DEGRASSIFIED

starboard side, forward, adjacent to Number One elevator. The bulkhead of the locker was burned through and magnesium fire spewed into hangar bay one. Two helicopters caught fire, causing evacuation of the forward hangar deck. Four A4E Skyhawks also received varying degrees of damage. Rapid action of plane handling crews in moving aircraft from forward areas of the flight deck and burning hangar bays prevented more serious loss of aircraft. Smoke penetrated living quarters on the 01 deck, main deck and 2nd deck. Many officers were trapped in their rooms by flash fires. The forward elevator was jammed in the "up" position and the entire overhead in hangar bays one and two were severely damaged. The catapults also received damage. Valiant efforts on the part of the ship and air wing ordnance personnel prevented large quantities of bombs, rockets and fuzes from detonating. CONSTELLATION and F.D. ROOSEVELT closed with ORISKANY, rendering helicopter assistance in transporting the injured and providing supplementary medical assistance. The fire was brought under control within about three hours. The final toll from the fire # was 43 officers and men dead, 3 seriously injured and 35 with minor injuries. The damage and losses resulting from this fire necessitated the ORISKANY's departure from YANKEE STATION to undergo temporary repairs at Subic Bay, R.P.

On 29 October a TICONDEROGA A4 returning from a day training flight, struck the ramp and was lost overboard. The pilot was not recovered.

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

During the period 1-4 October PERKINS, ST. FRANCIS RIVER, HANSON, CARRONADE, DENNIS J. BUCKLEY, ST. PAUL, UHLMANN, HISSOM, WALKE, HULL and EVERETT F. LARSON fired 4653 rounds and 2500 rockets at 425 targets. As a result, 541 structures and 12 sampans were destroyed. In addition, 570 other structures and 15 sampans were damaged. Eighteen VC were confirmed killed by naval gunfire.

During the week 5-11 October CONWAY, HOLLISTER, WALKE, UHLMANN, OZBOURN, DENNIS J. BUCKLEY, EVERETT F. LARSEN, MULLINIX, WHITE RIVER, ST. PAUL, HULL and DEHAVEN fired 7327 rounds and 1871 rockets, weighing more than one quarter of a million pounds, at 580 targets in South Vietnam. 129 Structures were known to have been destroyed and 263 others damaged. 202 VC confirmed killed by naval gunfire.

During the period 12-18 October the BUCK, OZBOURN, CHEVALIER, OKLAHOMA CITY, GURKE, DEHAVEN, HOLLISTER, MULLINIX, CLARION RIVER and WHITE RIVER fired 8136 rounds and 1232 5" SS rockets at 420 targets in South Vietnam. 576 structures and 12 sampnans were destroyed. 821 Other structures and sampans were damaged. 96 VC were confirmed killed by naval gunfire.

During the period 19-25 October the GURKE, WHITE RIVER, BUCK, CLARION RIVER, MULLINIX, CHEVALIER, OKLAHOMA CITY, BRADLEY and O'HARE fired 5067 rounds and 1918 5" rockets at 731 targets. 328 Structures and 78 junks/sampans were known to have been destroyed. 424 Other structures and 8 sampans were damaged. 49 VC were confirmed killed by naval gunfire and 5 others wounded.



DECISPARTINAPIED

During the period 26-31 October MANSFIELD, HULL, MULLINIX, O'HARE, THEODORE E. CHANDLER, CHEVALIER, BRADLEY, BUCK, VOGELGESAND and CANBERRA fired 8000 rounds and 2983 5" rockets at 578 targets. 462 Structures and 64 junks/sampans were destroyed. 849 Structures and 81 junks/sampans were damaged. 183 VC were confirmed KIA and 111 more wounded by naval gunfire.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

On 1 October, planning commenced to ready SEVENTH Fleet forces in the event of an RLT (-) sized amphibious operation. The RVN contingency force embarked in the ARG ships and sailed for the I CTZ. Reconstruction of SLF commenced with embarkation of elements of BLT 3/26 in HENRICO and TORTUGA. On 4 October, VALLEY FORGE arrived at Okinawa as the final ship of TG 76.6 and HENRICO sailed for Subic Bay enroute to rendezvous with the remainder of TG 76.6 in preparation for Exercise HILLTOP VII. On 5 October, the TORTUGA departed Okinawa enroute to SLF rendezvous in Subic Bay. The ARG (IWO JIMA, VANCOUVER and THOMASTON) arrived at a position off the Northern coast of I CTZ on 6 October and reported ready for contingency operations. Forces were HDQTRS RLT 26, BLT 3/3 and HMM 163. The VALLEY FORGE, with 79.5 and HMM 362 embarked, departed Okinawa enroute Subic Bay. Exercise HILLTOP VII commenced on 10 October at San Jose, Mindoro, R.P., and was completed on 12 October. Exercise MUD PUPPY I, a River/Swamp Warfare Exercise, commenced on 17 October at Navotas, Mindoro, R.P. TG 76.6 (ARG), with TG 79.2 embarked, remained in. a ready status for possible contingency operations off Northern I CTZ.

Exercise MUD PUPPY I was terminated on 20 October.

On 26 October TG 76.6, consisting of VALLEY FORGE, HENRICO and GUNSTON HALL sailed from Subic Bay enroute to RVN to relieve TG 76.5 in ready status off the Northern coast of I CTZ. On 28 October TG 76.5 (ARG) commenced off-loading TG 79.2 consisting of BLT 3/3 and HMM 163 at DONG HO and PHU BAI. TG 76.6, and TG 79.5 embarked, assumed readiness posture. For the remainder of the period rotation of forces was in progress to reconstitute normal ARG (TG 76.5) with normal SLF (TG 79.5) while maintaining at all times a contingency force in readiness.

VIP VISITS TO THE SEVENTH FLEET

During the period 5-11 October:

BGEN R.G. OWENS, USMC, Head JCS Team to "Review Air Operations for Avoiding Border Violations" visited ORISKANY.

Dr. W. MC MILLIAN, Prospective Scientific Advisor to COMUSMACV, visited INTREPID.

BGEN D.R. DEANE, Jr., USA, Assistant Commander First Division, Vietnam visited the CORAL SEA.

During the period 12-18 October:



DECLASSIMED

VADM A.M. SHINN, Prospective COMNAVAIRPAC, RADM P.A. HOLMBERG, NAVAIR-SUPSYSCOMREPAC and party visited CORAL SEA, INTREPID and ORISKANY.

The Honorable Robert MC NAMARA, SECDEF, and official party including Mr. Arthur SYLVESTER, Assistant SECDEF, GEN E.G. WHEELER, USA, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, LTGEN G.S. BROWN, USAF, Special Assistant to CJCS and BGEN A.J.F. MOODY, USA, Military Assistant to SECDEF, visited ORISKANY.

ADM U.S.G. SHARP, USN, CINCPAC, and official party including MGEN C. BROWN, USAF, J-2, CINCPAC Staff and BGEN HUTCHINSON, USMC, CINCPAC Staff, visited ORISKANY for conferences with SECDEF, COMSEVENTHFLT, and the "On Scene Commanders".

