


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To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-09)


Subj: The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1965

Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT ltr FF1-1, 5750 Ser 1/00647 of 18 Jul 1967

Encl: (1) Thirty-one (31) copies of Revised Errata Sheet for
subject publication

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith for inclusion with these
documents prior to distribution.

D. G. Parramore
D. G. PARRAMORE
Assistant Chief of Staff
for Administration



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THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE PACIFIC, 1965

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>CORRECTION</u>
Foreword	1	Delete "it", insert "is"
11	7	Delete "keeled", insert "heeled"
18	5	Delete "Kiem", insert "Kien"
19	10	Delete "operations, insert "operators"
28	7	Delete one "the"
33	11-13	Insert parenthesis vice commas between "network" and "at" and between "facilities" and "either"
45	10	Change "sieze" to read "Seize"
52	13	Insert "two" between "worked" and "shifts"
58	13	Delete "2/3", insert "3/4"
62	12	Delete "3/4", insert "2/4"
63	7	Change reference number "37" to read "38"
63	12	Change reference number "38" to read "39"
65	9	Change reference number "40" to read "41"
65	12	Change reference number "41" to read "42"
66	10	Change reference number "42" to read "43"
69	12	Change "superceded" to read "superseded"
70	4	Change "detrance" to read "deterrence"
71	12	Delete "of", insert "or"
75	9	Change "position" to read "positions"
77	Bottom	Change "danager" to read "danger"
80	Next to last	Delete second "unheard of", insert "incredible to"
120-121	Last line on 120 first two lines on 121	Delete entire sentence
121	15	Change "existense" to read "existence"
134	9	Insert "from" between "knew" and "his"
206	5 April	Delete "drone"
208	20 July	Change "deploys" to read "deploy"
210	11 November	Insert "first" between "begins" and "phase"
211	22 December	Change "700" to read "100"
219	Reference # 14	Delete "p.322."
220	Reference #18	Delete entire reference, insert "COMFIRSTFLT, Exercise Silverlance Post Exercise Report"
220	Reference #19	Delete "p.453."
220		After Reference Number 29, add new references 30 CINCPAC, <u>Command History 1965</u> , Annex A, 54. 31 <u>Ibid.</u>

221

Between present references 8 and 9, insert new reference "9 Ibid." Renumber all following references accordingly, adding one number to each.

225

After Reference Number 26, add new reference "27 Press Release, SEVENTH Fleet No 02-66 of 7 Jan 66"

229

After Reference Number 32, add new reference "33 CONFIRSTFLT 020517Z OCT 1965"
"34 FACFLT Report 3100-1 of 30 November 1965, Report of Exercise Baseline"

234

After Reference Number 25, add new reference "26 Data from COMSERVPAC"

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
United States Pacific Fleet



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ANNUAL REPORT

26 June 1964 - 30 March 1965



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FPO San Francisco 96610

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From: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Correction to the Annual Report of the Commander in Chief (U)

Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT SEC ltr FF1-1 5213 Ser 15/00349 of 30 Mar 65

1. It is requested that reference (a) be corrected by making the following pen-and-ink corrections to page 46 of enclosure (1) thereof:

a. Under the heading, "Western Pacific", delete:

- (1) "One Marine Expeditionary Brigade Landing exercise (LONE END)."
- (2) "One Cold Weather exercise of battalion scope."

F. L. Tausch
F. L. TAEUSCH
Assistant Chief of Staff
for Administration

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From: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Report of the Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet

Ref: (a) Article 0506(2), U. S. Navy Regulations, 1948
(b) OPNAVINST 5750.9, Subj: Command Histories

Encl: (1) Annual Report of the Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet,
period 26 Jun 64 to 30 Mar 65

1. Reference (a) requires each Commander in Chief to submit to the Chief of Naval Operations, at the end of the fiscal year and upon being relieved, a report containing such information as is necessary to permit a comprehensive review of the operations and conditions of his command. Reference (b) requires commands to submit a command history.

2. Enclosure (1) covers the period 26 June 1964 to the date of my relief, 30 March 1965, and contains the report and the command history required by references (a) and (b), respectively.


T. H. MOORER

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Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
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From: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-09)

Subj: The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1965

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5750.12

Encl: (1) The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1965

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded for information, and satisfies the requirements of reference (a) for the calendar year 1965 although it is recognized that reference (a) applies only to 1966 and succeeding calendar years.

D. G. Parramore
D. G. PARRAMORE
Assistant Chief of Staff
for Administration

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ANNUAL REPORT
COMMANDER IN CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
FISCAL YEAR 1965

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SUMMARY

During this reporting period the Pacific Fleet has experienced its busiest "peacetime" period in history. The tempo and scope of operations have steadily increased since July 1964. The operational highlights of this period consist of the following:

a. In August 1964 the destroyers, MADDOX and TURNER JOY, were attacked by North Vietnamese patrol craft in the Gulf of Tonkin. This attack triggered the first United States retaliatory air strike by carrier aircraft against selected North Vietnamese targets resulting in extensive damage to fuel storage areas and base installations.

b. During the latter part of November 1964, units of Task Force 76 provided disaster relief assistance in response to serious flooding conditions which occurred in South Vietnam.

c. Armed air reconnaissance missions over LAOS were commenced on 17 December 1964. These missions have been conducted by Task Force 77 aircraft on a continuing basis.

d. In December 1964, DANIEL BOONE became the first Polaris submarine to go on patrol in the Western Pacific. Since that time, three additional nuclear powered Polaris submarines have joined the Pacific Fleet.

e. Following the 6 February 1965, Viet Cong mortar attack on the Pleiku air base in South Vietnam, three CVAs of Task Force 77 were moved into position off the coast of South Vietnam in preparation for the second retaliatory strike against North Vietnam. On 7 February 1965, carrier air strikes were conducted against North Vietnamese barracks and staging areas. Additional carrier air strikes, not in response to any particular Viet Cong activity, were conducted against North Vietnamese targets in March 1965.

f. As an enhancement to airfield security, two batteries of the First LAAM Battalion were directed to deploy to Danang on 9 February 1965. These forces were augmented in March 1965 by the air-lifting of the First Battalion of the Third Marine Regiment (BLT 1/3) from Okinawa to Danang and the landing of the Battalion Landing Team which was embarked in Amphibious shipping stationed off Danang. As a result of these deployments, there are currently about 5,000 Marine security forces stationed in the Danang area. Later, in March 1965, the First Marine Brigade was deployed from Hawaii to the Western Pacific as a replacement for the Marine forces withdrawn from Okinawa.

The numerous fleet training exercises, covering every aspect of

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modern naval warfare, that were conducted during this period contributed greatly to the highly successful results obtained in the above operations. Basically, however, the success of these operations is directly attributable to the determination and dedication of the quarter-million Navy men and Marines who man the 425 ships and 3,000 aircraft of the Pacific Fleet. This has been and will continue to be the keynote of successful operations.

Brief status summaries of the various areas which comprise the current Pacific Fleet readiness posture are as follows:

Mine Warfare

The status of Mine Warfare is below the desired level of readiness and is still struggling upward. The principal problem associated with its slow progress has been the fact that this aspect of warfare has been long neglected. Only recently has there been an awareness of its potential. The specific problem areas which contribute to the current low state of readiness are:

- a. Inadequate numbers of aircraft capable of conducting mining operations.
- b. Inadequate numbers of ships with mine laying capability.
- c. Inadequate stocks and types of mines, particularly those needed to counter PT boats, Swatows and junks.
- d. Inadequate capabilities in mine countermeasures operations.

Fleet Anti-Air Warfare

The continued introduction of modern equipment in the form of missile ships, aircraft and electronics has improved the Pacific Fleet AAW capability. By the addition of NTDS equipped ships and other NTDS installations, the 1965/1966 Pacific Fleet AAW capability will be greatly enhanced. More specifically, the continuing influx of powerful search radars, missile systems, and the introduction of the F-4 aircraft with its improved versions of Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles have contributed significantly to the Pacific Fleet AAW readiness posture.

Amphibious Warfare

The Pacific Fleet has continued to maintain an effective and timely responsive capability to conduct amphibious operations and to maintain a sustained amphibious readiness posture at sea for long periods of time. This capability has been maintained in spite of deficiencies created by the continuous use of aging WW II

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amphibious ships and landing craft, shortages of funds for repair, insufficient numbers and types of ships to meet requirements, and the decline in the number of 5" and 8" gun barrels incident to the FRAM program and missile ship conversions. Emphasis on naval matters in support of counterinsurgency operations increased during this period. Contributions in this area by subordinate commands of the Pacific Fleet have been noteworthy.

Electronic Warfare

Electronic Warfare readiness has been improved by the additional EW exercises that were scheduled during this period. Additionally, PACFLT Type Commanders have instituted programs to systematically uncover and correct material deficiencies which prevent useful operational performance with existing shipboard installations. Command attention has been directed to define and implement useful EW applications in current operation plans and for future use.

Strike Warfare

The policy of maintaining a three carrier Attack Carrier Strike Group in the Western Pacific has continued to enhance the strike force potential of the Pacific Fleet. As a result of operations in the South China Sea area, an unusually high tempo of operations has been maintained in meeting strike and reconnaissance requirements. A new look has been taken toward fleet capabilities in the conventional ordnance field with particular emphasis on air-to-surface capabilities. Accordingly, the following measures were taken to improve the conventional ordnance readiness of PACFLT units:

- a. F-4 aircraft were provided with MER/TER racks for an increased air-to-ground capability.
- b. Accelerated procurement of equipment was initiated to provide the MK-81 (250#) bomb a high retardation tail, the combination of which is known as SNAKEYE.
- c. The CBU-2A/A, an anti-personnel/unit material weapon has been assigned as part of the ordnance inventory of all WESTPAC CVAs.
- d. The CBU-14, another weapon of the CBU family, but smaller, has been assigned for evaluation to determine its compatibility with A-1 type aircraft.
- e. Sidewinder L-C (IRAH/SARAH) capability was established in WESTPAC in January 1965.

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f. The SHRIKE weapons system was established in WESTPAC during March 1965.

g. A Combat Readiness Assessment (CRAE) ordnance allowance has been established within PACFLT.

In late December 1964, the REGULUS Weapons System was phased out and the first Pacific Fleet POLARIS submarine became operational.

Antisubmarine Warfare

The Pacific Fleet ASW capability has shown some improvement during the reporting period. Additional squadrons transitioned to the P3 aircraft and initial surveys are underway for the establishment of a second SOSUS station in the Aleutian Islands. The detection and classification of submarine contacts has progressed with the installation of an increased number of SQS-23 sonars in Pacific Fleet destroyers. However, localization of contacts using JEZEBEL/CODAR techniques remains poor. Naval Control and Protection of Shipping capability will be greatly increased by a six-month training period, commencing 23 March 1965, during which the Pacific Naval Control of Shipping Organization will actually route approximately 30 MSTs ships. ASW analysis teams have been established at COMASWFORPAC and COMSUBPAC, to support the Navy-wide Fleet ASW Data Analysis Program (FADAP).

