# Southeast Asia

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**Center for Vietnamese Studies**
*Southern Illinois University at Carbondale*

Southeast Asia

*An International Quarterly*

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# Southeast Asia

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# Abstract / Résumé

Cet article suggère que les points essentiels quant aux "intentions" du Japon à l'égard du contrôle américain dans les Philippines, étaient déjà clairs avant l'incident Mandchou de 1931 et le passage de l'Acte Tydings-McDuffie de 1934. L'auteur maintient que dès le commencement de l'hégémonie américaine, les représentants américains aux Philippines n'ont pu ignorer l'attitude du Japon. L'auteur, fort de preuves, affirme que les autorités américaines ont alors tenté d'éveiller un sentiment anti-japonais dans le pays.

L'article met l'accent sur les opinions diverses que le passage de l'Acte Jones de 1916 et la promesse de l'indépendance éventuelle des Philippines ont provoquées parmi les Philippins et les Américains. Ces opinions spéculent sur différentes attitudes du Japon à l'égard de cette indépendance. En conséquence, l'auteur discute des points de vue prêtant à controverse tels que la probabilité d'une aide japonaise apportée aux groupes pro-indépendants du pays, l'interprétation politique de l'immigration japonaise aux Philippines, le développement d'une défense philippine en vue de l'importance grandissante de la flotte japonaise maîtresse de l'Ouest du Pacifique, et l'interprétation du développement croissant des liens commerciaux du Japon avec l'archipel.

La conclusion principale de l'auteur est que ces opinions représentent plutôt l'état d'esprit des Philippins et des Américains déjà commis à une politique d'anti ou pro indépendance. Après une étude minutieuse des archives japonaises, Goodman remarque que les Japonais, objet de ces discussions, s'en tirent à un silence et une discrétion officielle remarquables, bien que conscients et attentifs. Selon l'auteur, les autorités japonaises au Japon et aux Philippines firent ou dirent peu qui put être critiqué par les autorités américaines. En même temps, cependant, les représentants japonais-diplomates et hommes d'affaires gardèrent les relations les plus intimes avec les supérieurs de la bureaucratie philippine et des affaires locales aussi bien qu'avec leurs propres compatriotes aux îles. Ainsi, tout en respectant les autorités coloniales, les Japonais ont travaillé à affermir leur rôle dans les Philippines en vue d'une indépendance éventuelle du pays.

# The Problem of Philippine Independence and Japan: *The First Three Decades of American Colonial Rule*

GRANT K. GOODMAN

BEFORE WORLD WAR II the major issue between the United States and its colonial ward in the Pacific, the Philippine Islands, was independence. From the time of the Treaty of Paris, which awarded the Philippines to the United States in 1898, to the passage in 1934 of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which promised the Islands their full independence after an interim transition period of ten years, great amounts of personal energy, verbal bombast, and political skill were expended by both Filipinos and Americans on the question of independence. In much of this activity the role of Japan was seen as focal, though, as will be suggested below, each participant in the discussions about Japan and Philippine independence preferred to define that focus in his own way.

The Manchurian Incident in 1931 seemed suddenly to magnify the relationship between Japan and various aspects of the possibility of Philippine independence. However, as I hope to show in the paragraphs that follow, all of the "concerns" about Japan that were to be articulated by both proponents and opponents of Philippine independence had already been clearly delineated during the first three decades of American colonial rule. Thus, much of the intensified speculation about Japan that immediately preceded and also followed the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act was either redundant or simply enlarged lines of argument already developed before 1931.

From the outset of the American occupation of the Philippines, the American governing authorities, supported in particular by both Americans and Filipinos writing in the local English-language press, consciously fostered the view that Japan represented a threatening menace to the Philippine Islands. Spy scares were reported with monotonous regularity. The dire effects of Japanese colonialism in Korea and Formosa were detailed over and over. The great benefits for the Philippines of the Western heritage of the Catholic religion and of European culture preserved under the aegis and guidance of the United States were continuously contrasted favorably with the "Oriental paganism" of Japan. The Filipinos were told that they really had, after all, nothing in common with other Asians, especially the Japanese, since Philippine religious, linguistic and political traditions were not only unique but superior to those of the "barbaric

Mongoloid hordes" to the north whose predatory desires included the ultimate conquest of the Philippines. So prevalent had these views become that by 1919 Carlos P. Romulo could write:

> Filipinos who have not been in Japan look with disfavor, with misgivings, with fear at any mention made of Japan's desire to take possession of the Philippines. There should be no such feeling. Japan is not such a fearful ogre as some would believe. Japan is not so hateful, she is not so greedy, so tyrannical, so cruel as she has been painted to us. Japan is a great country and we have much to learn from her. Rather than hating her, rather than speaking against her, we should endeavor to know her more intimately. . . .[1]

There were, of course, those Filipinos who did speak in more tempered tones about Japan, those who saw the Japanese as friendly neighbors, as potential allies or even as possible saviors. They saw the Japanese as fellow Orientals whose geographic proximity and ethnic ancestry made them far more logical helpmates in the achievement of an independent Philippine nationhood than the remote white colonialists.[2] Even by those articulate Filipinos who had been affected by American attitudes toward Japan, the Japanese were viewed as successful Asians whose successes were to be admired and, if at all possible, to be emulated. Wrote Romulo:

> I admire the Japanese people, I admire their patriotism, the fountainhead from which springs their industry, their thrift, their great respect for Japanese traditions, their skill and their love for work.[3]

This particular theme was to be reiterated again and again by Philippine observers of Japan throughout the 1920's and 1930's and is still being heard.[4] At base such views are little different from the admiration of and praise for the recently developed and still developing societies of Russia and/or China being voiced in many of the contemporary "underdeveloped" countries of Asia and Africa. For what was being admired or praised then and what is being admired and praised now is not really a specific country (Japan, Russia, China) or even a specific politico-economic organization (authoritarian Japan or communist Russia or China) but rather the "success," comparative of course, which these societies with what are ostensibly similar backgrounds and obstacles have enjoyed. For many thoughtful Filipinos in the early decades of the twentieth century, Japan was another Asian state which in a brief span of years had achieved the internationally recognized status of a Great Power and which therefore was the logical leader in the Far East. Distrust, fear, threat, invasion were, it was sometimes argued, all propagandistic concepts which the American colonialists had propagated in order to prevent

Asians like the Filipinos from joining hands with their natural ally Japan to throw off the imperialist yoke.

There were also those in the Islands who said that Japan alone could or would provide the economic resources needed for Philippine development. While economic conflicts between the United States and the Philippines were said to be inevitable since cane sugar competed with beet sugar and coconut oil with cottonseed oil, Japan was touted as the natural economic partner of the Philippines since Japan produced nothing which would compete with any Philippine product and therefore could provide a guaranteed market for all of them. There were also those who urged that, since Japan was then and would for the foreseeable future continue to be the dominant power in Asia, an anti-Japanese policy was national suicide while policies friendly to Japan would result in national salvation and a secure future for the nascent free Philippines under the protective wing of a militarily powerful but benign Japan.[5] Some Filipinos who were perhaps less sanguine refused to romanticize about the "common destiny" of the two countries but said quite bluntly that when the United States left the islands, Japan would assume America's role and that therefore it would be wise for the Philippines to begin to prepare itself for that eventuality and make the transition that much easier.

One aspect of Japan, however, seemed to be universally appealing to Filipinos and to stand out boldly in all their writings on the subject. To a people whose aspirations for national independence had been so rudely crushed first by Spain and then by the United States, the national unity and the patriotism of the Japanese were most impressive.

> Look . . . what we may learn by admiring the sublime abnegation, self-control, discipline, patience, resignation, and tenacity of purpose, shown by Japan, in the midst of the most terrible adversities and the most piercing disappointments of its existence.[6]

> General Romulo was very much taken with the Emperor system. There is one bond that seems to be a connecting link which joins the Japanese into a living whole—their love and respect for their Emperor. Their emperor is sacred to them. Their love for him is such that they would willingly shed their last drop of blood for his sake.[7]

Again and again Romulo harked back to the theme of the nobility and grandeur of Japanese patriotism and the need for the Filipinos to follow Japan's example.

When our boat steamed out of Yokohama harbor—last port in

> Japan—and we waved goodbye to the shrines and temples and geishas of the land of the cherry-blossoms and chrysanthemums, we inwardly felt the effects of the impression left on us by our stay in Japan—we were 'infected' by the Nippon patriotism and we left Japan loving our country, and cherishing its simple traditions as we never did before,—that piece of land given to us by God to love, to value, to adore.[8]

One must conclude, however, that in the overall picture of Philippine intellectual and political life in the first three decades of this century, Japan played albeit an extremely minor role, and there were only very occasional overt manifestations of pro-Japanese sentiment. Only relatively small groups of Filipinos seem to have been concerned in such activities. In Japan the tiny Filipino colony (students, traders, musicians, laborers) concentrated in Yokohama and Tokyo did have limited contact with certain extremist Japanese who were advocating an "Asia for the Asiatics" but who had no official support and whose efforts had little real import.[9] In Manila the increasingly romanticized memory of Japan's supposed aid in the Philippine Revolution affected some student groups and some of the disappointed revolutionaries who persisted in vain plots concocted to destroy the American colonial regime.[10] However, despite both persistent pleas from Filipino radicals and persistent fears on the part of American authorities in the Philippines, the Japanese evidenced no interest whatsoever in any political involvement in the Islands.

The first really meaningful reaction to Japan came during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 following the destruction of the Russian fleet by Admiral Togo in the Battle of the Straits of Tsushima. Coming as it did only a brief few years after the Filipino bid for freedom in the Philippine-American War had failed, this Japanese triumph sent a wave of nationalistic feeling and Asian pride surging through the hearts of a number of young Filipinos. Eighty-eight law students of the Escuela de Derecho led by future Justice Antonio Horilleno, future Assemblyman Isidro Vamenta, and future Commissioner of Non-Christian Tribes Teopisto Guingona drew up and signed a congratulatory message which they presented to Japanese Consul Narita Goro. Justice Horilleno speaking some 39 years later recalled the feeling of those who had participated in that action:

> Before the Russo-Japanese War, the Orient, as it seemed to us Filipinos, had no future, no prospects. It seemed as if there was no morning; that the sun which rose in the East was a sun not for Orientals, but peoples of other countries. Up to that time, there was no Oriental country, no Oriental people that could look the peoples of the West face to face.

> Thus, when Japan defeated Russia, we Filipinos, the college students especially, received the news with great enthusiasm and rejoicing. We saw in that victory the dawn of a new day for us people of the east; and so much more so because Japan was forced to accept a war waged against her, at a time when nobody ever believed that she would dare to fight Russia. For very few knew and appreciated the spiritual strength of Japan; very few understood the spirit of the Japanese Army to die rather than to surrender.
>
> We had been subjected to abuses and excesses by our foreign dominators. Other Oriental peoples suffered such abuses too, so that even the independent among them inwardly protested those excesses. But due to a lack of a truly vigorous spirit among them, nothing could be effectively done to correct those evils. Japan alone was the nation we had learned to look up to as one possessing that valiant spirit necessary to eject the dominators from the Orient.[11]

The victory of Japan also seemed to encourage certain former revolutionaries in the Philippines to try once again to develop support in Japan for a revitalization of the fight for independence. Since these attempts coincided with a general worsening of relations between the United States and Japan, the American authorities in the Islands evidenced growing concern about Filipino-Japanese contacts and ordered increased surveillance of them. Moreover, Japanese-American tensions were, quite naturally, magnified in America's vulnerable Pacific "bastion." Local concerns extended even to the possibility of a direct Japanese attack. On February 10, 1908, for example, Governor-General Smith sent a confidential cable to Washington "For eye of Secretary of War or Chief Bureau of Insular Affairs Only."[12] Smith asked, "Is there any change in Japanese situation? If any change, have large deposits with three banking institutions trust funds and general funds; would like to deposit all gold coin with Hongkong bank in case of danger taking draft or telegraph transfer on London for all funds deposited. Have not spoken to Hongkong Bank about this. Do you approve my taking it up tentatively?"[13] Washington's response to the Governor General was reassuring: ". . . nothing in the situation would warrant consideration of the arrangement suggested."[14] Nevertheless, the possibility of Japanese support for subversive elements in the Islands as a kind of prelude to invasion continued to attract the attention of local American intelligence.

Of particular significance in this regard were unsigned reports collected by the Secret Service of the Philippine Constabulary. Much of this information was clearly hearsay, and most of it probably came from sources who either held grudges of one sort or another against

those about whom they reported or who sought to cultivate favoritism from the Americans by being informers. Nevertheless, in an atmosphere among American officials in the Islands of increasing uneasiness about Japanese intentions, these bits of information could not be ignored. Indeed, to some extent these reports had to be given greater attention than they might have under ordinary circumstances since there was never any evidence that the Japanese government was directly involved. Therefore, since no official protest to Japan was possible, in the American view local vigilance could not be relaxed, and all rumors, no matter how seemingly trivial, had to be investigated.

In the fall of 1909 it was reported that Bonifacio Arevalo[15] and Vicente Sotto[16] were en route to Japan ostensibly to buy machinery but "really . . . to purchase arms."[17] At least two reportedly pro-Japanese societies of Filipinos were said to have been organized secretly and to include among their members certain leading ex-revolutionaries who had been involved in the Philippine-American War. These were supposed to include Emiliano Legaspi, who had spent six years in Japan, and Mariano Ponce, the one-time agent of the Malolos Republic in Japan and editor of the violently nationalistic journal *El Renacimiento*.[18]

In Tokyo a so-called "Oriental Society" was described as having as members a number of Filipinos as well as Siamese, Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese. Anti-Western speeches were regular fare at its meetings, and in the summer of 1908, at a meeting in honor of the Philippine national hero and martyr Jose Rizal, Okuma Shigenobu was said to have made a number of pointedly anti-American statements. Important members of the "Oriental Society" in the Philippines were supposed to be Ponce, who was of course well known to Okuma, a certain Amado Evangelista who had lived in Japan for many years, and Tomas Arejola.[19] The American authorities also heard of contact between a Japanese general and the revolutionary hero Pio del Pilar, who was supposed to have told the general that the Philippine people would support Japan in a war between the United States and Japan because Japan promised independence and that they also supported Philippine participation in an "Oriental League" of Japan, China, Korea and the Philippines.[20]

In the face of numerous reports like the foregoing, Governor General W. Cameron Forbes urged in communications to the Secretary of War that precautionary measures be taken in order to create a Philippine public opinion distrustful of Japan's motives and in order to counteract what Forbes believed was a systematic attempt by the

Japanese to undermine American prestige, to stir up racial animosity and to create dissatisfaction with the colonial government. To this end Forbes made a number of specific proposals: that special Filipino agents be sent to Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria to see for themselves the nature of the control exercised by Japan in those areas and that on their return they publish articles on their findings; that one of the Philippine political parties include in its platform a plank opposing aggression by any foreign power with the purpose of changing the sovereignty over the Philippines, especially any state having a monarchical form of government, i.e., Japan;[21] that a society of Filipino school teachers be organized to instill in the minds of the youth a "rational distrust" of Japan; that the government purchase the control of some newspaper of wide circulation so that occasionally officially inspired articles, e.g., anti-Japanese materials, might be published; that the government undertake an educational campaign to instruct the Philippine Constabulary and the Philippine Scouts in Japanese propaganda techniques and to warn them of the probable fate of the Philippines if it were to fall under Japanese domination; and that $25,000 in United States currency be authorized from the secret funds of the President or the Secretary of War in order to carry out all of these schemes.[22] In addition, Forbes recommended that prominent Filipinos be used to spread anti-Japanese propaganda. Specifically he suggested Jaime de Veyra whom he described as "a man I have means of controlling, through his wife, who is under obligation to me . . ."[23]

Unverifiable reports continued to reach Forbes that men like the distinguished scholar Teodoro Kalaw ("He is one of the most decided Japanese sympathizers"),[24] Mariano Ponce, and many others were pro-Japanese. Forbes in passing this information on to Washington very wisely urged that, considering the sources, all such rumors be treated "with a grain of salt."[25] The Governor-General also analyzed whatever Japanese activities there were in the Islands as being the work of freebooting adventurers who were "spending money quite freely" and probably not government sponsored.[26] Nevertheless, he continued to press for a program of counteraction suggesting again the official fostering of anti-Japanese sentiment by emphasizing the fate of Korea and Formosa under Japanese occupation, the lowly social and economic status of Japanese women compared with the emancipated Filipina,[27] and the probable destruction of Christianity in the Philippines if the islands came under a "heathen" Japan.[28]

One of the most important stimuli to potential pro-Japanese feeling

among the more radical "independentistas" came from the pen of the noted Austrian Rizalist and longtime friend of Filipino revolutionaries, Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt. Having been asked by one of his Filipino friends to give his views on the future of the Philippines, Blumentritt contended that since the United States, in his view, would never give the Philippines its independence, "the redemption of the Philippines" would only come by means of "a war of separation or of a conflict between Japan and the United States."[29] The former he dismissed as hopeless and surely resulting in "the ruin of the country."[30] The latter he viewed as a much more promising possibility.

According to Blumentritt, although the European powers despised the Japanese and resented their speedy industrial development, he believed that the Europeans were equally antagonistic to Amrican sovereignty in the Philippines since the passage of the protectionist Payne Tariff Bill by the American Congress. Thus, probably as a European himself, he argued that it was in the best interest of European commerce to support Philippine independence. Blumentritt contended, however, that the European powers, specifically France, Germany, England, Russia and Holland, would not permit Japanese annexation of the Islands and therefore for the present saw American sovereignty as preferable to Japanese. Wrote Blumentritt:

> . . . the aspect of the matter changes completely if the Japanese give a sure guarantee to give the Philippines true liberty, that is, to create an independent state with an "open door" for commerce. Then Japan would not only rid herself of a dangerous neighbor, but would render a good service to the European Powers.[31]

Blumentritt agreed that the likelihood of Japan undertaking a war for "ideal interests"[32] was certainly limited. Nevertheless, he pointed out that by means of such a war Japanese trade and prestige would be greatly augmented and the United States would be eliminated as a potential threat to Japan.

Clearly, there were serious fallacies of logic in what Professor Blumentritt wrote, but the point is not what he said but rather that *he* said it, when he said it. For several years preceding, certain Filipinos had been suggesting that a war between the United States and Japan would bring freedom to the Philippines. For example, an article from *Muling-Pagsilang*, a Tagalog edition of *El Renacimiento*, published in December, 1909, had tried to prove that a war between Japan and the United States would occur very shortly and had argued that Japan which had vanquished both the greatest nation of Asia and the greatest nation of Europe would surely vanquish the greatest

nation of America. Therefore, since Japan would win, the article demanded to know from its readers whether the Filipinos would be on the winning side.[33] Now with the publication of the letter of the distinguished scholar Professor Blumentritt, what up to that time had seemed to be nothing more than wishful thinking and revolutionary propaganda was given a degree of seeming veracity and of prestige which it had heretofore lacked. An American intelligence estimate in late March, 1910, reported that the Blumentritt letter had done more to arouse pro-Japanese sentiment in the Philippines than anything that had happened in months.[34]

Nevertheless, in the years that followed, the element in the islands that had been principally responsible for pro-Japanese activities or for the thesis that Japan was the real hope of Philippine "redemption" declined in importance. There were two primary reasons for this. One was the development of a grudging but realistic acceptance of American rule on the part of almost all Filipinos and a greater willingness on the part of Philippine politicians, at times even an eagerness, to play the American political game and to attain prestige, power, and even ultimately, perhaps, independence without resort to force or violence.[35] The other was the complete failure of the Japanese government to respond to the several overtures of such men as Mariano Ponce, Vicente Sotto or Artemio Ricarte or to occasional manifestations of pro-Japanese sentiment in the Philippine press.[36]

Consistent with its previously demonstrated attitude, the Japanese government's position in such instances continued to be one of concern lest such isolated examples be thought either to have been instigated by or to have been encouraged by Tokyo and thus cast a pall over Japanese-American relations. That such concern was well founded had often been evidenced by the nervous reactions of the American administration in the Philippines to what were considered to be subversive statements or activities. For instance, a report reaching the Japanese Foreign Office in March of 1912 indicated that a spy scare had so infected the authorities in the Islands that arriving Japanese who were wearing boots were being arrested and returned to Japan on the grounds that they were military spies. And what was apparently even of greater perturbation to the Japanese government than the tightened surveillance of Japanese entering the Philippines was the fact that the whole situation had seemingly been precipitated by a reported remark attributed to an unnamed influential Filipino to the effect that rather than accept the imposition of the American legal system in the Islands the Filipinos had no alternative but to seek the assistance of Japan.[37]

The election in 1912 of Woodrow Wilson and the outbreak of World War I in 1914 engendered new discussions in the United States as well as in the Philippines of the future status of the Islands. In the debates which followed, in statements by both Filipinos and Americans, almost inevitably there was reference to the role of Japan. Whether questions of principle or questions of practice were being argued, somehow the participants seemed to come back always to the topic of Japan. For the American colonial rulers the crux of the matter was whether the United States would profit most from a policy of fortification and retention of the Philippines or from a policy of non-fortification and independence. In effect, the problem was whether the threat to United States security would be greater if the Islands were set free so as not to irritate Japan or if they were retained and fortified with the probable irritant to Japanese power. In the former case, it was contended, the Japanese would inevitably overrun the Philippines economically and then politically thus ultimately dominating them. In the latter case, the United States would necessarily become further involved in the defense of an inherently (from the American point of view) indefensible area.[38]

Since, despite the apparent generosity of the Jones Law of 1916, there did not seem to be any prospect of immediate independence for the Philippines, Filipino arguments dealt almost exclusively with the oft-heard contention that, whenever the Americans finally did withdraw, the Japanese would seize the Islands practically simultaneously. In fact, so prevalent did response by Filipinos to this hypothesis become that the very subject matter came to be known in pro-independence circles as "The Japanese Bugaboo." The classic Philippine refutation of "bugabooism" appeared in a publication of the Philippine Press Bureau in Washington in 1919.[39]

To those who saw Japanese immigration to the Islands as a means of insidious infiltration leading to conquest, the answer was that the actual flow of immigrants was "negligible" as compared even with the numbers of Japanese entering Hawaii or California. Moreover, the repeated statements of Japanese political leaders that Japan had no intention of colonizing the Philippines were urged to be taken at face value relying on the high ethical standard of the spirit of Bushido. Further, it was pointed out that even if the Japanese had designs on the Islands, they would be utterly foolish to try to expand their hegemony over a people so totally different from themselves in customs, traditions, religion, language, and ideals. Strategically, too, it was stressed that the Japanese would be severely disadvantaged to have to protect some 3,000 additional islands in an area so far re-

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moved from the Japanese home islands. Finally, it was asked whether the "Japanese bugaboo" were being raised by the Americans as a facade behind which to perpetuate their hold over the Philippines or whether the United States was, in fact, so frightened of Japan that it felt it necessary to its own security to retain the Philippines.

One of the effects of this kind of highly speculative discussion seemed to be to make both the Americans and the Japanese extremely sensitive to the activities of each other in relation to the Philippines. During World War I, for example, since to the Americans the role of Japan as an Allied power had always seemed somewhat ambiguous, there was particular concern about certain indications that Japanese-sponsored Pan-Orientalism was gaining currency among some Filipinos. Clearly such a development was a predictable dividend of both the growing commercial and financial interest of Japan in the Philippines and of the new power position of Japan in Asia as a result of the seizure of German holdings in China and in the Pacific islands and of the Twenty-One Demands on China.[40] In May of 1915 a so-called "Oriental Association" ("Sociedad Oriental") was founded in Manila with the following stated purposes: to make a thorough study of social, economic and political conditions in the Orient; to secure mutual understanding among Oriental countries and to do away with prejudice; to determine the best means of communication with similar associations elsewhere in the Orient.[41] In order to achieve these aims, the Oriental Association intended to sponsor conferences with representatives of other Oriental countries, to send Filipinos to other Asian countries and to disseminate "correct" information about the Philippines.[42] The leader of the Pan-Oriental movement was identified as General Jose Alejandrino, a veteran of the Philippine Revolution and the Philippine-American War. Other moving forces in the organization were Teodoro Kalaw, then Secretary of the Philippine Assembly, Dr. Alejandro Albert of the faculty of the University of the Philippines, and later Undersecretary of Public Instruction, Pedro Gil, editor of Gen. Aguinaldo's journal *Consolidacion Nacional*, Arsenio Luz, then editor of the official Nacionalista Party paper *El Ideal* and later editor of the *Herald* and Mauro Prieto, prominent banker and economist.

Like the Americans, the British were also highly attuned to seemingly pro-Japanese activities in the Philippines since they were fearful of a possible spread of such developments to Asian areas under their colonial control, especially India. Thus, in 1918 a letter from the British Consulate-General in Manila reported that a Filipino-Japanese Social Club was being established on land donated by K. S.

Ohta, founder of the most important single Japanese enterprise in the Islands, the Ohta Development Co.[43] Other interested Japanese were said to be two local officers of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha and Inoue Naotaro, General Manager of the Ohta Development Co.[44] The same report identified two important Filipinos as pro-Japanese propagandists: Dr. C. B. Boncan who had been educated in Tokyo and his cousin A. H. Boncan who had been educated in Nagoya.[45] Certain Filipinos were also listed as having recently visited Japan: Mariano Ponce, his son Pedro Ponce, Pedro Gil (all members of "Sociedad Oriental") and Jose de los Reyes, a Philippine customs official who was married to a Japanese.[46]

Although undoubtedly neither the Americans nor the British saw such activities as those described in the foregoing to be ominous per se, what was apparently disturbing to them was the possibility that a "Sociedad Oriental" or a "Filipino-Japanese Social Club" might be symbolic of something much larger in scope. In reality, however, these groups seemed to stress such innocuous themes as friendship, good will, more accurate knowledge of one another's country, increased trade, travel, educational exchange, and, of course, eternal peace. From the standpoint of the Japanese in particular, such organizations were viewed as economic associations designed to bolster and expand Japan's commercial and financial stake in countries like the Philippines. A report from the American Embassy in Tokyo in 1919, for example, stated that a group of Kobe shippers eager to foster economic ties with the Philippine Islands had inaugurated a "Japan and Philippine Society" of about 50 members of whom some 35 were leading business men interested in Philippine trade.[47] The association announced that it would give dinners and receptions for the many leading Filipinos who passed through Kobe en route to and from the United States. The formation of this new group followed immediately upon the most profitable year to date in Japan-Philippines trade with the total volume for 1918 reaching thirty million yen.[48]

Obviously, the appearance of these various associations had no direct political implications, but with the Jones Law on the statute books, with Japan's power paramount in the Western Pacific, and with Japanese interests firmly entrenched at Davao,[49] contacts between the Philippines and Japan became more frequent and more intimate. In September of 1919, the Manila branch manager of C. Itoh & Co. reported that he had talked very confidentially with Sergio Osmena who had been en route to Japan. According to this report, it was neither true that Osmena was traveling to Japan to get married

nor to recover from an illness. For, it was said, that though Osmena, then Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives, was supposed to be hostile to Japan, he was actually coming to Japan to find out whether independence could be hastened by cooperation with the Japanese. Moreover, the C. Itoh manager said that Osmena wanted to find out what the Japanese leaders' attitude toward Philippine independence was and what they would do if the Americans used force to put down the independence movement.[50]

In 1920 there was held in Japan a meeting of the "Eastern Bar Association" which was founded by the Japanese and included among its members Philippine attorneys as well as Chinese, Siamese, and naturally Japanese attorneys. Fifteen Filipino delegates were present and were extensively entertained with funds provided by large Japanese corporations. The delegates heard an inordinate amount of anti-colonial propaganda about racial equality which was probably a sequel to the recent failure of the Japanese to gain acceptance of the racial equality clause at the Versailles Treaty Conference.[51]

A general appraisal of the Philippine view of Japan became available to the Foreign Office in Tokyo in mid-1921 through the statement of a member of the staff of the Mitsui branch office in Manila:

> At present in Manila there is a good deal of discussion of a United States-Japan war, and we hear these views everywhere. Moreover, every newspaper published in Manila carries frequent rumors of such a possibility, and one newspaper in particular has reported that Japan is busily preparing for war and that Japanese males in the Philippines between the ages of 18 and 35 have been called home for military training. Probably knowing that there is pro-Japanese feeling among the Filipinos, one group of anti-Japanese Americans in order to cause trouble is saying that Japan has an anti-American, anti-Philippine attitude. This seems to be directed at diminishing pro-Japanese feelings among Filipinos and at the same time slowing down the pace of independence.
>
> Though almost everybody wants independence, radicals are few. In short, they are thinking moderately and waiting for their chance. Though among the lower class there is a view that if a war between the United States and Japan occurred, the Philippines should support Japan, drive out the Americans and win its independence, responsible people do not take this view. They prefer to work and wait.[52]

Support for this interpretation of Filipino attitudes vis-a-vis Japan was provided by the comments of a Filipino student who stopped briefly in Japan en route to the United States to study. He told his Japanese questioner that while Filipinos in general respected Japan they had lost much of their former antipathy toward the United States

having seen the good government which the Americans had brought to the Islands and their efforts to educate and enlighten the Filipinos. The Philippines must obtain independence, he said, but "hostile operations" against the United States were utterly impossible.[53]

Clearly views like the above continued to weigh heavily in the considerations of the policy makers in Japan's Foreign Ministry. Japanese officialdom wanted no part of the unstable, erratic, and irresponsible radical element whose activities were anathema to both the American administration and to the emerging nationalist leadership in the Philippines. For it was evident that though these latter Filipino political leaders clamored for independence, they had become convinced that independence could ultimately be obtained from the United States through political pressure and constitutional processes, and they were willing to utilize the interim to secure their own political predominance in the Islands. There was no doubt, therefore, either in the Foreign Office or among the Japanese business community in the Islands that Japan's economic interest which was indeed Japan's primary interest in the Philippines could for the present best be assured by a politically "low posture" in so far as the Americans in the Islands were concerned and by a continuing effort to forge the closest personal ties with the Filipino leadership through expanding economic and cultural activities.

A secret report prepared within the Foreign Office in 1921 and entitled "The Philippine Independence Question" had a most insightful subsection headed "Japan and the Philippine Independence Question."[54] Its authors traced the development of anti-Japanese attitudes in the Philippines from the time of the Spanish-American War. The document began, quite accurately, with the statement that from the outbreak of the revolution of 1896, Filipino rebels had sent several missions to Japan to seek assistance, but Japan had not responded. It was then pointed out that, when the islands were acquired by the United States, many American politicians, financiers, and critics discussed ways of disposing of the Philippines because of the uprisings of the islanders, the miseries of the climate, and the financial losses encumbered in Philippine involvement. According to the analysts in the Foreign Office, however, those Americans who favored retention of the Islands countered most effectively with arguments either of a threat of Japanese invasion or of the possible plans of Filipinos to secure Japanese help to gain their independence.

From the Japanese point of view what the document did most tellingly was to list chronologically a series of straws in the wind, which, while minor in themselves, had by 1921 willy-nilly made Japan

a focus of pro- and anti-independence sentiment in both the United States and the Philippines. These included: the 1910 Blumentritt letter referred to above; a 1914 story in a Manila English language newspaper (*Cablenews American*) which suggested that Japan and the United States had worked out a deal whereby President Wilson had offered to make Japan the principal guarantor of Philippine neutrality in return for a lessening of Japanese pressure in regard to the California Alien Land Laws;[55] various statements by American figures, especially members of Congress, in 1915 and 1916, suggesting that America's Caribbean policy and Japan's Asian policy were the same ("Asian Monroe Doctrine"), that US-Japan relations would ease considerably once the United States left the Philippines, or that the United States should, in fact, withdraw from the Islands in favor of Japan since Filipinos would rather be governed by men of the "same race" to say nothing of the fact that Japanese immigrants would then go to the Philippines instead of to Hawaii or to the West Coast;[56] at the end of 1918, the establishment in Tokyo of a Philippine "Independence Movement Office" and visits to Japan shortly thereafter by both Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmena seeking Japanese "understanding" of their position; in 1920 Quezon's refutation of anti-Japanese opponents of Philippine independence by arguing that there was no possibility of Japanese treachery in the Islands; and finally, in Feb., 1921, an article in the then pro-American *Manila Times* hinting at possible danger to the Philippines with the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and even going so far as to ruminate on whether the Philippines might be another Korea.

Thus, it was clear, to the Foreign Office at least, that whether the Japanese had any political position on the future of the Philippines or not, numerous positions were being attributed to them by Americans as well as by Filipinos. Of course Japan did have interest in the Philippines, trade and investment being the principal ones, but in the overall foreign policy planning of the Japanese government the Philippines played a very minor role. Nevertheless, since the "bugaboo" of Japan had loomed large in American thinking from the time of the acquisition of the Islands, in the United States both those who favored Philippine independence and those who opposed it had increasingly come to invoke assumed Japanese intentions in behalf of their respective views.

Filipino advocates of independence were quick to appreciate the importance of the American image of Japan's attitude toward the Islands. Accordingly, they devoted more of their attention to this phenomenon. A speech in New York City in January, 1921 by

Philippine Resident Commissioner Isauro Gabaldon may be seen as typical of the "line" that was to be followed through the 20's by his countrymen in seeking American support for Philippine freedom.[57] Gabaldon began by saying that what he, Senate President Quezon, and the other Resident Commissioner Jaime de Veyra wanted was nothing more complicated than "independence under the League of Nations, a protectorate by the United States, a neutralization treaty among the great powers, and complete independence!" Then, in order to emphasize the "logic" of these requests, Gabaldon turned his attention to Japan:

> We do not fear Japan. Probably our independence can not be harmful to Japan. In spite of the Japanese being permitted freely to enter the Philippines, at present they do not reach 7,000 or 1/12 the Japanese living in California. There are those who consider the American control of the Philippines a military threat to Japan. As we understand it, it is the presence of the American flag rather than the Philippine national flag which has drawn Japanese laborers. We want to have correct relations with Japan and every other neighboring country in the future, and we want to try to rely on the United States.

