Southeast Asia

An International Quarterly

Center for Vietnamese Studies
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

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The editors invite submission of manuscripts in the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, pertaining to the region as a whole or to the societies comprising it. While the editors are responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles, it is understood that responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in articles and reviews is exclusively that of the authors and not that of the *Quarterly* or its editors.

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Southeast Asia, An International Quarterly, *(L'Asie du Sud-Est, Revue Internationale Trimestrielle)* est une revue consacrée aux recherches conduites par des savants de toutes nationalités qui s'intéressent aux questions de l'Asie du Sud-Est. Nous accueillirons des articles, des essais, des rapports de recherches, et des compte-rendus, mais la revue évitera scrupuleusement tout engagement politique ou idéologique.

Notre revue est publiée quatre fois par an sous les auspices du Centre d'Etudes Vietnamiennes, fondé à Southern Illinois University en 1969.

Nos rédacteurs invitent des contributions dans les sciences humaines et sociales, concernant particulièrement la région de l'Asie du Sud-Est ou les différentes sociétés de la région. Quoique les rédacteurs acceptent la responsabilité de choix des articles, les points de vue et les faits présentés, ainsi que les opinions exprimées tiendront strictement aux auteurs et ne coincideront pas nécessairement avec la prise de position des rédacteurs ni avec celle de la direction du Centre.

Les Manuscrits. Les auteurs sont invités à envoyer leurs manuscrits à Professeur Wesley R. Fishel, Rédacteur en Chef, *Southeast Asia, An International Quarterly,* Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois 62901, U.S.A. Les manuscrits doivent être dactylographiés, à interligne double, en deux exemplaires, et accompagnés d'un résumé ne dépassant pas 400 mots.

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IN MEMORIAM

Everett D. Hawkins

EVERETT DAY HAWKINS, who filled with high distinction a unique place in scholarly work and administrative contacts between academic circles in the United States and those in Indonesia, the Philippines, and other countries of the Far East, died unexpectedly on vacation in South Hadley, Massachusetts, of a cerebral hemorrhage, on August 31, 1970.

Professor Hawkins was born in New Jersey in 1906. During his undergraduate years at Oberlin he had two years of experience as a representative of the Oberlin-in-Shansi Program, teaching in north China. He then proceeded to Princeton University and completed his graduate work in the School of Industrial Relations.

After teaching a year at Princeton he was offered an appointment in 1935 at Mount Holyoke College, where he remained, with frequent absences, until 1963, when he was invited to come to the University of Wisconsin.

Although from the beginning of his career he was frequently on appointments in Washington, D.C., (Consultant on dismissal compensation for railroad workers to the Federal Coordinator of Transportation and section head in the Office of Price Administration), Professor Hawkins devoted increasing amounts of his professional and personal interest and energy to research in the development economics of the nations of Southeast Asia. He was the first Economic Adviser and Program Planning Officer for the Economic Cooperation Administration in Djakarta in 1951-52. This was the formative period of the Foreign Aid program and that crucial time when Indonesian officials, whose country's independence from the Dutch had been recognized one and a half years earlier, were feeling their way very tentatively in day-to-day negotiations with American officials. He returned to Washington to serve as the Indonesia Desk Officer for the Technical Cooperation Administration from 1952 to 1953. In 1956 he was back in Indonesia on a research travel grant from M.I.T. to do a study on the *batik* industry, in cooperation with Gadjah Mada University, and stayed to serve as a member of the Wisconsin group at Gadjah Mada from 1958 to 1960.

He was invited to teach in the Department of Economics at the University of Wisconsin as a Visiting Professor but first returned to Indonesia as the first economic adviser to the new Indonesian Government Economic Research Institute sponsored by the Harvard Development Advisory Service.

During the years Everett Hawkins taught at Mount Holyoke College, he served as Department Chairman and also as an adviser for a number of student, faculty and college activities. He was involved in organizing, in cooperation with fifteen other New England colleges, the Mount Holyoke Institute on the United Nations, which was financed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Foreign Policy Association, and other organizations. He was also active in the Four-College Asian-African Studies Program (Smith, Amherst, Mt. Holyoke, and the University of Massachusetts). In 1961 he was given Mount Holyoke's highest academic honor—a Mary Lyon Professorship.

At the University of Wisconsin he was Chairman of the East Asia Area Studies Committee from 1964 to 1968 and was a member of the advisory committees on MUCIA, International Studies and Programs, the Center for Development, and the Inter-University Planning Committee on Southeast Asia.

The Ambassador of Indonesia to the United States, Mr. Soedjatmoko, has expressed what very many Americans and Asians feel: "We owe him a great debt for his unceasing efforts in striving for the continuation of links between American and Indonesian universities and research institutions. His love, his deep and continuing interest in Indonesia and the development of her intellectual and scholarly capabilities is something of which we Indonesians are very profoundly aware. . . ."

Everett Hawkins was, by character and temperament, a rare combination of keen intelligence, dedication to international understanding, and gentleness of spirit. He was modest. He was capable of making each man his friend, able to express to each the genuine regard he had for him. It is an understatement that we shall miss him sorely. His combination of distinguished professional and personal qualities was unique. No one can take his place.

(Adapted from a Resolution of the Faculty of the University of Wisconsin)

Abstract / Résumé

Le concept de l'étude des régions géographiques particulières (discipline intitulée "Area Studies") et l'idée de reconnaître l'Asie du Sud-est comme une région qui mérite un tel examen peuvent tous les deux être considérés comme des notions dérivées de la problématique de la IIe Guerre Mondiale. Puisque les partisans de l'orientalisme traditionnel se bornaient à l'étude des "grandes cultures" fondée principalement sur l'enseignement de leurs langues classiques, de leurs littératures, et de leurs religions, ils ne voyaient pas en l'Indochine un champ d'étude intelligible. Pourtant, la discipline "Area Studies," née du travail consacré à l'organisation d'un nouveau monde à la suite du cataclysme des années 1939-1945, en est venue à reconnaître l'Asie du Sud-est comme une région qui, malgré la diversité de ses cultures et de ses peuples, se trouve accablée par un tas de problèmes semblables mais distincts de ceux des régions indienne et chinoise.

L'Asie du Sud-est diffère de ces deux grandes civilisations terriennes des régions voisines surtout par son orientation essentiellement maritime. Ce dernier trait fondamental, les produits exotiques de la région avec sa capacité relativement limitée de produire une nourriture suffisante, sa vulnérabilité géographique à la croisée des grands chemins mondiaux, tout tend à favoriser sa diversité plutôt que l'unité, en dépit même du fait que l'établissement par les Britanniques d'un contrôle unifié de ses routes maritimes a permis une certaine unité régionale pendant le siècle 1841-1941. Les progrès marqués par de telles mesures ont été annulés cependant d'abord par le fait que tous les pays, la Thaïlande exceptée, sont passés sous la domination coloniale de l'Occident, et deuxièmement par le nombre croissant de Chinois et d'Indiens qui, en avançant des deux côtés, forçaient les indigènes à jouer des rôles de moins en moins importants dans leurs pays.

L'ambition des Japonais d'amener l'Indochine dans leur sphère d'influence, dans leur zone de "co-prospérité en Asie Orientale," a engagé la région dans le conflit de la IIe Guerre Mondiale et y a abouti indirectement à la cessation de la domination coloniale de l'Occident. Après la guerre, l'Asie du Sud-est était regardée par l'Occident comme moins importante que les Indes, le Chine ou le Japon, et les nations d'Indochine se préoccupaient elles-mêmes de problèmes politiques intérieurs.

La fin de la domination occidentale a suscité pourtant le sentiment inquiétant que l'un ou l'autre de ces peuples voisins ne cherche à commander la région. Les aspirations de l'Inde de Nehru désireuse d'établir un Congrès d'états associés de l'Asie Méridionale ont provoqué peu d'anxiété; mais à mesure que la nouvelle Chine manifestait sa puissance, aux dépens notamment de l'Inde, on craignait qu'elle devînt une menace de plus en plus grave. Cette crainte déterminait la politique américaine au Viet-nam qui,

A View of Southeast Asia

CHARLES A. FISHER

ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT

BOTH THE CONCEPT OF AREA Studies and the recognition of Southeast Asia—the area lying between the Indian and Chinese sub-continents and Australia—as suitable so to be studied may justly be regarded as academic by-products of the Second World War.

When as a prelude to the conquest of Southeast Asia, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war, thereby making the latter truly global in scale, it became certain that the United States, as the giant among the Western Allies, would play a role at least equal to that of the USSR in determining the shape of the post-war world. Moreover, as the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 already implied, that role would involve a radical initiative in Asia. For the United States, itself born out of revolt against British colonialism, would seek to hasten the end of colonial rule, not only of its enemy Japan over the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, but also of its Western allies in South and Southeast Asia, where indeed it proposed to set the pattern by liquidating what remained of its own somewhat anomalous authority over the Philippines.

Without accepting in full the popular American belief that this policy would result in the burgeoning of democracy and a consequent rise in living standards in Asia, such as had in due course followed the achievement of independence in the United States, many people in Britain—of whom I was one—nevertheless shared the view that it was time to end colonial rule in Asia, and also welcomed what we believed lay behind the American aspirations in this respect. For, it seemed, the United States, having conquered the miseries of the great depression, had finally outgrown its isolationism, and now sought also to inspire its Asian neighbors with the New Deal psychology of faith in one's own ability to solve one's own problems and start building for a better future.

Clearly, however, if it was to play this new leading role in Asia, the United States, whose educational tradition had hitherto been even more Occident-centered than that of Europe, would need rapidly to increase its expertise in Asian affairs by initiating some form of crash program of Oriental studies. But these new studies would have to be very different in emphasis from the traditional Orientalism, which

en tant que pays dont la culture témoigne d'une influence plutôt chinoise qu'indienne, présente encore aujourd'hui un cas exceptionnel pour l'Asie du Sud-est. Simultanément le Japon, quoiqu'adoptant une politique conservatrice, a émergé comme le pays industriel dominant en Asie, et continue toujours à multiplier rapidement ses liens commerciaux avec l'Asie du Sud-est.

En dehors même de toute possibilité d'alliance politique avec la République Populaire de Chine, les Vietnamiens et les Chinois de l'Asie du Sud-est donnent lieu encore à des sentiments de mépris et de méfiance à cause de leur dynamisme économique supérieur, énergie qui promettrait autrement, en principe, de rapporter des bénéfices à la région. De telles circonstances géographiques et historiques nous font voir que l'Asie du Sud-est n'a que trop peu de chances qu'il lui soit permis de "jouir de l'obscurité tranquille qu'elle mérite tant." Son plus grand espoir de sûreté aussi bien que d'amélioration de son bien-être matériel dépend d'un plus ample contact, et non pas d'une réduction d'affaires, avec le monde extérieur.

had grown up mainly in Western Europe as an application to the great Asian cultures of the methods of European classical scholarship, based on the study in depth of Graeco-Roman culture through the mastery of its now extinct languages.

Manifestly this older approach, many of whose exponents delighted in the study of the past "for its own sake" and took a positive pride in their detachment from the modern world as the true way to the cultivation of impartial judgment and scholarly excellence, was anathema to those who now aspired to liberate Asians from their supposedly excessive preoccupation with a past which had lost its meaning, and to expose them to the revitalizing Western breezes of democracy, technology and free enterprise. What, in short, they wanted was a forward-looking Orientalism, which would get rid of the traditional image of aged and abstracted scholars shuffling around in carpet slippers, by discarding the evocative name Orientalism forthwith.

Thus was Area Studies born as a new integration of social science and cultural-linguistic studies focused primarily upon the problems of specific parts of the modern world, and in particular of Asia.[1] And despite the inevitable academic wrangles between extremist advocates alike of the traditional and the new approaches, a majority on both sides soon saw that the two, so far from being mutually antithetical, might usefully complement one another to the inestimable benefit of all concerned. Thus several of the most eminent scholars of the traditional Orientalism came to play outstanding roles as pioneers of the new Area Studies, and while not a few from Europe crossed the Atlantic in the process the reciprocal flow of ideas contributed immeasurably to the development of modern Asian studies in many parts of western Europe.

Yet one fundamental issue, which was implicit in the studied neutrality of the new term Area Studies, has remained unresolved. For while this implied that certain major parts—or areas—of the world existed, concerning which it was possible to make valid and useful "middle-order" generalizations not comparably applicable elsewhere, it left open the basis upon which such areas were to be determined.

To the traditional Orientalist, on the other hand, the basis was self-evident. To be an intelligible field of study, an area must be coextensive with one of the "great cultures," such as the Near East (now unfortunately renamed the Middle East), the Indian sub-continent as the home of Hinduism and Buddhism, or the Sinic-centered Confucian world of the Far East, each of which was distinguished by a common set of values, enshrined in a common religious or quasireligious tradition, and elaborated in a common literature to which one or more classical languages provided the key.

This assumption permeated the thinking, for example, of Sir Hamilton Gibb, the distinguished former Professor of Arabic in London and later in Oxford who subsequently became Director of the Center of Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard. Thus, apropos of what he considered to be the synthesizing role of the Orientalist in Area Studies, he commented:

> The important thing is that, if any such synthesis is attempted, it is significant and valuable only if the various data are related to a central core. The Orientalist's function is to furnish that core out of his knowledge and understanding of the invisibles—the values, attitudes and mental processes characteristic of the "great culture" that underlie the application even today of the social and economic data—to explain the why, rather than the what and the how, and this precisely because he is or should be able to see the data not simply as isolated facts, explicable in and by themselves, but in the broad context and long perspective of cultural habit and tradition.[2]

However, neither the whole world nor even the whole of Asia falls neatly within the ambit of one or other such major cultural region, and indeed some of the most interesting and also most problem-ridden areas consist of the borderlands or zones of overlap and interpenetration between two or more major cultures. Manifestly Southeast Asia is such an area, in which forces and influences of many kinds, emanating primarily from the two neighboring subcontinents of India and China have met, mingled and sometimes conflicted, and more recently and in varying degree been overlain by other forces originating even further afield in the Middle East and the West. In all this, as indeed in much else, Southeast Asia provides a remarkable parallel with the Balkans, which, as a middle ground between the German, Russian and Turkish cultural matrices has become a byword for cultural splintering and political instability.

Be that as it may, it was already clear long before Vietnam became a major focus of concern that Southeast Asia, between the two greatest states of what was about to become post-colonial Asia, would inevitably be a critical area, which would now need to be studied with a new urgency. But was it an intelligible field of study? With few exceptions, the proponents of the new Area Studies approach believe that it was, a viewpoint which was implicit in Owen Lattimore's Foreword to Karl Pelzer's *Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics*, as the following extract shows:

> Victory over Japan will establish a wider range of American interest in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia.... The difference

> between the world before Pearl Harbor and the world after victory over Japan will demand of us a new approach to the problems of peoples and politics, based on a new integration of the technical study of soil, climate, land utilization, extraction of minerals, and creation of industries, and the social study of the structure and functioning of human communities—families, tribes, villages, peoples, and nations—and of cultural complexes which extend over or into more than one kind of community, and of the relations between different kinds of units.
>
> A fresh integration is demanded of us because of the historical juncture. Of all the phases of history, the phase that immediately follows a great crisis is the one that demands the most subtle analysis of the way in which change works, and the most delicate handling of the process of change. In such a phase new problems appear that make an appeal to innovation, but at the same time old problems reappear that make an appeal to precedent. Most intricate of all is the old problem that reappears in a new guise, defying simple classification.[3]

But if Area Studies were prepared to accept Southeast Asia as an intelligible field the traditionalist Orientalists, almost to a man, were not. Southeast Asia, they avowed, had no "great culture" of its own, but comprised merely a congeries of lesser cultures, which, except for the mainly Sinitic Vietnamese, were predominantly of Indian derivation. Insofar as the area merited study at all, it should therefore, in line with the traditional Oriental wisdom of Solomon, be sliced into two parts to be respectively subsumed under East Asia and South Asia.[4]

Echoes of this view still resound with monotonous frequency in Britain, where the *Times*, though bowing part way to the pressure of lesser mortals' parlance by itself employing the term "south-east Asia," nevertheless displays its homage to the traditional Orientalism by refusing the full kow-tow to the new usage and imperiously denying it a capital S. In the same vein, Richard Harris (of the *Times*) has elsewhere expressed his views on the "geographical fiction" of Southeast Asia as follows:

> What in fact has the West done in face of its past geographical misconceptions and the unhappy legacy of French imperial sprawl? It began by inventing a new and confusing term to replace the valid old one. In place of Indo-China which did, at least, suggest the meeting point of two separate civilizations, we are now saddled with South-East Asia, inherited from a wartime command. . . . But the label South-East Asia divorces the area from both south Asia and east Asia, giving it an identity, and by inference a unity of its own which it has never had. . . .[5]

And a leading article in the *Times* of 22 February 1965 follows a similarly convoluted argument:

> ... The danger is that geography may obscure or distort the political, religious, and cultural realities out of which the world's conflicts are born ... South-east Asia ... is an upstart cartographically. ... We might get a little nearer to solving its problems if we looked at the realities behind the geography.[6]

Although the first of these quotations affects concern over other peoples' supposed misconceptions, it succeeds only in producing a host of new ones of its own. To begin with, Southeast Asia is not synonymous with Indo-China but includes besides its mainland half, to which at most the latter term is restricted, the maritime lands of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Secondly, while admittedly the term Southeast Asia was not widely used in its English form before the Second World War, it did in fact appear as early as 1900 in a British Parliamentary Paper, *Trade and Shipping of South-East Asia*,[7] and moreover, as *Südostasien* came to be fairly widely used by German-speaking scholars during the inter-war years.[8]

This in turn suggests what familiarity with past British, French, Dutch and American writings about their respective Southeast Asian dependencies confirms, namely that the division of that area into rival colonial spheres served to prevent all but the most far-sighted from appreciating the many common denominators which existed between these several territories. Thus it was left to the Germans and Austrians, with no colonial attachments to any particular part of Southeast Asia, to recognize the wood as something more than a series of individual trees. And although there were some exceptional English-speaking writers—such as Hugh Clifford, Alleyne Ireland and J. S. Furnivall—who also shared this wider view of Southeast Asia, even though they used such other names as Further India, the Far Eastern Tropics and the Tropical Far East[9] to define it, the argument that the outsider tends to have the best overall view is borne out by the fact that, while none of the Southeast Asian peoples have had any common name for this area as a whole, both the Chinese and Japanese have long been aware of it as a single entity, which respectively they called the Nan Yang and the Nanyo, both meaning the southern seas.[10]

These various names, especially if considered in relation to the people who used them, tell us a great deal about Southeast Asia. Thus the two names Further India and the Far Eastern Tropics are at one in defining it negatively, either as an easterly extension of India or a tropical appendage of China and/or Japan, and in so doing they draw attention to the way in which, throughout most of its history, it has been overshadowed by these greater Asian neighbors.

Secondly, these people who in the everyday business of life came to recognize Southeast Asia as an entity, have without exception been sea-minded, whether we think of the early Indian or later Chinese and Japanese mariners who in turn frequented the South China Sea and its borderlands, the British shipping experts of 1900, Lord Mountbatten's South-East Asia Command in 1943, or the Indian student of sea-power, K. M. Panikkar, whose book, *The Future of South-East Asia*,[11] probably did more than any other single work to popularize this usage.

Finally, the fact that the two academic disciplines which have most consistently recognized Southeast Asia as an entity have been anthropology and geography is also significant. For since the former of these is concerned less with the "great cultures" than with the simpler ways of life, it readily recognizes the existence in Southeast Asia of many common cultural as well as ethnic characteristics which antedate the historic Indian, Chinese and other overlays. And it has been the geographers who have most fully appreciated the significance of a physical environment which combines exceptional focality with severe internal fragmentation, in moulding the evolution of Southeast Asia as a whole. These geographical facts indeed lie at the heart of the parallel with the Balkans, which was first suggested by the geographer J. O. M. Broek,[12] just as it was another geographer, Karl Pelzer, who was the first to describe Southeast Asia as the lands bordering the South China Sea.[13]

Thus, so far from accepting the advice of the *Times* to look at the "reality behind the geography," it may perhaps be more useful to look at the geography behind the culture and the history. And in so doing we shall at least have some modern Oriental wisdom on our side, in the form of Hu Shih's pronouncement that "the civilization of a race is simply the sum total of its achievements in adjusting itself to its environment."

THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN ENVIRONMENT

With a land area of approximately 1.7 million square miles, Southeast Asia is of comparable size alike with South Asia and with East Asia. But being divided into one large peninsula, itself subdividing into several lesser ones, and a congeries of islands great and small, it is spread over a much greater extent of latitude and longitude in which the total area of sea far exceeds that of land. If therefore one accepts Sir Arthur Lewis' view that accessibility is the only "resource" which is definitely advantageous for economic growth,[14] one should expect Southeast Asia which, besides having a higher ratio of coast to land than any other part of the world of comparable size also forms a vast land-bridge across the great seaway round the southern fringe of Asia, to be peculiarly well favored in this respect.

However, it is axiomatic to the integrative approaches of both geography and Area Studies that no such factor can be considered in isolation. Thus, for an area to be wide open to the rest of the world is advantageous only if the area in question is strong enough materially, demographically and in organization to take advantage of, instead of itself being exploited by, the contacts which such exposure brings. And, unfortunately, in those other aspects of its physical environment which are more specifically conducive to building up strength and cohesion, Southeast Asia is not well endowed.

In latitude Southeast Asia straddles the equator and so lies not merely south of China but also on balance much further south than India which bestrides the northern tropic. Being thus contained almost entirely within the tropics, all of Southeast Asia except its highest uplands is hot all the year round, and since it is surrounded and interpenetrated by sea and lies within the ambit of the East Asian/Australian monsoons, it is, area for area, the wettest place in the world. Thus over most of its land surface the natural vegetation is dense forest, the highest intensity in this respect occurring within the equatorial zone whose outer limits correspond almost exactly with the northern and southern tips of Sumatra.

Contrary to popular opinion, this dense natural vegetation is not indicative of high soil fertility, but only of the "forcing-house" effect of its climate which conversely tends, through leaching, to exhaust the richness of the soil except in the relatively limited areas where fertility is replenished by recurrent deposits of river alluvium or non-acid volcanic ejecta. Moreover, since such extremely dense and prevailing damp vegetation is immensely difficult to clear, especially by peoples with only primitive tools, it has taken a very long time in equatorial Southeast Asia to break out of the vicious circle of population too sparse and backward to master its environment, and hence to acquire the necessary surplus for saving and specialization in order to attain both the numbers and the skills to achieve any significant degree of environmental control.

Away from the equatorial zone the climate is less constraining. For here a recognizable dry season means less continuous leaching of the soil, provides a good ripening period for grain, and the forest, though still generally heavy, is less dense than in the equatorial zone. And in a few sheltered interior valleys, notably in central Burma and Thailand, the Tonlé Sap basin of Cambodia and the intermont basins of east-central Java, all these relative advantages occur together in more pronounced degree.

Nevertheless such valleys are few and far between, and indeed lowland potentially useful for cultivation is extremely scarce in Southeast Asia. For what appear on atlas maps to be the largest plains, namely the coastal zones of eastern Sumatra, and much of Kalimantan and Irian, are largely swamp, too ill-consolidated to be cultivable, and furthermore extensive tracts of the great mainland deltas, seasonally submerged beneath deep flood water, originally proved almost equally difficult to utilize.

This combination of geographical factors has therefore presented Southeast Asia with serious built-in problems. Its position as a great crossroad by land and sea has made it a focus first of migrants and later also of traders from more northerly zones who have been attracted by its exotic products. But the difficulty of developing intensive grain cultivation in its humid tropical environment and particularly in the vicinity of its focal point where, virtually on the equator, the first great break in the land bridge opens the way for continuous sea passage from the Straits of Malacca to the South China Sea, has made it an exceptionally difficult area to unify politically. For, in striking contrast to India and still more so to China, which respectively in the Indus-Ganges and the Hwang Ho-Yangtze lowlands had great centrally-placed riverine granaries to provide the material bases for centralizing political power, Southeast Asia centers on the sea, in relation to which its better-favored lowlands, all of them far smaller than those of India and China, are peripheral. And since unified control over the focal South China Sea was never achieved under any indigenous power, the region as a whole remained weak and divided in the face of external pressures, and the consequent instability repeatedly aggravated the natural obstacles to population growth, which lagged ever further behind that of both India and China.

The nature of Southeast Asia's respective relations with China and India is also basically a function of geography. Because the northern uplands of mainland Southeast Asia are contiguous with the Sino-Tibetan plateaux and the north-south grain of the latter continues down into Southeast Asia, southward migration from the great human reservoir of what is now China has been relatively easy and, except perhaps in the very earliest times, the peopling of Southeast Asia has resulted from a series of north-south migrations. In this process human groups of increasingly Mongoloid character and successively at higher levels of advancement tended in turn to seek out the better agricultural lowlands, and in so doing to dispossess the previous inhabitants who were thus either exterminated, subordinated, absorbed through intermarriage or else driven out. Such displacement in turn involved their migration either further to the south, where at first there was a better chance of finding new land or, less happily, into the adjacent uplands, where too often the peoples concerned became impoverished and embittered, and remained both numerically and economically inferior to their dispossessors who prospered and multiplied in the plains until the sequence was again interrupted by invasion.

In contrast to this early relationship of Southeast Asia with China, which was direct and overland, that with India was much more tenuous. For here the rugged and fever-ridden Arakan Yoma formed a virtually impassable obstacle to overland movement into Southeast Asia, with the result that early Indian contacts with the latter were almost exclusively by sea and essentially commercial and cultural—in that sequence—rather than demographic. In all probability, as the name Suvarrabhumi indirectly confirms, Indian interest began with the search for new sources of gold after the movements of nomadic peoples in Inner Asia interrupted the caravan links with the Siberian gold producing regions shortly before the dawn of the Christian era. But although, basically because of its earlier origin, the influence of Indian civilization in most parts of Southeast Asia both exceeds and antedates that of China, a major exception occurs in what is today North Vietnam but was once, for over a thousand years prior to 939 A.D., part of the Chinese Empire. And this in turn reflects other fundamental geographical facts. For the Annamite Chain, north of the point where it reaches the coast not far from the present partition line, forms the true geographical divide between East and Southeast Asia, comparable to the Arakan boundary with South Asia; and the Songkoi delta and adjacent coastal plains are the only Southeast Asian lowlands which do not experience a strictly tropical climate since exposure to the northeast monsoon gives them a distinct cool season which moreover receives enough rain to permit the raising of a "winter" cereal crop as in nearby Southern China.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSONALITY

If one accepts Carl Sauer's hypothesis that Mesolithic peoples in Southeast Asia were pioneers of mankind's earliest form of agriculture, as part of a fishing-planting culture in which the men were responsible for boat-building and fishing while the women raised pigs and poultry and grew such foods as yams, aroids, and bananas,[15] it follows that parts of Southeast Asia at that stage were culturally in advance of both India and China. While Sauer's hypothesis, which seems to be derived primarily by arguing back from later cultural distributions, is not widely accepted, it is not inherently improbable. The rivers and shallow sheltered seas of Southeast Asia provide excellent fishing grounds, and so long as cultivation was limited to plants initially derived from the local rain forest and called for no extensive clearing of the latter, Mesolithic techniques would have been adequate for the task. But without more extensive clearing this system could not have advanced sufficiently to support more than a very small population and, whatever may be thought of Sauer's arguments, any major extension of clearing must have depended upon the development of more efficient tools. Significantly in this connection the advance to the Neolithic was made much earlier in northern India and China than in Southeast Asia, and in both of these neighboring areas the further advance to the Bronze Age, accompanied by sedentary grain cultivation, urbanism, a literate culture and political organization above the level of mere local clusters of riverine villages, also followed a similar sequence.

So far as Southeast Asia itself is concerned, the distribution of both Neolithic and early Bronze Age finds suggests that diffusion followed a similar north-south sequence to that of the prevailing migrational trend[16] and, perhaps too schematically, the two have respectively been correlated with the southward dispersal of the so-called Proto- and Deutero-Malays. But be that as it may, it is generally agreed that before any part of Southeast Asia came under the influence of Indian civilization, much of its coastal zone, both mainland and insular, had already attained a level of advancement not immeasurably inferior to, though in some important respects different from, the Indian.

This culture, which Coedès and others have gone so far as to call a civilization,[17] showed in a much more advanced form many of the traits which presumably according to Sauer derived from humbler Mesolithic origins, including a matrilineal organization of society, the building of elaborate houses on piles as befits an amphibious way of life and highly developed skills in seamanship. In addition, in at least some of the climatically better-favored areas, though probably not in the equatorial zone, the bearers of this culture were already practicing irrigated paddy cultivation.

Significantly also, its mythological-cosmological dualism, centered in the juxtaposition of mountain and sea and the related veneration of high places, seems to correspond to the kind of world view one might expect to find among mariners sailing the Southeast Asian seas, from whose surface individual islands appear to rise like the tops of otherwise submerged mountain peaks. And indeed in an area in which, as in the classical Mediterranean, the land divides but the sea unites, a high degree of mastery over the sea, as well as a significant measure of agricultural mastery of the land, was a fundamental feature of this nearest approximation ever attained to a common Southeast Asian civilization.

Nevertheless, this was not a politically organized unity and, given the inherent weakness of low food-producing and population-supporting capacity at the maritime focus of Southeast Asia, it is difficult to see how such a unity could at this stage have been established from within. But the sailors of Southeast Asia had already made contact across the seas with India, and this explains why, although Indian traders and adventurers doubtless played their part in the subsequent Indianization of Southeast Asia, this process was not simply the result of Indian initiative. For less advanced peoples often have the wit to imitate others who have progressed farther, and it was for this reason that, as van Leur has shown,[18] early Southeast Asian chieftains, having learned by such contacts that the princes of southern India employed learned Brahmans to legitimize their rule and to organize their states according to the Hindu code, began to do the same.

If the term Indianization be used to cover both the diffusion of Indian culture and its subsequent assimilation by most of the main Southeast Asian kingdoms, the Indianized period must be regarded as extending from the beginning of the Christian era until the 13th-15th centuries in different parts of the region. During roughly the first half of this period Indian culture spread along the sea routes between India and China, and besides introducing the art of writing and the Hindu-Mahayana Buddhist religions which for many centuries co-existed in Southeast Asia, it was also responsible for major advances in environmental control particularly through better hydro-technology, which in turn helped to support an urban superstructure and much larger and better-organized political units than any that had preceded them.

Throughout this earlier period all such Indianized states were located at key points along the sea route, notably on or near the mouths of important rivers and also in the vicinity of the Thai-Malayan isthmus which provided various overland shortcuts avoiding the pirate-infested detour through the Malacca Straits. But in time this Indianized civilization began to spread inland, both in the islands and especially into the interior river valleys of the mainland, into which meanwhile were moving new peoples from the north, each in turn more closely influenced by cultural contact with China. Moreover, since even Indian technology was not yet able, with limited resources of local manpower, fully to master the environmental problems of the great deltas or the equatorial zone, most of the main centers of power had by the later Indianized period shifted from the coastal zone into inland areas such as the Cambodian lake plain, east-central Java, and the middle Irrawaddy and Chao Phraya valleys.[19]

In all of these, intensive irrigated paddy cultivation supported a core of population large enough to form the nucleus of a major kingdom, extending also over the lesser peoples inhabiting the peripheries of the basin in question. Thus by a process of mutual adjustment between the incoming Indian culture and the rice-roots traditions of the deep interiors, away from the constant coming and going of the coastal zone, the historic kingdoms of Burma, Siam, Cambodia and Mataram in east-central Java gradually crystallized out.

Although this process neatly illustrates the Indonesian proverb that "religion comes in from the sea but custom comes down from the mountains"[20]—itself a variant of the ancient Southeast Asian dualism of mountain and sea—all of these examples except Mataram were on the mainland. For Java was the only island within the Indianized zone to possess major interior lowlands, and elsewhere in the archipelago the characteristic political units to develop were sea states.

Like their counterparts in the Mediterranean and the Baltic, such sea states could, if they straddled an important maritime highway, extract great benefit both from trading with and taxing the merchant shipping passing through. This was the principle upon which was based the one great exception among the Indianized Southeast Asian states, namely Sri Vijaya, whose focus near Palembang was almost on the equator, and whose power depended on the sea rather than the land. But although Sri Vijaya acquired great wealth by exploiting its position commanding the main maritime focus, its lack of any large agricultural base imposed limits on its power. Indeed it seems more appropriate to compare it to the Hanseatic League than to a territorial empire, and certainly its effective naval control extended only over the Malacca and Sunda Straits and the western approaches to the South China and Java Seas.

Thus, despite all its positive contributions, the process of Indianization did not succeed in unifying Southeast Asia culturally and still less so politically. For while the more advanced peoples certainly retained many basically Indian as well as pre-Indian cultural traits, each of the various incoming ethnic groups on the mainland also preserved much of its own cultural individuality, most obviously in respect of language. And, since these groups usually made their headquarters in the interior, and only extended their territories to the seaboard much later, they tended to remain essentially land-minded. By the end of the Indianized era, therefore, the great traditions of seamanship, which had formerly flourished on both sides of the South China Sea, were in process of becoming restricted mainly to the archipelagos, and Southeast Asia was thus beginning to divide into two, a process which was soon to be accentuated by religious change.

For while something of the Indianized culture found its way even into the remoter villages, the Hindu/Mahayana Buddhist ethos in its relatively purer forms had always been restricted to a small elite, and by the 12th century was ceasing to have much meaning even for them. When, therefore, a new Singhalese sect of Theravada Buddhism, a simpler creed appealing to the common man, was introduced into Burma in the 12th century, it spread rapidly also into Siam and Cambodia, undermining the established order and in large measure destroying the *raison d'être* of the great capital cities whose function was more religious and symbolical than mundanely economic. And beginning in the late 13th century, Islam, likewise a popular faith, also began to be disseminated in the wake of Muslim Gujarati and Bengali spice traders, again along the sea routes from India, though this time towards the Moluccas rather than towards China. Thus it spread rapidly through the Malaysian-Indonesian archipelago and even beyond into the remote Philippines which, having hitherto experienced only the outermost ripples of Indianization, now began to be more closely integrated into maritime Southeast Asia.

It was at this stage, when the wave of Indianization had finally spent itself and Southeast Asia, apart from Vietnam, was dividing into Theravada Buddhist and Muslim halves on opposite sides of the South China Sea, that the influence of China began for a time to loom much larger than heretofore in the affairs of the region.

Throughout the first millennium A.D., China had made no effort to extend its civilization into any part of Southeast Asia except the northern half of what is now Vietnam which, having been incorporated into the Chinese Empire since 111 B.C., was subsequently subjected to the Chinese administrative pattern based on the Confucian-trained mandarinate and employing the Chinese script. Moreover by the introduction of their own hydro-technology and related agronomy, superior even to those of the Indians, the Chinese were able to turn the northern Vietnamese lands[21] economically and demographically into an extension of southern China. However, in 939 A.D. the Vietnamese, capitalizing on these advantages, broke away from Chinese control and subsequently began to expand southwards in search of new land for their pullulating population. This process, which, after leading to the annihilation of the neighboring Indianized kingdom of Champa, had brought them into the Mekong delta by the 18th century, may be regarded as yet another instance of the southward demographic drift into Southeast Asia by a people possessed of an even higher degree of Chinese-derived culture than any of its predecessors. But meanwhile the Chinese themselves had also begun, though in a different way, to resume their own demographic push to the south.

Having originated far inland, Chinese civilization was essentially land-minded and, with a richly varied sub-continent extending over both cool- and warm-temperate zones at their disposal, the Chinese had been slow to take to the sea. Such tropical exotica as they desired were readily available from the barbarian kingdoms of Southeast Asia which were only too ready to trade with China in order to obtain the superior handmade goods which the latter could supply, and accordingly the Chinese had extended their diplomatic orbit southward by bringing most parts of Southeast Asia into a formal tributary relationship with themselves at various times during the Indianized era. Nevertheless, since the early centuries A.D. some Chinese seamen had themselves participated in trade with parts of Southeast Asia, and by the 13th century, perhaps because of pressures arising from growing population within their crowded littoral, the southern Chinese began to play an altogether larger part in such maritime commercial activities, and to found small settlements in various parts of the Nan Yang regularly visited by their junks.

Although, as Coedès insists, "the Chinese never looked with favor on the formation of strong states in the southern seas and . . . the periods of the greatest strength of Funan, Cambodia, and the Javanese and Sumatran kingdoms correspond in general to periods of weakness in the great Chinese dynasties,"[22] China did not normally interfere in the internal affairs of the Southeast Asian tributary states. But the more forthright and simplistic attitude of the Mongol conquerors who established the Yuan dynasty in 1280 led to a series of armed invasions of several parts of Southeast Asia, eventually even of Java in 1293, in an attempt to impose a more obvious hegemony than that of their Sung predecessors over these southern neighbors. And although in most respects the more traditional Chinese attitudes quickly reasserted themselves with the establishment of the indigenous Ming dynasty in 1368, the recently awakened interest in Southeast Asia found new expression in the activities of early Ming Emperors who dispatched thither a series of major naval expeditions between 1405 and 1431, in order to demonstrate China's interest and to further its influence within the region.

In this connection, therefore, great interest attaches to Admiral Cheng Ho's initiative in bringing under Chinese protection the small port city of Malacca, which by this time was developing as the successor to Temasik (Old Singapore).[23] For the latter had recently been eliminated by the rival pressures of Siam and Majapahit, which had meanwhile emerged as the leading powers respectively in the mainland and maritime halves of Southeast Asia and, but for this Chinese initiative, the continuing rivalry of these two neighbors for control of the sea route through the Malacca Straits would probably have destroyed Malacca as well.

Perhaps, therefore, it is too facile to conclude that, since the Ming naval expeditions ceased suddenly after a quarter of a century, they had in fact represented no more than a passing aberration. For, apart from the immediate nomadic and other threats to China's own security which precipitated the cessation, the multiplying presence of European shipping in the seas of East and Southeast Asia after 1511, together with the fact that large numbers of southern Chinese supporters of the Ming against the new Manchu dynasty after 1644 were in contact with fellow countrymen already illegally settled in parts of Southeast Asia by this time under European control, affords adequate explanation for the official reversion to an increasingly seclusionist policy, without giving any grounds for concluding that the Chinese, unlike the Japanese,[24] would never wish to resume maritime contacts with Southeast Asia in less hazardous circumstances. And indeed at the local level, the trickle of migrants from southern China to the Nan Yang continued unceasingly, despite rigorous penalties, throughout both the 17th and 18th centuries.

So far as Southeast Asia itself was concerned, the early phase of European colonialism, from the Portuguese conquest of Malacca in 1511 until the impact of the Industrial Revolution began to make itself felt thus far afield some three centuries later, was essentially peripheral in its effect. With only insignificant exceptions the mainland countries north of Malacca escaped even nominal subordination. And while the Dutch, who succeeded the Portuguese in the Malaysian-Indonesian archipelagos, staked out wide-ranging claims, their effective hold was limited to only a few percent of the total area, much the greater part of it in Java, whose agricultural potential they exploited under various forms of forced labor, though the blow dealt to indigenous shipping by their monopolist-mercantilist policies affected a considerably wider area. In the Philippines direct Spanish control was more extensive, and although the vigorous missionary efforts of the Catholics, together with the forging of new cultural and political alignment across the Pacific, served once again to draw the islands away from the rest of Southeast Asia, the introduction of such Latin American crops as maize, sweet potatoes, cassava and peanuts subsequently had far reaching effects in raising the food production of extensive areas unsuited for rice cultivation in both Southeast and East Asia.