Undersea Warfare

Short term evaluations have been completed on the PERMIT class submarine capability as an SSK and on the SUBROC weapon system. The readiness of the submarine force continues to be degraded by a shortage of material and personnel, with a serious deficiency in the area of ordnance. Of particular concern in this area, are the operational limitations and material deficiencies of the MK-37-0/1 torpedo which cause a marked reduction in the anti-submarine warfare readiness of Pacific Fleet submarines against high speed enemy submarines. A requirement also exists for a reliable anti-shipping torpedo to replace the obsolete weapons currently on hand. The primary mission of the Fleet Submarine Training Facility (FLESUBTRAFAC) Pearl Harbor, is to support the Polaris program by conducting training in virtually every equipment and system found on board the 627 class SSBN. A problem affecting FLESUBTRAFAC's accomplishment of this mission is the critical shortage of instructor personnel.

Plans

Revised General Orders 5 and 19 resulted in vast changes in command and control over the entire naval shore establishment. In

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essence, CINCPACFLT attained extensive additional authority and responsibility over Fleet Support activities, not only in WESTPAC, but also in MIDPAC and EASTPAC. The Commandants, ELEVENTH, TWELFTH, THIRTEENTH and FOURTEENTH, Naval Districts were placed directly under the command of CINCPACFLT. CINCPACFLT also became the area coordinator for all shore (field) activities in WESTPAC.

Intelligence

Two hundred and twenty-six mission planning folders with supporting documents were produced during this period. Production of other publications included basic intelligence studies, Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) folders, Order of Battle and Tactical Target Illustration Sheets.

Intelligence briefings were given to westbound PACFLT units as they passed through Pearl Harbor. In addition, all units having a need to know were kept informed of daily happenings through the PACFLT intelligence summary.

Peripheral reconnaissance missions were conducted by PACFLT surface and air units to satisfy PACOM priority intelligence collection requirements as well as asserting U.S. rights to be in certain areas.

The RA5C and the Integrated Operational Intelligence System on board USS RANGER underwent operational tests under combat conditions.

The Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific Photo Facility at Cubi Point, P.I., was established and processed 4 million feet of film during the period.

Communications

Progress in Pacific Fleet Communications has taken great strides during fiscal year 1965. The completion of the Trans-Pacific cable has improved point-to-point circuit reliability with a resultant increase in the speed and capacity for record communications. The recent unstable conditions in Southeast Asia have provided the impetus to accelerate the programmed communications improvements afloat and ashore in order to enhance the operational readiness of the Pacific Fleet. However, the desired degree of Pacific Fleet communication readiness still depends on the corrective action taken to alleviate the critical shortages of Radio and Electronics personnel.

Naval Security Group

The Pacific Area COMSEC effort was reorganized during this

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period. Electronic Intelligence Support to fleet units by NAVSEC-GRU Technical Guidance Units continues to increase. The Pacific Area Bullseye HFDF System is nearing completion with 6 of the 8 installations completed and 2 under construction.

Logistics

The increase in U.S. advisory effort in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) resulted in an accelerated buildup of HEDSUPPACT Saigon. Preliminary estimates have been made to expand logistic support by the introduction of specialized Army units.

Exercise LOG TRAIN was held at Korat, Thailand from 17 to 30 March 1965 to test the capability of SEATO nations to resist overt invasion of friendly SEASIA territory by use of SEATO air and ground forces.

The seaward extension of the DEW-line and contiguous barrier is being phased out with flight operations ceasing 1 May 1965 and BARFORPAC being disestablished by 30 June 1965. Revised missions and tasks of NAVSTA Midway have been submitted and approved by CNO. These reflect the disestablishment of the barrier operation.

In October 1963, a reduction of foreign national hires of 15% was directed. This was later meliorated to 10 1/2%. In November 1964, the Auditor General of the Navy conducted an on-site survey to determine if a further reduction in foreign nationals was feasible. This survey validated the previous CINCPACFLT position that further reductions are not feasible. As a result, any further reductions have been deferred. In one instance an urgently required increase in foreign national hires was approved.

The Fleet Air Western Pacific Repair Activity is continuing to make substantial annual savings in rework costs by precluding the requirement of having to maintain a large pipeline of aircraft for support of the SEVENTHFLT.

An increase in airlift support by VR-21 was achieved despite the critical decrease in material support for the aging C-118 aircraft.

Critical deficiencies in the support capability of the Navy's shore bases, particularly in the Western Pacific, have been carefully studied by the subordinate commands and by CINCPACFLT, and relative urgencies have been reflected in the priority list for the fiscal year 1967 military construction program.

Mobile Construction Battalions accomplished a variety of facility construction projects in the Pacific. During the period

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of this report, four Seabee Technical Assistance Teams (STATS) were employed in the Republic of Vietnam and three were employed in Thailand for the training of construction personnel.

Fleet Supply

To assist OPNAV in substantiating the fact that material consumption rates increase incident to an acceleration in the tempo of operations/flight hours, a material consumption rate survey was conducted. This survey showed that consumption did increase and as a result, recommended a factor of at least 1.5 of peacetime consumption be applied to demand based consumable material. For insurance items, it was recommended that the ship's allowance list re-write program include the task of making item by item determinations as to whether the increased consumption reflected in the hull, machinery, electronics, and ordnance sections of the survey are applicable.

Considerable improvement was made in the support to the SEVENTH-FLT when MARS arrived in WESTPAC in September 1964. Additionally, fleet support in Subic was increased with the acquisition of a Fleet Issue Load List (FILL) capability by NSD Subic. This added capability played a large role in meeting SEVENTHFLT material requirements during and immediately following the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

The CNO sponsored program for elimination of excess stocks on board Pacific Fleet Tenders and Repair Ships was completed on 30 November 1964. Approximately 73,000 items valued at over four million dollars were off-loaded.

A study of MATS support during August, September and October 1964 indicated that MATS capability is limited to approximately 500,000 pounds daily in all services and that MATS is unable to respond adequately to increased requirements when contingencies arise and airlift is most vital to fleet readiness.

The DIAL program initiated by CNO and implemented by ALPAC-FLT 16 directed all PACFLT ships, except those in overhaul, to submit requisitions for allowance list deficiencies to designated data processing centers. The data generated by this program will be used by CNO to make strong representation to fill material deficiencies in our ships.

Because of the steadily increasing number of casualty reports filed by the Fleet, which require parts for correction, a data collection system has been developed and is in use at Fleet Operations Control Center, Pacific. This collection system provides information to CNO and the material bureaus for use in revising

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ship's allowance lists and positioning a refined range of insurance items in WESTPAC.

The introduction, on or about 1 July, of revised afloat supply and accounting procedures, incident to implementation of the 3M program, is expected to increase certain phases of shipboard annual supply inspections. A greater degree of inspection procedures standardization among type commanders is also being developed.

The Supply Operations Assistance Program (SOAP) continues to be highly successful. However, because of inadequate S&E funding, many SOAP deficiencies are not funded.

Incident to implementation of OPNAVINST 4441.12, CINCPACFLT is assuming an expanded role in determining stock requirements at Pacific overseas bases.

In order to furnish adequate supply support to various forces in Vietnam during the past year, the resources required by Headquarters Support Activity Saigon (HSAS) have been steadily upgraded. The major impediment to the rapid build-up of HSAS stocks is the long order and shipping time for routine re-supply. Several actions, including the installation of AUTODIN, raising the Force Activity Designator and establishing special procedures to permit HSAS to requisition directly from NSBs Subic and Yokosuka have partially alleviated the long order and shipping time.

On 31 March 1965, Phase II of the Pacific Fleet POL Data Processing System will be turned over to CINCPACFLT. This system is designed to handle all ships and aircraft POL requirements at any desired level of detail.

Navy Resale Facilities in Vietnam have been recently expanded to include establishment of exchanges at Bien Hoa and DaNang under the dominant user concept. The establishment of these exchanges was authorized by ONI.

Fleet Maintenance

The material condition of the Pacific Fleet ships is considered to be Medium, based on a scale of High, Medium, Low and Not Ready.

The major factors which have contributed or will contribute to the improvement of material readiness are:

- a. The replacement of older ships with new or converted ones.
- b. The FRAM program and the adherence to the concept of thorough overhauls.

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c. The planned maintenance system which is currently being introduced into the fleet.

d. The boiler improvement program including inspection of all 1200 PSI boilers by qualified inspection teams.

The major factors that have contributed to the degradation of the Fleet's material readiness are:

- a. A lack of trained and experienced engineering personnel.
- b. A lack of sufficient funds for essential supplies and equipage and for restricted and technical availabilities.
- c. A lack of properly positioned repair parts.

Fleet Personnel

There has been no appreciable change in the general personnel situation within the Fleet. Shortages continue to exist in the "critical" enlisted ratings, particularly at the supervisory level, and in the officer ranks of LT and LCDR. The reenlistment rate continues to drop despite accelerated and sustained efforts to increase the retention rate. The enlisted distribution procedures within the Fleet have had two significant changes. Firstly, BUPERS has assumed the detailing of all Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers. Secondly, CINCPACFLT assumed direct control of PACFLT enlisted distribution responsibilities in an effort to respond rapidly to Fleet Personnel matters.

Fleet Civil Engineer

Concurrent with meeting increased requirements in South Vietnam, the total transportation equipment allowances in WESTPAC have been reduced by 315 items since the beginning of FY 1965.

The dredge, GULFSTREAM (YM 20), while under tow from Johnston Island to NAVSHIPREPAC Yokosuka, capsized and sank on 18 January 1965. There was no loss of life or damage to the towing vessel. A JAG investigation has been ordered, but has not yet been completed.

Fleet Medical and Dental

The general health of Pacific Fleet personnel has been excellent, with no unusual incidence of disease. Several ships did experience brief outbreaks of dysentery among the crew, but all outbreaks were promptly brought under control.

The Fleet Medical Office continues to provide medical briefing

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to medical department personnel of ships enroute to WESTPAC and SEASIA. Additionally, all Senior Medical Officers enroute to these areas were briefed prior to their departure for duty.

Dental support has been provided to the Pacific Fleet by approximately 381 Dental Officers, 8 Medical Service Corps Officers, and 600 Dental Technicians. With the additional responsibility to provide dental care for all United States Military Advisory Groups in the Pacific area, Navy dental facilities have been maintained at Taipei, Saigon, Bangkok and Chinhae.

Fleet Chaplain

In October 1964, CINCPACFLT sponsored the first Force Chaplains' Conference to be held in the fleet. Twelve chaplains, representing major area and type commanders attended. The attending chaplains voiced appreciation for the conference and recommended that one be held annually.