Commodore HOLFORD, RN, Commander in Charge, Hong Kong, visited CONSTELLATION at Hong Kong.

During the period 19-25 October:

Actor John GAVIN visited CONSTELLATION and F.D. ROOSEVELT

The Martha RAYE USO Troupe visited the CONSTELLATION.

During the period 26-31 October:

On 30 October ADM MC DONALD, Chief of Naval Operations, and official party including Dr. Thomas MC KNEW, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, National Geographic Society, VADM B.J. SEMMES, Chief of Naval Personnel, VADM I.J. GALANTIN, Chief of Naval Material, RADM G.E. MOORE, II, Deputy Commander of Supply Operations, NAVSUPSYSCOM and RADM G.E. CAGLE, Director Aviation Programs, OPNAV, arrived aboard CONSTELLATION commencing a two day tour of Yankee Team which included visits by various members of the party to CORAL SEA, F.D. ROOSEVELT, MT. KATMAI and HERBERT J. THOMAS.

During the period 26-31 October Dr. William MC MILLIAN, Scientific Consultant to COMUSMACV visited CONSTELLATION for IOIC orientation and discussions with VADM HYLAND and RADM RICHARDSON.

During this same period members of the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee Staff, Committee on Armed Forces and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government Operations visited CONSTELL-ATION and F.D. ROOSEVELT for general CVA orientation and discussions on logistics, target assignment and ordnance matters.

Following a visit to the Flagship, OKLAHOMA CITY, on 29 October, His Imperial Highness Neptunis Rex, accompanied by various notables, including Davy Jones, paid a visit to INTREPID and KEARSARGE while these vessels crossed the Equator.

COMSEVENTHFLT MOVEMENTS

On 1 October, VADM P.D. STROOP, USN (Ret), and VADM J.B. PEARSON, Jr., USN (Ret), called on VADM HYLAND aboard the Flagship.

VADM HYLAND attended change of command ceremonies on board OKLAHOMA CITY on 3 October.

On 4 October Mr. Yoshio Miwa, Admin Vice Minister, JDA, and party visited VADM HYLAND in OKLAHOMA CITY where they received the SEVENTH Fleet posture brief and a tour of the Flagship.

When OKLAHOMA CITY departed Yokosuka on 7 October for YANKEE STATION, VADM HYLAND flew to Cubi Pt., accompanied by RADM S.R. BROWN, OP-35.

On 8 October VADM HYLAND held discussions with RADM D.C. RICHARDSON, CTF-77, in CONSTELLATION at Subic Bay. VADM HYLAND then toured FICPACFAC. Following this tour he flew to Sangley Pt. where he flew an OSAP in a VP-50 aircraft on 9 October.

On 10 October VADM HYLAND flew to Danang for discussions with LTGEN WALT, CG III MAF and RADM WESCHLER, COMNAVSUPACT Danang, RVN. Following the discussions VADM HYLAND proceeded to YANKEE STATION where he met with RADM CURTTS, RADM dePOIX and BGEN OWENS in ORISKANY on 11 October. Upon completion of this meeting VADM HYLAND returned to his Flagship.

VADM HYLAND met with SECDEF MC NAMARA and party for discussions 12 October, RON, and returned to his Flagship on 13 October.

 ${\tt VABM}$ HYLAND met with VADM SHINN (Prospective COMNAVAIRPAC) and party in INTREPID on 15 October.

VADM HYLAND accompanied by VADM SHINN and party returned to the Flagship on 16 October for briefings and discussions.

pavy Jones, Representative of Neptunis Rex, visited VADM HYLAND at Latitude $0^{\circ}00$ 00, Longitude 106E on 23 October to discuss a visit to the SEVENTH Fleet's Flagship by Neptunis Rex and his Royal Court on 28 October.

The Flagship arrived at Her Majesty's Naval Base Singapore on 24 October for a scheduled four day visit as guests of VADM Sir FRANK TWISS, COMFEF.

VADM HYLAND exchanged calls with VADM TWISS and called on Mr. John B. DEXTER, Deputy Chief of Missions, U.S. American Embassy, Singapore on 24 October.

On 25 October VADM HYLAND attended COMFEF briefings and discussions.

On 28 October VADM HYLAND in OKLAHOMA CITY, departed Singapore for YANKEE STATION. He departed his Flagship at CAM RANH BAY on 30 October and flew to CONSTELLATION at YANKEE STATION to accompany ADM MC DONALD during visits to YANKEE TEAM Commanders.



NOVEMBER 1966

POLITICAL STATUS

The political barometer in the Republic of Vietnam remained generally steady during most of November. Although minor friction continued between the KY government and the southern political faction, resulting in the resignation of several Cabinet ministers, the government remained stable and free from serious political disturbances.

Diplomatic maneuverings continued in various communist and free world capitols to bring about a Christmas/New Year cease fire and negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the war. Although it appeared likely that a cease fire of some duration would be arranged, the North Vietnamese government continued to remain intransigent to all suggestions for peace negotiations.

AIR OPERATIONS

During the week 2-8 November the CORAL SEA, F.D. ROOSEVELT and CONSTELLATION operated from YANKEE STATION with over 1400 attack sorties being conducted against North Vietnam resulting in over 480 junks/barges damaged or destroyed. 170 Trucks damaged/destroyed, 21 primary bridges destroyed and several POL storage areas and military complexes severely damaged.

On 3 November two F4B aircraft were lost. A F.D. ROOSEVELT F4B was lost in an operational accident when the A4 tanker from which he was attempting to refuel had a hydraulic failure and the F4B aircraft subsequently flamed out from fuel exhaustion. A CORAL SEA F4B was lost from combat causes. The crew members from both aircraft were rescued in good condition.

On 4 November, F.D. ROOSEVELT experienced a flash fire in the paint locker and eight fatal injuries were incurred. Flight operations were not affected.

On 4 November, after performing upkeep to partially correct fire damage, the ORISKANY sailed from Subic to rendezvous with escort and outchop on 8 November.

The TICONDEROGA, CONSTELLATION, F.D. ROOSEVELT and CORAL SEA conducted strike operations from YANKEE STATION during the week 9-15 November. The winter monsoon weather pattern dominated over North Vietnam much of the week reducing the weight of effort and hampering destruction and evaluation of results. Approximately 700 attack sorties were flown, resulting in the damage/destruction of over 100 cargo junks/barges and over 25 trucks. Four significant bridges were destroyed and several POL and military areas were successfully attacked. On 11 November, a two carrier strike against the NINH BINH transportation complex resulted in numerous box cars destroyed/damaged, multiple rail cuts, and a general saturation of the area with bombs, producing secondary explosions, fires and dense smoke.



On 10 November, a KEARSARGE S2E disappeared while on a night surface patrol. Last radio contact was heard two hours after launch. Wreckage was found in the vicinity of 17-30N/108-30E, indicating crew of four was in aircraft at impact.

On 11 November, a CORAL SEA A4E pilot ejected after a mid-air collision with a squadron mate in the vicinity of 19-26N/105-52E. Pilot recovered one hour later in good condition. No report of damage to second aircraft.