On balance, however, European rule during the early colonial period contributed little to environmental control in Southeast Asia, and such improvements as it may have made in this respect in a few very restricted areas were more than offset by its disintegrating effect upon indigenous society. Moreover, in being limited almost exclusively to the archipelagos while its shipping dominated the seaways, it served still further to widen the divide between the mainland and the islands.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, 1786-1942

The later phase of Western colonial rule, under the influence of the Industrial Revolution, completely transformed the spatial relationships of Southeast Asia. As the pioneers of that Revolution, the British, though hitherto only marginally involved there, now became the pace-makers.

In a sense this was almost accidental. Having by 1764 beaten the French for predominance in India, the British soon began to look farther afield to China, the other great potential market for mass-produced textiles. And although concern for the defense of India played an important part in their acquisition of Penang in 1786, it was the desire to break the Dutch maritime monopoly farther east and to open up more effective communication with China that was decisive in the establishment of the new Penang-Singapore-Hong Kong axis, which, though not of set purpose, came to provide a new integrating factor in Southeast Asia. Yet this axis might never have come into being but for the initiative of Stamford Raffles, whose experience as a servant of the East India Company in Penang and Malacca and, above all, as Lieutenant-Governor of Java during the British occupation of 1811-16, had made him an enthusiastic champion of the peoples of the "eastern isles," so much "fresher from the hand of nature" than the inhabitants of India.

As a citizen of the self-styled workshop of the world, and one nurtured on the optimistic doctrines of the *Wealth of Nations*, Raffles despises the prevailing mercantilist attitude of the Netherlands Indies administration which had survived the demise of the *Vereenigde Oostinische Compagnie* in 1798. Instead of being subjected to the old system of forced cultivation, he believed that the local people should be encouraged to produce whatever would pay them best, so as to purchase the cheap consumer goods which the West could now provide, and thereby raise their standard of living. While law and order were, of course, essential, their purpose was not to hold the people down, but to enable them to exercise their fundamental human right to better their material lot as those in the West were beginning to do.

This desire to make a better job of running the Indies than the Dutch had done underlay Raffles' recommendation that the British should retain authority over the islands in order to liberate them from a pernicious and outdated order. In this last, as also in the related but less advertised fact that such a policy would also benefit his own country's economy by providing new outlets for its manufactures, the attitude of Raffles and some of his contemporaries provides a certain parallel with that of the United States towards Asia after the Second World War. Indeed the parallel may be taken further, for if the new policies were to be effectively introduced into Southeast Asia it would be necessary first to know much more about the area, including its geography, peoples, languages, customs, laws, agriculture, handicrafts and history—all of them quite different from those of India. Thus already before he set foot on Java and began assiduously to collect data for his *History of Java* (1817), Raffles, inspired by William Marsden's similarly wide-ranging *History of Sumatra* (1784), had amassed an impressive knowledge of such matters in respect of the Malay archipelago. And, notwithstanding their claim to be "histories," it seems reasonable to regard these two great works as being both in purpose and character true precursors of modern Area Studies.[25]

In the event, the British government rejected Raffles' pleas and restored the Indies to the Netherlands in 1816. But when in 1819 Raffles, mindful of the former role of Singapore within Southeast Asia, made a last bid to establish a British presence here by taking possession of this now virtually uninhabited island, London was persuaded to acquiesce primarily because of its potential usefulness as a way station on the sea route to China. Thereafter Raffles quickly put his ideas into practice. By making Singapore a free port in an area hitherto dominated by monopoly, and opening it wide to immigrants from wherever they wished to come, he laid the foundations for its rapid growth as a great regional entrepot and simultaneously stimulated the revival of indigenous shipping which had seriously declined over much of the archipelago as a result of Dutch restrictiveness. And although the area which Singapore directly served was somewhat reduced when, as a result of the Opium War, the British acquired Hong Kong in 1841, as indeed that of Penang had shrunk after Singapore's own founding, the significance of all three was greatly increased by the fact that they formed a single chain of free ports extending right through the heart of Southeast Asia. For by this time the steamship was coming into more general use and, besides speeding up transport, it put an end to piracy which had flourished by attacking becalmed ships. Moreover, the opening of overcrowded China after the Opium War led to a flood of emigration to the pioneer lands of Southeast Asia, following the sea route primarily to Singapore and Penang, from which it fanned out also into the Malay peninsula, the Netherlands Indies, and southern Siam.

Meanwhile the British, having in 1826 added the coastal strips of Arakan and Tenasserim to their Indian empire, proceeded also to include the Irrawaddy delta in 1852. This move, by drawing attention to the Irrawaddy, aroused widespread European interest in the possibility of avoiding the detour round the Malay peninsula, and approaching China direct up one or other of the great river valleys. Understandably, this idea appealed particularly to the French, who began building the Suez canal in 1859 and formulated plans for reviving in modern form the ancient portage across peninsular Siam by cutting a canal across the Kra isthmus, and then sailing up the Mekong to the interior of China. Although this, and the later variant of substituting the Songkoi for the Mekong, came to nothing since both rivers proved to be unnavigable for the purpose, the French acquired Indochina in the process and the British riposted by annexing the rest of Burma before both agreed to leave what remained of Siam as a buffer.

This new interest in the mainland led to revolutionary developments in its economy. Hitherto the Irrawaddy delta had been relatively sparsely occupied owing to the difficulty of controlling its flood waters, but in the 1870's the British, again seeking to raise local incomes in order to sell more British goods, set about tackling the flood problem with the new hydro-technology they had meanwhile been developing in northern India. Their successful taming of the Irrawaddy delta marked a fundamental breakthrough in the control of the Southeast Asian environment, and the related mass settlement of the delta by migrants from the incipiently congested dry zone and neighboring uplands was likewise a major innovation. These advances were copied, with variations, by the French in the Mekong delta and later by the Siamese, with foreign advisors, in the Chao Phraya delta, and essentially similar developments also took place notably in Java,[26] northeastern Sumatra and western Malaya. For since the opening of the Suez canal and the steady improvement in the steamship had greatly reduced the economic distance between Europe and Southeast Asia, it now began to pay for the latter to export not only relatively high value goods but also much bulkier items, including a widening range of industrial raw materials, of which during the early 20th century rubber became the most significant.

This vast expansion of production was made possible directly by the technological innovations already described and the swift increase after the opening of the Suez canal in the number of small steamships for local use within Southeast Asia. But no less important was the establishment of a much firmer framework of law and order on both land and sea, of efficient commercial organization centered in the great ports, and the rapid growth of population within the region. Moreover this last was itself the result of vastly improved stability, the conquest of local famine by improved transport, and the gradual diffusion of improved standards of sanitation and hygiene, together with the immigration of millions of alien Asian laborers, craftsmen, clerks and other middlemen, mainly from China but also, in Burma and Malaya, from India. And although these interacting changes affected every country in Southeast Asia, whose total population rose spectacularly from perhaps 25-30 million in 1830 to 150 million a century later, the entire process of breaking the former constraints which had held Southeast Asia back stemmed directly or indirectly from the initiative of Raffles, and in geographical terms radiated outwards from the great ports facing the British-dominated sea route.

In this sense, therefore, which is wholly consistent with the fundamentally maritime character of Southeast Asia, the latter had, by the 1930's, come nearer to being a single geographical region than ever before in its history, however much this fact was obscured by the way in which the several metropolitan powers tended to view their Southeast Asian dependencies in the context of their own particular imperium rather than in their true regional setting. But paradoxically in thus coming nearer towards regional unity, Southeast Asia had become less Southeast Asian.

This was not merely a matter of modernization or even of population growth for, despite the magnitude of the increase, Southeast Asia had not, except in a few relatively small areas, become overcrowded like India and China, to say nothing of Japan. But it had nevertheless been drastically transformed in other ways. To begin with, the ecology of Westernization, beginning in the 16th century but subsequently accelerating rapidly, had effectively turned every country inside out, so that instead of having their demographic foci and their capital cities in the interior, they were now administered mostly from one or other of the great coastal ports created and dominated by the foreigners.[27] And to countries in which the capital city had traditionally held a mystical as well as a merely material significance, the way in which these brash and exotic port cities flourished, while the once-revered traditional centers were allowed to sink into more or less squalid stagnation, struck at the very roots of national self-respect.

This brings us to the more obvious fact that, apart from Siam, all of Southeast Asia had become colonial territory, and indeed only in the Philippines and Burma had any hope been held out of independence even within the lifetimes of those most politically concerned. Nor of course was colonialism limited to the political sphere. The chosen elites, everywhere a minority though in some cases considerably more minor than others, were educated in a manner, and usually also in a language, which estranged them from their fellow-countrymen. And economically every country had become dangerously dependent on the vagaries of incomprehensible fancies and fortunes in Europe and North America, as the depression following 1929 catastrophically demonstrated right down to the village level.

For while there was a massive flow of goods both ways between the great ports and their hinterlands, the basic pattern of trade was not based primarily on reciprocal interchange within Southeast Asia, but consisted overwhelmingly of an outward flow of primary produce to Europe and the United States against an inward flow of manufactured goods from these same areas as a whole.[28] In short, Southeast Asia had become what German economic geographers called an *Ergänzungsraum*—or supplementary region—of the affluent West.

Finally, not merely was the apex of the politico-economic pyramid in each country formed by a small minority of normally transient Europeans, but the middle layer, much more numerous and now becoming far less transient, consisted of alien Asians, leaving the great mass of the indigenes at the bottom. The potential threat which this situation implied was described by Arnold Toynbee in 1931, when nationalism in both India and China was much in the news, as follows:

> When I touched at the Straits Settlements on my way out east, I realized that British Malaya was destined, by 'peaceful penetra-

> tion,' to become a new Chinese province; and I fancy, from what I have heard, that the same destiny may be in store for Burma, Siam, French Indochina, Dutch Indonesia and the Philippines. In the end, the current of Chinese expansion in the Tropics will meet the current of Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of the smaller, weaker and less efficient peoples in between, who are already fast going under. And, after that has happened, I surmise that the new frontier between China and India will tend, slowly but surely, to travel westward at India's expense and in China's favor.[29]

In fact, however, the Japanese acted before either the Chinese or the Indians. Certainly, they argued, Southeast Asia was a natural *Ergänzungsraum* but, applying the principle underlying the Monroe Doctrine to Asia, Southeast Asia—along with China—should be *Ergänzungsräume* of Japan. Little by little, as Japan's plans unfolded, and Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka eventually spelled out the argument that Greater East Asia meant East Asia (Japan and China) plus the Nanyo, the Western powers most directly involved began to recognize that Southeast Asia was indeed an entity if only in that it was all in dire peril, as was soon underlined by Japanese "peaceful penetration" into Indochina during 1941. So the ABCD front was hurriedly patched up, but unfortunately as yet without a back; the Institute of Pacific Relations organized the preparation of a series of monographs on "Southeast Asia," most of which did not appear until after Pearl Harbor; and in 1943, after the Japanese for the only time in history had brought the whole area under common overlordship, South-East Asia Command was established to help get them out, and Panikkar wrote *The Future of South-East Asia* to publicize India's claim to a leading role there when this had been done.

THE DECOLONIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The common trauma produced throughout all parts of Southeast Asia by the Japanese occupation compounded that caused only a decade earlier by the great depression. Admittedly, against the horrors suffered under the occupation can be set the gains of a forced education in the hard facts of international life, and the opportunities given in some of the occupied lands for more of the local population than heretofore to play subordinate parts in the running of their respective countries. But everywhere, not excluding the constitutionally more advanced Philippines and Burma to which the Japanese accordingly granted the contradiction of "independence within the Co-prosperity Sphere" in 1943, the initial euphoria occasioned by their talk of "Asia for the Asiatics"[30] gave way sooner or later to profound disillusion at this latest example of the age-old Southeast Asian experience of having one's fate decided by uncontrollable extraneous forces, against which it had become traditional to react by bowing with the breeze and waiting for it to pass.

The immediate postwar period witnessed the same basic trend operating in another way. Notwithstanding the later Philippine and Burma campaigns, the Japanese were expelled from Southeast Asia primarily because of events outside the region itself, and by the same token the Western Allies proceeded in effect to shape its future also at second hand. Providing that Japan could be prevented from ever again disturbing the peace of Asia, and both China and India built up in accordance with the American belief that liberation from foreign rule would automatically lead to exemplary international behavior, Southeast Asia, it seemed to be assumed, would present no great problem, and after a brief period of rehabilitation, its several countries could likewise take the same golden road, via independence, to a better future.

So, after a crash program of material reconstruction, the Philippines were set on this course in 1946 and the British, having agreed to give independence to India in 1947, also began to formulate plans for propelling a less prepared Burma and a far less prepared, ethnically diverse and administratively fragmented British Malaysian sphere in the same direction. However, since in contrast to the Americans and the British, the French and the Dutch had never attempted to justify colonial rule as a preparation for independence in the future, and moreover were both still suffering from the material and psychological wounds caused by their own occupation at German hands, it required a much longer and bloodier process before they could be persuaded to recognize the independence which the two greatest Southeast Asian countries, respectively Indochina and Indonesia, had already claimed to be exercising since 1945.[31] Moreover, so far as persuasion of the Western Allies was concerned, the emphasis seemed to be dictated more by the situation in Europe than by that in Southeast Asia. Thus it was the small but politically stable Netherlands which for the first four years felt the main blast of criticism, while France, the "sick man of Europe," apparently liable at any moment to succumb to the communist virus, was meanwhile treated much more gently, even though the Vietnamese nationalist movement was unique in Southeast Asia in being itself under communist leadership. And indeed it was the communist victory in China next door, while the Netherlands was in process of negotiating the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, which decided the United States to adopt a different attitude in respect to Vietnam. Thus they encouraged the French in their attempt to bypass Ho Chi Minh and set up a non-communist successor regime under Bao Dai, and eventually, after the French collapse at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the Americans were driven to discover and support a succession of new anticommunist leaders in the southern half of the country.

Thus in sequence independence came to Burma in 1948, Indonesia in 1949, the successor states of Indochina after the Geneva agreement of 1954, Malaya in 1957 and Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore by incorporation with it in the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, and to Singapore on its own after exclusion from Malaysia in 1965. Thereafter only the Portuguese half of Timor, a diminutive remnant of the first European empire in Southeast Asia, has slept on, seemingly oblivious to the winds of change.

Without reversing one's earlier view that by 1945 independence was overdue in Southeast Asia, one is bound in retrospect to admit that the magnitude of the difficulties it entailed was grossly underestimated by almost everyone who held this view at that time. For in fact all the countries in Southeast Asia faced a unique combination of problems which in their collectivity differentiated it from both South Asia and Africa, the other two major theatres of postwar decolonization.

To begin with, one must again emphasize that Southeast Asia alone was launched into independence in the wake of a prolonged period of military ravaging and occupation of its own territory, the full effects of which only became apparent as time went on. Suffice it to say that, with the exception of the Malaysian territories where *merdeka* was delayed as a result of the communist-terrorist "emergency," every Southeast Asian ex-colony began its effective independence with its prewar infrastructure severely crippled and in some cases barely capable of functioning at all, and with a backlog of from four to fourteen years in the proper servicing and replacement of essential machinery and equipment. In these circumstances therefore the new rulers began the task of reorganizing their countries with one hand tied behind their back, and the situation was made still more difficult by the existence of innumerable dumps and caches of arms and equipment left over from the war and available to be looted by individuals or groups hostile to the new regimes.

Furthermore the number of such potential rebels was itself greatly increased because the double change in overlordship—involving the Japanese as well as the Western powers—had added a new dimension to the emotions characteristically associated with "collaboration," and so sharpened the major inter-ethnic cleavages within the respective populations. For, in general, the Japanese had pandered to the major indigenous groups but penalized the local Chinese who, whatever their differences in other respects, were united in hatred of the nation that had already overrun their motherland; and many of the indigenous minority peoples, who had regarded the colonial authority as their protector against the indigenous majority communities, were ready to do what they could to sabotage the Japanese war effort and perhaps in the process to pay off old scores against their traditional local enemies. But even apart from such complications, the common ethnic diversity, whereby every Southeast Asian country contained one or more indigenous advanced communities, individually or together forming the majority and providing the nationalist leadership; various less advanced indigenous minority peoples; and one or more ethnically alien communities, invariably including Chinese, and in some cases also either Indians or Eurasians, presented the aspiring nation-builder with an immensely difficult task.

The most serious aspect of this arose from the focal position, both economically and geographically, of the predominantly urban and largely either commercial or professional ethnic alien communities in each country, a position which moreover might perhaps acquire a new significance from the way in which both China and India were already beginning to play much more positive roles in the world than either had done in the remembered past. And this led straightaway to the central socio-economic problem in every country, for while everyone agreed that living standards should be raised, and the country's wealth be used for the nation's own benefit rather than the enrichment of the former Western masters, the question of the internal shareout was no less vital and, being much clearer for all to see, was even more emotive. Moreover, since the ethnic aliens commanded a disproportionately large share of the expertise necessary to organize the production of wealth, the questions inevitably arose whether they could be trusted to do so in the interest of the nation as a whole and, even if they could, whether this process under their influence would not tend to drag the country still further away from its traditional values and way of life which nationalism was supposed to promote.

Meanwhile, however, the still basically colonial-style economies remained, as ever, at the mercy of external forces, a fact that was only too clearly reemphasized by the collapse in commodity prices in the early 1950's after the Korean war boom which had marked the top of the curve resulting from continued shortages ever since 1945. This collapse, coming as it did just as Indonesia, normally the greatest exporter in the region, was beginning to reorganize its economy after at last gaining independence, wrought such havoc there as to confirm Sukarno's suspicions that continued Western machinations lay at the root of all Indonesia's problems. While this was certainly not so, there was no denying that all Southeast Asia remained infinitely more vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations than were the established industrial nations. Equally dangerously, Southeast Asia—and in particular Indonesia—was the victim of the misguided belief that, because the area had proved exceptionally profitable for some Westerners to exploit, its total natural resources were exceptionally rich. For while both the Westerners and the Japanese had laid great stress on the value to themselves of Southeast Asia's easily accessible natural wealth their calculations were not concerned with the relationship between the scale of the latter and that of indigenous needs, and in these circumstances both the new Southeast Asian leaderships and their respective supporters tended to expect too much too soon, and inevitably suffered varying degrees of disenchantment.

Thus the early postwar period, when Southeast Asia, newly liberated first from the common Japanese occupation and then from its several colonial ties with individual Western powers, was beginning to shape its own destiny, soon revealed the truth of J. S. Furnivall's comment in 1946 that this was indeed an area, no part of which could be properly understood except in its wider regional context.[32] For everywhere the main problems facing the new regimes were compounded of the same basic ingredients, and although the respective proportions of these differed from country to country, and the different national elites, with very varied training and experience at the hands of different Western powers, adopted their own distinctive approaches, all these differences were no more than variations on certain common themes.

Whether in these circumstances Southeast Asia should be called a "unity" might still be debated, but that it faced a host of common problems, deriving from a common experience of coming to terms with a similar geographical environment and adjusting as best it could to the successive waves of peoples and cultures which had swept over it from before the dawn of history until the apocalyptic events of the Second World War, was surely beyond dispute. And if Lattimore's insistence that "a fresh integration is demanded of us because of the historical juncture" was already vindicated by the end of the 1940's, the two decades which followed were to highlight his related observation that "most intricate of all is the old problem that reappears in a new guise defying simple classification."[33]

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND ITS ASIAN NEIGHBORS

Besides opening the way for alien Asian minorities to assume a leading role in the internal economic affairs of the Southeast Asian states, the ending of Western imperial links also suggested the possibility that one or more of the region's greater Asian neighbors might replace the Western powers as the real controllers of its destinies. As we have seen, Panikkar had implicitly registered an unofficial Indian claim in this respect in 1943, and since neither Japan under American occupation nor China embroiled in civil war and its aftermath was at first able to take any initiative, India had the field virtually to itself for most of the decade which began with its convening of the Inter-Asian Conference at New Delhi in 1947. From the outset Nehru, while following Panikkar in stressing India's historic and cultural ties with the Southeast Asian countries, and in arguing that the latter, as major exporters of primary produce, were economically complementary to a densely populated and industrially developing India, differed radically from him in urging that the security of both India and Southeast Asia would best be served by their applying the Gandhian doctrine of non-violence to international affairs and thus making the Indian Ocean region a great nonaligned zone outside the ambit of the developing cold war. And with painfully recent memories of war on their own soil, and an understandable concern not to waste their limited economic resources on unnecessary armaments, the Southeast Asian countries were at first only too ready to follow this advice from a neighbor which missed no opportunity to speak up on their behalf at the United Nations and manifestly harbored no aggressive designs against them.

In this way, therefore, India emerged in the early 1950's as the leader of what Michael Brecher has called the Southern Asian Subordinate State System,[34] a process which indirectly received considerable support from the Commonwealth initiative in 1950 in launching the Colombo Plan, as a kind of mutual aid association buttressed by outside assistance, for the economic development specifically of South *and* Southeast Asia. Although the initiative behind the Colombo Plan is usually attributed to Mr. D. S. Senanayake of Ceylon and Mr. (later Sir) Percy Spender of Australia, Panikkar himself subsequently claimed that it was he who first inspired it, in a memorandum he prepared while serving as Indian Ambassador to China at the time when the communists were in process of taking over in 1949, and that his purpose in so doing was to strengthen the still extremely weak and divided Southeast Asian states against "the problem of communist expansion."[35]

Be that as it may, the new China soon began to outshine the new India and, however garbled the news coming out of it, there was little doubt that China, with Soviet help, was industrializing far more vigorously than India, notwithstanding all the aid the latter was receiving from both the West and the U.S.S.R. Moreover, while the majority of tolerant and easygoing Southeast Asians might applaud Nehru's expressions of fraternal feelings towards China, they were quick to see that, however much these sentiments might be reciprocated verbally, China did not hesitate to pursue its own interests in respect of Tibet, and the more hard-headed among them drew their own conclusions. In particular Sukarno, whose country owed most to India's earlier moral support, nevertheless contrived simultaneously to snub India by convening the First Afro-Asian Congress at Bandung in 1955 as a deliberate out-flanking of Indian aspirations to regional leadership, and to curry favor with China by affording it at Bandung an ideal opportunity to allay the fears of other Southeast Asian countries that a fate similar to Tibet's was being prepared for them.

The humiliation of India was completed by the Sino-Indian border conflict which reached its climax in 1962 and, whatever the rights and wrongs of this episode, it clearly indicated what the decline in Indian and the rise in Chinese trade with Southeast Asia soon confirmed, namely that India's leadership of Southeast Asia had been no more than a passing phase which could last only so long as the two great Far Eastern powers were temporarily out of action.

What China's long-term intentions towards its Southeast Asian neighbors may be is vastly too complex a subject to attempt to assess here, but at least it seems much too facile to suggest that it is limited merely to the negative aim of ridding the region of a United States presence. Beyond much doubt the primary motivation of China seems to be the wholly understandable one of reestablishing its position as the leading power within the area which it traditionally regarded as its orbit, and virtually all its actions from the reoccupation of Tibet to the creation of its own nuclear weaponry seem to have been related to that end.

Again, however, such an aim is a case of an old problem reappearing in a new guise, for while states may seek to act on the principle of historical imitation, they do not normally observe the constraints imposed by past technology in so doing. Thus although it is not clear whether China's aims involve the reimposition of some form of ascendancy over those Southeast Asian countries which formerly at one time or another were tributary to it, it seems probable that if it does envisage such a relationship, the latter, given the modernization of communications and economics, would be far less tenuous than it was in the past. Moreover, while it is certainly unwise to take literally the more provocative statements emanating from a country still smarting under a deep-seated sense of injustice at Western hands, it is well also to remember that the state which has developed the concept of the world's countryside encircling the cities is not itself a paper tiger, and that if it has any aspirations to lead such a process, Southeast Asia would appear to be the most accessible part of the world's countryside in which to begin. For already the essentially "rural" character of Southeast Asia has led to its being seen as an *Ergänzungsraum* in turn of the West, of prewar Japan and of postwar India; yet potentially is it not, alike on geographical, economic and demographic grounds, even more obviously complementary to China?[36]

As I have suggested elsewhere, Tokyo's foreign policy from the 1890's to the Second World War seems to have been based primarily on a recognition of the complementarity of the temperate and tropical Far East,[37] and on a related attempt to exploit Japan's own head start in modernization in order to bring China, while the latter was still weak, under its tutelage in an East Asia recentered in Tokyo instead of Peking, as a preliminary to uniting both the temperate and tropical Far East in a single great Asian Pacific region, euphemistically styled the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Moreover there appears to be a certain element of continuity, appropriately and skillfully adapted to radically changed political circumstances, in the "low posture" policy pursued by Japan since the Second World War. Thus by taking a back seat politically and relying, at minimal cost to itself, upon the American nuclear shield for its defense during a long enough period to allow memories of its own past militarism to fade, Japan has meanwhile devoted all its energies to building up a commanding technological lead even over the new China, and to making itself the predominant trading power in Southeast Asia. For the time being at least, both of these aims have now been achieved, but there is every prospect of prolonged and intensified Sino-Japanese economic competition in Southeast Asia as China also seeks to expand its trade there.

Whichever way this competition develops in the decades ahead it seems to portend a continuation of the trend for Southeast Asia to become much more closely aligned economically with East Asia at the expense of a further reduction of its now far weaker economic ties with South Asia, a situation which is already making the concept of a Southern Asian Subordinate State System look obsolescent. And in these changes of the postwar quarter century it is perhaps not wholly fanciful to see another example of an old problem in a new guise, as the present trend repeats in telescoped form something of the changing alignment which appeared to be in the making in Southeast Asia's relationships with its greater Asian neighbors in the centuries preceding the advent of the Europeans in this part of the world.

While it is possible to explain these changes in terms of the difference between what are sometimes respectively regarded as the "harder" Confucian and the "softer" Hindu-Buddhist attitudes to life, these also need to be seen in Hu Shih's terms as parts of a people's achievements in adjusting to its environment. In this connection the disciplined hard-working, and realistic Confucian attitude developed appropriately enough in what Fleure called a "region of increment,"[38] or one in which a temperate climate was conducive to high human energy and sustained human effort was rewarded with a good agricultural return. Moreover these attitudes became sufficiently deep-rooted to prevent the Chinese and the similarly placed Japanese and North Vietnamese from a collapse in morale even under the pressure of excessive population which developed during later centuries.

The experience of the Southeast Asian peoples has been very different from this. Over much of the area mankind has waged a prolonged and dispiriting struggle against the dense tropical rain forest, a struggle which has left its mark on the still relatively retarded peoples sparsely inhabiting various parts of the region. But in the better favored areas, where the main historic kingdoms grew up and gave rise to the traditions which are ancestral to the majority peoples of the region today, the experience was the happier one that lies behind the Thai proverb that there is fish in the river and rice in the field, so why worry? In these circumstances, given the absence of overcrowding and the presence of a hot—though at some seasons enjoyable—climate, it was sound sense to adopt a slower pace than that of the more thrusting foreigners, even if this did at times accentuate the need to bow with the breeze. While the partial climatic similarity—though by no means identical—between Southeast Asia and India may have played a part in rendering Southeast Asians receptive to Indian attitudes to life, especially before Indian culture had lost its early élan,[39] Raffles was unquestionably right in recognizing the profound difference between the prevailing cheerful peoples of Southeast Asia and the sense of all-pervasive despair which then as now seems to overhang India. To say this is not to admit to a belief in blind inexorable climatic determinism but rather to recognize that, precisely because man is not an automaton, he seeks to adapt his way of living to those of his circumstances which he cannot change, even though, unhappily, he is not always successful in his attempts.

These considerations lead to a final point. Within Southeast Asia today there are two main extraneous elements of what we may call temperate vigor, namely the overseas Chinese and the Vietnamese. However, there appears to be some evidence to suggest that both these peoples tend to adjust to permanent residence over several generations in the tropics by some weakening of their "Confucian hardness" and a gradual addiction to the characteristic Southeast Asian version of *dolce far niente.* For the view is widely held in Vietnam that the southerners, who have moved steadily deeper into the tropics since the 12th century, are "softer" than the northerners, and the Nanyang Chinese likewise are apt to regard those families which have been resident in Southeast Asia for several generations as more easygoing than those more recently arrived from China.[40]

Given time, therefore, these extraneous elements might be expected gradually to adjust their way of living to the Southeast Asian tempo, but such a change, whether it is to be welcomed or deplored, is certainly not likely to come about immediately. On the contrary the differentials and their economic consequences are at present so great that in the overseas Chinese case they have already split the Malaysian federation as originally conceived, and the Vietnamese problem is undermining the stability of the whole of Indochina and also threatens that of a wider area beyond. For although theoretically the dynamism of these two peoples could be an immense asset to the region as a whole, as in innumerable ways that of the Chinese has already been, this quality and what has gone with it are both feared and resented by their indigenous neighbors.

Here we come to what is surely the most critical instance of old problems appearing in a new guise and hence defying easy solution. For the dimensions of both these problems have been radically changed—though in different ways—by the recent transformation of China into a powerful Communist state. Thus Vietnam, which is contiguous with China, which it traditionally regarded as its enemy and oppressor, now shares a common ideology with it, while the Southeast Asian Chinese, who are dispersed throughout Southeast Asia though with pronounced concentrations in its cities, retain a strong sentimental attachment to China which tends to increase as the latter's prestige rises, but for the most part are inclined by their own economic role to reject its current ideology.

These observations are not meant to imply that the Vietnamese and/or the Nan Yang Chinese have no right to be in Southeast Asia or that their presence there is necessarily harmful to their neighbors. In the long view of history they are no more extraneous than the ancestors of other Southeast Asians, though at the present juncture the relatively recent arrival of the majority of the Chinese in the Nan Yang and of most of the Vietnamese in what is now South Vietnam may make them appear so. And even if other Southeast Asians still feel them to be extraneous, that of itself is no reason for reacting negatively to them, for is it not also possible to react like a pearl oyster and create something positive in the process?

Indeed the developing sense of regional awareness now evident in ASEAN[41] may represent precisely such a reaction. For ASEAN has grown out of Tengku Abdul Rahman's ASA,[42] itself the external counterpart to his original Malaysian Federation. And whereas the latter was designed to "contain" the great Singapore concentration of Chinese in a wider setting, ASEAN includes some 87 percent of all the Southeast Asian Chinese in a still wider grouping, in which the city state of Singapore is even more central than it was in the original Federation of Malaysia. In these circumstances Singapore should be free to make the most of its excellent situation and highly developed skills and so become a major regional industrial focus to the advantage of its neighbors as well as itself, and in turn the existence of a contented and stable Singapore should serve to assuage the wilder fears in other ASEAN states regarding the loyalty of their own Chinese minorities.

However, although the primary aim of ASEAN—"to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development of the region"—is unexceptionable, it is still premature to enthuse over its prospects and, in the minds of some, the extent to which Southeast Asian Chinese, reversing their stance of a generation ago, have now begun to act as intermediaries in the furtherance of Japanese commercial links with the region may suggest that ASEAN is not so much a natural pearl as a Mikimoto. Analogies aside, however, the key to the unity and hence also the security of Southeast Asia, still lies in control of its central seaway, and in this respect ASEAN at least contains all the most relevant countries, with the marginal exception of South Vietnam. And in particular it includes in Indonesia the only indigenous Southeast Asian state which has attempted since independence to build up any significant sea power of its own, though admittedly ASEAN has hitherto been careful to exclude strategic considerations from its purview.

Given the continuing instability within the Indochinese lands, moreover, it is understandable that ASEAN has hitherto stopped short of including any of them, though clearly the war in Vietnam, and all the problems which this poses for the rest of Southeast Asia, will not disappear by the area's being thus isolated. Yet here again there are signs of a more positive reaction. For the great Mekong River Development Project, to which all the four riparian states—Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand—have been committed since 1957, represents the most persistent and practical experience of regional cooperation so far achieved within Southeast Asia, and potentially affords an unprecedented opportunity for the application of contemporary technology and agricultural research to the solution of the age-old problems of the Southeast Asian environment. While North Vietnam is not a party to the arrangements, it could benefit immensely, particularly in respect of hydroelectric supplies, from the completion of the project.

Perhaps even more important in the long run, however, is the opportunity that cooperative international development of the Mekong basin might provide both for repairing the material ravages caused by the Indochina War, and also for harnessing in a new context the great but hitherto frustrated energies of the Vietnamese people of both North and South. For the full implementation of the project will call for all the dynamism and skills which the peoples of the entire area can collectively master, and an all-out effort by all concerned might make an invaluable contribution towards healing the terrible psychological wounds that the last twenty-five years have produced. But such an outcome would be possible only on the basis of a settlement of the war which did not either irrevocably partition the basin or turn it into an ideological frontier.

It is against this background that I view with alarm the now popular view that "Southeast Asia should be left to enjoy the obscurity it so richly deserves." For when all is said and done, the postwar dream of a new deal for Southeast Asia, under which the region would be liberated from the shackles of the past, helped by the West's greater skills and resources to create a better life for its peoples, and provided with the necessary security in which to find its own way forward was neither spurious nor ignoble. And even though terrible miscalculations have been made, and error has sometimes been compounded by individual and national stubbornness and pride, there can be no denying that the task needed—and still needs—to be completed.

Moreover, when one recalls the way in which the entire history of

Southeast Asia has been shaped by a geographical focality and the complementarity of its resources with those of more powerful outsiders, it is idle to assume that a final withdrawal of the Western presence will allow Southeast Asians to revert to their supposedly traditional practice of sleeping in the sun.

Already the decline of British and other links with Southeast Asia has been more than counterbalanced by the increase of Japanese economic penetration. Thus while the Suez canal, which as recently as 1956 was considered vital for the maintenance of British oil supplies from the Middle East, has now been closed for several years, Japan, once regarded as the aspiring "Britain of the East," seeks to persuade the bordering Southeast Asian states to permit the improvement of the Malacca Straits so that it own giant tankers may carry still more Middle Eastern oil to Japan. And after the British have declined to accept Panikkar's suggestion that they should cooperate in maintaining an Indian Ocean naval defense system, the U.S.S.R. is building up its naval strength in the same region, at least partly in order to pursue its own variant of—and perhaps ultimately to replace—the American doctrine of containing China.

In these circumstances it is abundantly clear that, whatever the West does or does not do, Southeast Asia will not be left to its own devices. And this being so, its more foresighted leaders already see that what it needs is not less but more outside interest in its affairs,[43] and, not least, a continuation of Western concern to maintain some degree of balance against the developing interests of other major powers. For only in the full light of knowledge which such a situation would bring will the magnitude of the region's needs be fully appreciated, the assistance required for the implementation of the Mekong and other major projects be forthcoming, and the possibility of Southeast Asia's ever again becoming a mere sphere of ruthless external exploitation be finally banished. Obscurity is not a permanent possibility for a major crossroads, and dirty work at such locations proverbially takes place in the dark.

1. In the early state of Area Studies the emphasis was preponderantly on Asian areas though the approach was subsequently applied also to many other parts of the world.

2. Sir Hamilton Gibb, *Area Studies Reconsidered* (London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1963), p. 15.

3. Foreword to Karl J. Pelzer, *Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics* (New York, American Geographical Society, 1945), p. xiii.

4. Although the motivation behind these tactics was less constructive and far less subtle than that of Solomon, they unintentionally achieved the same result of preserving the unity of the baby.

5. Richard Harris, *Independence and After* (London, Institute of Race Relations, 1964), pp. 9-10.

6. "In the Wrong Bundle," *The Times* (February 22, 1965).
7. *Trade and Shipping of South-East Asia*, Parl. Pap. 1900 (Cd. 324) LXXXVII, 1. I am grateful to my colleague Professor C. D. Cowan for drawing my attention to this paper.
8. See, for example, Robert Heine-Geldern, "Weltbild und Bauform in Südostasien," *Wiener Beiträge zur Kunst und Kulturgeschichte Asiens*, 4 (1930), pp. 28-78, and Karl J. Pelzer, *Die Arbeiterwanderungen in Südostasien* (Hamburg, 1935).
9. Sir Hugh Clifford, *Further India* (London, 1904); Alleyne Ireland, *The Far Eastern Tropics* (London, 1905); and J. S. Furnivall, *The Tropical Far East*, Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs No. 71, 1945.
10. The early Indian explorers and traders also had various collective names for the lands bordering the Straits of Malacca and much of the South China Sea, notably *Suvarnabhumi* or "land of gold." See P. Wheatley, *The Golden Khersonese* (Kuala Lumpur, 1961), Chapter 11.
11. K. M. Panikkar, *The Future of South-East Asia* (New York, 1943).
12. J. O. M. Broek, "Diversity and Unity in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review*, 34 (1944), pp. 175-195.
13. Karl J. Pelzer, *op. cit.* (1945), p. xvii.
14. W. Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth* (London, 1957), p. 53.
15. C. O. Sauer, *Agricultural Origins and Dispersals* (New York, 1952), Chapter 2.
16. The name Dongson which is applied to the highest Southeast Asian culture immediately preceding Indianization is derived from a village in northern Vietnam where extensive finds were first made. It is noteworthy that the preceding Mesolithic and/or early Neolithic Bacson-Hoabinh cultures were also first identified in northern Vietnam.
17. G. Coedès, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia*, Walter F. Vella, ed., and trans., Susan Brown Cowling (Honolulu, 1968), pp. 8-10.
18. J. C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society* (The Hague and Bandung, 1955), pp. 96-8.
19. Both to foreigners exploring and trading along the Southeast Asian seaways, who saw the great mainland rivers as the obvious means of entry to the interior, and to those indigenous kingdoms which emerged in the interiors and subsequently expanded downstream towards the sea, the deltas appeared as areas of major significance. But the great depth of their seasonal floods severely retarded the exploitation of their agricultural potential except along their edges before the nineteenth century (see above in the text) and it is significant that even then such Western port-of-entry capitals as Rangoon and Saigon were developed not within, but merely adjacent to, the Irrawaddy and Mekong deltas respectively.
20. Bruce Grant, *Indonesia* (Melbourne, 1964), p. 94.
21. To avoid confusion arising from the various changes in both the extent and the political organization of the territories occupied by the ancestors of the modern Vietnamese, I propose here to adopt present-day topographical terms.
22. Coedès, *op. cit.*, p. xviii.
23. Even before the Mongols had taken over Sung China they had shown a disposition after their conquest of Nan Chao (Yunnan) in 1253-7 to favour the tendency of the emerging Thai peoples to carve out new principalities at the expense of the larger Indianized states on the Southeast Asian mainland. See Coedès, *op. cit.*, p. 188, and note 21 above.
24. Southern Japanese adventurers and traders had begun to follow their Chinese counterparts into the Nanyo before the Tokugawa administration, likewise alarmed by the possibility that increasing contact with the Europeans would strengthen subversive elements at home, adopted its more rigorously maintained seclusionist policy in the 1630's.
25. Some years ago Karl Pelzer suggested to me that Raffles was the pioneer of Area Studies.
26. Under the stress of growing population pressure in Java the Dutch began to construct modern irrigation works during the middle of the 19th century.
27. The establishment in 1896 of the Federated Malay States with its capital at Kuala Lumpur represents a reversal of this process, but Singapore remained the effective headquarters of all British Malaya until after the Second World War.
28. Within this overall pattern there was an important triangular component, with exports from British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies to the United States normally considerably exceeding their imports from the latter, and so helping to balance the respective metropolitan countries' trading accounts with the dollar area.
29. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Journey to China, or Things Which Art Seen* (London, 1931), p. 259.
30. This was before the word "Asiatic" came to be replaced by "Asian".