As of 30 March 1965 there were 253 chaplains on duty in the Pacific Fleet including those serving with MSTSPAC. Allowances exist for 251 chaplains. The two chaplains in excess of allowance are carried on the allowances at COMNAVFORJAPAN and the Third Marine Division.

Naval Weather Service

Naval Weather Service support to the Fleet continues to be of a high quality. The broad resources of Fleet Numerical Weather Facility Monterey are now being piped over data links through Pearl Harbor to FWC Guam for transmission to the fleet. Air Force weather configured C-130 aircraft are expected to replace the WB-47 and WB-50 weather reconnaissance aircraft during calendar 1965 at Guam for typhoon reconnaissance.

Legal

Actions have been taken upon 13 investigations of collisions, groundings, major casualties or other operational events. The majority of the investigations revealed culpable conduct or performance of duty by naval personnel or contained a serious adverse reflection upon the performance of commanding officers.

A five day course in military law was organized and conducted for non-lawyer legal officers of various independent commands in the Hawaiian area. Fifteen Navy and Marine Lawyers in the area volunteered to participate as instructors in the course which provided instruction for forty-eight naval officers and twenty-two Marine Corps officers.

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Military Government

CINCPACFLT, as Military Governor of the Bonin-Volcano Islands and Marcus Island, initiated or accomplished several actions relative to the government of such islands. There was a complete revision of the Judicial and Criminal Codes of these islands and a Bonin-Islands Economic Improvement program was instituted.

Three Japanese fishing vessels entered the territorial waters of the Bonin-Volcano Islands during this reporting period. All were convicted of unlawful entry into territorial waters and subsequently fined.

CINCPACFLT, in his capacity as Military Governor of the Bonin-Volcano Islands, is the trustee for the Bonin-Volcano Trust Fund, which had a net worth of \$87,098.40 on 15 March 1965.

Personal Decorations

In February 1965, in order to effect prompt recognition of Navy and Marine Corps personnel participating in combat operations in Southeast Asia, the Secretary of the Navy delegated authority to CINCPACFLT to award the following personal decorations:

- Silver Star Medal
- Legion of Merit Medal
- Distinguished Flying Cross
- Bronze Star Medal
- Air Medal
- Navy Commendation Medal
- Secretary of the Navy Commendation for Achievement
- Purple Heart

CINCPACFLT in turn sub-delegated authority to CGFMFPAC to award the preceding decorations to Navy and Marine Corps personnel serving with Fleet Marine Force, Pacific units. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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PART I

OPERATIONS

ORGANIZATION OF THE PACIFIC FLEET

Ships and units of the Pacific Fleet are administratively organized in the following commands:

Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Amphibious Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Service Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Mine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Training Command, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

The ships and units of these commands, except when in overhaul or post overhaul status and in certain exceptions, are assigned to the FIRST or SEVENTH Fleets.

Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Force, Pacific acts as the principal advisor to CINCPACFLT in all matters pertaining to antisubmarine warfare and the control and protection of shipping.

The principal responsibilities of the area commanders are for functions of antisubmarine warfare, search and rescue, naval reconnaissance, escort convoy routing and diversion of shipping.

The area commands are:

Naval Defense Force, Eastern Pacific
Alaskan Sea Frontier
Hawaiian Sea Frontier
U. S. Naval Forces, Marianas
U. S. Naval Forces, Philippines
U. S. Naval Forces, Japan

There are four additional commands:

Barrier Forces, Pacific
Operational Test and Evaluation Force
U. S. Naval Forces, Korea
Fleet Tactical Support Squadron 21 (VR 21)

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COMBARFORPAC is the operational commander of the aviation units employed in patrolling the seaward extension of the Distant Early Warning System. This Force is being phased out with deactivation scheduled for 1 May 1965.

COMOPEVFOR is the operational commander for the support of the Navy's Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Program.

COMNAVFORKOREA performs tasks assigned under CINCPACFLT within the Korean area and also serves as the Naval component commander of the U. S. Forces Korea. COMNAVFORKOREA is not an area commander.

Fleet Tactical Support Squadron 21 provides airlift directly responsive to the requirements of the Fleet.

NORMAL OPERATIONS OF THE PACIFIC FLEET

FIRST FLEET

Commander FIRST Fleet, as the primary PACFLT operational commander is the Eastern Pacific, conducts operations supporting National Cold War objectives. He is prepared to augment forces of the SEVENTH FLEET on short notice. He conducts joint, intertype and fleet training exercises; develops intertype tactics; and plans for wartime offensive operations. The forces of the FIRST Fleet are organized as follows:

a. Strike/Antiaircraft Warfare/ASW Force (Task Force 11)

Task Force 11 is normally composed of those carriers, cruisers and AAW capable destroyers which are not assigned to SEVENTH Fleet or in overhaul phase.

b. Ready Force (Task Force 14)

Task Force 14 maintains the capability of augmenting forces operating in WESTPAC on short notice. COMFIRSTFLT is Commander Task Force 14.

(1) Ready Strike Group (Task Group 14.1)

Task Group 14.1, normally composed of one carrier, one cruiser and one to two divisions of destroyers, is capable of sailing in augmentation of forces operating in WESTPAC on 72 hours notice.

(2) Ready Amphibious Group (Task Group 14.3)

Task Group 14.3, normally composed of one amphibious squadron, one LANSHIPRON (plus detachments of Naval Beach Group, Underwater Demolition Teams, LCU squadrons and Tactical Air Support Squadrons) and one division of ocean mine sweepers, is capable of sailing in augmentation of forces operating in WESTPAC on 96 hours notice.

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(3) EASTPAC Ready Escort Group (Task Group 14.4)

Task Group 14.4 is composed of one destroyer division capable of sailing to the Western Pacific on 96 hours notice.

(4) MIDPAC Ready Escort Group (Task Group 14.5)

Task Group 14.5 is composed of one destroyer division capable of sailing to the Western Pacific on 96 hours notice.

(5) Ready Hunter-Killer Group (Task Group 14.7)

Task Group 14.7 is composed of one ASW support carrier with one division of destroyers capable of sailing to the Western Pacific on 96 hours notice.

(6) Ready Logistics Group (Task Group 14.9)

Task Group 14.9 is composed of two ammunition ships, three oilers, one store ship and one destroyer tender capable of sailing to the Western Pacific on 96 hours notice.

c. Task Forces 10, 12, 13 and 15 - 19 are utilized for contingency/exercise purposes.

SEVENTH FLEET

Commander SEVENTH Fleet is the primary PACFLT naval operational commander in the Western Pacific. He conducts operations in the Western Pacific, Eastern Indian Ocean and the Southeast Asian waters in support of the U. S. National Cold War objectives. The operations of the SEVENTH Fleet represent a balance between maintaining the advanced readiness status of assigned forces by allocation of sufficient training and upkeep time and at the same time, maintaining a posture of instant readiness for a general or limited emergency. Further, the SEVENTH Fleet operates both to influence and to respond to the unstable and potentially explosive political and military situations which prevail in the area of its responsibility. In achieving this balance, the major tactical forces of the SEVENTH Fleet are organized and employed as follows:

a. Taiwan Patrol Force (Task Force 72)

Task Force 72, normally composed of destroyers, aircraft and a seaplane tender, has the primary mission of conducting air and surface reconnaissance and surveillance in the SEVENTH Fleet area of operations. This force also provides ASW protection to fleet units and maintains a capability to conduct mine laying.

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b. Mobile Logistics Support Force (Task Force 73)

Task Force 73 includes repair ships, tenders, oilers, ammunition ships, stores ships and other types of auxiliary vessels. This force provides mobile logistic support, repair facilities and underway replenishment for the SEVENTH Fleet.

c. Amphibious Force SEVENTH Fleet (Task Force 76)

Task Force 76, composed of one amphibious squadron, one landing ship squadron and one amphibious assault ship, provides a ready capability to land a Marine Regimental Landing Team in amphibious assault. The force conducts amphibious training for Marine and Army units in the Western Pacific and assists in training indigenous forces in amphibious warfare.

d. Attack Carrier Striking Force (Task Force 77)

Task Force 77 includes attack carriers, cruisers and destroyers normally grouped in individual strike groups around a single CVA. Three CVAs are normally assigned to the SEVENTH Fleet, and one of these is a "large deck" carrier.

e. Fleet Marine Force SEVENTH Fleet (Task Force 79)

Task Force 79 is composed of the Third Marine Division (minus) and the First Marine Air Wing (minus). The division is based in Okinawa and the wing is based in Japan. The "minus" (one Regimental Landing Team and one Marine Air Group) have been organized into a brigade stationed in Hawaii, capable of assignment to SEVENTH Fleet on short notice.

f. ASW Hunter/Killer Group (Task Group 70.4)

Task Group 70.4 is composed of an ASW Carrier, two divisions of destroyers and one or two submarines from TG 70.9. The submarines provide service for ASW training and participate in coordinated training. The destroyers of this group are assigned from a cadre specialized in ASW. The DDs and CVS of this group normally have operated for several months as the FIRST Fleet Hunter/Killer Group (TG 14.7) prior to deployment as TG 70.4.

g. Mine Group (Task Group 70.5)

Task Group 70.5 is composed of two divisions of coastal minesweepers, one division of minesweeping boats with tender and one division of ocean minesweepers. This Group provides a ready capability for mine countermeasures and assists in training indigenous forces.

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h. Cruiser-Destroyer Group (Task Group 70.8)

Task Group 70.8 provides Cruiser-Destroyer Forces to the Attack Carrier Groups, ASW Group, Taiwan Patrol Force, Fleet exercises and exercises with allied forces; and to special contingency forces when required.

i. Submarine Group (Task Group 70.9)

Task Group 70.9 is composed of six attack submarines augmented by one additional attack submarine from June through October. Additionally, one auxiliary submarine (AGSS), one auxiliary transport submarine (APSS) and one submarine funded through the military assistance program are assigned this task group.

j. Amphibious Ready Group (Task Group 76.5)

Task Group 76.5 is normally composed of one Battalion Landing Team and one Marine helicopter squadron embarked in an Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH), a landing ship deck (LSD) and an Attack Transport (APA). This group is capable of instant response to contingency requirements by utilizing the vertical envelopment concept plus conventional landing by boats. A second amphibious ready group normally composed of one Battalion Landing Team embarked in an Attack Transport (APA), an Attack Cargo Ship (AKA) and a Landing Ship Deck (LSD) has also been maintained during periods of increased tension.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The first visits by a nuclear submarine to Hong Kong and to Japan were conducted by SEADRAGON. SEADRAGON visited Hong Kong on 27-30 October 1964 and 11-15 January 1965 and Sasebo on 12-14 November 1964 and 02-05 February 1965. The visits to Japan received wide-spread publicity and were exploited unsuccessfully by radical and Communist groups in Japan as anti-government and anti-U.S. propaganda. No incidents occurred to the detriment of the United States during any of the four visits.