On 12 November, two F.D. ROOSEVELT A4E's were lost in a mid-air collision during night CCA. Wingman made section penetration due inoperative TACAN and was given radar vector for separation. After separation attained, radar controller observed decreasing separation. Wingman did not respond to further vectors and collided with commanding officer of VA-12 four miles astern. Both pilots lost.

On 15 November a VAP-61 RA3B was lost 65 miles west of Agana, Guam due to failure of the fuel transfer system. One crew member rescued, two still reported as missing. SAR still in progress.

The TICONDEROGA and CORAL SEA operated from YANKEE STATION throughout the week of 16-22 November. Air operations against North Vietnam were kept at a low level by generally poor weather in the target areas and the incursion of tropical storm NANCY into the South China Sea. However, weather cleared significantly on 22 November for CORAL SEA aircraft to successfully strike the HAI PHONG SAM support facility. BDA not yet available. Strike pointed out marked increase in SAM and AA density and activity in HAI PHONG area.

Extensive SAR efforts continued throughout the week for crew members and civilian technician missing from VAP-61 RA3B down off Agana, Guam on 15 November.

On 18 November, a CORAL SEA A4 disappeared after attempting an IFR loft maneuver in the vicinity of 17-40N/105-33E. SAR was unsuccessful. Pilot is reported as missing.

During the week 23-29 November, the CORAL SEA, TICONDEROGA and F.D. ROOSEVELT operated from YANKEE STATION. Sortie rates remained at a very low level with very limited BDA due to the restricted visibility in target areas.

On 23 November, a TICONDEROGA A4E was hit while returning from a strike on CAN THON POL. The aircraft caught fire and gradually lost power. The pilot ejected in the vicinity of 20-18N/107-20E and was rescued by helo with no injury.

On 27 November, a TICONDEROGA A1H was hit be small arms fire while making an attack on a barge in the vicinity of 19-55N/105-01E. The aircraft caught fire and lost rudder control. The pilot ditched his aircraft in the vicinity of 19-44N/106-35E and was promptly rescued with no injury.



Routine naval gunfire support operations were carried out during the period 2-15 November.

During the week 16-22 November, the CANBERRA, MANSFIELD, COCHRANE, CLARION RIVER, DE HAVEN, THEODORE E. CHANDLER, HANSON, F.E. EVANS and WHITE RIVER fired 7155 rounds at targets in South Vietnam. Targets destroyed included structures, bunkers, fuel storage, sampans, trenches and rice caches. Numerous secondary explosions and fires were noted.

The MANLEY, NEWMAN K. PERRY, UHLMANN, WHITE RIVER, CANBERRA, NORRIS, T.E. CHANDLER, PHILLIPS, DE HAVEN, HULL and CLARION RIVER conducted gunfire support operations during the week of 22-29 November firing 5840 rounds, destroying or damaging numerous wooden and masonry structures, bunkers, sampans, trenches, infiltration points, VC camps and pack animals.

Operation SEA DRAGON continues in North Vietnam coastal waters between 17N and 18N. Routine gunfire operations were conducted against beached and waterborne logistical craft.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

On 3 November the normal ARG/SLF consisting of CTG 76.5 and CTG 79.5 were reconstituted and were in a ready posture off the northern coast of I CTZ. On 4 November, the VALLEY FORGE departed the area of ARG/SLF enroute to OKINAWA, the HENRICO and GUNSTON HALL, companion ships, completed embarkation of BLT 2/4 from RVN and followed the VALLEY FORGE enroute to OKINAWA. TG 76.5 consisting of VALLEY FORGE, HENRICO and GUNSTON HALL dissolved on 11 November.

VIP VISITS TO COMSEVENTHELT

During the week 9-15 November, RADM W.H. BAUMBERGER, USN, COMCRUDESPAC, visited CHICAGO, HERBERT J. THOMAS, KING, KEARSARGE and CORAL SEA.

MGEN M.J. INGELIDO, USAF, Vice Commander, 13th Air Force, visited CON-STELLATION.

During the week 16-22 November, ADM R.L. JOHNSON, USN, CINCPACFLT, visited CORAL SEA, TICONDEROGA, OKLAHOMA CITY, KEARSARGE and NAVASOTA.

BGEN R.D. STEAKLEY, USAF, JCS, visited the CORAL SEA and TICONDEROGA.

During the week 23-29 November, Senator M.R. YOUNG, (R-ND), Member, Senate Appropriations Committee; Mr. W.M. WOODRUFF, Assistant Chief Counsel, Senate Appropriations Committee; Mr. W.H. DARDEN, COS, Senate Appropriations Committee, and COL D.V. RATTIN, USN, SEC ARMY REP visited the CORAL SEA.



DEGERATORIPHI COMSEVENTHELT MOVEMENTS

On 2 November VADM JOHN J. HYLAND, COMSEVENTHFLT, departed his Flagship at YANKEE STATION and visited the ORISKANY at Subic Bay rejoining his Flagship at Tabones area in the Philippines on 4 November.

On 7 November VADM HYLAND with members of his staff flew to Baguio from Subic Bay in order to conduct the SEVENTH Fleet Third Quarter Fiscal Year 1967 Planning and Scheduling conference, returning to his Flagship at Subic Bay on completion of the conference on 12 November.

RADM H.C. REITER, USN, President Navy Board of Inspection and Survey met with VADM HYLAND on board the Flagship on 13 November.

VADM HYLAND met with ADM JOHNSON, CINCPACFLT, on board the CORAL SEA on 17 November. After discussions with RADM WALKER, COMCARDIV 9, ADM JOHNSON and VADM HYLAND returned to the OKLAHOMA CITY for briefings and discussions on 18 November. Following the briefings they heloed to the KEARSARGE for a meeting with RADM REICH, COMASWGRU 5. VADM HYLAND returned to his Flagship approximately 1145, 18 November.

On 21 November, VADM HYLAND departed his Flagship at OKINAWA and flew to ATSUGI for further meetings with CINCPACFLT. On 22 November VADM HYLAND delivered the opening remarks to the ROLLING THUNDER Conference in YOKOSUKA.

VADM HYLAND called on AM AMB JOHNSON in TOKYO on 22 November returning to his Flagship on 23 November.

RADM WILKINSON, Chief of Staff, COMUSFORJAPAN called on VADM HYLAND on his Flagship on 29 November.

DEGLATOFFIED

BASIC NARRATIVE --- DECEMBER 1966

SECLASSIFIED FORN

POLITICAL STATUS

The political situation in the Republic of Vietnam remained stable throughout December. Progress continued to be made by the Constituent Assembly in drafting a constitution.

The month was highlighted by the two forty-eight hour cease fire periods over Christmas and New Year. The cease fire truce was violated by the Viet Cong on numerous occasions by attacks on ARVN and allied forces. This action was reported to have prompted Premier KY to state that there may not be a cease fire during the TET Holiday, 8-12 February.

AIR OPERATIONS

During the week 30 November - 6 December, the TICONDEROGA, CORAL SEA and F.D. ROOSEVELT operated from YANKEE STATION with air operations curtailed by marginal to unsatisfactory flying weather due to seasonal northeast monsoon pattern. However, during a break in the weather, successful attacks were conducted in the HANOI area against the VAN DIEN Vehicle Depot by the TICONDEROGA and F.D. ROOSEVELT and against the CAN THON POL Storage by the CORAL SEA.