31. The Japanese proclaimed the creation of three ostensibly independent states, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, to replace the former French Indochina, in March 1945, but although they were also moving towards granting independence to the Netherlands Indies, the sudden ending of the Second World War came first, and the Indonesian nationalist leaders made their own declaration of independence on 17 August 1945.
32. J. S. Furnivall, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
33. See above as noted in the text.
34. Michael Brecher, *The New States of Asia* (London, 1963), Chapter 3.
35. K. M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas* (London, 1955), p. 55.
36. The old concept of temperate/tropical interdependence acquired a new lease of life with the late 19th century increase in the demand of the industrialized nations for tropical raw materials as noted above in the text. Today, with the increasing use of synthetic substitutes for such materials, the main basis of temperate/tropical complementarity lies in the difference in the degrees of industrial development between these zones. But in any case the degree of complementarity between the temperate Far East and Southeast Asia has for many centuries been greater than that between India and what it once thought of as "the lands of gold."
37. Charles A. Fisher, "The Britain of the East? A Study in the Geography of Imitation," *Modern Asian Studies*, II, 4 (1968), especially pp. 356-368.
38. H. J. Fleure, "Human Regions," *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, xxxv, 3 (1919), p. 96.
39. I suggest that this loss was a matter primarily of the gradual decline of dynamism in an originally non-tropical way of life as it spread slowly southwards, and its consequent failure to stand up to the later strains of overpopulation. Cf. C. A. Fisher, *The Compleat Geographer*, Inaugural Lecture, University of Sheffield, 1959, p. 16, and Pierre Gourou, *The Tropical World*, trans. E. D. Laborde (London, 1953), p. 51.
40. Admittedly other factors may also be involved, such as miscegenation, and increasing affluence in successive generations in contrast to the poverty common among new immigrants.
41. ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations), formed at Bangkok in August 1967, comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
42. ASA (Association of South-East Asia) formed in July 1961, comprised the original Federation of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
43. Cf. "The Power Pressures," a report of an interview given by the Singapore Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, in London (October 5, 1970) and "Small Nations and Super Powers," a report of a speech by the Singapore Foreign Minister, Mr. Rajaratnam, in New York, both in *The Mirror* (Singapore, October 26, 1970), p. 1.

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Abstract / Résumé

Dans l'étude de l'instabilité politique, la question principale est de déterminer comment le système en considération réagit en face de l'application de diverses formes de violence. Où le système est stable, les protagonistes principaux de l'arène politique savent que les changements fondamentaux du système exigent l'appui d'une grande proportion de ceux qui participent à la vie politique de leur pays. Dans les pays comme l'Indonésie, caractérisés par une politique d'instabilité, la moindre violence peut changer radicalement, mais de façon imprévisible, l'équilibre politique de ce pays.

On voit dans ce système de politique d'instabilité la meilleure explication des circonstances de l'affaire du 30 Septembre 1965 en Indonésie. A cette époque, le parti communiste indonésien, le PKI, comptait plus de 3 millions de membres et, d'après le parti, un total de 20 millions dans les diverses organisations de son front. Des officiers supérieurs de l'Armée se trouvaient même appartenir au "Bureau Spécial" clandestin du PKI. Au cours des six années qui ont précédé le régime Sukarno, la plupart des partis politiques les plus importants avaient été abolis ou rendus inoffensifs. Le PKI avait l'appui bienveillant de Sukarno, dont l'intention était d'isoler l'Indonésie de l'Ouest en vue d'une alliance avec la Chine. D. N. Aidit, le chef du PKI, devint le successeur apparent du Président Sukarno.

Dans la nuit du 30 Septembre au Ier Octobre 1965, six généraux de l'état major général, comptant parmi eux le Commandant Général de l'Armée, A. Yani, furent fusillés chez eux ou dans les banlieues de Djakarta. Le commandant d'un bataillon de la garde du palais du Président Sukarno, Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, s'est proclamé chef du "Mouvement du 30 Septembre," "qui était uniquement un mouvement militaire," d'après les dire de Radio Djakarta. A Djakarta le "Mouvement du 30 Septembre" était écrasé dans les vingt-quatre heures. Le 5 Octobre 1965, la Parti Musulman Nahdatul Ulama, avec le support de cinq partis moins importants, demandait au Président Sukarno de dissoudre le PKI. Cette demande signalait le commencement d'une campagne anti-communiste qui se termina par la mort de 150,000 à 300,000 partisans du PKI, dont Aidit et ses deux lieutenants Njoto et Lukman, par l'abolition du PKI, la chute éventuelle du Président Sukarno, et l'établissement d'un régime pro-Ouest contrôlé par l'armée.

Pourquoi les chefs du PKI, ont-ils pris le risque d'initier une chaîne d'évènements qui conduisit à la destruction du parti? Le coup d'état risqué par Aidit en vue de changements radicaux, et entrepris sans la mobilisation totale des forces politiques du PKI, apparait raisonnablement justifié si l'on y réfléchit en termes de système de politique d'instabilité.

The Gestapu Affair of 1965: *Reflections on the Politics of Instability in Indonesia*

GUY J. PAUKER

IN TRYING TO UNDERSTAND the specific differences between the politics of advanced societies and those of the rest of the world, we are likely to reflect first on the role of violence. This is understandable as violence carries the most immediate and direct threat to our daily lives and is repugnant to our value system. We only feel secure in society if violence is restrained and directed into predictable and legitimate channels.

When violence is thus controlled, the individual feels that he can avoid becoming its victim by behaving in socially approved ways: he accepts the demands of legitimate authority, advocates only changes by peaceful means, and sticks to the "rules of the game," which in advanced societies are supposed to exclude the use of force. The underlying and not necessarily correct assumption is, of course, that even the strongest social interests and passions will remain under the control of reason.

The events of the last few years remind us inexorably that no society has yet become immune to violence. There are, nevertheless, crucial differences between situations in which violence is a central feature of the political system, such as in totalitarian societies, situations where violence is an accepted tool of political action, though not an all-pervasive feature of society, and situations in which it appears primarily as the aberrant manifestation of deviant individuals and marginal groups.

These are obviously rather fine distinctions which, however meaningful to analytic minds, tend to blend nowadays into a cruder picture of horror and concern, as the quality of life in our society appears increasingly beclouded by gunsmoke. But we should not let such impressions obfuscate a crucial distinction between stable and unstable political systems, namely the fact that their resistance to the effects of violence is entirely different.

Stable political systems are those which despite constant institutional adjustments, which result cumulatively in major social transformations, absorb well the shock of violence. Conversely, political instability creates superficially an impression of drastic systemic mutations, while in fact the significant features of the respective society

Ayant mal jugé "la situation révolutionnaire," Aidit recontra l'échec total, aliénant l'armée contre le PKI. Pour Aidit, éliminer la direction anticommuniste de l'armée représentait l'élimination de ce qu'il considérait être le seul obstacle à sa succession éventuelle au pouvoir; c'est alors qu'il eut recours au personnel militaire affilié au "Bureau Spéciel" clandestin.

L'assassinat brutal des six généraux déclencha la réaction immédiate du Général Suharto qui, motivé par un réflexe de protection personnelle, changea le cours de l'histoire indonésienne le Ier Octobre 1965. Si les conspirateurs avaient enlevé les généraux au lieu de les assassiner, le coup d'état aurait eu plus de chance de réussir, permettant ainsi à Sukarno de donner une direction pro-communiste à l'armée. Ce plan d'action aurait neutralisé l'opposition principale à une prise de pouvoir relativement pacifique par les communistes.

remain unchanged. Characteristically they are very vulnerable to relatively small inputs of violence.

A comparison of social changes in the stable constitutional societies of the West in the last 150 years with that in the countries of Latin America during the same period will provide telling illustrations for this assertion. Political instability and social change are not concomitant and may even be mutually exclusive.

The existence of political stability in a given country is, of course, best tested over an extended period of time by an examination of the historical record. If institutions successfully resist radical efforts to destroy them, if authority is transferred in accordance with predetermined rules which are well understood and predictable, the system is presumed stable. But the most important test of political stability is to be found in the relations between antagonistic social forces. If these relations are suddenly and drastically changed by political events, the results are usually far reaching in their effect on the lives of people in that country, on economic interests, and on international relations. This is what one usually calls a change of regime, in contradistinction to a change of government involving personalities and even opposing parties but taking place within the framework of commonly accepted basic principles and institutions.

The sudden and basic restructuring of power relations in society involves in most cases the use of violence, whereas the gradual and slow transformations which have taken place in the most advanced countries of the West were by and large the result of peaceful change. In studying political instability the key question is to determine how the particular political system reacts to the application of various forms of violence and how the anticipation of those reactions determines the calculations of the major participants in the game of politics.

Where the political system is stable, the leading protagonists in the political arena know that basic changes in the system require the support of a very large portion of those participating in the political life of their country. This may involve the broad electoral masses of constitutional democracies, or only the active members of a totalitarian party, but in either case isolated events have only limited impact on the system as a whole.

In this respect the Western democracies and the Communist states seem to have certain common characteristics which set them apart from the unstable transitional societies of the Third World. Despite very important differences in the source of their political stability, Western democracies and Communist states show great resilience against marginal violent pushes attempting to destabilize them.

Nobody in his right mind expects a change of regime in Washington as the result of the assassination of a president or of any other major political figure. Even direct action on a larger scale, such as a march on the Pentagon in protest against the war in Vietnam, or widespread urban rioting, causing considerable loss of life and property, have no significant immediate impact on the allocation of political power in American society. In this respect the tragedies of the last few years illustrate in compelling fashion that this country has indeed political stability.

As for Communist states, in turn, it is hard to deny that the Soviet Union has achieved political stability in the half-century since it was established. The deaths of Lenin and Stalin, the succession struggles of the last fifteen years, sustained and extended attacks from abroad, and economic, religious, social and cultural crises of catastrophic proportions have not jeopardized the hold of the Communist Party on that country. Changes of personnel can only be explained, probably, by the total inner dynamics of that party, numbering several million members.

It is interesting to speculate whether the absence of coups and assassination attempts in Communist countries is the result of extraordinarily successful security measures or of the conviction on the part of hidden enemies of the regime that they would be unable to overthrow it by using the amounts of violence which they could mobilize. After all, the few totalitarian societies which have been destroyed crumbled only after the sustained application of major military power by the Allies against the Axis in World War II.

In the Third World the situation is entirely different. Leaving aside for the moment the question whether the use of violence results in changes of regime or only of government, it is quite clear that most of the countries of Latin America and Africa and some of the Asian countries are politically unstable; governments are easily overthrown by violence or the threat of violence. The figures for Latin America are indicative. From 1930 to 1965 the illegal and unscheduled changes of heads of state in nineteen Latin American countries totalled 106. The only exception was Mexico, which experienced no coups during that entire period.[1] It can therefore be argued that only Mexico has achieved political stability in Latin America. In Africa, there have been more than thirty coups or abrupt changes of government since 1960.[2]

In Asia, one can argue impressionistically, on the basis of the record of the last twenty years, that despite extraordinary institutional changes, or perhaps because of them, Japan is today a politically stable country and attempted coups or political assassinations are unlikely to affect the future of the regime. In a different way India seems to have surprising political stability despite economic and ethnic-linguistic difficulties, a political spectrum ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left, and serious international complications. One can also argue that the Philippines, despite serious social tensions, sometimes of an explosive character, have had political stability throughout their independent existence. Indeed, three years ago President Marcos was reported to believe that civil disorder would not be able to topple the regime within the next five years.[3] The impact of recent student unrest is still difficult to assess.

Without attempting an exhaustive survey, one can safely state that in most other Asian countries the use or threat of violence has played an important role in inducing political changes. Even the nationalist struggle for independence and for the maintenance of unity has rarely been able to prevent clashes between domestic forces, which sometimes occurred while the armed struggle against imperialist forces was still unresolved. Indonesia, for instance, did not have political stability in its formative years. Factional strife marred the achievement of national objectives throughout the period of its struggle for independence.

Although a quasi-parliamentary regime was established a few months after independence was proclaimed in August 1945, extraparliamentary forces brought cabinets down easily and the Western "rules of the game" never took hold. Until Sukarno was able to establish himself as dictator in July 1959, Indonesia had seventeen cabinets, none of which fell through a formal vote of nonconfidence by Parliament.

Relatively minor external pressures and behind-the-scenes maneuvers sufficed to make a Prime Minister return his mandate and created political crises which lasted occasionally several weeks, until a new governing coalition was put together. Constant cabinet changes created an atmosphere of administrative paralysis and economic stagnation, depriving the country of the release of energy that should have followed the achievement of independence.

After the proclamation of Sukarno's "guided democracy" in July 1959, political instability manifested itself in new forms. As constitutional rules were rendered meaningless by changes in interpretation which suited the whims of the ruler, a pervading atmosphere of uncertainty engulfed the political life of the country. The position of

Vice President was left vacant after the resignation of Drs. M. Hatta in December 1956. The modality of presidential succession was left undetermined, thus encouraging the ambitions of various politicians, without giving them any clear guidelines on how to establish their claim.

Several political parties were outlawed and their leaders arrested, while the concept of "enemy of the revolution" received official sanction as part of the established ideology of the regime. Thus an important part of Indonesia's legitimate political life was driven underground, compounding the problem represented by the existence of ideological and regional armed factions which had never recognized the legitimacy of the national political institutions.

Among those groups which were accepted as participants in the officially sanctioned political process, most political parties seemed increasingly unable to mobilize mass support, despite their extravagant membership claims.

The only party which seemed capable of bringing the people into the streets and generating the semblance of enthusiasm for Sukarno was the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Its young and dynamic leaders established themselves increasingly as national figures, especially after Sukarno gave them cabinet rank. In return they became the most zealous supporters of his ideological pronouncements, which they propagated incessantly in speech and writing.

By the spring of 1965 the PKI claimed three million members, its youth organization *Pemuda Rakjat* another three million, and its various front organizations a total of some twenty million followers. The party chairman, D. N. Aidit, who had taken over in 1951 a moribund organization of less than 8,000 members, was now a well-known figure in the international Communist movement and a major factor in domestic Indonesian politics. Although Sukarno had carefully avoided gestures which would have permitted anybody to establish himself as the President's chosen political heir, Aidit's chances began to acquire an aura of plausibility which other aspirants lacked.

As leader of the most vigorous and probably also most popular political party, Aidit could claim a right to the presidency not only in the name of democratic principles, but also by default, as all the other political groups except the Communists had participated in past cabinets without being able to help overcome the country's endemic economic, political, and social crises.

Promising improvements without spelling out a detailed program which could have been examined critically, the Communists seemed to appear to increasing numbers of ideologically uncommitted individuals as the country's last hope. Furthermore, they had the advantage of being able to add to their aura of dynamism and honesty the image of fierce and intransigent nationalists, supporting vociferously all of their country's chauvinistic claims.

Then disaster struck the PKI with lightning speed. On the night of September 30–October 1, 1965, six senior General Staff officers, including Army Commander General A. Yani were shot down in their homes or abducted and murdered on the outskirts of Djakarta. The commander of a battalion of Sukarno's palace guard, Lt. Col. Untung, proclaimed himself leader of a "September 30 Movement" (GESTAPU) which according to a statement broadcast over the captured Djakarta radio station was "solely a movement within the Army" directed against a "Council of Generals" which "harbored evil designs against the Republic of Indonesia and President Sukarno."[4]

The conspirators set up the same day an Indonesian Revolutionary Council to which—consistent with Indonesian predilection for numerology—they appointed forty-five members, many of whom had no personal involvement in the affair. In Djakarta the "September 30 Movement" was crushed within twenty-four hours and in the provinces only a few isolated outbursts of activity signaled its existence.

On October 5, 1965, the day when the victims of these assassinations were buried with full military honors at the Heroes Cemetery, the Moslem Nahdatul Ulama Party, supported by five smaller political parties, urged the President to dissolve the PKI. This marked the opening of an anti-Communist campaign which resulted in the massacre of 150,000 to 300,000 PKI followers, especially in East and Central Java and in Bali, in late 1965 and early 1966, in the banning of the Party by the military on March 12, 1966, and the deaths of numerous Communist leaders, including Aidit and his two deputies, Lukman and Njoto, and the detention to this date of tens of thousands of Communists as political prisoners.

Many students of Indonesian affairs, including this writer, found it at first very difficult to accept the notion that the PKI was involved in the "September 30 Movement." For almost fifteen years Aidit and his associates had shown considerable political skill. They had built up their party into the largest and most admired outside the Communist bloc. They had claimed insistently that the PKI had not engaged in armed revolt in 1948 at Madiun, but had been the victim of a provocation by reactionary forces determined to destroy Indonesian Communism.

The Party leaders were projecting an image of moderation and patience, demanding democratic elections and a broadening of the base of the government to include Communists, but without ever claiming full power for themselves. Consequently, although since about 1963 the PKI seemed very close to the line of the Chinese Communist Party in its attitude toward the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, domestically it seemed to practice not what the Chinese preached but what they condemned, a gradualist road to power, shunning the use of violence and relying on cooperation with all possible non-Communist allies.

Even when members of the Political Bureau of the PKI were captured and confessed in open trials before an Extraordinary Military Court their involvement in the "September 30 Movement," their statements were discounted by some Western commentators as products of show trials without basis in reality. Considerable ingenuity was used by some students of Indonesian affairs to explain the events of the night of October 1, 1965, as an "internal Army affair."[5]

It goes without saying that events of such dramatic scope and consequence as those which terminated Sukarno's career as the national leader of Indonesia, destroyed the Communist Party and resulted in the establishment of a new pro-Western regime controlled by the Army were bound to arouse intense emotions. Not all pronouncements about the "September 30 Movement," however scholarly their trappings, can be accepted as the result of dispassionate analysis.

But in fairness to those concerned it must be admitted that the circumstances surrounding the origin of that abortive coup are so complex and obscure that honest mistakes were also possible. Even after the chain of events was established in open court, impartial observers could retain strong doubts about the veracity of the crucial confessions and testimonies unless the inner logic of the seemingly foolish behavior of the Communist leaders could be explained.

I believe that Aidit's reasoning, which originated the "September 30 Movement," can be explained rationally in the context of the politics of instability to which I referred earlier. Whereas only madmen will try to overthrow the government in a stable political system, and political assassination is a futile action where it cannot lead to real changes of political regime, in countries suffering from political instability the same actions are far from foolish, even though miscalculations can lead to failure and disaster.

Where the political system is unstable, relatively minor changes in the balance of political forces can have major consequences. As I explained in a study entitled "The PKI's Road to Power" written in 1964,[6] the basic strategy of the PKI, as formulated and guided by

Aidit, was to avoid "internal warfare" and to alter gradually the balance of power among social forces, both by mass action and by subtle political maneuvers among the elites, especially in the palace clique surrounding Sukarno. Aidit spelled out some of his thoughts in a General Report to the Central Committee in July 1956, after the frustration of the PKI's hope to be included in the cabinet, although it had secured 16.4 per cent of expressed votes at the September 1955 general elections. He said at that time:

> Basically, the PKI's activity is to change the balance of power between the imperialists, landlords, and other compradore bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the people on the other, by arousing, mobilizing and organizing the masses.[7]

Then in December 1958, in preparation for its Sixth National Congress, the PKI altered the emphasis on "peaceful transition to socialism" in the Preamble to its Constitution and replaced it with the following statement:

> Whether the struggle is fierce or not and whether force is used or not in the transitional struggle toward socialism depends on the exploiting classes and on whether these classes are using force themselves, and not on the laboring classes.[8]

Most students of Indonesian Communism ignored this change in doctrine, especially as that militant amendment seemed at the time contradicted by the patient, gradualist, policy of the PKI, which started only several years later to parallel the Chinese line. As late as 1962-1963 Ruth McVey was writing:

> . . . The over-all tenor of the PKI's statements on the process of converting a nationalist state to a socialist one is that of emphasis on a long, hard pull toward power rather than on the expectation of inevitable and violent confrontation.[9]

Yet, as a matter of fact the PKI was preparing for the "inevitable and violent confrontation." After Aidit's return from a trip to China and other Communist countries, the PKI's militancy increased. The Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, held in December 1963, sanctioned the "unilateral action" instigated in the villages of Java by the Indonesian Peasant Workers Union (BTI) to carry out the provisions of the agrarian legislation of 1960, bypassing reluctant authorities and sharpening noticeably class conflicts in the countryside throughout 1964.

In January 1965 Aidit proposed that five million workers and ten million peasants be armed to counter Malaysia's military build-up, thus challenging head-on a fundamental unwritten doctrine of the Army that the PKI should never be permitted to acquire a paramilitary capability. The Army had strong feelings on this matter as the result of the Madiun rebellion of September 1948, when Communist military units attempted to overthrow the Republican government, which was trying in turn to bring all irregular armed groups, formed during the struggle against the Dutch, under the control of the General Staff.

In its foreign policy, which had the strong support of the PKI, Sukarno was isolating Indonesia not only from the West, but also from the United Nations, from which he pulled out in January 1965, and even from the non-aligned countries with which his foreign policy clashed repeatedly, as demonstrated in the maneuvers concerning the organization of a second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in June 1965. In moving toward an alliance with Communist China Sukarno and the PKI were arousing the strong resentment of an officer corps which viewed China as the most serious future threat to their country and were hostile to the Chinese minority living in their midst.

The sum total of these Communist-initiated or sponsored policies was bound to bring the PKI on a collision course with the Army. It can be argued that an ultimate clash had been unavoidable for a long time, as the PKI and the Army were the only two well organized power structures in the country, competing for political control not only at the top but vertically at each echelon, all the way to the grassroots. But it can also be argued that an accommodation between the two organizations was also conceivable, on the basis of radical nationalism and of Indonesia's "manifest destiny" in Southeast Asia.

In choosing the antagonistic road of confrontation with the Army, the Communist leaders misjudged the situation strategically, overplayed their hand, and lost everything. We may never know to what extent this was the result of overestimating the "revolutionary situation," in other words their party's actual popular appeal in the country, or the extent of their subversive penetration of the military establishment, or the value of Sukarno's protection.

In September 1966 the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PKI circulated in Central Java a "self-criticism" which was published in January 1967 in English translation in the *Indonesian Tribune* printed in Albania. We know now that the document was written by Sudisman, who was at that time the senior surviving member of the Political Bureau. He was captured by the Indonesian authorities in December 1966, sentenced to death after a public trial in July 1967, and executed. That lengthy document concluded that the PKI leadership misjudged the situation on all those counts and accused it of adventurism.

Sudisman's critique referred also to "mistakes in the organizational field, in particular those concerning the style of work which gave the Party leadership the power to build their own organizational channel beyond the control of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee."[10]

This cryptic remark referred to the covert organization created by Aidit personally in late 1964 to control and organize military personnel on active duty who were sympathizers, candidate members, or members of the PKI. This small organization, known to a few as the Special Bureau (*Biro Chusus*), was known to other party leaders as the Contact Board (*Badan Penghubung*) or the Contact Bureau (*Biro Penghubung*). Most information about the Special Bureau came from its head, a man who worked directly for Aidit and whose real name was Kamaruzaman but was primarily known in relation to the "September 30 Movement" as Sjam. He was captured in March 1967 and tried by the Extraordinary Military Tribunal in Bandung in February-March 1968.

Having attended the trial and watched Sjam throughout the proceedings, I have no doubts that the information that he revealed was authentic and believe that the reason he and, earlier, Sudisman at his trial, spoke so freely is that they had decided to use the platform provided by the court to inform the new generation of Communists which would be growing clandestinely in Indonesia what the mistakes of their predecessors had been.

From the trial of Sjam, corroborated by other evidence, it appeared quite clear that the PKI was not just marginally involved in the "September 30 Movement" but that the initiative and implementation actually came from Aidit himself, operating through his Special Bureau. To what extent the leaders of any political movement acting clandestinely engage the legal or even moral responsibility of their rank and file who had joined an overt organization and had no way of knowing what was planned covertly is a complex question which cannot be resolved here, although it remains of vital importance with regard to the political prisoners still detained in Indonesia in connection with the "Gestapu Affair."

Through the Special Bureau, Sjam and his associates recruited and instructed the Army and Air Force officers who actually carried out the assassination of the six generals and proclaimed Revolutionary Councils in Djakarta and in the provinces. Contacts between military personnel and the PKI were so carefully guarded after the Special Bureau was established in 1964 that no names of military personnel were found on PKI membership lists during the investigations under-taken after October 1, 1965. This is why it was possible to stage the "September 30 Movement" as if it were an "internal Army affair."

Although these facts cannot be challenged by dispassionate observers, it would be difficult to suppress a residue of doubt, even after hearing Sjam's statements in open court, unless the inner logic of Aidit's tactical calculations was understood. Engaging the PKI on a collision course with the Army was the result of an erroneous assessment of the "revolutionary situation" in Indonesia and in the world. But risking a clash with the military is one thing, and provoking them to react violently to the assassination of their leaders is something else again.

In retrospect it is still hard to believe that the massive anti-Communist purges of late 1965 and early 1966 would have been possible in an essentially tolerant country, where the death penalty was virtually unknown, but for the haunting image, widely publicized through all mass media, of the mutilated bodies of General Achmad Yani and his colleagues.

The tactical mistake of directly provoking the Army was indeed much greater than the strategic mistake of heating up the revolutionary climate after 1963. Those who have followed the events of 1965 will remember that the event which triggered the plot was Sukarno's sudden illness in August 1965 and the verdict of a team of Chinese doctors that he might die soon or become permanently incapacitated. As Sukarno survived till June 1970, an interesting subsidiary question is whether the Chinese doctors were deliberately misleading Aidit. But even if Sukarno had died in 1965 and the Army had taken over and re-established martial law, the PKI would have stood a better chance to survive overtly or, like other political parties before it, covertly, had it not given the Army cause for its physical annihilation.

Although Aidit's colossal error may be condemned as "subjectivism" or "adventurism" by his Communist critics, it is understandable within the context of the politics of instability characterizing Indonesia and so many other countries in the Third World. Where a small input of violence can alter drastically the balance of political forces in a country, overthrow a regime, and establish a new government, the assassination of key public figures is unfortunately not the senseless act that it is in advanced societies.

In planning the "September 30 Movement," the PKI leaders assumed that they had widespread popular support, even within the military establishment, and that their enemies were a small clique whose authority was not based on their own popularity but on delegation from the charismatic father-figure of Sukarno. Therefore, if they were eliminated swiftly in a way that appeared to the populace as an internal settlement of accounts within the Army, and Sukarno then appointed a new Army leadership friendly to the PKI, the balance of forces would have been tipped decisively in favor of the party and a take-over could have followed in due course, regardless of whether Sukarno was still around as patron and protector.

Because it has been stated frequently that the decisive response of the Army could not have taken place without the generals' knowledge that the United States was stemming the Communist tide in Vietnam, I would like to submit that the opposite argument is more plausible.

Whereas General Suharto acted on October 1, 1965, in a reflex of self-defense following the death of his colleagues and had neither time nor reason to think about the international implications of his command decisions, Aidit's actions were premeditated and planned over a lengthy period of time, and he must have considered the risks of external intervention if the PKI acted too boldly. It seems plausible to me that he concluded that the United States, being bogged down in Vietnam, where it had been forced to escalate in order to save a crumbling anti-Communist regime, was unlikely to be able to intervene simultaneously in Indonesia.

Therefore, giving history a small push through the "September 30 Movement," in an inherently unstable situation, was not only logical in terms of the domestic Indonesian situation, perceived as altogether favorable, except for the obstruction represented by a few die-hard generals, but also in the context of the international constellation of forces, as seen from Djakarta and probably also from Peking.

Finally, I would venture to suggest that the plot was probably much closer to success than appeared to be the case immediately after its collapse. It is always difficult to speculate about human reactions which could have taken place but did not. In this instance it must be remembered that on October 1, 1965 Sukarno was still a formidable political force in Indonesia. I suspect that he refused to endorse the plotters not because he disagreed with their objectives but because blood had been spilled and because General Nasution was still at large, after an attempt had been made on his life. Had the plotters confined themselves to kidnapping the generals, in good Indonesian tradition, which Sjam stated at his trial was their actual intention, Sukarno might have been able to appoint a pro-Communist Army leadership and the officer corps might have felt compelled by their loyalty oath to obey the Commander-in-Chief.

But the politics of instability are unpredictable, because they result to a large extent from the personal decisions of low-ranking individuals, who lack the analytic capability, the balance, and emotional stability which affairs of state require. Although my research on this very complex affair is not yet complete, I tend to believe that somewhere down the chain of command a political operation was turned into a crude murder plot and the unintended consequences of this switch in signals altered the course of Indonesian history and the strategic balance in the Western Pacific.

1. See Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power, Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 265.
2. The Associated Press, as quoted in The New York *Times* (June 14, 1970).
3. Personal communication from my colleague Dr. Paul Hammond following a visit to the Philippines in early 1968.
4. See "Initial Statement of Lt. Col. Untung," translation in *Indonesia,* published by the Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Vol. I (April 1966), p. 134.
5. The major effort came from a small group at Cornell University which published on January 10, 1966, a strange document of 162 pages entitled "A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia" which was given very selective distribution and became the source of a number of articles espousing the same thesis. The "Cornell Paper" created a furor in Indonesian official circles which has still not fully died down.
6. Published in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements,* 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969), viii+424 p.
7. See "United to Complete the Demands of the 1945 August Revolution," in *Pilihan Tulisan,* Vol. II (Djakarta, 1960); JPRS Translation, No. 8886 (1961), p. 25.
8. Bintang Merah Nomor Spesial, *Dokumen-Dokumen Kongres Nasional KE-VI,* Partai Komunis Indonesia (Djakarta, 1959), Vol. I, p. 268.
9. "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in *Communist Strategies in Asia,* ed. A. Doak Barnett (New York: F. A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), pp. 187-188.
10. "Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's Democratic Revolution in Indonesia (Self-Criticism of the Political Bureau of the CCPKI)," *Indonesian Tribune,* Vol. I, No. 3 (January 1967), p. 23.

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Abstract / Résumé

"La Paix et la guerre au Cambodge" représente une considération, en partie descriptive et en partie analytique, des origines, directions et implications d'un conflit armé dans un pays jusqu'ici caracterisé par son état pacifique. Il soutient que la source de la guerre ne doit être attribuée qu'en partie à la présence sur territoire cambodgien des effectifs communistes vietnamiens. Il voit comme facteur précipitant le bouleversement politique domestique du pays et la déposition qui s'y rattache du prince Norodom Sihanouk qui transforma l'orientation politique du Cambodge au sein de l'Indochine, qui de ce fait, défia les intérêts des communistes vietnamiens. Le début des activités militaires est pris en considération ainsi que le motif et l'effect de l'intervention militaire au Cambodge de la part des Sud-Vietnamiens et des Américains. La nature de la guerre est evaluée ensuite, ainsi que les perspectives des effectifs opposés. Quoique les insurgés communistes vietnamiens opèrent dans un milieu étranger, la thèse est soutenue que les problèmes que comporte le soutien d'un élément indigène cambodgien ne sont pas insurmontables, compte tenu de l'habileté technique dont ils disposent, du comportement des soldats sud-vietnamiens et du démembrement de l'administration provinciale. Les buts des communistes vietnamiens sont examinés, en même temps que la probabilité d'une incorporation du Cambodge au sein d'une Indochine consolidée, dominée par Hanoi. Il évalue également les difficultés que rencontre l'armée cambodgienne, et fait allusion à la stabilité du gouvernement à Phnom Penh ainsi qu'aux bases de son appui. Il est affirmé que le conflit en Indochine a provoqué une polarisation de forces politiques separées, chose peu caractéristique dans l'Asie du Sud-Est par une division idéologique plutôt qu'ethnique. Le conflit même se présente comme dependant de l'idealité et de l'alignement future du pays. La position internationale du Cambodge est ensuite réévaluée en soulignant le fait que le manque de succès à engendrer un appui international pour les successeurs politiques de Sihanouk représente en partie une tendance à voir la question comme un aspect intime de la guerre au Vietnam. Enfin, le rôle du Prince Sihanouk est examiné. Sa présence à Pékin est vue non seulement en fonction d'une rancune personnelle et d'amour-propre outragé, mais aussi comme le résultat des idées qu'il nourrit depuis longtemps sur la balance politique en Indochine et dans le Sud-Est asiatique.

Peace and War in Cambodia

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ONE CAN ONLY CONJECTURE that, sooner or later, the arena of war in Indochina would have extended to incorporate Cambodia. What is manifest, however, is that before March 18, 1970, Cambodia existed, if precariously, on the sidelines of violent conflict. With some regularity, the war taking place in South Vietnam did intrude, and often with tragic consequences for Cambodian civilians living in villages along the eastern border. American and South Vietnamese respect for the professed neutrality of Cambodia was less than complete but, in the main, its inhabitants lived in peace.

Cambodia had been violated from another source albeit less conspicuously. By the latter part of 1969, Vietnamese Communist formations utilizing Cambodian territory from which to prosecute the war across the border were estimated to number between 35-40,000.[1] This alien military presence did not present an imminent threat to the Cambodian regime; its principal energies were directed to the attainment of long denied goals in South Vietnam. Nonetheless, the Cambodian leader, Prince Sihanouk, was more than irritated by this intrusion. Indeed, he sought the removal of that presence through public and private diplomacy. But, underlying his protests and threats was a recognition of the absence of any practical alternative to the toleration of Vietnamese Communist activities. This was accompanied by the faint hope that placation would serve the interests of his country in the aftermath of conflict in Indochina. It was this policy of toleration, assiduously pursued over the years, that above all, had provided Cambodia with a tenuous peace.

If one contemplates the source of the protracted struggle which has transformed the condition of Cambodia, it will be seen to have arisen only in part from the presence on Cambodian territory of the force of Vietnamese Communists. The precipitating factor was an internal conflict between Prince Sihanouk and members of his Government, led by General Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak, who resented the suffocating omnipotence of the Cambodian head of state. The presence within Cambodia of Vietnamese Communist military formations furnished the justification for the inspired sackings of Vietnamese Communist diplomatic missions in Phnom Penh which served, in turn, as a prelude to the deposition of Sihanouk who was out of the country at the time. The alien presence provided a symbol of external aggression which was exploited by a group within the Government of Cambodia who set out initially to challenge the authority of Sihanouk. Faced with the obduracy of Sihanouk and consequent internal pressures, they found themselves with no alternative but to overthrow him.[2]

Exploiting the issue of the Vietnamese Communist presence in order to challenge the authority of Prince Sihanouk involved also a direct challenge to the Vietnamese Communists of an order that Prince Sihanouk had considered impolitic to undertake. The initial reaction of those Vietnamese Communist diplomats resident in Phnom Penh, apart from surprise and a demand for compensation, was to bargain with what they perceived to be a weak government for a continuation of logistical facilities.[3] But those dominating that government and who had challenged the authority of Sihanouk on the issue of his willingness to tolerate the Vietnamese Communist presence were not prepared to compromise and had with Canute-like defiance issued an ultimatum establishing a time limit for its removal. Whether through naïveté or a belief that American military assistance would be automatically forthcoming, the political successors of Sihanouk had committed an act, construed as provocative, which was of more than domestic import. It represented a transformation of the political orientation of Cambodia within Indochina and was construed by the Vietnamese Communists as posing a clear threat to their interests. In Hanoi, it was argued that "The Lon Nol-Sirik Matak Group, henchmen of the U.S., has staged a coup d'état which was a hostile act directed against the Cambodian people and the patriotic struggle of the Vietnamese people . . ."[4] And Prince Sihanouk, in Moscow at the time of his deposition commented that "the Socialist camp considers recent events are a direct threat to the balance of forces between the United States and itself."[5]

The manner of the ousting of Sihanouk represented an affront to the Vietnamese Communists who did not allow a lack of evidence to mute the charge of C.I.A. involvement. Their reaction was to transform an uneasy but not altogether unstable relationship into an adversary one. The Vietnamese Communists withdrew their diplomatic staff on March 26, and responded to Cambodian bravado by sponsoring political demonstrations beginning in the town of Kompong Cham, and by initiating a series of military probes in the southeastern provinces with the first significant confrontation at the town of Chipou in Svay Rieng at the beginning of April. Such an initiative was a logical reaction to the fact of being flanked on either side by hostile forces. The Vietnamese Communists moved against the weaker of the two in order to preempt combined operations foreshadowed by coordinated South Vietnamese artillery support for Cambodian ground troops, which was provided two days before the deposition of Sihanouk, and by a South Vietnamese ground incursion with United States helicopter support on March 27.

The degree of military success rapidly achieved at the expense of the slight and ill-equipped Cambodian army suggested an attempt to secure the speedy overthrow of the governmental group which had disrupted the political status quo or, alternatively, to hold up such a prospect prior to hard bargaining. An indication of Cambodian helplessness at insurgent advance in the direction of the capital was the harassment and massacre of members of the long resident Vietnamese community together with their use as human shields to draw Vietnamese Communist fire. This inhuman behavior was in part a product of the intensification of ethnic hatred, but it derived also from a conviction that communist organization within the Vietnamese community was capable of assisting enemy advance.

Up to the end of April 1970, there existed the likelihood that the Vietnamese Communists could have taken the Cambodian capital with a swift *coup de force* and restored Prince Sihanouk, then fulminating in exile in Peking. At the time of his deposition, the Cambodian army was pitifully weak in numbers and capacity, and ill-prepared to give battle. Many of its officers had greater experience in smuggling than in soldiering. In early engagements, units of this army broke ranks and fled while whole battalions were reported as lost (not in the military sense). The Cambodian Government, for its part, launched a vigorous recruiting campaign to raise seventy new battalions, but such an augmentation represented a paper exercise because neither training facilities nor equipment for provision were available. It was only in the last week of April that consignments of small arms, of Soviet design and Chinese manufacture, captured in South Vietnam, were made available by the Saigon Government with American approval.