USS MADDOX (DD 731) and USS TURNER JOY (DD 951) entered the Gulf of Tonkin on 31 July 1964 to conduct a DESOTO Patrol. During the patrol the destroyers were attacked by North Vietnamese Patrol craft. In reprisal to this attack a carrier strike was launched against the DRV. A second DESOTO Patrol consisting of USS MORTON (DD 948) and USS EDWARDS (DD 950) entered the Gulf of Tonkin on 17 September 1964 in order to emphasize U. S. convictions concerning the free use of international waters. During the night of 18 September the patrol encountered several fast closing contacts which were evaluated as hostile forces and taken under fire. No direct evidence to positively identify the hostile units was obtained and retaliatory strikes against the DRV were not launched. SEVENTHFLT forces were temporarily augmented and EASTPAC forces were alerted following these incidents until 28 September when a general stand-down in WESTPAC posture was directed by higher authority. Following

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the stand-down one amphibious task group with an embarked BLT was positioned off Cape Varella within 24 hours reaction time of either Cape St. Jacques or DaNang. A second amphibious task group with an embarked BLT maintained a 96 hours readiness posture in the South China Sea area.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

On 1 November 1964 the amphibious task group off Cape Varella was directed to take up a position off DaNang in response to the Viet Cong shelling of the Bien Hoa Air Base in South Vietnam. Two additional CVAs were also positioned off the RVN coast and the WESTPAC HUK group sailed to the South China Sea to provide ASW protection for Task Force 77. On 4 November, a stand-down was directed by higher authority which reduced the CVA requirement to one off South Vietnam with a second in the South China Sea on 48 hour reaction time.

(SECRET)

During the last two weeks in November, in response to serious flood conditions which occurred in South Vietnam, units of Task Force 76 provided disaster relief assistance delivering supplies from Hong Kong and also providing lighterage services in DaNang harbor.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

In late November the first LAAM Battalion was deployed to WESTPAC in amphibious shipping arriving in Okinawa on 7 December.

(SECRET)

On 17 December the Navy commenced armed reconnaissance missions in Laos on a continuing basis. Photographic and Electronic reconnaissance over Laos has continued during the period of this report. In December armed reconnaissance and limited strike operations of areas of military interest in Southeast Asia were initiated. Since December SEVENTH Fleet air units have conducted a significant amount of air reconnaissance operations in the RVN in order to satisfy COMUSMACV requirements.

(SECRET)

During December 1964 and January 1965, the following amphibious posture in the South China Sea was directed by higher authority:

20 December 1964 - One amphibious task group off Cape Varella on 24 hour reaction time to both DaNang and Saigon.

24 December 1964 - Amphibious task group off Cape Varella shifted to a position off Cape St. Jacques and a second amphibious task group with an embarked BLT sailed from Subic to join them, arriving on 26 December.

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6 January 1965 - One amphibious task group stationed off Cape St. Jacques with a second on 96 hour reaction time to the RVN coast.

23 January 1965 - One amphibious task group on 96 hour reaction time to RVN coast.

26 January 1965 - One amphibious task group stationed off DaNang and a second stationed off Cape St. Jacques.

29 January 1965 - One amphibious task group on 96 hour reaction time to RVN coast.

31 January 1965 - One amphibious task group on 72 hour reaction time to RVN coast. (SECRET)

USS DANIEL BOONE (SSBN 629) deployed on the initial POLARIS patrol in December 1964. The second and third POLARIS submarines, USS TECUMSEH (SSBN 628) and USS ULYSSES S. GRANT (SSBN 631), joined the deployed force in January and February 1965.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

On 25 December the Brink B.O.Q. in Saigon was bombed. A second CVA was positioned off RVN and retaliatory air strikes against the DRV were planned but not executed. On 30 December SEVENTH Fleet resumed the previous one CVA posture off RVN.

On 6 February the Pleiku air base in South Vietnam was attacked by the Viet Cong. Three CVAs were positioned off the RVN coast for possible retaliatory strikes against the DRV, one amphibious task group was positioned off DaNang and one was positioned off Cape St. Jacques. On 7 February U. S. Navy reprisal air strikes were executed against the DRV in conjunction with VNAF and USAF strikes.

(SECRET)

On 9 February two batteries of the First LAAM Battalion were directed to deploy to DaNang to enhance the airfield security. These batteries were in place and operational on 19 February 1965.

(SECRET)

On 10 February higher authority directed a stand-down to two CVAs off RVN with a third on 48 hour reaction time. Later on 10 February, the Viet Cong bombed the QUI NHON enlisted billet hotel and the third CVA returned to her position off the RVN Coast and on 11 February a three CVA reprisal air strike was conducted against the DRV in conjunction with a VNAF strike. On 21 February, higher authority directed a stand-down to two CVAs off RVN and a third on 48 hour reaction time and on 27 February the reaction time for the third CVA was relaxed to 96 hours. Also on 27 February higher authority directed an amphibious posture of one amphibious task group stationed off DaNang and one task group on 96 hour reaction time to RVN coast. (SECRET)

SECRET
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In June 1964, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT to determine by aerial surveillance and other means the current pattern of Junk traffic in the western part of the South China Sea. Two SP-2's conducted twelve flights from 7 July to 19 July 1964. They did not obtain positive evidence of infiltration by sea. TG 77.7 aircraft conducted flights between 15° N to 17° N from the West out to 120 NM twice daily from 3 July to 19 July 1964. There was no apparent movement of Junk concentrations and there were no positively identified DRV junks. Two P-2's conducted two flights from 14 September to 22 September 1964. No junks were found outside of 15 NM from land. Fourteen flights were conducted during the period 11-24 January 1965. No Junk infiltrations were discovered. During the first week of March 1965 representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and COMUSMACV conducted a conference on the subject of infiltration by sea and evolved a counter-infiltration operational concept that is presently being implemented. Four DDs, six MSO/MSG, five P2H, three A-1, and 2 RF 8 along with 16 VNN patrol craft and 100 VNN junks were on this task by 25 March. (SECRET)

COMPOSITION OF THE PACIFIC FLEET

As of 30 March 1965, the composition of the Pacific Fleet was as follows: (CONFIDENTIAL)

WARSHIPS

CA	1	CVA	9	DDR	3	SSG	1
CAG	1	CVS	4	DL	1	SSGN	1
CG	2	*DD	92	DLG	11	SSN	9
CLG	4	DDG	12	SS	34	SSBN	5
				Subtotal:		190	

* 6 DDs assigned to NRT

AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

AGC	3	APA	15	LPD	1	LSD	15
AKA	8	APD	3	LPH	3	LST	25
				Subtotal:		73	

MINE WARFARE SHIPS

MCS	1	MSC	9	MSO	31	MSI	2
				Subtotal:		43	

PATROL SHIPS

*DE	15	DER	10				
				Subtotal:		25	

* 9 NRTs

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AUXILIARY SHIPS

AD 6	AGB 1	AOG 3	ASR 4
ADG 1	AGS 3	APSS 1	ATA 2
AE 9	AGSS 8	AR 6	ATF 19
AF 8	AKS 2	ARS 8	AV 3
AFS 1	AO 19	AS 3	LST 2
	AOE 1	<u>Subtotal: 110</u>	

Grand Total: 441

INCREASED IN STRENGTH

FROM NEW CONSTRUCTION/CONVERSION/RECOMMISSIONING

RICHARD K. TURNER	(DLG 20)
REEVES	(DLG 24)
CHICAGO	(CG 11)
WADDELL	(DDG 24)
BENJAMIN J. STODDART	(DDG 22)
GARCIA	(DE 1040)

Subtotal: 6

FROM ATLANTIC FLEET

U. S. GRANT	(SSBN 631)
STONEWALL JACKSON	(SSBN 634)
DANIEL BOONE	(SSBN 629)
TECUMSEH	(SSBN 628)

Subtotal: 4

Grand Total: 10

DECREASES IN STRENGTH

TO PACRESFLT/INACTIVATIONS/DECOMMISSIONED

TRATHEN	(DD 530)
WISEMAN	(DE 667)
WATTS	(DD 567)
HAVERFIELD	(DER 393)
LANSING	(DER 388)

Subtotal: 5

(CONFIDENTIAL)

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TO ATLANTIC FLEET

RICHARD E. BYRD

(DOG 23)

Subtotal: 1

Grand Total: 6

Grand total to 30 March 1965	441
Total increases to 30 March 1965	10
Total decreases to 30 March 1965	6
Net gain	4

Grand Total as of 30 March 1965 445

AIRCRAFT UNITS (USN)

- 10 Attack Carrier Air Wings (CVS) (Includes RCVW)
- 5 ASW Carrier Air Groups (CVSG) (Includes RCVSG)
- 1 Helicopter Utility Squadron (HU)
- 1 Fleet Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VW)
- 2 Carrier Special Squadrons (2) VAW
- 1 Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron (VQ)
- 2 Air Development Squadrons (VX)
- 4 Fleet Utility and Drone Control Squadrons
- 16 Patrol Squadrons (VP) (Includes RVP)
- 1 Fleet Tactical Support Squadron (VR)
- 2 Photographic Squadrons (1) VAP (1) VFP

AIRCRAFT UNITS (USMC)

2 Marine Air Wings (MAW) consisting of:

7 Marine Air Groups (MAG)

- 7 Attack Squadrons (VMA)
- 3 Fighter Squadrons (VMF)
- 3 All Weather Fighter Squadrons (VMF (AW))
- 3 Fighter/Attack Squadrons (VMFA)
- 2 Composite Squadrons (VMCJ)
- 2 Observation Squadrons (VMO)
- 2 Transport Squadrons (VMGR)
- 1 Training Squadron (VMJ)
- 10 Helicopter Transport Squadrons (HMM/HMH)

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13-10-1050

FLEET TRAINING AND READINESS

Personnel

a. Shortages of supervisory pay grades (E-5 and above) continue to preclude manning at levels necessary for optimum maintenance and training. Due to continuing shortages of supervisors, augmentation of ratings is being accomplished by distributing designated strikers for petty officers. Unavoidably, this results in increased deterioration of equipment, more casualty reports and breakdown of preventative maintenance.

A comparison of petty officer leaders available and total numbers of CASREPs is shown below:

	CY63	CY64
Billets authorized	68,970	69,284
Personnel available	56,518	56,490
Shortage	12,452	12,794
CASREPs	3,292	4,695

A further breakdown of petty officer leaders for calendar year 1963 and 1964 follows. The tabulations above do not include CPOS or CPOM.

