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Center for Vietnamese Studies  
*Southern Illinois University at Carbondale*

Southeast *Asia*  
*An International Quarterly*

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# Southeast *Asia*

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## Abstract / Résumé

On notera un contraste frappant entre les anciens et les nouveaux procédés diplomatiques siamois si l'on compare les deux tentatives que fit, au XIX<sup>e</sup>. siècle, la Grande-Bretagne afin d'arriver à s'entendre avec le Siam. En 1821, l'échec de la mission du Docteur John Crawford revéla l'abîme d'incompréhension qui séparait l'Orient de l'Occident, abîme que ni l'un ni l'autre ne se souciait de franchir par la diplomatie. En comparaison, la mission que Sir John Bowring dirigea en 1855 fut une éclatante réussite. Elle aboutit à un traité entre le Siam et la Grande-Bretagne à la suite de la décision prise par le Roi Rama IV (le Roi Mongkut) de s'entendre avec l'Occident et d'adopter, pour ce faire, les techniques et les procédés occidentaux, y compris l'usage grandissant de la finesse diplomatique à l'occidentale.

La mission siamoise que conduisit en Europe, de 1891 à 1892, le Prince Damrong Rachanuphap, en tant qu'envoyé spécial du Roi Chulalongkorn, fils du Roi Mongkut, illustre tout particulièrement tel effort diplomatique. Le but ostensible de cette mission était de remettre des décorations honorifiques aux chefs européens et de visiter des institutions pédagogiques occidentales.

En 1968, on publia à Bangkok un recueil de lettres et de messages ayant trait à la mission du Prince Damrong, sous forme volume commémoratif distribué au cours de la crémation de Mom Chao Dissanowat Diskul, l'un des fils du Prince Damrong. Selon l'opinion de l'auteur du présent essai, cette collection de documents suggère que la mission du Prince Damrong avait des objectifs diplomatiques bien plus graves que ceux qu'elle se reconnaissait: en réalité, l'expédition représentait l'effort le plus sérieux et la plus complexe qu'aient jusqu'alors fourni les Siamois; l'intention en était d'adopter les rites et les cérémonies diplomatiques qui leur permettent d'atteindre à une reconnaissance plus étendue et espéraient-ils, plus égalitaire de la part des Européens.

La correspondance publiée récemment est formulée avec tant de finesse qu'il est impossible d'y découvrir aucune franchise mal venue. Toutefois, on peut l'interpréter comme suggérant que le Siam croyait que la Russie était, en Europe, un état bien plus puissant qu'elle ne l'était en réalité. Cette correspondance indique aussi clairement que le Siam regardait la Russie comme l'allié siamois le plus important d'Europe. Il en découlait donc que, si l'amitié Russo-Siamoise pouvait être établie avec assez de force et d'assez de publicité, il devenait concevable qu'une telle amitié put empêcher la Grande Bretagne ou la France de se saisir de territoires siamois. Les divers messages se rapportant à ce voyage indiquent aussi

## Nineteenth Century Siamese Adventures in Fringe Diplomacy

H. B. SMITH

IT IS A SURPRISING and interesting fact that practically no author, whether he be academician, journalist, or other, feels he can omit from his writing the now well-known fact that Thailand, or Siam, has never been a colony of a western power. It is, of course, the outstanding importance of the fact which would, through its omission, create a void in the understanding of modern Thailand. For the concept of freedom from outside domination has loomed large in shaping Thailand's orientation to the West, and it helps to explain Thai foreign relations and the directions which Thai diplomacy has taken in the last 120 years.

The maintenance of freedom was the motivating force which led to nineteenth century Siamese adventures in diplomacy which shifted radically during the course of the century from the type representative of a superior, autocratic oriental potentate to that which reflected the apex of the elaborate diplomatic procedures typifying the courts of Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. The shift

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que les Siamois espéraient promulguer une politique de bonne volonté mutuelle par l'octroi de décorations.

Dans les premières lettres du Prince Damrong, on peut discerner à Singapour et à Londres, une curiosité britannique plus que passagère pour ce qui est de sa mission auprès des Russes. C'est en Russie que la première, et aux yeux des Siamois, la plus honorifique des décorations devait être présentée au Tsarevitch. Il semblerait que les Russes, quant à eux, traitèrent la mission avec nonchalance. En fin de compte, la réception qu'ils lui réservèrent, si l'on en croit la correspondance publiée, apparait plutôt tiède.

Ainsi donc le succès réel de cette mission, à en juger rétrospectivement, consiste en la forte impression faite sur les Britanniques. La première parmi les nations non occidentales à adopter les procédés de la diplomatie occidentale, le Siam s'engagea de ce fait auprès de la Grande-Bretagne. Ceci facilitait l'amitié anglo-siamoise qui devint si importante au cours des dernières années du règne du Roi Chulalongkorn. Les précoces tentatives de diplomatie à l'occidentale entreprises par le Prince Damrong ont sans doute préparé la voie à des relations cordiales au cours de la période critique où le Siam se débattait pour maintenir sa souveraineté.

reflects, of course, the growing ominous proximity of European forces to Siamese borders, but the fact that the shift occurs reflects a commendable Siamese flexibility which other Southeast Asian nations lacked in dealing with European predators.