This last comment in part reflects the peculiar ambivalence so characteristic of the Filipino elite during their campaign for independence from the United States. However, in all fairness to Gabaldon, it must be recognized that he was talking to an American audience whose increasing concern in regard to the future of the Philippines was the role of Japan. Moreover, his arguments here—no Filipino fear of Japan, no Japanese fear of an independent Philippines, no significant influx into the Islands of Japanese immigrants—were all to be reiterated to Americans time and again by Filipino spokesmen for independence.

Curiously, at almost the same moment that Philippine spokesmen for independence were suggesting to Americans Japan's amenability to freedom for the Islands, Charles A. Dailey, special correspondent for the *Chicago Tribune*, was interviewing prominent Japanese in order to try to show that Japan really wanted American control to continue. While it is clear that these interviews were published to give support to the *Tribune*'s retentionist anti-independence position, at the same time it is evident that most of the proponents of the opinions recorded by Dailey were themselves seeking to "defuse" the American nervousness about Japan's supposed preoccupation with the "fate" of the Philippines.[58]

Hanihara Masanao, then Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, told Dailey that the American presence in the Philippines had never been

viewed in Japan as a menace but rather that the United States had always been welcomed as a friendly neighbor. He went on to say that Japan wanted only peaceful relations with the Philippines and had "absolutely no designs upon the islands whatsoever." According to Hanihara, "the majority of the thinking Japanese" preferred the United States to remain in the Philippines to insure Philippine good neighborliness toward Japan. "We do not want to be surrounded by people who cannot govern themselves," said Hanihara.

Another important figure who hoped that the Americans would stay in the Philippines was Viscount Kaneko Kentaro, Privy Councillor, Special Ambassador to the United States for the Portsmouth Treaty Conference, and President of the Japan-America Society. "Suppose you gave independence to the Filipinos," he told Dailey. "In five or ten years, I can say that the Filipinos will make a mess of it. History has not shown them capable of self-government." In addition, Kaneko scoffed at any idea of Japanese designs on the Philippines. He pointed out that Japan had its own troubles in Taiwan, Korea, and Sakhalin—"too many irons in the fire," as he put it. Commerce, not conquest, was Japan's lifeblood, said Kaneko, and therefore, feeling that Japanese commerce with the Philippines was safest under American protection, he concluded his remarks with the observation that "we would be genuinely sorry if the United States left."

Fujiyama Raita, then President of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, minced no words in his chat with Dailey. Japan, he said, had no ambitions toward the Philippines. He further stated that the Islands should be left "as they now are." Fujiyama's culminating view was that the American presence in the Philippines was parallel to the Japanese presence in Korea and that in both places the people were much better off. Thus, no more than he could be expected to support independence for the Koreans could he be expected to support independence for the Filipinos.

The former Ambassador to England and one of the architects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Viscount Kato Komei, stressed to Dailey that, as long as the Philippines remained peaceful and unfortified, it made no difference to Japan who controlled the Islands. Kato, like so many of his fellows, pointed out once more that Japan had no territorial interest in the Philippines. He noted: "If she had, she could have realized them long before the United States went there. Aguinaldo had some idea of getting Japan interested, but we gave him no encouragement whatever."

As Marquis Okuma Shigenobu, then nearly 80, saw it, Japan's only

wish for the Philippines was that the Islands be "quiet and prosperous." He recalled that in earlier years many Filipinos had come to Japan seeking assistance against the "injustice" of Spain but that Japan had not interfered in any way. Okuma told the *Chicago Tribune* correspondent, "We have no dissatisfaction with American rule."

Two prominent men who favored the continuation of the American presence in the Islands but warned against any attempt by the United States to fortify the Philippines were Viscount Shibusawa Eiichi, financier and founder of the Chamber of Commerce of Japan, and Dr. Soeda Juichi, President of the Bank of Taiwan and President of the Japan League of Nations Society. Shibusawa said that if the United States fortified or increased its naval strength significantly in the Philippines, Japan would respond by a similar augmentation of its military forces in the area thus increasing tensions between the two countries. Soeda contended that, since Japan had no ambitions in the Islands, fortifications were unnecessary. Moreover, again according to Soeda, since Japan would come to the aid of the United States should any third power attack the Philippines, the entire question of fortification was a moot one.

Among the interviewees, only two, Baron Sakatani Yoshio, formerly Minister of Finance and a leader in the House of Peers, and Inukai Tsuyoshi, Diet member and former Minister of Education, spoke in even mildly encouraging terms about Philippine independence. Sakatani said that he had met and been impressed by Sergio Osmena and thought him the type of leader who could probably sustain independence once it was given. However, in Sakatani's opinion the real crux of the independence question was economic. If the Philippines could achieve financial independence, then Sakatani thought that the United States should withdraw. But, if not, then the Americans should remain 10 or 20 years more before granting the Islands their independence. In any event, according to Sakatani, even after independence, the United States should assume the lead in all important questions relating to the Philippines. Inukai, who spent most of his interview praising the correctness of the policies of Japan, simply said that he thought that, since the United States was the principal international standard bearer of "self-determination," it was logical for that policy to be followed in the case of the Philippines.

Interviewer Dailey's conclusions were logical in the light of the responses of his subjects. His most important presumption was that Japan represented no threat to the Philippines even if the United States retained the Islands. In fact, almost all of those interviewed seemed to prefer American retention to Philippine freedom. Thus, for a

representative of the anti-independence *Chicago Tribune* there was satisfaction in reporting that the Japanese had no interest in the Philippines, that they had their hands full elsewhere. Dailey went so far as to state that "If Japan must expand, the nearby continent of Asia offers her the greatest opportunity." For him the argument that the United States should withdraw from the Philippines in order not to frighten the Japanese was so much nonsense.

The publication of the interviews brought swift reaction from the Philippine press.[59] The *Herald* wrote in an editorial that the Japanese really knew almost nothing about the Philippines. It suggested further that what they did know came from third party publications, especially American books which were available in Japan. Therefore, the *Herald* criticized the Japanese for being so ill-informed and so dependent on American "propaganda." The Spanish language Nacionalista Party organ *El Ideal* particularly criticized those Japanese who doubted the Filipinos' ability to govern themselves. The same paper attacked Japan's "imperialistic attitude" and contended that those interviewees who had approved of the American control of the Philippines were simply justifying Japan's role in Korea and China. *El Ideal* also assured the Japanese that an independent Philippines would be much less of a threat to Japan's security than the colonial situation which found the United States and Japan confronting each other across a common boundary between Taiwan and the Philippines.

The dispute, reflected in these interviews and their interpretations, between the anti-independence Republican administrations in Washington and their representatives in Manila on the one hand and pro-independence Filipino politicians and their spokesmen in Washington on the other continued throughout the 1920's. The retentionists and their opponents both expended considerable effort during the decade in attributing motives to Japan, motives which naturally redounded to the advantage of their particular political position. Accordingly, the Japanese could not remain insensitive to such attributions, though they were extremely careful not to become directly involved in the independence question. The Foreign Office kept track of these discussions through reports from its consular staffs abroad, through meetings with Filipinos passing through Japan, and through reports from Japanese businessmen, merchant seamen, travelers and the like returning from visits to the Philippines.[60]

In the fall of 1923, a so-called Philippine Independence Party passed through Japan en route to Washington.[61] The group included then Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives Manuel Roxas

and his wife, accompanied by three advisers and three secretaries. Roxas told the Japanese that one of his aims in going to the United States was to try to counteract the idea, seemingly prevalent among the Republican administration in Washington and Manila, that, if the Philippines were given self-government, they would fall victim to Japan. There were three points, Roxas stated, which he intended to make in response to this claim. First, he would argue that Japan had abandoned a policy of advancing southward in favor of a policy of advancing northward. Therefore, there need be no anxiety over a possible Japanese seizure of the Philippines after independence.[62] Second, Roxas would point out that Japan's first southward advance, the annexation of Taiwan, had been an experience filled with difficulties and losses for the Japanese thus making it even more unlikely that there would be any further desire to move to the south. Roxas's third point was to be that, even if for geographical and racial reasons a free Philippines were to cooperate with Japan, Filipinos would never brook any interference by Japan in their internal affairs.

Naturally Roxas was almost as eager to have the Japanese hear out his logic as he was to have the Americans accept it. For he understood well, even in 1923, that since there were obviously strong doubts in Japan about the viability of an independent Philippines, Japan's willingness to have confidence in and to cooperate with a future free Philippines was essential to that same viability. In fact, in order to provide concrete evidence of the desire of the Filipinos to have closer ties with Japan, Roxas turned his attention to a more immediate and more emotional matter: the Great Earthquake of 1923.

He complained that although the Philippines had contributed its doctors, its nurses, and its aid to Japan's earthquake sufferers, this assistance had been lumped with that of the United States. Accordingly, Roxas said that Philippine help had gone unnoticed and unknown in Japan. To overcome this disadvantage, the Filipinos had organized their own earthquake relief assistance program and had sent Roxas, as Chairman of that program, to present directly to the Japanese in the name of the Filipino people 70,000 pesos collected from all over the Islands. This money, Roxas stressed, was completely separate from the United States and had no connection whatsoever with it.[63]

That Roxas was considered an important personage by the Japanese seems evident from the attention paid to him on his return from the United States the following summer. When passing through Japan en route back to the Philippines, he was given "every courtesy" including customs exemption.[64] However, again indicative of what

the real interest was of Japan in the Philippines, the Foreign Office records indicate that the "importance" attached to Roxas did not necessarily stem from his preoccupation with the independence problem. For the Consulate General in Manila in a coded message to Tokyo pointed out that on July 16 the Philippine Legislature would take up matters relating to cement and therefore recommended that Roxas, while in Japan, meet with such "interested parties" as representatives of Asano, Mitsui, and Suzuki.[65] Not independence, not bases, not neutrality—all matters which had seemed to preoccupy Roxas on his prior visit to Japan—but cement was what the Japanese really wanted to talk about. And, whenever in subsequent years Philippine independence was to be a subject of discussion between Filipino leaders and influential Japanese, although the Japanese made properly courteous noises about neutralization and fortification, their overriding concerns continued to be trade and investment with a secondary interest in immigration.

During the 1920's, party governments in Japan, postwar isolationism in the United States, the Nine-Power, Five-Power and Four-Power Washington Treaties, and economic prosperity in both countries had tended to contribute to a relaxation of tensions between Japan and the United States. But for the Philippines the independence question remained a burning one and the problem of Japan continued to affect discussion of it. A capsule of the typical arguments involved may be seen in these excerpts from a stenographic report of a luncheon discussion of "Philippine Independence" in New York before the Foreign Policy Association on January 31, 1925.[66]

> Statement of Mr. Marcial P. Lichauco, Harvard Law Student:
>
> Mention is also made of the Japanese bugaboo. Our answer to this menace is that Japan has time and again promised us that she would be the first nation to guarantee our neutrality. And we have full faith and confidence in the word of the Japanese nation, even if your Congress hasn't. [Applause.]
>
> Statement of Vicente Villamin, writer and economist:
>
> The Filipinos have no official cognizance of the impressive international developments in which their country is involved. We have been told repeatedly of the so-called Japanese bugaboo which [does] not seem to have its terrors to Mr. Lichauco.
>
> Statement of Dr. Henry Parker Willis, President, Philippine National Bank, Chairman, Phil-American Chamber of Commerce:
>
> . . . That we have any reason to doubt that [the Japanese] would make a binding treaty to neutralize the Philippines, that they would show good faith toward us, I have no ground for supposing.

> It should be noted that under our reduction of naval power, the naval authorities say that we could not hold the Philippines in case of war. The Philippines are within the cruising radius of the Japanese fleet, and they are not within ours. As things stand, we remain in the Philippines at the consent and under the general agreement of Japan. That Japan could drive us from the Philippines I suppose is obvious . . . I see no reason to doubt [it].

Statement of Lichauco in answer to a question as to whether the Filipinos have a racial and cultural affinity for the Japanese:

> There is no doubt that we have no such feeling of relationship toward the Japanese. In fact, we believe that one of the strongest reasons why Japan would not want to come with us is because we are so totally different from them.

The crucial argument, in terms of its international implications, of the entire debate over Philippine independence seemed to be whether a powerful, armed, expanding, imperial Japan would permit a relatively defenseless independent Philippines to survive. As is evident from the statements quoted above, the points of view on this problem varied greatly, and what is even more apparent is that they were all in fact colored by other positions which frequently had little or nothing to do with Japan. That is, committed supporters of independence tended to minimize and even scoff at the potential threat of Japan and to use some rather extreme arguments to prove just how trustworthy Japan was and how utterly disinterested Japan was in the Philippines.[67] Similarly, committed opponents of independence obviously used the Japanese "bugaboo" with equal vigor in order to try to prove that the moment American sovereignty was withdrawn Japan would gobble up the islands. What both groups failed to recognize (or if they recognized it, failed to admit) was that Japan's policies were not predicated simply on the independence or lack of independence of the Islands but rather on what Japanese interests in the eyes of her policy makers demanded at any given moment. And as far as the defensibility of the Philippines was concerned, unfortunately vis-a-vis Japan, as the events of 1941-42 were so sadly to prove, the country could not be defended with or without American assistance.

Nevertheless, throughout the debates over Philippine independence the record is replete with statements on both sides of the Japanese question, some more fantastic than others. While on the one hand Japanese immigration was being described as a disguised invasion and all immigrants were reported to be military reservists, on the other hand Japan was being depicted as completely non-aggressive and the so-called Japanese menace was said to be "the product of mere

fantasies."[68] "Fear-mongers" (or, more accurately, retentionists) proclaimed that the Philippines were being overrun by voracious Japanese colonists while advocates of immediate independence said that the Japanese were in fact repelled by the unfriendly tropical climes where they could never hope to survive.[69]

Proponents of independence maintained that the only basis for Japan's seeming threatening posture toward the Philippines was the fact that as long as American bases were present in the Islands, it was Japan which saw herself as threatened. Once American sovereignty was terminated, they said, clearly an independent Philippines could pose no danger for Japan, and, therefore, the supposed military interest of Japan in the islands would disappear and a truly peaceful attitude and a scrupulous respect for the rights of other nations on the part of the Japanese would prevail.[70] Retentionists, however, insisted that the only reason for Japan's not having seized the Philippines to date was the presence of American forces in the Islands. As Japan grew stronger militarily and economically, it would be all the more necessary, they asserted, to sustain an American presence in the Philippines as a barrier to Japanese conquest.[71]

Interestingly, of course, this debate raged among Filipinos themselves or between Filipinos and Americans and through it all the subjects of these discussions, the Japanese, could be paragons of discretion only occasionally interjecting appropriately platitudinous statements. Japanese officials, whether in the Philippines or in Japan, did or said little which could be criticized by the American authorities who were responsible for Philippine foreign affairs. At the same time, however, representatives of Japan, both diplomats and businessmen, not only maintained the closest contacts with their countrymen in the Islands but assiduously developed intimate associations with the highest level of Filipino officialdom and with the local business community. Thus while carefully continuing to accord proper respect to the colonial rulers, the Japanese were at the same time paving the way toward a more influential role in the Philippines if and when independence might be granted.

1. C. P. Romulo, "From the Land of the Cherry-Blossoms and Chrysanthemums," *The Citizen*, September 25, 1919.
2. ". . . the United States is only joined to us by an accidental tie, conquest, and Japan is tied to us by the natural ties of its geography, its birth and its permanence in this part of the world," *La Democracia*, July 21, 1915.
3. Romulo, *op. cit.*, September 18, 1919.
4. "Can we as a people be able to retain much of what we hold as tradition, accept a technological order without losing our cultural identity? The Japanese have demonstrated the fact that this can be done. The Japanese have also shown to the whole world the strength of their native institutions." *Sunday Times Magazine* (Manila), April 23, 1961, p. 11.

5. ". . . the Filipinos . . . desire to become acquainted with Japan in order to learn if that vigorous armed power are to some day serve as a guarantee of their nationality. . . ." *La Democracia,* July 20, 1915.
6. *La Democracia,* July 21, 1915.
7. Romulo, *op. cit.,* Sept. 25, 1919.
8. Romulo, *op. cit.,* Sept. 18, 1919.
9. It was reported that in 1908 about 180 Filipinos residing in Japan, China and Hong Kong had incorporated a "Liga Filipina Japonesa" and offered their services to the Japanese government. (Division of Natural Resources, National Archives, Washington, D.C., War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs [hereafter "BIA"], 381/3. In 1909 a society called "Adhension Filipina" was founded by Tomas Arejola who was its president and by Martin Pobre, engineering student in Japan and brother of Deputy Baldomero Pobre, who was its secretary. BIA 381/2.
10. See, for example, G. K. Goodman, "General Artemio Ricarte and Japan," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* (Sept. 1966), Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 48-60.
11. Quoted in "1905 Nippon Victory Was Vindication of All Asians," *The Sunday Tribune Magazine* (Manila), March 26, 1944.
12. BIA after 381/1, Feb. 10, 1908.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. Arevalo (1850-1920) was a dentist, a sculptor and a patron of the arts who had exhibited portraits of the Emperor and Empress of Japan in the Hanoi Exhibition of 1902. E. A. Manuel, *Dictionary of Philippine Biography* (Quezon City: Filipiniana Publications, 1955), Vol. 2, p. 62.
16. Sotto was a lawyer, a journalist, and a political radical whose affinity for Japan persisted to the eve of World War II. See G. K. Goodman, "Japan and Philippine Radicalism: The Case of Vicente Sotto," *Solidarity* (Manila, June, 1970).
17. BIA 381/2 Sept. 27, 1909. Actually Arevalo went to Japan to study the operation of a textile factory preparatory to the proposed acquisition of machinery for the establishment of a textile plant in the Philippines. The plan never materialized. Manuel, *op. cit.,* p. 65.
18. Governor General Forbes cabled the Secretary of War on September 21, 1909: "[I am] convinced that the hostility of the *Renacimiento* is inspired by Japanese influence with the object of prejudicing the Filipino people against the Government. . . ." BIA With 381/2. On October 21, 1909, *El Renacimiento* editorialized, "Colonies gain neither independence nor any right without long and bloody struggles." On October 29, 1909, the lead editorial was entitled: "Prince Ito Martyr to Duty."
19. BIA 381/3, Oct. 3-30, 1909.
20. *Ibid.*
21. In October, 1909, Forbes went to Romblon where he met Sergio Osmena and suggested that the Nacionalista Party platform include a subtle anti-Japanese plank. "He [Osmena] said it would be arranged very easily; that it was a natural corollary to the existing planks of their platform, which provide for a national program and could be expressed without any particular change. The addition of the words 'especially a monarchical form of government' will be sufficient to accomplish all of our purposes. . . . We have given him the arguments and will furnish him corroborative data as fast as it is turned out." BIA 381/15, Oct. 16, 1909.
22. BIA 381/8, Oct. 11, 1909 and BIA 381/9, Nov. 26, 1909. In the Oct. 11 message Forbes noted opinions on a possible Japanese-American conflict expressed to him "over a year ago" by General Emilio Aguinaldo. "He told me that the majority of the Filipinos would be neutral; that a large minority—but not quite half would be in favor of the United States and willing to fight, and an extremely small minority would actively favor Japan. For his part, he was through with fighting and would be among the neutral."
23. BIA 381/9, Nov. 26, 1909. De Veyra was later to be head of the Executive Bureau of the Philippine Government and also served as a Resident Commissioner to the United States.
24. BIA 381/4, Nov. 8, 1909.
25. *Ibid.*
26. BIA 381/9, Nov. 26, 1909.
27. A Filipino visitor to Japan, Judge Simplicio del Rosario, was quoted in an interview on his return as follows: "Women carry on their backs all sorts of heavy loads and it is a common sight to see women drawing heavy carts loaded with large boxes of merchandise." Quoted from the issue of September 22, 1909, as reported in R. R. Ingles, "50 Years with the *Times*," *Manila Times,* September 22, 1959.
28. BIA 381/9, Nov. 26, 1909.

29. Letter dated Jan. 25, 1910 and published in *La Vanguardia,* Mar. 4, 1910.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. BIA With 381/4, Jan., 1910.
34. *Ibid.,* Mar., 1910. That the Japanese were completely taken by surprise by the Blumentritt letter and were concerned about its possible effect on Japanese-American relations is evident in a dispatch from the Consul General in Hong Kong to the Foreign Ministry. At first the Consul, who said the letter had been shown to him in English by a reporter for the *New York Herald,* referred to Blumentritt as a "certain Australian" though he later corrected himself. (Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter "JMFA"), I.6.2.1-6, Mar. 2, 1910.)
35. This trend was encouraged by the victory of the anti-imperialist Democrats in the American election of 1912 culminating in the passage in 1916 of the liberalizing Jones Law which gave the Filipinos full legislative powers. "By this time even the most intransigent Filipinos, with the exception of General Ricarte, who had exiled himself from the country, had become sincere friends and loyal supporters of the United States." Manuel L. Quezon, *The Good Fight* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1946), pp. 132-33.
36. A signed article in the Spanish language newspaper *La Vanguardia* for June 14, 1911, for example, stated that the help of Japan would be "expedient" in securing Philippine independence and that by so assisting the Filipinos the Japanese would, if they succeeded, force the withdrawal of their "most dreaded rival" and open up a new area for large-scale immigration. The author concluded: "With respect to the contingency of Japanese domination in the Philippines, it should be less antipathetic and perhaps more advantageous to the Filipinos than the domination of today. After all, Filipinos and Japanese are almost brothers and there exists an abyss between Tagalog and Yankees." Quoted in *The Cablenews American,* June 25, 1911.
37. JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2, Mar. 28, 1912.
38. Roy Watson Curry, *Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), pp. 132-36.
39. Jose P. Melencio, *Arguments Against Philippine Independence and Their Answers* (Washington: The Philippine Press Bureau, 1919).
40. In January, 1915, in Tokyo a Pan-Oriental type of organization, the "South Sea Association," was founded in order to strengthen the ties between Japan and her neighbors to the south including the Philippines. *Japan Advertiser,* January 29, 1915.
41. "Pan Orientalism in Philippines," *New York Evening Post,* August 14, 1915.
42. *Ibid.*
43. National Archives of India, Foreign & Political Department, Extl.-Oct.-12-Part (B) Secret 1918; letter from British Consulate General, Manila, Apr. 26, 1918.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*
47. BIA 6144/48-A, April 28, 1919.
48. *Ibid.*
49. See G. K. Goodman, *Davao: A Case Study in Japanese-Philippine Relations* (Lawrence, Kansas: 1967).
50. JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 1, Sept. 18, 1919.
51. BIA 6144/82-a, May 19, 1920.
52. JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 4, June 3, 1921.
53. *Ibid.*
54. The full report is contained in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2, May, 1921. Secret.
55. This seems to have stemmed from a visit to Japan by Gov. Gen. Harrison simultaneous with the debate over the California land problem.
56. In the debates over the Jones Act, the Democrats in favor of the legislation said that, in the event of an attack, the United States could not defend the Islands. In such discussions, there was no doubt that Japan was the potential "enemy country."
57. The full text of the speech is found in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 3, Jan. 3, 1921.
58. The text of the interviews is found in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, April, 1921.
59. The reactions are summarized in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 1, May 16, 1921.
60. The records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs include a large number of pertinent newspaper clippings.
61. The conversation with Roxas is reported in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2, Nov. 28, 1923. Secret.
62. When Roxas did testify before the American Congress in behalf of Philippine independence, the Japanese press reported his statement that Japan was indifferent

to the Philippines and had no interest other than the possibility of the Philippines being used as a base for hostile forces. According to Roxas, once independence was granted, that problem would "evaporate." *Asahi Shimbun*, Feb. 18, 1924. Clipping found in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2.

63. JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2, Nov. 28, 1923. Secret.
64. JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2, June 24, 1924. In code.
65. *Ibid.*
66. BIA 364/556.
67. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs Manuel Roxas even credited the Philippine independence movement with bringing about democratic reforms in Japan. *New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1930.
68. Manuel Roxas quoted in the *Herald*, Oct. 2, 1927.
69. "Although the Empire of Japan and the Philippine Islands have been side by side for millions of years and there was no exclusion law to deprive the Japanese from going into the Philippine Islands, by the last official census there were only 7,800 Japanese there. I mention this fact because one of the most persistent points urged against the immediate granting of independence which was categorically promised is the Japanese bugaboo." Resident Commissioner Camilo Osias quoted in *Congressional Record*, March 25, 1930.
70. "Now if our brother Malayans of Siam can live happily and be increasingly prosperous without the sovereignty of an alien people, without tariff-free access to American markets, and also, if you please, without the slightest molestation from Japan or any other power on earth, why can not the Philippines look forward to equal contentment, peace and satisfaction under independence?" Former Resident Commissioner Isauro A. Gabaldon quoted in *Filipino Nation*, August, 1930.
71. "From an international standpoint withdrawal of America from the Philippines at this time, when Asia is charged with dynamite will unbalance the delicate international equilibrium. . . . America and Japan are powers around a body of water, having conflicting interests. Japan is militarily weaker than the United States because she does not have certain basic raw materials, especially iron ore. The Philippines has nearly 400 million tons of unexploited iron ore deposits. These deposits, under the control of Japan will strengthen that country's sinews and therefore its military power. That fact ought to have some meaning to the United States." Vicente Villamin quoted in the *Denver Post*, Sept. 14, 1930.

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## Abstract / Résumé

The Treaty of Saigon of 1862, which followed the Franco-Spanish expedition of 1858 into Cochinchina, gave France a foothold in South Vietnam. Expanding thence toward the Center, then the North, France signed a treaty with the Court of Hue in 1874 confirming her new conquests, as a prelude to the definitive Treaty of the Protectorate of 1884, which formally sanctioned French control over all of Vietnam.

After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, many French traders, who sought to occupy North Vietnam in order to facilitate distribution of their goods destined for Yunnan, found in Dupré, the French Admiral-Governor of Cochinchina, an enthusiastic source of support. Aided by missionaries located in Tonkin and by Catholic Vietnamese who served as a "Fifth Column", Dupré sent Garnier to occupy Tonkin without striking a blow, in spite of the resistance of the Vietnamese. Disregarding counsels of moderation preached by Paris—reflecting the ensuing financial difficulties, suffering, and the occupation of France by the Prussians—Dupré organized the conquest of Tonkin by himself and, in spite of several setbacks, finally secured from the Vietnamese, in 1874, "his" treaty, not only by using force but by slightly undiplomatic means as well. In this he was aided by the internal turmoil of the country and by a defeatist tendency on the part of the Hue government. This political treaty was complemented by a commercial treaty signed shortly afterwards.

The treaty of 1874, which "assigned to France sovereignty over Lower Cochinchina," authorized the free exercise of the Christian religion, opened Tonkin to foreign commerce and the Red River to navigation up to the Chinese frontier. It was negotiated in haste by Dupré in consequence of the situation in France, and finally was ratified by the French Government, which considered it "an important diplomatic success," although it contained several contradictory clauses and aroused a wide variety of reactions.

# Le Traité de 1874

NGUYEN XUAN THO

## I

### Le Traite de 1874

ON EST EN 1873.

Depuis 1864, la révision et le remplacement du traité de 1862 sont à l'ordre du jour. Chaque nouveau gouverneur français apporte ses pleins pouvoirs, les offre avec des encouragements au gouvernement de Huê. Celui-ci répond par l'indication de plénipotentiaires, puis chacun déclare inacceptable ce que propose l'autre.

En attendant, le traité de 1862, dont il ne reste rien, est censé toujours en vigueur; le gouvernement français est le premier à se réclamer de lui quand il y a le moindre avantage.

L'amiral Dupré, en arrivant, avait avisé le gouvernement de Huê qu'il était habilité à traiter, et qu'il le désirait; il n'y avait pas eu davantage de suites que précédemment bien que, chacun de son côté, les deux protagonistes fussent de plus en plus convaincus qu'il fallait en finir. Une ambassade de Huê, venue à Saigon avec l'intention de continuer sur Paris, avait été internée par l'amiral-gouverneur.

Après plusieurs entrevues avec l'ambassade prisonnière, le 11 septembre 1873, l'amiral Dupré écrivait à l'amiral d'Hornoy, ministre de la Marine à Paris:

> . . . J'ai eu l'honneur de vous rendre compte de l'arrivée de l'ambassade annamite à Saigon.
>
> . . . J'ai tenté de dissuader les ambassadeurs annamites de continuer leur voyage. Leur gouvernement les a invités à conférer avec moi sur différents points qui ne sont pas sans importance.
>
> . . . Il ne m'a pas été possible d'arracher à mes interlocuteurs le fond de leur pensée, ils sont craintifs et méfiants.
>
> . . . Mon but serait de leur faire demander le protectorat de la France, qui entrainerait pour eux l'obligation de ne recevoir aucun agent diplomatique ou consulaire étranger; la présence d'un représentant du gouverneur à Huê; la présence dans la capitale ou dans un ou plusieurs ports du Tonkin et de l'Annam d'un agent français appuyé par une force militaire suffisante pour assurer la sécurité; la liberté de commerce sur ces différents points; la suppression des douanes et de toute entrave au commerce sur la frontière de terre; l'ouverture de la navigation du Song Koi au commerce français,

annamite et chinois, moyennant le paiement de droits modérés à la côte at à la frontière de Chine; la liberté de culte accordée aux chrétiens annamites et l'abolition complète de toutes les entraves apportées à l'exercice de la religion. Enfin, et bien entendu, le paiement de ce qui reste dû à l'indemnité espagnole.

Moyennant les conditions loyalement et consciencieusement remplies, si d'ici là ne survient aucun trouble ni rebellion dans les trois provinces en question, le gouvernement français s'engagerait à remettre au roi Tu-Duc l'administration de ces trois provinces après . . . années écoulées depuis l'échange des ratifications. Le gouvernement français conserverait à Vinh-Long, Chau-Doc et Ha-Tien, un Résident et une force suffisante pour assurer la sécurité des chrétiens et de tous les Annamites qui nous ont loyalement servis, la conservation des droits des Cambodgiens, la complète ouverture de toutes les routes, fleuves, canaux, et voies de communication en général. En remboursement des dépenses faites par nous dans les provinces, le gouvernement annamite paierait une redevance de . . . cent mille piastres.

De son côté, le gouvernement français prendrait l'engagement de défendre le roi Tu-Duc contre toute attaque du dehors ou du dedans, de l'aider de son expérience pour la direction à donner à la politique et à son administration; mettre au service du Roi des hommes experts pour rétablir l'ordre dans ses finances, pour régulariser la rentrée des impôts, et pour organiser un service des douanes; des instructeurs militaires pour former une armée; des armes perfectionnées, des vaisseaux bien construits avec des canons puissants, des ingénieurs et des ouvriers habiles pour diriger les travaux. . . .[1]

En marge des conférences soi-disant officielles, des entretiens privés entre les ambassadeurs vietnamiens et l'interprête Philastre ont eu lieu, au sujet desquels, dans une lettre du 23 septembre 1873 au ministre de la Marine, Dupré écrit:

. . . Les négociations préliminaires entamées avec eux n'ont pas fait de progès apparent pendant les deux semaines qui viennent de s'écouler. Elles ont été entravées d'une part par la crainte très fondée des ambassadeurs de faire aucune concession avant de pouvoir constater qu'ils n'ont négligé aucun effort pour faire accepter les demandes de leur gouvernement, d'autre part l'état de maladie trop réel du premier ambassadeur Lê-Tuan. Notre deuxième conférence a été suivie d'un entretien très prolongé des Envoyés avec M. Philastre . . . (pouvant se résumer) comme suit:

(1) Restitution des trois provinces occidentales moyennant remboursement de nos dépenses d'établissement;
(2) Maintien du statu quo commercial;
(3) Engagement de la France d'assister le roi Tu-Duc;
(4) Abandon de l'instruction publique à des fonctionnaires annamites.

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De la discussion qui a lieu à ce sujet, M. Philastre a emporté la conviction que les deux premières demandes n'étaient reproduites que pour la forme et que ses interlocuteurs ne se faisaient aucune illusion au sujet de cette restitution impossible. . . .[2]

Les conditions avancées étant nettement opposées, chacun tenant à garder ses positions, pour le moment au moins aucune entente n'est possible. Les pourparlers sont donc laissées en suspens.

Au cours de ces entretiens en tête à tête, le 16 Septembre 1873, les ambassadeurs vietnamiens avaient remis au plénipotentiaire français un mémoire:

. . . Premier point: Si M. le Gouverneur laissait racheter les territoires de ces trois provinces de Bien-Hoa, Gia-Dinh et Dinh-Tuong, alors il apparaitrait raisonnable de demander à titre gratuit la restitution des trois provinces de Vinh-Long, An-Giang et Ha-Tien. Cependant, si M. le Gouverneur exigeait le remboursement des dépenses faites jusqu'ici dans ces trois provinces, nous demanderions à les supporter, et on diviserait par exemple la somme en un certain nombre d'annuités d'une valeur donnée. L'Empire du Dai-Nam demande à accéder à ces conditions.

Deuxième point : L'Empire du Dai-Nam doit encore deux millions de piastres sur l'indemnité de guerre, cela tient à ce qui avait été stipulé dans le traité conclu entre les trois puissances. Mais si M. l'amiral de la Grandière contrevint aux stipulations de ce traité, et vint avec des troupes prendre en plus des trois provinces de Vinh-Long, An-Giang et Ha-Tien, M. l'amiral de Langrandière aurait dit encore que si l'Empire du Dai-Nam consentait à céder ces trois provinces, alors il arrangerait les choses de manière à réduire cette indemnité de un million six cent mille piastres, et que, de plus, chaque année il enverrait un navire à vapeur surveiller les pirates. Mais l'Empire du Dai-Nam ne voulut pas consentir à cette cession: c'est pour cela que le paiement de cette indemnité est resté en souffrance jusqu'à ce jour. Actuellement, si nous obtenons de M. le Gouverneur qu'il consente au premier point que nous venons d'exposer, et à restituer les trois provinces de l'Ouest à l'Empire du Dai-Nam, alors notre pays est prêt à payer le montant intégral de cette indemnité.