An evident turning point in the military situation was the intervention at the end of April by South Vietnamese and American forces. This move had been preceded, however, by at least two incursions in April by South Vietnamese ground troops with American advisers and logistical support. When, on April 30, President Nixon sought to justify the intervention, the tenor of his remarks stood in contrast to a major speech he had delivered only ten days previously. In the earlier of the two speeches, Nixon announced a further military withdrawal from South Vietnam, and expressed a sanguine appreciation of the security situation there. The coup in Cambodia had occurred more than a month before and yet the President did not then indicate in any way that the time was opportune to strike at enemy sanctuary areas—as his generals had long advised. But, on April 30, he argued ". . . I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last ten days endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam now and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be there after our withdrawal of 150,000."[6] Nixon went on to reveal, however, that it was not only the alleged threat posed by consolidation of sanctuaries that had provoked an agonizing reappraisal of his own "Nixon Doctrine" but also the clear and present danger that Cambodia would fall totally under the control of the Vietnamese Communists. He explained:

> Thousands of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries, they are encircling the capital of Phnom Penh. . . . If this effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a vast staging area and springboard for attacks on South Vietnam along six hundred miles of frontier—and a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat without fear of retaliation.[7]

Without discounting the long standing preoccupation of Nixon's generals with the question of the sanctuaries, his initiative—particularly in unleashing the South Vietnamese—reflected a deep anxiety that the regime in Phnom Penh was in danger of imminent overthrow.[8] By this stage, Prince Sihanouk was well ensconced in Peking where he had established a National United Front of Kampuchea (somewhat unfortunately expressed in French acronym as FUNK). Expressions of solidarity with his cause "to obliterate the coup d'état" were readily forthcoming from the North Vietnamese, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and the Lao Patriotic Front. This social revolutionary concert had come together with the incongruous figure of Sihanouk at a meeting in Southern China a week prior to Nixon's decision to intervene. The progress of Vietnamese Communist military activity within Cambodia indicated the prospect of a restoration of Sihanouk through the good offices of Hanoi. Should this have come to pass, there would not have been communist sanctuaries within Cambodia but the entire country would have become an active sanctuary interposed between Thailand and South Vietnam. The American President who had set such store on the program of Vietnamization as a means to facilitate military withdrawal concluded that the course of events within Cambodia posed an intolerable threat to that program.

Nixon's decision to intervene undoubtedly dramatized the transformation of Cambodia into a battleground of the Indochina war. The sense of crisis was heightened above all by domestic repercussions within the United States. The unfortunate *obiter dicta* of the President and the tragedy of youth at Kent State University tended to overshadow the actual military intervention. It is arguable that the intervention in itself did not extend the scope of the war in Indochina; rather, it affected its intensity. The extension had been brought about when the Cambodian Government in removing its head of state disturbed a politico-military equilibrium which, through lack of resources, it was unable to restore. From that juncture, given the interests and the resolution of the Vietnamese Communists, Cambodia's fate as an additional battleground was sealed. To the communists, the regime in Phnom Penh appeared no different in character and in outlook to those which exercised power in Saigon and Bangkok. And in the absence of a willingness to countenance a continuation of the policy of toleration with which Prince Sihanouk had been identified, that regime was obliged to face the consequences of its posture and vulnerability. The end of any prospect for compromise became evident on May 5, when the Chinese People's Republic announced that its Embassy in Phnom Penh was being withdrawn and that relations with Cambodia would be conducted through Prince Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union established the same day in Peking.[9]

The Cambodian Government expressed its grateful appreciation of the military intervention countenanced by President Nixon without their approval. The formal position of that government was that they adhered to a policy of neutrality and desired only to pursue an independent path in foreign relations. Circumstances, however, did not permit such a privileged posture and the South Vietnamese and American military intervention occurred at a time when the Cambodian Government had begun to despair of receiving any form of assistance in its perilous plight. As such, the operation provided the Cambodian Government with an urgently needed sense of assurance that it was not totally alone against the reputedly invincible Vietnamese Communists.

Within Cambodia, the external military intervention had the effect of denying supplies of ordnance to the insurgents—though one can only conjecture about the proportion of the total quantity secured. The involvement of the South Vietnamese in particular and the availability of tactical air support had the effect of posing a heavy sanction in fire power wherever the Vietnamese Communists sought to concentrate their forces.

The external intervention imposed certain restraints on the military situation taking effect by the third week in June.[10] As the force of the Vietnamese Communist onslaught reduced in momentum, opportunity was provided for the Cambodian Government to refurbish its army. Units of recruits were despatched to South Vietnam for intensified training and weapons and equipment provided by the United States were more readily distributed. However, the intervention did not transform the pattern of military activity within Cambodia. And after the period of American involvement (May 1–June 30), the insurgents continued to dictate the military initiative. They have demonstrated an ability to attack provincial centers throughout the country almost at will, and to draw Cambodian troops into combat situations where the process of reinforcement and retrieval is costly in terms of human life and the destruction of human habitation. The battle for the south-westerly hill station of Kirirom, the contests for the town of Saang to the south of the capital and the encirclement of forces along Highway Six north to Kompong Thom amply demonstrate this process. The aptitude of the insurgents for mobility has been exemplified in their swift appearance as far to the west as the town of Siem Reap, and also by their reported use of artillery in the monsoon season in central Cambodia.[11] They have been able to cut communications by road and rail, and to disrupt commercial traffic. Military activity in the period following the American withdrawal from Cambodia has not been designed to strike directly at the Government in Phnom Penh. Indeed, Vietnamese Communist forces have not, thus far, made any attempt to harass the capital. Rocket launchers have been found close to Phnom Penh, but there has not been any attempt so far to initiate a reign of terror as practiced periodically in the case of Saigon. Whether at all inhibited by the claim of bringing national liberation or by the continued presence in Phnom Penh of Soviet and East European Communist diplomatic missions, it is clear that the more immediate priority is not the investment of the Cambodian capital but the administrative subtraction of Cambodia from Government in Phnom Penh.

The insurgents have enjoyed undoubted success in the disruption of provincial administration and in the neutralization and attrition of the Cambodian army. A fundamental goal would appear to be regroupment and consolidation of position in the north and eastern provinces which are totally beyond Cambodian Government control, in order to reestablish a point of entry from which to strike at South Vietnam, especially in the Mekong Delta region. In addition, there is in progress an attempt to mobilize the Cambodian peasantry into an insurgent force capable of presenting, at least, the appearance of an indigenous national liberation movement.

Given the continued international attention being directed towards Cambodia and the presence in Phnom Penh of a sizeable press corps, any future attempt to replace the government would be more convincing if conducted through an identifiable and authentic Cambodian component. The likelihood of Vietnamese Communist success in this latter endeavor is uncertain. There would seem to be a number of difficulties which would have to be overcome before an indigenous politico-military organization can be promoted. There is the obvious factor of being obliged to operate in an ethnocultural environment alien to Vietnamese Communist experience with attendant problems of local familiarity, language, and sources of intelligence. In addition, there is the sustained tradition of emnity between Khmer and Vietnamese expressed in massacre only too recently. The Khmers do have a genuine homogeneity and a sense of common identity which the Vietnamese Communists may find difficult to bend to their will. Certainly, the condition of Cambodia does not merit comparison with South Vietnam where problems of land tenure, the presence of quasi-autonomous and alienated groups and a government identified with a minority religion could all be exploited to generate a forceful insurgency. At the same time, Cambodia has not had major experience of communism and nationalism joined in symbiotic relationship. The Khmers are all Theravada Buddhists, and there has not been any indication of dissent on the part of the *Sangha* which has committed itself to the cause of the government.

There is no doubt, however, that the Vietnamese Communists are highly skilled in political work in villages. Within Cambodia, they enjoy some advantage in being able to utilize the services of those indigenous insurgents whose activities were brought to public notice in 1967 and whom Prince Sihanouk labelled *Khmers Rouges*.[12] Such an advantage is hardly likely to be decisive in itself as the number and quality of committed *Khmers Rouges* is believed to be decidedly limited. More significant have been the unanimous reports acknowledging that Vietnamese Communist practice in the villages has been conciliatory and that terror has been eschewed, at least for the time being. Food is paid for, property and women are respected. By contrast, the behavior of the intervening South Vietnamese forces, who did not depart with their American allies, has been less than praiseworthy, and unlikely to attract the positive support of the people they purport to defend. Such insensitive conduct would seem to cancel out any propaganda advantage to be derived from Sihanouk associating himself with those whom he used to vilify not only as traditional antagonists of Cambodia, but also as the worst of their kind. There is every danger that inconsequential action by new found allies and by government forces could foster that measure of rural alienation from which the Vietnamese Communists could profit. The message of the latter in the villages is very simple and germane: Under the rule of Prince Sihanouk, there was peace; under the government of Lon Nol, there is war, death and destruction. This is a convincing message given the transformed condition of Cambodia, and its sponsors have the additional advantage of claiming to represent the man reputed to have enjoyed reverence as well as an outstanding popularity in the rural areas.

The number and degree of commitment of the indigenous "Sihanouk forces" is an unknown quantity. Journalists released from captivity in Cambodia have testified to the reality of such an entity. Robert Anson of *Time Magazine*, released at the end of August, has reported that he has seen the beginnings of a Khmer "liberation army" which appeared to be growing stronger, fed both by volunteers and prisoners. An acute observer of contemporary Cambodia, writing in the same week, pointed to a growing acknowledgment that the Vietnamese Communists had been able to involve thousands of Cambodians in the conflict. He commented:

> Captured Sihanoukist soldiers, however, do not seem strongly committed to their cause and tend to regard themselves as conscripts. Most observers agree that the Sihanouk army, although a budding reality, will remain much more an arm of the Vietnamese Communists than an independent force.[13]

The quantity and quality of those forces supporting the side of government is more open to observation. The Cambodian army faced the post-Sihanouk situation with a complement of about 35,000. This number was augmented rapidly to over 120,000 through a recruiting campaign which brought a flood of volunteers, particularly from among the younger people of the capital and the towns. They had resented the political style of Sihanouk and have shown enthusiasm for the Lon Nol regime, which is, on the surface cohesive among its members, if thus far unable to consolidate a popular base.

The Cambodian army had to face the initial onslaught of the Vietnamese Communists without any real capacity for effective resistance. The subsequent infusion of arms and equipment from the United States has not been able to compensate for the lack of elementary experience and skill in conducting a military operation. Nonetheless, as the war has continued its agonizing course, an initial absence of any determined resistance has been replaced by greater resoluteness and patriotic spirit among those who have volunteered for military service. For the time being, however, the Cambodian army has a very limited capacity for offensive action and its activities have been characterized in the main by reactive moves to military initiatives taken by the insurgents. Consequently, the Cambodian Government has only a tenuous control in some provinces, while in others, such as, Stung Treng and Kratie, it does not even hold the capitals. There is no immediate prospect of restoring the administrative structure in those provinces where it has been so disrupted. Such structure is, of course, much easier to disrupt than to reconstruct, and if a politico-administrative vacuum is left for too long in areas of population, then there will be much greater prospect of the Vietnamese Communists being successful in establishing local organizations in which Cambodians can be encouraged to develop a stake.

The military situation remains very serious indeed for the Government in Phnom Penh that, at times, has appeared to be not much more than the Government of Phnom Penh. It has limited resources and expertise, and a shattered export economy for its assets. Militarily, it is extremely dependent on support (especially tactical air support) and supplies from South Vietnam and the United States. One might argue also that it has yet to be fully tested because the monsoon season has coincided with much of the period of fighting so far. The onset of the dry season will further test its resolve and the success of the military training of its recruits compared to those Cambodians being mobilized by the Vietnamese Communists.

Irrespective of any progress in this field, there is little likelihood, in the near future, of the Vietnamese Communists being driven from their redoubts in the northeastern provinces which serve as reception areas for men and supplies coming down the complex of routes from North Vietnam and through Laos. Such a situation of stasis, combined with a sufficient measure of harassment to neutralize even an improved military capacity by the Cambodians, might well be adequate for Vietnamese Communist purpose in reconsolidating a prior position. The prospect for the early revival of active sanctuaries, however, remains a matter of speculation. A sanctuary in the type of protracted war practiced in Vietnam is not a destructible fortress but a territorial facility. The Vietnamese Communist main force units eluded destruction during the attack on this facility. What may have changed, however, is the communist perception of the security of the sanctuary areas. Once a sanctuary has been violated, it ceases to be inviolable. Indeed, the border with South Vietnam has ceased to be a military boundary. This prospect may induce a greater measure of caution in the placement of communist forces, despite the domestic constraints on President Nixon.

The argument that Cambodia is serving as a shield or safety valve assisting the progress of Vietnamization has a certain plausibility. There is little doubt that the eruption of conflict in Cambodia and the consequent external military intervention has upset the plans and the general capability of the Vietnamese Communists, if only temporarily. In reacting to the fall of Sihanouk, they have certainly committed substantial resources west of the Mekong and away from their principal priority. This assessment provides little comfort for the regime in Phnom Penh which has experienced the wrath of the insurgent forces and which has yet to develop an offensive capability to deploy against them.

Cambodia has been drawn into the vortex of an ideological as well as a military conflict. In this context, the factor of ethnic identity—so significant in the politics of Southeast Asia—has been subsumed if only temporarily. The deposition of Sihanouk and the nature of communist response has led to a polarization of forces across ethnic lines in spite of the inter-ethnic bitterness which has surrounded the confrontation. Ranged to one side are multi-ethnic forces purporting to support social revolution and fundamental political change; to the other, the multi-ethnic supporters of the political and social status quo. The conflict is thus about the future political identity and alignment of Cambodia.

One cannot rule out the possibility of Cambodia being envisaged as part of an Indochina dominated from Hanoi. The Lao Dong Party has long held a proprietary interest in the entire area of former French colonization. The fact that a "United Front of Indochinese Peoples" has been set up is an indication that communist practice in the First Indochina War is being revived. As far back as 1950, the communist dominated Viet Minh established a Central Committee for the Liberation of the Khmer People. In 1952, this committee was elevated to the status of Khmer Resistance Government. And, at the Geneva Conference on Indochina of 1954, the North Vietnamese delegate, Pham Van Dong, sought vigorously to persuade the participants to recognize the credentials of this Resistance Government, but without success. On that occasion, he was encouraged by the Chinese in particular to withdraw his demand. Sixteen years later, however, Prince

Sihanouk enjoys the enthusiastic hospitality of Peking, whose government provided facilities for a "summit conference of the Indochinese Peoples" and has announced a measure of military aid for Sihanouk's forces in the field. The Soviet Union, piqued by the Chinese role in the Cambodian crisis, still maintains a diplomatic presence in Phnom Penh, and has denied recognition to Sihanouk's Government of National Union. The nature of Sino-Soviet competition, however, makes it exceedingly difficult to refuse support for the interests of Hanoi. Indeed, it would seem logical for the Soviet Union to back any aspirations the Vietnamese Communists may have for dominion in Indochina in the interest of promoting countervailing power on the southern periphery of China.

The circumstances of conflict have obliged the Cambodian regime to treat with those who have come uninvited to defend the country. The principal direct benefactor has been South Vietnam. But there is no doubt that the South Vietnamese military see their intervening role as one of suzerain power, and many difficulties abound in a relationship which the Cambodians regard as a necessary evil. The Thai, for their part, have been much more equivocal in their support for the Government of Lon Nol. The United States, however, continues to provide tactical air support and military supplies, although Vice President Agnew in Phnom Penh at the end of August[14] pointedly reaffirmed his government's intention not to become militarily involved.

Exigency has drawn Cambodia into the fold of an informal alliance and away from the neutrality which was the hallmark of Prince Sihanouk's rule. The need to accept outside military assistance and to compromise policy through necessity has not helped Cambodia's cause in the world, although its Foreign Minister is well aware of the substantive value of the support of those states who allegedly indulge in facsimile international politics. Irrespective of the reality of nonalignment, the Cambodian Government has made some attempt to preserve the form of that posture. For example, the present head of state, Cheng Heng, sent a congratulatory telegram to his counterpart in Outer Mongolia on the occasion of its national day. The regime in Phnom Penh certainly appreciates the continued presence there of the Soviet diplomatic mission which is seen as a tenuous symbol of adherence to a neutral policy. Indonesia, for its part, increasingly conscious of problems of regional security, took a diplomatic initiative to try to induce a measure of restraint into the Cambodian conflict within the context of a nonaligned gathering. In the event, the Djakarta Conference in May 1970, was attended only by the active well wishers of the political successors of Sihanouk. The communist countries both decried and boycotted the meeting, while India, Burma and Ceylon, among other neutrals, were conspicuous by their absence. The resolution of the Conference on the withdrawal of all foreign troops was praiseworthy, but innocuous in effect as was the consequent diplomatic efforts of a mission drawn from Indonesia, Japan and Malaysia, dubbed by some "The Three Wise Men" and by others "The Three Blind Mice". In July, Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia, an active proponent of regional cooperation and the initiator of the Djakarta Conference was obliged, for quite sensible reasons, to reject a Cambodian request for military assistance. Her Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, was reported to have remarked, "We have no arms for them. We just pray for Cambodia."

One reason for the clearly expressed inhibition on the part of Indonesia is that, for many countries, the conflict in Cambodia is regarded as but a facet of the war in Vietnam. This factor has certainly bulked large among nonaligned countries, and was, in part, responsible for the absence of decision as to which of two competing delegations should represent Cambodia at the Nonaligned Conference held in Zambia in September 1970. It has been argued that the Cambodian Government has been unduly delinquent in its public efforts to differentiate between the war within its borders and that in Vietnam. But it is most likely that, seen from Phnom Penh, the order of priorities does not demand any great expenditure of effort on soliciting the support of those who tend to live in a world of pious resolutions and little else. The government there is faced with a protracted war—a process of attrition in which those with the greatest steel of mind and determination of body are most likely to succeed. The outcome is not to be expected in any clear-cut fashion in the immediate future. In the meantime, the process of attrition, like some endemic parasite, continues to feed off the body of Cambodia and to leave it in a debilitated state.

In this consideration of the extension of war to Cambodia, only passing reference has been made to Prince Sihanouk in militant exile in Peking. It would seem appropriate to contemplate the position of a man once described as the barometer of political change in Southeast Asia.

Prince Sihanouk has enjoyed a reputation for many things. If he achieved a periodic notoriety, it had come to be recognized increasingly in the years just prior to his deposition that he was a patriot concerned, in the face of grave difficulty, to preserve the integrity of Cambodia. This is not to say that personal ambition, an unstable temperament, and a sense of omniscience did not characterize his conduct. But he was, above all else, a realist and conducted his country's foreign policy to match prevailing realities. He once pointed out that "Our interests are served by dealing with the camp that one day will dominate the whole of Asia—and by coming to terms before its victory—in order to obtain the best terms possible."[15] Such a sentiment may help to explain, in part, his conduct following his deposition.

In March 1970, he was in Moscow and on the point of departing for Peking. Receiving the news of the coup at this juncture, he proceeded as planned, and not to the south of France, as some might have expected. His presence in Peking may be said to indicate a determination of spirit, as well as a sense of pique and outrage at his removal from high office. One might venture to suggest that his presence and activities in Peking represent something more than a simple case of a fallen man selling his soul to the devil.

Prince Sihanouk has long held a conviction about the future balance of power in Indochina. He is not one of nature's social revolutionaries, and, indeed, in power in Cambodia was quite ruthless towards those with whom he now shares a political embrace. He presents an incongruous figure in Peking and amongst the Indochinese revolutionaries. Nonetheless, he appears to believe that they will secure their declared ends in the face of American opposition. He is not inclined to be a puppet and, as a consequence, he seeks to influence events under the aegis of Peking rather than of Hanoi. He must be aware that he can be restored only through the military zeal of the Vietnamese Communists, but he believes also that the Chinese Government would prefer to see a cluster of states in Indochina rather than its reconstitution under the hegemony of the Vietnamese. He is thus sustained by the hope, however feeble, that Peking will see it in its interests to interpose its power at the appropriate time to ensure the integrity of a conciliatory Cambodia. Whether his favored scenario will be realized is a matter for conjecture. For the time being, he sits in Peking associated with personal adherents and former antagonists plotting the downfall of his political successors in Phnom Penh.

Those who were responsible for the ousting of Sihanouk have opened up a Pandora's Box whose contents have exceeded the scope of their imagination. It is a great irony that they justified his removal by reference to the presence in Cambodia of Vietnamese Communists.

The outcome of their action has been a dramatic extension of that presence, and the change in the condition of Cambodia from peace to war.

POSTSCRIPT—May 1971

The following comments take account of developments in Cambodia since last September when this article was written:

1. In spite of the increased size of the Cambodian Army, the provision of arms and training and continued military support from the South Vietnamese on the ground and from the United States in the air, the overall military position of the Cambodian Government has not improved. The insurgent forces have been able to effectively neutralize the Cambodian Army rendering it incapable of assuming major initiatives to extend the area of Government control. For the time being, this would appear to be the primary military purpose of the Vietnamese Communist expeditionary force.

2. The civil war aspect of the conflict does not appear to have changed radically. The *Khmers Rouges* remain a tiny component of the insurgent forces, and there is no clear evidence that the Vietnamese Communists have, as yet, been able to mobilize the Cambodian peasantry. However, they have certainly modified their tactics by resorting to terror against the civilian population, including the Buddhist monks. In January 1971, during the spectacular raid on Phnom Penh airport, the capital was rocketed to psychological advantage; a calculated risk in view of the presence there of Soviet and East European communist diplomatic missions.

3. The political cohesion of the Cambodian Government was tested during April and May 1971, following the resignation of Prime Minister Lon Nol, who suffered a stroke the previous February. After nearly three weeks of internal contention, a formula was found whereby the unifying figure of Lon Nol was retained as nominal Chief of Government while the more controversial Sirik Matak was confirmed as chief executive. The partially paralyzed state of Lon Nol appears to symbolize the general condition of Cambodia.

4. Although the international activities of F.U.N.K. have expanded, the role of Prince Sihanouk still resident in Peking appears increasingly to be that of prisoner of circumstances. His hosts make decreasing use of his royal person for revolutionary purposes.

1. See the report by General Lon Nol, endorsed by Prince Sihanouk, "Les Implantations des Vietcong et Nord—Vietnamiens Le Long de Notre Frontière" in *Le Sangkum,* Phnom Penh, No. 51 (October 1959), pp. 95-7.

2. See the author's "Political Upheaval in Cambodia," *The World Today* (May 1970).

3. Considerable attention has been given to the role of the port of Sihanoukville (now Kompong Som) as a point of entry for Vietnamese Communist supplies. Diplomatic circles in Phnom Penh are agreed that Prince Sihanouk withdrew this facility early in 1969.

4. *Vietnam Courier* (Hanoi, March 30, 1970).

5. *The Times* (March 19, 1970).

6. *President Nixon's Address on Southeast Asia Situation,* U.S.I.S., American Embassy, London, May 1, 1970.

7. *Ibid.*

8. On May 12, Prince Sihanouk remarked that the American intervention occurred when "Our People's Army had already surrounded Phnom Penh and was on the point of taking the capital by storm." *Vietnam Courier* (May 25, 1970).

9. The Cambodian Government has claimed that before May 5, the Chinese Government had expressed a willingness to arrange an accommodation between the Lon Nol regime and the Vietnamese Communists and indicated a readiness to sacrifice Sihanouk in return for a restoration of facilities for the insurgents within Cambodia.

10. Prince Sihanouk has claimed that "Without the American intervention we would not be in Peking today but already in Phnom Penh." *The Times* (May 6, 1970).

11. *Ibid.*, September 18, 1970.

12. See Milton Osborne, "Regional Disunity in Cambodia," *Australian Outlook* (December 1968), and the author's "Rebellion or Subversion in Cambodia?", *Current History* (February 1969).

13. T. D. Allman in *The Far Eastern Economic Review* (August 27, 1970).

14. U.S. Department of State 8544, *Cambodia Concluded* (June 30, 1970), pp. 17-19; "Cambodia," *The Far Eastern Economic Review* (September 5, 1970), p. 4.

15. At a press conference at Kep in February 1964, see *Les Paroles de Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk. January/March 1964* (Phnom Penh 1964), p. 134.

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Abstract / Résumé

Dans le présent essai, l'on se propose d'analyser les raisons politiques 1° de l'établissement après la seconde guerre mondiale d'un état religieux en Birmanie, et 2° de l'éventuel échec de cet état. Un résumé des événements historiques expose les tentatives des nationalistes d'avant-guerre pour avancer la cause du Bouddhisme en présence d'un régime colonial occidental et d'un croissent esprit de sécularisation. Pendant l'occupation japonaise le mouvement nationaliste et religieux qui retardait jusqu'alors, fut ranimé par les Japonais qui voulaient opposer à l'attitude "neutre" des précédents coloniaux brittaniques la notion d'un plus grand rôle politique pour le Bouddhisme. La première influence du mouvement séculier d'après-guerre sous la direction de l'AFPFL refroidissait cette ferveur religieuse, mais à l'ascension d'U Nu, dont la piété était profonde, la flamme politique du Bouddhisme se ralluma.

Bien que le problème de l'état religieux ne prît pas d'ascendant avant les élections nationales de 1960, la question avait été discutée pendant le régime d'U Nu. Le caractère exact d'un éventuel état religieux restait vague pour la plupart des leaders, mais ce fait ne reflétait aucun désir de limiter la liberté religieuse des non-Bouddhistes. Une telle indulgence ne caractérisait pourtant pas l'attitude des personnalités dirigeantes religieuses. Il convient de citer parmi les arguments pour l'établissement d'un état religieux les propositions suivantes: (1) le peuple le favorisaient; (2) la religion devait servir de défense contre le communisme; (3) la moralité avait été minée par le mouvement sécülariste; et (4) une telle décision ne ferait que ratifier la politique déjà pratiquée.

L'opposition à l'idée d'un état religieux venait principalement de certains camps, notamment du parti politique qui s'opposait à U Nu et de l'armée. Leur position contre l'état religieux était fondée sur les arguments que voici: (1) l'établissement d'un tel état donnerait lieu à la désunion; (2) une politique pareille irait à l'encontre des tendances populaires de l'époque; (3) c'était inconstitutionnel et anti-démocratique.

Le problème de l'état religieux devint une cruciale question politique pendant les élections de 1960 dans lesquelles les disciples d'U Nu soutenaient la cause de l'établissement d'un état bouddhiste. A la suite des élections le parlement adopta d'une voix presque unanime le nouvel amendment qui promulguait l'établissement d'un état religieux. U Nu commit une série d'erreurs politiques en négligeant d'incorporer dans la nouvelle loi un amendement corrolaire destiné à garantir la liberté religieuse, car la formation de l'état religieux vexa les minorités et l'armée. Ensuite un deuxième amendement de la constitution destiné à protéger les minorités religieuses offusqua les moines bouddhistes les plus pieux. Ce dernier

The Rise and Fall of the Religious State in Burma

FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN

BURMA'S FLIRTATION WITH THE Buddhist state provides an intriguing case study for the scholar interested in the interrelationship of religious ideals and practical politics. Rarely in modern times has a state experienced the convolutions of official religious policy as has this center of Theravada Buddhism. In the last eighty years Burma has passed from being a nation officially recognizing Buddhism, through a colonial period of neutrality toward religion, to a Japanese occupation with its efforts to obtain co-operation from co-religionists, to independence which has brought, in order, religious neutrality which at the same time recognized the special position of Buddhism, a Buddhist state, and finally, in 1962, an army led return to the "equality of all religions."

A number of ways of discussing the concept of the Buddhist state in Burma is possible. The more philosophically or theologically oriented would, perhaps, view the varying concepts of Buddhism's role in the state as considered by Burmese scholars and religious leaders. The legal authority might assess the constitutional developments leading to the Buddhist state and the rights granted various confessional groups, a method of research found particularly attractive in Pakistan. As a political scientist, I am interested only tangentially in these elements, although their value is recognized. This paper will emphasize the role of varying groups in the struggle to attain the Buddhist state and the results of that political action. Thus, this will be a study of the political process, the necessary practical measures which were needed to gain a spiritual state. In analyzing this process, three factors will be considered: the history of the concept of the Buddhist state in Burmese politics, views of political activists as to what that institution should entail, and finally, the 1959-1961 endeavor to establish a Buddhist state in Burma.

I

In a political sense, perhaps the romanticized version of the role of Buddhism in monarchical Burma was more important than its actual position. Before the British occupation the hierarchy did maintain some control over the *sangha* (monkhood), the king did pay official

évenement aboutit dans les communautés à des émeutes menées par des jeunes moines bouddhistes. Finalement, l'état religieux tomba sous un coup militaire en 1962. L'armée supprima l'état bouddhiste ainsi que la constitution entière.

obeisance to the *pongyis* (monks), and at times sought their advice, and Burma was a confessional state in which religion played an integral part. But, the role of the *sangha* and the precepts of Buddhism were not as definitive as later religious nationalists interpreted them to be.[1] In the last years of the monarchy the hierarchy was losing control over the *sangha* and probably never held the position developed in neighboring Thailand. The advice of the learned *sayadaws* (abbots) was often *ad hoc* with its efficacy depending on the ruler and, finally, the legislation of the state was not as rigidly bound by the *Dhamma* (religious law) as some over-zealous *pongyis* later thought.

Yet, particularly during the second and third decades of this century there arose something of a romantic version of what a Buddhist state could provide and a rather nationalist concept of what the Christian conqueror denied.[2] This was often infused with monarchical associations as some of the more traditional Burmese longed for a king who would "conserve the religion, society and customs of the Burmese race." The early proponents of the confessional state, romantics and otherwise, saw in its return two major benefits: it would preserve and strengthen Buddhism and Buddhism, in its turn, would bolster what was felt to be a deterioration of things Burman. These two points might be considered in some detail since they became facets of postwar arguments regarding the religious state.

Those concerned with what they felt to be the decreasing impact of Buddhism on Burma's everyday life could accumulate considerable evidence. There were those, of course, who held that under the domination of non-Buddhists it was impossible to practice their faith in a proper fashion. U Ottuma, the nation's foremost prewar religious-political leader, declared that it was useless to work for Nirvana while the English remained.[3] *Pongyi* nationalist spokesmen, writing in the radical *Knowledge* or in speeches given across the countryside, pointed to more tangible examples of deterioration. Monastery education fell off markedly in the decades following the consolidation of British rule as Burma's youth sought the secular education necessary for advancement in the new colonial world.[4] Christian conversions, although occurring primarily in formerly animist rather than Buddhist areas, were considered by both Buddhist nationalists and some missionaries to be a portent of total conversion.[5] Secularism was also becoming more apparent in all walks of life, particularly in the cities where the destruction of hierarchical control over the *sangha* led to considerable deviation in the practices of individual monks.

The last point was a reason for closer state-church relations expounded by both religious nationalists and sections of the apolitical laity. The picture of *pongyis* actively engaged in politics, lining up for motion pictures, and otherwise not acting in accordance with the *Vinaya* (disciplinary rules for monks contained in the Buddhist scriptures) was disturbing to many. Within and without the *sangha* it was felt that a state backed religious order would provide the necessary discipline to a society fractured by colonialism and Westernization.

While the British remained, those seeking a closer identity between religion and state were disappointed. Although voices called attention to "anti-Buddhist" activities in the legislative council and prewar political leaders piously (and, perhaps, opportunistically) declared their support for state-aided Buddhism, the colonial administration found itself bound to forestall major efforts to destroy the tenuous religious neutrality of the colony. Meanwhile, the younger nationalists, such as those in the radical Thakin movement, were beginning to reflect the more secular training and ideologies of the colonial period. Finally, for a variety of reasons, the *sangha*, particularly the more influential *sayadaws*, began to display a declining interest in political activity. Thus, by 1942, when the Japanese entered Burma, the political atmosphere of the country was less favorable to the concept of the religious state than it had been twenty years earlier. Yet the idea still lived even among the younger nationalists as may be seen in an editorial in the Thakin influenced newspaper, *New Burma* which proclaimed that, "the Buddhist conception of the function of State as the protection of religion is in clear contrast to the British Imperialist doctrine of divide and rule."[6]

The Japanese administration interjected a new balance of forces. More particularly, the "neutral" British were replaced by a conqueror who considered that the similarity of faith between Japan and Burma could be an effective force for mutual co-operation. Also, throughout Southeast Asia, in Islamic and Buddhist nations, the Japanese felt that the more conservative religious elements could be trusted more than the mercurial secular nationalists.[7] At least, the one could be balanced off against the other. Thus, a Minister of Religion was named (a Buddhist), the *sangha* hierarchy was reunited under government *aegis*, and the Japanese frowned upon, but did not halt, local efforts to pressure Christians into accepting Buddhism.

The limited success of the Buddhist elements during the Japanese occupation did not provide an atmosphere conducive to a religiously oriented state once independence was attained.[8] The Thakin dominated nationalist movement which controlled the government at the time rejected the concept of the Buddhist state although it recognized the "special position of Buddhism, as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union."[9] In fact, it took fifteen years before Burma was able to form a Buddhist state, and that experiment lasted less than one year. In the intervening years both the *sangha* and U Nu, then Prime Minister, made what are by now well known efforts to emphasize Buddhism at home and abroad.[10] These activities need not be discussed here. Suffice to say that by 1958 the people had become used to the idea of government aid to Buddhism and to having a Prime Minister who was deeply committed to that faith. This period was also distinguished by a number of efforts to establish Buddhism as the official religion and considerable argument surrounding the religious state concept.

II

In spite of, or perhaps because of, long decades of debate, the postwar period displayed no clear-cut agreement among politicians as to the proper form which the religious state should take. U Nu himself remained decidedly vague on the issue in his public pronouncements either for reasons of political sagacity or theological ambiguity. This author, in discussions with Christian leaders approached by Nu, was amused and confused to find that the Prime Minister had confided his belief in a religious state analogous to England. When faced with penetrating questions on what he meant by the British religious state, he shifted his models to Pakistan and Thailand! Others expressed the view that if a religious state were formed it would and should only be to sanction officially existent government efforts on behalf of the Buddhist religion. Most politicians who supported the concept of the Buddhist state, and there were a number who rejected it, did not appear to desire a very much greater institutionalization of Buddhism under the *aegis* of a confessional state than already existed. Particularly emphasized by U Nu and other political proponents was tolerance of non-Buddhists. As will be explained later, this was not the attitude of at least part of the *sangha*. Most political leaders echoed the words of the president of the Organization to Establish Buddhism as the State Religion who, while criticizing other religious states which had imposed restrictions on other faiths, declared that, "The same cannot happen in Burma because Buddhism does not curtail the rights of other religions."[11] Nor did either major political party, during or after the 1960 election campaign, put forth a program which would have denied religious freedom to non-Buddhists. In almost every case, the supporting politicians' public concept of the Buddhist state was one in which the government would engage actively in shoring up the faith of Buddhists, not in converting non-Buddhists. Some members of the *sangha* did not express this degree of tolerance and viewed the issue as one by which the religious minorities would be educated as to the fallacies of their faiths. It was this group which was to call for the rather interesting, if theologically illogical, excommunication of U Nu after he fostered a constitutional amendment guaranteeing religious tolerance to minority groups. Suffice it that the majority of the politicians who were to have the power to institutionalize the ideal of the Buddhist state sought either a limited, tolerant interpretation or government neutrality toward all religions. Those who were to cause bloodshed based on a "narrower" view were primarily from the *sangha*, not the laity.

Whatever the concept of the exact nature of the proposed institution, the proponents marshalled a number of arguments which they vigorously expounded. To the more politically minded none of the following points had quite as much impact as the single fact that the voters and Nu wanted it and it was, therefore, politically wise to applaud the issue. It should be emphasized that the religious state issue reached a peak of excitement during the 1959-60 election campaign and the various candidates assessed the issue in relation to their constituents' views on the subject. Aside from this factor there were a number of arguments which had been before the people for decades, thereby conditioning them to the idea of a confessional state. These had been put forth in later years primarily by Nu and the *sangha*. In a speech before Parliament Nu gave three private reasons for his position:

(1) A desire to create a great deal of merit.

(2) It was the overwhelming desire of *sangha* and laity.

(3) It was best that he make Buddhism the state religion before the issue got into the hands of fanatics.[12]

Without going into great detail, other arguments heard at the time included:

(1) Religion is the best weapon Burma has against the communist insurgents who have ravaged the country since 1947. This was a basic point of both Nu and the *sayadaws*. It was the reason forwarded by the latter to put pressure on Nu in 1954 to teach Buddhism in the schools and had long been a key issue of debate for Nu in his discussions with Burmese Christian leaders. In numerous speeches the then Prime Minister had referred to religion as the most effective weapon in reuniting Burma and even the army had used religion as a campaign technique against the communists.[13]

(2) Burma is a Buddhist country in which the vast majority of the people practice that faith. It was argued that the state should recognize that fact and proclaim it to the world. By the exemplary way in which the state would thus act it would demonstrate to others the best attributes of Buddhism.

(3) Morals and Burmese culture have degenerated since the reign of King Thibaw and Dhammantarayas (dangers to the Dhamma) have appeared because Buddhism lost its official recognition. "When it is reinstated as a State religion, morals and culture will improve correspondingly."[14] This was, of course, the old argument used throughout the British period. It had special import in postwar Burma where life was uprooted by war and rebellion, and where the *sangha*, especially in Rangoon, appeared to be flouting the *Vinaya* and Westernization continued its infiltration into Burmese thought.

(4) The religious state will only sanction what is already in existence. The laws providing for the *sangha* and religious holidays had been put on the books during U Nu's period and the constitutional provisions making Buddhism the official faith will merely provide the legal framework to give structure to the aforementioned factors. This and the next argument appear to have been primarily rationalizations or counter-arguments to meet the criticisms of opponents.

(5) The Burmese, and more particularly the Buddhists' concept of the religious state is one of tolerance as *Metha* (benevolence) is the primary credo of the religion. Thus, the new system would, in fact, by emphasizing Buddhist values, lead to a greater unity among the various faiths of Burma. To an extent, this was a new facet of U Ottuma's premise that Buddhism could not be practiced properly except within a Buddhist state. To some non-Buddhists this logic appeared rather specious.

The proponents of the religious state did not go unchallenged. Three major elements saw in it a danger to their positions. The political opposition to Nu considered the issue a political trick to win support in the coming election, but were somewhat confused as to how to counterattack. The religious minorities, particularly the Christians and Moslems, were not completely soothed by the promises of tolerance. Finally, the armed forces feared that the special status given Buddhism would make more difficult the pacification of warring minorities. Three key criticisms were constantly used:

(1) The most often asserted argument of both the military and political opposition centered around the question of unity. Burma has substantial Christian, Hindu, Moslem and animist minorities, portions of which have staged armed rebellions against the government on

religious and ethnic bases. A significant number of Karens, both Buddhist and Christians, continued to maintain hostilities. Moslems were subject to abuse and assault by Burmese Buddhists before the war and even after the religious state was inaugurated. Nu's rivals pointed to these frictions as well as drawing upon historical analogies such as Europe's Thirty Years' War and forced conversions during the Japanese occupation. They also had the words and actions of new Burma's founder, Aung San, and the early united front party, the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League. Both had attacked the mixing of religion and politics and, in no uncertain terms, called for the separation of church and state. The dangers inherent in communal violence were particularly evident to the army, which in previous years had fought Karens, Mons, Kachins, Shans and Moslems. The opposition parties were probably more worried over the impact of the issue on the elections, complaining that

> Our AFPFL has no desire to use political strategy which can only give birth to communal problems, and such strategy will be contrary to the intention of the Buddha in propagating Buddhism.[15]

(2) A second criticism was that the religious state was out of harmony with the times. Other new states, it was argued, based their philosophy on the separation of church and state and Burma could not advance into the modern world under an archaic constitutional structure. This was tied to the first issue as opponents pointed to new states such as India and Pakistan in which the rousing of communal passions had caused communal friction.