The inauguration of diplomatic change in Siam can be illustrated by comparing two of the nineteenth century British efforts to come to terms with the Siamese, that of the Crawford mission in 1821, and that of Sir John Bowring in 1855. The major concern of this paper, however, will be the early Siamese use of European forms of diplomacy as revealed by a Siamese mission to the courts of Europe in 1891-92.

In September, 1821, when Dr. John Crawford was deputed by the Governor-General of India on a mission to the courts of Siam and Cochin China there had been no effort whatsoever on the part of the Siamese, up to that time, to seriously study and emulate western diplomatic practice. Needless to say, there was probably no thought on Crawford's part that oriental customs in diplomacy would govern the negotiations, for the British had already had their fill of the arrogance of the Burmese in any form of diplomatic confrontation. In Crawford's journal, for example, his feeling of British superiority is revealed by an entry on April 23, 1822 where by inference he refers to Siam as, ". . . a barbarous and despotic country," compared to an England which, in his words possessed, "a free and civilized Government."<sup>1</sup>

The Crawford mission failed because no feel for the need for compromise developed on either side in what one could call a truly satisfactory fashion. Part of the difficulty in negotiation stemmed from the fact that the British included a surveyor as a member of the mission. This fact in itself suggests that the British interests in Siam went beyond the trade agreements they outwardly sought. Nonetheless, the instructions to Crawford specifically stated:

We rely with confidence on the discretion of the Envoy for avoiding any occasion of offence or jealousy to the Sovereign or people of the countries . . . which might be created by an incautious attempt to undertake survey operations.<sup>2</sup>

The instructions, however, seem to have been disregarded. Crawford, according to Siamese sources, went about his surveying operations without permission to do so, threatening those who stood in his way and using extremely intemperate language, all of which was reported to the Siamese government.<sup>3</sup> As a partial result of this behavior, the Siamese altered the treaty which Crawford had thought was final and mutually agreed upon at the time of drafting. When

the treaty was returned to him and the translations were effected Crawford was greatly exasperated to find alterations in the wording. His feelings over this breach in diplomatic procedure and behavior was revealed in his report to India on July 13, 1822:

I had the mortification to discover that material alterations had been made . . . in which the clause in favour of a free and fair commerce was changed for a pledge of assistance from the officers of the Government. After the many examples I had already had of the want of candor on the part of the officers of the Siamese Government I knew it was in vain to remonstrate and judging that an exposure of this circumstance might possibly lead us into embarrassments I considered it most prudent to forbear even from bringing the matter to the notice of the Siamese Government at all and accepted the documents as they were transmitted.<sup>4</sup>

Sir John Bowring studied all of the accounts of the Crawford mission in preparing for his own mission to Siam in 1855, and he drew heavily from both the Finlayson account<sup>5</sup> and Crawford's own *Journal* when he later compared his own mission with that of Crawford. Bowring's comments contrast notably with the above-mentioned Crawford report. He noted:

. . . The present state of matters in Siam presents many an element of hope which did not belong to the period of Mr. Crawford's visit. Though my course was not unattended with difficulties and embarrassments, they were much less than those with which my predecessors had to struggle, and many circumstances independent of me, or any influence or action of mine, contributed to my success which were wanting to the earlier efforts made for the extension of our amicable relations with Siam.<sup>6</sup>

Bowring, of course, had the supreme advantage of appearing on the Siamese scene at a time when the learned and revolutionary monarch, Rama IV, King Mongkut, (1851-68) had decided that the only way to coexist with the West was to join the West through the adoption of western techniques and procedures. King Mongkut, instead of conducting diplomatic negotiations in the usual essentially feudal, oriental fashion with the superior expecting tribute in the form of gifts from the inferior (although gifts were still important), and with no thought of disadvantageous concession by the former to the latter, sensed the western utilization of subtlety in diplomatic procedure and was the first Siamese monarch to come to terms with it. In 1855 King Mongkut saw enough advantage in friendship with Great Britain to grant important economic and legal concessions in the treaty he signed with Bowring. This agreement with Britain, in

turn, opened the door to what amounted to a revolutionary spate of treaties with other western powers.

It fell to King Mongkut's son, Rama V, or King Chulalongkorn, (1868-1910) however, to attempt the perfection of a diplomatic system which would enable Siam to operate in the field of international relations on a more modern and equitable basis with western powers. The necessity for a Siamese shift in total terms to the practices of the West in diplomatic procedure was most clearly underlined by the Franco-British competition for colonies in Asia during the last decade of the nineteenth century. As is now well known, the Siamese were caught between British interest in Burma and French aspirations in Indo-China.