Troisième point: Dans l'article IV du traité de 1862, il est dit: 'Si, plus tard, l'Empire du Dai-Nam traite avec d'autres pays et veut consentir à une cession de territoire en faveur d'un autre pays, alors si l'Empereur des Français consent à cette cession, l'Empire du Dai-Nam pourra le faire, sinon, non.' Nous considérons ces mots comme réellement non conformes à la raison et cela parce que le territoire de l'Empire du Dai-Nam est régi par l'Empereur du Dai-Nam, et c'est à lui d'apprécier et de décider. Si, pour quelque affaire que ce soit, il doit d'abord s'entendre avec le souverain de la France, la réciprocité exigeant que lorsque la France voudrait traiter avec un pays quelconque il faudrait qu'elle s'entendît avec l'Empereur du

Dai-Nam. Ce qui est une chose impossible à cause de la distance et des longueurs qu'elle entraine. D'ailleurs tous les autres pays sont des puissances indépendantes qui traitent entre elles sans qu'aucun article analogue ait été introduit dans le traité. Nous demandons donc la suppression de cette clause.

7è mois, 25è jour.[3]

Ces demandes, si raisonnables et si justes soient-elles, sont loin d'être prises en sérieuse considération par l'amiral français. On peut s'attendre à un refus de Dupré; mais ce refus aurait pu être plus courtois!

Il écrit, à ce sujet, dans sa lettre du 23 Septembre 1873 à son ministre:

. . . J'ai accusé réception (du mémoire) en déclarant que je n'avais pas à examiner les considérations politiques et historiques sur lesquelles ils appuient ces demandes et que quant à celles-ci, après mes déclarations catégoriques et souvent renouvelées au ministre des Relations extérieures de Tu-Duc, je manquerais au respect que je dois aux ordres formels et répétés de mon gouvernement en acceptant leur discussion. Je leur en ai exprimé mon regret.

Ils prévoyaient un refus mais ils ne s'attendaient pas à le recevoir aussi sec. . . .[4]

Laissant de côté les pourparlers, Dupré attend tranquillement le déroulement de son plan savamment étudié: voyage de Garnier au Tonkin, suite des évènements. Du résultat de la mission pour laquelle il a donné carte blanche à Garnier, dépendent la reprise des négociations avec les Envoyés de Hue et de ses nouvelles exigeances.

Entre temps, à quelques jours de l'arrivée de Garnier à Hanoi (5 novembre 1873), Dupré écrit le 27 octobre 1873 à son ministre de la Marine au sujet des négociations et du traité qui lui tient beaucoup à coeur:

. . . Comme vous le verrez, les garanties que je compte demander seront les suivantes:

(1) Engagement de ne recevoir aucun agent étranger politique ou commercial:

(2) Présence, sur chacun des points où nous aurons un agent, d'une force militaire suffisante, pour le faire respecter;

(3) Remise de tout le service de la douane aux mains d'administrateurs français et possibilité de saisir, en cas de besoin, ce revenu qui sera de longtemps le plus clair de ceux du Roi.

. . . L'ensemble de ces garanties me semble constituer la mainmise effective sur l'Empire d'Annam exigée par le télégramme du 22 Octobre. . . .

Je ne saurais répondre d'enlever l'adhésion de la Cour de Hue à ce double projet sans lui accorder quelque compensation. La première que j'offrirais serait de donner au Roi la propriété de terrains assez

étendus situés dans les arrondissements de Saigon et dans celui de Go-Cong, sur lesquels se trouvent d'anciens tombeaux de sa famille, au moyen d'un arrangement dans le genre de celui qui a été conclu avec l'Angleterre pour le tombeau de l'Empereur à Sainte-Hélène.

Si cette condition ne suffisait pas, je me déciderais à regret à lui rendre l'administration de la province de Vinh-Long, après un nombre d'années qui serait à déterminer et pendant lesquelles le gouvernement annamite aurait loyalement rempli toutes ses obligations envers nous. Il est entendu que nous continuerons à occuper la citadelle de Vinh-Long et que nous conserverions la libre circulation par terre comme par eau sur tout le territoire cédé. . . .

Mais après réflexion, je crois que nous ne pouvons nous dessaisir de notre autorité entière sur les provinces de Châu-Dôc et d'Ha-Tiên par lesquelles nous communiquons avec le royaume du Cambodge placé sous notre protection. . . .[5]

Apprenant la présence des négociateurs de Huê à Saigon, jugeant intéressantes les propositions de Dupré dans sa lettre du 11 septembre 1873, animé peut-être d'un désir sincère de négocier avec le gouvernement vietnamien en raison de la situation actuelle de la France, le 22 Octobre 1873, l'amiral d'Hornoy adressait à l'amiral Dupré un télégramme:

Autorisation de négocier d'après les bases de votre lettre du 11 septembre. Le Protectorat, accepté en échange de la restitution de l'administration des trois provinces devra être en réalité, sinon explicitement, une mainmise effective sur l'Empire d'Annam. Cette condition est absolue, et vous n'y souscrivez que si toutes garanties vous sont données à ce sujet. Stipuler une redevance annuelle, équivalent, autant que possible, au revenu des trois provinces, déduction faite des frais.[6]

Cette autorisation de négocier faisait suite aux pleins pouvoirs signés par le Président Thiers le 6 novembre 1872, qui étaient destinés à remplacer ceux donnés par le gouvernement impérial.

Le lendemain, 23 octobre, suit une lettre du ministre de la Marine au gouverneur de la Cochinchine:

J'ai l'honneur de vous confirmer ma dépêche du 22 de ce mois ainsi conçue: 'Autorisation de négocier . . . déduction faite des frais.'

Cette dépêche dont les termes ont été concertés avec le vice-président du Conseil, ministre des Affaires étrangères, en présence et avec l'agrément de M. le Président de la République, contient en substance la pensée du gouvernement à l'égard des négociations que vous allez engager avec l'ambassade de l'Empereur Tu-Duc en ce moment à Saigon. Les présentes instructions n'ont pour objet que de développer, conformément au désir exprimé par vous, cette pensée et de vous tracer la ligne de conduite à tenir pour atteindre à un résultat qui satisfasse à la fois le légitime orgueil de la France,

les intérêts bien entendu de nos finances et de notre commerce ainsi qui le développement de notre influence dans l'Extrême-Orient.

Les communications successives que j'ai récemment reçues de vous, concernant l'importance de jour en jour croissante d'une intervention de la France au Tonkin, les arguments dont vous avez appuyé la demande pressante d'autorisation d'agir par les armes sur ce pays n'ont pas été sans m'impressionner vivement et si j'ai résisté à des instances aussi énergiquement formulées, c'est que je sentais d'une part que notre situation nous imposait à cet égard la plus grande réserve et de l'autre que le même résultat pouvait être atteint peut-être par les moyens pacifiques.

Les négociations, en ce moment engagées, nous ouvrent cette dernière voie et le gouvernement n'hésite pas à vous y suivre si l'acceptation d'une sorte de protectorat sur l'empire d'Annam peut réellement nous créer, sans coup férir, une situation prépondérante et assurer à notre pavillon une route directe et relativement facile vers le Yunnan, qui nous permettrait de prendre une large part dans le commerce de cette riche province.

Un semblable résultat est de nature à motiver, de notre part, quelques concessions et le gouvernement vous autorise à examiner s'il est possible, en rendant à Tu-Duc l'administration des trois provinces de Vinh-Long, Châu-Dôc et Ha-Tiên, d'obtenir de lui des avantages susceptibles de compenser un pareil sacrifice. Si vous parveniez à déterminer les conditions d'une sorte de suzeraineté analogue à celles déjà existées dans certaines parties de l'Extrême-Orient, le gouvernement serait assez disposé à entrer dans vos idées au sujet des finances, de l'armée et des douanes.

Je ne puis, dans cette lettre, entrer dans plus de détails, j'aurais soin de la faire à mesure que les négociations suivront leurs cours. Je dis surtout cela au point de vue des relations extérieures. Mais vous pouvez, dès à présent, promettre notre appui à l'Annam contre la Chine.

. . . Nous le tenons quitte de la portion d'indemnité due à la France.

. . . J'approuve de tous points les mesures de précaution que vous vous proposez de prendre pour la restitution, au bout de nombre d'années à fixer, et d'après la loyale exécution du traité, des trois provinces annexées par l'amiral de La Grandière.

. . . Le maintien du protectorat devra nous créer des obligations nouvelles, et les nécessités de notre politique nous interdiraient de réduire nos forces militaires. Il sera donc nécessaire de demander au gouvernement annamite qu'il contribue aux frais de la protection dont il sera l'objet de notre part. Vous avez indiqué, comme une des conditions à exiger, le paiement d'une redevance annuelle. Il me paraitrait équitable que cette redevance se rapprochât le plus possible du revenu des trois provinces rétrocédées, déduction faite des dépenses qu'elles nécessiteraient . . .

En ce qui concerne l'indemnité de guerre, ce aui reste dû de la part afférente à l'Espagne devrait être intégralement soldé. . . .[7]

Nous venons de voir la réponse de Dupré à cette lettre.

Les termes de la lettre de l'amiral D'Hornoy ne sont pas seulement ceux d'un ministre de la Marine, supérieur direct de l'amiral-gouverneur de Cochinchine, mais l'expression de la pensée même du gouvernement de la République. Aux souhaits du gouvernement français d'un protectorat au Viet-Nam, sacrifiant volontiers pour l'obtenir quelques avantages mineurs, tels le retour à la Cour de Hue de l'administration des trois provinces occidentales cochinchinoises, Dupré, de son côté, écarte ces vues raisonnables sans y faire la moindre allusion dans sa lettre du 27 octobre, disant même ouvertement qu'il est loin d'être partisan de la rétrocession de ces provinces.

Peut-être la situation de la France au lendemain du conflit franco-allemand avec ses difficultés financières, ses souffrances, son occupation, laissent-elles un effet bienfaisant sur le comportement des dirigeants français d'où leur largeur d'esprit mise en relief par cette lettre de l'amiral d'Hornoy. Si l'ambassade vietnamienne avait pu aller jusqu'en France, comme on a tant souhaité à Huê, pour négocier directement avec Paris, au lieu d'être forcé de le faire à Saigon, Lê-Tuân aurait pleinement réussi dans sa mission comme avait réussi Phan-Thanh-Gian.

Et quatre jours après le coup de force de Garnier à Hanoi, le 24 novembre 1873, dans une lettre à son ministre des Affaires étrangères, Dupré écrit:

> . . . M. Garnier est à Hanoi sans opposition. . . . Les Annamites ne feront aucune tentative pour faire partir M. Garnier dont la présence à Hanoi garantit le Tonkin de nouvelles expéditions dans le genre de celle de Dupuis et donne à nos négociations un point d'appui excellent. Aux demandes d'évacuation, je répondrai par une demande de conclusion de traité.
>
> Je ne prévois de ce fait aucune complication, aucune augmentation de dépense possible, aucun envoi de troupes en Cochinchine nécessaire.
>
> Je m'attends à des éloges pour avoir pris position au Tonkin à la demande même du gouvernement annamite. . . .[8]

Jusqu'ici tout se déroule exactement comme Dupré l'a prévu. Garnier est bien installé à Hanoi, "le Scorpion" et "l'Espingole" sont avec lui, le "Decrès" qui va incessamment revenir de Hong-Kong. Il n'attend plus que les négociateurs vietnamiens; aucune complication en vue. . . .

Dès l'annonce de la prise de Hanoi, Dupré en dépit de ses désirs de conquête, commença à s'inquiéter sérieusement; Garnier et lui agissaient contrairement aux vues du gouvernement français; n'allait-on

pas trop vite? Une extension trop rapide de la domination française au Tonkin n'allait-elle pas entrainer de la part des Vietnamiens une action dangereuse et une déclaration de guerre dont, personnellement, il porterait la responsabilité? Une fois de plus, il voulait traiter avec Huê.

L'ambassade vietnamienne étant toujours à Saigon, l'amiral en profita pour relancer les négociations qu'il avait jusqu'ici intentionnellement laissées en veilleuse.

Les Vietnamiens acceptent sans difficulté la reprise des négociations, l'assurant en outre de la bonne volonté de leur gouvernement, promettent l'ouverture du fleuve Rouge, et l'établissement de la liberté de commerce dans le Nord. Mais, disent-ils, comment discuter de la paix si les Français nous font la guerre?

Devant de si bonnes dispositions, Dupuis estima que le but de l'intervention était atteint, du moins pour le moment. Aussi, tout en expédiant des renforts au Tonkin, il envoya à Huê un officier pour présenter, par contact direct, les bases d'un arrangement définitif et mettre fin à une situation dont les périls lui apparaissent de plus en plus menaçants. Le lieutenant de vaisseau Philastre, interprête dans toutes ces négociations, fut choisi pour cette mission.

Le premier ambassadeur Lê-Tuân, malade, reste à Saigon; son second, Nguyên-Van-Tuong fut chargé d'accompagner l'officier français à Huê et recevoir en même temps les nouvelles instructions de son gouvernement.

Dans ses instructions à Philastre en date du 6 décembre 1873, Dupré écrit:

> Conformément aux désirs exprimés par les Ambassadeurs, vous vous rendrez à Huê pour remettre au Roi . . . faits prisonniers à Hanoi. Vous embarquerez sur le 'Decrès' qui doit faire route dimanche matin 7 courant et qui vous débarquera à Tourane avec les fonctionnaires sus-mentionnés et le deuxième ambassadeur qui va solliciter l'autorisation officielle nécessaire pour traiter.
>
> Votre mission est une mission de paix et conciliation. Vous seconderez de tout votre pouvoir les démarches de Nguyên-Van-Tuong. . . .[9]

Dans une lettre addressée à S.M. Tu-Duc, après lui avoir annoncé l'envoi d'un officier porteur d'une "supplique respectueuse", Dupré ajoutait:

> Permettez-moi d'espérer, Sire, qu'il reviendra prochainement m'annoncer la bonne nouvelle que rien ne s'oppose plus à la négociation du traité destiné à sceller l'alliance indissoluble et l'éternelle amitié de la France et de l'Annam.[10]

A Huê, Philastre fut reçu assez froidement; pouvait-on, en même temps, négocier et employer la contrainte? Ayant appris ce qui se passait à Hanoi, et les activités de Garnier qu'il jugeait néfastes, il décida, de sa propre autorité, d'y partir et d'y rejoindre les ambassadeurs envoyés par Huê pour discuter avec Garnier. De la sorte, il freinerait ce dernier, et ferait appliquer les dernières instructions reçues. Tuong l'accompagna.

A l'entrée du fleuve Rouge, Philastre apprit la mort de Garnier; il se substitut aussitôt à l'enseigne Esmez, qui l'avait remplacé provisoirement dans la poursuite des négociations.

La mort de son collègue l'avait surpris et, à n'en pas douter, le touchait profondément; cependant il était personnellement hostile aux mesures prises par Garnier au Tonkin. Peu auparavant, il lui avait écrit:

> . . . Avez-vous songé à la honte qui va rejaillir sur vous et sur nous, quand on saura qu'envoyé pour chasser un baratier quelconque, et pour vous tâcher de vous entendre avec les fonctionnaires annamites, vous vous êtes allié à cet aventurier pour mitrailler sans avis des gens qui ne vous attaquaient pas et qui ne sont pas défendus? [11]

Le 20 décembre 1873, Dupré avait envoyé à Garnier des instructions précises, l'invitant à suspendre, et même à abroger les mesures d'ordre commercial décrétées par lui, et à maintenir le Tonkin fermé jusqu'à la signature du nouveau traité. Ces instructions ne furent jamais appliquées.

Arrivé le 3 janvier 1874 à Hanoi, ayant évidemment les mêmes instructions, Philastre passa des conventions avec Nguyên-Van-Tuong, les 5 janvier et 6 février, pour l'évacuation de Ninh-Binh, Nam-Dinh et Hanoi, et leur remise aux autorités vietnamiennes. Le 16 février, il quittait le Tonkin.

Au moment où Philastre et Tuong voguaient vers le Tonkin, Dupré apprend la mort de Garnier. L'amiral s'affola. Le bruit courut que pesait sur lui la menace d'un conseil de guerre. Le 4 janvier 1874, dans une lettre au ministère de la Marine, Dupré tenta de rejeter sur Garnier les responsabilités.

Si la mission de Philastre et de Tuong à Huê est en partie réussie, si Tu-Duc, de son côté, attend aussi les négociations, et profite de l'occasion pour témoigner à sa manière sa "reconnaissance" à Dupré—si, vraiment, il y a reconnaissance—, en faisant frapper pour Dupré et lui a envoyé une médaille en or, celui-ci ne peut se réjouir entièrement. La mort de Garnier l'afflige profondément pour plusieurs raisons. A travers ce deuil et les conditions dans lesquelles s'est déroulée

cette cruelle disparition—car le cadavre de Garnier, décapité, ne fut retrouvé que bien après les sanglants combats—, c'est tout le plan de l'amiral bouleversé, ses dures conditions tant rêvées s'évanouissent, en plus de la menace d'un conseil de guerre possible; mais son traité, il finira bien par l'obtenir.

Et si l'amiral-gouverneur était inquiet de la succession trop rapide des évènements, le gouvernement français le fut bien davantage. Il avait signifié son opposition à toute action; comme d'habitude, il se serait laissé faire une douce violence si tout s'était bien arrangé sans trop de fracas; ce n'était pas le cas!

Après avoir avisé ses supérieurs, par dépêche, de la prise de Hanoi, puis de la mort de Garnier, le 10 janvier 1874, Dupré avait envoyé un compte-rendu détaillé, avec demandes de récompense.[12] Mais cette dépêche s'était croisée avec une autre de son ministre, du 7 janvier:

> Le triste évènement que vous m'annoncez justifie les appréhensions que je vous avais exprimées au sujet de la mission envoyée au Tonkin et dont je n'ai pu empêcher le départ.
>
> En présence du fait accompli, je ne peux qu'espérer que la mort de nos officiers est aujourd'hui vengée, et que les intérêts de notre honneur comme de notre influence ont été sauvegardés par un prompt et sévère châtiment. Je vous recommande d'agir en toutes circonstances avec les représentants de la Cour de Huê.
>
> Hâtez par tous les moyens la conclusion du traité, qui aura pour résultat l'évacuation de la citadelle de Hanoi, car je vous rappelle que le gouvernement exige de la façon la plus absolue qu'il ne soit pas question d'une occupation prolongée, encore moins définitive, d'une partie quelconque du Tonkin.[13]

Paris reste partisan d'une négociation avec Huê d'un traité aux conditions acceptables de part et d'autre, vu la situation de la France en Europe. Les récents évènements du Tonkin ne font que confirmer cette intention et accélérer cette décision. Qu'il le veuille ou non, cette fois Dupré doit s'incliner.

Tout le monde, non . . . car les missionnaires n'étaient pas d'acord, et tenaient à l'occupation. Le 25 décembre 1873, Mgr. Puginier, apprenant l'évacuation, proteste vigoureusement, par une lettre à l'amiral Dupré:

> . . . M. Garnier, dans le but d'éviter les troubles et de maintenir la tranquillité, s'est empressé de pourvoir à la réorganisation du pays occupé par lui. A sa demande, un grand nombre d'hommes se sont offerts pour remplir différents postes, ou former une milice. . . . Par là même, ces hommes et une grande partie de la population se sont trouvés compromis aux yeux du gouvernement annamite. Les chrétiens surtout. . . . Plusieurs de leurs villages ont été pillés et incendiés. . . .

> La grande majorité de la population avait salué avec bonheur l'apparition du drapeau français, qui lui annonçait une ère de paix et prospérité. Le prestige de la France était grand, et il l'est encore, mais il est nécessaire, pour la conservation de ce prestige, que la protection soit irrévocablement assurée à toute la population compromise. . . . Si la France se retirait ou n'agissait pas selon que l'exigent les circonstances, cela amènerait la ruine de tous les chrétiens et occasionnerait le plus grand désordre dans le pays. Toutes ces populations qui se sont réjouies à l'arrivée de votre Envoyé perdraient toute estime pour la France et leur affection se changerait facilement en haine, si la confiance qu'elles avaient placées en elle se terminait malheureusement par une terrible déception. . . . Dans les circonstances de troubles et de menaces dans lesquelles se trouve actuellement le pays, il est nécessaire, pour que la protection soit efficace, qu'elle soit appuyée par un nombre respectable de troupes, environ mille hommes et deux nouveaux petits vapeurs. Le but de ces troupes ne serait pas de faire la guerre, mais seulement de châtier les perturbateurs de la paix. . . .[14]

La brusque arrêt de la campagne du Tonkin laisse enfin la possibilité de s'occuper du traité. Par ailleurs, Dupré lui-même tenait tellement à son traité. Très ambitieux, voulant que son nom reste brillamment attaché au Viêt-Nam, voulant, à sa rentrée très prochaine dans la métropole, une fois la menace du conseil de guerre écartée, recevoir sa troisième étoile, en attendant encore mieux, il terminait sa troisième et dernière année de gouverneur par un échec assez complet. Malgré sa vantardise et ses affirmations aux ministres qu'il agirait seul et réussirait, le bilan était loin d'être brillant: pas de Tonkin, qu'il avait promis; quant à la liberté du fleuve Rouge, elle était réduite à une proclamation! Pour ne pas rentrer les mains vides, il n'avait plus qu'une ressource: être celui qui avait obtenu le traité.

Les affaires du Tonkin étant arrangées au mieux; Rheinart fut envoyé à Hanoi pour remplacer Philastre. Ce dernier, accompagné de Nguyên-Van-Tuong, devait rentrer à Saigon; ils y arrivèrent le 21 février 1874.

Le jour où Dupré doit prendre le bateau pour rentrer en France était déjà fixé, son successeur désigné, donc il va mettre l'épée dans les reins des plénipotentiaires vietnamiens.

La conjoncture est bonne d'ailleurs, car Tu-Duc, malgré l'épilogue en somme satisfaisant pour lui de l'aventure Garnier, reste très inquiet: les premiers succès foudroyants d'une poignée d'aventuriers ne font-ils pas craindre une nouvelle tentative, ne serait-ce que pour sauver l'honneur? Une attaque sur Huê, même, n'est-elle pas possible? Il consent à donner des instructions plus conciliantes aux ambassadeurs.

Et les vietnamiens proposaient aux Français: Remise totale des indemnités de guerre; abandon de la clause relative aux relations extérieures, dénommée par eux "Doan hanh tac hanh"; retour à Saigon de certains vapeurs se trouvant au Tonkin, évacuation de certains corps de troupes occupant le Tonkin; nomination d'un consul vietnamien à Saigon.

Le 24 février Dupré répondit qu'il était impossible d'abandonner la clause relative aux relations extérieures; qu'il consentait à restituer le territoire presque entier de la province de Vinh-Long, c'est-à-dire la partie limitée par les rivières Ham-Long, Ba-Thac et Nha-Mân. Le gouvernement vietnamien devait toutefois payer à la France 36.000 piastres chaque année. La citadelle de Vinh-Long sera occupée par un résident français et une garnison pour surveiller les mandarins vietnamiens dans l'administration de cette province. Elle sera totalement restituée au gouvernement de Hue quand celui-ci aura payé à l'Espagne le million de piastres dû et aure exécuté toutes les clauses du traité. A Hanoi, Rheinart aura à sa disposition quarante soldats, deux cents autres s'installeront à Haiphong. Trois bateaux resteront au Tonkin. Il sera fait abandon, à tous les endroits où existent des tombeaux de la famille impériale, en Cochinchine, d'un périmètre d'une superficie de sept à huit "mâu", dans les alentours.

Au lieu d'accepter la restitution de Vinh-Long, comme leur avait proposé Dupuis, et d'exiger le retour des autres provinces, alléchés par la proposition des Français d'offrir au gouvernement de Huê cinq bâtiments de guerre, les plénipotentiaires vietnamiens demandaient à l'amiral de conserver cette province sous son administration; sur les 1.500.000 francs d'impôt annuel de Vinh-Long, Tra-Vinh et Mo-Cay, les Envoyés de Huê demandaient aux Français de garder 500.000 francs pour les dépenses diverses et de remettre à l'Espagne un million de france en paiement de l'indemnité de guerre qui, de cette façon, pouvait être réglée au bout de cinq à six ans.

La question des catholiques fut la seule agitée dans ces réunions. Mgr Colombert tenait à la négocier lui-même. Le coadjuteur de Saigon refusa la clause obligeant les mandarins vietnamiens catholiques à se conformer aux rites en vigueur à la Cour de Huê: les ambassadeurs devaient la supprimer; seules les clauses favorables aux missionnaires sont conservées.

Au moment où ces négociations touchent à leur fin et que le traité politique vient d'être signé (le 15 mars 1874), le 17 mars, à trois heures du matin, on trouve le premier ambassadeur vietnamien, Lê-Tuân, décédé à l'hôtel de l'ambassade. Le bruit a couru qu'il s'était donné la mort en s'empoisonnant.

Le traité est donc signé:[15] l'amiral Dupré a gagné la course contre la montre, Si le traité de 1874 n'est pas pour l'amiral un succès complet, il est au moins, pour lui, une réussite non négligeable, Il peut, à juste titre s'enorgueillir.

La France voyait reconnaitre sa souveraineté sur les trois provinces occidentales de Cochinchine qu'elle occupait, en violation du traité précédent, depuis 1867; deux ports du Nord, et un du Centre, étaient ouverts au commerce, chacun étant la résidence d'un consul français protégé par un petit groupe de soldats. Enfin un "resident" français s'installait à Huê. Par réciprécité, le gouvernement vietnamien pouvait installer un représentant à Pairs et un autre à Saigon, ayant les mêmes grades que le résident français à Huê. Par la suite, Dupré n'acceptait qu'un consul vietnamien à Saigon: Nguyên-Thanh-Y sera désigné à ce poste, ainsi qu'un consul adjoint, Phan-Khiêm-Ich dont les activités restaient bien limitées; ils ne devaient pas y rester longtemps.

Le libre exercice de la religion chrétienne était de mieux en mieux garanti. Ce traitement plus libéral, obtenu au cours de la journée du 11 mars, après des séances les plus agitées de toutes ces conférences, on le devait à Mgr. Colombert. Par l'article VIII, les actes de traitrise des ennemis de la patrie étaient légalisées officiellement par la Cour de Huê; on leur reconnaissait en outre le droit parfaitement légal de "collaborer" avec l'ennemi. La question litigieuse d'indemnité de guerre est aussi réglée. Pour faire renoncer aux négociateurs vietnamiens à leurs demandes de rétrocession des trois provinces de Vinh-Long, Châu-Doc et Ha-Tiên, qui jusqu'ici tenait particulièrement à coeur non seulement à la Cour, mais à la nation toute entiére, Dupré s'engageait, dans la rénuion du 10 mars, à faire don à leur gouvernement de cinq bâtiments à vapeur. Quant à la politique extérieure, raison d'être d'une nation souveraine, les représentants du gouvernement de Huê s'engageaient à se conformer à celle de la France.

Parmi les points qui semblaient à l'avantage des Vietnamiens, le même article III précisait que le Viêt-Nam ne changerait rien à ses relations diplomatiques actuelles, donc que ses liens et sa suzeraineté toute platonique avec la Chine ne seraient pas affectés (par la suite, les autorités françaises présentèrent une interprétation inverse de cet article). La "souveraineté" du Viêt-Nam, et son "entière indépendance" sont reconnues; il n'était plus question d'occupation du Tonkin; il ne reste à Hanoi qu'un consul, Rheinart, avec une garde de quarante hommes. Et il n'était nullement question de protectorat.

N'oublions pas l'attribution de la Grand Croix de la Légion d'Hon-

neur, qui devait être remise à Tu-Duc, le 13 Avril 1874, à l'occasion de l'échange des ratificaitions du traité.

Cette fois encore, la politique française a habilement combiné l'emploi de la force et le recours à la négociation: Garnier et Philastre pour les opérations de force, puis la fabrication du traité; elle obtient un compromis apparent en retrait sur ses objectifs primitifs.

Une telle politique ne réussissait que parce que, au sein même du gouvernement vietnamien, sans cesse menacé par l'agitation intérieure, il existe une tendance défaitiste, prête à accepter de tels compromis.

Le gouvernement français dût être relancé à plusieurs reprises par Dupré, qui n'était plus "persona grata" en raison de l'affaire du Tonkin, pour ratifier finalement ce traité avantageux par rapport aux conditions initialement prévues.

La France venait de remporter un succès diplomatique important; en août 1874, devant l'Assemblée Nationale, en exposant les motifs du projet de loi portant approbation du traité, le gouvernement pouvait conclure:

> . . . Cet acte, en consacrant la souveraineté de la France sur la Basse-Cochinchine, met fin aux incertitudes de toute nature qui pesaient sur notre colonie depuis 1867. A des relations empreintes d'une sourde hostilité et d'une méfiance instinctive, il fait succéder des rapports franchement pasifiques et amicaux entre la France et la Cour de Huê. En auvrant au commerce étranger un port de la Cochinchine centrale, un des ports et la capitale du Tonkin, ainsi que la navigation jusqu'à la frontière chinoise du fleuve qui paraît être la débouché naturel d'une partie considérable de la Chine, il offre libéralement à toutes les nations des advantages dont l'avenir révèlera l'importance.
>
> Enfin il assure à nos coreligionnaires annamites un traitement identique à celui que les lois du pays accordent aux autres sujets du roi d'Annam, et il confère aux missionnaires la liberté qu'ils n'ont point au Japon, et dont la jouissance en Chine demeure subordonnée à bien des conditions et à bien des réserves. . . .[16]

L'amiral Krantz, qui passa quelques mois comme gouverneur après l'amiral Dupré, compléta ce traité politique par un traité de commerce, également négocié à Saigon par la même ambassade, qui fut signé le 31 août 1874 par Nguyên Van-Tuong.

Ce traité se composait de vingt-neuf articles, et d'un article additionnel, demandé par la France, se rapportant aux droits de douane, d'ancrage et de phare dans les trois ports ouverts de Qui-Nhon, Hai-Phong et Hanoi, qui se trouvaient fixés pour dix ans. Et il donnait les conditions du négoce en transit vers le Yunnan par le fleuve Rouge.

Ce fut la seule activité de l'amiral Krantz durant son séjour en Cochinchine.

Quant à Dupuis, de qui l'on ne pouvait plus se servir, il fut complètement abandonné, et disparut d'une scène qu'il avait occupée trop longtemps avec la complicité tacite de Saigon. Philastre saisit sa flotte, ses biens sont séquestrés. Rentré à Saigon, il tentera encore, le traité signé, de revenir au Tonkin, de s'installer à Hai-Phong, puis se décidera à revenir en France, Ce qui ne signifie pas du tout, comme nous aurons l'occasion de le voir par la suite, qu'il renonce à s'occuper du Viêt-Nam, à récupérer la fortune momentanément perdue, et même à l'accroitre au détriment des Vietnamiens.

En ce qui concerne les deux fils de Phan-Thanh-Gian, dans une lettre du 15 septembre 1874 au ministre des Relations extérieures à Huê, l'amiral Krantz l'informait qu'il avait demandé pour eux le pardon du gouvernement français et qu'ils regagneraient bientôt leur pays.

1. "Mémoires & Documents Asie", Tome 31, pp. 284-291.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 328-332.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 332.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 332.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 371-381.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 371-381.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 318 à 321.
8. "Mémoires & Documents Asie", Tome 32, p. 24.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 36 à 39.
10. Reproduit par J. Marquet & J. Norel, "L'occupation du Tonkin par la France (1873-74)," Tome I, p. 139.
11. Cité par H. Brunschwicg, "La colonisation Française".
12. Dupré demande que Garnier soit nommé capitaine de frégate à la date du 21 novembre 1873, jour de la prise de la citadelle de Hanoi, mais le ministère de Broglie refusa d'accorder l'avancement posthume réclamé par l'Amiral. La veuve de Garnier obtint même difficilement une pension.
Dans les sphères officielles, on entretient d'un Francis Garnier "aventurier, tumultueux et compromettant, soldat indiscipliné".
Quand, en décembre 1875, les restes mortels de Garnier furent ensevelis à Saigon, l'amiral-gouverneur Duperré alla jusqu'à interdire aux officiers de la garrison d'assister aux obsèques.
13. "Mémoires & Documents Asie", Tome 32, p. 70.
14. Reproduit par G. Taboulet, ouvrage cité, pp. 731 à 733.
15. Nous publions à l'Annexe le texte intégral de ce traité.
16. Journal Officiel de la République Française du 4.8.1874.

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## Abstract / Résumé

Après une brève discussion sur certains aspects caractéristiques dans le développement de la linguistique indonésienne l'auteur mentionne qu'après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale la linguistique indonésienne était moins dominée par l'Ecole hollandaise (néerlandaise). Un procédé d'internationalisation s'établit.

Cependant, la contribution des indonésiens s'était largement limitée à l'étude lexical dela langue indonésienne.

Certains domaines tels que le vieux javanais qui était également important pour la linguistique indonésienne comparée, sont restés des domaines isolées accessibles seulement à ceux qui sont en mesure de faire usage des sources hollandaises.

Dans la deuxième partie de l'étude l'auteur attire l'attention du lecteur sur l'importance que pourrait avoir l'étude de la langue indonésienne pour la linguistique le général. Trois sujets sont cités: (1) Multilinguisme; (2) Le procédé d'interpénétration mutuelle des langues qui a lieu actuellement dans plusieurs régions d'Indonésie; (3) L'apparition de l'Indonésien comme langue nationale.

Quant au javanais, langue encore parlée par près de 40% de la population indonésienne, il présente un interêt particulier pour la linguistique le général, interêt dû aux phénomènes remarquables que cette langue présente: la nature systématique de l'onomatopée le mécanisme complexe des styles determinés socialement et le rôle joué par la distinction entre thème et propos dans la syntaxe javanaise.