(3) Finally, it was argued that the religious state was contrary to both the spirit of the Constitution and democracy. The Constitution was based upon the equality of all religions and even a new amendment would contravene the basic views of its writers. Also, Burma's democracy and the Constitution demanded (1) absolute freedom of worship, (2) non-discrimination and (3) no loss of privileges based upon religious belief.

As we shall see, the arguments used by the supporters of the Buddhist state helped to get Nu and his party elected, resulting in sufficient power in the Parliament to fulfill their desires, but the contrary views influenced the army, which had substantially more power and later resulted in the downfall of Nu and the dissolution of the religious state.

III

The elections of 1960 during which the religious issue was of paramount concern have been analyzed by this author in other articles and will not be considered in detail at this time.[16] However, it is necessary to summarize the events of 1959-60 in order that the Buddhist state issue can be considered in perspective. The elections were fought primarily by two offshoots of the old AFPFL, the "Clean" AFPFL, led by Nu, and the "Stable" AFPFL, led by Kyaw Nyein and Ba Swe. Prior to the inauguration of the campaign (and, therefore, before a constitutional prohibition against using religion for political purposes was officially applicable) U Nu made a series of promises including a plea for a Buddhist state. At first, the "Stable" faction attacked Nu's position as unconstitutional and divisive, but in time recognized the attitude of the voters and tried to gain the "religious vote." While never promising a religious state, the "Stable" leadership did propose an eleven point program that gave more to the Buddhist-minded than had U Nu. For a variety of reasons including the attachment of the "Stable" faction to the army in the minds of the voters, the personality of Nu and the religious issue, the "Clean" organization won an overwhelming victory. The final vote gave the "Clean" faction and its allies approximately four-fifths of the seats in Parliament, more than enough to meet the two-thirds requirement for a constitutional amendment.

At the time there were a number of commentators, including this one, who considered that Nu wished he had not been quite so rash in his promises at the beginning of the campaign. While he did not again raise the religious state issue prior to his victory, his colleagues quickly used the idea to gain support for the party. Thus, whether desirous or not of immediately establishing the religious state, U Nu found that the forces he had set in motion during the election made it necessary to accept the people's mandate. Within eighteen months a variety of hearings had been held throughout the country and Parliament acted to pass the needed constitutional amendment.

At this point a detailed examination of the 1961 battle to pass the amendment might be in order.[17] Two factors in the situation should first be considered. The text of the Third Amendment, as it was called, and the accompanying State Religion Promotion Act were not so far-reaching as to seriously affect, in themselves, the various minorities. The legislation, as finally promulgated, was directed primarily toward Buddhists who were to have compulsory Buddhist teaching and whose relics and scriptures were to be protected. The only overt impact on non-Buddhists related to religious holidays and certain sumptuary laws. Some opponents did not think the Nu government had gone far enough while other feared a new era of bigotry.

Secondly, Nu appeared to have made a serious political error in the manner in which the amendments were presented. He first brought forth the Third Amendment establishing the religious state, using all his political power to gain passage. This resulted in recriminations from both the political and religious opposition who termed him arbitrary. At the same time he received the appelations of "Hero of Buddhism" and "Defender of the Faith" from members of the *sangha.* He followed this with the Fourth Amendment guaranteeing religious freedom. This instigated cries of "traitor" and "excommunicate him" from many of the same *sangha* members who now believed that Nu had not acted in good faith. Thus, he lost support from both extremes whereas possibly a single amendment carrying both the Buddhist state and the protection of minorities could have eased the situation.

The political battle for the amendment had largely been fought the year before the amendments were considered and Nu had almost token parliamentary opposition. In a rare demand he called for and got party cohesion on the issue. The vote was overwhelming, 220 to 15 with one abstention in the Chamber of Deputies and 100 to 15 in the Chamber of Nationalities. A more difficult problem at the time was how to appease the extra-parliamentary groups in opposition. In this Nu was only temporarily successful and in his ultimate failure he substantiated many of the predictions of his rivals. The three elements in disagreement were the religious minorities, rejuvenated politically minded *pongyis,* and the armed forces. The first disrupted Burma's political unity, the second brought bloodshed, and the third caused the downfall of the democratic process.

The *sangha* had applauded Nu's efforts to inaugurate the Third Amendment. After its ratification, however, *pongyi* support was lost and a deterioration of church-state relations developed with the Fourth Amendment to guarantee religious freedom. The more militant members of the *sangha* pledged to fight the legislation "to the death" and an organization of about one hundred monks calling itself the Sangha's Provisional Committee for Opposing the Constitution (Fourth) Amendment Bill declared, "We will readily give our lives for the protection of the Buddhist *Sasana* which was founded by our Lord by sacrificing His life in a series of innumerable existences."[18] Another *sangha* association protested that Nu had cheated the people and "pulled a fast one" on the *sangha* by proposing the new amendment. It called for nationwide demonstrations if opponents were not successful in stopping the bill. The older *sayadaws,* while criticizing the Fourth Amendment, were careful to point to the dangers of breaking the bonds of priestly conduct. The Hnakyeikshitsu Sayadaw, head of the 50,000 member Union of Burma Presiding Sayadaws Ahphwe, reminded the young militants that, "Under the sacred rules, which are inviolable, meetings, processions, and demonstrations are improper. A monk may not even raise his hand in passion."[19] This advice was not fully accepted then or in the next two months.

When the Fourth Amendment was passed the vote was 300 to 0 with 62 M.P.'s abstaining. However, in order to get into the Parliament building the legislators had to run a gauntlet of some 500 *pongyis* who stationed themselves at various vantage points. Those they could stop were called upon to sign pledges that they would not vote, while other legislators had to sneak into Parliament in disguise in order to bypass the waiting monks. The Government had, meanwhile, installed 2,000 police and closed a number of schools while Indian businessmen locked their shops. Finding themselves frustrated, the *pongyis* then held processions and demonstrations in spite of police bans to the contrary. Some monks complained of being prevented from throwing themselves bodily in front of the autos of arriving Members of Parliament. So much for the *Vinaya* and the tolerant concept of Buddhism on the day of the ratification of the Fourth Amendment.[20]

A matter of debate between the opponents and proponents of the Buddhist state had been the type of religious atmosphere which would result, the former prognosticating bigotry and the latter a new era of tolerance under Buddhism. A major development in the months following the inauguration of the confessional state, the North Okkalapa affair, underlined some of the worst fears of the opposition. The situation arose when the government agreed to build five mosques (as against 52 *dhammayons*—prayer halls for Buddhists) in the then new satellite towns outside Rangoon. This did not cause severe friction until after the religious state had been formed, at which time large crowds of *pongyis* began demonstrating and petitioning Cabinet members. By early November sizable bodies of monks began to occupy the mosques to stop further building and bus-loads of their colleagues waited in reserve. The presiding *sayadaws* attempted to mediate the question between the militant young monks and the administration but finally on November 13, 1961, "washed their hands of the mosque affair." This signalled bloody rioting led by monks and including villagers, reminiscent of the anti-Indian riots of 1938. The result was the burning of one mosque, arrest of 371 persons including 92 monks, death of four persons, and known injury of 13 including 2 *pongyis*. When unsuccessful in defeating the police, other *pongyis* allegedly tried to get Rangoon residents and even insurgents to join their cause.[21]

Communal rioting of this sort was not new in Rangoon and cannot be laid at the feet of the Buddhist state. Yet, violence of this degree had not been seen in the capital for more than two decades, nor had overt *pongyi* activity been on so large a scale since prewar days. No doubt the taste of politics had been found interesting by a number of young monks, some of whom rationalized their behavior on the ground that as members of a Buddhist state the minorities should be more circumspect. It should be emphasized, however, that while the dispute concerned their mosques, the Moslem community remained quiescent and the friction that developed was between the government that had established the religious state and militant monks with supporting laity. What would have developed in later periods between *sangha* and state is difficult to foretell because within four months the third extra-constitutional element, the army, had made its bid.

The military hierarchy was less than enthusiastic about the religious state and warned of a possible take-over if it stimulated serious trouble. While otherwise remaining outside of the conflict over the amendments, it obviously feared the consequences of these acts on its efforts to bring peace to Burma. The period of Nu's return to power after the first army coup had been one of heightened violence in the countryside, particularly among the Shans and Kachins. The addition of religious tension involved in the Buddhist state issue only added to army dissatisfaction. There is no evidence to show that the religious state question was one of the two or three major elements behind the second coup of 1962, but there is substantial evidence showing disapproval of the experiment within the high command. The threatening tone of statements of the military when discussing the issue in 1961 and the disavowal of the Buddhist state after the second coup are but two examples.

IV

The Burmese experiment with the Buddhist state failed, not so much because of inadequacies in the concept itself, but due to the political fact that the one element in the state with overwhelming power, the military, did not desire to maintain it. Thus, no matter how learned the theological discussions be, modern politics demand that such concepts as the religious state be considered within their total *political* environment. One facet of the situation which obviously did lead to its demise was the variation in concepts of the Buddhist state, not among scholars, but among the effective political actors. To summarize, the majority of the politicians differed quite markedly from the militant *pongyis* and, to a significant extent on the Fourth Amendment debates, with the important *sayadaws*. The legislators' concept was one of upgrading Burmese Buddhists by providing them with a structure upon which to build while allowing religious freedom to non-Buddhists. The *sangha*, in spite of pronouncements on Metha, was unwilling to support a broadly based constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. The difference between the younger and older *pongyis* appeared to be centered on what each group was willing to do to attain its desires.

A second major variation in concept was between the politicians and the military. The Members of Parliament, dependent on their constituents for re-election, were less bothered by the impact of their legislation on the up-country revolts. The army for its part had been forced to fight insurgents for fifteen years and looked askance at any factor which might cause further friction. Thus, the army favored religious neutrality for political and military reasons which had little or nothing to do with theological concepts.

Finally, the question should be asked, can a "tolerant" concept of any religious state be successful initially? The very inauguration of a confessional state strengthens, at least temporarily, religious beliefs, consolidates the opposition and gives hope to the extremists. Its initial period of inception brings an increased interest in religion and even if the faith accepts tolerance as an article of its creed, the laity and more militant priesthood may take the opportunity to enforce their faith on others. In its short existence, the Burmese experiment did not give the lie to this assertion.

1. For an excellent analysis of Buddhism during the period of the monarchy see Donald Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 12-37.

2. See Fred R. von der Mehden, *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963).

3. U Ottuma's life and statements do much to illuminate the values of the prewar political *pongyi*. See Bamakhit U Ba Yim, *U Ottuma* (Rangoon: Thamameitta Press, n.d. [in Burmese]).

4. In 1885 monastary schools reportedly had an average attendance of not less than 50 to 60, but by the 1920's they were reportedly down to one and sometimes none. *Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider and Report upon Buddhist Pupils in Vernacular and Lay Schools under Buddhist Management, 1928-29* (Rangoon: Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 2-3.

5. Von der Mehden, *op. cit.*, pp. 190ff.

6. *New Burma* (April 23, 1939).

7. For example, see Harry Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958).

8. Success was particularly inhibited by differences in view between the Japanese and Burmese on the role of the monk.
9. This was expressed in the postwar AFPFL pamphlet, *The New Burma in the New World* (Rangoon: Nay Win Kyi Press, 1945).
10. For an analysis of U Nu and his policies see Richard Butwell's excellent, *U Nu of Burma* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).
11. *Nation,* March 18, 1960.
12. *Burma Weekly Bulletin* (August 31, 1961), p. 137.
13. Fred R. von der Mehden, "Burma's Religious Campaign Against the Communists," *Pacific Affairs,* XXXIII (September 1960), pp. 290-99.
14. *Nation* (March 18, 1960).
15. *Nation* (December 14, 1959).
16. See Richard Butwell and Fred R. von der Mehden, "The 1960 Election in Burma," *Pacific Affairs,* XXXIII (June 1960), pp. 144-57.
17. See Donald Smith, *op. cit.,* for a further discussion of the events of this period.
18. *Nation* (September 25, 1961).
19. *Nation* (September 26, 1961).
20. See *Nation* and *Guardian* (September 26, 1961).
21. *Nation* (October 30-November 18, 1961).

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Abstract / Résumé

Une façon généralement acceptée d'aborder le champ relativement nouveau du développement politique est d'évaluer les critères suivants: (1) l'étendue de l'égalité et de la participation politique, (2) le degré de différenciation et de spécialisation, et (3) l'efficacité du système politique.

L'évolution du concept d'égalité et d'une plus large participation politique en Thaïlande s'est largement intensifiée pendant les années 60. Les facteurs déterminants qui ont donné naissance à ce courant ont été un plus haut niveau d'éducation, de nouvelles possibilités dans le domaine économique et un système moderne d'information des masses. Le principal facteur d'accélération a été la promulgation d'une nouvelle constitution en 1968, et la campagne électorale pour les élections nationales de 1969. L'accroissement de l'égalité et de la participation politique aux Philippines pendant cette période a été provoqué par des forces similaires à celles qui se sont manifestées en Thaïlande, mais cette forme de développement a été plus intense en raison de la présence d'un corps électoral plus large et d'une plus grande participation populaire dans le passé. Ce courant a modifié l'aspect de la vie politique aux Philippines: désormais les liens personnels entre electeurs et hommes politiques, font place à la recherche d'un contrôle public plus étendu sur les institutions gouvernementales de caractère impersonnel.

L'analyse du développement politique sous forme d'une différenciation et d'une spécialisation de plus en plus grande est limitée aux changements dans les groupes d'intérêts, les partis politiques et les institutions gouvernementales. Le développement des groupes d'intérêts en Thaïlande est basé principalement sur la formation de sociétés organisées d'hommes d'affaires thaïlandais (pas chinois) et d'étudiants thaïlandais. Aux Philippines, la même forme de developpement politique a largement pris place parmi les étudiants militants, qui poursuivent un changement radical sur les plans politique et social. La nouvelle constitution en Thaïlande a provoqué la naissance d'un système de partis politiques bien différenciés, consistant en un parti de gouvernement, un grand parti d'opposition et de nombreux petits partis dissidents. Aucun développement important ne s'est produit dans la différenciation du sytème unique à deux partis aux Philippines, bien que les deux partis principaux aient adopté quelques slogans socialistes, et recruté des leaders plus jeunes afin d'intégrer certains petits groupes orientés vers la "nouvelle gauche".

Le développement d'institutions gouvernementales plus différenciées en Thaïlande s'est produit grâce à la promulgation d'une nouvelle constitution en 1968. Un corps législatif à deux assemblées avec une chambre basse élue a été créée avec beaucoup de restrictions constitutionnelles à son pouvoir. Cependant ces assemblées semi democratiques ont fourni une

Political Development in Thailand and the Philippines: *A Comparative Analysis*

FRANK C. DARLING

THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL development is one of the most recent innovations in the discipline of political science. Only during the past decade have political scientists asserted a consistent interest in the realm of human behavior concerning the rate and direction of political change toward some real or assumed stages of advancement. Yet the monumental growth of teaching and research in this newly discovered dimension of political science has induced widespread disagreement over the meaning of the concept of political development as well as its moral and social implications. In spite of this diversity of views, there is considerable agreement that political development involves the augmentation of the following criteria: (1) the value of *equality* and *political participation,* (2) the *differentiation* and *specialization* of the political system, and (3) the *capacity* of the political system.[1] These criteria will provide the basic framework for this article comparing political development in Thailand and the Philippines.

The extent to which the value of equality is accepted individually and collectively by the members of society influences the degree of political participation. This criterion is a measure of the leveling of the traditional hierarchical social structure and the expansion of a secularized political consciousness. It assesses the degree to which politics is oriented toward some meaningful role by the mass public rather than the confinement of political decision-making by a few. It provides some standards to judge the impact of the value of equality in reducing latent or manifest diffidence toward political institutions and leaders and in increasing certain expectations from the political system.

Political development in the form of an expansion of equality and political participation is closely related to increasing political differentiation and specialization. And augmentation of equality and broader popular participation induces the formation of new and diverse political structures and roles. Some of these political forces pursue autonomy from formal government institutions in their endeavor to control these same institutions. By this criterion, one can assess the degree of specificity and the division of labor resulting from the formation of these new political structures and roles.

voie légale pour une certaine représentation populaire dans la formulation de ses aspirations politiques. Aucun changement digne de s'y arrêter n'a pris place dans les institutions gouvernementales aux Philippines, bien que des structures plus différenciées puissent émerger de la prochaine Convention constitutionnelle qui doit se réunir en 1971.

L'analyse du développement de l'efficacité politique montre d'intéressantes corrélations. Le système politique de la Thaïlande avec des niveaux relativement bas d'égalité de participation politique, de différenciation et de specialisation a augmenté sa possibilité de maintenir la sécurité interne, de promouvoir le développement économique et social et d'adopter une politique étrangère efficace. Le niveau relativement élevé des deux premiers critères de développement politique aux Philippines a tendu vers une efficacité réduite en ce qui concerne la sécurité interne, le développement social et économique et la politique étrangère.

Le développement politique a de multiples facettes et dimensions. Les divers éléments d'un système politique évoluent vers des stades de développement plus hauts ou plus bas suivant differentes vitesses de changement. Le développement politique en lui même n'est pas suffisant pour faire avancer une société vers une vie meilleure. Il n'a une importante signification morale ue dans la mesure où il est combiné avec un progrès économique et social approprié. De la même façon le concept de développement politique doit être élargi de manière à y incorporer d'importants critères qualificatifs tels que la liberté individuelle et la dignité humaine dans une société en voie de modernisation.

An expansion of the first two criteria of political development directly affects the capacity of the political system to implement policies sufficient for the society to cope with its environment. This third criterion is a measure primarily of the performance and efficiency of official structures in promoting desired change. It assesses the rationality and effectiveness of the administrative process in managing "outputs" or legitimized policies to meet the needs of the society.

Before undertaking a comparative analysis of these criteria of political development in Thailand and the Philippines, it is necessary to determine in some degree the levels of political development achieved by these two Southeast Asian societies in the past. Each polity is at a different level of development since each has been shaped by different and diverse historical and social forces. The traditional society in Thailand was governed until 1932 by an absolute monarchy which focused political loyalties toward a single locus of power.[2] The rapid deterioration of the political role of the monarchy thereafter created a vacuum which has promoted military rule. In contrast, the traditional society of the Philippines consisted of scattered autonomous village communities governed by local rulers who made no concerted attempt to organize an integrated polity over any sizeable portion of the archipelago. Thailand evaded Western colonial rule because of a fortuitous combination of geography, timing, and indigenous leadership, although the kingdom was influenced by the West through the imposition of extraterritoriality, the employment of Western advisers, and the acquisition of Western education by a growing number of Thai at home and abroad. In contrast, the Philippines was colonized by two Western powers, Spain and the United States. The Spanish spread the Roman Catholic religion and the Americans sponsored an ambitious program of political tutelage and education. Political reforms initiated by the United States included the establishment of an independent judiciary, the formation of free political parties, a freely elected legislature, and a trained civil service.

One assessment of the different levels of development of the two political systems has placed Thailand in the category of a "modernizing oligarchy" and the Philippines in the category of a "political democracy."[3] Given these different levels of political development, the comparative analysis of the two polities in this article will describe each criterion briefly and evaluate its degree of change, not with respect to the political phenomena of the other society, but in terms of each polity's past. In many respects this is the most genuine measurement of political development since many political changes in any society are *sui generis*. Cross-national comparison is interesting but tends to be a data-gathering process of limited value. It serves some utility since societies, like people, are constantly comparing themselves to others. Yet the real measure of political development is the advance of a political system beyond its own former status. It involves the rate and direction of change of its component parts toward higher stages of development.

EQUALITY—POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The measurement of political development in the form of an increasing acceptance of the value of equality and broader political participation can be accomplished by an analysis of what Almond and Verba have labelled the "participant political culture."[4] The strength of the "participant political culture" in any society determines the extent of the value of equality and the degree of popular participation in the political system.

In Thailand the participant political culture has always been very weak. For many centuries the bulk of the people lived in an isolated environment and took no role in politics. They expected little or nothing from the government in the form of benefits or services. Political authority was rigidly controlled by the king and a small group of royal advisers. The political culture was steeped in inequality. This condition was caused by the Hinduized traditions incorporated into the absolute monarchy, the apathy induced by Hinayana Buddhism, the long uninterrupted history of national unity, and the avoidance of Western colonial rule. Thai political culture did not change significantly after the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932. A small group of military officers and civilian aides continued to dominate the politics of the kingdom except for a brief period of civilian rule and free elections in the aftermath of World War II. Until recently the overwhelming majority of Thai people have remained indifferent to politics. They have been largely unaffected by the concept of political equality. They have made few demands for political participation. As late as 1968 an American political scientist concluded:

> The near future is unlikely to bring any major change in the Thai political system, always excluding the little-known potential of the Northeast. Probably there will be some form of controlled parliament in which especially the middle class is granted increased expression of interests, a larger number of civilians are coopted into the spoils system, and the age-long passivity of the masses is left as little disturbed as possible. In short, the basic pattern will persist with expedient and slight modification.[5]

During the past two years the political culture in Thailand has had some fermentation and change. Modest political development has occurred in expanding a sense of equality and a broader political participation. These trends have taken place almost entirely in the urban middle class, although many rural villagers in areas exposed to banditry and Communist insurgency are increasingly aware that they can obtain government assistance by certain political actions. Other social and economic developments have induced this slowly spreading political consciousness. The Thai have traditionally respected authority, while abhorring regimentation and routine.[6] A sense of individualism growing out of family training and the Buddhist religion have promoted a propensity toward geographic mobility. This condition combined with economic and social modernization has caused a rapid urbanization movement as rural villagers have moved to Bangkok and provincial cities throughout the kingdom. In urban centers larger numbers of people than before are receiving formal education beyond the primary level and more persons are obtaining skilled and semiskilled employment. While the government continues to be the largest employer, more people are working in the private sector. The increasing number of university graduates for a relatively decreasing number of government jobs is turning more educated young people toward business and other non-governmental careers. A Thai entrepreneurial class is gaining in sophistication and competing more effectively in the commercial sector wtih the Chinese. Cultural secularization is spreading through modernizing mass media. More Thai are having contacts with Westerners inside and outside the kingdom.

These changes affecting Thai political culture have thus far reached a relatively small portion of the population, yet there are some signs of diminishing diffidence toward political institutions and leaders and greater desire for political participation. One significant measurement of this aspect of recent political development is the voter turnout in February 1969 elections. In this election 49.16 per cent of the eligible voters exercised their right to vote.[7] This movement is perhaps especially significant since it was the first election in Thailand since 1958 and it achieved the second highest voter participation in any national election. This development has generated more participation in other sectors of the political system, primarily in the newly elected national legislature. It has aroused hope for a more participant political culture in the future. One Thai journalist has commented:

> What should not be primarily overlooked is the degree of political consciousness among the local citizens themselves. Many of them had hitherto been apathetic to politics and considered it an odium

> ... Only within the last two years have certain political leaders ... made some efforts to popularize a concept that politics is a virtue.[8]

The political culture in the Philippines has always been more participant than that in Thailand. The concept of equality has been more widespread. Political control over the archipelago was highly centralized during the era of Spanish rule, yet the indigenous upper class early participated in local administrative affairs. These early village chiefs were called the *cabeza* and collectively were known as the *principalia*.[9] In the process of seeking some accommodation between the foreign rulers and the masses, the *principalia* acquired a durable intermediary role. Near the end of Spanish rule, they gained increasing economic influence and obtained more modern education. They became known as the *illustrados*. Under American rule, this same upper class became more deeply entrenched and acquired greater wealth. They rapidly filled the expanding political roles created by the American colonial administration, and they have dominated Philippine political institutions since independence. Their power has rested on an electorate which has expanded from 100,000 voters in 1907 to 2,100,000 voters in 1946 and to more than 8,000,000 voters in 1969.[10]

The political culture which has evolved between the small ruling oligarchy and the mass electorate is intensely personal, particularistic, and fluid. Professor Carl Lande has described this aspect of Philippine political behavior as a "kinship system" which consists of "a network of mutual aid relationships between pairs of individuals" held together by "dyadic ties."[11] These "dyadic ties" exist between the members of the political elite and the "little people" within their kinship and communal groups. Professor Jean Grossholtz has further described this element of the Philippine political system as a bargaining process. She states:

> Philippine political culture is a bargaining culture, which is made evident by the Filipino way of perceiving and responding to power, conflict, and human interaction . . . The Filipino personalizes his ties to the political system, uses his vote as a *quid pro quo*, and fully expects that his demands will be met if he is skillful in exploiting his relationship to those with power. Within this context, there have developed pragmatic, hardheaded politicians who understand the reciprocity that exists between themselves and the voters and know that if they help the people they will be helped in return.[12]

The result is a vast and complex web of family, personal, and regional loyalties between voters and elected political leaders. The political culture involves much use of manipulative skills at the upper and lower levels of the social structure. It relies on a mutual obligation between the voter and the politician, and it assumes some kind of "equal" relationship between each as giver and receiver. Yet in practice the Philippine political culture is characterized by gross inequalities. Voter participation in political elections has not brought notable material rewards to the mass public. Elite participation in the inner decision-making process has bestowed benefits largely on the upper class.

Yet the political culture in the Philippines, as in Thailand, is currently experiencing significant changes. Largely since the mid-1960's political development toward more equality and broader popular participation has been induced by many of the same economic and social trends taking place in Thailand, including urbanization, the expansion of modern technology, and increasing contacts with Western advancements inside and outside the country. The political impact caused by these economic and social changes in the Philippines has been much more intense than in Thailand since the Philippines has a larger and more differentiated private economic sector, and the new political consciousness is spreading from a much broader participant base. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this new phase of political development is a move away from intensely personalized political relationships and toward more individual and collective involvement in formal governmental institutions which affect the society as a whole. A new political culture may be emerging in which expanding segments of the electorate are no longer concerned only with meager personal benefits bestowed through the largess of a familiar politician. They now seem to be seeking more rewards by gaining a direct voice in the actual decision-making processes of the government. They are moving beyond political personalities toward political institutions.

This development is shown on a modest and limited scale by the revival of the Communist-led Hukbalahap rebellion in central Luzon since 1965. The goal of this small insurgent force is the total overthrow of the present social system and the establishment of a communist society. Much more significant is the new political behavior among the expanding urban class. In Manila and many provincial cities new demands are emerging for major alterations in formal governmental institutions. This spreading political consciousness is most intense among second generation urban dwellers, who, unlike their parents have no memory of the hardships of village life and the struggle for status and security in a competitive urban environment. Many young people take modern benefits of urban life for granted. Their expectations are high while employment opportunities are few. They are better educated than their elders, more idealistic, more numerous, and more impatient with the defects of their society. They condemn more vehemently the privileged ruling oligarchy which dominates the political system. The following statement by a youthful member of the opposition party in the Philippine Senate is typical of this trend.

> Indeed, the Philippines is a land of traumatic contrasts. Here is a land in which a few are spectacularly rich while the masses remain abjectly poor. Gleaming suburbia clashes with the squalor of slums. Here is a land where freedom and its blessings are a reality for a minority and an illusion for the many. Here is a land consecrated to democracy but run by an entrenched plutocracy. Here, too, are a people whose ambitions run high, but whose fulfillment is low and mainly restricted to the self-perpetuating elite. Here is a land of privilege and rank—a republic dedicated to equality but mired in an archaic system of caste.[13]

DIFFERENTIATION—SPECIALIZATION

Political development in the realm of increasing differentiation and specialization takes many forms. It is impossible in a brief analysis of two separate polities to assess the wide range of phenomena in this crucial area of political change. However, by examining three major variables in Thailand and in the Philippines we can indicate the character of recent increases in political differentiation and specialization: (1) interest groups, (2) political parties, (3) government institutions.

Interest groups in developing societies emerge as distinct clusters of people seek some form of organization in articulating their common goals and imposing demands on the political system.[14] Advancement of a society toward higher political, economic, and social levels causes the formation of new and more diverse interest groups. The degree of differentiation and specialization among these interest groups and their autonomy from other political structures is an important measurement of political development.

Interest groups in Thailand have been weak, undifferentiated, and diffuse. In the past they have exerted minor influence in the political system. The peasants in some regions of the kingdom have been organized into cooperative associations only through the intermittent efforts of government-sponsored programs. The formation of labor unions has been hampered by the large number of Chinese skilled workers and the fear of Communist infiltration. The few small labor unions which emerged after World War II were abolished by the government in 1958. The formation of Thai business organizations has been delayed by the dominant commercial role of the Chinese and the slow evolution of a Thai business class. A distinct Thai business group has likewise been balked by important cultural barriers and governmental favoritism toward Chinese commercial interests by top-ranking military leaders coopted into the directorships of large Chinese companies.[15]

Recent development toward increasing differentiation and specialization has occurred on a modest scale in two areas. The slowly expanding Thai business class is showing signs of moving toward what Almond and Powell have labelled "associational interest groups."[16] Thai businessmen have formed an organization called the Thailand Management Association which is seeking to elevate business skills in the kingdom and at the same time to articulate the common interests of the Thai business community to the government.[17] The Thailand Management Association has a representative on the Board of Trade, which is a high-ranking government council assisting in the formulation of economic and trade policies. This organization likewise seeks to curtail the special favors given to Chinese commercial interests by Thai government leaders in an effort to promote the growth of Thai industry and the development of a genuine Thai business class. In time this trend is likely to lead to the formation of other differentiated interest groups, especially labor unions.

New political activity among Thai students has also been a significant development in the political system. Until recently the only notable political actions by university students were the mass demonstrations at Chulalongkorn University in February 1957, protesting the rigged elections by the Phibun Songkhram government.[18] Not until 1968 have Thai students again sought to get involved in politics. The promulgation of the new constitution was accompanied by a demonstration of 1000 students from Thammasat University protesting the retention of martial law.[19] The students subsequently ran their own candidates in Bangkok municipal elections (none of which was elected), and they served as poll watchers in local and national elections during the following year. Students have assisted in the political campaigning of the Democrat Party opposing the present government. In February 1970, students from Thammasat University staged a massive sit-in at the Ministry of Justice to protest an attempt to reduce the autonomy of the courts.[20] In cooperation with the press, the students were successful in blocking this move and in initiating efforts to remove the Minister of Justice. The heady effect of this successful action aroused a stronger desire for political action among Thai student groups and caused the king to appeal personally to a university audience to refrain from imitating their foreign contemporaries by fomenting disruption and violence.[21] Formal student organizations in Thailand are still relatively small and weak, yet a movement is gaining strength which may enable students in the future to exert some influence on political reform. Like the nascent growth of a Thai business class, student organizations in Thailand may assist in the development of other differentiated and specialized interest groups.

The Philippines has long had many more associational and non-associational interest groups than Thailand with a much higher level of differentiation, specialization, and autonomy. Yet these groups have exerted relatively little political influence due to the personalized political culture and the inability to engage in large-scale organized action on specific class lines. According to Professor Lande:

> In view of his active involvement in profitable arrangements of dyadic cooperation with individuals whose social status differs from his own, the ordinary Filipino sees little need for collective action among members of his own class, especially if such action threatens to alienate his dyadic partners. As a result, most Filipinos take little interest in class or interest-group legislation.[22]

The peasants in the Philippines, as in Thailand, have never been organized on a large scale for collective political action.[23] The most significant peasant group seeking political reform in the post-World War II era has been the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) with a membership of about 50,000 peasants organized by foreign-trained Jesuit missionaries.[24] The processing of important agricultural products has led to the formation of the "sugar bloc" consisting largely of two organizations, the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters and the Philippine Sugar Association. The "tobacco bloc" is organized primarily by the Tobacco Growers Association. The labor union movement, as in Thailand, has been hampered by rapid urbanization, the fear of Communist infiltration, and the tendency of the government to settle labor-management disputes. Few unions are organized in large numbers on a specialized basis. The country has approximately 3000 small labor unions and a few highly fragmented labor federations with a claimed membership of 1,000,000 workers.[25] Their political influence is weak and diffuse. The rapid expansion of medium and light industry since World War II has caused the emergence of stronger organizations representing Filipino business and commerce. This trend has assisted the growth of a distinct Filipino entrepreneurial class which is much larger and more aggressive than its counterpart in Thailand and in a better position to compete with the relatively smaller Chinese commercial community. Yet in spite of this development toward more differentiation and specialization, Filipino business groups still tend to influence public policy on a personal rather than an organizational basis.

The most significant development among interest groups in the Philippines toward increasing differentiation and specialization, as in Thailand, has been the result of new political actions by students. Yet in the Philippines this movement may portend the most radical change in political development since World War II, and possibly since the formation of the present political system early in American colonial rule. The recent trend among student organizations has been decidedly toward the political left: the mode of expression has tended toward "anomic" political action.[26] It erupted in its most violent form in January 1970 at a mass demonstration outside the Congress building in Manila as President Ferdinand Marcos was delivering his State of the Nation address. On leaving the building the Chief Executive and his wife had to be shielded by police to avoid objects thrown from the crowd. Four days later a more violent demonstration occurred at the President's residence in Malacanang Palace in which five students were killed and extensive damage was inflicted on government and private property. The Department of Education was forced to suspend classes in all schools and universities in the Manila area for one week. Other student demonstrations have taken place since these bitter outbursts.

This sudden violent eruption of "student power" has had certain effects on the government. Although President Marcos labeled the student demonstrators as "local Maoist Communists," he made some major concessions to their demands.[27] He reshuffled his Cabinet and appointed younger men to head important offices. He promised not to seek a third term and appealed for major institutional improvements at the Constituent Assembly scheduled to amend the present constitution in 1971. He accepted the resignation of the head of the national police force.

The political significance of these turbulent events in the Philippines, as in Thailand, is likely to go beyond the confines of student protest. Although student protest is likely to continue in the future, the formation of a sizeable and coherent student organization is unlikely. Instead, the most likely form of political development is intermittent agitation by relatively small and loosely coordinated student groups which may influence other political structures and roles and thereby promote more vigorous political action toward reducing the present inequality of power and wealth. In brief, the recent political action by students may lead to the formation of stronger differentiated and specialized interest groups, political parties, and formal governmental institutions seeking perhaps some Filipino form of socialism or a move toward a Filipino "New Deal." According to Onofre Corpuz:

> The new Filipino student movement is a completely new and different phenomenon, for all the evidence indicates that it is determined to keep its political chastity . . . I therefore foresee that student power in the Philippines will eventually be channeled into socio-political agitation, rather than evolve into an institutionalized and permanent party in national politics. An agitational role will mean that student power will be exercised essentially as an instrument of citizen protest and as a catalyst for reform.[28]

Political parties in many non-Western societies perform different functions from their counterparts in the West. Few try to aggregate interest groups in their effort to gain control over formal governmental institutions. Most are engaged primarily in political socialization and political recruitment. Some also seek legitimacy and support for government policies.[29] When some of these purposes have failed, many political elites have opposed further evolution of political parties. Yet, political parties have developed when the political leadership realized it must involve the people in some degree in the affairs of the political system in order to continue the process of modernization and to keep itself in power. The extent of differentiation and specialization among political parties is therefore another significant standard of political development.

Political parties in Thailand have never been strong instruments of power. They flourished briefly after World War II, but they have languished since the return to military rule in 1947. They were completely abolished by the Sarit government in 1958 and revived only in 1969. When Thai political parties have functioned, they have consisted largely of personal followings of prominent government and opposition leaders. The party organizations have been weak, fragmented, and undisciplined.[30] They have engaged primarily in the aggregation of factions and cliques. This condition has made the political party system in Thailand difficult to classify and describe. It has some elements of a one-party system, a two-party system, a multi-party system, and a dominant-party system. The major function of the government party has been to legitimize the political rule of successive military leaders and to approve government-sponsored bills in the elected or appointed national legislature. The major opposition party has been the Democrat Party which has proposed essentially the same policies as the government party, including a perpetual promise to promote democracy, reduce corruption, and improve administrative efficiency. Numerous small parties which have won a few seats in the legislature have shifted their support from the government party to the opposition on specific issues. A small socialist party has advocated greater government control of the economy, a neutralist foreign policy, and the recognition of Communist China. The two minuscule communist parties (one Thai and one Chinese) have been illegal since the early post-World War II period.

Recent development among Thai political parties has been in their revival and nascent functioning, a trend which encourages the formation of more differentiated and specialized political parties in the future. The promulgation of the new constitution in 1968 was accompanied by the passage of a Political Parties Act which elaborated the rights and obligations of officially recognized political parties.[31] Fifteen political parties were organized which ran 1,247 candidates for the 219 seats in the February 1969 elections for the lower chamber of the national legislature. The major result of this first election in almost eleven years was the winning of 75 seats by the government party, now called the United Thai Peoples Party (UTPP), 57 seats by the opposition Democrat Party, and 72 seats by smaller parties and independents. Subsequent maneuvering caused a number of Independents to join the UTPP, giving the government party a total of 110 seats in the lower house. Parliamentary deliberations on pending legislation during the past two years by these parties has provided important political experience. The government party has been required to explain its policies and defend its actions before a popularly elected representative body. Some limitations have been imposed on executive power by the opposition. During both years since its revival the Democrat Party has pressed for substantial reductions in the national budget, a move that failed but which won sizeable support.[32] The Liberal Party has sought to transfer the control of elementary education from the Ministry of Interior back to the Ministry of Education.[33] One of the most significant aspects of this recent political development is that the resurgence of political parties combined with other advances in the political culture and by interest groups may have ended the period when governments in Thailand can be changed only by a military coup d'etat. In the future the government may rely increasingly on its political party for support rather than military power. In time changes of government may be achieved primarily through open competition among political parties.

Political parties in the Philippines are much more developed and experienced than their counterparts in Thailand. The party system has its historical roots in the early American colonial period and political party activity can be traced back to the formation of the Federalist Party in 1900.[34] The Nacionalista Party dominated the nationalist movement in the pre-independence era and a two-party system emerged after independence. Third political parties have arisen from time to time, but they have failed to obtain widespread voter support due to the particularistic political culture and the electoral system.

Yet the two-party system in the Philippines is much different from that in the Western democracies. Filipino political parties aggregate personalities and factions, not organized interest groups with a common political goal. They are vast fluid collections of "dyadic" relationships between competing politicians and their local followers. Both parties are virtually identical in leadership, membership, and policies. Both are pragmatic and nonideological. Both lack unity and discipline and their members switch readily from one party to the other. Both parties assist in maintaining national unity and avoiding bitter regional and cultural splits. Both parties provide a continuity in national policies in spite of major weaknesses in implementing these policies.

Philippine political parties have experienced relatively minor development in spite of recent demands for broader political participation and some changes in interest group behavior. There has been a modest trend toward increasing differentiation and specialization in the formation of the Socialist Party of the Philippines and growing support for the Christian Socialist Movement led by former Senator Raul Manglapus.[35] These small political parties may gain sizeable electoral support in the future and seek control of the government. A likely reaction to this possibility would be the merger of the two major parties to prevent the ascendancy of a left-wing government. Yet the most feasible action may be the adoption of a portion of the "new left" program by the two major political parties. If popular support for this new "radical" movement continues to grow, both major parties are likely to move slightly and simultaneously to the left.[36] Yet this action will again cause both political parties to be virtually identical. The party system in the Philippines will continue to be undifferentiated and unspecialized. Political development in this sector of the political system will still be lacking.