Damage was extensive in both areas in spite of heavy AAA and missile defenses.

On 2 December, a CORAL SEA F4B took a direct hit during retirement from a TARCAP mission. The aircraft disintegrated in the air in the vicinity of 21-24N/106-19E but the RIO may have survived.

On 2 December, an F.D. ROOSEVELT A4C on night armed reconnaissance disappeared in the vicinity of 20-05N/106-12E after taking evasive action from a SAM warning. A second F.D. ROOSEVELT A4C piloted by the Commanding Officer of VA-172 disappeared in the SAR area while conducting a search for the downed aircraft. Both pilots are reported as missing in action. Although air operations from YANKEE STATION continued to be curtailed by frequent marginal to unsatisfactory flying weather during the period 7-13 December, occasional improvements in target weather permitted attacks by aircraft from the KITTY HAWK, TICONDEROGA and F.D. ROOSEVELT. A somewhat intensified level of activity over previous weeks resulted in approximately twenty-five trucks and sixty cargo junks/barges destroyed or damaged during armed reconnaissance. Major strikes were conducted against the XUAN MAI Bridge and VAN DIEN Vehicle Depot complex near HANOI and against the NGUYEN XA Barracks. In addition, radar controlled attacks were successfully executed by the KITTY HAWK A6 aircraft against the HAI PHONG SAM assembly area, PHU LY Bridge and NAM DINH Railroad Yards.

During the period 14-20 December, the KITTY HAWK, TICONDEROGA and F.D. ROOSEVELT continued strike operations from YANKEE STATION. Weather improved slightly over this reporting period permitting an increased tempo of operations.

DE@ERASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIEDOFORN



DEGLASSFIED

On 14 December, a three CVA strike was executed against the VAN DIEN Vehicle Depot a few miles south of HANOI inflicting extensive damage throughout the target complex. In addition, five major bridges were destroyed during the week. Approximately forty trucks were destroyed or damaged and the THUAN LE underground POL Storage Area was attacked producing numerous secondary explosions and heavy black smoke. The KITTY HAWK A6A aircraft continued all-weather radar attacks on point targets and lines of communications including a night attack on the HAI PHONG SAM Assembly Area.

On 14 December, an F.D. ROOSEVELT E1B was forced to ditch six miles from the F.D. ROOSEVELT when the port engine failed and the propellor would not fully feather. There were three fatalities as a result of this accident.

A TICONDEROGA F8 aircraft received damaged from a SA-2 missile and was subsequently lost. The pilot was not observed to eject from the aircraft prior to its crash.

An F.D. ROOSEVELT A4E aircraft received a direct hit from a SA-2 missile. Both pilot and aircraft were lost.

On 20 December, an F.D. ROOSEVELT F4B pilot became disoriented during IFR climb after suspected gyro horizon failure. On the order of the pilot the RIO ejected from the aircraft and was successfully rescued without injury. The pilot later regained control of the aircraft and landed safely aboard the F.D. ROOSEVELT.

The ENTERPRISE, F.D. ROOSEVELT and KITTY HAWK were on YANKEE STATION during the period 21-31 December. The scope of strike operations were reduced both by a forty-eight hour cease fire over Christmas and by seasonal poor flying weather. The HANOI-VINH Railroad was struck numerous times by A6A aircraft, generally using a full system radar drop, and a limited amount of interdiction of water borne traffic was accomplished.

On 21 December, a KITTY HAWK A4C was lost to estimated 57MM fire during armed reconnaissance of Route 15. The pilot was forced to eject in the vicinity of 18-09N/106-13E and was immediately captured.

On 27 December, a KITTY HAWK A4C aircraft was lost when the pilot ejected immediately after catapult. The pilot was promptly rescued by KITTY HAWK helo, sustaining only minor injuries.

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

During the period 30 November - 6 December naval gunfire support ships fired routine gunfire missions in the Republic of Vietnam.

SEA DRAGON OPERATIONS: COMDESRON NINE in WARRINGTON, with MULLINNIX was relieved by COMDESDIV 202 in KEPPLER with INGERSOLL. Navy Al spotter aircraft from the TICONDEROGA were used for the first time in SEADRAGON Operations. Poor weather and high surf conditions kept activity at a low level except for the following:





- a. WARRINGTON rescued two personnel adrift in a small fishing boat. Subsequent questioning by in-country authorities determined they came from a CHICOM fishing fleet off HAINAN.
- b. WARRINGTON fired on nine large and twenty to twenty-five medium logistics craft. Damage assessment was not obtained due to darkness, but two secondary explosions were observed.
- c. The INGERSOLL was taken under fire by a 4" gun shore battery. Two air bursts showered the INGERSOLL with sharpnel but, other than a hole in the bridge shield, no material or personnel casualties were sustained. The INGERSOLL and KEPPLER conducted counter-battery fire until clear of the area, with undetermined results.
- d. The KEPPLER and INGERSOLL fired on a number of scattered logistic craft. The results included three direct hits on a motorized barge, heavy damage to a light barge and light to moderate damage to several other barges and small craft.

During the period 7-13 December, naval gunfire support ships, including the SEVENTH Fleet Flagship, USS PROVIDENCE, fired routine gunfire missions in the Republic of Vietnam.

On 7 December, the MANLEY, while involved in routine naval gunfire support with U.S. Senator Jackson (D-WASH) observing, had an explosion in a 5"/54 gun mount, injuring three personnel.

SEADRAGON OPERATIONS: COMDESDIV 202 in KEPPLER with INGERSOLL supported by Al spotter aircraft from the TICONDEROGA continued North Vietnam surface logistic craft interdiction and patrols. Several large barges were taken under fire and either destroyed or heavily damaged. A radar site was also fired upon with damage to the site reported.

During the week 14-20 December, units of Task Group 70.8 fired 9992 rounds in routine gunfire missions in the Republic of Vietnam. The INGERSOLL and MADDOX continued North Vietnam surface logistic craft interdiction and patrols in SEADRAGON Operations. Weather in the area was poor causing reduced traffic. Brief periods of good weather revealed intermittent light traffic which was taken under attack.

The UHLMANN, CANBERRA, HOEL, NORRIS, NEWMAN K. PERRY, CARRONADE, TURNER JOY, DENNIS J. BUCKLEY, HERBERT J. THOMAS and HULL conducted gunfire support operations during the period 21-31 December firing 6910 rounds during routine naval gunfire support missions in North Vietnam.

SEADRAGON OPERATIONS: The MADDOX, O'BRIEN and BENNER continued interdiction of waterborne logistic traffic between 18N and 17N. Level of activity remained at a low level with two exceptions:

a. At 231046H O'BRIEN was taken under fire by a North Vietnam coastal battery. Before clearing the area, about three minutes after the first salvo, the O'BRIEN received two direct hits and one near miss from assumed 57MM. Moderate material damage on the after deck house was received with two men killed in action and four wounded in action. The O'BRIEN fired 130 rounds in counter battery fire. All YANKEE TEAM CVAs diverted or launched strike aircraft to suppress shore battery fire. The BENNER relieved the O'BRIEN that evening and the O'BRIEN proceeded to Subic Bay for repairs.



b. In marked contrast to the small number of logistic craft normally active in the SEADRAGON area, approximately 325 craft were sighted during the forty-eight hour Christmas standdown. Logistic traffic density returned to the normal low upon termination of the standdown.