	CY63		CY64	
	Billets	Avail	Billets	Avail
PO2	33,908	28,141	34,124	28,240
PO1	24,739	18,998	24,946	19,144
CPO	10,323	9,389	10,214	9,106
CPOS	1,934	1,769	BUPERS controlled	
CPOM	873	760	figures available	

These figures indicate that although there was a slight increase in petty officer figures allowed, the fleet actually had less petty officer leaders in 1964.

This shortage coupled with the increased tempo of operations, possible escalation of hostilities in Southeast Asia requiring extended deployments and increased time allotted for maintenance have produced an increased amount of material failures. Ships presently are deploying with less time between deployments and normally below already curtailed personnel allowances. A factor further compounding the problems is that the austere personnel allowances must be filled by E-4 and nonrated personnel filling billets requiring experienced petty officer leaders. Unless more petty officers are made available, a general degradation of deploying units material status can be expected to continue. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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b. The continuing shortage of Sonarmen, attributable to the lack of retention of these highly trained personnel has seriously affected the ASW posture. Recently, the six year obligatory program has been instituted which should provide relief in the near future. This program initially was started in the Fire Control ratings for missile systems with considerable success and the resultant savings in training money expended.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Shortages in certain key rates/ratings frequently require the reassignment of large numbers of personnel to units preparing to rotate, thus increasing instability. In addition, this instability has seriously handicapped shipboard training programs, particularly in ships and squadrons receiving new systems and equipment.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

d. The shore activities in CONUS as well as overseas must be maintained below their authorized enlisted allowances in an effort to keep ships and operating units in an acceptable state of readiness.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

e. There continues to be a shortage of LT/LCDR in 11XX and 13XX, thereby requiring LTJG and ENS to assume duties for which they are not yet fully qualified.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

f. The frequent addition of programs within PACFLT without commensurate personnel augmentations continues to severely task already strained personnel resources. In this regard the emphasis placed on support of personnel requirements for Southeast Asia further aggravates the situation. Specific examples of such additional requirements are: FICPAC, FICPACFAC Cubi Pt., PTF support and VAP 61.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

g. The ever-increasing personnel requirements for new construction have barely been met due to the shortages of personnel discussed here and in the Fleet Personnel Section.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

h. TAD funds shortage. Lack of adequate temporary additional duty funds and the uneven flow from quarter to quarter is perpetuating a backlog of unfinished training. This further aggravates the attempt to keep training loads level at fleet training activities and results in uneven utilization of courses.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

Foreign Training

That portion of the military assistance program under the cognizance of CINCPACFLT has continued to progress satisfactorily with continued progress noted. Individual MAP recipient countries are encouraged to become self sufficient in the training field. There has been a steady decline in training provided for all PACOM MAP countries except Vietnam.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

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Mobile training teams are being scheduled as required. The program is being closely monitored to insure that teams scheduled are not repeated in subsequent years. All MAAG representatives were informed at the annual MAP training workshop if a continuing need exists for in-country training, a change to the JDT was to be submitted to obtain the necessary talent.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

Japan has become completely self-sufficient and is being phased out of the aid program. The majority of the training being scheduled in Japan is through the military sales program with only limited training being provided under MAP to satisfy previous commitments.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

All combat training for Indo China has been suspended. Only support training that cannot be attributed to the present war effort is being offered. The MILTAG presently in Indo China is being reduced to caretaker status through attrition.
(SECRET)

HMNZS OTAGO was provided work-up and refresher training at Fleet Training Group, Pearl Harbor in August-September 1964.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

The MAP submarine program continued with USS RATON (AGSS 270) providing services in the first half of FY 1965 and USS ROCK (AGSS 274) providing services in the second half. Participating countries were Korea, China, Philippines and Thailand. Services were predominantly to the ASW forces of the above countries. In addition, an occasional exercise is conducted in connection with reconnaissance/raid landing teams from MAP country Marine or Army forces.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

UDT/SEAL Shortages

The escalation of hostilities in Southeast Asia and the resultant increased utilization of Seal Teams both operationally and in training exercises necessitate an increase in Seal/UDT trained personnel. CINCPACFLT OPLANs require a total of 13 Seal detachments comprising a total of 156 personnel; however, the current PACFLT strength is only 10 officers and 50 enlisted personnel. CINCPACFLT has requested an annual increase of 6 officers and 30 enlisted men until an end strength of approximately 300 is reached. The first increment has been approved for FY 66.
(SECRET)

Coordinated Air/Surface Training for Contingency OPS

Destroyer patrols being attacked by small high speed surface boats in the Gulf of Tonkin and the resultant action graphically portrayed a general deterioration in surface gunnery and coordinated air/surface operational capabilities. Extensive training programs were undertaken in WESTPAC and EASTPAC to improve these capabilities in PACFLT deploying units. The programs highlighted deficiencies not only in procedures

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and delivery capabilities but also in material availability and reliability. Presently, all deploying units demonstrate proficiency in countering high speed targets and shore bombardment prior to chopping to SEVENTHFLT OPCON. Further, conventional training ammunition requirements have been increased to accommodate the accelerated training schedules.

(SECRET)

SERE Training

Recent developments in Southeast Asia have highlighted the necessity for survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) training for all personnel who are engaged in operations that may subject them to capture or detainment by enemy forces. SERE training within PACFLT is being provided in accordance with the following priority:

1. COMNAVAIRPAC units.
2. Personnel being assigned to Southeast Asia.
3. All other units.

Inadequate personnel available for SERE instructors necessitated the above priority system in order to meet the requirements of OPNAV Instruction 003305.1.

DOD directive 1300.7 and SECNAV letter 00011POLB of 21 May 1956 both provide policy guidance for SERE. There is a basic conflict between the two cited instructions and the ambiguity must be resolved to facilitate effective training of students.

SERE training is presently being provided at San Diego, Whidbey Island and Barbers Point. COMNAVAIRPAC is CINCPACFLT's agent for all SERE training.

(SECRET)

ASW Readiness

The ASW capability of PACFLT forces has shown a slow but steady improvement since the last report. This improvement is attributable, primarily, to the introduction of new equipment and continued emphasis in training. The material aspects contributing to the improvement in capability are set forth below.

a. The P2 aircraft are gradually being replaced by P3 aircraft. Three squadrons of P3A aircraft are currently operational and a fourth is in the final phase of transition.

b. The HS squadrons have completed their transition to the SH-3A helicopters.

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c. There has been a continuing program of replacing S-2A aircraft with S-2D/E configurations. The latter provides a JEZEBEL capability, improved automatic navigational system, integrated tactical display, and improved communications equipment.

Although the increase in capabilities of ASW aircraft has been significant, other serious deficiencies exist to militate against the ASW readiness of PACFLT units which are as follows:

a. There are insufficient VP aircraft to perform the myriad of missions and tasks assigned by current Operations Plans, War Plans, etc.

b. Instability of personnel, and shortages of supervisory personnel in the technical ratings continue to adversely affect readiness. An improvement in first tour reenlistments and increased "A" and "B" school outputs would improve the existing readiness posture.

c. The emphasis on JULIE/JEZEBEL operations in VP and VS squadrons has resulted in a concentration of training in these areas with a corresponding degradation of operational efficiency in other sensors. Radar operators in P2 and P5 aircraft are tactical coordinators who receive no formal training in scope interpretation and equipment operation. This has resulted in a minimal capability for snorkel detections and an unacceptable performance for periscope detections.

d. The ALD-2A ECM equipment installed in P3A aircraft has proven to be unacceptable. A modification program has been instituted and the ALD-2A ECM equipment in current deliveries has been discontinued. As a result of the modification program, the thirteen ECM equipped P3A in NAVAIRPAC inventory are having the ALD-2A removed during PAR cycles which commenced in September 1964, at the approximate rate of one per month.

e. Available ASW torpedoes are not fully capable of countering the anticipated threat and additionally, are in short supply.

f. Design deficiencies in items such as underwater sound signals and sonobuoys limit their effectiveness.

g. Lack of adequate repair and overhaul funds does not permit thorough maintenance and orderly installation of new capabilities in fleet units.

h. Shortages of repair parts to support equipments in the fleet leads to unacceptable long periods in which equipment is out of commission due to lack of parts.

i. Continued scarcity of submarine services for training.

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j. The SQS-26 Sonar System, which is scheduled for the fleet, is still not operational. (CONFIDENTIAL)

k. The older ordnance, such as the Torpedoes MK 34-3, 43-1 and 43-3, Depth Charges MK9 and MK14, and Weapon ALFA are in good supply but have limited capabilities against even medium-speed, medium depth submarines. (SECRET)

l. Deficiencies continue to exist in PACFLT surface ship initial allowances of ASW standard torpedoes. The initial allowance requirements (ship-fills) are computed as 192 MK-37 and 1875 MK-44/46 for destroyers, plus 48 MK-44/46 for cruisers, for a total initial allowance requirement of 2,115 ASW standard torpedoes. As of 1 February 1965 assets were 153 MK 37-0 and 1605 MK 44-0/1, for a total of 1758. The initial allowance deficit for PACFLT surface ships is 357 ASW standard torpedoes. Furthermore, an insufficient number (less than one percent of TYPHOON-1 requirements) of ASW standard torpedoes are prepositioned ashore to support a 90-day contingency operation. Approximate deficit is 365 MK-37 and 3785 MK 44/46 for a total prepositioning deficit of 4150 ASW standard torpedoes. (SECRET)

m. The majority of torpedo stocks for ASW air units consist of the obsolescent MK-34 and the substitute-standard MK-43 torpedoes which have only limited capabilities against modern submarines. The initial allowance requirements of ASW standard torpedoes are computed as 728 for the CVS's, 180 for the AV's and 960 for the VP AUW Units, for a total of 1598. As of 1 May, there were 498 MK 44-0/1 torpedoes on hand for a deficit of 1100. No ASW standard torpedoes for air units are prepositioned in the Pacific Fleet. The 90-day combat usage requirement (TYPHOON-1) is computed as being 2835 torpedoes, and the deficit is 2835 torpedoes. All PACFLT ASW surface ship, submarine and aircraft Initial Allowance Requirements and 90 Day Combat Requirements (PWRS Requirements) for all types of ASW ordnance are currently in the process of being reviewed and updated. Consequently, these figures will be subject to change due to the impact of a more definitive rationale. (SECRET)

n. The low stock level of JEZEBEL sonobuoys in the Pacific Fleet would limit the ability of air units to conduct ASW operations in a limited or general war. Total PACFLT requirements to provide six months combat usage, plus aircraft allowances, for sonobuoys, EER Charges, and Float Lights/Marine Markers are as follows:

<u>Expendable Stores</u>	<u>Inventory Objectives</u>	<u>Assets</u>	<u>Deficits</u>
JEZEBEL Sonobuoys	174,960	25,597	149,363
JULIE Sonobuoys	60,720	93,811	(Excess)
Directional Sonobuoys	6,960	276	6,684
Active Range Sonobuoys	12,816	6,715	6,101
Bathythermograph Sonobuoys	14,688	0	14,688
EER Charges (SUS MK57, 61)	303,840	282,481	21,359
Float Lights/Marine Markers MK6, 7 and 25	430,560	87,089	343,471

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Submarine Warfare Readiness

The readiness of the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force continues to be degraded by material and personnel shortcomings.

a. A serious deficiency exists in the area of ordnance.