Increasing differentiation and specialization among such extra-governmental structures and roles as interest groups and political parties tend to cause a corresponding expansion in differentiation and specialization of governmental institutions. These official structures manage the final stage of the political process in which demands for political action are converted into legitimized programs and policies.

The degree of differentiation and specialization of governmental institutions is therefore another important measure of political development.

Governmental institutions in Thailand have tended to be undifferentiated and diffuse. The powerful tradition of the absolute monarchy and the centralized rule imposed by the military leaders has promoted the formation of an official political apparatus dominated by the executive. From 1932 until 1958 the kingdom had six provisional or permanent constitutions which theoretically provided a parliamentary form of government, although the Prime Minister and the Cabinet with few exceptions were able to monopolize the rule-making and rule-application functions.[37] The exercise of executive rule has been relatively moderate and benevolent. While decision-making power has remained highly concentrated and unified, the Thai government leaders have created an extensively differentiated and specialized bureaucracy which is remarkably competent by Asian standards.[38] Executive rule, however, has been highly authoritarian and it has blocked the formation of more differentiated and specialized government institutions capable of limiting executive power.

Until recently, the only specialized government institution which had acquired autonomy from executive control has been the judiciary. Since the modernization of the court system in the nineteenth century, the judiciary has been the least politicized structure in the Thai government. In spite of the long period of monarchial and military rule, the courts have upheld high standards of justice, and within limits they have checked administrative excesses by executive officials. The judges have maintained a strong loyalty to the judicial process, and they have sought to protect the legal rights of the people. The major limitation on their power by the executive has been the intermittent imposition of martial law.[39]

The most significant form of political development toward increasing institutional differentiation and specialization in Thailand has been the provisions in the 1968 permanent constitution for a partially elected legislature. A bicameral Assembly was formed in February 1969 consisting of a 162-member Senate appointed by the king and a 219-member House of Representatives elected by the people.[40] The Cabinet is no longer directly responsible to the legislature and Cabinet members are now barred from serving in the lower house (although not in the Senate). The entire Assembly can adopt a vote of no-confidence in the Cabinet only at a joint sitting of both houses. In spite of the formidable limitations on its power, the House of Representatives has become the major governmental institution providing a legitimate forum for criticizing the executive. The most significant opposition has occurred during the deliberations over the national budget. These debates have been lengthy and intense. They have caused the Cabinet to modify its administrative actions and legislative proposals, and have prevented it from obtaining parliamentary approval for its legislation in a few hours or a few days by overwhelming majorities as had been the case under previous constitutions. The passage of the 1970 national budget took several months, and it was approved by a vote of 110 to 63, a relatively balanced vote by previous Thai standards.[41] The action of the government to impose new taxes in June 1970 required a personal public plea by the Prime Minister to overcome the bitter opposition in the lower house, which approved this measure by a majority of only one vote.

At present the national legislature is only a partially differentiated and autonomous representative institution capable of voicing opposition to the government. Yet the evolution of a weak legislature is a form of political development beyond a society with no legislature. As in other societies (such as pre-revolutionary America, pre-revolutionary France, Bismarck's Germany, and Meiji Japan), the present lower house in Thailand may become increasingly important. Some efforts to move toward this goal have already been made by the opposition Democrat Party, which seeks stronger provisions for civil rights, parliamentary control over the Cabinet, and more direct procedures in introducing votes of no-confidence.

Governmental institutions in the Philippines were increasingly differentiated and specialized from the beginning of the American colonial period until independence was gained in 1946. These official structures were modelled largely on those in the United States. The Philippine constitution provides for a presidential system and a separation of powers. The President is elected directly by a national electorate as is the 24-member Senate, and a 104-member House of Representatives is elected by single-member electoral districts. The balance of power between the executive and the legislature favors the President, who has extensive appointive and veto powers, considerable fiscal discretion, and direct control over local government. An independent 11-member Supreme Court possesses authority to declare laws passed by the two political branches unconstitutional by a two-thirds majority. Official institutions are further differentiated and specialized among a Commission on Elections, a General Auditing Office, a vast administrative bureaucracy, and numerous local elected and appointed officials.

No significant trend toward increasing political differentiation and specialization has taken place in the Philippines since independence. At the present time there is only the possibility of potential development at the forthcoming Constituent Convention scheduled for 1971. There is a possibility that major amendments to the present constitution will be made at that time and new governmental institutions will be created. One proposal is to return to a single six-year term for the President as was the case from 1935 to 1940, during the period of the Commonwealth. This change would significantly increase the specialization of the political system by expanding the power of the president, especially during the early period of his term in office. Another proposal has been made to create a third legislative body for the representation of interest groups.[42] Perhaps the most significant influence at the conference will be exerted by President Ferdinand Marcos, whose stature as the first chief executive to serve two terms might be effectively used to modify governmental institutions so they can more effectively implement public policy and at the same time expand the institutional channels for broader popular representation.

CAPACITY

Political development assessed by the third criterion, political capacity, also takes numerous forms. The analysis here will focus briefly on recent changes in capacity in Thailand and the Philippines in maintaining internal security and managing economic and social development in domestic policy and in protecting the national interest in foreign policy.

The Thai government has managed most elements of its domestic policy with increasing rationality and efficiency since the early post-World War II period. The basic function of maintaining internal security has posed a serious challenge because of scattered banditry and the Communist insurgencies in the northern, northeastern, and southern border provinces. The government has trained sizeable specialized police forces and received extensive foreign assistance to counter these threats of domestic violence. In addition to improvements in the internal security forces, the Bangkok authorities have also implemented an Accelerated Rural Development Program (ARD) to bring isolated villages into the mainstream of national life and to reduce economic and social grievances which might be exploited by the Communists. Mobile Development Units (MDU) consisting of rural administrators and technicians have constructed roads, water control projects, and other improvements in remote villages. These official policies have significantly reduced banditry and subversion in the northeastern and southern provinces. Only in the most remote northern provinces have the Communists recently expanded their subversive operations, yet these have succeeded in some degree only among primitive Meo tribesmen.

The capacity to expand the national economy is one of the most impressive accomplishments of the Thai political system. The official role in economic development has consisted of a mixed policy, promoting public and private enterprise, foreign aid, and foreign investment with increasing use of government economic planning since 1961. This economic policy has achieved notable results. The Thai economy has expanded annually at a rate of approximately 7.5 per cent, which is the best growth record in South and Southeast Asia. The currency is sound and freely convertible. The government possesses foreign exchange holdings of almost $1,000,000,000, which is the largest monetary reserve of any non-industrial nation. The per capita income in 1967 was $153 and the gross national product was $5,000,000,000.[43] The GNP is expected to reach $6,500,000,000 by 1971. The benefits of this expansion of economic development have been unevenly distributed throughout the kingdom and a disproportionate share has gone to the upper and middle classes. Yet important economic gains have also been made by industrial workers and peasants engaged in commercial agriculture. The government is making increasing efforts to provide more economic development to peasants living in remote rural villages.

The capacity of the Thai government has also expanded in the realm of social development, primarily in the educational field. The government enacted a seven-year compulsory education law in the early 1960's and increased elementary school enrollment to 4,630,424 students. It has also established 219 vocational schools with an enrollment of 54,387 students.[44] Since 1965 provincial universities have been established in Chiengmai, Khonkaen, and Songkhla. This constitutes the first effort by the government to operate institutions of higher education outside the Bangkok area. More limited expansion has occurred in social services such as public housing, public health, and medical education. The most notable deficiencies in social development have been the lack of modern labor legislation, social security programs, and family planning facilities.

Thai foreign policy has displayed an impressive capacity to cope with the external threat of Communist aggression and subversion in weak neighboring nations. The Thai government has succeeded in protecting its national security in a precarious environment by a policy of seeking cooperation and support from both global and regional powers. Since 1950 the dominant element in this effort has been close cooperation with the United States. The Thai government has negotiated bilateral economic and military aid agreements with the United States through which it has received over $1,000,000,000 in foreign assistance. It has joined the SEATO alliance, provided air and naval bases to the United States to support military operations in Vietnam, and sent 10,000 Thai troops to fight in South Vietnam. The modification in United States policy to reduce American involvement in the Vietnam conflict has produced strains in American-Thai relations, but the Thai government has maintained a promise from the United States to uphold its commitment to defend the kingdom from large-scale Communist aggression. Since the early 1960's the Thai government has sought to balance its relations with the United States by closer cooperation with non-Communist nations in the Asian region. Thai foreign policy provided much of the initiative in the formation of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961 to promote cooperation in economic, social, and cultural affairs between Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines. This organization was expanded in 1967 into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to pursue the same basic goals among the three ASA members plus Indonesia and Singapore. The Thai government also played an instrumental role in the formation in 1966 of the nine-power Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC), which is more loosely organized than ASEAN, but more politically oriented toward significant regional issues.

The capacity of the Philippine government is more difficult to measure than political capacity in Thailand. Filipino society contains a much larger private sector and the political system has faced numerous inherent difficulties in the transition from colonial to indigenous rule. The Japanese occupation during World War II was harsh and debilitating. The "revolution of rising expectations" is more widespread than in Thailand and the actual impact of governmental "outputs" in managing new demands and ameliorating grievances is more complex and ambiguous. The geographical position of the archipelago contributes to a more "care-free" environment with the result that the country's political leaders find it difficult to implement policies which require personal discipline and sacrifice.

These factors have hampered the capacity of the Philippine government in managing its domestic policy. They have contributed to increasing crime and lawlessness in Manila and the provinces. Some civil disorder in central Luzon is due to the limited revival of the Communist-led rebellion, but most crime is committed without political motivation. Since the mid-1960's the ability of the government to manage this threat of internal violence has deteriorated. Prominent officials, including a judge, a jail warden, a mayor, and an acting governor, have been murdered in public. Kidnappings and armed robberies are frequent. Some effort has been made by the Philippine government to combat the recent expansion of crime by the installation of a modern communication system (Metrocom) in the Manila area and the establishment of more effective working relations between law enforcement agencies.[45] Yet these measures have had only a modest effect thus far in curtailing lawlessness and crime. An attempt was also made early in the first Marcos administration to reduce smuggling, which costs the government approximately $350,000,000 in lost revenues each year. The president appointed an honest and competent Customs Commissioner who doubled customs revenues within one year and reduced smuggling by 40 per cent.[46] But political pressure caused President Marcos to remove this efficient public servant and smuggling has again assumed major proportions.

The capacity of the government to manage the national economy has wavered erratically from some constructive measures to frequent incompetency. In spite of the gradual expansion of an indigenous industrial sector, the national economy still depends largely on American economic aid, American military spending, and the export of sugar, hemp, coconuts, lumber, and minerals. The government's role has been confined primarily to the management of currency controls and foreign trade policies. An attempt at economic planning began during the Macapagal administration in the early 1960's, but it has been ineffective and public agencies have exerted relatively little influence on economic development. A land reform law has been passed but has not been implemented as a consequence of the opposition of vested interests which exert considerable influence on both houses of Congress. The government has also sought to increase rice production through a variety of methods since the early post-World War II period, but until 1968 this policy consistently failed. The Philippines had one of the lowest rice yields in the world and the government was required to import food from elsewhere in Southeast Asia. During the past three years rice production in the Philippines has increased and the agricultural sector is now meeting local needs and exporting modest quantities of rice. Yet this achievement was not accomplished by an expansion of the capacity of the Philippine government. It was caused by the innovation of IR-8, the "miracle rice," developed by the International Rice Research Institute at Los Banos, which is supported by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations.[47] Nor has this accomplishment enhanced the capacity of the government to manage other aspects of the national economy. The economic growth rate of approximately 5 per cent is just slightly higher than the annual population increase. Philippine currency is unstable and sells in international exchanges at rates up to 50 per cent higher than the official rate. The foreign exchange reserves of the government are declining. The trade deficit of $25,000,000 in 1966 increased to $300,000,000 in 1970.[48] The gross national product in 1967 was $6,250,000,000 and this figure is expected to increase to about $7,500,000,000 in 1971. The per capita income in 1967 was $180, although in the actual distribution of income only 1 per cent of the population received an income of $5000 while more than 70 per cent of the people received less than $100. To cope with the inordinate wealth among the small upper class, which President Marcos has labeled the "conscienceless rich," the government has imposed drastic economic measures, including new taxes on luxury goods, additional credit restrictions, drastic budget cuts, improved tax collection, and new moves to borrow funds from abroad. In spite of these policies, the capacity of the Philippine government to manage the national economy still is severely limited.

In promoting social development, the Philippine government, like that of Thailand, has been most successful in the field of elementary education. With American aid, the government assisted in the reconstruction of the large number of public schools which were damaged or destroyed during the Japanese occupation. By 1967 elementary school enrollment had increased to 5,577,901.[49] One of the major accomplishments of the first Marcos administration was the construction of large numbers of new buildings, a step which has further raised the level of elementary education. The Philippine government also maintains a modest community development program designed to elevate living conditions in the barrios. It administers an extensive social security program which at present is largely confined to government employees. It has enacted labor legislation providing for minimum wage rates and government arbitration machinery in settling disputes between management and labor. The government likewise administers a limited welfare program in public health, child and old age assistance, etc. As in Thailand, the Philippine government has done little to provide family planning facilities to cope with the rapid population expansion.

Philippine foreign policy has displayed a notable capacity to maintain cooperative relations with the United States, primarily in an effort to obtain external assistance for economic and social problems rather than to bolster national security. This capacity has been enhanced by the goodwill generated during the four decades of American colonial rule and the common struggle against Japanese aggression. Since achieving independence, the Philippine government has forged closer relations with the United States by providing air and naval bases and by joining the SEATO alliance. The Filipinos also amended their constitution just after independence to provide special rights to Americans in utilizing natural resources in the Philippines in return for favorable access to the American sugar market and the promise of extensive American economic aid. They acceded to the Laurel-Langley agreement which provides for the gradual removal of favored trading privileges by 1974.

On the other hand, the major shortcoming in foreign policy has been an inability to provide an alternative to extensive economic and political relations with the United States as a corollary to a perceptible trend toward more flexibility and autonomy in foreign affairs. The Philippine government also has failed to quell outbursts of anti-American criticism and xenophobic action at the very time when more foreign assistance and investment are needed. It has failed to explain to the Filipino people that the sudden removal of American military bases, American private investment, and the American sugar market will cause a drastic decline in the Philippine economy. Philippine foreign policy has also been less able than that of Thailand to balance its intimate relationship with the United States with closer cooperation in the Asian region. The policy of seeking closer relations with Malaya and Indonesia during the early 1960's through a loosely-structured association known as "Malphilindo" proved abortive. In contrast to the efforts of the Thai government to promote regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Philippine government has intermittently disrupted this endeavor by seeking to extend its jurisdiction over the territory of North Borneo. Philippine foreign policy has likewise been slow and hesitant in undertaking the difficult but necessary task of developing public understanding for closer long-range trade and political relations with Japan. However, the capacity of the Philippine government to maintain more effective relations within the Asian region has been enhanced to some degree by membership in ASEAN and ASPAC as well as the successful effort to locate the headquarters of the Asian Development Bank in Manila.

CONCLUSION

Political development is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. Each element of a political system moves toward higher (or lower) stages of development at a different pace or rate of change. Some elements may be advancing, while others may be going in the opposite direction.[50] This complex pattern of behavior has been observed in this brief comparative analysis of political development in Thailand and the Philippines. Thailand has recently experienced a modest expansion in equality and political participation among peasants in threatened rural provinces and the urban middle class; the Philippines has witnessed a somewhat more intensive expansion of equality and political participation due to a larger urban base and a more secular political culture. Yet these slightly different changes have induced markedly different effects in other aspects of political development in the two countries. The modest development in equality and political participation in the "modernizing oligarchy" in Thailand has induced the formation of nascent interest groups (primarily businessmen and students), the revival of free political parties, and the establishment of a semi-constitutional system which includes a partially elected legislature and increasing legal limitations on executive power. The more extensive development in equality and political participation in the "political democracy" in the Philippines has had some effect on the formation of student organizations and a more articulate urban middle class, but it has caused no significant development elsewhere in the political system, including the political parties and government institutions.

The development of political capacity in Thailand and the Philippines as herein examined lends support to the well-known thesis that an authoritarian polity in a developing society can cope more effectively with economic and social modernization than a democratic polity. The political system in Thailand, which is low in equality, political participation, and specialization has achieved a relatively high capacity in maintaining internal security, promoting rapid economic development, and protecting the national interest in spite of a serious Communist threat and a reduced American presence in Asia. The Philippine political system, which is high in equality, political participation, differentiation, and specialization has experienced no significant expansion of its capacity to maintain internal security, promote economic development, and advance the national interest, in spite of a minor Communist threat and large expenditures of American foreign aid. In brief, Thailand has little political democracy yet the political system has sustained and in many cases raised the living standards of the bulk of its people, who in general appear satisfied with the government of their society; the Philippines has much political democracy yet the political system has performed inadequately in elevating economic and social conditions for large segments of the population who are increasingly bitter and disillusioned with their system of government.

This conclusion raises a basic moral issue regarding the concept of political development. Is political development by itself necessarily a "good thing?" Does it lead a society inexorably toward "the good life?" This is a question which will not be quickly resolved, given our limited level of scientific research on the developing societies. Yet it may be possible at this point to posit the hypothesis that this issue will be more adequately addressed if political development is envisioned as part of a broad modernizing process in developing societies which must be accompanied by commensurate forms of economic and social modernization. Furthermore, the student of political development must consider additional criteria in measuring the "quality" of the society by combining quantitative measurements of the augmentation of equality-political participation, differentiation-specialization, and capacity with the measurement of improvements in material living standards and the evolution of an environment which offers more personal satisfaction amid the complexities of modern life. A narrow view of political development is as inadequate as a narrow view of economic development in seeking a suitable framework for measuring advancements in the developing societies. Furthermore, this broader concept of development is likely to entail some evaluation of social movement toward what Professor David Apter has labelled a "reconciliation system," where individual privacy and autonomy are widely shared values that are integrated into simultaneous advances toward a modern industrial society.[51]

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Abstract / Résumé

Deux propositions couramment avancées concernant l'agriculture dans les pays moins développés sont que (1) le coefficient de rendement agricole des exploitations de petites dimensions laisse à désirer, et (2) qu'il y a une sous-utilisation considérable de la main d'oeuvre et de la main d'oeuvre excédentaire dans le secteur agricole. Dans cette étude de la production rizière du Sud-Vietnam nous analysons ces propositions dans une enquête sur les différences de la production des exploitations agricoles qui sont classées dans quatre groupes selon la superficie de la terre consacrée à la riziculture: moins de .7 hectares, entre .7 et 1.49 hectares, entre 1.5 et 2.99 hectares, ou au dessus de 3.0 hectares. Nos observations se basent sur la valeur de la production, ainsi que sur la valeur de la terre, outils agricoles, main d'oeuvre, bêtes de trait et autres dépenses de 566 fermes à riziculture. Les données ont été obtenues de la *Rural Income and Expenditure Sample Survey of South Vietnam* recueillies en 1963 et 1964. Utilisant les statistiques constantes à l'échelle de modèle Cobb-Douglas et un procédé à rebroussement linéaire et à tri factice, nous avons pu obtenir des évaluations approximatives des paramètres de production des quatre exploitations rizières, ainsi qu'un appréciation de la différence des coefficients entre n'importe quels deux groupes d'exploitations. En plus des renseignements directs fournis par les évaluations paramètriques, nous avons également pu étudier la différence des rapports de la valuer du produit de la main d'oeuvre par rapport aux taux des salaires dans les quatre groupes de fermes. D'où nous déduisons ce qui suit:

(1) Au fur et à mesure qu'augmentent les dimensions de l'exploitation, et l'élasticité du rendement par rapport à la main d'oeuvre et le rapport de la valeur du produit de la main d'oeuvre peu productrice augmentent par rapport au taux des salaires. D'où l'on peut déduire que les exploitations de petites dimensions ont un moindre rendement que les plus grandes par rapport à l'utilisation de la main d'oeuvre. Ce résultat s'accorde avec la proposition concernant la sous-utilisation de la main d'oeuvre, du moins en ce qui concerne les exploitations de dimensions plus modestes.

(2) Sauf par rapport aux plus petites exploitations, nous n'avons pas pu trouver de preuves soutenant la proposition que la rentabilité des plus grandes exploitations est proportionnellement supérieure. Ainsi, des programmes organisés pour favoriser les exploitations des deux groupes de dimensions moyennes (.7 a 1.49 hectares et 1.5 a 2.99 hectares) ne créeraient pas forcément des opérations peu rentables.

Land Size and Patterns of Resource Productivity in South Vietnamese Rice Production

JAY S. SALKIN

Introductory Comment:

ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE ECONOMIC policy intended to promote agricultural development are often hindered by a lack of information concerning the optimal levels and combinations of factors of production to employ in producing farm outputs. In this study, we investigate the differences in the patterns of resource productivity among rice producers of varying size in South Vietnam by analyzing the differences in the production functions for rice of different size farms.

From this study we draw two important conclusions: (1) The ratio of the value of the marginal product of labor to the wage of labor is observed to increase with the size of the farm—that is, small farms tend to use additional labor beyond the point where the additional labor employed adds more to the value of output than the market wage of the labor. This supports the notion that there is underemployment of labor in rice agriculture in South Vietnam and conforms to the view that small farms, because of the magnitude of their own household labor supply and the lack of opportunities for alternative employment, tend to use more labor than price efficiency would dictate. (2) Our results indicate that technical efficiency does not continuously rise with the size of the farm. Farms using 3.0 hectares or more of land were not technically more efficient than farms operating on .7 to 1.49 hectares of land or farms employing 1.5 to 2.99 hectares of land. Thus, programs designed to promote farms of the latter two size ranges cannot be rejected out of hand as leading to inefficiency.

THE DATA

The source of information on production activities of South Vietnamese rice producing farms was the 1964 Rural Income and Expenditure Sample Survey designed by Professors Adelman and Stroup in 1962 and directed by the latter in 1963 and 1964.

There were 2910 households, 30 from each of 97 hamlets in 68 districts of the 29 provinces for whom annual data, covering the time period from June, 1963 to June, 1964, were available. Of these households, 1627 were producers of paddy (raw rice); but for this analysis, only 566 households which listed positive amounts of each of the five major input categories (land, capital, labor, draft animals, and other expenses), and whose crop production consisted almost entirely of rice, were utilized.[1] These 566 farms were separated into four groups according to the area of land devoted to rice production. There were 150 farms (26.5 percent of the sample) that used less than .7 hectares of rice. 141 farms (24.9 percent of the sample) comprised the group of farms that used at least .7 hectares, but less than 1.5 hectares of land. The third size grouping consisted of 117 farms (20.7 percent of the sample) whose land input was at least 1.5 hectares, but less than 3.0 hectares. The remaining 158 farms (27.9 percent of the sample) whose land input was at least 3.0 hectares comprised the fourth size group.

For each farm, data were available on the physical quantity of paddy produced, the value of paddy produced, the area of land devoted to rice production, the value of land used to produce rice,[2] the number of each type of farm implement owned, the value of the stock of farm implements,[3] the "number of days worked by all household on own or rented fields, and accordingly can amount to more than 365 days,"[4] the cash expenditure for hired labor, the value of in kind payments to hired labor services, the cash expenditures for hired draft animals, a prorated measure of the value of the household's own animal input,[5] the total value of draft animal services, and the value of other production expenses.[6] Information was also available on the price of paddy sold for most households,[7] the provincial average land rental rate, the provincial average daily wage for labor, and the provincial average daily rental rate for draft animals.

PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS FOR FARMS OF DIFFERENT SIZES

For purposes of empirical analysis, we employ the Cobb-Douglas model of production for each of the four groups of rice farms. With five inputs, the production function of each farm in any one group can be expressed as:

$$(2.1)\quad Y_i = A_j\, X_{1i}^{\alpha_{1j}}\, X_{2i}^{\alpha_{2j}}\, X_{3i}^{\alpha_{3j}}\, X_{4i}^{\alpha_{4j}}\, X_{5i}^{\alpha_{5j}}$$

where Y is the value of rice produced, X_1 is the value of land devoted to rice production, X_2 is the value of the stock of farm implements (capital stock), X_3 is the value of labor services, X_4 is the value of draft animal services, X_5 is the value of other expenses, i denotes the i^{th} farm, j denotes the size group, A is the technical efficiency or scaling parameter, and the α_j's are the elasticities of output with respect to land, capital, labor, draft animals, and other expenses for the j^{th} farm group. Within any one farm group, it is assumed that the parameters of the production function are constant.[8]

Equation (2.1) can be transformed into a model expressing output per unit of land as a function of the per unit of land, where the unit of land is in value terms.[9] This is obtained by dividing both sides of (2.1) by the measure of the land input, X_1. By further rearrangement of terms we get (dropping the individual and size group subscripts):

$$(2.2)\quad \frac{Y}{X_1} = AX_1^{(\alpha_1+\alpha_2+\alpha_3+\alpha_4+\alpha_5-1)}\left(\frac{X_2}{X_1}\right)^{\alpha_2}\left(\frac{X_3}{X_1}\right)^{\alpha_3}\left(\frac{X_4}{X_1}\right)^{\alpha_4}\left(\frac{X_5}{X_1}\right)^{\alpha_5}$$

By taking the logarithm of (2.2) and appropriately specifying the farm entrepreneurs maximizing behavior and the error structure of the model, ordinary least squares could be employed to obtain consistent and asymptotically unbiased estimates of the parameters of the production function.[10]

However, because the original sample was sorted by land size, we have reduced the range of variation in X_1; hence, it is less likely that the coefficient on X_1 will be significant. The coefficient on X_1 in (2.2) is the sum of the elasticities minus one, a measure of the degree of returns to scale.

In view of the problem involved in reducing the range of variation in X_1, we assume that there are constant returns to scale in production; i.e., the coefficient on X_1 in (2.2) is zero. This yields the model given by:

$$(2.3)\quad \frac{Y}{X_1} = A\left(\frac{X_2}{X_1}\right)^{\alpha_2}\left(\frac{X_3}{X_1}\right)^{\alpha_3}\left(\frac{X_4}{X_1}\right)^{\alpha_4}\left(\frac{X_5}{X_1}\right)^{\alpha_5}$$

The regression model employed in this study can then be expressed as:

$$(2.4)\quad y = a_j + \alpha_{2j}x_2 + \alpha_{3j}x_3 + \alpha_{4j}x_4 + \alpha_{5j}x_5 + u$$

$$\text{where } y = \text{Ln}\,\frac{Y}{X_1},\quad a_j = \text{Ln}\ A_j,$$

$$x_2 = \text{Ln}\left(\frac{X_2}{X_1}\right),\ x_3 = \text{Ln}\left(\frac{X_3}{X_1}\right),\ x_4 = \text{Ln}\left(\frac{X_4}{X_1}\right),$$

$$x_5 = \text{Ln}\left(\frac{X_5}{X_1}\right),$$

and u is the disturbance term assumed normally distributed with mean zero, and uncorrelated with the inputs.[11] There are two estimation procedures that could be employed in order to obtain estimates of the parameters of the production functions of the four size groupings of farms. The first procedure involves performing four regressions, one for each group of farms.

The alternative procedure which was used in this study involves constructing four dummy variables, one for each size category, and employing the following regression model.

$$(2.5)\quad y = \sum_{j=1}^{4} a_j D_j + \sum_{j=1}^{4} \sum_{k=2}^{5} \alpha_{kj} D_{kj} X_k + u$$

$$\text{where } D_1 = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{If land area less than .7 ha.} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$D_2 = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{If land area at least .7 ha. but less than 1.5 ha.} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$D_3 = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{If land area at least 1.5 ha. but less than 3.0 ha.} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$D_4 = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{If land area 3.0 ha. or larger} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The advantage of using the latter procedure rests in the ease of comparing the coefficients of the different groups, and testing the significance of the difference between any two coefficients. The magnitude of the coefficients is the same for both procedures; however, the standard errors of the coefficients may differ. The results for equation (2.5) are given in Table 1.

Reading across any row of coefficients in Table 1 we can observe the differences in parameter of the production functions of farms of different sizes. In the case of the elasticity of output with respect to capital (farm implements), we find that this parameter is not significantly different from zero for the smallest and largest size farms, while it is larger and significant for farms in Groups II and III. The coefficient on labor, α_2, consistently gets larger and more significant as the size of farm increases. The draft animal coefficient is significantly positive for all size groups, although the magnitude of this coefficient is smallest for farms in Groups III and IV. The elasticity of output with respect to other expenses is consistently lower, though

Table 1

RICE PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS FOR DIFFERENT SIZE FARMS: II

	Size I	Size II	Size III	Size IV
Capital: α_2	.069 (.044)	.169* (.048)	.130* (.047)	.058 (.054)
Labor: α_2	.030 (.046)	.066 (.049)	.139* (.059)	.299* (.058)
Draft Animals: α_4	.251* (.055)	.376* (.054)	.196* (.059)	.146* (.040)
Other Expenses: α_5	.502* (.064)	.408* (.050)	.391* (.054)	.247* (.046)
Constant: a	.946* (.103)	1.626* (.103)	1.523* (.099)	1.534* (.103)
R^2	.828	—	—	—
F	383.9	—	—	—
Number of Observations	566	—	—	—

Size I: less than .7 ha.
Size II: .7 – 1.49 ha.
Size III: 1.5 – 2.99 ha.
Size IV: 3.0 ha. or larger.
Standard errors of estimates in (parentheses.)
*Significantly different from zero at probability level ≤ 5 percent.

always significantly positive, as we move from the production function of small farms to that of the largest farms. The constant term, a, which is the logarithm of the technical efficiency parameter, is lowest for the production function of the smallest farms, and approximately the same for the production functions of the other three groups.

While it is obvious that the production functions of the four groups of farms are different with respect to the magnitudes of the parameters, it would be more useful if we could determine which, if any, of the parameters of the production function for one group are significantly different from those of another group's production function. That is, we want to see if there are significantly different production functions for rice farmers of different sizes. This can be analyzed by taking a linear combination of any two corresponding coefficients from equation (2.5):

(2.6) $\lambda = \delta' B$

where δ' is a 1 X 20 vector of known numbers; for the case of the difference between the logarithms of the technical efficiency parameters of farms in size groups I and II, δ' would be given by:

(2.7) $\delta' = (1, -1, 0, 0, \ldots\ldots, 0)$

and B is 20 X 1 vector of the estimated coefficients:

(2.8) $$B - \begin{matrix} a_1 \\ a_2 \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \alpha_{21} \\ \alpha_{31} \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \alpha_{22} \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \alpha_{54} \end{matrix}$$

Thus λ equals $a_1 - a_2$. The variance of λ is given by:

(2.9) $\sigma_\lambda{}^2 = \sigma^2\, \delta'\, (X^1X)^{-1}\, \delta = \delta'\, \Sigma_{BB}\, \delta$

where σ^2 is the disturbance variance, estimated by $S^2 = \frac{SSE}{N - 21}$. N is the number of observations and SSE is the error sum of squares. Σ_{BB} is the covariance matrix of the coefficients for which an unbiased estimate is given by:

(2.10) $S_{BB} = S^2\, (X'X)^{-1}$

With this information, the significance of the difference between any two coefficients can be obtained from the formula:

$$(2.11)\quad t = \frac{\lambda}{\sqrt{\sigma_\lambda{}^2}} = \frac{a_1 - a_2}{\sqrt{\sigma^2_{a_1} + \sigma^2_{a_2} + 2\ \text{Covar}\ (a_1, a_2)}}$$

where t is the student's t ratio, and an absolute value of t greater than 1.96, given 566 observations, indicates that the difference between the two coefficients is significantly different than zero at the probability level less than or equal to 5 percent.[12]

In Table 2 we report the difference in the coefficients for all possible corresponding pairs of coefficients. That is we list the differences between Groups I and II, Groups I and III, Groups I and IV, Groups II and III, Groups II and IV, and Groups III and IV. Eleven of the thirty possible difference coefficients emerged as significant. Thus,

Table 2

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CORRESPONDING PARAMETERS OF DIFFERENT PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS

	Size I-Size II	Size I-Size III	Size I-Size IV	Size II-Size III	Size II-Size IV	Size III-Size IV
$\alpha_{2m} - \alpha_{2n}$	−.100 (.065)	−.061 (.064)	.011 (.070)	.039 (.067)	.111 (.072)	.072 (.071)
$\alpha_{3m} - \alpha_{3n}$	−.036 (.067)	−.109 (.075)	−.269* (.074)	−.073 (.077)	−.233* (.076)	−.160* (.080)
$\alpha_{4m} - \alpha_{4n}$	−.116 (.077)	.055 (.081)	.105 (.068)	.171* (.080)	.221* (.067)	.050 (.071)
$\alpha_{5m} - \alpha_{5n}$	.094 (.081)	.111 (.084)	.255* (.079)	.017 (.074)	.161* (.068)	.144* (.071)
$a_m - a_n$	−.680* (.146)	−.577* (.143)	−.588* (.146)	.103 (.143)	.092 (.146)	−.011 (.143)
$m = 1, 2, 3$						
$n = 2, 3, 4$						
$m \neq n$						

Standard errors of estimates in parentheses.
* Significantly different from zero at probability level ≦5 percent.

we can say at the outset, that most of the differences among the parameters of the four production functions were not significant.

None of the coefficients on capital (farm implements) was significantly different from that of another farm size group, although the magnitudes of the differences were substantial. With respect to the coefficients on labor for the four size groups, three of the differences were significant. The elasticity of output with respect to labor for farms equal to or greater than 3.0 hectares in size was significantly larger than that of farms in the other three groups. This result supports the notion of disguised unemployment of labor in South Vietnam. Larger farms tend to use more labor relative to land and the other inputs, and at the same time the elasticity of output with respect to labor increases with the size of the farm. While these are somewhat offsetting effects to the productivity of labor, the net effect is such that the marginal productivity of labor is much greater on the largest size farms than on the smallest size farms. The marginal product of labor, in the context of the Cobb-Douglas function can be expressed as:

$$(2.12)\quad MPX_3 = \alpha_3 \frac{Y}{X_3}$$

where α_3 is the elasticity of output with respect to labor and Y/X_3 is the yield per unit of labor.[13] Table 3 contains the results of using equation (2.12) for each of the four groups of farms.

Table 3

VALUE MARGINAL PRODUCTS OF LABOR

	α_3	$Y \div X_3$ (a)	MPX_3
Size I	.030	1.59	.048
Size II	.066	2.30	.152
Size III	.139	2.69	.374
Size IV	.299	3.33	.996

(a) This is the mean value in piastres of output per piastre of labor input for each size group.

From Table 3 it is apparent that the marginal productivity of labor is much lower for small farms than for large farms. Furthermore, considering that equation (2.12) defines the marginal value product per piastre of labor, we obtain the result that labor is employed beyond the point where the value of its contribution to output equals its wage for all the size groups of farms. However, the value is close enough to unity for farms in the largest size group to suggest that these farms operate very close to the point where the wage of labor is equal to the value of the marginal product. The smaller size farms operate in such a manner that the value of the marginal physical product of labor is much less than the wage of labor, increasingly so as the size of the farm is smaller.

Only two of the coefficients on draft animals were significantly different from one another. Farms employing between .7 and 1.49 hectares of land had a significantly higher elasticity of output with respect to draft animals than either of the two groups of farms using more land. Farms of 3.0 hectares or more in size had a significantly lower elasticity of output with respect to other expenses than that of any of the other groups of smaller size farms. Other expenses, such as fertilizers and insecticides per hectare of land decreased as farm size increased; however, the use of land values resulted in the value of other expenses per piastre of land rising slightly as land size increased.

Differences in the logarithm of the technical efficiency parameter, a, were significant in only three cases.[14] Farms of less than .7 hectares had a significantly lower constant term than the other three groups of farms. Moreover, while none of the differences between the constant terms of any two of the three largest size farm groups is significant, the logarithm of the technical efficiency parameter is largest for farms between .7 and 1.49 hectares in size. This result does not lend support to the view that larger farms are more efficient. That is, our evidence indicates that farms in size group II are just as efficient, if not slightly more so, as farms in size group III or IV.[15]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The results of this production function analysis are consistent with the less formal analyses found in other sources dealing with the economics of smallholder rice production in South Vietnam. Sansom found evidence that the efficiency of large plots had declined in South Vietnam after 1964, though in his analysis the emergence of a labor shortage with concomitant rising labor costs was "responsible for the different sizes of the optimum plots in the two periods."[16] Prior to 1964 Sansom found that labor was abundant and that due to production techniques there were marked peaks in the demand for labor which accentuated the seasonal unemployment of rural workers. Hendry has also noted in his earlier study that rural laborers had very high seasonal unemployment rates.[17] The traditional culture and production techniques were consistent with underemployment, especially of the households' own labor supply.

The results obtained are consistent, too, with recent research in other Asian countries. Yotopoulos and Lau, for example, found in India that while small farms do not maximize profits as the very large farms do, they are technically much more efficient, in fact so much so that overall they have a higher level of profits than large farms if both face the same market prices for inputs and outputs and have the same endowments of physical capital and land.[18]

Of course, it should be remembered that the data on which this study was based are five to six years old, and may be invalidated by new production techniques, high-yielding rice varieties, and the processes of war and time. This is an empirical question which only more recent data can confirm.

1. Only farms that derived 99 percent or more of their total crop income from rice were included in the sample.
2. This was obtained by multiplying the area of land used times the provincial average rental rate of a hectare of land.
3. The value of the stock of farm implements was obtained by summing up, for each household, the products of the number of each type of implement times the average price of that implement. The average price of each implement was computed

on a national basis from information on purchases of new implements contained in the survey.

4. Stroup [11], p. D31. The household's own labor input was adjusted according to its composition and availability of all farms within the corresponding province. The adjusted household labor input was converted into value terms by utilizing the provincial average wage.

5. This measure was obtained by first attributing to any farm that owned draft animals the provincial average per hectare of land draft animal expenses times the number of hectares of land used by this farm. This measure of owned draft animal input was adjusted by an index based on the number of draft animals owned per hectare.

6. Included in this input category are cash expenditures for insecticides, fertilizers, irrigation, seed, and miscellaneous other production expenses, as well as the value of all payments in kind, except that of labor.

7. Those farms without such information were assigned the local paddy price at the time of the survey, or the hamlet average price of paddy sold, whichever was available.

8. Using value measures we observed that factor proportions were not constant between size groups. The unity elasticity of factor substitution inherent in the Cobb-Douglas function implies that factor shares, given by the elasticities of output with respect to the various inputs, and hence the ratios of factor shares, will be constant. Thus, on the basis of our analysis of patterns of resource use we would have to be suspicious of the use of a single Cobb-Douglas model for all rice farms in South Vietnam. However, since our data were not derived from an accounting identity, the existence of variations in factor shares could be due to discrepancies in the measurement of inputs, in which case the use of the Cobb-Douglas function might not be inappropriate.

9. Fitting production functions on a per unit of land basis yields information on contribution to yield made by per unit of land variations in other resources. This is of particular "usefulness in farm planning and budgeting." Suryanarayana [13], p. 2.

10. Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze [14], pp. 786-790.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Goldberger [3], p. 166.