SALVAGE OPERATIONS

During the week 30 November - 6 December, SEVENTH Fleet salvage forces were heavily committed to salvage operations along the Republic of Vietnam coast as follows:

- a. The ARIKARA was assigned to salvage YFRN 412 grounded two thousand yards north of the entrance to HUE River. Heavy surf slowed salvage efforts throughout the week. The barge was moved two hundred and thirty-five yards seaward before the tow wire parted. The barge was anchored and flooded down on a sand bar awaiting further efforts on 7 December.
- b. The CONSERVER continued efforts to raise DONG NAI dredge sunk in sixty-two feet of water in the vicinity of 10-08N/107-01E through 4 December. Seas and current hindered operations and led to suspension of efforts on 5 December when the CONSERVER and GRAPPLE were assigned to salvage Barge 601.

During the week 7-13 December, the ARIKARA successfully completed salvage operations by towing the previously grounded YFRN 412 to Danang. The CONSERVER and GRAPPLE discontinued efforts to salvage Barge 601 and proceeded enroute to raise the sunken DONG NAI dredge.

The GRAPPLE and CONSERVER continued salvage operations to raise the sunken DONG NAI dredge during the week 14-20 December.

During the period 21-31 December, salvage efforts were temporarily suspended on the DONG NAI dredge due to bad weather and a more urgent requirement to salvage the Philippines commercial Tug TIBURON, chartered by the U. S. Government which was grounded on the South Vietnam coast approximately sixty-three miles north of Danang. The SIOUX, GRAPPLE and COCOPA were standing by on scene but heavy surf and high winds prevented any salvage action by on-scene forces. The TIBURON went aground stern first and had a ninety degree list to port in heavy surf.

Efforts to salvage the Tug TIBURON were terminated on 31 December when Commander Task Force 73 was informed by COMNAVFORV that continued salvage efforts was not justified as a military necessity.

MISCELLANEOUS

Patrol Squadron EIGHT out chopped to LANTFLT on 5 December after completing a six month deployment. During their deployment to SEVENTH Fleet Patrol Squadron EIGHT flew 7700 accident free hours. PATRON 17 transferred to Sangley Point marking an end of the P-2 deployments to the Japan area. All future P-2 deploy-



ments are programmed for Sangley Point.

The USS O'BRIEN and helicopters attached to Task Group 70.4 were directed to the scene of a fire aboard the Chinese Nationalist fishing vessel TEN LOO. Another merchant ship arrived in the area and U. S. aid was not required.

VP aircraft continued surveillance of MERSHIPS in the SEVENTH Fleet area of responsibility during the month of December; which included approximately 317 missions, sighting 1126 ships, of which, 146 were from Communist Bloc countries.

SAR

On 13 December, two TICONDEROGA A4C aircraft were lost as a result of battle damage. One A4C aircraft was damaged by a SA-2 missile, the other by AA fire. Both pilots ejected in close proximity of the TICONDEROGA and were recovered uninjured.

VIP VISITS TO THE SEVENTH FLEET

During the week 30 November - 6 December, ADM U.S.G. SHARP, USN, CINCPAC, visited the TICONDEROGA.

During the week 7-13 December, U. S. Senator Jackson (D-WASH) visited the USS MANLEY. U. S. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), Mr. O.W. Behrens, Quick Magazine, Munich, Germany, visited the KITTY HAWK. U. S. Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) visited the KITTY HAWK.

During the week 14-20 December, Mr. Martin Martinez, Nucleo Radio, Mexico Radio visited the TICONDEROGA. Mr. Robert R. Rodwell and Mr. Thomas A. Hamill, Flight International visited the F.D. ROOSEVELT. Mr. John Steinbeck visited the KITTY HAWK.

During the period 21-31 December, Representative G.H. Grider (D-TENN), visited the KITTY HAWK. Dr. Billy Graham visited the KITTY HAWK. RADM J.W. KELLY, Chief of Chaplains and Cardinal Spellman visited the F.D. ROOSEVELT. The Bob Hope show was presented in the BENNINGTON and F.D. ROOSEVELT. Representative John Marsh (D-VA) visited the ENTERPRISE.

COMSEVENTHFLT MOVEMENTS

VADM John J. HYLAND, COMSEVENTHFLT, shifted his flag from OKLAHOMA CITY to PROVIDENCE on 1 December. VADM HYLAND departed his Flagship on 30 November enroute YANKEE STATION for discussions with ADM SHARP in TICONDEROGA returning to his Flagship on 1 December.

VADM HYLAND departed Yokosuka, Japan embarked in PROVIDENCE on 5 December enroute to YANKEE STATION arriving on 10 December.

DECLASSIFIED

On 10 December, VADM HYLAND departed his Flagship off CAM RANH BAY via helicopter to attend the CTF-72 change of command ceremony aboard the USS CURRITUCK. VADM HYLAND was the principal speaker and guest of honor, and presented RADM Roy M. ISAMAN the Legio of Merit on behalf of CINCPACFLT. RADM ISAMAN was relieved as CTF-72 and Commander Patrol Forces SEVENTH Fleet by RADM Damon W. COOPER. After the change of command, VADM HYLAND boarded an SP-5 patrol plane and conducted a Market Time Blue Patrol flying as co-pilot for aircraft commander CDR PURDY, Commanding Officer, Patrol Squadron FIFTY.

On 11 December, VADM HYLAND flew to Saigon for discussions with GEN WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV and LTGEN MOMYER, Commander Seventh Air Force.

On 12 December, VADM HYLAND met with representatives of the Pressat the residence of Mr. Barry Zorthian, Director of JUSPAO, in Saigon. He held further discussions with Seventh Air Force, visited VP-17 facilities at TAN SON NHUT // Air Base and then flew to Danang where he rejoined his Flagship by helo.

On 15 December, VADM HYLAND visited KITTY HAWK and TICONDEROGA at YANKEE STATION. On 16 December, the Flagship departed YANKEE STATION and visited PIRAZ and all SAR Stations with visits by VADM HYLAND to the R.K. TURNER, LONG BEACH and PREBLE. On 17 December, the Flagship returned to YANKEE STATION where he visited the F.D. ROOSEVELT. On the evening of 17 December, VADM HYLAND, embarked in PROVIDENCE, proceeded to OKINAWA.

On 20 December, VADM HYLAND, heloed to Fort Buckner, Okinawa and return for a call on LTGEN UNGER, HICOM RYUKYUS.

On 22 December, VADM HYLAND embarked in PROVIDENCE arrived in Yokosuka, Japan.

On 23 December, VADM HYLAND attended a change of command ceremony in MARS and, in addition, held a conference with RADM T.J. WALKER, CTG-77.4/COMCARDIV THREE on board the Flagship.