(1) The Torpedo MK37-0/1, although in reasonable supply, has operational limitations and material deficiencies which reduce the anti-submarine warfare readiness of PACFLT submarines against high speed (greater than 19 knots) enemy submarines. Provision of the next generation of submarine launch ASW weapon, utilizing present state of the art techniques to PACFLT submarines, is considered mandatory as soon as feasible. Additionally, the reliability of the MK37-0/1 has not been satisfactorily demonstrated as of this date.

(2) A reliable anti-shipping torpedo is urgently required to replace obsolete and obsolescent weapons currently on hand. The "standard" submarine launched anti-escort/anti-shipping torpedo MK16-6 has been withdrawn from PACFLT for conversion to Torpedo MK-16-8. First deliveries of these converted torpedoes have been promised for August 1965.

b. The material readiness of PACFLT submarines is good although repair parts shortages continue to prove detrimental to efforts to improve this aspect of readiness. Additionally, the following conditions exist:

(1) The SUBSAFE program, requiring prolonged overhauls, has reduced the number of operational ships available.

(2) The lack of adequate overhaul and repair funds has precluded improving material readiness and providing much needed improvements in operational capabilities.

c. While the Submarine Force continues to enjoy the highest reenlistment rate in PACFLT personnel shortages, particularly in critical ratings, it has not aided the monumental efforts to maintain an adequate state of material readiness.

(SECRET)

Submarine Training Services

Limited numbers of submarines with which to provide ASW training services continues to be a major problem. Studies by COMFAWPAC indicate that 8 hours of submarine services per month per Combat Air Crew are needed to maintain the requisite ASW proficiency of VP crews. For a representative 6 month period recently studied, COMFAWPAC found that despite optimum utilization of services provided, only one half of the desired total was obtained. Independent study by COMFAWLANT confirms the

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existence of a similar situation in LANFLIT. Current programming for phasing out of certain Fleet Snorkels, as additional numbers of nuclear submarines are provided, will aggravate this problem. Most SSNs, of necessity, have been assigned to high priority tasks making them unavailable for routine services. Such utilization may be expected to continue in the future, so it is readily apparent that the resulting further reduction in conventional submarine numbers will exert a degrading influence upon:

ASW training of surface and air elements.

The ability to conduct weapons impact tests.

The ability to provide ASW and type training for submarine junior officers assigned to duty in SSBNs.

In effect the demand for services continues to rise yet the forces available to meet this need decrease. The often suggested retention in operational status and redesignation of suitable submarines, now programmed for deactivation, and their exclusive use in a service role, though not capable of eliminating this problem, would certainly serve to alleviate it.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Fleet Submarine Training Facility, Pearl Harbor

Fleet Submarine Training Facility, Pearl Harbor was established by the Secretary of the Navy in May 1960. This complex was designed and constructed to, "Provide facilities and training courses peculiar to submarines for officers and enlisted personnel." It supports primarily the POLARIS program by training in virtually every equipment and system found on board the 627 class SSBN. It does not provide initial training, but has as its purpose the maintenance and improvement of existing submarine skills. The Ford Island, FBM portion of the facility became operational on 4 January 1965 when the GOLD crew of USS DANIEL BOONE (SSBN 629) entered its first off-crew training cycle. To date, four SSBN off-crews have entered this training cycle. By mid 1967, off-crews of all seven PACFLT SSBN's will have taken advantage of the training offered. A problem affecting the accomplishment of FLESUBTRAFAC's mission is the serious lack of instructor personnel. The addition of new training requirements, particularly in the area of refresher maintenance training, has caused the command to be hard pressed for sufficient instructors to teach required courses. COMSUBPAC has recently forwarded a personnel augmentation request (133 additional) in an attempt to provide relief for FLESUBTRAFAC's shortage.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

1200 PSI Boiler Training

The 1200 PSI boiler problem and the associate training has been the source of much study and correspondence. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 022031Z DEC 64 NOTAL submitted PACFLT requirements for 1200 PSI training. The primary requirement is that of obtaining additional instructor personnel and equipment for the COMCRUDESPEC engineering school. Lack of funds and the reluctance of ships to send personnel from rates already in short supply precludes maximum utilization of training facilities at the Naval Boiler Technical Laboratory in Philadelphia.

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Aircraft Readiness and Training

The overall readiness of the fleet has been enhanced by the introduction of the new multi-sensor reconnaissance aircraft, the RA5C, and the formulation of plans to introduce both the A6A and the A7A attack aircraft.

a. The RA5C deployed to the SEVENTH Fleet aboard the USS RANGER (CVA 61) in August 1964 which was the first deployment of this weapons system in either fleet. The RA5C primary mission is to conduct all-weather multi-sensor reconnaissance with a limited secondary mission for attack during all types of weather conditions. Although there have been the usual attendant difficulties associated with deployment of a new weapons system, this early attainment of operational experience has resulted in significant advantages. (SECRET)

b. The A6A is a twin-jet carrier aircraft operated by a side-by-side pilot and bombardier/navigator team. The aircraft is a highly maneuverable, stable weapons platform capable of delivering large loads of conventional ordnance or variable yield nuclear weapons over long distances at night and during all weather conditions. Plans have been firming to effect delivery of the A6A to the fleet during the second quarter of FY66 with its introduction and operational site at U. S. Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, Washington. Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing 12 has been tasked with the responsibility for A6 training and Heavy Attack Squadron 123 has been designated as the A6 Readiness Squadron for the Pacific Fleet. (SECRET)

c. During August 1964 plans were formulated and aligned to task ATKRON 122, at NAS, Lemoore, California, with A1 training until 1 January 1968 at which time this squadron would assume A-7 training with VA-125 retaining the A-4 training responsibilities. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Amphibious Warfare Readiness

By application of continued effort, the readiness of the Amphibious Forces has been maintained at a satisfactory level. The following factors militate against improvements in this posture:

a. Shortages of funds for repair, overhaul and equipage contribute to the detriment of the force. This shortage of funds, coupled with the extremely high tempo of operations, which has been required of amphibious forces, can result in serious degradation in material readiness in the very near future.

b. Insufficient numbers and types of ships are available to meet requirements.

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c. The decline in numbers of 5" and 8" gun barrels in the fleet, incident to the FRAM program and missile ship conversions, has reduced the gunfire support capability of the fleet. As more missile ships enter the fleet to replace gun ships this situation will be aggravated.

d. The majority of amphibious ships in the fleet today are carry-overs from World War II. While these ships have been and are doing an excellent job the fact remains that they continue to age. The new construction program is not considered adequate to provide timely replacements. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Mine Warfare Readiness

Mine Warfare Readiness, while below the desired level, is still struggling upward. The principal problem in the slow process of improvement is the fact that this aspect of warfare has been neglected for years and only recently has there been a growing awareness of its potential. The principal problem areas which contribute to the low state of readiness are:

a. There are insufficient numbers of aircraft which are capable of conducting mining operations. This precludes the implementation of large scale mining plans within a reasonable period of time.

b. Inadequate numbers of ships capable of laying mines are available. Currently the only ship in PACFLT which can be utilized for mine laying is USS EPPING FOREST (MCS 7) utilizing mine laying tracks procured by COMINPAC.

c. Adequate stocks of mines are not available.

(1) Present mine stockpiles consist, almost entirely, of World War II mines. These mines are marginal in both material, reliability and adequacy of performance characteristics.

(2) Although the MK 57 mine has been approved for service use and approval of the MK 56 is imminent it will be several years, under current procurement planning, before sufficient numbers of these mines will be available to provide a deep water, ASW influence mining capability.

(3) The MK 27 mobile mine continues to require inordinate expenditures of effort to insure reliability. An urgent requirement exists for a modern, reliable, mobile mine.

(4) An urgent requirement exists for a mine which can be air laid in shallow water and which will be effective in interdicting junk traffic and PT-type craft. The Destructor 115A, in the final stages of operational evaluation, will partially meet the requirement. However, this mine can only be delivered by helicopters or surface ships.

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Accordingly, a requirement will continue to exist for a mine which will fulfill the anti-smallcraft role and be suitable for carriage on high performance aircraft.

(5) The rate of procurement programmed for new mines, such as the MK 52, 55, 56, and 57 is such that PACFLT requirements will not be met until the 1972-1973 time frame.

d. Inadequacies continue to exist in mine countermeasures capabilities: (SECRET)

(1) There is no satisfactory capability, in being, to sweep pressure mines.

(2) The prime movers for minesweepers and minesweeping generators remain unreliable. Additionally, repair parts support is marginal.

(3) Continued shortage of minesweeping equipment and repair parts for minesweepers degrade the overall readiness.

(SECRET)

Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)

Present ASW forces are equipped with inadequate ECM suits. Tactically, a long-range passive detection and fixing ECM suit for use against submarines employing radar for search and/or missile and torpedo fire control purposes would provide a magnitude increase in the effectiveness of our ASW forces. Essentially, these forces would then possess a long-range, passive detection capability which would curtail the submarine's unrestricted use of radar for search and fire control purposes. Such an ECM suit could thus function as a primary ASW sensor and would subject the submarine to disclosure of its own position whenever radar signals were radiated. As an adjunct to such a system, ASW forces should also have the capability of intercepting high frequency radio transmissions from the submarine and obtaining azimuth bearings on these transmissions so as to localize the submarine's position.

The air ECM equipments, ALQ-R and ALQ-78, promise to be most effective in an ASW role when they are developed, as will the surface ship SINEWS III System. The BULLSEYE Shore Radio Position Fixing System should also prove to be of extensive use to ASW Forces.

The solution to this problem lies in the development, procurement, and timely installation of ECM equipment which can meet the challenge presented by the Soviets in the form of new electromagnetic emitters and pro-submarine warfare tactics, especially those associated with the ECHO Class SSGN and the SS-N3 cruise missile. To complement this, the ELINT

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collection program must be vigorously pursued and targets of opportunity fully exploited.