13. Equation (2.12), because it uses value measures, could be rewritten as: $MPX_3 = a_3 \frac{P_Q Q}{Q}$ where P_Q is the price of paddy, Q is the quantity of paddy, W is the wage for labor and L is the quantity of physical labor units. Marginal physical product of labor is given by $MPPL = a_3 \frac{Q}{L}$, and the value of the Marginal physical product is $VMPP_L = a_3 \frac{P_Q Q}{L}$; hence, equation (2.12) expresses the ratio of the value of the marginal physical product to the wage.

14. The constant term, a, is an unbiased estimate of the logarithm of the technical efficiency parameter, but not of the technical efficiency parameter itself. See Goldberger [4], pp. 467-470.

15. This could be interpreted, alternatively, in terms of average costs. Because we have imposed constant returns to scale, the average cost curve is a horizontal line, if all inputs are variable. However, the height of the average cost curve will vary with the reciprocal of the technical efficiency parameter. Hence, the larger the technical efficiency parameter, the lower will be the average cost of producing any given level of output.

16. Sansom [10], pp. 274-276.

17. Hendry [7], pp. 134-136.

18. L. J. Lau and P. A. Yotopoulos [8], pp. 22-23.

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Abstract / Résumé

La musique du théâtre au Vietnam reflète la formation culturelle des Vietnamiens, à la fois profondément influencés par les Chinois et obstinement indépendants, et les influences que les Vietnamiens ont absorbées de leurs voisins du Sud-Est asiatique en plus. Le Vietnam, ayant la forme à preu près d'un sablier long et peu épais, a été divisé géographiquement, et parfois politiquement, en trois sections, et chacune des trois a produit un genre de théâtre adapté à son propre caractère. Le centre avec un terrain accidenté et une population éparse, est amateur de classique *Hát Bội*, qui ressemble beaucoup à l'opéra sérieux chinois. Le Nord, avec ses vallées fertiles et bien peuplées du Fleuve Rouge a pris en affections le *Hát Chèo* sous sa forme populaire d'opéra folklorique. Le Sud, vietnamien depuis seulement quelques centaines d'années, reflète le plus les diversités des cultures qui ont pris racine dans ses plaines plates et fertiles. L'influence de la musique Cham et Cambodgienne anime le *Cải Lương*, espèce d'opérette, créé au commencement du vingtième siècle des sources ainsi variées que la musique de chambre vietnamienne et l'opérette française. Quoique ces trois musiques aient joué d'une protection imperiale et aristocratique, un trait remarquable est qu'elles ont résisté aux contrôles officiels et ont continué comme expression du peuple vietnamien. La poésie et la musique ont été les formes d'arts favorites des Vietnamiens, et ensemble elles ont créées une riche diversité de chants folkloriques, cérémoniaux, musique de chambre, et vocalisations poétiques. Tous ces aspects se sont insinués dans des formes de théâtre vietnamien. Les trois formes de l'opéra vietnamien ont en effet absorbé beaucoup de musiques qui ont disparu sous leurs formes originales. Ainsi est-il que le musicologue est obligé d'aller au théâtre pour entendre un grand mélange des goûts musicaux vietnamiens et du passé et du présent. Cette étude examinera les formes du théâtre vietnamien historiquement en mettant l'accent sur la musique, et en considérant les perspectives actuelles de chaque forme.

Theater Music of Vietnam

STEPHEN ADDISS

Introduction

Vietnam has many kinds of music, and many varieties of each musical form. The North, the Center, and the South have their own kinds of ritual music, folk music, chamber music, and ceremonial music, and the ethnic minorities provide even more variety with their own ceremonies, dances and songs.

Musical theater, long popular in Vietnam, divides clearly into three sections, the classical theater of the Center, the folk opera of the North, and the renovated theater of the South. We will examine each of these forms, but first a few general notes on the language and music of Vietnam may be helpful.

Vietnamese as spoken follows the cultural division of the country into three parts, but it is everywhere an inflected language. It has four, five, or six different tones depending on whether the speaker is from, respectively, the Center, the South, or the North. Vietnam switched from the use of a form of Chinese characters to the use of a Western-style alphabet over the last three centuries, with special signs indicating the tones:

má high rising *ma* level *mà* low falling
mạ low constricted *mã* and *mả* dipping rising

Even more than Chinese, the Vietnamese language depends on tones for understanding; speaking with a poor accent but good tones is preferable to speaking with a good accent but no tones, a fact that has created problems for Westerners learning the language. In addition to the tonal marks, Vietnamese has several marks to differentiate vowel pronunciations, and two forms of the letter "d", soft and hard:

săn sân cô cơ da đa

The strong tonality of the language has had a profound effect on Vietnamese music. A word with a high rising tone cannot be sung with a falling melody, and vice versa. As a result, many melodic forms were developed that could accommodate improvised changes of notes to fit the tones of the words used. In both folk and classical music, words and melody have had an especially close and mutually interdependent relationship.

The primary influence on Vietnamese music has been that of China, with a secondary influence from Southeast Asia through the Cham peoples who once had a powerful kingdom in what is now South Vietnam. The Cham still exist, in greatly reduced numbers, as one of the ethnic minorities. The scales in Vietnam follow the pentatonic of China, with the exception of the South, where the scale is "bent" but remains of five notes.



Starting with the usual pentatonic scale (here given starting from the note C but in actual practice beginning in Vietnam with any pitch convenient to the performers) the Vietnamese have many possibilities. Any of the five notes may begin the scale as the "tonic" or rest point, the second inversion resembling our minor scale being especially popular:



In addition, the scale may actually be transposed to the same pattern on a new note, a process called metabole. A single example is given here, but in fact each note may become the new *do*, and elaborate melodies in Vietnam often use several metaboles in the same piece.



Vietnamese music, as with Vietnamese culture, is primarily East Asian rather than Southeast Asian. Its closest affinities are to China, Korea, Japan, and Mongolia, but within this group Vietnam is the only country where a strong Southeast Asian influence is also present. This combination of influences, plus the inherent musicality and long musical traditions of the Vietnamese, has produced a sophisticated and multifaceted musical culture.

Between the years 2500 and 1500 B.C. a mass of migrations southward from China sent numerous tribes of peoples into Southeast Asia, carrying with them a kind of proto-theater based on a common fund of myths, rice-culture, and animism.[1] The Vietnamese actually came somewhat later, pushing the Cham further south and fighting the Khmer to the west.

The next great wave of influence in Asia was that of India, which, through traders and missionaries of Buddhism and Brahmanism, strongly invaded the cultures of all Southeast Asian countries, in the first 1,000 years A.D.[2] Vietnam, more than its neighbors, resisted the Indian thrust. The royal music was touched with the charm of the music of the Cham, but Vietnam itself had been ruled as a part of the Chinese Empire with only short rebellious exceptions from 40 to 939 A.D. The Vietnamese kept their identity but adopted Chinese Mahayana Buddhism mixed with Confucianism and a hint of Taoism, Chinese characters for writing, and Chinese government styles for mandarin education and bureaucracy.[3]

In China during the Chou Dynasty (c. 1120 B.C.), religious festivals were held with chanting priests, mimed actions, and even small plays used to educate the people in religious beliefs. There were also actors, jugglers and acrobats in this precursor of Chinese opera.[4] The early Vietnamese probably had a simplified form of religious theater in their early days. A kind of funeral music with dance, the *vãn ca*, had come from China, but between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries two of the three main forms of Vietnamese theater were born, the classical *hát bội* and the satiric and folkstyle *hát chèo*. The third form, *cải lương*, was born in the twentieth century as a mixture of chamber music, French theater, and traditional Vietnamese elements.

The *hát chèo* evolved as a Northern form, the *hát bội* as a specialty of the Center, and the *cải lương* as the characteristic form of the South, and as they are quite separate forms of theater, we shall examine them separately.

HÁT CHÈO

There are several theories as to the origin of the popular *hát chèo*. One holds that touring groups of musicians, actors and acrobats gradually evolved a kind of musical theater out of satiric and vaudeville elements, putting them together in a kind of folk theater. According to another, a Chinese actor was employed by the Vietnamese Emperor Trân-Hung-Đao to teach his skills to the Vietnamese after they had captured him in the wars against the Yuan Dynasty Mongol-Chinese forces.[5] Another influence was that of early processions and festivals, leading to the establishment of an acting group in 968 A.D.[6] In any case the theater developed from some of the same sources as the *hát* *ả đào*, ceremonial functions that required entertainment at banquets, at festivals, and on auspicious occasions. Early troupes of actors and musicians were called *phường chèo bội*, and later *chèo sân đình*, names reflecting the performances in meeting halls and courtyards. Many performers were farmers after harvest time, others were touring musicians, dancers, singers, and acrobats who would gather for a theater-in-the-round to act out old stories and legends, to dance with lamps and flowers, to sing praises of the Emperor and of mandarins, to teach proper values, and especially to satirize and to amuse.[7] The early instruments used included the oboe (*sona*), flute, 2-string violin, little drum and gongs. The words to the songs were poetry of 7-7 or 6-8 syllable lines, and the songs were of several styles: joyful, sad, flirtatious, serious, and religious (the last sung by monks, frequent characters in the stock plays). The music, unlike *ả đào* melodies, used many additive sounds to enable the performer to increase the melismatic content of the melody, so the *chèo* tunes could use second parts, echoes, repeated phrases, and impressive high or low notes.[8] They followed the pentatonic scale, *do re fa sol la*, but with many metaboles (transpositions) to make the melodies especially rich. Everything centered upon the full entertainment aspect of the music, and the court had to ban the use of *hát chèo* at funerals in 1730 as they were too jolly for these supposedly sad occasions.[9]

The *hát chèo* reached its peak in the end of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1790 it was said that men of good family would not hesitate to leave their professions to join troupes, and even to dress as women in order to perform on stage.[10]

Five kinds of rhythms predominated in the *chèo*, and are given by Pham Duy as follows:

nhịp cách—irregular beat, free phrases of separate lengths.
nhịp đuổi—very quick, beats following the phrases with echoing and overlapping melodies.
nhịp sắp—regular and quick.
nhịp dặt—the opposite of the *đuổi* in that the beat goes before the phrase.
nhịp chờ—a slow, regular beat.[11]

Along with these rhythms went certain melodic formulas, always free to the extent that the performer could improvise on the basic tune-structure, and always capable of being modified by the tones of the language indicating a rising or a falling tone. The melodic basis was determined by the character who was singing and the situation in the play. For happy occasions there were many kinds of *sắp* melodic designs.[12] *Sắp cổ phong* was an ancient style, *sắp qua cầu* was for comedians walking perilously across a bridge, and other *sắp* were for comedians or domestics appearing in various plays, including versions of the famous Vietnamese narrative poem, *Kim Vân Kiều*. *Sắp chót* was for evil personages, while *sắp gối lớp một* was a love song.

Another kind of happy song was the form of *cách*, such as the *cách cú*, a form in free rhythm. Comedians, in addition to singing the *sắp*, had characteristic pieces such as *hề mồi*, *hề gây nhịp một*, and the satiric *hôi tiếu*. The *hề mồi* came from the early practice of an actor preparing a playing area by walking around it with a torch, to indicate the outlines of the "stage". So *hề mồi* means "*clown's torch*" and is still a kind of song used in performances on elaborate stages in theaters.[13]

The sad songs included *làn tham*, a plaint about the horrors of war, the *ba than*, a plea for protection, and the *vãn cầm*, a song in a forest. Sentimental tunes were often varieties of the *sa lệch*, *đường trường* (including a bridal song), and *hát đúm*, a kind of tune popular in Bắc Ninh province, as well as many songs of parting and of love. There were special songs for madness, for flirting, for the monks, and even some for infanticide, the *hát ru kê*.

The *hát chèo* had spoken sections (*nói vặt*) and many kinds of declamation as well as song forms. *Nói lối* was a chanting of 7-syllable lines, frequently of a serious nature, by high class personages. *Nói đệm* was the same kind of line but in more common speech. *Nói sử* was a kind of a recitative form, *sử xuân* was the happy arioso, *sử rầu* or *sử sầu* the sad tune, and *sử vãn* was used to introduce the funeral song, *hát vãn*, in lines of 6-8 syllables. Finally there was the *nói lung*, 7-syllable lines chanted lightly, with the form of *nói lung chênh* for more elegant scenes.[14]

An example follows of an introduction (*vỉa*) leading to an arioso or song (*hát sử*). The singer in her free section at first is accompanied by flute and violin weaving around her melody, then the orchestra including drums, gongs, cliquettes and lutes enters for a brief instrumental section in unison and sets a steady beat before the singer begins the song. In this case the arioso is *Quan âm Thị kính*, or song about Thị-Kính (Kuan Yin). In this complicated plot, a young wife is about to cut her husband's beard while he sleeps. He wakes, and seeing her with a knife is frightened and sends her away. She dresses as a man and goes to live at a pagoda, where young girls fall in love with her. She has a baby that she had been carrying in secret, and one young girl accepts it as her own and is dismissed from the pagoda.[15]

The scale follows the usual *hát chèo* pentatonic pattern, in its *re fa sol la do* form. For convenience, *re* is here interpreted as the note D, but in performance it may vary to suit the singer's convenience. There is a hint of metabole transposition at the beginning of the third line with the note B, in which the new scale *re fa sol la do*, beginning on the note E, is implied. At the end of the third line the note C reappears, changing the scale back. In cases like this there is some ambiguity as to whether the scale has changed or whether the note B has entered only as a passing note, or functions as an ornament. First we will give the scales and then the music.

The notations are only approximate, for the skill of the singers is shown by the addition of vocal ornaments to the line, including trills, vibratos of various speeds and widths, grace notes, sliding tones, and appoggiaturas. The melody as given above would be the structure from which the singer and players improvise the arioso.

Plots of the dramas were often as complicated as that given above, but usually revolved around a simple theme. The distinctions between country and town life frequently provided the dramatic spark to set in motion a series of events that gave each character a chance to express various emotions.

The German dramatist Peter Weiss, who visited North Vietnam in 1968, gives the following account of the beginning of a *hát chèo* he saw:

A young girl is expecting a visit from her boyfriend. She prepares her parents for his arrival, cleverly giving the impression that it is they who wish her to get married. Her fan laid on her arm pointing backwards, indicating that she is an honorable maiden, she sings that she is ready to get married only to please her parents.

The suitor arrives, and tells the audience that he is an industrious student and a young scholar. He has seen a maiden whom he would like to marry, and so early in the morning he has set out on the road. Now he is here, at the house where the girl lives with her family, and he will show how polite and well brought-up he is.

The father appears, and takes the play off on a tangent. He is a drunken old man, a stock character who is portrayed without coarseness, merely defining an everyday event in its various and comic aspects. His is a famous scene; there are actors who are master portrayers of the drunk old man. He leans swaying on his stick. "If I fall into the pond, the pond will get wet," he mumbles and mimes being drunk. "All I need is ten water buffalo to have ten water buffalo. All I need is a half a tooth to have a tooth and a half."

The young man comes up to him, bows and states his intentions. He speaks in a classical Vietnamese, while the old man makes a contrast by speaking a very rural dialect. This leads to various misunderstandings. Eventually the young girl will put her suitor to many tests of his devotion, the plot will go through many complications, emphasizing rural versus city values, and finally end happily after many kinds of songs and interludes.[16]

Performances of a *hát chèo* troupe often opened with individual introductions by the entire cast, with the recitative *sử chúc* and the song *ngũ phúc chúc thọ*. After this opening the story would unfold with the songs and declamations mentioned and, of course, many more. Dance was and is an important element in the show, with naturalistic gestures to bolster the words. In a phrase "sky and earth, do you know my suffering?", an actor might point up and down and finally at himself in dance form. Gestures have many meanings, as do the way characters walk to indicate their mood, position in the story and intentions. A serious walk, for example has the feet pointing outwards. Hand movements are numerous and somewhat like those of Cambodian and Thai dancing, and may indicate different things at different times.

Some of the dances in *hát chèo* are the wedding dance, the dance of the four genies, the dance of the foolish man and of the foolish woman, and the dance of love-madness. In the past there were also dances similar to the early *hát ả đào* flower and lamp ceremonial dances. *Hát chèo* has always been partly a folk theater, and has reflected the life of the rice farmers and peasants, with the most important personage frequently a woman, perhaps reflecting matriarchal strains in Vietnamese society. Many of the songs talk about animals and use animal imagery, for example a man is like a kind cat who never bites, or a woman is like a fish that men try to catch.[17] So *hát chèo* has echoes of feminism and of animalism, but in the French occupation it lost its countryside character and was put on formal stages for more elaborate and sophisticated performances. *hát chèo* borrowed and transformed songs from the *ả đào* and from the *hát trống quân* festival music, and the plots began to concern themselves more with townsfolk and city dwellers. In this renovation of *hát chèo*, the form loses its purity in the new mixture in the new plays, but gains in elaboration and perhaps also in strength of structure. Of the many new playwrights, Nguyễn Đình Nghị has been the most successful. During the war with the French the form suffered, but has been restored in the North under the strong patronage of the Hanoi government, which sponsors the folk and people's arts. The music and dances have been restored almost to their pre-French purity, but the stories are mostly new or have been changed to include the message that the regime thinks beneficial. This change is known to the Vietnamese as "ancient bottle but new wine".[18]

The instruments used in the *hát chèo* orchestra have grown in number over the years. The classic group consisted of transverse flute, 2-string violin, small two-faced drum, gongs, and cliquettes. Nowadays are added the vertical flute, other forms of 2-string violins such as that with the coconut body, the large viol, the 2-string lute, the monochord *bầu*, and the large "rice" drum. For recitatives and declamations, the instruments used are the two kinds of flute and the monochord or 2-string violin. For songs, the entire orchestra may join in. Between parts of a song, or between musical numbers, the orchestra plays one of the melody formulas of transition called *lưu không*.[19] *Hát chèo* is flourishing these days as a formalized folk-theater or kind of light opera, but is performed almost exclusively in the Red River area of North Vietnam.[20]

HÁT BỘI

The theater of the Center, or classical theater, is based primarily on Chinese opera. Before the advent of the form, Vietnam had a primitive kind of theater called *cảnh tượng*, scenes of dancing, singing, war mime, and acrobatics, with the actors masked. Sometime during the twelfth or thirteenth centuries, Chinese taught the Vietnamese their classical theater, and this became *tuồng*, later called *hát bộ* and *hát bội*, as it became played for the common people instead of only for the court.[21] Over the centuries, more developed forms of Chinese theater came to Vietnam, so that current *hát bội* is much more similar to the eighteenth century Manchu form of theater than it is to Yuan or Sung Dynasty opera. Its beginnings probably date from the capture of Chinese actors during the Mongol invasions, perhaps in 1285 although various legends give various dates.

We know that in 1437 *tuồng* was played at the court; it did not reach the general public until the reign of Lê Hiển Tông (1740-1786). *Hát bộ* or *bội* means singing with gestures, a name given the plays because they were the most formalized and elaborate in Vietnam. Chinese taste was constantly modified to that of the Vietnamese, particularly in the music. The stories remained mostly Chinese, but within the opera tradition the music became the combination of Northern and Southern that has always moved the Vietnamese. Although one commentator on Asian theater considers that Vietnamese *hát bội* "differs in no degree, other than that of excellence, from Chinese opera,"[22] I think his understanding of Vietnamese theater may be judged by the fact that he is apparently unaware of *hát chèo* at all.

It is true that in its form *hát bội* remained very similar to the Chinese prototypes. Costumes, makeup, and the symbolic use of scenery and props came intact from the Chinese form, and although gradually Vietnamese historical dramas made their appearance, most plays were translations of Chinese historical tales. In either case, the plays had a Confucian moral, showing the restoration to power of a good Emperor by a heroic and self-sacrificing nobleman or mandarin, facing danger, killing usurpers, and showing the audience the importance of loyalty.

When Vietnam was divided into two parts in the eighteenth century, the Nguyễn dynasties in the South greatly encouraged *hát bội*. While the Lê dynasty in the North favored the *hát ả đào*, the Nguyễn brought the best singer-actors to their court in what is now the Center. When the country was united again Emperor Gia Long organized an official theater and built a special stage within the forbidden city in Huế in 1804.[23] Dramas based on Vietnamese history were encouraged, and put actors on a par with soldiers in the Imperial service. The lead performer, Nhứt Âm, had the equivalent rank of captain, while bit players were ranked as corporals.[24] The Emperor's troupe did not play for the general public, but other travelling groups began to wend their way through the countryside, bringing opera to towns and villages. Frequently these travelling groups were formed partly from ex-favorites of the palace:

> The dancers were young beauties from fifteen to seventeen, recruited among the people and trained to serve in the Imperial ballet company until "the flower of their youth began to wither" when they forfeited the privileges of appearing before the dragon, that is, the Emperor. Discharged . . . they were returned to ordinary life. These young artists had to create jobs for themselves. They formed among themselves travelling companies to roam the country on foot, each individual carrying his equipment in bundles hung on either end of a long bamboo pole. They gave public performances for whoever would buy their services.[25]

These travelling companies brought both drama and dance to the provinces, and both disseminated and influenced all the different kinds of Vietnamese theater. Under the encouragement of all the Emperors since Gia Long, *hát bội* became popular in all parts of Vietnam, but had its greatest success in the Center with the focus on the court. Under Emperor Tự Đức (1847-1883) the official company employed 300 actors picked from all over the country,[26] but it was also this Emperor who commented that "actors do not belong to the human species".[27] On the other hand, many Emperors picked high mandarins to write the dramas, and even Emperor Thành Thái (1889-1909) himself was known to perform.[28]

The best of the mandarin playwrights was Đào Tấn (1847-1907), who also organized the first school for *hát bội*, called Học Bộ Đình, or "study-theater house." In addition to teaching, Đào Tấn wrote more than twenty operas, using Chinese stories but reflecting the decadence of Vietnam under the French.[29]

Hát bội plays, at first mostly translations of Chinese operas, were gradually Vietnamized in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Stories were adopted from such sources as the Vietnamese epic poem *Kim Vân Kiều*. Perhaps the greatest music-drama in the world, at least in size, was a cycle of one hundred operas, written in the nineteenth century, called *Vạn Bửu Trình Tường*.[30] When it is clear that each of the hundred dramas took ten to twelve hours to perform, Wagner's Ring cycle seems modest by comparison. Each of the one hundred operas is based on a character representing a medicine, and the different dramas have interconnecting plots. There are traditionally one hundred medicines in Vietnam, so this offered a ready means of organizing the cycle. Nowadays only a few of the operas are remembered and performed. Another cycle of forty operas, *Quần Phương Hiến Thụy*, was based on forty characters each representing a flower. The drama centering on "Miss Rose" would show a beautiful but prickly girl, for example. These large opera-cycles were written in *tuồng pho* style, meaning serial, official, mandarin-written productions. The common people had at the same time a popular version of classical theater, with much more satire, called *tuồng đồ*. These were mainly orally improvised plays that reached their peak about 1870.[31]

In the early twentieth century the French paid authors to write dramas that would further Vietnamese-French friendship, and some of the mandarins complied. One even adopted *Le Cid* of Corneille to become an opera called *Lộ Địch*, which is still extant. At the same time there was an increase in interest in patriotic Vietnamese themes for operas, using the legends and stories of the past such as the rebellion against the Chinese led by the Trung sisters. The influence of the French was found mostly in the increased romanticism of *hát bội* in the early years of this century. Instead of plots of almost entirely a military and heroic, symbolic and dramatic cast, there now entered love stories and romances, with an accompanying change in the music.

Today, *hát bội* is in a period of decline. There are occasional performances of the pure form of the art, but with no court to sponsor the troupes there is little "high style" left.[32] A kind of renovated and modernized *hát bội* has a certain popularity but even this form, in modern language and with scenery and props, does not have anything like the popularity of *cải lương*, which has taken some of the plots and music from *hát bội*.

Musically, in *hát bội* the percussion is the most important element. The largest drum is the *trống chiến*, or battle drum, which punctuates declamations and accompanies songs and dances and leads the orchestra. It may be played with six kinds of attacks:

(1) *thùng*—a hard blow in the center of the drum;
(2) *tang*—hit with the flat of the stick near the edge of the drum;
(3) *cắc*—hit on the wooden side of the drum;
(4) *rụp*—a double hit in center;
(5) *tích*—one hand on the skin mutes the blow by the other hand;
(6) *tống*—the end of the stick hits the edge of the drum.

Each little set of drum notes has its own meaning, somewhat like Wagnerian leitmotives. Even the audience sometimes had a drum with which to comment on the performance. For example, a single *tang* meant that a noble listener wanted to speak to the maestro, a single *tích* was a negative comment, while two *thùngs* meant good and three excellent.[33]

The leader of the orchestra played both the *bát câu*, small one-sided drum, and the *trống cơm*, or rice drum.[34] The second most important musician played the oboe, *kèn* or *sona*. In accompanying Chinese-style tunes, this instrument replaced in popularity the 2-string violin preferred in China. The *sona,* in Vietnamese ears, "rips the heart from your intestines"[35] and is therefore also used in funeral music

The third player performed on one of the several versions of the 2-string violin. Although not as pervasive as in Chinese opera, the *cò* or the *nhị* was especially used to accompany declamations. The fourth musician played the transverse flute, *sáo,* although in recent years he sometimes played the coconut-body 2-string violin, *gáo*. The fifth member of the orchestra played one form or another of lute. This might be the 3-string lute *tam,* the lute of the *hát ả đào* called *đáy,* the 2-string moon-lute *nguyệt* or *kìm,* the 4-string *tỳ bà,* or the long necked *xên* or short-necked *doan.* The sixth and final musician played a variety of percussion instruments including gongs and cliquettes, sometimes also the buffalo horn and cymbals.

Another version of the orchestra has the leader playing all of the percussion, two violinists, a flute, a lute, and an oboe player making up the six. In the countryside smaller troupes of three musicians made up the orchestra, the leader playing the drum with one hand and the gong with the other, the oboe-player doubling on the coconut-violin, and the third playing the other forms of 2-string violin.[36]

The orchestra has certain times when it plays without singing:

(1) *khai trường*—or *trống dương dâu*—the overture to the entire opera, using the full orchestra.
(2) *bài chiến*—or *trống rao*—between scenes of the drama.
(3) *trống dâm bang* or *trống xuất binh* or *bài ra binh*—to accompany the departure of warriors.
(4) *trống giao chiến*—to accompany scenes of battle.

As the titles indicate, using the word *trống* or drum, the chief percussionist dominates the ensemble as well as leading it.[37]

The greater part of *hát bội* is occupied with singing. It has been estimated that 70 per cent to 80 per cent of the performance time may be taken up in song,[38] with the violins and lutes providing an accompaniment in unison with the vocal line or, more often, weaving elaborations of the melody as it is being sung. There may be some speech, but the predominant line is solo voice, as there is no chorus and duos consist mainly of traded-off solo sections.

There are six main varieties of vocalism, the *hát khách* (arias in Chinese style), *hát nam* (arias in Southern style), *xướng, bạch, ngâm, thán,* and *oán* (ariosos), *hát bài* (songs of particular characters), *hát* *niêu* (various songs including adopted folk-tunes) and *nói lối* (declamations and recitative).[39]

The *hát khách*, or songs of the strangers (i.e. Chinese), are not related directly to any music from Chinese opera, but use the Northern pentatonic scale of

do re fa sol la

and are generally for joyful scenes and strong scenes. Like most of the music in *hát bội*, the *khách* use a classical Sino-Vietnamese language that is difficult to understand, with a syncopated rhythm. In a pure *hát khách* the verse lines are of seven syllables, but there are other varieties in freer prosody, such as the *khách phú*. There is also the *khách tử*, a death aria in slower rhythm, and *khách tẩu mã*, song of the galloping horse, in rapid tempo. The pure *khách* is used for arias sung by the scholar before taking his exams, the warrior anticipating battle, etc., and has the important orchestral melodic instrumental accompaniment of the *sona* or oboe.

The *hát nam* has the sadder accents of the South, where Vietnamese have always found the music languorous and melancholic. Some of the varieties of *nam* have the same names as tunes of both chamber music and Southern theater, but the music in each case is different. For example, there are pieces called *nam ai* (southern sorrow) in all three forms with different melodies.

The arias of *hát bội* in the *nam* style have lyrics in more ordinary words than those of the classical *khách*, and use the lines of 7-7-6-8 syllables that Vietnamese poets have long favored. *Nam xuân* is a song in a serene mood. As with other arias, the percussion plays variations on a rhythmic formula. *Nam ai* is for sad scenes such as those of separation, while *nam di* is for a character overcome with grief. *Nam chạy* is in quicker tempo, for an actor in distress such as being chased by bandits. *Nam dứt* and *nam biệt* are songs of separation.

Of the arioso-like chants, the *xướng* is an expression of feelings preceding the presentation of a character in the opera. *Bach* are recitatives sung by soldiers and monks before the *nói lối* declamations. *Ngâm* are poems that are read musically, and *thán* and *oán* are plaints in 7-syllable lines. *Thán* is the more classical of the two latter forms, and is sung when a woman finds her husband or her parents dead, and at other dolorous occasions.

Many characters such as bad spirits, soldiers, madmen, monks, magicians, loyal sons, and musicians have their own songs. These arias are called *bài* and they occur in stock situations in the plots.

Hát niêu, or various songs, covers the other kinds of arias that may be sung, such as the *thài* or song of sacrifice, the *giao duyên* love song, and *đọc sách,* students' song. This heading also covers the kinds of songs popular in different regions of Vietnam that make their appearance in *hát bôi: Sa mạc* and *bồng mạc* in the North, *hát giã gạo* and *hát chèo đò* in the Center, and the various *Ly'* folksongs of the South. There are even *ly' mọi* for minority group (montagnard) characters, and *ma cô nữ*, a madman's song imitating the accent of Cambodians.

The music of *hát nòi* seems very clangorous to Western ears, with less of the haunting melodies than other forms of Vietnamese music. The martial air of most of the plot leads to a lot of drum rolling and shouting, and the *sona* takes the lead in the warlike music, as in this typical example, with the B*b* as given standing for the natural seventh of the harmonic series:[40]



In the more tender moments, mostly laments, the two sizes of violins take the lead in accompanying the singers with more graceful and Vietnamized melodies. A typical vocal part, sung in free rhythm and with many vocal embellishments, follows, in the *re fa sol do* inversion of the pentatonic scale:[41]

Nói lối is the form for declamations, of which there are many types. Characters go into declamations and recitative to introduce themselves, to insult their enemies, to show anger, when meeting a friend, for sadness, before death, for vengeance, and for innumerable other purposes. The main divisions include: *lối tuồng*, the actors introduce themselves in a kind of falsetto, using a rhythmic prose and modern language. *Lối bóp*, declamations of anger and insults, are accompanied by oboe and percussion. *Lối nam* is a sad declamation in rhythmic prose and in either classical or normal language, accompanied by the 2-string violin. *Lối dam*, *lối gia* or *lối hang* are declamations in the style of speech-rhythms, unaccompanied, and *hường* and *tán* are variations which are inserted into the introductions and before *hát nam*.

Hát bội is a conventionalized and symbolic art-form, not at all a realistic one. It borrowed from Chinese opera the use of gestures and movement for an amazing variety of meanings. In Chinese opera there may be 54 different hand movements, 107 different motions with the sleeves, and 138 or arm, leg, and foot movements.[42] The Vietnamese modified their symbolic gestures somewhat but retained such signs as the stiff walk of the official, the raised index finger for emphasis, the clinched fist of the warrior, and the elaborate battle scenes that include tumbling.[43] Costumes are also symbolic and standardized for the characters, and scenery (except in some reformed companies which have made them more elaborate) was a painted backdrop, a table and two chairs. With simple props, a whip representing a horse for example, *hát bội* leaned on mime and gesture to convey meanings rich in subtlety, but like all classical arts it takes time to appreciate and is having a difficult time surviving in the current era. To be fully appreciated, *hát bội* demands a large body of spectators who know the drama, recognize the gestures and aria-forms, appreciate the singing styles including falsetto and vocal elaborations, and can be moved by an exceptional performance of a standard role. In these respects it is very much like Western opera, although even more stylized and less naturalistic. It will be one test of Vietnam's future to see if *hát bội* can survive.

CẢI LƯƠNG *(Renovated Theater of the South)*

Cải lương, unlike most forms of Vietnamese music, whose beginnings are shrouded in the past, began in 1917.[44] A group of civil servants organized a performance they called *ca ra bộ*, singing with gestures, and instead of using the traditional *hát bội* they took some of the chamber music of the South, (called "music of the amateurs" after coming down from *ca Huế*), and set a text on top of the familiar tune *Tứ Đại Oán* (Four Grievances). They used a portion of the long poem *Lục Vân Tiên,* using a section they called *Bùi Kiêm* (and) *Nguyệt Nga.* With some talking but mostly singing, this told how Bùi Kiêm, after failing in his examinations returns to his home. His uncle has rescued Nguyệt Nga, a lovely young girl who threw herself in the river after an unhappy love. Bùi Kiêm falls in love with the girl and all ends happily. This first little play took less than fifteen minutes, and was just part of a variety program, but it led to a new and most popular kind of musical theater.[45] The first performance in fact was a benefit for French war relief in the First World War, but already by 1918 this form had its first full-length presentation on its own merit.

The first performers were amateurs, but in the next year musicians and singers from other forms of music, minstrels and *hát bội* actors, entered the field. The name *Cải lương* seems to have first appeared in 1920, apparently to distinguish it from a kind of modernized *hát bội* called *tuồng Tầu* (Chinese Drama). Later *tuồng Tầu* referred to the Chinese classical plays in *cải lương,* with old legends, fantastic costumes, and raucous orchestration retained from *hát bội.* On the other hand, *tuồng Tây* (Western Drama) referred to the more Europeanized stories, often Vietnamese dramas but sometimes also versions of tales of Victor Hugo, Dumas, and other French authors. One popular favorite was *Trà Hoa Nữ, La Dame aux Camélias* (or La Traviata) in Vietnamese.[46]

A large group of new plays were written for the immediately popular *cải lương,* emphasizing Vietnamese stories and praising individualism and freedom rather than the traditional Confucian virtues of loyalty and self-sacrifice. In the late 1920s and 1930s adventure stories and popular novels were adopted for use, including Roman adventures of the Ben Hur type, known as *tuồng kiếm hiệp La mã* (Roman Warriors). In the 1940s, the war years brought forth two new types, *tuồng chiến tranh,* war dramas, and *tuồng dã sử lịch sử,* patriotic Vietnamese legends. The spirit of freedom was well served by these later dramas, which the French could not censor as they used old legends of Vietnam to remind the audience of the Viet Minh battles of the current time.

In the war dramas, often set in imaginary countries with newly-designed uniforms used for the first time as costumes, the actors played battle scenes with movies of war used as a background with tanks, planes, and large guns.[47]

Forms of *cải lương* reached both the North and the Center of Vietnam, using local music behind the singing, but the greatest popularity of this form was and is in the South. In the 1950s more and more kinds of stories found their way into *cải lương*, including Samson and Delilah and Rashomon. The 1960s saw a melange of the different kinds of dramas, and today one may find a love story, an ancient legend, a Buddhist story, or even a fanciful tale of make-believe kingdoms of other worlds.

Of course the music had to grow with the medium, and using familiar chamber-music favorites, with new words to the melodies, did not long suffice. Many new kinds of tunes were invented, the most important of which was the *vọng cổ*. There are various opinions as to whether this melody began as a folk tune or perhaps was composed. In any case, its first full appearance, even in simple form, was as *dạ cổ* or *dạ cổ hoài lang* (longing for one's husband):[48]

Moderato Dạ Cổ Hoài Lang (circa 1920) (tranh)



At this point it was still using the scale of the Center, *do re fa sol la*, but it rapidly changed to the scale of the South, *do mi fa sol la*, also called the *vọng cổ* scale.

Vọng Cổ Scale



Two other versions of the same tune were discovered by asking some of the older singers to sing the earliest versions of *vọng cổ*:

Early Vọng Cổ (as sung)





The comparison of the three examples shows that as in all Vietnamese music the notes are free, with a structure providing the basis, or musical map, for the performers to improvise on. The words may dictate part of the actual melody, since a high-rising inflection on a word cannot be sung on a downward melody, but much of the improvisation is the attempt by the singer and the musicians to add life and meaning to a traditional form. The form of *vọng cổ* has remained the same by having the freedom to grow in performance. We can study the first phrase and see it evolve from a four-measure melody to a structure for many melodies through 8- and 16-bar phrases up to the 32-measure phrases that are sung today.

When *vọng cổ* changed from 8- to 16-measure phrases the structure changed slightly:



A 16-measure opening phrase might be played in this fashion on the *tranh*:[49]

16-Measure Vọng Cổ (circa 1945)

The *vọng cổ* quickly became the most popular part of *cải lương*. Appearing several times in every drama, it might be sung by any important character, or even as a duet trading off melodic lines. *Vọng cổ*, primarily a form representing sadness and nostalgia, might be a lullaby, a love song, or even an expression of anger. The improvised introduction to the piece, in which a singer could try her most languorous tones, became so popular that the applause would interrupt the aria when the main body of the piece began, and nowadays some singers will add another introduction in free rhythm in the middle of the selection. Popular records in Vietnam, most of which are played at 45 rpm, might begin with a tango or cha cha and break into *vọng cổ* in the middle, so pervasive is this tune-structure. A singer who cannot sing a good *vọng cổ* can never succeed in *cải lương*.

The other music in *cải lương* is mostly based on the amateur music, and as such divides into the happy and lively mode of *bắc* and the sadder modes of *nam*, the latter including the nuances *xuân*, *đảo*, *ai* and *oán*, the last of which is the same nuance as the *vọng cổ*. In addition, the Chinese theater groups that came to Cholon (a suburb of Saigon) brought Cantonese music, which impressed Vietnamese musicians enough to form a type of song they called *quảng* style, a bright kind of series of tunes in the *do re fa sol la* pentatonic in imitation of Cantonese music.