On 29 December, VADM HYLAND met with U.S. AMB Johnson in Tokyo.

On 30 December, VADM HYLAND presented awards at a ceremony on board USS REEVES.



CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

STRIKE OPERATIONS

- (S) Over the year 1966, SEVENTH Fleet aircraft flew 33,115 strikes into North Vietnam. The large majority of these were flown during the good weather summer months. It was not thus by choice; the winter months with the on-shore weather flown provides the strike pilots with almost continuous impenetrable weather. The increasing number of the A6A all-weather attack system provided a notable measure of relief during the winter months at the end of the year and added significantly to the night attack capability.
- (S) Despite the devastation wrought by aircraft throughout the year, especially during the period of the most intensive air operations from April to October, there was still a continuous movement of men and material toward the south. Reports indicated expansion of facilities and increases in the numbers of enemy troops in the southern areas.
- (S) Changes in targeting philosophy were noticeable by the shifting stress placed on the particular types of targets being attacked. Initially the priority was for interdiction and disruption of the lines of communications. Then, for a period, there was a concentrated effort to destroy the SA-2 missile sites. This was followed by an all out effort to destroy the POL system. Each of these shifts in emphasis was quickly adapted to by NVN, and the movement of anti-aircraft defenses to cover the areas of principal concern was readily apparent.
- (S) New weapons, delivery systems and tactics continued to make their appearance in the SEVENTH Fleet's operations against North Vietnam. The SHRIKE missile began to see extensive use in the campaign to counter the SA-2 threat. The newer and larger air-to-ground guided missile, BULLPUP B, began to appear in greater numbers, and as proficiency in its use improved, began to play a greater role in "bridge-busting" and flak suppression. The A6A INTRUDER, all-weather attack aircraft saw more extensive employment in maintaining the SEVENTH Fleet presence and pressure in North Vietnam. Operations were periodically affected by shortages of certain air munitions but those were largely eliminated by the end of the year. Further, the numbers of combat aircraft available to replace those lost to combat and regular operations created a concern that the size of operating units might have to be reduced before new models or replacements were forthcoming. This required utilization of replacement aircraft from all available sources.

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

(C) The use of naval gunfire in support of in-country forces, South Vietnam, increased as rapidly as the availability of both forces and ammunition allowed. From a level of about 90 ship-days per month at the beginning of the year NGF support rose to an average of 207 ship-days per month during the final quarter. Two factors contributed to this rapid rise; first, in-

DECLASECRET NOBORN

country requirements and, second availability of SEVENTHFLT NGFS assets. The increase in NGFS assets was difficult to achieve. A lack of ammunition was the subject of much effort by higher command. While the problem was not completely solved, increased quantities of ammunition kept pace reasonably well with higher usage rates. Increased ship availability was provided by major deployment policy changes. At the beginning of 1966 destroyer assets were fully committed while still not being able to meet the demand. In February, DD rotation policy was changed so that DD reliefs were provided as on station South China Sea reliefs rather than at 160E. This ten day overlap policy enabled COMSEVENTHFLT to provide an increased and even level to NGF support.

- (C) In March, it became policy to deploy an 8" cruiser to SEVENTHFLT at all times. This enabled COMSEVENTHFLT to keep an 8" gun ship on the line about 55 per cent of the time. Beginning in April four IFS/LSMR were deployed to SEVENTHFLT for the express purpose of providing increased NGFS. This allowed about 1.3 IFS/LSMR to be maintained on the line.
- (C) The above increase in assets enabled COMSEVENTHFLT to increase his NGF support, but was still not sufficient to fulfill in-country requirements placed at up to 270 ship-days per month. The implementation of interdiction efforts against waterborne logistic craft north of the DMZ in December further emphasized the critical shortage of NGF support ships.

ASW

- (S) ASW in the Western Pacific amounts to coverage of a large ocean area with minimal forces. There was no evidence in 1966 of CHICOM or Soviet submarines in the South China Sea. Thus ASW efforts during the year were devoted to maintaining an on-station ASW capability at Yankee Station to meet a submarine threat should it have materialized. In the absence of this threat, ASW forces provided the following services to our forces in the South China Sea:
 - a. Surveillance of foreign shipping in transit.
 - b. SAR helo support to Yankee Station Units.
 - c. Detection of possible infiltrators into South Vietnam.
 - d. Possible protection against PT boat threat.
 - e. Surface, Sub-surface Surveillance Coordinator (SSSC) functions.
- (S) Ocean surveillance air patrols also provided random coverage of the Communist Peripheral Area on a scheduled basis.

- (S) Other ASW activity in the Western Pacific amounted to a response to particular intelligence information received in one form or another. This generally consisted of the following:
 - a. Unidentified sonar contacts.
 - b. Soviet out-of-area surface operations.
- c. Operations outside the Sea of Japan of small submarine tenders or ATA's that have had submarine activity associated with them in the past.
 - d. Other intelligence information.
- (S) The ASW capability of the WESTPAC forces was generally good, with a reasonable possibility of thwarting any conventional submarine operations of our potential enemies. To improve the ASW posture two things stood out as major requirements. First, the need for better intelligence on movements of potential enemy submarines; second, the need for improved sensors and weapons to contend with this threat. The best prospective solution to the first remains a SOSUS system in WESTPAC. In the second area, ASWILS, a recent advance, was put into operation in WESTPAC by the Iwakuni P-3 Squadron. Operational employment of ASWILS in the Sea of Japan area was considered an ideal proving ground for this equipment.
- (S) The ability to analyze contacts accurately and quickly in WESTPAC was another area in which improvement remains necessary. Data Link Transmission capability in our VP aircraft and installation of improved analyzing equipment in our VP ASCACS was made a top priority project.
- (S) It has been recommended that SOSUS coverage be provided to WESTPAC Ocean areas as a high priority project to meet the growing Soviet and CHICOM submarine threat.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

(S) The Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force, although primarily organized to cope with possible contingencies arising anywhere within the SEVENTH Fleet area of responsibility, was called upon to participate in eight combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam during 1966. These operations ranged in scope from unilateral amphibious operations to amphibious assaults conducted to provide additional troops ashore for an in-country operation already in progress. The over-all effectiveness of ARG/SLF actions was satisfactory with many problem areas concerning command relationships, combat loading, rotation of forces, testing and evaluation, and methods of employment being resolved as the year progressed. Of special interest was the implementation of training exercises in the conduct of amphibious warfare in Riverine environments.

EGETASSIFIED

DECLEARINGED

- (S) Quick reaction to contingencies, rapid planning and flexibility were underscored during the year as the most notable traits of the ARG/SLF as well as the remainder of the SEVENTH Fleet Amphibious Forces.
- (S) Combat effectiveness of the team, rated in direct relationship to available intelligence information, ranged from excellent to satisfactory.
- (S) Planning for future operations included the concept development for a second ARG/SLF team to be established in April 1967. To gain continued and greater effectiveness of these teams, it was repeatedly and earnestly recommended that every effort be expended to improve available intelligence information and obtain lucrative targets for the specialized capabilities of these forces. It was also recommended where possible, practical, and operationally feasible, that planning for the employment of these teams include continuing, much-needed upkeep on the ships of the ARG's and not radically disrupt the orderly rotation and training of forces assigned to SLF's. Many of these recommendations were formalized and acted upon in the finally approved, "COMUSMACV/CINCPACFLT agreement for U. S. Naval Support Operations conducted in RVN".

