TIMBERWORK (C) operations in NVN, a combination of adverse weather conditions, higher priority missions of other agencies and the 1 April reduction in bombing activities serve to delay timely receipt of aerial photography. In many cases, lack of appropriate photography caused delays in planning and scheduling of missions. This will undoubtedly continue to be a problem in the event operations in NVN are resumed and an effort to obtain assignment of higher mission priorities would seem to be the only solution.

"b. Difficulty in Resupply Operations. Considerable problems were encountered in attempted resupplies of both long-term and STRATA teams during 1968. Restrictions on overflights of NVN north of 20° N after 1 April and of NVN-controlled teams by CINCPAC direction, are conditions that cannot be resolved at MACSOG level. Adverse weather and team error are also unresolvable problems. STRATA resupply difficulties were primarily caused by improper techniques and bundle configuration. Experimentation and testing had all but resolved these problems before the 1 November bombing halt suspended STRATA infiltration in NVN.

"c. Lack of Required Equipment. A general shortage of NNA uniforms and equipment has continuously hindered efforts to deploy agents and teams clothed and equipped in such a manner as to be able to pass at a distance as NVA personnel or possibly survive a chance encounter. Although efforts were made to obtain captured equipment from units in RVN in 1968, no workable system was implemented to insure that equipment was reserved for MACSOG. Efforts to initiate manufacture of needed items had not been successful as of the end of 1968.

"d. Difficulty in Aircraft Observer/STRATA Team Contacts. Inherent difficulties in working with brevity codes and a language barrier resulting from utilization of non-VN speaking observers caused communications between aerial observers from NKP and deployed STRATA teams to be inadequate. Diplomatic restrictions which prevented VN personnel from remaining in Thailand over 24 hours precluded use of VN observers. Unless this diplomatic restriction is lifted, it is anticipated that this problem will continue during missions controlled by NKP, whether operations in NVN are resumed, or during interim operations in PF/DB AOS. A change to the MACSOG JTD which will incorporate US operations officer/observers with VN language capability will greatly alleviate this problem." *

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV Command History 1968,"
PF III -4-8 (SACSA)

PART V. EVALUATION (U)

A. SACSA EVALUATION 1964

1. The confusion over the mission of agent teams is evident in a memorandum written by SACSA in August 1964. It states that along with other psychological weapons (radio, leaflets, mail) specially trained teams were introduced into North Vietnam to "create either a real or notional resistance movement within the DRV."* As discussed earlier, the resistance movement was not to be approved at the Washington level. (See Annex A for a discussion of "Resistance Movement".)

2. An evaluation of recruiting problems and prospects was included in the memorandum:

"The problem of team selection and targeting is complex and requires consideration of the various factors of ethnic origin, religion, location of families, motivation, intelligence, and an assessment of the individuals will to survive and resist. North Vietnam breaks down territorially into two distinct areas. One area is the mountainous tribal region of western and northwestern NVN. Here the Meo tribe offers the best chance of success because of its native, hostile attitude towards all non-Meo people. The other area is the Vietnamese inhabited lowlands which comprise the Red River Delta system and the coastal plain. Here the communists exercise almost complete control over the people which makes it difficult to establish large-scale resistance. Any successful development would be expected to remain passive and unorganized. In spite of these difficulties, efforts have been underway to create a credible resistance movement in NVN.

"It is to be noted that within the largely Meo-dominated western and northwestern parts of NVN, there are other ethnic geographic divisions which compound the selection problem. Simply stated, all precautions must be taken to match the team personnel with its drop location.

" With due consideration given to ethnic groups, religion, and family location, experience so far has shown that the military services of the RVN are more desirable as sources for additional agent/team members. Qualified civilians will continue to be selectively recruited as required."**

* (TS) Memorandum, SACSA, "Psychological Operations Teams - North Vietnam," 6 Aug 64. (SACSA)

** (TS) Ibid., pp 1-2

3. The memorandum concludes with an overall evaluation including some problem areas and expectation for the future:

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"Early infiltrations (1960-1963) DATA were forced to remain dormant because of the difficulty of achieving resupply. Their main task was survival. The resupply attempts were largely unsuccessful because of the enormously difficult task of locating tiny drop zones in jungle areas where no navigation aids exist. It is known that four members of one team died from malnutrition. The same team was finally successfully resupplied in July after more than a year of living off the land.

"This problem has now been solved by the installation of precise navigation equipment in the delivery aircraft.

"The exact nature of the team PsyOps activities is unknown. As can readily be understood, radio communications with these teams is very difficult technically, and is extremely hazardous for the team. Messages transmitted by the teams are, therefore, very short - they can listen much more safely than they can talk.

"In addition to these problems, and as already stated, the objective is long range. Results are not expected at any specific date. The potential for establishing a resistance base, however, is now in place and, for the time being, relatively well supplied."*

B. COMUSMACV EVALUATIONS, 1966

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The increased interest in intelligence collection capabilities in 1965-1966 prompted the following evaluations of the agent teams contributed to intelligence by MACV/MACSOG in the late 1966.

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1. The following is quoted from the COMUSMACV message report:

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"a. Summary: As of 1 Nov 66 MACSOG had twelve agent teams in North Vietnam, comprising 102 individual agents. From 1 January to 1 November 1966, nine of these teams produced 73 intelligence reports. The three newest teams, KERN, HECTOR, and SAMSON, infiltrated in 1966, have not as yet produced intelligence information. Productivity of the different teams and the topics covered in the reporting are discussed in detail below, but in general the information produced is of intelligence value. The teams have become increasingly responsive to priority collection requirements in the past four months, with different teams reporting on two Priority 1 SICR topics. The production average of the twelve reporting teams has been somewhat less than one report per month per team

* (TS) Ibid., pp 2-3

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