The growth of *cải lương* made it necessary to have a great deal of additional music. The chamber music was not enough, so many new pieces were written, particularly shorter selections to fit particular kinds of action. Many kinds of music also entered the theater from folk music, such as the popular folksong *Lý Con Sáo* (The Magpie), and the music of the blind minstrels, of the soothsayers and diviners, and even some from European sources made their entrance. I even heard the theme from the movie "Exodus" played at a *Cải Lương* performance, sounding very out of place amidst the otherwise totally traditional melodies.[50]

Declamations often precede the songs, such as *nói lối* before recitatives, *lối bắc* (northern style) before the happy tunes and *lối ai* before sad ones.[51] Certain pieces of music are played in most dramas, such as *xuân xe* when a hero is retreating, *tẩu mã* when a horse is pantomimed, and Western style melodies under the heading of *bài ta theo điệu Tây*, in the dramas on Western themes. The use of Buddhist music is mainly for the religious theme play, the *tuồng Phật*, while the chants of the sorcerers are used in the magic dramas, *tuồng tiên.*

A writer making up a new *cải lương* operetta, for that is what the form most resembles, can select from at least one hundred melody types or tune-formulas already known to the performers and audience. He will write a new set of lyrics for each piece, and some spoken passages as well as stage action. Actors in the larger troupes learn their parts word for word, while smaller troupes improvise many of the actual lines from a rough draft of the plot. Most importantly, the leading players will have a chance at a spectacular *vọng cổ* at climactic moments, and each of the main performers will have both musical and dramatic exploits to perform. A successful *cải lương* star is the one kind of Vietnamese traditional musician to earn more than a decent living nowadays; these stage favorites are the equivalent of last century's opera divas and today's movie stars of the West. Singing is the most important feature of the *cải lương*, as 70% to 80% of a performance may be devoted to song, accompanied by melody instruments such as the *tranh*, moonlute, and 2-string violin improvising around the melody. In *hát bội*, entrances and exits were set to drums and cymbals; in *cải lương* they are set to wooden clappers.[52]

The instrumentation in *cải lương* has varied over the years, but usually has included the zither-like *tranh*, the 2-string moonlute, or *nguyệt*, the *nhị*, or violin, and clappers. For the Chinese style dramas, the *sona*, gongs, and drums appear, and also occasionally a clarinet-like instrument, *kouan*, and the 36-string *yang k'in*, which is somewhat like our hammered dulcimer.[53] A flute is frequently heard in the more lyric pieces, as are other forms of 2-string violins and lutes. Western instruments have also been used, including mandolin, saxophone, snare drum, piano, clarinet, and trumpet. The only Western instrument that has really made a place for itself in *cải lương*, however, is the guitar. It may be similar to a Western guitar in EADGBE tuning, or it may be tuned in fifths and octaves. It has even been adopted for the Vietnamese "bent" tones by being hollowed out between frets, with extra room for the player to add melodic slides and quarter-tones to the notes.



Cải lương has increased its popularity over the years by being able to change with the tides of history and musical fashion. It has been estimated that in 1964 there were seventy-five professional troupes of *cải lương* in Vietnam, compared with ten of *hát bội*,[54] itself a generous estimate. Although perhaps the least pure of traditional musical forms, *cải lương* has, in its borrowing, retained musical elements that would otherwise be lost, and with its fifty or so musical numbers per performance it has provided the major outlet for the singers and instrumentalists of South Vietnam to gain a hearing and make a living.

OTHER FORMS OF THEATER

A curious form of musical theater in Vietnam grew out of the festival card games in Bình Định. The dealers of the cards, singing the names of each card dealt, were adept at telling stories in their song-patter, and at the end of the festivals these singing dealers would go around the countryside singing moral tales celebrating the virtues of Confucianism, as well as love songs. These troubadours, using the scale *do mi fa sol la* of the South, were very popular and called their kind of song *bài chòi trải chiếu*[55] or card-hut lie-down mat, as the songs came from huts where they dealt cards at first, and from mats they sat on later. At first singing alone or with instruments, the troubadours began to make gestures and even to take the parts of characters in their stories. In the early twentieth century this became a kind of theater, with families forming small groups of performers to go around and give open-air performances. At this time, in addition to *hát bài chòi* kind of song that came from card-dealing, the singers added *xuân nữ* for sad situations, still using the *do mi fa sol la* scale of the South, and *Sàng sê* for happy songs, a new kind of tune in *Bắc* style scale of *do re fa sol la.*

Around 1920 this kind of theater went onto a stage, using simple red curtains with white borders, or white with green borders, telling stories of village happenings. Perhaps a troupe would tell how a village chief had abandoned his wife, or had been flirting with another man's wife, or stories about farmers; occasionally they performed old rustic Chinese stories. With the increased elaboration of productions, music was added from *hát bội* such as the *cổ bản* tune, and from folksongs such as the *hồ quảng.* Most of the lyrics were in the poetic styles of 5-5, 7-7, and 6-8 syllable lines. In the period of 1930 to 1940, the influence of *cải lương* was felt by the addition of adventure stories and music such as the *vọng cổ.*

After Điện Biên Phủ and the separation of the country, many *hát bài chòi* artists went North, where their plays were welcomed as a people's art. New stories were invented and the theater was built up. Soldiers and cultural cadres from the North coming South brought a kind of *hát bài chòi* back to Bình Định that was superior to that remaining in the province.

The instrumentation of *bài chòi* is free, but usually includes the *sona* oboe, 2-string violin, cymbals, drums, and occasionally the monochord and guitar.

Spoken drama has never fared well in Vietnam, as the various kinds of opera or operetta have always had more popularity. A kind of semi-Western form of drama called *kịch* has had some small success in this century. The French encouraged this form except when the themes of the dramas seemed anti-colonialist.[56] *Kịch* have mainly survived as parts of variety shows, and as an amateur art produced by students.

Summation

Vietnamese theater has fared best as a musical theater, but the musical temperaments of the different regions of Vietnam have resulted in three major forms. The classical *hát bội* of the Center is most akin to grand opera. The popular *hát chèo* of the North resembles opera comique, and the renovated *cải lương* of the South is a kind of operetta. The first two forms have been evolving for close to a thousand years, the last for only fifty, but of the three it is only *hát bội* that is in danger of losing its ability to change to the times. If *hát bội* cannot survive, Vietnam, and indeed the world, will have lost one of its grandest forms of theater. *Hát chèo* and *cải lương*, less strongly

Chinese forms, are as popular now as they have ever been, and it is on these adaptable combinations of music and drama that the future of Vietnamese theater will rest. Whatever the results of the twentieth century incursions of political turmoil, long periods of warfare, and Western cultural influence, it is safe to say that Vietnamese theater will continue to absorb and reflect the musical and emotional lives of the Vietnamese people.

1. James R. Brandon, *Theatre in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967), pp. 8-9.
2. Elisabeth Halson, *Peking Opera* (Oxford, 1966), p. 1.
3. Brandon, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-9.
5. Trân Văn Khê, *La Musique Vietnamienne Traditionelle* (Paris, 1962), p. 23.
6. Cf. Peter Weiss, *Notizen zum Kulturellen Leben in der Demokratischen Republik Viet Nam* (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), pp. 143-144.
7. Conversations with Pham Duy. The writer spent some time with Mr. Duy discussing a book soon to be published in Vietnam on Vietnamese music, written by Pham Duy, who is the leading composer-collector-singer of this country.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Trân Văn Khê, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
11. Conversations with Pham Duy.
12. Trân Văn Khê, *Viet-Nam* (Paris, 1967), pp. 179-180.
13. Conversations with Pham Duy.
14. Trân Văn Khê, *Viet-Nam*, p. 181.
15. Taken from a tape recording made by Pham Duy.
16. Weiss, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-152.
17. Conversations with Pham Duy.
18. Quoted by Pham Duy to the author.
19. Trân Văn Khê, *Viet-Nam*, p. 178.
20. Brandon, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
21. Conversations with Pham Duy.
22. Faubion Bowers, *Theatre in the East* (New York, 1956), p. 305.
23. Conversations with Pham Duy.
24. Trân Văn Khê, *La Musique Vietnamienne Traditionelle*, p. 86.
25. Brandon, *op. cit.*, quoting from an unpublished manuscript of Nguyen Phuoc Thien, "The Vietnamese Stage" (Saigon, date ?), p. 3.
26. From an interview with Pham Duy.
27. Brandon, *op. cit.*, quoting Thien, p. 7.
28. Pham Duy is the source of this information.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. Brandon, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
33. According to Pham Duy.
34. Trân Văn Khê, *Viet-Nam*, p. 182.
35. In the words of Pham Duy.
36. Trân Văn Khê, *Viet-Nam*, p. 183.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
38. Brandon, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
39. This list of songs was gathered from both the books of Trân Văn Khê, from conversations with Pham Duy, and from the author's observations.
40. Both the musical illustrations were taken from tape recordings made by Pham Duy of the first act of the opera *Hâu Sanh*, and were then notated by the author.
41. Cf. Trân Văn Khê and Pham Duy.
42. A. C. Scott, *The Classical Theatre of China* (London, 1957), pp. 96-137.
43. Brandon, *op. cit.*, p. 141.
44. Most sources, including Pham Duy, give 1917; Trân Văn Khê believes 1918 is correct.
45. This play was performed at a special program of *cai lu'o'ng* which I narrated

in Saigon in 1967, the fiftieth anniversary of the music. Much of the following information was obtained by talking with elderly performers at that time. Some *cai lu'o'ng* from that concert is due to be issued soon by Folkways on LP records.

46. Cf. Pham Duy.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Given the author in lessons by Professor Vinh Bao of the Saigon Conservatory.
49. These examples are notated by the author from many versions he heard in Vietnam as he traced the history of this music. Of course, as the phrases doubled in length, the number of phrases performed grew fewer, from twenty phrases of four bars each to six phrases of thirty-two bars, plus one or two introductions.
50. Heard in Saigon in 1967.
51. Trân Văn Khê, *Viet-Nam*, pp. 191-192.
52. Brandon, *op. cit.*, p. 132.
53. Trân Văn Khê, *Viet-Nam*, p. 190.
54. Brandon, *op. cit.*, p. 173.
55. This section was developed with references to conversations with Pham Duy.
56. Brandon, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

Stephen Addiss is a prominent musician and student of ethnomusicology with particular interest in Vietnamese music.

Southeast Asian Archives / Notes et Documents de l'Asie du Sud-est

An Annotated Translation of *Đai-nam Chính-biên Liệt-truyện Sơ-tập, Nam-Chưởng-truyện* (Description of Luang Prabang)

SOKICHI KIMURA

Translator's Note

The most important historical documents of the Nguyễn Dynasty of Vietnam are the *Đại-nam Thực-lục* 大南寔錄 , the official chronicles of the Nguyễn Dynasty, and the *Đại-nam Liệt-truyện* 大南列傳 , the official biographical work of the Nguyễn Dynasty. Both of these documents were compiled on the basis of Châu-bản 硃本 , or the dynastic archives viewed or criticized by emperors personally with minium ink, including Tấu-bản 奏本 (report), Thượng-dụ 上諭 (decree), Chiếu-chỉ 詔旨 (edict), and other documents connected with official matters.[1]

The *Đại-nam Thực-lục* is divided as follows:

Đại-nam Thực-lục Tiền-biên 大南寔錄前編 (Previous part, 12 vols.) contains the historical facts of subjugation and development in the middle and south part of Vietnam by successive Nguyễn lords from 1558 to 1777.

Đại-nam Thực-lục Chính-biên Đệ-nhất-kỷ 大南寔錄正編第一紀 (Part 1, 60 vols.) contains the historical facts of the overthrow of the Tay-sơn rebels and unification of a whole country by Nguyễn Phúc-Ánh 阮福映 from 1778 to 1802 and the history of the Gia-Long 嘉隆 period from 1802 to 1819.

Đại-nam Thực-lục Chính-biên Đệ-nhị-kỷ 大南寔錄正編第二紀 (Part 2, 220 vols.) contains the history of the Minh-Mạng 明命 period from 1820 to 1840.

Đại-nam Thực-lục Chính-biên Đệ-tam-kỷ 大南寔錄正編第三紀 (Part 3, 72 vols.) contains the history of the Thiệu-Trị 紹治 period from 1841 to 1847.

Đại-nam Thực-lục Chính-biên Đệ-tứ-kỷ 大南寔錄正編第四紀 (Part 4, 70 Vols.) contains the history of the Tự-Đức 嗣德 and Hiệp-Hòa 協和 periods from 1847 to 1883.

Đại-nam Thực-lục Chính-biên Đệ-ngũ-kỷ 大南寔錄正編第五紀 (Part 5, 8 Vols.) contains the history of Kiến-Phúc 建福 period from 1883 to 1885.

Đại-nam Thực-lục Chính-biên Đệ-lục-kỷ 大南寔錄正編第六紀 (Part 6, 11 Vols.) contains the history of the Hàm-Nghi 咸宜 and Đồng-Khánh 同慶 periods from 1885 to 1888.

On the other hand, *Đại-nam Liệt-truyện* is divided as follows:

Đại-nam Liệt-truyện Tiền-biên 大南列傳前編 (Previous part, 6 Vols.) contains biographies of persons, arranged by categories, during the Nguyễn lords' period.

Đại-nam-Chính-biên Liệt-truyện Sơ-tập 大南正編列傳初集 (Part 1, 33 Vols.) includes the original text of the present translation, contains biographies of persons during the Gia-Long period, arranged by categories, plus an additional category which is not strictly biographical, but rather consists of a description of various foreign countries (Ngoại-quốc-truyện 外國傳), i.e., of Cao-man 高蠻, or Cambodia (Vol. 31), Xiêm-la 暹羅, or Siam, Thủy-xã Hỏa-xã 水舍火舍, or the King of Water and the King of Fire (Vol. 32), Miến-điện 緬甸 or Burma, Nam-chưởng 南掌, or Luang Prabang, Chiêm-thành 占城, or Champa, Vạn-tượng 萬象, or Vientiane (Vol. 33).

Đại-nam Chính-biên Liệt-truyện Nhị-tập 大南正編列傳二集 (Part 2, 46 Vols.) contains biographies of persons during the Minh-Mạng, Thiệu-Trị and Tự-Đức periods arranged by categories.

Each part of the *Đại-nam Thực-lục* and *Đại-nam Liệt-truyện* mentioned above was separately published by the Quốc sử-quán 國史館 (Bureau of Historiography) in Huế. However, since they are treasured books of the Court of Nguyễn, they have had limited circulation. When Professor Nobuhiro Matsumoto of Keio University, Tokyo, visited Vietnam in 1933, he asked the Imperial Court to print them and to provide six sets of *Thực-lục* and *Liệt-truyện* by 1935, so that he could distribute them to universities and research institutes in Japan. Because of recent war disasters complete sets of *Thực-lục* and *Liệt-truyện* have been difficult to find even in Vietnam. Considering this fact, the Keio University Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies began to reprint the *Thực-lục* and *Liệt-truyện* in 1961. Thus far, the *Đại-nam Thực-lục Tiền-biên*, *Đại-nam Liệt-truyện Tiền-biên*, *Đại-nam Thực-lục Chính-biên Đệ-nhất-kỷ* and *Đại-nam Chính-biên Liệt-truyện Sơ-tập* have been published.[2]

What follows is a brief introduction to the Ngoại-quốc-truyện of *Đại-nam Chính-biên Liệt-truyện Sơ-tập*, including Nam-chưởng-truyện 南掌傳, i.e., a description of Luang Prabang.

The description of Cambodia first gives a brief account of the relations between the Nguyễn lords and Cambodia, and then a more detailed treatment of Cambodian relations with two stronger neighboring countries, Siam and Vietnam, during the Gia-Long, Minh-Mạng, and Thiệu-Trị periods, including religion, manners and customs, local products, etc.

The description of Siam contains an account of an attack on

Hà-tiên 河仙 by Trịnh Quốc-Anh 鄭國英 (Chêng Chao 鄭昭, i.e., King Taksin of Siam), and of his massacre of Mạc Thiên-Tứ 鄚天賜 and his whole family, the ruin of King Taksin himself, relations between Siam and Vietnam during the Gia-Long and Minh-mạng periods, and the early days of the Thiệu-Trị period, including again details of religion, manners and customs, local products, etc.[3]

The King of Water and the King of Fire were the Sorcerer Kings of the Jarai tribe, who had exerted religious and magical influence, not only among the Jarai but also on various neighboring tribes. The description of the Kings of Water and Fire tells of their tribute to Vietnam and their kingly functions as well as offering data on the territory, food, clothing and shelter, manners and customs, etc.[4]

The description of Burma contains accounts of the relations between Burma and China and between Burma and Vietnam during the Gia-Long, Minh-Mạng, and Thiệu-Trị periods, and also concerning the territory of this country, including once again its religion, manners and customs, local products, etc.

The description of Luang Prabang relates the tribute paid to China, quarrels over succession to the throne and the tribute to Vitenam during the Gia-Long and Minh-Mạng periods, including the territory of this country, population, manners and customs, local products, etc. Details are given in the translation.

The description of Champa tells of the independence from Chinese control during the late Han dynasty, various subsequent relations with China, continuous extension of Vietnamese influence over Champa, and the decline and fall of Champa, manners and customs of the Chams, etc.[5]

The description of Vientiane relates the control exercised by Siam, the attack by the Tây-sơn rebels, cooperation with Nguyễn Phúc-Ánh (i.e., the Emperor Gia-Long), tribute to Vietnam, the attack on Siam by A-nỗ 阿努 (Chao Anu, the King of Vientiane), and the fall of Vientiane, including the usual data on the territory, manners and customs, local products, etc.[6]

The *Đại-nam Chính-biên Liệt-truyện Sơ-tập*, which was reprinted by the Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies in 1962, is the source of the present translation of the Nam-chưởng-truyện, or description of Luang Prabang. The translation is punctuated and paragraphed in accordance with English usage. Chinese terms such as place-names, names of historical epochs and so forth are Romanized according to the Wade System. It is hoped that this translation may prove useful to those interested in the history of Laos.

Finally the translator wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Ch'en Ching-ho of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who read the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions.

[1] Although Châu-bản 硃本 generally means archives amended by emperors with minium ink, the Châu-bản of the Nguyễn Dynasty had traditionally included reports, decrees, edicts, as well as other documents connected with official matters. Cf. Ch'en Ching-ho, "The Imperial Archives of the Nguyễn Dynasty," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Singapore, 1962).

[2] Regarding *Đại-nam Thực-lục* and *Đại-nam Liệt-truyện*, see, e.g., the following: Nobuhiro Matsumoto, "Annanshi Kenkyu jo no Ni Shiryo: Bibliographie Annamite to Dainan Jitsuroku" (Two Materials for the Study of Vietnamese History: Bibliographie Annamite and Đại-nam Thực-lục), *Shigaku*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Tokyo, 1936); 陳荊和, "國史遺編的編者與內容" (The Compiler and Contents of the Quốc-sử Di-biên by Ch'en Ching-ho) in 潘叔直輯 "國史遺編" 香港中文大學新亞研究所東南亞研究室刊 ("Quốc-sử Di-biên" compiled by Phan Thúc-Trực, published by the Southeast Asia Studies Section of the New Asia Research Institute of the Chinese University of Hong Kong), Historical Material Series No. 1 (Hong Kong, 1965).

[3] Regarding the Mạc family, see, e.g., the following: E. Gaspardone, "Un Chinois des mers du Sud, le fondateur de Hà-tiên," *Journal Asiatique* (Paris, 1952), pp. 363–385; Riichiro Fujiwara, "Bakkyu Jiseki Ko" (Studies on Mạc Cửu's Activities), *Shiso*, No. 5 & 6 (Kyoto, 1954); 陳荊和, "河僊鎮叶鎮鄚氏家譜注釋" (Notes on the "Hà-tiên trấn Hiệp-trấn Mạc-thị Gia-pha" by Ch'en Ching-ho), 國立臺灣大學 "文史哲學報" (Bulletin of the College of Arts, National Taiwan University) No. 7 (Taipei, 1956), pp. 83–139.

[4] The details about the King of Water and the King of Fire may be found in Nobuhiro Matsumoto, "Indoshina no Chi to Hito" (Land and People of Indo-China) in *Toa Minzoku Bunka Ronko* (A Study of the People and Culture of East Asia by Nobuhiro Matsumoto) (Tokyo, 1968). According to Professor Nobuhiro Matsumoto, the King of Water had the function of stopping droughts and praying for rain during the dry season; on the other hand, the King of Fire had the function of stopping rain and praying for sunshine during the rainy season. He also notes in his article that "This Sorcerer King has many of the characteristics of a magician who controls rain; and in a country like this where the contrast between the rainy and dry seasons is extreme, he, on the one hand, demonstrates his power during the rainy season, while, on the other hand, he uses his ability during the dry season. This magician who was essentially one and the same 'rain maker' and who was of approximately a single nature, probably became the King of Fire and the King of Water, as his functions came to be divided between two separate figures, in line with the general tendency in the native pattern of thinking toward dualism." (p. 39)

[5] Regarding Champa, see, e.g., the following: G. Maspero, *Le Royaume de Champa* (Paris, 1928); Naojiro Sugimoto, *Tonan Ajiashi Kenkyu, I* (Studies in the History of Southeast Asia, 1) (Tokyo, 1956), revised 1968.

[6] Regarding the fall of Vientiane, see Walter F. Vella, *Siam Under Rama III: 1824–1851* (New York, 1957), Chap. 6.

NAM-CHƯƠNG-TRUYỆN

Nam-chưởng 南掌, or the Kingdom of Luang Prabang, had the alternative designation Lao-long-quốc 牢龍國, and was also commonly known as Lão-qua-gia 老檛家. Nam-chưởng first paid tribute to China in the third year of the Yung-lo 永樂 period of the Ming Dynasty (1405 A.D.), and the office of the tribal chieftain officially known as the Lao-kuo Chün-min Hsüan-wei-shih-ssŭ 老檛軍民宣慰使司[1] was then established.

The Emperor Lê Thánh-tôn 黎聖尊 of An-nam 安南, during the tenth year (Kỷ-hợi 己亥) of his reign (i.e., the sixteenth year of the Ch'êng-hua 成化 period of the Ming Dynasty)[2] massed an invasion force of ninety thousand men, under the command of Lê Thọ-Vực 黎壽域 and other generals. Advancing along three routes, they routed the Ai-lao[3] 哀牢, marched into Lão-qua and slew the Pacification Commissioner, Đao Bản-nhã 刀板雅 and his two sons.[4] However, Phạ-nhã-tái 帕雅賽, the youngest son of Đao Bản-nhã, fled to Bát-bách[5] 八百, and the Ming authorities subsequently invested him as successor to the post of Pacification Commissioner.

In the eighth year of the Yung-chêng 雍正 period of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1730 A.D.), Nam-chưởng dispatched envoys to China to pay tribute. Subsequently, Nam-chưởng also frequently paid tribute to the Lê Dynasty of Vietnam.

The years rolled on, and there came the reign of King Triệu-ấn 召印. Triệu-ấn had four sons, the eldest being Nộ-sạ 怒乍, the second Triệu-xú 召醜, the third Triệu-phong 召楓, and the youngest Triệu-chiếm 召占. Upon the death of Triệu-ấn, Triệu-phong succeeded to the throne. When Triệu-phong died, his son, Ôn-mãnh 温猛, was but three years of age. Availing himself of the occasion, Nộ-sạ promptly seized the throne, but the forces of Vạn-tượng[6] 萬象 thereupon invaded Nam-chưởng and captured Nộ-sạ, Ôn-mãnh and Ôn-mãnh's mother, carrying them off to the Kingdom of Vientiane. Nộ-sạ was subsequently released, but the detention of Ôn-mãnh and his mother continued.

In the year of Tân-hợi 辛亥 (1791 A.D.), the Tây-sơn[7] 西山 rebels attacked the Kingdom of Vientiane. Ôn-mãnh and his mother seized the opportunity to escape from the Kingdom of Vientiane and returned to Nam-chưởng, where they were reunited with Nộ-sạ. As Ôn-mãnh grew older, he suspected that Nộ-sạ was planning to assassinate him and finally fled to the province of Yün-nan 雲南 to appeal to the Ch'ing authorities. The Emperor gave him an imperial seal, whereupon he raised an army of native soldiers and marched against Nộ-sạ. He advanced as far as Mang-nhĩ 芒弭, but Nộ-sạ counterattacked and Ôn-mãnh was defeated and fled. Thereafter, Ôn-mãnh roamed the area between Mang-mân 芒蟠 and Mang-lư 芒廬, having no fixed residence. Later still, carrying his imperial seal, Ôn-mãnh went off to live in Triệu-tấn châu 召晉州 in the province of Hưng-hóa 興化 in Vietnam.

In the autumn of the first year of the Gia-Long 嘉隆 period of the present dynasty (1802 A.D.), Ôn-mãnh received word that the Emperor Gia-Long had subjugated Bắc-hà[8] 北河 with a powerful army. A provincial official in Hưng-hóa arranged for Ôn-mãnh to visit the Emperor's camp at Thăng-long[9] 昇隆 and offer his congratulations. The Emperor gave him an audience, but since peace in the Empire had just recently been restored, the Emperor could spare no time to deal with Ôn-mãnh's problems, and ordered him to return to Triệu-tấn châu. In the eighth year of the Gia-Long period (1809 A.D.), officials from Bắc-thành[10] 北城 escorted Ôn-mãnh to the capital. Knowing that Ôn-mãnh had once been granted the Ch'ing Imperial seal, the Emperor decided to send him to the north and leave him to his own resources. Consequently, the Emperor dispatched a message to the Ch'ing authorities and sent Ôn-mãnh to the Lạng-sơn 諒山 Pass to await further action. However, since Ôn-mãnh could not stand independently, the Ch'ing authorities disowned him and confiscated the Imperial seal. The Emperor Gia-Long then ordered that Ôn-mãnh be sent back to Triệu-tấn Châu, where he subsequently died.

After the death of Nộ-sạ, who had ousted Ôn-mãnh and seized his kingdom, Lư-mang 蘆芒, the son of Nộ-sạ, succeeded to the throne. Lư-mang dispatched his envoy Xà-mộc 蛇木 to solicit a fief[11] from the Ch'ing Government. The Ch'ing Government agreed and sent emissaries who delivered the Imperial seal and granted the fief.

In the second year of the Gia-Long period (1803 A.D.), the King of Luang Prabang decided to accede to the suzerainty of Vietnam. Accordingly, he dispatched his envoy Nại-khai 柰開 with a message to the Vietnamese court. Nại-khai requested permission to travel by way of Ninh-biên châu 寧邊州 and paid tribute. The Vietnamese Emperor commanded the officials of Bắc-thành to entertain the envoy generously and granted a fief to the King of Nam-chưởng by written consent. However, Nam-chưởng subsequently suspended payment of tribute to the Vietnamese court.

Again, in the first year of the Minh-Mạng 明命 period (1820 A.D.), the King of Nam-chưởng dispatched his envoy Đạo Cầm-xúc 導琴歷 and others with gifts of local products as tribute to the

Vietnamese court. However, when they reached Sơn-la châu 山羅州 in the province of Hưng-hóa, the provincial officials turned the envoys back on the grounds that the payment of tribute *via* the Sơn-la châu route was contrary to precedent.

In the fourth year of the Minh-Mạng period (1823 A.D.), the King of Nam-chưởng, Phì-la-xà-ất-nha 肥羅蛇遏牙, dispatched the envoys Đạo-tự 導字, Đạo-hiệu 導校 and Xà-lai 蛇來 to offer tribute to Vietnam. Travelling by way of Ninh-biên châu in the province of Hưng-hóa, they arrived in Thụy-nguyên huyện 瑞原縣 in the province of Thanh-hóa, whence the Quản-ngọc Lặc-sách[12] 管玉勒册, Phạm Thúc-Nhu 范叔儒, sent them on to the provincial citadel. They delivered their King's message, to the effect that Nam-chưởng, having deep respect for the Imperial Court, had tried in vain to pay tribute several times during the past twenty years, and was once again sending envoys to petition for the honor of subjection to the authority of the court.

The provincial officials having conveyed this message to the Emperor, the latter issued a proclamation stating that Nam-chưởng, being located in the remote southwestern regions, had never previously paid tribute to Vietnam, but had finally offered its allegiance in a sincere and praiseworthy fashion. Accordingly, the Emperor directed that the envoys be allowed to proceed to the capital, where he received them in audience.

The Emperor then ordered the Board of Rites to determine the tributary periods (i.e., the years of Sửu 丑, Thìn 辰, Mùi 未 and Tuất 戌)[13] and articles of tribute (i.e., two bull elephants, two elephant tusks and four rhinoceros horns)[14] and sent the envoys back with gifts for themselves and their King. However, when the Emperor sent his emissaries to Nam-chưởng, he found that the representations of the Kingdom's envoys had merely been empty words—in fact, the promised payments of tribute failed to materialize.

In the ninth year of the Minh-Mạng period (1828 A.D.), Bắc-thành dispatched one Đinh Công-Tĩnh 丁功靜, a native of Sơn-tây 山西, to reconnoiter the routes to Trấn-ninh[15] 鎮寧, the Kingdom of Vientiane and Nam-chưởng. However, he was intercepted at the border of Nam-chưởng, whereupon he fabricated an official letter, addressed to the King of Luang Prabang, requesting payment of the tribute due to Vietnam. The authorities of Nam-chưởng, believing the letter to be genuine, received him with due ceremony.[16] Moreover, the King asserted that Nam-chưởng had regularly payed tribute to Vietnam in the past, but had suspended payment since their envoys were prevented from bearing tribute by way of Sơn-la châu some ten years ago, and that the lord and people of the Kingdom had consequently been haunted by fear and misgivings, and would be unable to contain their joy if accepted as subjects and allowed to pay tribute.

Thereupon, Đinh Công-Tĩnh departed, accompanied by the King's envoys with offerings of local products. After they had arrived in Ninh-biên châu in the province of Hưng-hóa, Đinh Công-Tĩnh called upon the officials of Bắc-thành, who reported their arrival to the Emperor.

Since the envoys had just arrived from a distant land, the Emperor felt that their supplication should not be rejected out of hand, and that the envoys should be accommodated at Bắc-thành and interrogated regarding the sincerity of their intentions.

Accordingly, the Emperor ordered the officials to escort the envoys, Phì-như 肥茹 and Mang-ngoại 芒外 and others, to Bắc-thành and conveyed to them the following declaration: "Years ago, Nam-chưởng offered its allegiance to our country, but later discontinued payment of tribute. This shows a lack of proper respect for a great nation. We could easily administer appropriate punishment with a small detachment of troops. However, it scarcely behooves a grand and august nation to take umbrage over a petty kingdom such as yours. Therefore, we shall magnanimously disregard your delinquency for the present. But now, your remote kingdom has again dispatched envoys to our land. We need not discuss Đinh Công-Tĩnh's trickery—the Court will naturally punish him. But you—have your lord and people long since decided to humbly submit to our authority? Or have you come, not out of true sincerity, but merely because you were deceived by Đinh Công-Tĩnh? In any case, you are free to leave our frontiers, if you so wish."

The envoys replied as follows: "In the past, we offered to pay tribute to your country, but unfortunately payment has been delayed owing to the pressure of domestic affairs. Recently, we heard that Trấn-ninh had been annexed by the Empire of Vietnam. Moved by profound respect for your authority, our lord and people had already prepared tributary payments, and we were just about to begin our journey to deliver these payments when Đinh Công-Tĩnh happened to arrive in our country. Happily believing that this would assure the success of our mission, our King commanded that we accompany him and set forth for Vietnam. Now, we beg permission to proceed to the capital, be received in your august audience and pay our sincere respects."

The officials of Bắc-thành translated the envoys' message and conveyed it to the Emperor, who granted their request. The envoys finally reached the capital, and were received in the courtyard by the Emperor, who commended them for their efforts. The Emperor then ordered the Board of Rites to fix the tributary periods (once every third year, i.e., in the years of Thân 辰, Tuất 戌, Sửu 丑 and Mùi 未),[17] the articles of tribute (four pairs of elephant tusks, eight rhinoceros horns and two bronze drums)[18] and the route to be followed (from Trấn-ninh to the capital *via* Nghệ-an 乂安).[19] Then, the envoys were generously given gifts and allowed to return. The King of Nam-chưởng, Lư-mang, was given four rolls of brocade, eight rolls of camlet, ten rolls of silk, forty rolls of silk gauze and thirty rolls of cotton cloth. Gifts of crepe silk clothing and silver were awarded to the chief envoy and his entourage according to their rank.

In the eleventh year of Minh-Mạng (1830 A.D.), Nam-chưởng dispatched envoys to the capital to participate in the celebrations marking the fortieth birthday of the Emperor, Thánh-Tổ Nhân-Hoàng-Đế 聖祖仁皇帝 (the Emperor Minh-Mạng). During the ceremonies, the envoys were given precedence over the envoys of Cambodia.

In the fourteenth year of Minh-Mạng (1833 A.D.), Nam-chưởng again dispatched envoys to pay tribute to Vietnam. When the envoys reached Trấn-ninh, the provincial officials of Nghệ-an reported their arrival to the Emperor, who had the Board of Rites revise the regulations regarding the admission of such emissaries to the capital. (The former regulations required that the mission should comprise twenty-six persons, of whom one chief envoy, one vice-envoy, three captains, one interpreter and four soldiers, i.e., ten persons in all, were permitted to enter the capital. Under the revised regulations, entry into the capital was limited to one chief envoy, one vice-envoy, two captains, one interpreter and three soldiers, i.e., eight persons in all. The rest of the group were to remain at the border, and would receive appropriate gifts.)[20] The revised regulations were conveyed to the Nam-chưởng mission, and their envoys proceeded to the capital accordingly. Upon their arrival, they presented the Court with native products and delivered a message which read as follows: "Owing to various internal matters, the payment of tribute has been delayed beyond the appointed time . . . Years have already elapsed since the wandering people of Mang-cai 芒該 in the prefecture of Trấn-ninh drifted into Nam-chu o ng, and they are now *peacefully* settled there. Being content with their new home, it is quite natural that they should be reluctant to move elsewhere. Therefore, we beg you to allow them to remain in our country and peacefully pursue their livelihood." The Emperor granted this request, and his edict was duly conveyed to the Trấn-ninh Phòng-ngự-đồng-tri[21] 鎮寧防禦同知 and other relevant officials. The Emperor also agreed to disregard precedent and permit the substitution of certain other local products for the bronze drums in the next payment of tribute since, such drums were not produced in Nam-chưởng. On returning to Nam-chưởng, the envoys were rewarded with generous gifts. However, Nam-chưởng again failed to pay tribute when the appointed year arrived.

In the nineteenth year of Minh-mạng (1838 A.D.), Nam-chưởng dispatched Tạo-khâm-phân 造欽紛 and others to Vietnam with a message[22] earnestly requesting permission to pay tribute. The frontier officials reported the arrival of the envoys to the Emperor, who sent a group headed by Nguyễn Khắc-Trạch 阮克宅, a department director of the Board of Punishments, to join the provincial officer, Nguyễn Đình-Tân 阮廷賓 and others, and to interrogate Tạo-khâm-phân. The envoys from Nam-chưởng gave evasive answers; consequently, they were not allowed to pay tribute, and the Emperor ordered them expelled from the borders of Vietnam. In subsequent years, Nam-chưởng again failed to discharge its tributary obligations.

The capital of Nam-chưởng was located at Mang-long 芒龍, in a commanding position flanked on the left by the Mekong River. The country was bordered on the east by Trấn-ninh, on the west by Siam and Burma, on the south by the Kingdom of Vietniane and on the north by Yün-nan. The population was at least twenty thousand. The inhabitants were ferocious by nature, and adorned their bodies with tattoos. Silver currency was used in the market-places, but spiral shells were used in place of silver when the latter was unobtainable. (One hundred such shells made up one Mạch 陌, and one thousand shells made up one Quán 貫).[23] Weapons were not manufactured by local craftsmen; swords and firearms were all obtained from other countries. Local products included gold, copper, iron, white cloth, tử-nghị[24] 紫蟻, beeswax, honey, sulphur, nitre, cardamom,[25] and salt. Fauna included rhinoceroses, elephants, cattle, and horses.

[1] Literally, the "Laos Military and Civil Pacification Commissioner," a tribal chieftain formally invested with certain local powers by the Imperial Government.

[2] Original note, i.e., inserted parenthetically in the original text. Actually, the tenth year (Kỷ-hợi 己亥) corresponds to the fifteenth (and not the sixteenth) year of the Ch'êng-hua, i.e., 1479 A.D.

[3] The Thai tribes inhabiting the region adjacent to the western borders of the middle part of Vietnam were called the *Ai-lao* by Vietnamese writers of that period. This "Ai-lao" has no immediate connection with the "Ai-lao" referred to in Chinese historical sources such as *Hou-han-shu* 後漢書.

[4] Regarding this military expedition, see, e.g., the following: *Đại-việt Sử-ký Toàn-thư* 大越史記全書 (Complete History of Đại-việt), specifically, the section concerned with the tenth year of Hồng-đức 洪德; *Khâm-định Việt-sử Thông-giám Cương-mục* 欽定越史通鑑綱目 (Imperial Authorized Complete Survey of the History of the Việt: Text and Commentaries), 23; Lê Thành Khôi, *Le Viet-nam: Histoire et Civilisation* (Paris, 1955), p. 231.

[5] The territory of this country, a tributary of China during the Yüan and Ming Dynasties, extended from northern Thailand to the mountainous regions of eastern Burma. The inhabitants were mainly of Thai stock. Cf. *Ming-shih* 明史, 315; Tatsuro Yamamoto, "Kaiyakugo ni mietaru Hyakui oyobi Happyaku no moji" (The characters of *Po-i* and *Pa-po* appearing in *Hua-i-i-yü*: a study of the alphabets of the Thai races), *Toho Gakuho*, No. 6 (Tokyo, 1936).

[6] I.e., the Kingdom of Vientiane. Description of this Kingdom may also be found in *Đại-nam Chính-biên Liệt-truyện Sơ-tập* (see the Translator's Note).

[7] Regarding the Tây-sơn rebellion, see, e.g., the following: *Đại-nam Chính-biên Liệt-truyện Sơ-tập*, 30; Lê Thành Khôi, *Le Viet-nam*, Chap. 7.

[8] The North, i.e., the Tongking region.

[9] Thăng-long corresponds to the present Hanoi.

[10] At the beginning of the reign of the Emperor Gia-Long, Vietnam was divided into twenty-three trấn 鎮 and four doanh 營. Each trấn was administered by an official known as the Trấn-thủ 鎮守. The Tongking region, which had previously been the domain of Trịnh 鄭, comprised eleven trấn. Cochinchina, which had recently been subjugated by the Vietnamese, was composed of five trấn. Both districts were administered by a Tổng-trấn 總鎮 or governor-general. One Tổng-trấn resided in Bắc-thành 北城, i.e., Hanoi, and another Tổng-trấn resided in Gia-định-thành 嘉定城, i.e., Saigon. The central portion of the country was composed of seven trấn. The imperial territory itself comprised four doanh. See Nobuhiro Matsumoto, *Betonamu Minzoku Shoshi* (A short history of the Vietnamese (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 130–31.

[11] I.e., recognition as a vassal state under the Emperor.

[12] Title of a certain official post in the government of the Nguyễn Dynasty.

[13] Original note.

[14] Original note.

[15] Corresponding to the present-day Xieng Khouang district in Laos.

[16] Literally, with "sedan-chair and parasol."

[17] Original note.

[18] Original note.

[19] Original note.

[20] Original note.

[21] The sub-Prefect of Trấn-ninh.

[22] Yeh-shu 葉書, i.e., a message written on leaves.

[23] Original note.

[24] It seems likely that Tử-nghị 紫蟻 can be identified with stick lac. See Berthold Laufer, *Sino-Iranica*, reprinted in Taipei (1967), pp. 475–78; *Đại-nam* Nhất-thống-chí 大南一統志 (Historical geography of Đại-nam), 34 (the province of Hưng-hóa, native products).

[25] Sa-nhân 砂仁, or in Chinese, sha-jên, meaning the kernel of so-sha-mi 縮砂蜜 (*Amomum xanthioides*). Cf. B. Laufer, *Sino-Iranica*, pp. 481–82; Masao Konoshima, "Tonanajia no Kigusuri ni kansuru Yosatsu Hokoku" (Preliminary survey of the crude drugs of Southeast Asia), *Tonanajia Kenkyu*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Kyoto, 1967).

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