LOGISTICS

- (S) The continuing high tempo of operations during 1966 and the age of SEVENTHFLT ships resulted in an increased level of material casualty reports. Casualties filed in November and December 1966 rose to all time highs of 482 and 515 respectively, compared with a total of 307 reported for December 1965.
- (S) Logistic support also reflected major increased levels, as seen in the following comparison of monthly data:

		End 1965	End 1966
a.	Number of Underway Replenishments	618	712
b.	Fuel Replenishments (MBBLS)	2,609	3,071
c.	Provision Replenishments (S/T)	3,234	4,050
d.	General Stores Replenishments from Mobile Units (S/T)	22,500	28,000
e.	WESTPAC Demands from Fleet Units	61,400	71,700

(S) Major repairs accomplished in WESTPAC included changes of four propellers to USS CORAL SEA, three propellers and tail shaft to USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, and temporary repairs resulting from major fires in USS ORISKANY and USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. These repairs underlined the importance of the availability of major repair capability in the Western Pacific in reducing the

DECL SACRES NAFORN

time required for fleet units to retire from operations because of major combat damages or operational casualties.

- (S) Continued progress was made in the development of various base facilities in Southeast Asia in support of the SEVENTHFLT. The most significant of these were air facilities at Danang, Chu Lai and Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam, plus fleet support facilities in various Vietnamese ports.
- (S) The Air Deployment Delivery System (ADDS) was successfully tested in WESTPAC under combat conditions. This system was designed to meet the increasing demands by Pacific ships for rapid receipt of vitally needed parts, electronic, and propulsion systems. Three test drops by parachute to under-way units were successfully picked up within three minutes of splash-down.
- (S) At the start of Calendar Year 1966, it became increasingly apparent that at the rates of expenditures experienced to that time, a critical shortage of munitions would develop. Permission to expend War Reserve Stocks was granted. COMSEVENTHFLT directed that prudent and efficient weapon employment measures be commenced. As the year progressed and air munitions shortages became widespread in all services, CINCPAC took control of all air munitions and instituted an allocation system in order to preserve stocks over the lean summer months.
- (S) Air munitions availability improved considerably during the latter months of 1966, and in the final month of the year weapon production exceeded combat requirements in most cases.

INTELLIGENCE

- (S) During 1966, operating forces under Commander SEVENTH Fleet continued an intensive intelligence reconnaissance program. Such efforts extended throughout the Western Pacific but were concentrated primarily along the Communist periphery from the Sea of Japan to the South China Sea and in Vietnam. As a result, significant success was achieved in accomplishing both special and routine intelligence requirements issued by higher authority, as well as those requirements directly supporting Task Force 77 units engaged in the Vietnamese war. Continued improvement was noted in the most critical area of providing timely warning of North Vietnamese surface to air missile launches and MIG fighter approaches by electronic warfare aircraft and APR-27/ALQ-51 installed in tactical aircraft (Project Shoehorn). In addition, greater emphasis was placed on target selection and bomb damage assessment to enhance effectiveness of the air warfare effort.
- (S) Groundwork was laid to obtain improvements in 1967 in support of Task Force 77 units operating in the Gulf of Tonkin by obtaining, (1) additional electronic warfare aircraft (2) infra red equipment to provide real-time interdiction target data and (3) a substantial augmentation of defense analysis and target exploitation personnel.

DECLASSIFIED



COMMUNICATIONS

- (C) Increasing combat operations in SEASIA kept traffic volume at an all time high average of about 1620 messages per day. This problem was compounded by increases in percentage of higher precedence traffic and message length. The multi-channel broadcast was implemented in early January, but a sufficient number of ships were not outfitted with equipment to realize the full potential. As the year progressed additional channels of the multi-channel broadcast were activated and, in conjunction with WESTPAC COMMSTAS, this permitted cutting some traffic on the GRTT and reducing some of the backlog.
- (C) In NGFS communications the year began with equipment incompatibilities both ashore and afloat. Due to terrain features VHF portable equipment proved to be the choice of shore spotter teams, however most NGFS ships were not equipped fro VHF-FM. A temporary solution was obtained by issuing AN/PRC-25 portable VHF-FM transceivers to ships on the gun line. Requirements were stated for a permanently installed AN/VRC-46 on board NGFS ships.
- (C) The wide communication flexibility of USS ANNAPOLIS proved extremely effective in providing multiple services to SEVENTH Fleet units during 1966, and the concept of a local area broadcast was tested and proved highly successful.

PERSONNEL

- (C) Habitability, mail and recognition of individual effort were the chief personnel matters of concern in 1966.
- a. Increased manning levels of SEVENTH Fleet ships, generated by more complex equipment and increased Navy participation in the Vietnam conflict, were looked at with a "hard eye" during 1966. Crowded conditions aboard ships, particularly deletorious to morale and personnel effectiveness under the hot and humid conditions in Western Pacific waters, led to proposals for reduction of shipboard populations and studies by higher authority.
- b. Approaching the problem of habitability under crowded conditions from another angle, COMSEVENTHFLT requested that air conditioning be installed wherever practicable aboard ships deploying to this area. Attention was given to the problem by higher authority and ships deploying to WESTPAC were given priority in the installation of air conditioning units.
- c. To obtain faster mail service for fleet units, COMSEVENTHFLT recommended, and gained approval for, direct mail service from CONUS to the Philippines. COMSEVENTHFLT also supported and helped gain approval for establishment of a Fleet postal unit at Danang, RVN to expedite mail delivery to units serving in the Gulf of Tonkin.



d. In June 1966, COMSEVENTHFLT published a comprehensive Awards Manual for the guidance of units participating in operations under his control. Greater attention was also given to processing and screening of recommendations for awards to Navy personnel participating in the Vietnam conflict to insure equal recognition for equal acts and accomplishments.

TRAINING


- (U) Training in 1966 continued at a reduced pace oriented to preparation for specific tasks of SEVENTH Fleet units engaged in combat or combat support operations in SEASIA. Most training took place during transit to and from Yankee Station and Market Time duties. Emphasis during inport periods centered on upkeep and R&R. When DIXIE STATION was vacated, the training pattern for newly arrived CVAs was changed. Instead of a "break in" period against lightly defended targets in South Vietnam they were positioned at Yankee Station and initially assigned targets in the lesser defended Southern route package areas of North Vietnam.
- (U) No major fleet exercises were conducted during the year. An ASW Group Sea of Japan transit was completed in September. ASWEX's were conducted each quarter. Units of the Amphibious Task Force assigned to ARG/SLF operated in HILL TOP and MUD PUPPY exercises prior to executing DECKHOUSE operations in SVN.
- (U) The tempo of operations continued to prevent extensive type training and emphasized the need for ships to be fully trained for normal type functions prior deployment. Actual operations, of course, served as most realistic training in those operational tasks to which units were committed.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

(U) News coverage of SEVENTHFLT actions in the war was recognized early in the year as far below the level merited by their scope, intensity and results. By the nature of operations SEVENTHFLT units were not easily accessible to correspondents. The alternative of coverage by Navy public affairs personnel alone was clearly not possible with the limited numbers available. In July, COMSEVENTHFLT directed establishment of a twice weekly COD flight to a CVA on Yankee Station and a once weekly flight to a CVA on Dixie Station to overcome to a significant degree the problem of access for correspondents. The results obtained demonstrated that affirmative action by the Navy to "take the newsman to the news" was the major contributing factor to a significant improvement in news coverage of SEVENTHFLT's contributions to the Vietnam war during the second half of the year.