# The Languages of Indonesia: *Past, Present, and Future*

E. M. UHLENBECK

## THE PAST

IN ORDER TO BE able to say something relevant concerning the history of the study of language in a given area, it is necessary to combine knowledge of that discipline with knowledge of history. Applied to the area under consideration, this means at least fulfilling two requirements: one should demonstrate familiarity with the history of Indonesia at least since the linguistic exploration of that area began, and at the same time, one should be acquainted with Indonesian linguistic studies and be able to evaluate them against the development of linguistic science in general. It is this double requirement, an obvious one, but given the present state of linguistics, one which needs to be explicitly stated, it is this which makes the history of a science, as Malkiel has recently reminded us, "an exceptionally exacting discipline."[1] Therefore, I do hope that my necessarily concise historical survey is not too far off the mark from both the historical and the linguistic points of view.

The linguistic exploration of the languages of Indonesia has followed a course which runs parallel with the development of linguistic knowledge about other areas outside Western Europe. As elsewhere, this was largely the work of foreigners and formed part of the European political, economic and technological expansion which began in the fifteenth century. First came the explorers, traders and travelers. An illustrious and early example of this type of accidental exploration is the work of an Italian, Pigafetta, who joined Magellan on his epoch-making journey around the world and was the author of one of the oldest Malay word lists, taken down in Eastern Indonesia in 1521.[2]

In the wake of, or sometimes even in the company of, these explorers and travelers came the missionaries. It is to them that the great credit for the development of Indonesian linguistics should be given. Missionaries all over the world have always been aware that conversion to their faith could be achieved best if their religious message was brought in the native language. Therefore, missionaries have been industrious students of languages, and the most farseeing among them began to realize at a fairly early date that preliminary training at home would facilitate this process of language learning.

For most of them the first and, in the beginning, the only Indonesian language to be studied was Malay, since the advent of Islam in Indonesia the lingua franca over a large area. However, a few missionaries ventured to learn other Indonesian languages as well. The Dutchman Cornelis de Leeuw, for instance, is known to have preached in Sangirese, the language of the island of Sangir, north of Sulawesi as early as 1683.

As in other provinces of human endeavor, scientific interest arose out of practical needs. The necessity for an active command of the native language and for developing the linguistic skills required for embarking upon the thorny but pressing task of translating the Bible, hymns and other biblical literature led missionaries to long and sustained linguistic fieldwork, often in difficult circumstances. Their descriptive results, sometimes crude and naive, from the point of view of modern scholarship, were nevertheless highly worthwhile because they were based on a high level of familiarity with the facts, a circumstance nowadays only too rarely achieved. Werndly's extensive grammar of Malay which appeared in 1737 may be viewed as an early example of this type of meritorious work in linguistic exploration.

It is only towards the middle of the nineteenth century that, after a long period of near-stagnation, Dutch scientific interest in the languages of the areas where they had acquired degrees of political and economic influence began slowly to increase.

The history of early Indonesian linguistics may largely be equated with the history of Malay and Javanese studies. Up to 1850 the knowledge of other Indonesian languages was very meagre, if not completely lacking. For instance, Sundanese, although spoken in the immediate vicinity of Batavia, the Dutch colonial capital, remained virtually unknown till 1845. However, fifteen years later some descriptive studies by missionaries were completed that were real contributions to Indonesian linguistics, although they were not on a par with Roorda's influential Javanese grammar of 1855. Hardelandt's grammar of Ngadju-Dajak, the first extensive description of a Borneo language, came from the press in 1858. About the same time Matthes, another missionary, began to publish his descriptive work on Makassarese and Buginese. However, by far the most original and important contribution to Indonesian linguistics of that period was Van der Tuuk's work on Batak, published between 1860 and 1867. His grammar, which appeared in English translation in 1971,[3] is on the same level in descriptive quality with Kleinschmidt's meticulous description of Eskimo of 1851. Also, comparative Indonesian linguistics entered a new phase thanks to Van der Tuuk, who in his polemical

discussion with Roorda formulated the two sets of sound correspondences, which since Brandes' dissertation of 1884 have borne his name.

It is not my intention here to describe in detail the process of the gradual expansion of the knowledge of Indonesian languages since 1850. Those who are interested in access to the relevant literature may refer to the critical surveys of studies on the languages of Indonesia issued by the Dutch Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology.[4] However, even in this thumb-nail sketch I cannot completely forego mentioning the salient aspects of this expansion.

First of all it is necessary to mention the influence of the colonial relationship between Holland and Indonesia on the shaping of Indonesian linguistic studies. While in the eighteenth century, in the days of the Dutch East Indian Trading Company, it had been sufficient for the Dutch authorities and negotiators to have at their disposal some (mainly Eurasian) interpreters and translators, more extensive practical linguistic knowledge was needed when from 1830 onwards in Java and later at a different rate in the other islands outside Java, Dutch colonial influence steadily increased and Dutch civil servants began to deal directly with the Indonesian population. Thanks to Roorda who strongly stressed the importance of learning Javanese for efficient government of the Indies, it became the tradition that future civil servants had to follow an academic program which included both Malay and Javanese. The need for language instruction made possible, in Holland, and especially at the University of Leiden, already well-known for its Oriental studies, a center for Indonesian studies, modest in size, but with an important function to fulfill. In 1851, the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology was founded in The Hague. It gradually became a rallying point for all who took an interest in things Indonesian.

It is necessary to bear in mind that until the middle of the present century Indonesian linguistic studies were rarely pursued for their own sake. They normally formed an element in a broader framework of scholarly activity. The main objective was to produce all-around scholars, equally at home in Indonesian philology, history and ethnology and, if needed, in still other disciplines. Knowledge of Sanskrit and Arabic was considered an indispensable element in the academic program because of the Indian and Islamic influence on the cultural history of large areas of Indonesia. This areal specialization with its emphasis on the historical point of view at least partly explains why, in general, Indonesian studies between 1850 and 1950 developed largely in isolation from what was going on in linguistics and other sciences in Western Europe.

Within the Dutch East Indies another center of Indonesian studies

had come into being, namely the Batavia Society of Arts and Letters founded by 1778. This society, whose activity in the first century of its existence was modest, became, especially after the first world war, an increasingly important focal point for all students in the Dutch colonies engaged in the study of Indonesian history, ethnology, language and literature. Progress reports from the linguistic officers appointed by the colonial government for the more important areas and islands had to be sent in to this society and were discussed at its regular meetings. When the society ceased publication in 1955, more than 80 volumes of its journal and an equal number of its volumes of transactions had appeared, containing many real contributions to Indonesian linguistics from the hands of Adriani, Jonker, Esser, and other scholars of that period.[5]

By the onset of the Second World War, the Batavia center seemed on its way to becoming by far the more important of the two centers. It is true that because of the Dutch colonial tradition of returning to the homeland, the center in Holland could be regularly reenforced by mature scholars, but in Batavia, Malay and Javanese began to be taught at university level in 1924, while plans for a faculty of letters were realized shortly before the Second World War broke out. Institutions such as Bale Pustaka (the Bureau for Popular Literature), the Archaeological Service, and the Bureau for Indonesian Affairs contributed to the creation of a climate favourable for a further growth of Indonesian studies. This expectation seemed also justified by the fact that Indonesian scholars such as Hoesein Djajadiningrat, Poerbatjaraka, Prijono, Prijohoetomo, and Tjan Tjoe Siem had returned to their country after their training in Holland, and there they should be able to get young Indonesians interested in their own language and culture. While in Holland the major raison d'être of Indonesian studies remained the training of Dutch administrators for future service in the colonies, it seemed as if the study of Indonesian languages in the Dutch colonies themselves began to acquire a somewhat higher status in Dutch colonial society: Indonesians began to become aware of their cultural heritage, started pressing for political rights, and began to demand that languages such as Malay and Javanese be given a more important place in school and in society generally. Moreover, since the first decade of the present century there had been a rapid, although in proportion to the number of illiterates quite insufficient, expansion of primary education in the Dutch East Indies. The general policy followed by the Dutch government as to primary education for Indonesians was that instruction

everywhere should be given in the local vernacular. This meant that by about 1940, instruction on the lowest school level was given in no less than 53 different languages for which schoolbooks had to be made available. Bale Pustaka, the Bureau for Popular Literature, founded in 1908, had the task of creating an increasing variety of reading materials in some of the major Indonesian languages, such as Malay Javanese, Madurese, and Sundanese, for those who had left school and had to be provided with opportunities to use and to preserve their newly acquired skills. All these educational activities helped impart certain cultural and social functions to the scientific study of the Indonesian languages.

To the outside world Indonesian studies seemed to be a field almost hermetically closed. I have pointed out[6] that with respect to scientific exploration each colonial power kept to its own territory. The study of the languages of Malaysia and Northern Borneo was undertaken by the British, that of the languages of Madagascar by the French, while the languages of the Dutch East Indies were—with a few but important exceptions—only studied by Dutch scholars. For them it was a natural thing to publish the results of their work in their own language, and this made the study of the literature on the languages of Indonesia into a domain nearly isolated from foreign interest. An especially harmful result was that the study of the Indonesian languages became divorced from that of the Oceanic area, in spite of the fact that the famous Dutch scholar Kern had shown in his work on Fiji and Anetyum that it was most fruitful for a scholar to look beyond political boundaries.

## THE PRESENT

After this historical survey, necessarily incomplete and sketchy, it is time to try to characterize the present situation as it has developed since war came to Southeast Asia and independence to Indonesia after a long and painful struggle. Four features stand out clearly: the decline of Dutch scholarship due to the heavy loss in manpower suffered during the war and not completely compensated for by the subsequent expansion at home,[7] the beginning of the internationalization of Indonesian studies, the predominant, if not exclusive, interest within Indonesia in practical problems concerning the further development of the Bahasa Indonesia into the national language of the republic, and a slowly growing but still too modest participation of Indonesian scholars in the study of that language.

The term internationalization may refer to two different activities.

First of all one may use the term for the fact that Indonesian studies no longer remained the nearly exclusive concern of Dutch scholars and that American, Russian, German, and Australian scholars began to enter the field. One may also use the term in a more narrow sense, referring to the conscious effort made by Dutch scholarship united in the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology to make the results of the past internationally accessible and to encourage the present generation of scholars to abandon the use of Dutch and to present their scientific results in English.

It is obvious that this process of internationalization taken in both senses is still far from complete. The bibliographical series of the Institute, considered to be one of the most valuable elements of its program of internationalization, does not yet cover the whole of the areas in which Dutch scholarship was influential, and in its translation series few volumes important for Indonesian linguistics have so far been included. The whole field of Old Javanese in which philology and linguistics are still inseparable aspects of one and the same scientific activity, is still only accessible for those who have a good reading knowledge of Dutch. The first translation in English of one of the main Old Javanese texts, the Nagarakrtagama, was published less than ten years ago, but a text such as the Old Javanese Ramayana, which dates from the beginning of the Tenth century and which is of crucial importance for our understanding of the history of Javanese and for comparative linguistics as well, is only accessible in a text edition in Javanese characters with a Dutch translation of less than satisfactory quality, while the use of Van der Tuuk's Old Javanese dictionary requires knowledge of at least modern Javanese, Balinese, and Dutch. In this situation it is understandable, although not quite forgivable, that some scholars entering the field still prefer to make a new start instead of taking the trouble to become acquainted with the results established in an earlier stage, which are so difficult to assimilate.

The present interest in Indonesia for the Bahasa Indonesia is certainly more than justified, not only because of the role this language has to play (and was already playing in the making of Modern Indonesian society after the elimination of Dutch), but also because one had much ground to make up since during the colonial period comparatively little was accomplished in constructing a grammatical and lexicographical description of modern Malay. There are several Indonesian languages of far less social importance which have received a much larger share of attention from qualified scholars. The study of Malay and of Bahasa Indonesia was a neglected field. The first dictionaries which paid systematic attention to modern usage began to ap-

pear around 1950, while grammatical description rarely went beyond the limits of elementary introductions.

However, although this new emphasis on Indonesian is to be welcomed—for instance Poerwadarminta's lexicographical studies[8] constitute an important advance—, it is useful to keep in mind that the many varieties of present-day Indonesian cannot be studied in a satisfactory way without taking into account the regional languages as well. The remarkable mutual interpenetration and osmosis between, for instance, Indonesian and Javanese which is now going on, is a process that, part from its sociolinguistic significance, may furnish an opportunity to study processes of language change at close range. At present it seems that among students in the Indonesian faculties of letters and in the teachers colleges, interest in Javanese and other regional languages is regretably not in proportion to the importance these languages have for the study of modern Indonesian.

If one finally tries to survey the present state of affairs concerning the description of the languages of Indonesia, one cannot but be struck by a remarkable degree of unevenness. Some extensive language areas such as Borneo are still largely unknown territory in spite of recent advances on a few points. On other languages, however, reliable and detailed descriptive work has been done: I may mention here the impressive mass of descriptive data collected by Adriani and made available by Esser,[9] Esser's own work on the Toradja-languages of Central Celebes, Mori, Ledo and Kulawi,[10] Jonker's grammar of more than 700 closely printed pages of the language of Roti,[11] and with respect to North West Sumatra, the excellent work done by Snouck Hurgronje and Hoesein Djajadiningrat on Achehnese.[12]

As to comparative linguistics, one cannot be blind to the fact that within the field of Austronesian comparative linguistics much progress can be made if the still existing separation between Oceanic and Indonesian linguistics can be overcome. I am convinced that full utilization of the Indonesian data and especially of the Old Javanese epigraphical and literary data, will lead to a deeper understanding of the historical processes which led to the present diversity of many closely related languages.

## THE FUTURE

It is clear that many non-linguistic factors will decide the future of Indonesian studies and I do not consider it my task to discuss them here. What I would prefer to do is to consider what function these studies may have for the further development of linguistic science.

It is generally recognized that some thirty or forty years ago the

areal specialization characteristic of Oriental Studies in the past had to give way to specialization by discipline. By this Copernican revolution the concept of Oriental Studies lost its scientific relevance. While in the past it had been considered necessary to gain expert knowledge on a variety of disciplines all bearing on a given geographically defined region, it became now more important to keep abreast of developments within one single discipline, wherever such developments might take place. This growing awareness of the unity of linguistics and, let me add, of anthropology as well, led to a different appreciation of the role of theory in the description of language and culture. One and the same theory of language became relevant for all languages whatever their location, and the same is true for the study of culture. Language description and linguistic theory presuppose each other; language description will remain highly unsatisfactory without explicit adoption of a theoretical framework, while linguistic theory can only become more adequate if applied and thereby tested in many descriptive studies. It cannot be doubted that progress in linguistics largely depends on fruitful interaction between general linguistics and the study of individual languages.

Turning now to Indonesian linguistics I cannot avoid observing that this interaction is still far from optimal. It is difficult to cite instances in which Indonesian descriptive results have had a visible impact on the development of linguistic theory. On the other hand, in many cases new theoretical insights have only rarely been applied consistently to Indonesian linguistic facts. I consider it one of the most important tasks for those who in the future will be engaged in the study of Indonesian languages to try to remedy this unsatisfactory situation. This can be done not only by getting used to keeping track of the developments in linguistic theory, but, even more important, to be as explicit as possible as to the theoretical framework adopted and to indicate as accurately as possible at what point the observed facts cannot be accounted for by the theory in a satisfactory way. Future descriptive studies which fail to satisfy these two requirements will be only marginally useful.

There is another methodological requirement which in the present stage of linguistics plays a crucial role. It is rightly considered necessary to base one's descriptive conclusions on close and accurate observation of a great mass of data belonging to one language. In short, the study in depth of a single language is more likely to contribute to general linguistics than a superficial gathering of data from different languages, although such collections may of course still have

great value for getting a first idea of the existing genetic relationships in an unexplored area.

In the beginning of this article I observed that most work on Indonesian linguistics was done by foreigners. I believe that the time has come for a change on this point, precisely because of the present emphasis on close and prolonged observation of the facts. The type of observational skill called for at present can be acquired best by linguists who study their native language. This means that Indonesian descriptive linguistics first of all needs more extensive participation from Indonesian-born, well trained linguists. The future of Indonesian descriptive linguistics depends largely on the availability of a sufficient number of Indonesian scholars interested in the study of their own languages. Their descriptive work would not only be valuable for the development of general and comparative linguistics, but would also contribute to providing a more solid foundation for the study of Modern Indonesian. I am very pleased to know that this view is now shared by the Indonesian authorities and that plans are being made to enable a group of promising young Indonesian students of languages to acquire the necessary training for such future descriptive activities.

Linguistics is at present divided by deep-seated differences of opinion about central questions of linguistic theory, but all its practitioners agree that the ultimate goal of linguistics is to acquire full understanding of language in all its aspects and in its historical development. This implies that linguists should pay attention not only to universal language traits but also to individual characteristics. It is not enough to know what all languages have in common, we also need to understand the latitude these universal characteristics allow and in what way individual features are related to this universal framework. Although the present quest for language universals is to be welcomed, this does not mean that progress in linguistics can be based solely on monolingual research. The results of the study of a single language, even if it is American English, still need to be checked against data taken from differently structured languages. It is therefore extremely welcome news that the Center for Applied Linguistics in Washington has recently taken the initiative "to further the description of the languages of the world through systematic planning on a global scale." This initiative was very well received at an International meeting held recently in Burg Wartenstein, Austria in which linguists from all continents participated.[13] This is a very timely initiative because the recent emphasis on linguistic theory, although

valuable in itself and a sound reaction against previous a-theoretical trends, may upset the balance between linguistic theory and language description and result in underestimation of the gigantic descriptive task with which linguistics is faced.

The program which was discussed in the meeting in Austria will be developed after a period of stocktaking which is expected to take two years. At first, it will be directed at all those languages which are at present less well-known. Many languages of Indonesia are in this category. It appears then that the Indonesian government and the international community of linguists are both convinced of the desirability of promoting the description of Indonesian languages. This augurs well for the future.

The question may be asked whether there are other reasons for devoting more descriptive attention to the Indonesian languages than the quite general argument about the usefulness of the study of a great variety of language structures. Is it possible to indicate special features of, or problems in, Indonesian languages which make these languages particularly important objects for linguistics? In order to be able to give a reliable answer to this question a much more extensive knowledge of the Indonesian languages is required than I can muster. I can only give an answer on the basis of my limited experience. I would suggest then that the study of Indonesian languages is of particular relevance for the following set of problems:

(1) The study of all problems related to multilingualism. There are few areas in the world where there is a more extensive and still growing amount of multilingualism than in Indonesia. On Java, for instance, Bahasa Indonesian in different varieties, Sundanese, and Javanese are often spoken within one and the same household and it is not at all unusual to find people with a command of two or three Indonesian languages which they daily use in different communicative situations and at different social levels. Most, if not all, current linguistic theories are based on the assumption of a completely homogeneous speech community, and it is one of the tasks of the future to find out how completely such theories are able to cope with the intricately structured plural speech communities developing in Indonesia.

(2) Closely related to the problems of heterogeneity is the problem of mutual interpenetration of languages and language change which was mentioned earlier in this article. For instance, it seems likely that in a not too distant future idioms may emerge in Java which cannot be identified either with Javanese as it is spoken today

or with Indonesian in its present forms. In this connection the brilliant work done by William Labov in the New York area[14] has a high relevance for Indonesian linguistics. Let me add that the study of sociolinguistic problems might also turn out to be of particular importance for determining the course of the linguistic policy to be followed by the Indonesian government. If this is true, these problems should have a high priority in Indonesian society.

(3) Certainly of no less interest for linguistics are the problems, partly psycholinguistic and partly sociolinguistic, which are related to the further development of Bahasa Indonesian into the national language of Indonesia. It is well-known that the syntax of Bahasa Indonesian as well as its rapidly expanding lexicon have been influenced by Dutch, although there are hardly any publications in which one finds a satisfactory description of the syntactic patterns in which this influence has expressed itelf. The semantic changes which borrowed elements have undergone upon entering Indonesian have never been described in sufficient detail. In short, present day Indonesian differs considerably syntactically as well as semantically from all other Indonesian languages and it would be important to know how much these differences constitute a difficulty for those who have to gain fluency in Indonesian on the basis of a native command of a regional language.

In addition to these three sets of interrelated problems there are others I have encountered in my studies of Javanese which I feel merit the attention of a wider circle of scholars. The first one concerns the onomatopoeic phenomena found in Javanese. The presence of onomatopoeia is a universal but marginal feature of language, but the interesting aspect of the Javanese onomatopoeia is their systematic nature. There is a subclass within the verb system which only consists of onomatopoeic forms, displaying a quite regular pattern.[15]

The second topic which I consider of great interest for general linguistics is the remarkably complex phenomenon of honorifics and socially determined speech styles present in Javanese at least until about 1950. Although this phenomenon is also of a universal nature, it is quite clear that in Javanese it has been elaborated to an extent which is probably unique.[16]

Third, and finally, I am convinced that not only Javanese but also other Indonesian languages may have an important task to fulfill in widening our syntactic views. For a student of the syntax of Indonesian languages it is clear that there are many syntactic phenomena, especially those related to the distinction between topic and com-

ment, which cannot be accounted for within the framework of the sentence. They clearly overstep the limits of this structural unit. Not all phenomena occurring in the sentence find their explanation within the sentence, and languages in which this is particularly clear deserve close attention.

This is a rather subjective list of topics to which still others should be added. I have tried to emphasize that in the past important descriptive work has been done which ought to be more widely used and appreciated; second, that Austronesian comparative linguistics would benefit from systematic use of the available Indonesian data, especially those of Old Javanese; that the training of Indonesian-born linguists is probably the best way to hasten and improve our descriptive effort in this area; and finally, I have mentioned a number of phenomena in the Indonesian area which seem worthy of a more general interest.

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## Abstract / Résumé

The Cambodian crisis was marked by the removal of Prince Sihanouk from his position as Chief of State by the Lon Nol Government. Conditioned by a quarter-century of war in Vietnam, the Western press has developed a tendency, when discussing Indochinese conflicts, to summarily divide the engaged forces into two sharply opposed camps. It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the nuances of the situation in Cambodia because the press has simplified to an extreme degree one aspect of the conflict, thereby missing an essential aspect, that of the grave latent crisis that underlay the events of 1970.

Following the departure of Prince Sihanouk for France (January 4, 1970), there were many rumors spread concerning the increasingly rigid and even insolent attitude of the Vietnamese Communists, who had infiltrated the country by the thousands. These infiltrations of 1965-66 had been transformed into an occupation, very severe in the Northeast of the country, and in spite of their interdiction by the Khmer authorities.

At the beginning of 1969, Prince Sihanouk admitted the truth of this infiltration to the press. Due to the faulty application of the economic and financial reforms decided upon in 1963, Sihanouk, at the Sangkum Congress in July 1969, acknowledged that the State was bankrupt and accepted the investiture of a "Government of Salvation" headed by Lon Nol and his deputy, Sirik Matak. The objectives of this government were to relieve the dangerous economic situation, halt the contraband traffic in rice which was ruining the State, and to enforce a policy of strict neutrality.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam had objectively found it in their interest to maintain Sihanouk in power as long as possible, but the demonstrations of March 11 and 12 against their Embassies and Information Bureaux in Phnom Penh pushed the crisis to a climax.

On March 18, Sihanouk was deposed. The Communists interpreted this to mean that "their ally had disappeared; it was up to them to take the situation into their own hands, in other words, to fight."

On April 23, the Communists occupied Saang, an area 30 kilometers from Phnom Penh.

On April 30, the Americans intervened, accompanied by South Vietnamese troops. Lon Nol appealed to the Americans for a very simple reason: There was no one else in the region capable of halting the Vietcong and North Vietnamese offensive which was overrunning the Khmer defenses.

From this perspective, one is first tempted to think that it was Sihanouk

# Une Synthèse de la Crise Cambodgienne

P. N. PENH

## I

### La Chute de Sihanouk

LORSQUE LE PRINCE SIHANOUK, qui suivait une cure de repos à l'hôpital Calmette (Phnom Penh) décida subitement, le 4 Janvier 1970, de partir le soir même pour la France, première étape d'un voyage de trois mois, qui devait le conduire également à Prague, à Moscou et à Pékin, le sentiment prévalut dans les milieux politiques et diplomatiques de la Capitale khmère, le Chef de l'Etat du Cambodge fuyait devant l'orage.

Beaucoup de rumeurs se référaient à l'attitude de plus en plus raide —d'aucuns disaient même insolente—des Vietnamiens communistes infiltrés par centaines de milliers dans les provinces frontalières khmères à l'égard des autorités civiles et militaires du Royaume et de la population elle-même. Non seulement les occupants ne voulaient pas quitter le pays et se moquaient des "opérations de refoulement" timidement entreprises contre eux avec des effectifs trop modestes, mais ils interdisaient à Sihanouk lui-même la visite de certaines zones.

Le calcul de Sihanouk, en entreprenant sa tournée à l'étranger *qu'il pouvait abréger ou prolonger* selon les circonstances, c'était très probablement de laisser au Gouvernement la responsabilité d'une situation extrêmement difficile, sur le plan économique et financier. En Juillet 1969, au Congrès du Sangkum, le chef de l'Etat fit un aveu de carence économique et il accepte l'investiture par l'Assemblée National du Gouvernement dit "de Sauvetage," en fonction actuellement, et qui succèda à celui, qu'il avait lui-même formé sous le vocable de "Gouvernement de la dernière chance". Ces deux qualificatifs, décernés par Sihanouk, sont suffisamment explicites de la situation réelle de l'état qui se dégradait depuis 1963.[1]

Si Lon Nol et Sirik Matak échouaient, Sihanouk aurait là, le meilleur motif de le renvoyer et de charger l'un de ses partisans "in-

who had kept peace and that Lon Nol and Sirik Matak had lost it. But in fact they spoke for a large body of Khmer opinion which had responded to the situation thus: "If we allow these things to continue, in six months it will be too late, we will no longer be masters in our own house." In such a situation it is not easy to establish responsibility.

conditionnels" de former un gouvernement plus docile. Plus rien alors ne s'opposerait à son retour dans l'enthousiasme populaire, avec chants de *bienvenue des enfants des écoles*, lâcher de ballons, drapeaux en grappes jusqu'à sa résidence et "bains de foule".

S'il quittait son pays, quant à l'avenir incertain, Sihanouk n'imaginait toute de même pas qu'il pourrait être destitué en son absence selon les formes légales.[2]

Tel était l'état d'esprit de Norodom Sihanouk quand il partit pour la France. Son flair, qu'il estimait infaillible, l'avait pourtant trompé cette fois-ci. Il ne prévoyait pas que, sur le plan économique et financier tout au moins, le Gouvernement Lon Nol-Sirik Matak en étroit accord avec l'Assemblée Nationale, redresserait la situation après des années de gestion incohérente et acquerrait de ce fait plus d'autorité. La question des Vietnamiens infiltrés, personne, pas même Sihanouk, ne pouvait la règler, ni par négociation, ni par pression militaire, puisque ceux-ci, commodément installés, à l'abri des incursions américaines, largement ravitaillés en vivres, en médicaments et en munitions depuis le Laos et les ports khmers du Golfe du Siam entendaient bien demeurer là jusqu'à la fin de la guerre au moins. Ils étaient en outre très supérieurs en nombre, en armement et en expérience aux unités khmères qu'on pouvait leur opposer.

Mais surtout Sihanouk n'avait plus sa popularité d'autrefois. Longtemps, il avait été aimé, vénéré même par la grand majorité de son peuple.[3]

Mais on lui reprochait parfois de s'attribuer trop souvent le mérite d'oeuvres qui étaient le fait du travail manuel et de l'effort financier des collectivités urbaines et rurales. Lors de ses visites en province, les "dons" qu'il accordait pour telle ou telle réalisation ne venaient généralement pas de sa bourse personnelle, qui n'y eut pas suffi, mais des "caisses" qu'il administrait et qui étaient approvisionnées par le gouvernement et les entreprises étatiques. Il se substituait ainsi parfois au gouvernement, le privant du même coup des ressources dont il aurait dû disposer.

Cela n'est pas très grave en soi. Ce qui est plus grave, c'est que les jeunes qui, par milliers, en sortaient des lycées et facultés avaient le plus grand mal à trouver du travail et restaient parfois pendant des années à la charge de leurs familles. Les veritables intellectuels eux-mêmes devaient souvent accepter des situations ne correspondant pas à leur formation et mal rémunérées. Elle provoqua ainsi de la rancoeur chez les jeunes qui ne pouvaient pas ne pas remarquer que, par ailleurs, les rares places vacantes dans l'administration et certaines entreprises d'Etat étaient, dans neuf cas sur dix, attribuées à des parents ou amis

des dirigeants, ou aux candidats particulièrement "généreux" envers les chefs de service.

Ce n'est pas seulement par manque de travail que les jeunes se séparaient peu à peu de Sihanouk. Presque tous, comme leurs professeurs, étaient démocrates, assez socialisants[4] même et souvent républicains. S'ils approuvaient généralement les grandes options de la politique étrangère cambodgienne: neutralité, coexistence pacifique, ils n'étaient plus d'accord sur l'espèce de dictature de que Sihanouk exerçait depuis quelques années. Autrefois affable, modeste et accessible aux conseils, le prince s'était transformé-conséquence probable d'un très long exercice solitaire du pouvoiren un homme totalement sûr de lui, méfiant envers ceux qui souhaitaient l'informer, ne tolérant aucune opposition, aucune critique, ni même une opinion divergeante si peu que ce soit de la sienne. Par contre, il croyait trop aisément ceux qui, par intérêt ou opportunisme, lui disaient qu'il avait toujours raison. Au Cambodge il n'y avait plus dialogue—et la jeunesse le sentait.

Un cas pénible fut celui de l'ancien Président du Conseil Sim Var, député de Phnom Penh et directeur d'un journal assez polémiste, mais bien fait: "Khmer indépendant." Pour quelques critiques sur la gestion des affaires publiques, M. Sim Var devint la bête noire du Prince Sihanouk qui l'obligea à fermer son journal et l'attaqua mainte fois à la radio, le traitant de "gâteux" et l'accusant d'être à la solde des imperialistes du fait de son mariage avec une japonaise. Sim Var subit avec dignité l'épreuve. Mais ce vieil homme, compagnon de Sihanouk dans la "Croisade Royale," n'oublia pas l'offense. Son parent, M. Douc Rasy, deputé et conseiller du Gouvernement, l'ancien ministre et l'actuel Président de l'Assemblée Nationale In Tam, M. Trinh Hoanh, ancien ministre lui aussi, M. Hoeur Lay In, président de la commission des affaires économiques et du plan de l'Assemblée, bien d'autres encore, n'oublièrent pas non plus, le moment venu, qu'ils avaient été menacés et humiliés.

C'est dans cette atmosphère pesante et déprimante que Sihanouk quitta son pays le 4 Janvier. C'est toutefois la question des Vietnamiens infiltrés qui allait exaspérer le plus l'opinion et rendre possible la chute du Prince.

## II

### La Corde Raide

Vis-à-vis des Vietnamiens communistes infiltrés au Cambodge, Sihanouk jouait, depuis des années, un jeu extrêmement délicat—et

qu'il n'aurait pas pu continuer bien longtemps s'il était resté au pouvoir.

Certes, comme la plupart des Cambodgiens, il n'avait que méfiance à l'égard de ceux qu'on appelle là-bas, avec une intentions péjorative, "les Yuans" (Annamites), ce peuple guerrier et prolifique qui, dans les siècles passés, occupa tout le "Bas Cambodge": la Cochinchine, où vivent encore plus d'un million de Khmers. Pour le Prince, tous les vietnamiens "rouges" (communistes) et "bleus" (nationalistes) se valaient, ils étaient les "éternels avaleurs de la terre cambodgienne."

Mais Sihanouk, qui se proclamait volontiers anti-impérialiste et anti-américain, avait une secrète indulgence pour les Nord-Vietnamiens et les hommes de F.N.L. qui tenaient tête si bravement au "colosse américain" et à ses "valets de Saigon"—selon son expression favorite. Des années durant, Sihanouk avait essayé de faire reconnaître la frontière actuelle Khmero-Vietnamienne par Saigon. Il vint même, dans cette intention, rendre visite à Ngo Dinh Diem, qui lui infligea une grave humiliation en revendiquant d'emblée la plupart des îles du Golfe du Siam, au large de la côte cambodgienne. Les successeurs de Diem, sans doute pour ne pas se priver d'une monaie d'échange en cas de négociation, ne retirèrent jamais cette revendication inacceptable, dont le fondement juridique était d'ailleurs plus que douteux.

Sihanouk, déçu du côté de Saigon, croyant par ailleurs fermement que les communistes seraient de toute façon les gagnants en Asie du Sud-Est, accueillit avec chaleur ces ouvertures. Il a ainsi entretenu des relations diplomatiques aves le FNL et le Nord Vietnam et se promettait de "coexister" très amicalement.[5]

Mais les Vietnamiens communistes n'allaient pas tarder à exploiter au maximum la situation. Puisqu'ils étaient les amis de "Samdech" (Monseigneur), avec lequel ils échangeaient périodiquement des messages de soutien et de congratulations, n'était-il pas normal que le Cambodge devint leur "base arrière" pour le combat "commun"?

Les infiltrations de 1965-1966 se transformèrent en occupation, très lourde dans le nord-est du pays où de larges zones peu peuplée devinrent interdites aux autorités Khmères, plus fluide mais plus dangereuses dans les provinces de l'est et du Sud-est, où la population supportait avec une impatience grandissante la présence, à proximité de leurs villages, d'unités vietcong qui en arrivaient à se conduire comme en pays conquis.

En Janvier 1968, à l'issue d'une conférence de presse, les micros coupés, Sihanouk révéla pour la première fois aux quelques journalistes présents, la gravité de la situation.

"Je vais," dit-il en substance, "vous faire une confidence que je vous demande de ne pas câbler: notre pays est littéralement envahi par les

vietcongs et les Nord-Vietnamiens. Ils sont installés partout le long de notre frontière et je ne pense pas qu'on puisse les faire partir. C'est une véritable tragédie et le Cambodge est probablement perdu."

Officiellement, Sihanouk niait, face aux accusations de plus en plus précises des Americans.