(SECRET)

Surface Operations (General)

PACFLT material readiness has been improved through new construction and additional FRAM ships. The FRAM Program is tapering off and the influx of new ships is not adequate to compensate for the inexorable aging of our ships. Many of the early FRAM ships are approaching the end of their extended life.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The increasing rate of casualty reports is the result of increased age, tempo of operations and inadequate maintenance and repair funding. Additionally the problem of maintenance is compounded by the influx of new equipment for which supply support is less than adequate.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PACFLT FY64 funding for overhauls, repair and Supply and Equipage has been considerably less than that which is considered minimum to sustain the desired standards of readiness and provide orderly improvements in capabilities. The fact that unit readiness has not decreased markedly is due only to the intense effort and zeal of the personnel. However, it is felt that a point of no return is being approached wherein human exertion will be unable to compensate for the lack of necessary funds. An even more critical aspect of the material status is the distinct possibility that continued failure to provide required maintenance funds will have a detrimental effect on morale and contribute to the personnel retention problems.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Variable Depth Sonar (VDS)

VDS has now been with the fleet for a number of years, but the safety restrictions that have been imposed during exercises have precluded the use of VDS in close search situations, and have not allowed sufficient tactical use of the equipment to fully explore its capabilities. Due to the foregoing, existing procedures for the use of VDS are inadequate and, in some cases, misleading. New safety requirements and exercises are being examined for fleet adoption which will permit more effective employment and evaluation of VDS. The collection of meaningful VDS data from these exercises should provide the basis for revision and updating of VDS doctrine. The latest recommendation calls for a conference by representatives of OPNAV, BUWEPS, Force, Type and Fleet Commanders to determine criteria for the use of VDS in ASW free-play exercises.

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Drone Antisubmarine Helicopter (DASH)

Significant production and qualification efforts devoted to the DASH system have resulted in twenty-four (24) PACFLT DD's completing SQT and four (4) AD's acquiring DASH Class C maintenance support capabilities. By 4 February 1966, these figures are expected to increase to forty-two (42) and five (5) respectively.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Although simultaneous multiple DASH operations appear feasible, current frequency interference problems do not permit such operations. As a first step in overcoming this and other interference problems, it is anticipated that presently assigned frequencies (406-550 mcs) will be canceled and replaced by permanent assignments in the 4400-4800 mcs range.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Fleet Anti-air Warfare Readiness

The readiness of the fleet in the area of AAW has been improved by the continued influx of modern ships equipped with powerful search radars and current missile systems. Additionally, the introduction of the F4 aircraft, along with improved versions of the SIDEWINDER and SPARROW missiles systems, has been significant in improving our posture.

In spite of the foregoing factors, the following considerations serve to degrade readiness in this vital area:

- a. Adequate stocks of repair parts for new equipments and systems do not exist. This situation contributes to unacceptable down times on vital equipment.
- b. The TERRIER, TARTAR and TALOS missile systems have not yet attained their designed capability to counter the low flyer threat. Accordingly, the gun remains our only available counter to this significant threat.
- c. An unfulfilled requirement exists to develop a relatively small, simple point defense missile capability which can be installed on most non-missile ships for defensive purposes.
- d. An unfulfilled requirement exists for a reliable aerial target which can be employed at low altitudes for training in countering the low flyer threat.

(SECRET)

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MIDPAC Regulus Aerial Target Program

It became apparent during the past year that the inventory of Regulus I aerial targets would not be depleted by the planned phase-out date of September 1965. In view of the current and forthcoming austere situation regarding powered aerial targets, the Regulus I was determined to be invaluable as the means to alleviate the expected powered aerial target program in the MIDPAC area. Action was taken to extend the Regulus I program beyond September 1965 and until such date as the inventory would be depleted. Additionally, it was determined that Guided Missile Unit TEN (GMU-10) could be decommissioned and the responsibilities for Regulus I firings turned over to Utility Squadron ONE. Decommissioning GMU-10 would permit approximately 78 enlisted billets and 8 officer billets to be available for reassignment to the fleet eight (8) months earlier than previously programmed. Both deactivation of GMU-10 and extension of the Regulus I program were approved by CNO on 1 March 1965. Utility Squadron ONE was directed to assume Regulus I launch responsibilities for MIDPAC missile firings on 1 April 1965.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Strike Warfare Conventional Ordnance

Events within the Pacific area during the past year generated the need for a new look into fleet capabilities in the conventional ordnance field with particular emphasis on air-to-surface capabilities. In early fiscal year 1965 it became quite apparent that immediate measures had to be undertaken in order to improve the conventional ordnance capabilities of the fleet. Accordingly, the following measures were initiated to improve the conventional ordnance readiness of PACFLT units.

a. In order to provide the F4B aircraft with an air-to-ground capability, emergency procurement of MER 4/TER 4 bomb racks was initiated. When the CONSTELLATION deployed to WESTPAC she received 12 sets of MER/TER bomb racks in September 1964. CORAL SEA deployed in January and received 8 sets of MER/TER racks soon after reaching YANKEE TEAM station. Follow-on procurement for the MER 7/TER 7 bomb racks, which are compatible with the F4, A4 and A6 aircraft, has been initiated. Fleet introduction will begin in April 1965. Additionally, emergency procurement was initiated for the MK-4 gun pod for the A4 and F4 aircraft. Fleet introduction of the MK-4 gun pod is expected to commence in June 1965.

b. As a result of increased tension in SEASIA the Department of Defense approved the emergency procurement of the MK-14 retardation tail for the MK-81 low drag bomb. This combination bomb and tail, known as SNAKEYE, has been used extensively by carrier based aircraft in SEASIA operations. The MK-15 retardation fin, which will provide SNAKEYE capability for the MK-82 low drag bomb, is now undergoing operational evaluation and should reach the fleet commencing in April 1965.

(SECRET)

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c. The CBU-2A/A anti-personnel/unit material weapon is currently carried on board all WESTPAC CVAs. This weapon has been used on several road reconnaissance and flak suppression type missions. Due to the relatively short period that the CBU-2A/A weapon has been available for fleet use, the effectiveness of this new weapon has not been adequately determined.

d. Another weapon of the CBU family, CBU-14, which is a smaller unit compatible with the A-1 aircraft, is currently under evaluation for fleet use. It is anticipated that CBU-14 will provide an excellent low level anti-personnel/unit material capability for the A-1 aircraft.

e. **SIDEWINDER 1-C (IRAH/SARAH)** was introduced to the fleet in December 1964 and deployed to WESTPAC in USS CORAL SEA in January 1965.

f. The **SHRIKE weapons** system was introduced in the fleet in February 1965 and will deploy March 1965 to WESTPAC in MIDWAY. Follow-on deployment of SHRIKE is scheduled for ORISKANY in May 1965 and INDEPENDENCE in June 1965. (SECRET)

g. In order to provide sufficient conventional ordnance to train ordnance personnel and pilots in the handling, loading, and delivery of conventional weapons, a Combat Readiness Assessment (CRAE) ordnance allowance has been established within the Pacific Fleet. A CRAE ordnance allowance consists of sufficient conventional ordnance to provide a maximum one day operation effort (120 Sorties) for an attack carrier. Each CVA is scheduled for three CRAE exercises during their respective training and deployment periods. In order to properly space these exercises each CVA conducts one CRAE exercise in EASTPAC prior to deployment, one CRAE exercise in MIDPAC during the ORI and one CRAE exercise during WESTPAC deployment.

h. Additional measures have been taken that will significantly enhance the conventional ordnance capabilities of PACFLT units in the future. Of particular importance in this regard are the following items:

(1) Development of a reliable mechanical fuzing system to provide instantaneously through 4 sec firing delay the VT fuzing capability for the MK-80 series bombs and SNAKEYE MK-81 and MK-82.

(2) Development of a reliable cockpit **intervalometer** for the A-4 aircraft. Such an intervalometer is currently under production and should be available for fleet use in the fall of 1965.

(3) Development of new conventional ordnance handling equipment in order to expedite the arming and rearming of carrier and land-based aircraft.

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(4) Continued emphasis on the development of new conventional ordnance items to meet the needs of the fleet. The following new conventional ordnance items are under development:

WALLEYE
GLADEYE
DENEYE
PADEYE
ROCKEYE
FIREYE
BRITEYE

(SECRET)

Nuclear Readiness

PACFLT's nuclear readiness posture has increased during the period of this report. This increase is attributable to the following:

- a. Implementation of POLARIS into the Pacific Fleet.
- b. A continuing increase in the number of nuclear capable forces, the majority of which achieved capabilities in ASTOR, TERRIER and ASROC delivery systems.
- c. An increase availability of MK57 bombs.
- d. The retirement of the obsolete MK105 bombs and the W27 REGULUS Warheads.

There are problems, however, that continue to detract from PACFLT's state of nuclear readiness. These problems are:

- a. PACFLT's MK43Y1 and MK43Y3 weapons allocations for FY65 were drastically reduced from that authorized for FY64. The current FY65 allocations are inadequate to insure continuous coverage of programmed targets.
- b. Weapon modification and retrofit programs cause numerous stand-downs when weapons that are already in short supply are pulled away from delivery forces for required modifications. This problem will become more acute in the near future when the MK43 MOD 1 program becomes fully implemented.
- c. Training weapons/missiles continue to be in short supply.
- d. A shortage of Aircraft Service Change kits (ASC 897) for SP-2H aircraft has caused a delay in attaining a MK57 bomb capability with these aircraft.
- e. With the present facilities and personnel it will become increasingly difficult to provide adequate nuclear training support for the increasing number of nuclear capable forces.

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f. The lack of universal technical check lists (similar to the NAVWEPS loading check lists) hinders efficient technical maintenance and handling operations with nuclear weapons. This situation will continue to exist as long as the current up-dating system exists for OP publications. (SECRET)

Conventional and Chemical/Biological Ordnance

The readiness of the FMFPAC forces to conduct Chemical/Biological warfare has been enhanced by the training received by MAG THIRTEEN in support of Deseret Test Center test programs. While our offensive posture is satisfactory, a defensive capability, including detection and protection systems, is virtually non-existent.

Conventional ordnance readiness has been enhanced by:

a. Development of computerized systems for the development of requirements will improve the capability to adapt to fluctuating situations.

b. The adoption of the Combat Readiness Assessment Exercise (CRAE) concept has streamlined the aviation training program.

PACFLT conventional ordnance capability is considered unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

a. Aviation

(1) There are insufficient quantities of conventional weapons on hand to support contingency operations for more than about 60 days.

(2) Conventional ordnance handling aboard ship is outmoded and precludes attainment of the full capabilities of modern aircraft.

(3) Improved intervalometers and electrical fuze test equipment for aircraft is not available.

(4) The Hazards of Electronic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) problem does not appear to be significantly reduced.

b. Surface

(1) Critical shortages of gun ammunition exist in all areas. These have been the subject of voluminous correspondence and further discussion is considered extraneous.

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(2) As previously discussed the shortage of gun barrels reduces the surface and gunfire support capability.