AAW

(S) When the NVN interdiction program became a steady series of strikes, considerable pressure developed to move fleet units farther north into the Gulf of Tonkin. Shorter ranges permitted larger ordnance loads or fewer aerial tankers. To maintain an adequate rescue capability for downed air-



Crews, SAR Sings had to be moved well into the Gulf. Concurrently with movement of naval forces NVN developed a limited, air attained to the ever increasing amount of the northward movement of naval forces NVN developed a limited, air attack air traffic over the Gulf of Tonkin produced a situation in which standard Fleet procedures were no longer adequate.

- (S) This situation was complicated by the development in recent years of guided missiles as the primary weapon for AAW. Missiles, while vastly superior to guns, had been developed with emphasis on long range capability. However, both the written rules and pilot judgement required a visual identification of hostile aircraft before firing. The requirements for visual contact created a strong demand for missiles which could be fired at minimum rather than maximum range. It was obvious that without a clear picture of the air situation USN forces were badly handicapped in both offensive and defensive roles.
- (S) In late April and early May 1966 the SAR forces in the Northern Gulf of Tonkin were augmented by the USS TOPEKA whose task was to evaluate the concept of one ship performing the following functions within a designated zone in the Gulf of Tonkin:
 - Positive ID and track of all aircraft in the zone.
 - b. CAP control.
 - c. Flight following.
 - d. SAR assistance.
- (S) As a result of the evaluation the PIRAZ (Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone) was established on 15 June 1966. The PIRAZ area included NVN territory and the international water of the Gulf of Tonkin north of 18-30N and east of 105-00E. All aircraft entering the zone were to check in with the PIRAZ ship. Considerable difficulty has been encountered in effecting necessary coordination and communications linkages. However the situation continues to improve. Although PIRAZ was established primarily for force defense, the PIRAZ ship concept also includes the following functions:
 - Vectored strike elements for rendezvous.
- b. Vectored aircraft in distress to a tanker or to positions requested by pilots.
 - c. Provide navigation assistance to strike elements.
 - d. Controlled CAP in protecting AF units operating in the Gulf.
 - e. Issued warning of MIG activity.

DECLEREDATED

- f. Issued warnings when friendly aircraft approach too close to the border of Communist China.
- (S) Active AAW over the Gulf of Tonkin has not materialized, however employment of MIG aircraft in an air-to-air role over selected areas in NVN, particularly in the Hanoi area, has steadily increased since mid-year.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

- (S) In response to the growing air defense measures by NVN, ECM had a major impact on ROLLING THUNDER Operations.
- (S) Project SHOEHORN, which provided an ALQ-51 repeater jammer, APR-27 launch alert receiver and a chaff dispenser, continued to grow in scope and magnitude. All aircraft exposed to a SAM environment became eligible to receive SHOEHORN equipment in order to enhance aircraft survivability and reduce attrition. By the end of August DIA reported that in one year NVN had fired over 733 SA-2 missiles against U.S. aircraft destroying 20 and probably destroying 10 more U.S. aircraft. Thus it took 24 SA-2 missiles to kill one U.S. aircraft. Undoubtedly electronic jamming and deception, plus timely electronic warnings, contributed greatly to the relatively poor performance of this missile.
- (S) Greater numbers of SHRIKE anti-radiation missiles became available in WESTPAC allowing an increase in employment of these missiles against NVN radars. As a result, electronic monitoring of NVN revealed that SAM battalion commanders became more cautious in radiating FANSONG radars during U.S. air raids. BDA of the radars where SHRIKES were aimed proved difficult to obtain but impacts adjacent to many NVN radars were reducing radiations to a minimum. Thus SHRIKES were assisting in denying the enemy the use of electronic weapons control systems.
- (S) Early in the year several DD's were fired upon by radar controlled NVN shore batteries. These incidents caused concern at all levels resulting in quick reaction capability (QRC) shipboard noise jammers being placed on DD type ships to deny range information to NVN fire control radars.
- (S) Electronic warfare in 1966 was employed on the largest scale since WW II, and the degree of sophistication was far superior. New tactics employed when new equipment was deployed resulted in a requirement for updating EW doctrine and publications and in establishment of specialized capabilities in repair units to accomplish the extensive reconfigurations required.
- (S) The jamming effort against NVN radars would not have been possible without a comprehensive data base of Sino-Soviet emitters. Consequently, U.S. Navy Elint collection efforts intensified in the PACOM area, especially around NVN. All types of naval platforms were tasked to increase our coverage in WESTPAC. The EOB for NVN continued to increase at a steady rate.

DOCUMENTARY ANNEXES

- A. COMSEVENTHELT Employment Schedule 1966, Part I and Part II
- B. STAFF Duty Officer Record Log 1966
- C. Press Kit DECKHOUSE V
- D. History of Amphibious Operations in South Vietnam March 1965 December 1966 THISD PHIBROL PET REPORTS
- E. COMSEVENTH Fleet Organization 1966 [FILED SEPARATECY]
- F. STAFFS/SHIPS/UNITS Attached SEVENTH Fleet 1966
- G. S.S. BATON ROUGE VICTORY Salvage Ops
- H. (1) SECNAV Brief 13 July 1966
 - (2) COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS 4 August 1966 (BRIEF)
 - (3) COMSEVENTHELT SPECIAL BRIEF FOR VICE CNO RIVERO and AS STS 16 July 1966
 - (4) CTF 72 BRIEF 1 August 1966
 - (5) COMSEVENTHELT BRIEF FOR SECRETARY BALDWIN UNDERSECRET-ARY OF THE NAVY 7 December 1965
 - (6) BRIEF FOR VADM NEEDHAM INSPECTOR GENERAL 9 May 1966
 - (7) SPECIAL BRIEFING FOR UNDER SECNAV MR BEAUMONT CONDUCTED 18 May 1966 on board OKLAHOMA CITY (CLG-5)
- I. COMSEVENTH Ser N12-28 dated 18 Jan 1967 Community Relations Activities
- J. CINCPACFLT MESSAGE 130329Z JAN 1967 Statistics for COMUSMACV
- K. ADMINO COMSEVENTHELT MESSAGE 100402Z JAN 1967 Statistics for COMUSMACV CY1966 PAO WRAP-UP
- L. COMASWFORPAC MESSAGE 210820Z JAN 1967 INTSUM 1-67

TAPES L FILED IN AR ORAL HISTORY