Il lui fallut bien admettre un jour la vérité.[6] Au début de 1969, il montra à la presse une carte d'écolier sur laquelle il avait sommairement hachuré les zones d'occupation vietnamienne. Quelques semaines plus tard, il produisit une carte très détaillée, dressée par l'état-major: "Voyez," dit-il "il y a ici des P.C. de bataillons et même de régiments, là des bases et des dépôts, là des hopitaux et des infirmeries. "Mais," précisa le prince, "je vous interdis de situer de façon précise les centres occupés, car les Américains viendraient les bombarder et nos "bons amis" de Hanoi et du FNL m'accuseraient de les avoir trahis. "Il est vrai," ajouta-t-il avec un clin d'oeil, "que les Américains connaissent ces détails aussi bien que moi."[7]

Par la suite, Sihanouk fit publier à plusieurs reprises des rapports de son sécrétaire d'Etat à la Sécurité et son Ministre de la Défense Nationale sur les activités des communistes vietnamiens au Cambodge. Voulait-il exercer, en agissant ainsi, une pression sur ces derniers? Peut-être, en fait, lâchait-il seulement du lest pour éviter le reproche de partialité. Car, en même temps les armes et munitions transitaient discrètement par le Cambodge à destination des zones d'occupation vietnamienne et, au-delà, vers les positions vietcong au Sud-Vietnam. Peu de gens connaissaient l'étendue de ce trafic, qui rapporta des fortunes à ses organisateurs. Mais personne, n'ignorait que des quantités considèrables de riz, de mais, de bétail, de volailles, de produits pharmaceutiques étaient achetés sur place par les services de ravitaillement vietcong qui payaient rubis sur l'ongle—mais parfois à la fin, en faux billets de 500 riels supérieurement imités. Le prince lui-même s'en plaignait, disant que ces achats directs ruinaient l'Etat, qui tirait une partie de ses ressoures du monopole du commerce extérieur. Mais la contrebande jouissait de complicité largement monnayées dans l'administration et sans doute dans l'entourage du chef de l'Etat lui-même.[8] Il était pourtant possible d'y mettre fin, comme le prouvèrent, en mars dernier, Lon Nol et Sirik Matak: mais les vietnamiens ne le leur pardonnèrent pas.

Sihanouk a déclaré ces jours derniers à Hanoi que, lorsqu'il était au pouvoir, il avait accordé aux marquisards vietnamiens une aide "sous plusieurs formes et un soutien effectif."

Mais Sihanouk, s'il a favorisé les forces de Hanoi et du "Front," entendait bien en tirer un profit pour son régime: les "occupants" se tenaient assez tranquilles dans les zones "concédées" et n'apportaient

qu'un appui limité aux Communistes Cambodgiens rebelles à Sihanouk,[9] qualifié par ceux-ci, dans leurs tracts, de "valets des Américains" et de "dictateur sanguinaire." Les Cambodgiens "rouges" bougeaient assez pour inquiéter le Prince; ils n'étaient pas assez forts pour le mettre réellement en difficulté (leurs nombres sont aux environs de 3000—Voire le rapport de Lon Nol à Sihanouk, publié dans le Sangkum N° 51, 1969, pp. 95-7). Tandis que les dirigeants vietnamiens assuraient Sihanouk de leurs "sentiments de solidarité fraternelle" dans leurs messages, le chef de l'Etat Khmer réprimait activement la rébellion de leurs partisans cambodgiens.[10] La tête des "chefs de bande" était mise à prix, jusqu'à 30,000 Francs ($1 US = 5.45 F) pour certains. L'armée royale traquait les communistes cambodgiens dans la jungle et les forêts et Sihanouk donnait presque toujours l'ordre de fusiller sans jugement[11] les prisonniers.

Il est curieux de constater qu'aujourd'hui figurent parmi les membres du "gouvernement en exil" qu'il a formé à Pékin trois anciens députés d'extrême gauche: MM. Hou Yuon,[12] Hu Nim,[13] Khieu Samphan,[14] qu'il avait désignés voilà trois ans comme "traîtres à la Nation."

La RDVN et le FNL avaient objectivement tout intérêt à ce que Sihanouk restât le plus longtemps possible au pouvoir. Mais ils avaient les antennes partout et savaient, depuis des mois, que le Prince était en perte de vitesse. Ils n'ignoraient pas que Lon Nol et Sirik Matak, interprêtes de l'opinion, mettraient dès qu'ils le pourraient, un terme aux facilités accordées à leurs forces au Cambodge et s'efforceraient, d'obtenir l'évacuation de celles-ci. Le départ du Prince pour la France en janvier, ils l'interprétèrent: leur allié disparaissait, il leur fallait reprendre eux-mêmes la situation en main, donc se battre.

Les Cambodgiens au Cambodge, eux croyaient, à tort comme on l'a vu, qu'il leur suffirait de manifester violemment leur mécontentement contre "l'occupation" et leur résolution de libérer leur pays pour que les gens de Hanoi et du Front acceptent de négocier le départ de leurs troupes. Ils pensaient, en somme, qu'après des années de complaisance, l'énergie serait payante. Et quand, le 11 mars, une foule de jeunes en colère mit à sac les Ambassades de la RDVN et du G.R.P. du Sud Vietnam à Phnom Penh, les organisateurs de cette manifestation, qui bénéficiait visiblement d'un large appui populaire, pas plus que les dirigeants du pays, n'imaginaient que les Vietnamiens saisiraient l'occasion pour retirer quelques jours plus tard leurs diplomates du Cambodge et pénétrer presque aussitôt profondément à l'intérieur du pays.

Sihanouk, apprenant la manifestation, la blâma sans tarder, dans un télégramme à la Reine sa mère, rendu aussitôt public. Il annonçait aussi

son prochain retour. Le Gouverneur de Phnom-Penh fit repeindre les bordures de trottoirs et placer un peu partout drapeaux, banderoles et guirlandes. Mais le Prince ne revint pas, scellant ainsi son destin.

## III

### La Destitution

Plusieurs personnes qui accompagnaient Sihanouk, alors à Paris (il venait d'être reçu la veille par le Président Pompidou),[15] ont dit que son désir de regagner son pays au lendemain de la manifestation anti-vietnamienne du 11 Mars était réel. Il avait même rédigé des télégrammes d'excuses pour les dirigeants soviétiques et chinois auxquels il avait promis sa visite. Mais certains de ses conseillers et membres de sa famille lui représentèrent qu'un piège pouvait lui être tendu dans sa capitale, qu'il serait peut-être arrêté dès sa descente d'avion.

De tout ce qu'on a pu savoir à Phnom-Penh, rien de tel ne se serait passé. Le Prince aurait été accueilli fort convenablement.[16] Ses Ministres, les députés même, lui auaient tenu un language ferme mais respectueux, lui demandant d'user de son autorité pour amener les Vietnamiens à négocier le retrait de leurs troupes. Sa position de Chef de l'Etat et de "national leader," lui présent, n'aurait pas été mise en cause. Tout restait possible.

Quoi qu'il en soit, le prince revint sur sa décision et décida de se rendre, comme prévu à Moscou et Pékin, pour demander, disait-il, aux dirigeants de ces pays amis qu'ils interviennent auprès de leurs alliés vietnamiens afin que ceux-ci "ne s'ingèrent pas trop dans les affaires intérieures cambodgiennes." Sihanouk croyait-il vraiment une telle médiation possible? Ou bien voulait-il se donner du temps, dans l'attente d'un renversement en sa faveur de la situation à Phnom-Penh?

La seconde hypotèse semble la plus exacte. Un message téléphonique serait en effet parvenu dans la capitale khmère (où il fut intercepté) prescrivant au Colonel Mannorine, son beau-frère, de liquider un certain nombre d'opposants. La divulgation de cette nouvelle dans les milieux politiques cambodgiens hostiles à Sihanouk décida les opposants à renoncer à tout compromis et à passer à l'action. Le 18 Mars au soir, alors que le Prince prenait congé des dirigeants soviétiques et se préparait à prendre l'avion pour Pékin, une dépêche lui apprenait sa destitution.

L'Assemblée Nationale et le Conseil du Royaume s'étaient en effet réunis dans la matinée à Phnom-Penh et avaient entendu les réquisitoires passionnés de plusieurs députés et d'un conseiller contre le Chef de l'Etat. Des reproches longtemps contenus explosèrent; le prince fut

accusé de tyrannie, de violation de la constitution, de soutien actif au Vietcong, de mauvais traitements à l'égard des parlementaires,[17] etc. Cette dernière accusation ne pouvait que toucher la majorité silencieuse qui se souvenait que Sihanouk avait banni les députés de sà présence pendant des mois et ne leur avait épargné ni sarcasmes ni menaces. Les indécis finirent par se rallier aux plus énergiques et la déchéance fut décidée à l'unanimité. Personne ne se leva pour défendre le maître d'hier.

Lorsque la radio khmère annonça, le 18 Mars à 17.00 heures la destitution de Sihanouk, la population, qui n'était pas dans le secret des dieux, fut saisie de stupeur. La diffusion intégrale, le soir même, de la séance mémorable du parlement, où l'idole de la veille avait été abattue, éclaira un peu les esprits. Il n'y eut nulle part de réaction. Le lendemain, la vie reprenait, normale, et les télégrames de soutien au gouvernement affluaient des provinces. Cela signifiait que les autorités locales se ralliaient et donnaient des gages pour rester en place. Les mutations furent peu nombreuses. Si l'on remplaça de nombreux gouverneurs il n'y ait pas de bouleversement dans l'administration. A vrai dire et pour inopinée qu'ait été la destitution du Chef de l'Etat, elle avait été conforme à la Constitution.[18] Sihanouk n'était plus roi: il tenait son mandat du Parlement et avait négligé d'en demander le renouvellement, comme il l'aurait dû, à chaque législature. Sans doute pensait-il que c'était là une formalité bien inutile, nul n'ayant osé jusqu'ici lui refuser quoi que ce soit. En cette affaire comme en d'autres, il n'avait pas respecté la Constitution.

Les fonctionnaires, donc, restèrent au côté du gouvernement régulièrement investi, huit mois auparavant, par l'Assemblée. L'armée, qui n'avait pris aucune part aux événements, demura à son poste. Un cas de conscience se posa toutefois pour certains officiers: Sihanouk avait été le "commandant suprême"; ne restaient-ils pas engagés par le serment de fidélité qu'ils lui avaient prêté? Lon Nol, soucieux de maintenir l'unité dans l'armée, convoqua pendant plusieurs jours, chez lui, les principaux "hésitants," les logeant dans des chambres à air conditionné et les invitant à sa table, où ils discutaient de la situation avec lui et leurs collègues de l'Etat-Major.

C'est Sihanouk qui, finalement, fit glisser les attentistes dans le camp gouvernemental, lorsque le 23 Mars, parlant sur les ondes de Pékin, il appela ses compatriotes à l'insurrection et leur annonça qu'ils devaient lutter au côté des forces révolutionnaires vietnamiennes et laotiennes pour chasser les Américains "de toute notre Indochine." L'armée khmère n'était ni "Fasciste" ni "putschiste," mais elle avait trop souvent combattu les rebelles et les Vietcong infiltrés pour passer dans leur camp, même par obéissance à un chef historique.

Il y avait finalement, plusieurs jours après la déposition du Prince, assez peu de monde sous les verrous et les choses se passaient "à la cambodgienne," c'est-à-dire sans drames. Lon Nol, qui connaissait l'influence considérable des bonzes bouddhistes sur l'opinion, s'expliqua devant leurs cadres et leur demanda d'informer les fidèles de ce qui s'était passé. Il reçut, selon les témoins, un accueil plutôt encourageant.[19] Le Président du Conseil pouvait aussi compter sur la majorité des lycéens et étudiants et la quasi-totalité du corps enseignant—une fraction gauchiste, remuante, très anti-vietnamienne, très "jacobine."

Sihanouk une fois déchu et les choses n'allant pas mal, le gouvernement s'efforça de faire, en matière de politique étrangère . . . du "Sihanoukisme"—c'est-à-dire de sauvegarder la neutralité et la coexistence avec tous, y compris les puissances socialistes. Ses démarches diplomatiques et ses declarations tendirent à éviter la rupture avec Hanoi et le "Front," et à trouver avec eux un arrangement pour un retrait échelonné de leurs forces. M. Yem Sambaur, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, s'y employa désespérément. Mais les diplomates vietnamiens—de simples Chargés d'affaires—avaient reçu des instructions. Ils réclamèrent des indemnités pour les dégâts causés à leurs ambassades et des assurances de sécurité pour l'avenir. Cela leur fut accordé. Sur la question de l'évacuation, ils restèrent muets. Une seconde réunion était prévue quand on apprit que Hanoi et le Front avaient décidé de retirer leur personnel et de "suspendre" le fonctionnement de leurs représentations. L'Ambassade de Chine, pour sa part, ne répondait plus aux appels du "Quai Sisowath"—le Quai d'Orsay khmer—qui cherchait à savoir l'étendue du soutien que la Chine entendait accorder à Sihanouk, qui n'était encore qu'un hôte de ce pays.

A peine le personnel diplomatique vietnamien avait-il quitté Phnom-penh que le drame commençait: des forces vietnamiennes sortant des zones de stationnement attaquaient, avec l'aide des khmers vietminh,[20] des postes militaires khmers. Une intense propagande, basée sur les déclarations de Sihanouk enregistrées sur magnétophones, puis rediffusées, était menée dans les campagnes auprès des paysans. Des villes étaient envahies, des routes coupées, des officiels assassinés. L'armée cambodgienne, au début mal informée des subtilités de la guerre psychologique, connut des difficultés sans nombre.

En fait, cette invasion directe n'avait pas été prévue à Phnom-Penh. Le gouvernement n'avait obtenu, ni même cherché, aucun soutien extérieur, n'avait reçu aucune promesse tant soit peu sérieuse d'aide de quiconque. Quand l'attaque des Vietnamiens et des maquis commença, il disposait d'une quinzaine de chars assez modernes et d'une

vingtaine de vieux blindés, d'une dizaine de chasseurs et bombardiers, d'une poignée d'avions de transport et de si peu de camions qu'il lui fallut réquisitionner ceux des commerçants et les cars de voyageurs pour véhiculer les troupes vers les endroits menacés. L'armée était équipée de façon lamentable: les armes et les munitions provenaient de cinq ou six origines différentes, tout manquait, l'artillerie, les télécommunications, les cartes même parfois. Des dizaines de milliers d'étudiants et collégiens s'engagèrent; encore fallait-il les armer et les instruire. Leurs jeunes cohortes furent parfois envoyées avec un minimum d'entraînement contre les soldats vietnamiens aguerris, et subirent de sérieuses pertes.

Lon Nol, pourtant, avait mainte fois dépeint à Sihanouk l'état de dénuement extrême des FARK[21] (Forces Armées Royales Khmères) et avait demandé qu'on lui permette d'engager au moins dix mille homme de plus. Le Prince lui répondit qu'on n'avait pas d'argent; l'armée, pour lui, n'était d'ailleurs destinée qu'au maintien de l'ordre et aux travaux collectifs utiles à la population. En cas d'invasion, le Prince recommandait la pratique de la guérilla. Mais celle-ci ne s'improvise pas. . . .

Lon Nol et Sirik essayèrent de faire front aux multiples actions offensives adverses. Ils demandèrent à "toutes les puissances amies—mêmes, au début, à la Chine et à la Russie, des armes pour défendre leur pays, revendiquant pour les Cambodgiens "l'honneur de combattre". Ils espéraient encore éviter le recours aux forces étrangères. En même temps, ils réclamaient la réactivation de la Commission Internationale de Contrôle,[22] que Sihanouk avait mise en sommeil—et même l'envoi par l'ONU d'observateurs neutres.

Pendant plus d'un mois, personne ne répondit aux appels de plus en plus angoissés des dirigeants cambodgiens—et ce fut le silence de la France, longtemps l'amie privilégiée, qui leur fut le plus pénible. Vint un moment où l'on comprit à Phnom-Penh que, sans intervention extérieure massive et rapide, la résistance allait sans doute s'effondrer. Les combats se déroulaient presque aux portes de la capitale lorsque Nixon decida l'intervention américaine au Cambodge, imité par le gouvernement sud-vietnamien.

## IV

### L'Intervention Etrangere[23]

Lon Nol a fait appel aux Américains pour une raison très simple: ils étaient les seuls à même, dans la région, à pouvoir s'opposer rapidement et efficacement à l'offensive vietcong et nord-vietnamienne qui

bousculait la défense khmère. Le gouvernement cambodgien avait d'abord présenté à Washington une demande d'armement si considérable (de quoi équiper 400.000, puis "seulement" 200.000 hommes) que l'administration Nixon en fut effrayée et refusa tout net.

Au reste, les choses allaient si vite au Cambodge que ce flot d'armes ne serait sans doute pas parvenu à temps à destination. Il n'y avait pour Nixon que deux solutions: ou demeurer sourd à l'appel cambodgien—et c'était presque à coup sûr l'installation d'un gouvernement communiste à Phnom-Penh dans les semaines qui souvaient, donc une menace majeure contre le Sud-Vietnam et la Thaïlande—ou bien envoyer pour un certain temps une force importante au Cambodge qui, en attaquant et détruisant (si possible) les principales bases vietcong et nord-vietnamiennes, affaiblirait et désorganiserait le potentiel adverse au Cambodge, et accessoirement soulagerait l'armée khmère.

Au Cambodge même, où se déroulent en ce moment de durs combats, les Vietcong et Nord-Vietnamiens semblent se reprendre après avoir été bousculés. Ils ont tout de même perdu quelques milliers de combattants, de nombreuses bases et de très importants dépôts d'armes. Leurs difficultés logistiques sont évidentes. Ils tenent assez visiblement de les pallier en accentuant leur pression sur les provinces du nord-est et de l'est cambodgiens, qu'ils occupent en partie, de sort que l'armement et la ravitaillement chinois et soviétique venant du Nord-Vietnam continue à parvenir aux forces du F.N.L. du Sud-Vietnam et à eux-mêmes. Par ailleurs, l'insécurité est entretenue dans d'autres provinces situées sur la carte à l'est du Mékong par des commandos vietnamiens, très mobiles et efficaces, aidés par les "maquis" cambodgiens.

L'intervention américaine ne pouvait qu'être bien accueillie par le gouvernement khmer, qui aurait souhaité la voir se prolonger le plus longtemps possible. Il n'y avait pas, au Cambodge (sauf parmi l'extrême-gauche) de haine véritable contre les Américains, malgré toute la propagande dirigée contre eux pendant des années. Certes, ils avaient été souvent politiquement maladroits et, dans leur chasse—d'ailleurs sporadique—au Vietcong à travers la frontière, ils avaient fait subir plus de pertes à la population du cru qu'à leurs adversaires, maîtres dans l'art du camouflage. Sihanouk, quand il renonça à leurs aides, en 1963, surtout pour contenter la Chine (il l'a reconnu dans un discours voilà deux ans) provoqua le mécontentement des milieux d'affaires et de beaucoup d'officiers qui voyaient l'armée réduite désormais à la portion congrue. L'hostilité, ou tout au moins la méfiance, les Cambodgiens les réservaient à leurs voisins et ennemis "héréditaires," les

Vietnamiens et les Thaïlandais, qui s'étaient partagé les dépouilles de l'empire khmer d'autrefois.

Aussi est-il très douteux que le gouvernement du Général Lon Nol ait apprécié qui l'armée sud-vietnamienne accompagne l'armée américaine dans sa campagne au Cambodge. Très vraisemblablement, il n'a pas eu le choix. Et les succès remportés dès le début par les troupes saigonnaises, supérieurement armées et équipées, bien commandées, entraînées à la guerre classique comme à la contre-guérilla, ont suscité dans les milieux dirigeants khmers, civils et militaires quelques inquiétudes pour l'avenir.

Les observateurs ont reconnu, assez généralement, que les forces gouvernementales sud-vietnamiennes opérant au Cambodge se sont fort bien battues—ce qui rassure quelque peu les Américains sur la poursuite de leur programme de "vietnamisation". Mais la tentation est grande pour les généraux vietnamiens de prendre plus que leur part dans la conduite des opérations militaires et de ménager assez peu les villes et villages khmers où l'adversaire résisterait.

L'un des buts officiels de l'intervention sud-vietnamienne est la protection de la minorité vietnamienne au Cambodge, forte de 600.000 âmes environ. Les autorités khmères ont eu la désagréable surprise de s'apercevoir, au fur et à mesure de l'avance des communistes vietnamiens, que de nombreux ressortissants vietnamiens apparemment paisibles vivant au Cambodge étaient soit des partisans, soit même des agents du Vietcong. C'est ainsi que le problème de rapatriement des ressortissants vietnamiens au Cambodge s'imposa au Gouvernement Lon Nol.

Des négociations menées à Saigon entre les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères du Cambodge et du Sud-Vietnam ont permis la reprise des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays. Tout le vieux contentieux n'est pas réglé. Au moins y a-t-il eu promesse des deux parties de "respecter" la frontière commune, ce qui sera un sujet de satisfaction pour le Cambodge. La qualité des relations fraîchement rétablies dépendra toutefois, pour une bonne part de l'attitude du gouvernement et du commandement sud-vietnamiens à l'égard des Cambodgiens. Si ces derniers sont traités en alliés et en amis, tout se passera probablement assez bien. Si les Cambodgiens sont traités en auxiliaires, le sentiment anti-vietnamien encore vivace parmi la jeunesse et le peuple se réveillera et tout ira mal.

Aux prises avec Hanoi et le "Front," privé de relations avec Pékin, la Corée du Nord et une douzaine de nations progressistes ou neutralistes[24]—arabes notamment—qui reconnaissent le "gouvernement en exil" de Sihanouk, placé devant la perspective d'être "lâché" par

l'Union Soviétique et ses alliés de l'Europe de l'Est, voyant la France lui battre froid pour ne point compromettre les chances, de plus en plus faibles d'ailleurs, d'un arrangement global entre toutes les puissances intéressées dans l'Asie du Sud-Est, le gouvernement Lon Nol-Sirik Matak se voit obligé d'enterrer pour le moment ses espoirs de coexistence pacifique générale et de rechercher le concours des puissances anticommunistes. Les relations diplomatiques sont rétablies avec Bangkok, Séoul, Taipeh, et sûrement avec Bonn (les relations avaient été rompues à la suite d'une manoeuvre de l'Ambassade de la R.D.A. à Phnom-Penh; Sihanouk tomba dans le piège et le regretta par la suite). Le Japon donnera sans doute une aide économique assez importante. L'Amérique fournira pour 7 millions et demi de dollars d'armes et sans doute aussi une aide économique et technique.

Est-ce à dire que le Cambodge ne sera plus neutre? En droit il le restera probablement, car tout porte à croire qu'à moins d'y être forcé, il n'adhérera à aucune alliance militaire et n'acceptera pas de bases étrangères sur son territoire. Si, par quelque chance insigne, la situation militaire s'améliorait beaucoup et s'il avait pu d'ici la renforcer considérablement sa propre défense, il demanderait certainement aux troupes "amies" qui s'y trouvent de rentrer chez elles avec l'assurance de sa profonde gratitude. En fait, même aujourd'hui où il est entraîné à droite par le poids de l'événement, le gouvernement Lon Nol-Sirik Matak accueillerait avec joie (et il ne le cache pas) une réconciliation avec le camp socialiste.

Il est intéressant de noter que la loi khmère sur la neutralité, qui date d'une douzaine d'années et dont Sihanouk lui-même avait pesé les termes, autorise le gouvernement khmer, si le pays est victime d'une agression et si tous les recours diplomatiques sont restés vains, à faire appel à l'aide d'une ou plusieurs "puissances amies".

Ces dernières années, Sihanouk craignait très visiblement la poussée du "communisme asiatique," qu'il appelait "l'autre impérialisme". Il avait nettement fait comprendre aux Américains qu'il souhaitait les voir rester en force "dans les parages" (pas au Cambodge tout de même) après leur désengagement au Vietnam, afin de faire contrepoids aux Vietnamiens et Chinois communistes et permettre aux petites nations comme la sienne de "manoeuvrer" pour préserver leur indépendance.

Il avait même envisagé, dans de nombreux discours, qu'en cas de graves difficultés, le Général Lon Nol demande l'aide américaine, que le Chef de l'Etat se refusait à solliciter lui-même pour des raisons de "dignité". Et, dans un éditorial écrit de sa main voilà quelques mois et traitant des aides étrangères, il conseillait aux Américains, pour

contenir plus efficacement le communisme en Asie du Sud, d'accorder des aides militaires "sans présence physique" et des aides économiques aux régimes nationalistes et populaires—il pensait évidemment au sien.

## V

### De L'Auto-Critique a la Vengeance

Sihanouk a toujours été à la fois fasciné et effrayé par le communisme. Sa connaissance du marxisme est assez sommaire et le petit "livre rouge" de Mao Tsé Toung lui paraissait plus apte à guider les Chinois, au sortir de siècles d'esclavage, qu'à inspirer des peuples de vieille civilisation. Mais le pragmatiste qu'il était enregistrait les succès communistes en Asie et il lui semblait presque impensable que les 7 millions de Cambodgiens puissent longtemps échapper à la pression communiste vietnamo-chinoise. Il s'était même bercé de l'espoir (et cela explique peut-être son attitude actuelle) qu'il serait choisi par Pékin pour présider aux destinées d'une République Socialiste Khmère: des 1968, il se demandait, devant ses intimes, s'il ne deviendrait pas le Secrétaire Général d'un parti communiste triomphant au Cambodge. Tout récemment encore, il envisageait d'abandonner ses fonctions de Chef de l'Etat pour n'être plus que le président du Sangkum, fonction qui ferait de lui, disait-il, "un second Mao".

Ces perspectives restaient tout de même assez vagues dans son esprit. Elles ne l'empêchaient pas de réprimer durement, chez lui, les menées subversives d'extrême-gauche et de sonder les intentions des Américains, au cas où. . . . Dans ses discours, il appelait son peuple à la lutte contre les rebelles d'extrême-droite et d'extrême-gauche, "traîtres à la nation".

Quand le Gouvernement Lon Nol-Sirik Matak prit ses distances vis-à-vis de lui, il le dénonça comme "réactionnaire". Dans un dernier éditorial (qui ne fut pas publié) de la revue "Le Sangkum," il souhaitait que ses éventuels successeurs pratiquent un communisme national "comme en Yougoslavie" ou, qu'à défaut, ils recherchent la protection de Pékin contre les visées annexionniste et la tendance à la domination politique de Hanoï. Il n'est donc pas très étonnant que, dans son malheur, il soit venu chercher réconfort et appui en Chine.

Toutefois, Sihanouk ne pouvait ignorer qu'il n'obtiendrait le concours de Pékin qu'à condition de s'aligner complètement sur la position chinoise: pas de compromis avec l'impérialisme, lutte jusqu'à la victoire finale" contre les Américains en Asie du Sud—et contre le capitalisme partout dans le monde. Dépendant en tout des Chinois, il ne pouvait plus être cet homme fier disant "non" aux uns et aux autres,

que beaucoup de Cambodgiens admiraient. Il ne pouvait plus surtout "manoeuvrer" avec les Nord-Vietnamiens et le "Front" qui, s'ils l'accueillaient avec les égards dûs à un Chef d'Etat en exercice, ne pouvaient voir en lui après sa déchéance, qu'une carte à jouer.

Pour entrer dans le "club" très fermé du communisme asiatique, Sihanouk fit son auto-critique. Il admit qu'il avait été "aveugle" (mais c'était la faute, ajouta-t-il, du Général Lon Nol qui l'avait "trompé"), il avoua l'échec de son "socialisme bouddhique," reconnaissant qu'il ne pouvait y avoir de compromis entre le "véritable socialisme (le marxisme) et le capitalisme." Il ne nia pas ses "échecs socio-économiques," dont il attribua la responsabilité à la "réaction". Il s'excusa d'avoir été "injuste" envers les jeunes progressistes qu'il avait pourchassés et se dit sûr de leur pardon. Il proclama enfin qu'il savait bien qu'il était personnellement "fini" et que sa seule ambition était de passer le flambeau aux vrais révolutionnaires.

Pourquoi Sihanouk a-t-il dressé ce constat de faillite qui fut certainement la démarche la plus pénible de sa vie? Tout porte à croire qu'il a été mené, non par une véritable conversion politique, mais par une réaction presque pathologique d'orgueil blessé.

A Pékin, le prince a déclaré: "s'il fallait chercher à tout prix à une lutte un *motif personnel*, je dirai *que je veux me venger* d'avoir été aussi lâchement, aussi méchamment calomnié, injurié et humilié par mes ennemis de l'extrême-droite, Je ne sais pas accepter l'injustice et c'est pour me faire rendre justice et honneur que je lutte et lutterai, sans esprit de recul, contre la bande de Lon Nol."

Ce désir de vengeance a servi de façon inespérée la lutte révolutionnaire en Indochine. Il a, en quelque sorte, légitimé au Cambodge même les "*maquis*" *communistes* khmers qui, recrutant dans les provinces des éléments *ruraux monarchistes* et traditionnalistes toujours attachés au Prince, se qualifient "d'armée de Sihanouk". Il a surtout permis aux Vietcong et Nord-Vietnamiens, dont le prince est devenu objectivement l'allié et le garant, de mener des opérations à l'intérieur du Cambodge sous le couvert du "gouvernement royal" de ce pays, pour "venir en aide" au peuple cambodgien. Sans Sihanouk à leur côté, les combattants de Hanoï et du "Front" qui occupent maintenant plusieurs capitales provinciales, seraient sans doute considérés par l'opinion mondiale comme des agresseurs. Les voilà qui, pour beaucoup, sont des libérateurs d'une petite nation qu'un "complot de la C.I.A." et des "réactionnaires" a privé de son chef légitime et d'un régime qui quinze ans durant, lui avait conservé la paix.

Le coeur se serre quand on voit ce qu'est devenu aujourd'hui le cambodge, qui fut longtemps le pays de "la douceur de vivre". Dans

l'est et le Sud, la population fuit, abandonnant ses terres et ses biens, cherchant sous les bombardements et les mitraillages un illusoire abri. Les petites villes à l'est du Mékong sont pour la plupart en ruines, les plantations d'hévéas, richesse du pays, sont en partie détruites.

De ce drame, il n'est pas facile d'établir les responsabilités. On est tenté, à première vue, de penser que Sihanouk, quoi qu'il ait fait, c'était la paix et que Lon Nol et Sirik Matak, en exigeant le retrait des forces communistes vietnamiennes, se sont conduits en "apprentis sorciers," jetant leur pays dans la guerre. C'est un raisonnement que tiennent un *certain nombre de chancelleries*, qui trouvaient leur compte à l' équilibre fragile de naguère, n'étant guère gênées par l'implantation prolongée de quelques dizaines de milliers de Vietcong et Nord-Vietnamiens au Cambodge.

Mais cette implantation, devenue lourde et humiliante, non seulement gênait les Cambodgiens, mais encore leur était de plus en plus insupportable et leur paraissait de plus en plus dangereuse pour l'avenir.

Sihanouk disait: "Nous ne pouvons rien faire, nous n'avons pas les moyens de chasser les Vietnamiens, soyons patients. A la future conférence de la paix, s'ils ne sont partis volontairement, nous ouvrirons notre dossier et nous ne mâcherons pas nos mots." Lon Nol et Sirik Matak, soutenus en cela par une large partie de l'opinion, répondaient: "Si nous laissons les choses aller, dans six mois il sera trop tard, nous ne seront plus les maîtres chez nous. Protégés par leurs soldats, des colons vietnamiens s'installent en nombre dans les régions excentriques et poussent vers les grands lacs. Nous serons vietnamisés. C'est maintenant ou jamis qu'il faut donner le coup d'arrêt."

La guerre au Vietnam, Sihanouk la voyait naguère finir aux alentours de 1970: "je vous prédis que ce sera terminé dans deux ans," disait-il aux journalistes américains qui "couvraient" la visite au Cambodge de Madame Kennedy. Cette guerre semblait pourtant, ces derniers mois, avant qu'elle ne s'étende au Cambodge, devoir durer bien plus longtemps. Et les Vietnamiens implantés accentuaient leur tendance à user sans aucune retenue de territoire khmer.

On peut penser que si Lon Nol et Sirik Matak n'avaient pas mis Hanoï et le "Front" en Mars dernier au pied du mur, c'est Sihanouk qui, "volens nolens," aurait été contraint de la faire dans les mois qui viennent sous la pression de son opinion publique.

Le probléme, simplifié à l'extrême, est finalement le suivant: un petit peuple pauvre et insuffisamment armé doit-il ou non accepter qu'un voisin plus peuplé et bien plus puissant occupé, des années durant, sourd à toutes les protestations, ses provinces frontalières? Ce

qu'une nation d'Europe jugerait intolérable, un petit pays d'Asie devrait-il le tolérer?