(3) The missile UNREP capability remains to be successfully demonstrated. (CONFIDENTIAL)

OPERATIONS PLANS AND CAPABILITIES

Amphibious Warfare

The problems relating to age and speed of amphibious ships remain. However, the Pacific Fleet has demonstrated the capability to retain amphibious forces at sea for lengthy periods of time despite some adverse conditions encountered. The WESTPAC Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5) and the Special Landing Force (TG 76.7) have maintained a very high readiness posture for SEASIA contingency operations. These "mobile sea bases" have proven themselves to be effective counter-insurgency assets. Their capabilities are continually enhanced through periodic rotation of amphibious shipping and embarked Fleet Marine Force Battalion Landing Teams. Current problems prevailing in amphibious warfare and remaining as a matter of record which degrade PACFLT capabilities for Amphibious Warfare are:

- a. Attrition of large caliber guns for Naval Gunfire Support.
- b. Deterioration and maintenance requirements of present landing craft.
- c. Over-age, slow speed and air conditioning problems within amphibious shipping.
- d. The antiquity of command and control facilities available in AGCs presently assigned to PACFLT. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Counterinsurgency

During this period, the **deterioration** of the situation in the Republic of Vietnam, emphasis in counterinsurgency support was increased. In February the elements of a Marine Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion were landed at DaNang with the mission of air defense of the DaNang Airfield. (SECRET)

The contribution to the counterinsurgency effort in RVN made by the PACFLT SeaBee Technical Assistance Teams (STATS) continued to be significant in light of the favorable reports received regarding their contribution to the U. S. Military Civic Action Program. (SECRET)

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Task Element 79.3.3.6 (Marine Helicopter Element in the Republic of Vietnam) was upgraded to the Task Unit (79.3.5) with increased infantry defense augmentation (1 USMC Rifle Company) and the addition of elements of the USMC LAAM Battalion. (SECRET)

Most amphibious exercises included counterinsurgency training objectives. The difficulties in finding training areas which duplicate those river/delta areas common to SEASIA remain. However, the combined exercises, in countries such as Thailand (JUNGLE DRUM III) provide valuable training in rice country terrain. (CONFIDENTIAL)

The release of TUNNY (SSG 282) and HALIBUT (SSGN 587) from their deterrent commitments during FY65 permitted their recent assignments to mutual training exercises with the First Marine Brigade in amphibious reconnaissance and raid operations. These exercises, conducted in Hawaiian waters, provided valuable training of ships' personnel in the covert transport, landing, and reembarkation of amphibious reconnaissance teams and equipment in a hostile environment. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Unconventional Warfare

The recently established Naval Operations Support Group, Pacific (NOSG PAC), a component of COMPHIBPAC, continued to gain experience in unconventional warfare operations by participating in unilateral and combined exercises in addition to continuing their assigned deployment missions in the Republic of Vietnam. (SECRET)

Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)

The continued introduction of modern equipment in the form of missileships, aircraft and electronics has improved the Pacific Fleet AAW capability. The Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) in PACFLT received a rest when the USS ORISKANY (CVA 34), USS KING (DLG 10) and USS MAHAN (DLG 11) entered the shipyards for improvement. These units are now back on the line and are getting a work-out with new computer programs of the modular concept. By the addition of the USS CHICAGO (CG 11), USS KITTY HAWK (CVA 63) and other NTDS installations, the 1965/1966 Pacific Fleet NTDS AAW capability will be greatly enhanced. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Pacific Barrier

AEWBARONPAC operations have been reduced to one aircraft on station in consonance with the barrier phase-out. The planned phase-out is progressing normally and will be completed on schedule by 30 June 1965. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SECRET **DECLASSIFIED**

Strategic Command and Control Systems

Plans are progressing for an interim Subordinate OCC Data System (SODS) for COMNAVDEFEASTPAC by November 1965. A NECPA like system with a USQ-20 computer has been selected as the interim system.

The COMNAVDEFEASTPAC installation is being developed as the Navy's prototype SODS. CINCPACFLT has recommended that a compatible NECPA like system be developed for the flagship of Commander FIRST Fleet as the Navy's prototype Fleet Flagship Data System (FFDS). In this way the SODS-FFDS relationship can receive early evaluation.

CINCPACFLT has established a requirement for a high speed digital data link between the Major OCC Data System (MODS) at FOCCPAC and the CINCPACFLT headquarters building.

CINCPACFLT developed a concept for utilization of the MODS, SODS and FFDS as an overall system, and presented this concept to CNO on 13 January 1965. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Electronic Warfare

The fleet shipboard capability to operationally utilize existing Electronic Warfare equipments has improved. This is a direct result of a carefully implemented material readiness improvement program being conducted by the Type Commanders and increased command attention requiring use of EW equipments. (CONFIDENTIAL)

The increased operations by Soviet naval units throughout the Pacific Fleet and in particular, the larger number of deployed Soviet SIGINT vessels has placed added emphasis upon EW techniques. Protection of PACFLT operations, including the **SSBNs**, from Soviet surveillance is of vital concern. (SECRET)

The following actions have enhanced the fleet operational EW posture:

a. CVA HF communications can now be conducted using the LEAPFROG techniques which permits HF transmissions without disclosing the CVA position.

b. The RA-5C aircraft is operational on the USS RANGER. This is part of the IOIC/IOIS (Intergrated Operational Intelligence Center/System).

c. The EA-3B EW aircraft has been integrated into carrier operations in SEASIA. This permits rapid ELINT/EW data for the operating forces.

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d. A general requirement has been levied on operational commands to devise and specify EW applications for use in war and contingency plans.

e. PACFLT Type Commanders have specified mandatory Active and Passive EW exercises in their training and competition manuals.

f. A PACFLT ECM/EW material readiness conference is now being conducted each quarter.

g. Actions to inhibit effective Soviet sea-based intelligence collections are under study. Further effort is needed in this area.

(SECRET)

Strike Warfare

The policy of assigning three Attack Carrier Strike Groups in the Western Pacific and keeping an additional carrier in a ready status in the Eastern or Mid-Pacific has been maintained.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Current operational strike planning and weapons employment have shifted emphasis from nuclear weapons readiness to the tactical employment of conventional ordnance.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

SHRIKE will be deployed to the Western Pacific in April 1965.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Extensive target and weaponing planning has been accomplished in response to tactical requirements generated by the Vietnamese situation.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

During the period June to December 1964, Regulus guided missile submarines HALIBUT and TUNNY provided a reduced SIOP coverage of two targets whenever either submarine was available to be on station. In December 1964, a complete stand-down and Regulus missile system phase-out was accomplished as programmed when Polaris submarines commenced deterrent strike patrols.

(SECRET)

Polaris became a reality in the Pacific Fleet when DANIEL BOONE (SSBN 629) deployed on the initial patrol in December 1964 from the PROTEUS (AS19), moored in Guam. The second and third Polaris submarines, TECUMSEH (SSBN 628) and ULYSSES S. GRANT (SSBN 631), joined the deployed force in January and February 1965 respectively; and in April 1965 STONEWALL JACKSON (SSBN 634) will increase the total deployed force in the Pacific to four.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

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Antisubmarine Warfare

PACFLT ASW aircraft capability showed a modest improvement during the reporting period. P3 aircraft are gradually replacing P2s, and helicopter squadrons have completed transition to the SH-3A. Initial surveys have begun in the Aleutian Islands for installation of the next SOSUS station to complement the CAESAR OBOE station. ASW Mine Warfare capability has increased through conduct of MINEX CPX "DRAGON'S TEETH".
(SECRET)

a. PACFLT ASW Force Levels

The Soviet threat to naval forces and merchant shipping has greatly increased with the Soviet development and improvement in air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, and subsurface-to-surface missiles. This increased threat has greatly extended the area within which forces and counter-measures must be maintained ready for immediate use. To cope adequately with this threat, a significant increase in the number of forces, particularly long range patrol aircraft and nuclear submarines, is required.
(SECRET)

b. Detection

The number of destroyers equipped with SQS-23 sonars has increased to 71, providing a significant increase in potential detection capabilities. In addition, emphasis is being placed on the evaluation of the SQS-26 and BQQ-2 sonars. Extensive Oceanographic Surveys such as the FASOR II cruise of USS BAYA (AGSS 318) and USNS Charles H. DAVIS (AGOR 5), are required to determine sound velocity profiles and propagation losses for optimum employment of these sonars.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

c. Classification

The Pacific Fleet will receive two Interim ASCACs for installation in one CVS and at one VP shore base, with installations to be completed in January 1966. The Interim ASCAC is an improvement over the present ASCAC, which is not standardized as regards equipment or functional arrangements. However, more ASCACs are needed afloat and ashore to evaluate ASW aircraft LOFAR contacts.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

d. Localization

Aircraft localization of submarine contacts by JEZEBEL/CODAR remains poor. The difficulty is attributed to the excessive amount of time required to lay the CODAR plant and commence localization procedures. SOSUS localization in the Aleutian Islands area has not been possible, since only one SOSUS station, CAESAR OBOE, exists there. Installation of a second SOSUS station in that area will provide cross bearings, permitting adequate localization.
(SECRET)

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e. Attack

Forty PACFLT destroyers are now ASROC equipped and nuclear certified. (SECRET)

f. Naval Control and Protection of Shipping

Emphasis shifted during the reporting period from NCS organizational planning to contingency operational planning and "live" training, with the NCSORG assumption of control on 23 March 1965 of some 30 MSTTS ships for a 6 month period. The Pacific-Indian Ocean convoy routes, prepared at FOCCPAC using automatic data processing methods, were forwarded to CNO as part of the world-wide wartime system. NAVCOSSACT commenced a feasibility study on the development of preplanned ocean clearing instructions, using the results of exercise "RED LABEL" conducted in March 1964. The Tonkin Gulf crisis focused attention not only on operational planning for NCS control of MSTTS, but also on the deficiencies in merchant ship communications, publications and defensive equipment stockpiles. (CONFIDENTIAL)

g. Oceanographic Systems

The most significant development in this field was the establishment of Commander Oceanographic Systems Pacific on 1 September 1964, at Treasure Island. (UNCLASSIFIED)

h. Inshore Undersea Warfare

During the Operational Readiness Evaluation of ASW Group THREE in November 1964, Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit THIRTEEN was utilized to test the capability of mobile units to embark in ships as an assist to straits **surveillance**. The results of these operations indicated satisfactory progress in the area of Inshore Undersea Warfare. (CONFIDENTIAL)

i. Analysis

An ASW analysis team was activated in September 1964, on the staff of COMASWFORPAC. This group will support the Navy-wide Fleet ASW Data and Analysis Program (FADAP) in two important areas:

(1) The collection, processing and analysis of PACFLT ASW free-play exercise data;

(2) The conduct of operational analysis studies concernin various ASW problems. Both of these efforts will be primarily concerned with the objective of applying analysis program results to PACFLT ASW System improvements as rapidly as possible. (CONFIDENTIAL)