1. Lire *Asian Survey*, Vol. XI, No. 3, Mars 1971, par Donald Kirk.
2. La destitution, le 18 Mars 1971, du Chef de l'Etat khmer (Sihanouk) était-elle ou non constitutionnelle?
Il suffit de consulter les textes constitutionnels pour répondre affirmativement à l'instar de l'ONU qui l'a fait sans aucune hésitation. Lire *La Légimité Républicaine* éditée par le Ministére de l'Information. Un article de Douc Rasy (1970).
3. La France accepta d'accorder au Cambodge son indépendance, le 9 Novembre 1953. Sihanouk rentra de "son exil" en triomphateur dans sa capitale, acclamé par ses "Chivapol" ou volontaires du "Mouvement des Forces Vives." Il créa autour de lui la légende du petit roi solitaire, courageux à l'extrême et finalement victorieux. Lire le *Dossier Sihanouk*, p. 10.
4. Le professeur Jean Delvert dans son article: "Les paysans Cambodgiens dans la tourmente" a relevé dans le figaro du 2 Juillet 1970 de l'Elite troublée:
"L'intelligentia cambodgienne, instituteurs et étudiants, politiquement 'progressiste' formée directement ou indirectement par des maîtres français, est ralliée au Gouvernement, à la fois par le dégôut devant la corruption et le favoritisme, par le furent de si fermes soutiens de l'ancien parti démocrate jouent dans les campagnes un rôle u peu équivalent à celui des instituteurs en France avant 1914. Et quant aux étudiants, Lycéens et Collégiens, ce ne sont pas des fils de bourgeois comme il a été dit, mais essentiellement des fils de paysans. Les progrés de l'enseignement secondaire ayant été trées rapides, beaucoup de jeunes paysans sont collégiens ou lycéens, et ces enfants influencent leurs péres. On sait qu'ils se sont engagés en masse dans l'armée. Il n'ya d'ailleurs pas de coupure entre la population urbaine cambodgienne et la population rurale."
5. Voir la lettre du Premier Ministre nord-vietnamien Pham Van Dong adressé au Prince Norodom Sihanouk (8-6-67) et de M. Nguyen Huu Tho, Président du FNL (6-6-67) reproduites par le Ministére de l'Information dans: *Documents sur l'aggression vietcong et nord-vietnamienne contre le Cambodge* (1970).
6. D'ailleurs Sihanouk, en 1966 avait admis virtuellement de l'occupation du territoire khmer par les troupes nord-vietnamiennes et vietcong. Voir *Emerging Southeast Asia* p. 395 de Donald W. Fryer, McGraw-Hill, 1970, p. 395.
Lire les séries d'articles de Jacques Decornoy dans le Monde à partir du 9 Juillet 1968. Lire aussi la version de Sihanouk dans le Sangkum No 37 d'Aôut 1968 et No 38 du Septembre 1968.
7. Voir AFP du 28 Mars 1969 sur Conféerence de Presse du Prince Sihanouk (du 28 Mars 1969).
8. Monique Sihanouk (femme de Sihanouk), Madame Pomme Chéng (belle-mére de Sihanouk), Colonel Oum Mannorine (beau-frére de Sihanouk) Sécretaire d'Etat de l'Intérieur, Khek Vandy (proche ami de Monique), P.D.G. du *Magasin d'ETAT*, grâce à leur délicate position ont bien coordonné les contrebandes et les traffics du riz au Vietcong avec les concours des marchands chinois et les communistes vietnamiens au Cambodge. Voir *Asian Survey*, Vol. XI, No. 3, Mars 1971, p. 244 *de* Donald Kirk.
9. Lire les séries d'articles de Jacques Decornoy dans *le Monde* à partir du 9 Juillet 1968.
Lire aussi la version de Sihanouk dans le Sangkum No. 37, du mois d'Aôut 1968, et No. 38, du mois de Septembre 1968.
10. *Ibid.* 5.
11. Discours radio diffusis du 19 Juin 1968 à Takeo, Sihanouk a déclaré qu'il ne respecterait plus la constitution, ni les lois du royaume. Voir *Légimité Republicaine*, p. 4, *op. cit.*
12. La Radio de Pekin a annoncé en 1967 que les 2 députis Hou Youn et Khieu Samphân ont été executés et l'on a même précisé le lieu de l'exécution ainsi que leur tombeau. La sourie officieuse de Phnom-Penh disait que le Colonnel Oum Mannorine.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. L'entretien avec le Président Pompidou: le 10 Mars 1970.
16. Le Prince Norodom Kanthol, ancient Président du Conseil des Ministres du Cabinet Sihanouk, venait en personne assuré Sihanouk à Paris avant son départ pour Moscou de l'attitude de Phnom-Penh.
17. Lire les textes des déclarations à l'occasion de la proclamation de la République Khmére (les 9-10-11 Octobre 1970), p. 3.

18. *Ibid.*, No. 2.
19. *Ibid.* 16, No. 4.
Lire Message de son éminence le chef religieux de l'Ordre Thamayuth, p. 13.
Message de son éminence le chef religieux de l'Ordre Mohanikay, p. 14.
20. Khmer Viet Minh nom donné à Cambodgiens communistes dont le Leader est Son Ngoc Minh, siégant à Hanoi.
21. FARK (Forces Armées Royales Khméres) devenaient actuellement FANK (Forces Armées Nationales Khméres).
22. CIC: La Commission Internationale de Controle est composée de l'Inde (présidente) du Canada et de la Pologne. Sihanouk avait officiellement demandé le départ en Décembre 1969.
23. Quelques dates jugeant susceptibles à une grave crise latente:
Le 8 Mars 1970, un environ de 1500 Cambodgiens de la province de Svay Rieng avaient manifesté contre un camp vietcong installé dans la région.
Les 11 et 12 Mars, les ambassades, bureaux d'Information de la R.D.V. et du G.R.P. à Phnom Penh furent mis à sac.
Le 14 Mars, Sihanouk condamna le Gouvernement Lon Nol en collusion avec le C.I.A.
Le 15 Mars, des pourparlers furent engagés entre le gouvernement Lon Nol et les diplomates communistes pour obtenir l'évacuation de ces troupes.
Le 16 Mars, les communistes n'y donnérent pas suite et passérent à l'attaque.
Le 18 Mars, destitution légale de Sihanouk de sa fonction de Chef d'Etat.
Le 23 Avril, les communistes occupérent Saang (environ 30 KM de Phnom Penh).
Le 30 Avril, l'intervention des troupes américaines et sud-vietnamiennes.
Le 21 Juin, le retrait des troupes américaines.
24. Vingt-trois pays ont reconnu le G.R.U.N.K.: la République Populaire de Chine, la République populaire de corée, la Republique de Cuba, la République Populaire d'Albanie, le gouvernement révolutionnaire provisoire du Sud-Vietnam (G.R.P.), la République démocratique du Vietnam, la République socialiste de Roumanie, la République arabe syrienne, la République socialiste fédérative de Yougoslavie, la République d'Irak, le Neo Lao Haksat (Front Patriotique Lao), la République populaire du Congo, la République algérienne démocratique et populaire, la République démocratique du Soudan, la République arabe lybienne, la République populaire du Sud-Yémen, la République islamique de Mauritanie, la République arabe unie, la République de Guinée, la République unie de Tanzanie, la République arabe du Yémen, la République centraficaine et la République démocratique de Somalie.
G.R.U.N.K. (Gouvernement royal d'union nationale du Kampuchéa) fut constitué le 5 Mai 1970 à l'issue du premier congrés du F.U.N.K. (Voir: Dossier Sihanouk, pp. 44-45).
Il est composé de 12 membres:
Penn Nouth: President des Ministres (réside à Pékin);
Chau Séng: Ministre chargé des missions spéciales (il réside principalement à Paris);
Sarin Chhak: Ministre des Affaires Etrangéres (voyage au Moyen-Orient et réside au Caire);
Chan Youran: Ministre de l'Education populaire et Jeunesse (il voyage en Afrique noire et réside aux environ de Paris);
Ngo Hou: Ministre de la Santé, des affaires religieuses et sociales (installé a Paris depuis décembre 1970);
Thioun Mom: Ministre de l'Economie et des Finances (a suivi Sihanouk à Pékin);
Khiev Samphan (?): Ministre de la Défense nationale (s'il est vivant);
Duong Sam Ol: Ministre de l'Equipement militaire et armement;
Hu Nim (?): Ministre de l'Information-Propagande;
Hou Yuon (?): Ministre de l'Intérieur et des réformes communales;
Chéa San: Ministre de la Justice et des réformes judiciaires (réside à Moscou);
Hout Sambath: Ministre des Travaux publics, des Télécommunications et de la Reconstruction actuellement ambassador à Belgrade);
Sur 12 membres de ce gouvernement officiellement installé à Pékin, trois seulement résident dans la capitale chinoise.

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P. N. Penh is a well-informed Cambodian intellectual.

# Abstract / Résumé

L'évaluation correcte de l'influence de Phan Boi Chau et de Phan Chu Trinh, fameux patriotes pré-marxistes de l'époque coloniale, pose un problème complexe pour les historiens marxistes du Nord Vietnam occupés à une révision marxiste de l'histoire vietnamienne.

Chau et Trinh font figures de héros nationalistes malgré la différence de leur approche quant au moyen de libérer leur pays.

Chau, déterminé à détruire le pouvoir français, voulait utiliser toute force potentielle à cet effet, y compris l'utilisation d'éléments partiels de la monarchie féodale; Chau était diaposé à parvenir à ce but par la force des armes.

Trinh, au contraire, voyait dans le systéme féodale l'obstacle principal à une indépendance véritable. En conséquence, Trinh était favorable à une co-opération avec la France si celle-ci était prête à sincèrement participer à cette libération du pays.

Pour un Marxiste-Léniniste, cette différence d'approche a grande signification. Selon la théorie léniniste de colonialisme et d'impérialisme, l'influence de patriotes non-marxistes peut devenir un facteur positif dans l'établissement de la révolution sociale dans un pays opprimé. Mais à ce moment-là, le mouvement nationaliste se doit de reconnâitre les impérialistes comme l'adversaire essentiel. Avec la destruction de l'autorité impériale, l'élimination des élites locales et des institutions féodales, alors considérées d'ordre secondaire, se produit d'ellemême, inévitablement.

Selon ce principe léniniste, les historiens marxistes vietnamiens aboutissent à la conclusion que Chau est plus patriotique que Trinh. Tandis qu'ils se rendent compte de ses vues limitées tant au point de vue organisation qu'au point de vue idéologie, ils attrubuent à son zèle patriotique et à sa croyance en une lutte armée contre les impérialistes, ce caractère positif révolutionnaire. D'un autre côté, ces mêmes historiens voient en Trinh un patriote qui a mal évalué le vrai ennemi.

Tandis que l'activisme révolutionnaire de Chau finalement conduit à la guerre vietminh de libération, le réformisme de Trinh a simplement abouti à une collaboration avec la France.

On peut donc tirer deux conclusions de l'évidence de cette étude; (1) que les historiens du Nord sont relativement libres dans leur interprétation de la période nationaliste pourvu qu'ils respectent le principe marxiste et (2) que le rôle du patriotisme demeure un élément vital dans la lutte pour l'indépendence.

# Hanoi Scrutinizes the Past: *The Marxist Evaluation of Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh*

**William J. Duiker**

OUTSIDE OF HO CHI MINH, there are few Vietnamese better known to their countrymen than Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh. It is, indeed, often difficult to think of one without simultaneously thinking of the other, for their lives often seem inextricably intertwined. Not only were the two contemporaries, friends, and two of the most prominent political figures of their day, they symbolized, each in his own way, the two divergent approaches to the salvation of Vietnam under French rule. Phan Boi Chau, activist and revolutionary, represented and led that element in the Vietnamese nationalist movement determined to evict the colonial authority by force, to seize power and restore Vietnamese independence by armed struggle. Phan Chu Trinh, theorist and moderate reformer, symbolized that faction which desired the creation of a modern and independent state of Vietnam, but saw France as a progressive and civilizing force which could assist Vietnam's progress toward that end. If they disagreed over methods, they were in substantial accord on the final goal. Even in defeat, the two seemed related. In June, 1925, Phan Boi Chau was arrested and put on trial by the French in Hanoi for treason. The same year, Phan Chu Trinh returned to Vietnam after 14 years in exile in France, and within a few months had died of ill health. Chau's trial and Trinh's funeral became the scene of vast demonstrations of sympathy and mourning throughout Vietnam. Though some might admire Phan Boi Chau more for his heaven-storming ardency, and others prefer the cool rationality of Phan Chu Trinh, both have been widely revered in the years since their death as two of the great patriots of the colonial period. Books and articles written about them in South Vietnam have generally limited themselves to praise of their steadfast heroism and staunch determination, and there has been little inclination to subject their lives and works to critical examination.

This tendency toward relatively uncritical admiration has not been repeated in the north, however, where study of the two presents some knotty problems. As participants in the early stages of Vietnam's struggle for national liberation, their roles would necessarily have to be re-assessed in terms of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This attempt to

evaluate Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh in a Marxist framework will be the main topic of this paper.

There is relatively little disagreement about the major events in their lives. Phan Boi Chau was born in 1867 in Nghe An province in the crowded panhandle of North Vietnam. The son of a Confucian scholar turned village school teacher, young Chau grew up in poor surroundings, but was given the benefit of a classical education. By the time he had reached early maturity, Phan Boi Chau had passed the traditional civil service examination obstacles, and seemed destined for a career as a public official in the imperial bureaucracy at Hue, the puppet Vietnamese government of the French protectorate of Annam.[1]

But Chau had grown to manhood with a fierce sense of resentment at the French conquest of Vietnam and chose, instead, to enlist his efforts in overthrowing the colonial government and restoring to Vietnam control over its own destiny. In the early years of the 20th century, he began to make contact with a number of groups throughout Vietnam anxious to initiate resistance against French control-remnants of the old *Can Vuong* guerrilla groups of Phan Dinh Phung which had been crushed by French military units in the 1890s; the "pirate of Yen The", Hoang Hoa Tham, who had built a mountain redoubt in the hilly region of North Vietnam and resisted sporadic French attempts to bring him under control; scholar-gentry elements attached to the court and throughout Vietnam disturbed at conditions in society and willing to use force to attempt to remedy them. By 1904, Phan Boi Chau had managed to weld together a number of these disparate elements into a secret revolutionary organization, the *Duy Tan Hoi* (Modernization Society).

Phan Boi Chau was not primarily an ideologue, but an active revolutionary, and his plans for the liberation of his country were not complex. In general, his aims can be summarized as follows:

(1) Reliance on all elements in Vietnam (including patriotic elements at the court) opposed to the continued presence of the French in Vietnam.

(2) Internal self-strengthening by raising the moral, technological, and intellectual level of the population. Chau had been gradually exposed to Western learning and had become a convert to the wonders of democracy and science. He took as his model the Meiji reforms in Japan, where internal modernization had effectively transformed Japan into a modern state capable of competing successfully with the great imperialist nations of the West. The key to self-strengthening,

in Chau's view, was to instill in the Vietnamese people a heightened sense of self-confidence and national consciousness.

(3) General commitment to the establishment after independence of a modern state based on Western values. For a time, convinced that the intellectual level of the masses was too low for democracy, he felt that a transitional period of constitutional monarchy along Japanese lines was necessary. By 1912, however, he had been persuaded (mainly by Sun-Yat-sen) that a republic was the best solution.

(4) Educational efforts could only be partially effective, since the French authorities had shown a hostile attitude toward any measure designed to improve the educational level of the Vietnamese. Therefore internal self-strengthening had to be combined with intensified attacks on the French centers of power in Vietnam, in the belief that only armed struggle could finally oust the colonial regime.

(5) Reliance, if necessary, on foreign aid, to provide weapons and diplomatic support.

Phan Boi Chau's efforts, continued over a period of two decades, had little success. Weak in organization and discipline, primitive in propaganda techniques, divided by regional and ideological differences, hounded by effective French security measures, the movement attracted considerable covert sympathy but little active support, and made virtually no headway in its goal of evicting the French. Chau made strenuous efforts to train a hard core of dedicated revolutionaries, and a number of students were sent to Japan to study, but little effort was made to reach the peasantry, and the movement failed to establish deep roots among the mass of the population in rural areas. Military efforts were sporadic and often romantically unrealistic: ill-conceived attacks on Sino-Vietnamese border posts, isolated assassinations of public officials, attempted poisoning or subversion of French military units. Even in turning abroad for assistance, the *Duy Tan Hoi* had little success. Japan, after initially toying with the idea of becoming big brother to the oppressed Asians under colonial control, eventually abandoned the idea and evicted the Vietnamese exiles who had established their headquarters in Japan. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary *T'ung-meng-hui* was liberal in promises but gave little real assistance. During the First World War, the group even hoped for German support, with little result.

After World War I, his enthusiasm somewhat dimmed by continual failure, his revolutionary group in a state of disintegration, Phan Boi Chau's resolve weakened and he toyed briefly with the possibility of conciliation with the French.[2] French conditions for a settlement,

however, amounted virtually to surrender, and Chau later repudiated his brief gesture of friendship. In 1925, an ageing revolutionary, abandoned by many of the radical youth now returning to Marxism, already a voice out of the past, he was arrested by French authorities and placed for the last 15 years of his life in house arrest in Hue. Though his luster had dimmed and his party had virtually collapsed, his name still evoked admiration and respect. Later revolutionary groups would scorn his primitive methods, but held up his career as a symbol of the highest devotion to country.

Up to a point, Phan Chu Trinh's background is strikingly similar to that of Phan Boi Chau. Born in 1872, son of a lower-level military officer in Quang Nam province in Central Vietnam, Trinh, like Chau, received a traditional Confucian education and passed the civil service exams with honors, becoming an official in the imperial bureaucracy at Hue.[3] But Trinh too had begun to read Western works in translation, as well as the writings of the modernists in China. Disgusted with the sad state of Vietnam, which he ascribed to the corruption of the imperial officials and the general ignorance and lethargy of the people, he resigned his position in 1905 and returned home to study and think. For a period he traveled around the country, making contact with factions opposed to the French presence. Then in 1906 he went to Japan to consult with Phan Boi Chau and acquaint himself with the situation abroad. As this point, the essential differences between the two began to become clarified. In long conversations, Trinh indicated his fundamental disagreement with Chau's determination to drive the French out by military force, and with the latter's willingness to utilize the traditional monarchy as an ally. Though sharing Chau's discontent with conditions at home, Trinh contended that the root of the problem was the effete Nguyen dynasty and Vietnam's own outworn customs. France, in his view, was an advanced civilization and could be a progressive force in assisting Vietnamese reformers in destroying the vestiges of the feudal system. Only when Vietnam had become a modern society could reformers think about obtaining complete independence from its colonial master. Violence was death. Reliance on foreign aid was an illusion. Despite their intellectual disagreement, the two got along well personally, and on parting, Trinh expressed the hope that Phan Boi Chau would devote himself to writing propaganda tracts and persuading young Vietnamese to go abroad to study, while Trinh would strive for reforms at home.[4]

On his return to Vietnam, Phan Chu Trinh immediately addressed a public letter to the French Governor-General Paul Beau, in which he indicated the approach that was to characterize his reformist ideas for the remainder of his life: he was critical of French policy in

Indochina for its high taxes, its state monopoly of opium, salt, and alcohol, its failure to institute needed reforms in society; he expressed his concern that the French seemed to despise the Vietnamese and treat them like cattle rather than human beings; most specifically, however, he criticized the French for supporting the corrupt imperial regime in Hue. In effect, Trinh was not asking the French to leave, but to live up to their obligation as protectors, and get on with the job of modernization.

In 1908, Trinh was arrested in Central Vietnam by the Hue regime on a charge of sedition. Eventually transferred to French control he was sent to Poulo Condore island, despite the efforts of some elements in France to help him.[5] Efforts to free him were eventually successful and he was permitted to live in France in 1911. He lived in Europe for 14 years, supporting himself as a photo-retoucher and occasionally expressing himself on the state of affairs in Indochina.[6] Finally permitted to return to Vietnam in 1925, he showed that his views had changed little over the years. In two famous talks given in Saigon, he advocated cooperation between France and Vietnam. The Vietnamese, he said, should be willing to learn from the French, whose culture in many ways was superior to that of Asia. At the same time, the French should live up to their stated ideals of the "mission civilisatrice" and cease mistreating the Vietnamese. He continued to oppose revolution, maintaining that French control and Vietnamese patriotism were not incompatible, and for the Vietnam of the future he advocated a modern state based on Western concepts of justice and democracy, supplemented by a revival of the true humanitarian qualities of original Confucian thought[7] Trinh's health had declined while in France, however, and he died in March, 1926. His funeral was the occasion of mass mourning by many factions of Vietnamese society.[8]

Within a few short months the two old patriots had disappeared from the political scene. Their methods were radically different but their ends were similar. Neither had succeeded, but both had touched the heart of Vietnam and awakened a new sense of national consciousness.

## THE MARXIST EVALUATION OF MODERN VIETNAMESE HISTORY

Historians in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), involved in the process of establishing a Marxist periodization of the history of Vietnam, have, of course, been strongly influenced by Lenin's theory of colonialism and imperialism. According to Lenin's formulation, the European conquest brought Western concepts and practices to the nations of Southeast Asia, but the colonial governments delib-

erately preserved the old feudal system in order to facilitate their goal of economic exploitation. The growth of a native capitalist class, which might otherwise have occurred, was hindered by colonial determination to transform Southeast Asia into a market for Western manufactured goods. In such circumstances, the weak bourgeois class cannot play its historic leading role in the overthrow of the feudal system.

In these conditions, resistance to colonial control in a country like Vietnam would have to comprise a variety of classes in society opposed to foreign rule. The earliest anti-French activity, such as the *Can Vuong* movement, was led by patriotic elements from the feudal scholar-gentry class. Ultimately, shoots of capitalism would appear in the first quarter of the 20th century, bringing new demands for reform along Western democratic lines, but the local bourgeoisie was too weak by itself to lead the resistance movement, and would be joined by other anti-imperialist elements, the peasantry and the tiny proletariat (Lenin's four class alliance), as well as some patriotic feudal intellectuals.

Such was the situation when Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh began their active lives. Both were evidently the product of feudal society, but at the same time were influenced by Western democratic capitalist ideals. They were therefore able to transcend their class limitations and provide leadership for the nationalist movement at an important stage of its development. A key to the success of the liberation struggle, in a Marxist framework, lies in correctly determining the main adversary for the resistance movement. In a colonial country such as Vietnam, the progressive forces were faced with two adversaries, each of which was reliant on the other for support—the internal feudal system led by the monarchy at Hue, and the imperialist colonial authority. In such circumstances, where the feudal elements are subordinate to the colonial government, the latter is clearly the main adversary. In tactical terms, this meant that the nationalist movement in Vietnam should concentrate its efforts on overthrowing French colonial authority. The imperial government was of secondary importance and its control would inevitably disintegrate on the destruction of French rule.

Armed with the Marxist historical dialectic and Lenin's application of it to Asia, historians in North Vietnam began to analyze all aspects of the colonial period in Vietnam including, for our purposes, the roles of the two great patriots, Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh, in forwarding the victory of socialism in Vietnam.

PHAN BOI CHAU, PATRIOT AND REVOLUTIONARY

The first serious works on Phan Boi Chau from a Marxist point of view were two biographies written by the historian Ton Quang Phiet and a volume of his works edited and with an introduction by Dang Thai Mai.[9] These first assessments of Phan Boi Chau given in North Vietnam set the tone for all later work on the Vietnamese revolutionary. Phan Boi Chau's limitations as a revolutionary leader were openly admitted and analyzed: his understanding of the role of the masses was primitive, he had little sense of organization, he failed to see the importance of ideology and seemed to rely almost entirely on a simple form of patriotism. His motives were democratic but his instincts were still Confucian. He vacillated, from revolutionary romanticism to conciliation, from monarchism to republicanism, and failed to develop a consistent point of view.[10]

But with these limitations noted, both writers emphasized the positive aspects of Phan Boi Chau's career: he was an intensely patriotic man, and his determination to free Vietnam provided a focus for all the formless national sentiment beginning to arise in Vietnam in the early years of the century. Phan Boi Chau was a member of the feudal class, but was sufficiently conscious of new trends to absorb the progressive thought of the capitalist West, and injected it into the patriotic movement. In that sense, Phan Boi Chau formed the necessary link between the traditionalist *Can Vuong* movement and the New Democratic revolutionary struggle to come. Most important, Phan Boi Chau correctly recognized the error of relying on the French to assist the Vietnamese in the process of social change. Chau considered the French as hostile to the modernization of Vietnam and openly declared that the French presence would have to be eliminated as a first step.

By the early 1960s, more intensive work on the life and works of Phan Boi Chau was initiated under the auspices of Hanoi's historical journal, *Nghien Cuu Lich Su* (Historical Research). *Nghien Cuu Lich Su* sponsored a series of articles by scholars interested in the career of Phan Boi Chau, as a result of which a fairly clear position of his place in Marxist history has been established.

Contributors to *Nghien Cuu Lich Su* have generally followed the lead of Ton Quang Phiet and Dang Thai Mai. Phan Boi Chau is given credit for being Vietnam's first modern nationalist. Considerable stress is placed on his intense love of Vietnam, his call for "100,000 nameless heroes" to defend the sacred cause of the nation.[11] There is an almost excessive emphasis on his patriotism, and it is apparent that

historians are straining to hold him up as a model for imitation in contemporary North Vietnam. Phan Boi Chau's brief foray into pacifism and conciliation, which non-Marxists used to emphasize, is generally forgiven now as a "temporary aberration". The general consensus follows Tran Huy Lieu in maintaining that Chau was "clumsy and naive" about politics, and that he was seduced by the blandishments of governor-general Sarraut, who had promised basic changes in French policy.[12] All articles quote later writings to prove that he later regretted his action.

A few writers have gone so far as to claim that Phan Boi Chau was moving toward Marxism in the waning years of his life. In 1920, Chau had become acquainted casually with two members of the Soviet delegation in Peking and, according to his own autobiography, expressed an interest in sending young Vietnamese to the Soviet Union to study.[13] Although nothing came of these initial overtures, he later showed at least a superficial understanding of Marxist terminology in a eulogy he wrote for Pham Hong Thai, a young Vietnamese who had died attempting to assassinate a high French official in Canton in 1924. In *Truyen Pham Hong Thai* Chau expressed the conviction that Vietnam needed a social as well as a political revolution, and that no revolution could succeed without an active role by the "lower classes", the proletariat, and the peasantry. The fire of revolution, he concluded, would "burn up the palace of imperialism".[14] Some Marxist scholars suggested that he had grasped the meaning of socialism and was only prevented from further development by his arrest in 1925.[15] The general consensus, however, is that Phan Boi Chau's understanding of socialism was primitive, and that he did not progress beyond the stage of bourgeois thought.[16] Tran Huy Lieu, who had visited Phan Boi Chau in Hue in the 1930's, states explicitly that Chau's socialism was strictly of the utopian variety: a book Chau was writing on socialism stressed that China had invented the concept 3000 years ago.

In sum, the *Nghien Cuu Lich Su* series established Chau as a great builder of national unity, the first Vietnamese consciously to espouse the concept of nationalism, and a model for emulation by young Vietnamese anxious to serve the national cause. His limitations are freely admitted, but in his recognition of the need for modernization, and his reliance on armed struggle to defeat the French aggressors, he is seen as a worthy revolutionary precursor to the communist movement led by Ho Chi Minh.[17]

PHAN CHU TRINH, PUPPET OR PATRIOT

Until recently, relatively little work has been done on Phan Chu Trinh in the DRV. The only attempt of note to analyze Trinh and his role in the liberation struggle was Ton Quang Phiet's already cited *Phan Boi Chau va Phan Chu Trinh*. Even recent work on Trinh in the north has relied frequently on a biography published in the south, The Nguyen's *Phan Chu Trinh*. Ton Quang Phiet's verdict on Phan Chu Trinh was a relatively negative one. By concentrating his ire on the feudal regime and viewing the French as a civilizing force, Trinh completely misinterpreted the situation in colonial Vietnam. Unlike Phan Boi Chau who had correctly observed that French authority had to be defeated before feudalism itself could be overthrown, Trinh had mistakenly seen France as a potential ally in Vietnam's struggle for modernization. Phiet conceded that Trinh was a sincere patriot and not simply out for his own interests; he admitted that it took courage to oppose the French in 1906 in his public letter to Beau; but in Phiet's view, Trinh's rejection of armed struggle and his advocacy of peaceful reformism was not only a misreading of reality, it was actually harmful, since it diminished Vietnamese determination to resist imperialism.[18] In the author's view, Phan Chu Trinh, by falling into the error of listening to the siren song of Western bourgeois liberalism, was distinctly not a model to follow.

By the mid-1960s, *Nghien Cuu Lich Su* was ready to attempt a more intensive analysis of Trinh's role in the national struggle. In reading the series launched in 1964, it becomes apparent that many DRV historians are attempting to carve out a more positive niche for Phan Chu Trinh in the modern history of Vietnam. There was a general chorus of criticism for his manifest weaknesses: his reliance on France was totally misguided, and he failed to see that the so-called "democracy" and "high culture" of the West was a sham and a delusion; his characterization of violent revolution as the road to death was a snare for the unwary, and posed a danger to the diligence of patriots to free their nation. His underestimation and even contempt for the masses was ill-befitting a national leader. Some even pointed out that his devotions to the ideals of democracy and republicanism was misleading, citing comments he made in 1925 to the effect that in some cases, such as Japan under the Meiji and modern Thailand, constitutional monarchy is an effective instrument for progress.[19]

Yet with all his weaknesses, most of the writers appeared anxious to stress his positive role in forwarding the liberation struggle: by

his call on the French in 1906 to reform he was, at least briefly, the leader of the progressive movement; by his support of the Free School of Tongking (the *Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc*) he furthered the introduction of Western democratic capitalist thought to Vietnam. He surpassed Phan Boi Chau in his recognition that reliance on foreign aid was a mistake. Some have even gone so far as to maintain that he was at least implicitly anti-imperialist.[20] Most important, his devotion to the cause of Vietnam was unquestioned by all.

As a result of the NCLS incursion into his life, it seems clear that Trinh's image as a national figure has been somewhat rehabilitated. Though his shortcomings are obvious, his anti-imperialism debilitated, his anti-feudalism disorganized, he is now seen as a "patriotic reformer", as opposed to the "puppet reformism" of such bourgeois and semi-feudal thinkers as Bui Quang Chieu and Pham Quynh, whose own activities are seen as directed only toward the profit of the capitalist class, and in no sense patriotic.[21]

One final note is of interest. Both figures came from the feudal class, and DRV historians, tied to the economic determinism of Karl Marx, are somewhat at a loss to explain the differences between the two. Two reasons are usually given for this discrepancy: (1) although both came from a feudal background, Phan Boi Chau's father was a poor village scholar of profoundly anti-French sympathies. Trinh's father was a small military official, and though he served with the *Can Vuong* he was eventually executed by them on suspicion of treason. Quite possibly, it is held, his father's death affected young Trinh's attitude toward violent struggle. (2) Chau came from Nghe An province, traditional seat of revolutionaries and hotbed of anti-French feeling in the late 19th century. All accounts of his life show that he developed a strong anti-French feeling even as a youth. Trinh grew up in Quang Nam province where rebellious elements were weak and easily put down. In addition, capitalism developed early in Quang Nam, a fact which explains Trinh's early conversion to capitalist democratic thought.[22]

## CONCLUSIONS

More work is evidently being done on both these major figures in Vietnamese history, but the general outlines, at least for the time being, have been made clear. Both Chau and Trinh, patriotic feudal intellectuals, have now been given credit for helping to obtain Vietnamese independence from colonial control. Chau is seen as the more important and positive figure—whereas his commitment to armed struggle led ultimately to the formation of the Communist Party (in-

deed, many of his group eventually joined Ho's Revolutionary Youth League), Trinh's reformism was a blind alley, and led ultimately only to the fake reformism of such "running dogs of imperialism" as Pham Quynh and Bui Quang Chieu.

Two tentative impressions emerge from a reading of the various materials from Hanoi on the period:

(1) there seem to be relatively few rigid guidelines limiting the freedom of researchers to draw their own conclusions. Historians are expected to work within the general confines of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, of course, and there is no attempt to formulate an alternative theory of history. But within these obvious limits, the researcher seems somewhat free to draw his own conclusions about the positive or negative role of individual personalities or events. If *Nghien Cuu Lich Su* has imposed a party line regarding the eventual place of Chau and Trinh in history, it is not evident to this reader.

(2) a vital importance has been placed on the role of patriotism in the national liberation struggle. Neither Phan Boi Chau nor Phan Chu Trinh were particularly progressive thinkers by Marxist standards. Certainly neither, even at the end of their lives, had more than a superficial understanding of Marxist concepts of class struggle, the historical dialectic, or Lenin's four-class alliance. Yet both are being held up by the regime today as striking examples of the highest form of patriotism. The attention given to them in Hanoi's historical journals far surpasses that given to any communist figures, with the obvious exception of Ho Chi Minh himself. Whatever the Maoists in China may be doing to their own history, and to the memory of such pre-Marxist figures as Liang Ch'i-ch'-ao and Sun Yat-sen, the Vietnamese have clearly turned to history as a means of stimulating the elemental force of nationalism in North Vietnam today.

1. The main source for Chau's life is his autobiography *Phan Boi Chau Nien Bieu* (A Chronological Biography of Phan Boi Chau) (Hanoi, 1957). Information on his career in English is located in Joseph Buttinger's *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, Two Volumes (New York: Praeger, 1967), *passim*.

2. This is one area of substantial disagreement between Marxists and some non-Marxists. Pro-French writers often cite this period as proof that Chau eventually abandoned his revolutionary stance. For a Marxist riposte, see Tran Huy Lieu, "Phan Boi Chau, tieu bieu cho nhung cuoc van dong yeu nuoc o Viet-Nam dau the ky XX" (Phan Boi Chau, the model for all patriotic movements in Vietnam in the early 20th century), NCLS (105) December, 1967, p. 6.

3. Primary sources for Trinh's life are The Nguyen, *Phan Chu Trinh* (Saigon: Tan Viet, 1956) and Ton Quang Phiet, *Phan Boi Chau va Phan Chu Trinh* (Hanoi: Van Su Dia, 1956).

4. These talks are given in some detail in *Nien Bieu*, p. 72.

5. Some Frenchmen thought that Trinh's moderation could be profitably used to siphon off sentiment for Chau's revolutionary group. For example, see Ton Quang Phiet, "Phan Chu Trinh: Tu cach con nguoi va chu truong chinh tri" (Phan Chu Trinh: His character and his political program), NCLS (70) January, 1965, p. 16.

6. Most famous was his open letter to Emperor Khai Dinh during the latter's visit to Paris in 1922. A Vietnamese version is located in NCLS (67) October, 1964, pp. 15-21.
7. The talks are in *Ibid.*
8. See Buttinger, *op. cit.*, p. 557, for details.
9. Ton Quang Phiet, *Phan Boi Chau va Phan Chu Trinh* (Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh) (Hanoi, 1956); Ton Quang Phiet, *Phan Boi Chau va Mot Giai Doan Lich Su Chong Phap cua Nhan Dan Viet-Nam* (Phan Boi Chau and A Stage in the Anti-French History of the Vietnamese People) (Hanoi, 1958); Dang Thai Mai, *Van Tho Phan Boi Chau* (The Essays and Poems of Phan Boi Chau) (Hanoi, 1960).
10. Ton Quang Phiet, *Phan Boi Chau va Phan Chu Trinh*, pp. 43, 61; Dang Thai Mai, p. 12.
11. Tran Huy Lieu; Nguyen duc Su, "Chu nghia yeu nuoc cua Phan Boi Chau" (The Patriotism of Phan Boi Chau), NCLS (83) February, 1966, pp. 34-35.
12. Tran Huy Lieu; Chuong Thau, "Phan Boi Chau qua mot so sach bao mien Nam hien nay" (Phan Boi Chau in articles and books in contemporary South Vietnam), NCLS (67), October, 1964, pp. 14-15.
13. *Nien Bieu*, p. 189.
14. Excerpts can be found in Tran Huy Lieu, p. 2.
15. Chuong Thau, "Anh huong cua Phan Boi Chau doi voi mot so to chuc cach mang Trung-Quoc" (Phan Boi Chau's influence on Chinese revolutionary organizations), NCLS (56) November, 1963, pp. 32-39.
16. See, for example, Tran Huy Lieu; Huong Pho, "Gop phan danh gia tu tuong cua Phan Boi Chau" (A contribution to the evaluation of the thought of Phan Boi Chau), NCLS (94) December, 1967, pp. 26-27.
17. New work is underway, including at least one full-length monograph, but evidently no change in interpretation has taken place.
18. Ton Quang Phiet, *Phan Boi Chau va Phan Chu Trinh*, pp. 114-115.
19. These comments are located in "Quan tri chu nghia va dan tri chu nghia" (Monarchism and Democracy), NCLS (67) October, 1964.
20. To Minh Trung, "Chu nghia cai luong Phan Chu Trinh" (The reformism of Phan Chu Trinh), NCLS (67) October, 1964, pp. 29-38. There is much sterile argumentation throughout all the articles over whether Trinh was a representative of feudal intellectual thought or the rising capitalist class. For example, see To Minh Trung, *ibid.*
21. Duy Minh, "Danh Gia Phan Chu Trinh" (An Estimation of Phan Chu Trinh), NCLS (69) December, 1964, p. 16.
22. Ton Quang Phiet, *Phan Boi Chau va Phan Chu Trinh*, pp. 39, 67; To Minh Trung, pp. 30-31; one writer wearied of looking for causes and said it was just a difference of personality. See Van Tao, "Ket thuc cuoc thao luan ve Phan Chu Trinh" (An end to the discussions on Phan Chu Trinh), NCLS (76) July, 1965, p. 18. Van Tao's article was written on behalf of the editorial board of NCLS and predictably ended the series on a middle note.

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# Abstract / Résumé

Cet article comprend une discussion sur les données démographiques contenues dans l'annuaire statistique du Vietnam qui se propose d'évaluer les tendances récentes et la situation actuelle de l'éducation au Vietnam du Sud. L'accent y est mis sur l'accroissement du nombre d'élèves fréquentant les écoles, sur la proportion croissante du nombre de filles scolarisées et de la proportion de la population d'âge scolaire en général. Ces indices indiquent une tendance progressive mais significative à fournir une éducation à la portée de tous les jeunes atteignant le niveau d'âge scolaire élémentaire. Des problèmes importants persistent dans les domaines du recrutement et du maintien des enseignants, problèmes découlant de la concurrence que présentent l'industrie locale et les débouchés offerts par les Américains, du terrorisme Viet Cong continu ainsi que de la diminution sensible de la considération dont jouissait le poste d'enseignant au profit d'autres professions. Les problèmes majerus du système éducationnel non encore résolus sont les suivants:

(1) déterminer la proportion adéquate des ressources disponibles devant être consacrées au développement de l'éducation;

(2) l'accès difficile à l'enseignement secondaire et supérieur pour un grand nombre d'étudiants dont les aspirations se sont accrues ces dernières années et,

(3) la question peu considérée quant à savoir comment intégrer les jeunes diplomés dans l'économie vietnamienne.

# Education as an Aspect of Development: South Vietnam

DAVID C. EATON

## I

### Introduction

EDUCATION IS WIDELY ACKNOWLEDGED as a prime aspect of development in countries of rapid social change. In the process of contact with the Western world, one of the earliest indications of the effect of social change on individuals is growing aspirations for educational opportunities for children and youth. Political leaders in developing nations have set the prospect for educational opportunities as a key plank in their attempt to gain widespread acceptance and popularity.[1]

The extent to which education can become a keystone of positive social change within a society depends on a wide variety of factors. There are significant possibilities that education may detract from rather than contribute to the overall change process to the extent that educational requirements become "out of phase" with remaining aspects of change. When the demands for educational facilities must compete with economic development, health and welfare, development of local governmental leadership for severely limited resources, it is not unlikely that one or more will come out on the short end. Further, the extent to which educational advantages offered are received and used by the citizens of a developing nation depend strongly on previous exposure to education and particularly the extent to which formal education may be viewed as an extension of colonialism. Finally, the expectations which parents have regarding the ability of formal education to raise the level of living, and the ability of a country to absorb graduates profitably into the economy are key factors limiting the use of "education" as an immediate "cure-all" for the problems accompanying national development.

A basic concern in the United States regarding the Vietnam confrontation has been about the ability of the Vietnamese to achieve a level of political stability, economic independence and military security to meet the continuing demands of social change and national development. Even among those who have supported the involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam, there have been serious questions regarding the ability of the nation to effectively deal with its own internal prob-

lems apart from military security. Assuming such inability, it seemed clear that further expenditure of personnel and financial resources was of dubious utility. In the months following the 1968 Tet offensive, there were a number of attempts on the part of Civilian Organization for Rural Development Service (CORDS) as well as what is the military side of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) to evaluate various components which affect the probability of South Vietnam meeting the challenge of internal security and development. One area which has received substantial emphasis is that of education with a significant portion of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) budget in South Vietnam being allocated for education.[2]

This paper seeks to deal with a few aspects of the educational situation in South Vietnam and the possible consequences associated with existing conditions. (1) Basic Elements of the Role of Education in South Vietnam, (2) A brief section deals with basic elements of the role of education in South Vietnam, and is followed by more specific aspects of contemporary educational patterns to indicate patterns of change where data are available.[3] Particular attention is given to (1) School enrollment, (2) Elementary and Secondary School Teachers, (3) Private Schools, (4) Higher Education, (5) Students studying abroad, and (6) The role of University Students in Vietnamese Society. Finally, a brief section seeks to draw some evaluative conclusions regarding the prospects for the contribution of education in the overall change process and national development.

## II

### Basic Elements of the Role of Education in South Vietnam[4]

Throughout Vietnamese history there has been a traditional respect for the educated within society. The content of the traditional education was Oriental philosophy and classical literature. The colonization by France undermined the traditional content of education and replaced it with a Western orientation that included scientific methodology and emphasis on history, science, and law. In the place of Oriental philosophy and literature, the contributions of European writers was emphasized. Instead of focusing on the education of a literate minority, new efforts were made to educate the total population.

Vietnam has worked as vigorously as the security situation would permit to expand its educational system during the past decade. Between 1955 and 1965 the number of elementary school pupils more than tripled, and the number of secondary school students doubled.

The lack of facilities still presents serious problems on all school levels. The enforcement of law prescribing compulsory and free education for children between 6 and 11 years of age is dependent upon the completion of more than 10,000 additional elementary school classrooms. The massive financial assistance of USAID in the educational sphere has been primarily directed at reducing this deficit in elementary education.

The major problem affecting true educational up-grading of Vietnam remains at the secondary school level and higher. Not only is there a shortage of classroom facilities, but many families are unable to pay the required amounts for tuition and books. As a consequence the number of children of secondary school age who are in school constitutes only about 10 percent of the total in that age group.

There is an acute shortage of teachers at all school levels. The large-scale departure of French academic personnel after 1954 left a serious gap in instructional personnel which has not yet been filled. At the present time there are more classrooms than there are teachers to fill them. Of the teachers presently filling teaching positions, a majority are not properly trained and many have no more than an elementary education themselves. Of those persons who have the qualifications to teach school, a significant proportion have taken higher paying, more prestigious jobs with American employers as clerks, due to the low salaries and status currently associated with public school teaching. Taken together, the lack of facilities and the lack of properly trained Vietnamese teachers seriously threaten to undermine educational standards. Yet the development of the nation depends heavily upon developing the intellectual resources of the country.

The deterioration of security throughout the country as a result of military operations, has led to a serious decline in school attendance. Viet Cong terrorists have systematically burned down school buildings, particularly in rural areas, and have kidnapped, killed, or threatened hundreds of teachers. As a consequence, the number of school dropouts has soared, and teachers refuse to accept teaching posts in insecure areas.

The aims of education are closely linked with national goals. The curriculum, although still patterned somewhat after the French system, has taken on distinctive Vietnamese identity. Increased emphasis has been placed on teaching Vietnamese language and literature, and teachers are encouraged to teach their students traditional Vietnamese values and to work for Vietnamese unity. The content of the curriculum and even the availability of curriculum materials in many locations remains a serious problem.

Educational policies in recent years reflect official concern regard-

ing the nation's lack of a trained elite to provide necessary qualified administrators and technical specialists for national development. Systematic efforts have been made to give the bulk of the school-age population at least an elementary education, and to raise literacy levels among the adult population, and to expand the ranks of skilled industrial workers. It is the present goal of the Ministry of Education to expand universal free education to cover at least 4 years of secondary schooling. Another aspect of educational reform is to make education more "practical" by replacing the largely academic college-preparatory secondary curriculum with a differentiated program which will be adapted to the needs of particular regions within the nation.[5]

STUDENTS IN SCHOOL

Data obtained from the Ministry of Culture Education and Youth for the period 1955 to 1967 are shown in Table 1. The total school population increased from slightly over half a million in 1955-56 by over one and a half million to a total of 2,315,594 students enrolled in school in the 1966-67 school year. The rate of growth by year ranges from a low of 1.4 per cent in the 1964-65 year to a high of 30.6 per cent increase in the 1957-58 year followed by a 21.4 per cent increase in the following year. The average rate of increase in total school population for the eleven year period studied was 12.1 per cent.

As shown in the table, there was a steady decrease over the 11 years in the proportion of the total school population enrolled in kindergarten, primary and secondary schools. This means that a greater proportion were enrolled in higher education, technical, artistic, and professional schools over the same period. The most dramatic increases were for the "higher education" category with an increase from only 0.3 per cent of the total school population to 1.4 per cent of the total school population. Enrollment in technical, artistical, and professional schools constituted 0.6 per cent of the school population in the 1955-56 school year and by 1966-67 had risen to 0.8 per cent of the school population.

Traditionally education has been a perogative of males in Vietnamese society. While there is still a preponderance of males at all levels of education in Vietnam, there has been an increasing proportion of females. The most dramatic changes in sex ratio have been experienced in higher education where in the 1955-56 school year there were almost six men for every woman student (Sex ratio = 587.5) and by the 1966-67 school year there was one woman student

## Table 1

DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOL POPULATION, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM BY LEVEL OF SCHOOLING SEX RATIO FOR LEVELS OF SCHOOLING, AND INCREASE BY YEAR 1955 TO 1967[6]

| School Year | Kindergarten, Primary and Secondary Education | | Higher Education | | Technical, Artistic and Professional | | Total School Population | Increase (Per Cent) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *% of Tot Sch Pop* | *Sex Ratio* | *% of Tot Sch Pop* | *Sex Ratio* | *% of Tot Sch Pop* | *Sex Ratio* | | |
| 1955–1956 | 98.9 | a | 0.3 | 587.5 | 0.6 | 190.2 | 665,104 | |
| 1956–1957 | 98.7 | a | 0.4 | 466.0 | 0.8 | 355.9 | 785,421 | 18.1 |
| 1957–1958 | 98.5 | 164.2 | 0.4 | 429.6 | 0.9 | 220.5 | 1,025,841 | 30.6 |
| 1958–1959 | 98.6 | 163.3 | 0.5 | 462.3 | 0.7 | 254.6 | 1,245,418 | 21.4 |
| 1959–1960 | 98.6 | 159.2 | 0.6 | 463.0 | 0.7 | 242.2 | 1,424,214 | 12.6 |
| 1960–1961 | 98.5 | 157.4 | 0.7 | 451.1 | 0.7 | 236.8 | 1,534,671 | 7.8 |
| 1961–1962 | 98.3 | 156.0 | 0.9 | 438.2 | 0.7 | 255.0 | 1,640,143 | 6.9 |
| 1962–1963 | 98.2 | 151.2 | 0.9 | 389.7 | 0.8 | 230.4 | 1,773,894 | 8.2 |
| 1963–1964 | 98.0 | 147.8 | 1.0 | 364.6 | 0.8 | 190.9 | 1,936,091 | 9.1 |
| 1964–1965 | 98.5 | 144.2 | 1.2 | 327.3 | 0.8 | 211.6 | 1,963,350 | 1.4 |
| 1965–1966 | 97.7 | 137.1 | 1.3 | 300.5 | 0.9 | 198.6 | 2,116,929 | 7.8 |
| 1966–1967 | 97.7 | 135.0 | 1.4 | 281.1 | 0.8 | 197.4 | 2,315,594 | 9.4 |

for every 2.8 men students (Sex ratio = 281.1). Perhaps more significant in terms of overall educational patterns is the fact that there has been a steady increase in proportion of girls enrolled in primary and secondary schools. From 1957-58, the first year when sex data were available, a sex ratio of 164 was reduced to a sex ratio of 135 by the 1966-67 school year. There is reason to believe that this tendency is probably greater in primary than secondary school, since most families are willing to experience greater financial sacrifices to send boys to secondary school than they do for girls.

While age-sex data for Vietnam as a whole have been quite unreliable for a variety of reasons, an estimate of school enrollment as a proportion of Vietnamese children in various age groups led to a

**Table 2**

ESTIMATED SCHOOL AGE POPULATION IN SCHOOL BY LEVEL OF SCHOOL 1961-62 TO 1966-67, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM[7]

| SCHOOL YEAR | LEVEL OF SCHOOL | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Primary | Junior Secondary | Senior Secondary |
| *1961–1962* | | | |
| Students in School | 1,306,559 | 173,375 | 44,802 |
| School Age Population[8] | 2,875,610 | 1,673,608 | 947,907 |
| Per cent | 45.4 | 10.4 | 4.7 |
| *1962–1963* | | | |
| Students in School | 1,393,839 | 199,027 | 54,048 |
| School Age Population | 2,832,160 | 1,647,335 | 933,585 |
| Per cent | 49.2 | 12.1 | 5.6 |
| *1963–1964* | | | |
| Students in School | 1,514,857 | 220,724 | 62,734 |
| School Age Population | 2,803,988 | 1,630,949 | 924,297 |
| Per cent | 54.0 | 13.5 | 6.8 |
| *1964–1965* | | | |
| Students in School | 1,507,626 | 250,978 | 64,970 |
| School Age Population | 2,848,826 | 1,657,029 | 939,078 |
| Per cent | 52.9 | 15.1 | 6.9 |
| *1965–1966* | | | |
| Students in School | 1,593,949 | 284,233 | 70,762 |
| School Age Population | 2,982,762 | 1,738,770 | 988,569 |
| Per cent | 53.4 | 16.3 | 7.2 |
| *1966–1967* | | | |
| Students in School | 1,785,841 | 342,299 | 87,329 |
| School Age Population | 2,998,220 | 1,743,923 | 988,323 |
| Per cent | 59.6 | 19.6 | 8.8 |

projective technique for estimating the size of primary, junior secondary and senior secondary age populations based on fairly reliable enumeration conducted in four cities of Saigon, Da Nang, Bien Hoa, and Nha Trang in 1964. (See Table 2.) Assuming some degree of reliability for at least the trends, it may be suggested that over the period 1961-62 to 1966-67 there has been an increase in the proportion of school-age children who are in school despite the difficulties encountered in obtaining teachers, facilities and other resources. In other respects the indications are consistent with those suggested above that the greatest gains have been in the area of primary ages and a significant drop off of school enrollment between primary and junior secondary school. The effect of obtaining minimum education as contrasted with inability to achieve higher levels cannot be estimated, but undoubtedly have considerable potential effect on political process and campaign promises.

### ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS

The availability of qualified Vietnamese school teachers has been a significant hindrance in upgrading the quality of education for Vietnamese youth. The number of young people desiring education as teachers has not kept pace with the growth in school population or the demand for teachers in a rapidly growing educational situation. One of the reasons for the reluctance to become a public school teacher is that teaching no longer is accompanied by the high status it conferred during the traditional period in Vietnamese history. This is an experience which is not unknown in other societies where salaries for teachers has not kept pace with rising cost of living and a rise in the general standard of living. In addition to this fact, many young people feel that if they can afford to complete secondary school and go on to higher education they would prefer to train for a professional field with greater status and salary potential.

Even among those who have acquired academic credentials for teaching an unknown but fairly significant number have opted to gain employment in alternate fields, with particular emphasis on employment with U.S. military and contracting concerns. Others have left the teaching profession because of the undesirable security situations and the threats they have received from the Viet Cong to themselves and to their families.

During the period between school year 1959-60 and 1966-67, the number of teachers in public and private schools at the primary and both secondary levels increased by 52.4 per cent, while the population of students for the same categories increased by 60.8 per cent. (Table

## Table 3

NUMBER OF TEACHERS, STUDENTS, AND STUDENT-TEACHER RATIO FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION SCHOOL YEAR 1959-60 TO 1966-67, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM[9]

| Educational Level | 1959–60 | 1960–61 | 1961–62 | 1962–63 | 1963–64 | 1964–65 | 1965–66 | 1966–67 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Primary Education* | | | | | | | | |
| Teachers | 22,922 | 24,335 | 24,050 | 25,565 | 26,545 | 25,605 | 27,613 | 29,908 |
| Students | 1,216,272 | 1,277,802 | 1,306,559 | 1,393,839 | 1,514,857 | 1,507,626 | 1,593,949 | 1,785,841 |
| Ratio | 1 : 53 | 1 : 53 | 1 : 54 | 1 : 55 | 1 : 57 | 1 : 59 | 1 : 58 | 1 : 60 |
| *Junior Secondary* | | | | | | | | |
| Teachers | 4,715[a] | 5,510[a] | 5,548 | 5,390 | 6,338 | 6,744 | 6,522 | 8,846 |
| Students | 160,635[a] | 203,760[a] | 173,375 | 199,027 | 221,724 | 250,978 | 284,233 | 342,299 |
| Ratio | 1 : 34 | 1 : 37 | 1 : 31 | 1 : 37 | 1 : 35 | 1 : 37 | 1 : 44 | 1 : 39 |
| *Senior Secondary* | | | | | | | | |
| Teachers | | | 1,484 | 1,877 | 2,401 | 2,615 | 2,804 | 3,360 |
| Students | | | 44,802 | 54,048 | 62,734 | 64,970 | 70,762 | 87,329 |
| Ratio | | | 1 : 30 | 1 : 28 | 1 : 26 | 1 : 26 | 1 : 25 | 1 : 26 |
| *Total* | | | | | | | | |
| Teachers | 27,637 | 29,845 | 31,082 | 32,832 | 35,284 | 34,964 | 36,939 | 42,114 |
| Students | 1,376,907 | 1,431,562 | 1,524,736 | 1,646,914 | 1,798,315 | 1,823,574 | 1,948,944 | 2,215,469 |
| Ratio | 1 : 50 | 1 : 48 | 1 : 49 | 1 : 50 | 1 : 51 | 1 : 52 | 1 : 53 | 1 : 53 |

3) At the primary level of education there was a gradual increase in teacher-student-ratio from one teacher for 53 students in the 1959-60 school year to one teacher for 60 students in the 1966-67 school year. At the secondary-junior school level the teacher-student ratio was somewhat better—an average of 1:37 for the eight year period with the lowest ratio in the 1961-62 year with one teacher for every 31 students, and the highest ratio in the 1965-66 year with one teacher for every 44 students. A still better teacher-student ratio was found for senior-secondary school where the ratio decreased from 1:30 in the 1961-62 school year to 1:26 in the 1966-67 school year. An explanation for this difference may be attributed in part to the fact that the majority of secondary school students are attending private rather than public school. When compared with the teacher-student ratio in private primary school alone it may be seen that the teacher-student ratio is approximately 10 points lower for the period 1959-60 to 1963-64 with a range of 1:41 to 1:47 for that period. Beginning in school year 1964-65 there is almost no difference between teacher-student ratio for public and private primary school, and in 1966-67 the teacher-student ratio for the two types of school was 1:60.

Using the same projective technique used in Table 2, the estimated size of the school age population for 1968 is as follows: (1) Primary School (ages 6-11) 3,260,000; (2) Junior Secondary School (ages 12-15) 1,957,000; and Senior Secondary School (ages 16-18) 1,083,000. If one used the teacher-student ratios in effect in 1966-67 as a standard, the following number of teachers would presently be required to provide education for all school age students: (1) Primary School Teachers, 54,333; (2) Junior Secondary School Teachers, 50,179; and Senior Secondary School Teachers, 41,653, a total of 146,165 teachers. This constitutes approximately three times as many teachers as are presently available.

## PRIVATE SCHOOLS

About one-fifth of elementary school students, two-thirds of students in junior secondary school, and about one-half of students in senior secondary school were attending private schools in the 1966-67 school year. A significant proportion of these private schools were organized by foreigners, although some of them have been taken over by Vietnamese now. Of the various private schools, those organized by the French are the most popular. Since the majority of the elite are graduates of French schools, a French education continues to be highly valued. The French schools have proportionally more qualified teachers, and a degree from a French school is generally regarded as

preferable to an equivalent degree from a Vietnamese institution. A considerable number of French teachers are still in Vietnam, but a majority of them returned to France following the political upheaval in 1964.

Besides the French schools there are also a number of other private schools operated by the Chinese and the Khmer ethnic minorities. Although under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture, Education and Youth, they enjoy considerable autonomy in matters of internal administration. In accordance with governmental efforts to assimilate national minorities, the teaching of Vietnamese language, history, and literature has been made compulsory since 1956.

Data regarding enrollment in private and semi-private schools is

**Table 4**

PROPORTION OF PRIVATE OR SEMI-PRIVATE STUDENTS BY SCHOOL LEVEL, SCHOOL YEARS 1959-60 TO 1966-67 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM[10]

| SCHOOL YEAR | LEVEL OF SCHOOL | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Primary | Junior Secondary | Senior Secondary |
| *1959–1960* | | | |
| Total Enrollment | 1,216,272 | 134,906 | 25,729 |
| Private/Semiprivate Enrollment | 214,515 | 86,712 | 10,443 |
| Per cent | 17.6 | 64.3 | 40.6 |
| *1961–1962* | | | |
| Total Enrollment | 1,306,559 | 173,375 | 44,802 |
| Private/Semiprivate Enrollment | 214,169 | 11,408 | 21,215 |
| Per cent | 16.4 | 64.3 | 47.4 |
| *1963–1964* | | | |
| Total Enrollment | 1,393,839 | 199,027 | 54,048 |
| Private/Semiprivate Enrollment | 222,732 | 140,690 | 25,878 |
| Per cent | 14.7 | 63.7 | 48.1 |
| *1964–1965* | | | |
| Total Enrollment | 1,507,626 | 250,978 | 64,970 |
| Private/Semiprivate Enrollment | 244,732 | 163,019 | 29,501 |
| Per cent | 16.2 | 65.0 | 45.4 |
| *1965–1966* | | | |
| Total Enrollment | 1,593,949 | 284,233 | 70,762 |
| Private/Semiprivate Enrollment | 254,170 | 189,642 | 32,468 |
| Per cent | 15.9 | 66.7 | 45.9 |
| *1966–1967* | | | |
| Total Enrollment | 1,785,841 | 342,299 | 87,329 |
| Private/Semiprivate Enrollment | 349,223 | 236,926 | 46,837 |
| Per cent | 19.6 | 69.1 | 53.6 |

presented in Table 4. Over the period 1959-60 to 1966-67 the proportion of all primary school students attending private schools ranged from about 15 per cent to about 20 per cent. Before 1966, the arrangement by which France administered public schools (called semi-private) had been totally eliminated from primary education but remained to some extent in both junior and senior secondary school. A much larger percentage of junior secondary students attend private and semi-private schools. Over the period 1959-60 to 1966-67 there was a gradual but steady increase in the proportion attending private schools from 64.3 per cent in 1959-60 to 69.2 per cent in 1966-67. In senior secondary schooling a smaller proportion of students attend private and semi-private schools, but the same gradual increase in the proportion so attending is important. In the 1959-60 school year 40.6 per cent of senior secondary students were attending private or semi-private schools, and that proportion increased to 53.6 per cent by the 1966-67 school year.

As noted elsewhere, the student teacher ratio in private schools is much more advantageous, the teachers tend to be better qualified, and the pay and status is much greater. The effect of this condition on the overall educational situation in Vietnam is to prevent a significant number of Vietnamese to acquire secondary education because of the relatively expensive tuition involved in attending private school and the fact that most of the private schools are located in urban areas.

### HIGHER EDUCATION

Over the period 1957 to 1967 there was a phenomenal increase in university enrollment.[11] In the 1957-58 school year there were 4,364 students enrolled in faculties of higher education with 81 per cent of that number being men. The faculties of greatest importance were law (51.8%), letters (20.0%), sciences (23.0%), and medicine (14.1%). By the 1966-67 school year there had been an increase of 642 per cent and an average yearly increase of 3,114 or 24.7 per cent. A total of 32,393 students were enrolled in faculties of higher education in the 1966-67 school year with a smaller 73.8 per cent of that number being men. The faculties of greatest importance in 1966-67 were letters (29.9%), law (27.3%), sciences (19.1%), pharmacy (8.9%), pedagogy (4.4%), medicine (4.3%), and architecture (3.3%).

The greatest increases by faculty over the 10 year period were for the faculties of letters (978%), pharmacy (860%), architecture (849%), pedagogy (527%), and sciences (517%). In addition a new faculty of Political Sciences and Management was established in the

1964-65 school year which accounted for 4.5 per cent of total university enrollment that year but even smaller percentages in 1965-66 and 1966-67 school years. The changes of greatest significance from the point of view of national development are the increases in students preparing for professional careers in teaching, pharmacy, architecture, and physical science. The traditional fields of law and medicine remained very popular, but did not experience growth of equivalent amounts over the 10 year period studied.

### STUDENTS STUDYING ABROAD

During the French period, most of the elite attempted to send their children to France for at least a portion of their education. Following the ascent of Prime Minister Ky in 1965, the Vietnamese government stressed the enforcement of regulations designed to limit the number of students attending universities abroad to those enrolled in courses essential to the national economy which are not offered at Vietnamese universities. At that time there was a significant cut in the number of government scholarships for students to study abroad, and a severe limitation on study abroad for students without scholarships.

Table 5 presents data showing the country of study for students with and without scholarships for the years 1960 through 1967. Students studying abroad on scholarships reached a total of 1,532 in the 1967 period with the principle countries of study being Malaysia (28.4%), United States (27.4%), and Republic of China (14.9%). The proportion of students studying abroad on scholarships in the United States has lessened from 42.8 per cent of the total in 1960 to a low of 18.7 per cent in 1966. Another significant reduction in scholarship students is that France, which was once a major recipient of scholarship students, experienced a reduction of a high in 1963 of 23.1 per cent to 0.6 per cent and 0.1 per cent in 1966 and 1967 respectively.

It is also significant to consider the country of study abroad for students without scholarships. For the period 1960 to 1964, by far the largest proportion of students without scholarships went to France. The low for the period studies was 40.5 per cent in 1960 to a high of 85.2 per cent in 1964. In 1965 a total of only 25 students without scholarships were going abroad for study and of this group 6 went to France and 12 went to the United States. In the 1966 and 1967 years no students without scholarships have gone to France to study. There is, however, a significant switch for 1966 and 1967, since in those years there was a major increase in the number and proportion of Vietnamese students without scholarships studying in

## Table 5

COUNTRIES OF STUDY FOR VIETNAMESE STUDENTS WITH AND WITHOUT SCHOLARSHIPS STUDYING ABROAD, 1960 TO 1967[12]

| | Students With Scholarships | | | | | | | | Students Without Scholarships | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 |
| Belgium | 4 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 11 | 12 | 2 | 2 | — | — | 3 | — | 98 | 107 |
| Per cent | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 24.0 | 20.0 |
| Canada | 39 | 18 | 31 | 42 | 49 | 67 | 46 | 42 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 18 | — | 29 | 33 |
| Per cent | 5.1 | 3.0 | 4.8 | 8.7 | 8.5 | 13.6 | 4.9 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 7.1 | 6.2 |
| United States | 325 | 231 | 208 | 119 | 169 | 134 | 176 | 420 | 11 | 27 | 18 | 26 | 39 | 12 | 73 | 97 |
| Per cent | 42.8 | 38.6 | 32.5 | 24.8 | 29.4 | 27.2 | 18.7 | 27.4 | 9.9 | 10.1 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 48.0 | 17.9 | 18.1 |
| Malaysia | 38 | 21 | 1 | 17 | 1 | 1 | 336 | 435 | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | — |
| Per cent | 5.0 | 3.5 | 0.2 | 3.5 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 35.7 | 28.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| France | 99 | 83 | 117 | 111 | 85 | 21 | 6 | 1 | 45 | 155 | 213 | 271 | 623 | 6 | — | — |
| Per cent | 13.0 | 13.9 | 18.3 | 23.1 | 14.8 | 4.3 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 40.5 | 57.8 | 49.3 | 50.7 | 85.2 | 24.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Switzerland | 7 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 9 | 4 | 3 | 8 | 7 | 12 | 15 | — | 131 | 147 |
| Per cent | 0.9 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 32.2 | 27.4 |
| Republic of China | 78 | 70 | 59 | 46 | 109 | 45 | 110 | 229 | 41 | 24 | 132 | 141 | 3 | — | 5 | — |
| Per cent | 10.3 | 11.7 | 9.2 | 9.6 | 19.0 | 9.1 | 11.7 | 14.9 | 36.9 | 9.0 | 30.5 | 26.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 1.2 | .3 |
| Australia | 17 | 26 | 26 | 20 | 23 | 43 | 43 | 74 | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | — | 1 | — |
| Per cent | 2.2 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 8.7 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Total all Countries | 759 | 598 | 640 | 480 | 574 | 492 | 940 | 1,523 | 111 | 268 | 432 | 534 | 731 | 25 | 407 | 536 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Belgium and Switzerland which accounted for 24.0 per cent and 32.2 per cent respectively in 1966 and 20.0 per cent and 27.4 per cent respectively in 1967. Although there is some indication that there will be a major increase in Vietnamese students desiring to receive higher education in the United States in the coming years among wealthy families, students without scholarships going to the United States presently account for only about 20 per cent of the total. A continuation of the pattern of desire for French-type higher education may be expected to have a significant influence on study abroad for well-to-do families for some time to come.

Table 6 shows the data regarding category of study for students with and without scholarships for 1967. Of the 1,523 scholarship holders the major categories of study were administration and police (38.9%), agriculture and tenure (15.4%), and higher studies, sciences, and technology (10.5%). Of the 536 nonscholarship holders

**Table 6**

CATEGORIES OF STUDY FOR SCHOLARSHIP HOLDERS AND STUDENTS WITHOUT SCHOLARSHIPS, STUDYING ABROAD, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, 1967[13]

| Category of Study | CATEGORY OF STUDENT | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Scholarship Holders | | Students Without Scholarships | | All Students Studying Abroad | |
| | Number | Per cent | Number | Per cent | Number | Per cent |
| Agriculture and Tenure | 234 | 15.4 | 4 | 0.7 | 238 | 11.6 |
| Public Works, Communication | 49 | 3.2 | 14 | 2.6 | 63 | 3.1 |
| Higher Studies (sciences, and technology) | 160 | 10.5 | 250 | 46.7 | 410 | 19.9 |
| Education | 82 | 5.4 | 4 | 0.7 | 86 | 4.2 |
| Administration and Police | 592 | 38.9 | 25 | 4.6 | 617 | 30.0 |
| Economics and Finance | 99 | 6.5 | 130 | 24.2 | 229 | 11.1 |
| Industry and Mining | 11 | 0.7 | 12 | 2.2 | 23 | 1.1 |
| Information, press, motion pictures | 5 | 0.3 | 29 | 5.4 | 34 | 1.7 |
| Health and Sociology | 112 | 7.4 | 16 | 2.9 | 128 | 6.2 |
| Other fields of study | 179 | 11.8 | 52 | 9.7 | 231 | 11.2 |
| TOTAL | 1,523 | 100.0 | 536 | 100.0 | 2,059 | 100.0 |

the major fields of study were: higher studies, sciences, and technology (46.7%), and economics and finance (24.2%). These data would tend to indicate that scholarship aid is being provided as planned for directly applicable fields such as administration, police science and agriculture, while students studying on their own finances are focusing on more academic fields in preparation for university teaching and professions.

### STUDENTS ROLE

Although students constitute a very small minority in Vietnam, in recent years university students have asserted their ideas and wills with significant effect on the social and political structure of the nation. Student participation in numerous political inspired demonstrations and activities have become an expected part of each day's news. The mobilization of all young people for the armed forces has had the effect of lessening the impact of these student efforts, but following completion of the war it may be expected that there will be a resurgence of university student influence on a wide variety of aspects of Vietnamese life.

During the period of 1963 to 1967 the activities of university students was loud but relatively uncoordinated. Evidently, they had not been directed and controlled by any single student or outside political organization. This is true partly because they, like other political groups, were divided into a number of subgroupings based on religious, regional, and political tendencies. As a consequence, it has often been difficult to separate student social and political activities from those being carried out by the older generation. However, students have often been used by the adult organizations as an action arm and as a means of drawing attention to political and social reform objectives. The idealism and fervor of university students make them ideal candidates for activist cadres for larger social and political groups.

Students as a group are frequently impractical in their political orientations. They are intensely nationalistic and extremely sensitive to signs of foreign domination or interference in Saigon's internal affairs. Some student groups believe that the threat of Communist China must be eliminated before peace can be restored. In general, students have pressed for early elections and replacing military with civilian leadership. They regard themselves as the guardian of Vietnamese democratic goals, and consider themselves as the genuine watchdogs of government and society. Compared to the older generation, they appear to have greater self-confidence in their ability

to win over the Communist insurgents. They are inclined to believe that the Viet Cong are first of all Vietnamese nationalists and only secondarily misguided conspirators.

## III

### Evaluation and Conclusions

Despite the attention focused on education as an aspect of national development both by the government of RVN and U.S. AID, education has failed to achieve the potential hoped for by advisors and promised by national political leaders. A basic issue affecting formal education at the present time remains the threat of Viet Cong terrorism, although local security in urban areas and many of the rural regions has improved to the point where those who desire to go to school may do so with relatively certainty of safety. There has been a continued growth in desire on the part of children and their parents for a formal education; in fact, the demand and aspiration for education has outstripped the ability of the Vietnamese government to provide facilities, financial support, and teachers.

A complicated ministerial structure at the Saigon level contributes to the difficulty experienced in offering adequate support and guidance to education at local levels. Cultural and ethnic differences tend to be obscured, requirements tend to be inflexible, and adequate communication between local and national levels is far from acceptable. Curriculum revision is badly needed at all levels, but there is lacking any real consensus regarding the direction which the curriculum should take or how to bring it about. There remain problems related to the acquisition of such basic requirements of formal education as books, and paper, and the distribution of available materials is often incumbered by political factors such as relationship between province and village chiefs and teachers in the schools.

School enrollment while still far from satisfactory demonstrates progressive growth through the past decade and holds promise for reasonable continuation of present trends in the future as security is insured. Greater advantage is being taken of the female school-age population and traditional barriers to education of females even in rural areas is being broken down. A principle deterrent to satisfactory progress in public schools lies in the ability of the government to obtain and retain teachers. Existing status and salaries are too low to retain teachers presently employed and definitely too low to attract able persons into the field. Inability to solve this problem could have serious consequences for the country for an extended period of time.

In addition to the more general problems addressed above, there are three quite significant issues which appear to have received little attention to date.

(1) A question faced by all developing countries is how to determine the appropriate proportion of available resources which should be allocated to educational development. This is a particularly crucial issue to the extent that rising educational aspirations among the population make performance as well as promise an important aspect of political stability. At the same time there is little agreement on the part of development consultants regarding education as being the best input of limited resources especially if the decision involves a wide-spread low level of formal education which is of little functional value to industrial development.

(2) Increasing numbers of children have completed or are presently enrolled in primary schools and it is this level of education which has received the major input of U.S. AID funding. Aspirations for continued formal educational and technical training have became established in the minds of both the children and their parents. At the present time there is considerable blockage to continued education due to limited availability of teachers and school facilities even for those with personal financial resources. But the major aspect of the problem is the lack of national funds available to supplement inadequate personal family resources to pay for tuition and books. The full effect of the blocking of these educational aspirations is difficult to estimate, but undoubtedly has substantial implications for overall development.

(3) Failure of decision makers and long-range planners to view education in its relationship to other factors of national development. Integral to this problem is the matter of how graduates of secondary and technical schools will be integrated into the Vietnamese economy. Graduates who cannot find jobs might be considered to be relatively volatile and particularly susceptible to enemy propaganda.

An earlier version of this paper was presented in the Sociology of Education Section, Annual Meeting of Midwest Sociological Society, April 16–18, 1970, in St. Louis. The author is indebted to Professor Shailer Thomas for suggestions based on the earlier paper.

1. See for example, C. E. Beeby, *The Quality of Education in Developing Countries*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); John W. Hanson and Cole S. Brembeck, *Education and the Development of Nations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966); and Adam Curle, *Educational Problems of Developing Societies* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969).

2. There is recent evidence of growing concern within USAID regarding the outcomes of technical assistance to developing countries. For a recent statement of problems to be studied in the area of education and development, the reader is directed to "Priority Problems in Education and Human Resources Development—

The 1970's" a staff paper prepared by Agency for International Development, Bureau for Technical Assistance, Office of Education and Human Resources, Revised November, 1970.

3. The data utilized in this paper were collected while the author was connected with a research-planning project in South Vietnam while serving on active duty with the U.S. Army, 1968-69. Special appreciation is due to the National Institute of Statistics, Republic of Vietnam, for making some pre-publication materials from the Ministry of Culture, Education and Youth available to the author. These data did subsequently appear in the *Vietnam Statistical Yearbook*, Series 14, 1969.

4. A recently published piece by Nguyen Dinh Hoa includes some helpful material on historical factors in Vietnam's educational development. "Vietnam," in Carlton E. Beck (ed.), *Perspectives on World Education*, (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company, 1970), pp. 217-221.

5. This section partially excerpted from *Area Handbook for South Vietnam*, DA PAM 550-55, 1967, pp. 143-144.

6. Data adapted from Table 31, "Number of pupils and students, school year 1955–1956 to 1966–1967," *Vietnam Statistical Yearbook*, Series 14, (Saigon, Republic of Vietnam: National Institutes of Statistics, 1969), p. 67.

7. Data adapted from Table 42, "Vietnamese kindergarten, primary and secondary education: Number of teachers and students, school year 1959–1960 to 1966–1967," *Vietnam Statistical Yearbook*, Series 14, (Saigon, Republic of Vietnam: National Institute of Statistics, 1969), pp. 78, 79.

8. School age population was estimated on the basis of the age distribution in a sample population survey of Can Tho, Da Lat, Hue, and Nha Trang in 1964 and applied to total population figures for the years indicated. Primary age 6 to 11, junior secondary age 12 to 15, and senior secondary age 16 to 18.

9. Data adapted from Table 42, "Vietnamese kindergarten, primary and secondary education: Number of teachers and students, school year 1959–60 to 1966–1967," *Vietnam Statistical Yearbook*, Series 14, (Saigon, Republic of Vietnam: National Institute of Statistics, 1969), pp. 78, 79.

10. Data adapted from Table 42, "Vietnamese kindergarten, primary and secondary education: Number of teachers and students, school year 1959–1960 to 1966–1967," *Vietnam Statistical Yearbook*, Series 14, (Saigon, Republic of Vietnam: National Institute of Statistics, 1969), pp. 78, 79.

11. Based on data contained in Table 43, "Higher education: Number of students by faculty and sex, school year 1957–1958 to 1966–1967," *Vietnam Statistical Yearbook*, Series 14, (Saigon. Republic of Vietnam: National Institute of Statistics, 1969), p. 81.

12. Data adapted from Table 39, "Scholarship holders and students without scholarships going abroad by category and country of study, 1960 to 1967," *Vietnam Statistical Yearbook*, Series 14, (Saigon, Republic of Vietnam: National Institute of Statistics, 1969), pp. 72, 73.

13. Data adapted from Table 36, "Scholarship holders going abroad by category, sex, and field of study, 1963 to 1967," *Vietnam Statistical Yearbook*, Series 14, (Saigon, Republic of Vietnam: National Institute of Statistics, 1969), p. 71.

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# Books / Chronique Littéraire

## The Philippine Polity: A Japanese View

By Royama Masamichi and Takeuchi Tatsuji. Translated by Takeuchi Tatsuji. Edited by Theodore Friend. New Haven: Monograph Series No. 12, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1967, XXX, 293 pp., Appendices.

MOST OF WHAT WE know of the Philippine body politic during the Spanish colonial era through World War II stems from official Spanish, American, and Filipino documents as well as scholarly writings by colonial or Commonwealth officials and American and Filipino academics. This volume is particularly interesting, therefore, in that it provides insights into how Japanese academics, as of the early 1940's, perceived the Philippine polity. While they relied essentially on sources familiar to Westerners, their interpretation of some of these materials is uniquely Japanese.

This publication consists of two distinct yet supplementary parts. The first, a study of the Philippine polity, constituted a portion of the larger *Report of the Research Commission on the Philippines.* The other is a diary kept by one of the scholars while he was engaged in that study. Also, there is an excellent editorial essay by Professor Theodore Friend which summarizes the study of the Philippine polity and succinctly analyzes some of its major underlying assumptions.

The study is divided into four chapters: Survey of Spanish Rule in the Philippines, Characteristics of American Rule in the Philippines, Government and Politics under the Commonwealth Regime, and Formation of an Independent State. The first three are historical and/or descriptive in nature and are based upon frequently cited sources; thus, they add little to what is already known about the Philippines. The fourth chapter is of more interest to the reader, for it interprets—from a Japanese point of view—the significance of socio-economic and historical forces in the Philippines in terms of Philippine political development theretofore and the prospects for the eventual establishment of an independent as well as modernized political-administrative system. It also attempts to show why this new Philippine state should, and how it would, fit into the Japanese-proposed Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The interpretations contained in the fourth chapter are based on certain concepts which are rooted in Japanese culture—if the term "culture" can be used here in the broadest sense. Professor Friend identifies the Japanese concept of *Kokutai* as being perhaps the most basic of these. This is the notion of the national polity which implies that religion, society, and the state are so closely intertwined as to be inseparable. But,

as Professor Friend also notes, this concept had been alien to the Philippines at least since the arrival of the Spanish.

It is little wonder, then, that the authors' perceptions (of what was and what likely would be as regards Philippine politics and government) were distorted; for they were viewing things through lens tinted with their own culture. Recognition of this fact serves as a useful reminder to American scholars, some of whom, including this reviewer, at times have unconsciously analyzed or prescribed for the political system of the Philippines in terms of assumptions which have emerged from American culture. And while it must be admitted that Western scholars have become aware of the danger of letting their own cultural conditioning influence their research and writings about the Philippines, this was not true in earlier days; of course, the Japanese scholars who authored this study were functioning in such an earlier era.

The diary, kept by Takeuchi Tatsuji, indicates some of the guidelines and basic premises which were agreed upon by the two authors before they began their research in the Philippines. For instance, they determined that a new concept of authority and institutionalization should be imparted to the Filipinos and that their research and subsequent report should reflect this. Moreover, the diary pinpoints each of the Japanese occupation officials and Filipino officials as well as scholars with whom the authors either conducted interviews or held informal discussions; it also summarizes what was said by these people. The latter is interesting in another sense insofar as it reveals the degrees of frankness with which eminent Filipinos expressed their views to the two Japanese scholars.

This publication might profitably be read by all students of Philippine studies. It should prove to be of particular value to those political scientists and historians who specialize in the study of the Philippines.

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## "Natural" Politics, Economic Development and Rural Behavior in Thailand (A Review Article)

*Thailand: Social and Economic Studies in Development.* Edited by T. H. Silcock. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1967. pp. xvi + 334. $Aus. 8.40.

*The Economic Development of Thai Agriculture.* By T. H. Silcock. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. pp. xvi + 250. $11.50.

*Agricultural Change and Peasant Choice in a Thai Village.* By Michael

Moerman. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968. pp. xii + 227. $6.00.

THAILAND PRESENTS A SPECTACLE of politics in the raw. By this I don't mean the law of the jungle or a "war of every man, against every man"; indeed in Thai politics it is far more often a show of force rather than an act of violence which is all that is needed to bring about change (the overthrow of the system of absolute monarchy in 1932, for example). What I mean by "in the raw" is natural, basic behavior undisguised by borrowed trappings. This natural behavior, whether we like it or not, is becoming more and more obvious in developing countries as they shake off the Western-influenced patterns of the colonial and immediate post-colonial regimes.

For it is the colonial experience which first distorted and then disguised the attitudes and practices of the traditional and emerging elites throughout the third world. It did this in two ways. First, by introducing them to Western parliamentary processes and political ideas—more in theory, of course, than in practice. Indeed one of the most glaring contrasts in Southeast Asia was between the splendid watchword of the French Revolution—Liberty, Equality and Fraternity—and its concrete denial in Vietnam. Second, the commitment, in formal terms at least, of the anti-colonial, nationalist movements either to Western liberal-democratic or to Marxist values. This is demonstrated most strikingly by the leadership of the immediate post-colonial regimes: Sukarno's *marhaenism*, U Nu's "Buddhist socialism", Sihanouk's "khmer socialism" and, in a pathetic caricature of reality, Diem's "personalism".

Thailand, by contrast, emerged unscathed from colonial pressures and unshaken by revolutionary convulsions: the change-over from a princely to a bureaucratic oligarchy in 1932 and from military-civilian partnership to military dominance in the later 1930s was, if not exactly peaceful, unmarred by either sustained or intense conflict. Above all, Thailand was relatively unaffected by the Japanese war and its aftermath, in comparison to the havoc wreaked in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. Significantly, all three countries were shortly afterwards subjected to insurgency, although two of them had become independent. (Even the Malayan Emergency, besides being an anti-colonial struggle, was a civil war between Kuomintang and Communist Chinese and a racial conflict, since the Malays generally supported the administration).

While Western ideas still influenced nationalist or revolutionary movements in the rest of Southeast Asia, the Thai "power elite" maintained a progmatic, down to earth stance. Illusions about the easy achievement of socialist planning—for instance, Pridi's economic proposals of 1933—or of the democratic transformation of Thai society have long since been dispelled. The only area of politics where any systematic theorising can now be observed is that of foreign affairs, where the managers have least control of their subject.

This pragmatic "monolithism" (see also Pierre Fistié, L'évolution de la Thailande contemporaine, Paris: Armand Colin, 1967) is, of course, something of an exaggeration. There are "two values" affecting Thai elite attitudes, as Professor Silcock and Dr. Evers point out in the first book under review: "Within the bureaucratic structure there is a growing distinction between the outward-looking, modernizing administrative elite and a power elite, mainly based on army cliques", citing David Wilson's Politics in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962). These features, they note, have a bearing on economic development: "The relations between the different emerging classes [including the third elite: the Chinese business community], and also between them and the peasants in the countryside, impose constraints on the type of development that is possible" (p. 91).

But the point I am making is that the contrast between the ideals and the practices of government in the West, so important for an understanding of the nationalist movements elsewhere in Southeast Asia, has not been, and is not, particularly relevant for Thailand. When I say that other countries of the third world are now reverting to a "natural" behavior, I do not imply that they are in some sense "unfit" for democracy. One only has to glance at the recent history of France, let alone Greece or Weimar Germany, to realise how fragile Western parliamentary institutions are. It is the exaggerated expectations of achieving the ideal democracy or socialism, enhanced by the heady optimism of independence movements, which have now largely disappeared from the third world, except in the blueprints of unsuccessful politicians. Now a more realistic scepticism prevails. In a number of countries, however, the process has obviously gone to the other extreme, and disillusionment has bred cynicism. Thailand, because of certain hopeful features (discussed below) may be somewhere in between.

*Thailand: Social and Economic Studies in Development* contains admirable descriptions or analyses of "natural" behavior: demographic, by Caldwell; Financial, Corden, Richter, and Prot Panitpakdi; rice trading, Usher; and banking, industrialisation, and planning, all by Silcock. The latter's contributions, appearing under such prosaic headings as "Money and Banking" and "Promotion of Industry and the Planning Process", demonstrate an unusual and fascinating awareness of the complex interaction of political and economic activities. Even so, he has to warn the reader not to expect a detailed account of the conduct of particular banks, because "the necessary research would be long, unpleasant, and perhaps dangerous both to the writer and to public order in Thailand" (p. 182).

Silcock makes two extemely important observations on the respective roles in Thai banking (and related activities) of the capitalists, who are mainly Chinese, and the politicians, who in this "privileged" context are disproportionately military (see pp. 184-5):

> Chinese business is generally far more decentralised than Western business. . . . The banker is an agent in extending a rather looser form of influence mediated through capital. He may bring syndicates and information together to provide sources of capital gains; he may lead to traders who in turn give extended trade credit, so creating an area of enterprise in which the bankers' (and his partners') economic influence may be extended; he can secure some political protection for his partners' interests. . . . To politicians they [bankers] can also give help in furthering business interests, in addition to income and credit; they can also be a channel for conferring favours on key supporters in the various services, without the embarrassment of direct money payments. (p. 183)
>
> The politicians gain [from cooperation with bankers] mainly by consolidation of their personal following, and also by wealth that enables them to fulfill the obligations that Thai custom expects of important people but that the legitimate [i.e. Westernized] political structure does not provide. Probably the main service they [politicians] give is that, given the Thai social structure, their name on the Board [of Directors] is enough to discourage bank inspectors and other enforcement officers from going beyond (or even up to) the letter of the law in enforcing regulations on interest, foreign exchange, or business interests. Active intervention is probably usually unnecessary. It may, however, be used to affect the form of government projects, so as to enable the bank or its clients to secure contracts or other advantages. In addition the funds of government enterprises or even departments may be deposited in the bank. Useful information, particularly in relation to real estate, may also be provided. (pp. 183-4)

The pragmatic nature of Thai politics is clearly demonstrated by the ability of the politicians (above) to put material before ideological considerations; (this is also, despite formal postures, evident in foreign policy). For the Chinese are "alien", often resented in their role of middlemen, particularly in the rice trade, and at times have been considered politically suspect for alleged leanings toward Peking. Yet even members of the strongly anti-communist regimes of Field Marshals Phibun and Sarit have realised (in both senses) the benefits obtained by cooperation.

The growth of professionalism, both in the civilian bureaucracy and among younger army officers (David Wilson, The United States and the Future of Thailand, New York: Praeger, 1970, pp. 109, 112-3), does, however, serve to restrain some of the excess of business-political collusion. Professional standards and financial integrity are highly prized in the Bank of Thailand (Silcock, op. cit., pp. 187-9) and in the Ministry of Finance, the Civil Service Commission and such fairly recently established expert bodies as the National Economic Development Board and the Budget Bureau (p. 195). Officials serving in these organizations, often educated abroad, are among the chief proponents of Western "modernizing" values; this is in contrast to the senior military men who reflect more "indigenous" or traditional attitudes. In fact the latter have generally had far less international experience and come from families of lower social origins than their civilian counterparts.

As for the interactions of the three elites—military, civilian-bureaucratic

and Chinese—Silcock raises the question whether these have resulted in a "more or less rational strategy for economic development" (p. 294) or, on the contrary, in an uncoordinated process pushed out of shape by the contending interests of the different groups. But Silcock does not really come down on one side or the other. He makes the point that a combination of politicians, imparting a national emphasis, bureaucrats infusing scientific method, and businessmen introducing adaptability and flexibility, "might" produce a more rational policy than any one group separately. Yet he adds that if Thailand has "in some measure" benefited from this interaction, it has not been on any basis of mutual discussion and agreed policy. He further argues (p. 295) that in areas other than trade and monetary policy, "we are compelled to take into account an interaction of pressures in which the bureaucracy is neither able to play the role of coordinator nor actuated predominantly by rational, professional considerations".

Although the economic planning process has undoubtedly been strengthened by the experience of the first Six Year Plan (1961-6) and subsequent Five Year Plan (1967-71) and by continued recruitment of able staff, recent events have paradoxically confirmed the ambiguity of the situation (noted above) by emphasizing the "haphazard" element affecting the economy. Among these are the advent of a new factor in 1969 after 11 years of absence, the elected House of Representatives, which has not always been amenable either to governmental or bureaucratic control. Second, the adverse balance of payments in 1969 (for the first time in a decade) and, potentially of far more gloomy significance, the growing problem of finding export markets for rice, because of the self-sufficiency achieved by the "green revolution" in more and more traditionally importing countries. Partly as a result, the tax or "premium" on Thai rice exports, extensively discussed by Silcock (op. cit. chapter 10) and in The Economic Development of Thai Agriculture (pp. 16-19, 63, 216-7), has been lowered in successive stages: it now brings in about 5 per cent of government revenue, compared to the over 10 per cent referred to in the works cited.

Still further impediments to economic progress are the business recession of 1970-71; the government's uncertain handling of the budget (the able director of the Budget Bureau was transferred as a result of political pressures in 1970) and of tax increases; the United States' program of troop withdrawals from Thailand and Vietnam and the drying up of U.S. military spending (both R & R and military construction); and finally, contrary to the state of affairs in the early 1960s, noted in the first book under review (pp. 265-7), a spate of resignations from the poorly-paid civilian service, especially of technically-qualified personnel, to join local or foreign business firms and international organizations. These doubtful prospects may, however, be outweighed in the future by the benefits from offshore oil discoveries.

Agricultural and forestry products, particularly rice, rubber, corn, cassava, kenaf and oil seeds, made up over 88 per cent of all Thai exports (average 1961-5); 81 per cent of the economically active population in 1960 was engaged in rice cultivation; and the rural sector provided over one-third of the gross domestic product. These and other official figures (up to 1965) in Silcock's The Economic Development of Thai Agriculture provide a useful backdrop against which to discuss Moerman's scrupulously detailed, intelligent and perceptive study of a Thai-Lue village in the far North.

Moerman had noted the spread of modern farming methods, particularly in the use of hired tractors and broadcasting (instead of transplanting) rice, on the villagers' shares of a large "distant flood" field (see pp. 34-5, and chapter IV, "Tractor Agriculture"). What surprised him, on returning four years later in 1965, was to discover that they were no longer doing so. The explanation is that villagers had always regarded broadcasting (erroneously it appears, pp. 161-2) as a source of reduced yields and the tractor as an uncomfortable expense. So they dispensed with both as soon as the altered physical environment, the clearing and levelling of the fields had ended the danger of flooding, made them no longer necessary. Moerman comments (p. 185): "This reversion to traditional farming, more than any other single fact, convinces me of the practical importance of understanding the native's perception and cognition of his technological system. If we insist on viewing the tractor solely as a laborsaving device, reversion to the plow seems incredible . . ."

The return to traditionalism does make sense in terms of the attitudes of these particular villagers who, moreover, are prepared to work harder as a result (p. 189). Yet how typical is Lue "pride in working hard and spending little" (p. 184) of rural behavior elsewhere in Thailand? And how widespread is this act of reversion? In other words do many other Thai villagers have a similar opportunity to "dispense" with mechanization and commercial relations? There is still cultivable land to be cleared and rivers to be tapped for irrigation in the North, but this is not the case in the "overpopulated" Central Plain or the Northeast. And even if most Thai villagers prefer the old ways, as no doubt they do, can they withstand the pressures for modernization brought about by an enterprising minority?

In his assessment of the central and north-central provinces, for example, Silcock observes (p. 117): "Ploughing with hired tractors has become fairly general, though harvesting is mainly done by traditional methods. As mechanisation and irrigation improve, the size of the typical family farm can be expected to rise to 30-40 *rai*, . . ." But as there is no vacant land for larger farms, to develop them will require increased migration elsewhere. In fact Silcock's advice is to encourage farmers to "move out of subsistence agriculture" and perhaps to encourage instead "relatively large-scale landholdings" in the Centre and South (pp. 197-8, 203).

Silcock attributes the "sensational growth" of parts of the north-central region to improved road, rail, and water transport, to "a great deal of capital being invested" in opening up new land, the strong trade demand for export crops, and the "active business enterprise" of "highly capable" Chinese traders (pp. 125-8, 171). In general, he points out, public capital formation has contributed to development mainly through transport and irrigation. Private capital, however, has contributed through private development of land, "fairly considerable" investment in mechanical equipment, and a "rapidly expanding" investment in fertilizers, pesticides, and chemical weedkillers (p. 169).

The important role of private development, which is relatively uninhibited, if at times "distorted", by political demands, is strikingly confirmed by Moerman's finding (p. 188). Villagers, he notes, learned from private businessmen in 1953 to broadcast rice and use tractors, and currently to use fertilizers. "Although numerous government pronouncements extolled fertilizers and insecticides during 1959-1961, villagers ignored them. . . . I do not know of any innovation in production which the villagers of Ban Ping have knowingly received from government officials." The reason is this: "What the government suggests is the government's way, the way of 'men who eat a monthly salary' and who are not familiar with or sympathetic to village productive considerations."

The question from whom innovation is learned has profound implications, because it has often been assumed, and this impression is encouraged by official publicity, that governments can and should play a leading role in economic development. On the other hand, the rapid expansion of the private sector in agriculture may well have undesirable consequences; among them, the widening gulf in ownership of land and wealth (and hence in economic and political power) between the enterprising few and the "traditional" majority, which is occurring where the "green revolution" is most effective; this is leading to rural polarization and eventually to class conflict. Thus, paradoxically, it is in this area above all where modern professional standards, and not least in politics, will be needed if "natural" economic appetites are to be curbed for the benefit of the larger community. The signs therefore point in two directions: for the West is expert, but the East is Red.

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## Toward Disengagement in Asia

By Bernard K. Gordon. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. Pp. vi + 186. $2.45.

THE UNITED STATES MILITARY disengagement from Asia, and particularly from Southeast Asia, has now become an irreversible process. The ques-

tion at issue is how far and how fast the rate of military withdrawal should be. While the Nixon Doctrine emphasizes continuing interest and involvement by the United States in Asian affairs, its main feature is the gradual withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam and other Asian countries, to be accomplished within a reasonably fixed timetable. It is, of course, expected that Asian countries, especially those allied themselves with the United States, would have to shoulder greater burden in the defense of their own security and stability.

Since the American military withdrawal has been primarily applied to South Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries, the question of security and stability of Southeast Asia has naturally received a great deal of attention. There is a genuine concern that this lowering of the United States military presence in the region would create a "power vacuum," which could be filled by forces hostile to the free and independent countries of Southeast Asia.

There is increasing doubt whether developing countries of Southeast Asia could assume a larger share of security burden without stress and strain which, in turn, would undermine their long-term real security. And, finally, there is growing skepticism whether the avowed intention of the Nixon Doctrine of stabilizing the situation in Southeast Asia could really be achieved.

Dr. Bernard K. Gordon's book was written and published before the application of the Nixon Doctrine and therefore the author could only propose conditions in which American disengagement in Asia could take place, assuming disengagement to be a policy best served the United States interest in Asia. The book is subtitled "A Strategy for American Foreign Policy" and therefore addresses itself primarily to the American audience. *Toward Disengagement in Asia* deals with American objectives in Asia in general and in Southeast Asia in particular. It devotes also a sizeable portion to developing and recommending specific strategy for American disengagement from Asia, which would serve the United States interests as well as maintaining, and even strengthening, security and stability of Southeast Asia.

The whole book could perhaps be divided into two main parts: a broad aspect examining the United States interests, objectives, and policies globally with particular emphasis on American Asian policy and a specific strategy which would allow the United States to disengage, without sacrificing its interest and jeopardizing security and stability, from Southeast Asia. In the first part, Dr. Gordon examines the United States priorities and persuasively puts forward a three-level principle of American national interests, ranging from the most vital or Level One interest, when the United States would be prepared to go to war in its defense to Level Three interest which involves no action on the part of the United States. The region of East Asia, which includes China, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia, is considered to be a Level One interest and the United States

went to war in the past and presumably would be prepared to go to war in the future, to prevent one-nation dominance of the region. The author then examines historically the role of the United States and the balance of power in Asia in order to emphasize the central thesis that the best interest of the United States is served by prevention of a one-nation hegemony in East Asia. He also touches on the problem of "the strikingly wide gap between the public and official explanations for U.S. Asian policy and the underlying purposes which those policies have been designed to achieve" (p. 44).

With the emergence of Communist China which, Dr. Gordon strongly indicates, has been acting to gain regional dominance in East Asia, how could the United States achieve her aims in the region without pressuring it into open conflict with China? The answer, according to the author, is to be found in the possibility of multipolarity in Asia. This is the second part of the book and the author puts forward an interesting and intriguing strategy for American foreign policy in order to achieve this purpose. Briefly stated, the United States and other interested Powers, Japan and Australia being specifically mentioned, should encourage and help the movement for regionalism in Southeast Asia, particularly in the direction of regional security.

The author describes Southeast Asian regionalism with particular reference to two organizations—the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Dr. Gordon forsees a more cohesive Southeast Asia before the end of the decade as a result of the development of regionalism. Since China is likely to press for regional dominance in the direction of Southeast Asia, regional security cooperation among ASEAN countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, could act as a counterbalancing force against expansionist China.

Dr. Gordon assumes that the United States would act against any major conventional and nuclear aggression in Asia for a long time to come and the regional security arrangement in Southeast Asia "will be primarily concerned with defense against low-level or insurgent threats." (p. 138) The author then proposes a creation of an "ASEAN Counterinsurgency Force" comprised of troops from ASEAN member countries with the United States, Japan, and Australia providing necessary and relevant material assistance, to be used by ASEAN members if necessary against such threats. Specific proposals are advanced with regard to the formation of the ASEAN Force, such as the possibility of the British base in Singapore being used as "ASEAN Defense Headquarters" (p. 148), number of troops required (from 35,000 to 50,000 men p. 156) and possible assistance by interested powers (p. 160). Even a scenario for an ASEAN Force in operation is described (pp. 160-165).

Although the author cautions against regional security cooperation being "seized upon as a justification for premature American disengage-

ment" (p. 175), encouragement and assistance by the United States, Japan, and Australia for regional security arrangements in Southeast Asia along the proposed outline would serve both the United States interest and objective in Asia, i.e., Southeast Asian regionalism helping to promote multipolarity in East Asia and regional security cooperation deterring China from incorporating Southeast Asia into her sphere. Thus the United States could lower her military presence in Asia without undermining her own interests and objectives.

It is a pity that *Toward Disengagement in Asia* came out before the Nixon Doctrine which has made American disengagement from Asia before the end of the Vietnam war a reality. The Nixon Doctrine is aiming at achieving probably the same objectives examined in this book. The question is whether the United States intends to employ the same means, prescribed in this book, in order to pursue her interests in Asia. For the strategy advocated in this book, in particular, the ASEAN regional security arrangement, although it is not likely to happen, could have serious implication for Southeast Asian countries themselves in the long run.

There is little doubt that the development of indigeneous regionalism in Southeast Asia could be described as encouraging, especially in relation to the generally accepted notion that Southeast Asia as a region is nothing more than a geographical expression. It has brought Southeast Asian countries closer together to the extent that a "core" group of regional-minded Southeast Asian countries has emerged (the ASEAN members) and a useful cooperation framework has been established. Regionalism has been accepted as desirable and even necessary and has helped, to some extent, to generate the feeling of regional solidarity. However, even those most enthusiastic about Southeast Asian regionalism have to concede that there is a wide gap between aspiration and achievement. Without attempts at bridging this gap, which would involve serious and realistic examination of goal, commitment, policy, and strategy of implementation, regionalism in Southeast Asia is likely to be practiced for its own sake. At this stage where all efforts should be directed at achieving tangible results, to bring in the concept of regional security cooperation as envisaged by the author would probably end whatever effectiveness Southeast Asian regionalism has at present and is capable of having in the future.

The most difficult obstacle for the formation of an ASEAN Force proposed by Dr. Gordon is the fact that ASEAN member countries have yet to share a common view regarding the nature of the threat to their own respective security and stability. It is true that they are all concerned but they hold different views with regard to the means of maintaining security and stability. In other words, their common interest in the matter is a negative one and this is not likely to bring about such a positive action needed for the creation of "ASEAN Counterinsurgency Force."

Even if it is further assumed that there is drastic deterioration of the

situation in Southeast Asia, that, for example, the United States immediately and unilaterally withdraws from Southeast Asia and China steps up her aggression, then the ASEAN member countries would be forced to cooperate in order to survive. This scenario is obviously favorable to the establishment of the proposed ASEAN Force. However, even within this imaginary environment, creation of the ASEAN Force is likely to be effective on paper rather than in practice. The author himself points out that Southeast Asian leaders realize the difficulty of defense cooperation and further recognize that much more experience and trust is required before any attempt can be made. (p. 138) Regionalism has not developed far enough to create the necessary trust and experience. Furthermore, the proposed ASEAN Force, to be operationally effective, would need a great deal of professionalism and sophistication which, unfortunately, are qualities yet to develop among Southeast Asian countries. The formation of ASEAN Force in these circumstances would be more likely to become an artificially superimposed structure rather than an effectively operationable defense force.

The long-term implications of this concept are even more serious for the future of Southeast Asian countries. The creation of "ASEAN Counterinsurgency Force," though possible in principle but unlikely to be effective operationally as indicated, would have the effect of formalizing the "anti-China" image of ASEAN, which all ASEAN members have, insistently and consistently, tried to avoid. Moreover, the roles of material and other relevant assistance to the ASEAN Force assigned to the United States, Japan and Australia, which presumably would have to be done by formal international agreements, are likely to put the "pro-West" and "anti-China" image of ASEAN in a fairly permanent footing, thus doing away with whatever possibility is left for a detente with China, and the possibility of ASEAN co-existence with China. Also, the practice of self-reliance does not exclude the possibility of cooperation among Southeast Asian countries in matters commonly affecting their security and stability. The author cites examples of joint actions by Indonesia and Malaysia, by Thailand and Malaysia, and by Philippines and Malaysia (p. 158). Regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia is, therefore, possible as long as it is specific, bilateral, and informal. It does seem, therefore, that increasing self-reliance together with cooperation on specific common security matters could be expected to achieve the same objective. The efforts of the United States should be directed at achieving some sort of understanding with China because the two powers are the principal antagonists in Asia today. Is there, perhaps, here a role for Japan in bringing it about?

In disputing Dr. Gordon's proposed strategy concerning regional security arrangement in Southeast Asia, the reviewer does not want to leave the impression that it is not an important book. *Toward Disengagement in Asia* should be required reading for those interested in Asia

in general and in Southeast Asia in particular. The analysis of the United States objective, interest, and policy in Asia is most persuasive and few would quarrel with Dr. Gordon's treatment (although on "Myths and Reality in American Asian Policy" (pp. 44-58), this reviewer tends to think that the problem raised is probably insoluble on the operational level). Detailed treatment of Southeast Asian regionalism with particular emphasis on ASA and ASEAN is particularly useful and should be read by all interested in Southeast Asian regionalism. One small point which this reviewer begs to disagree is Dr. Gordon's characterization of ASEAN as a product of MAPHILINDO and ASA combined. Elsewhere, the approach and argument are sound and scholarly.

To this reviewer, there are three additional qualities to be found in *Toward Disengagement in Southeast Asia*, namely, conciseness, readability, and a refreshing quality of the author in putting forward his opinion with conviction and persuasiveness. Dr. Gordon has been able to maintain these qualities in his book without sacrificing scholarship. In the world of increasingly value-free scholarly analysis and unreadable scholarly work, this achievement can not be overemphasized.

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# *Borneo Research Bulletin*

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