The major part of this paper, therefore, will be concerned with the development of a new Siamese diplomacy on the eve of the major Siamese clash with the French, which came in 1893, and it is my main intention to reinterpret the purposes of an important Siamese mission to Europe undertaken in 1891-92. It should be noted that during the period when the French were developing their foothold in Cochin-China and Cambodia, Siamese diplomacy was largely conducted through British consuls in London, Rangoon, and Singapore.<sup>7</sup> The "Department of Foreign Affairs" in Siam was a part of the Ministry of Finance until 1885, and it was only promoted to ministerial status in that year.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, there was no strong Siamese effort to conduct foreign affairs through Siam's own nationals outside of Siam until the last decades of the 19th century.

I have used the term, "fringe diplomacy" in referring to certain aspects of the new Siamese approach to the West, so perhaps I should indicate what I mean by these words. My use of the word, "fringe" is to indicate that by the end of the nineteenth century the Siamese were going beyond the direct forms of diplomatic practice which are involved in specific treaty negotiation, they were willing to extend their diplomatic efforts into western countries, and they were adopting some of the elaborate western diplomatic facade indicators of friendship in order to buy friendship and support.

My specific example of this form of Siamese diplomacy, which I wish to analyze in some depth, is the intriguing mission to Europe in 1891-92, undertaken by H.R.H. Prince Damrong Rachanuphap, on the order of his half-brother, King Chulalongkorn. Until very recently there has been no reason for researchers to attempt to read between the lines regarding the well-publicized reasons for Prince Damrong's trip. Earlier in 1891 the Russian Tsarevich had paid a visit to Siam and had presented a decoration to King Chulalongkorn.

Prince Damrong, it was stated later in the year, was going to Europe to personally repay the visit of the Tsarevich, to confer a decoration on Alexander III in return for the honor paid the Siamese monarch, and to pay courtesy calls at various other European courts. He also was to study educational methods in the West, for Prince Damrong was Director of the Department of Education at the time of his departure. These reasons for the trip are the ones given by Sutcharit Thawonsuk, who has written the most definitive biography of Prince Damrong to date,<sup>9</sup> Tej Bunnag, in turn, whose excellent Ph.D. thesis on Damrong was finished in 1968, was content to agree with the reasons for the trip as put forth by Sutcharit.<sup>10</sup>

In 1968, however, a series of letters and messages relating to Prince Damrong's mission were uncovered in the archives of the Department of Fine Arts in Bangkok, and were published as a funereal volume to be distributed at the cremation of Mom Chao Dissanawat Diskul, one of Prince Damrong's sons.<sup>11</sup> This collection of documents casts a new light on the possible reasons for Prince Damrong's trip, and the various letters reveal in most interesting fashion the early efforts of the Siamese to use fringe diplomacy as a means to gain European friendship and support at a time when the danger to Siam's borders was growing.

In my opinion, this collection of documents reveals that Prince Damrong's mission had more intriguing undertones than the face of the mission suggested. Whereas it was all that it was represented to be, and which in its face represented fringe diplomatic efforts, my suggestion is that the trip represented a deeper and more complex effort on the part of the Siamese to adopt diplomatic courtesies and rituals to achieve greater, and, hopefully, more egalitarian European recognition for Siam. It was, in short, one more illustration, this time in the realm of diplomacy, of the Siamese effort to fight fire with fire by using the West's own methods in dealing with the West.

Prince Damrong was a natural choice to head the mission, for earlier in the year, 1891, he had been sent to Singapore to carry the official letter of welcome from King Chulalongkorn to the Tsarevich and had been associated with the Tsarevich in Bangkok.<sup>12</sup> The young prince was also a good choice because he read, understood, and spoke excellent English, and could thus not only communicate readily with the foreign advisers in Siam's employ but could also seek their advice.

In essence, the recently published correspondence, although it is carefully phrased and is never bluntly obvious, suggests that Siam

believed Russia to be a much mightier state in Europe than she was in reality. It also clearly indicates that Siam deemed Russia to be Siam's most important friend in Europe, and it is clear that the Siamese felt that if Russo-Siamese friendship could be firmly enough established, and well enough advertised, the friendship might feasibly prevent seizure of Siamese territories by Britain and France.

On the apparent assumption that there was diplomatic magic in the conferring of decorations, the various messages relating to the trip indicate that the Siamese were willing to rather overwhelmingly subscribe to the European custom of awarding decorations as a means of expressing royal favor, or as a means of seeking favor so that the Siamese could have the support of European nations not directly involved in Siam's problems with colonial powers. It is also interesting to note that the sons of King Chulalongkorn himself could be used as secondary pawns in the Siamese quest for international friendship. Finally, there was inevitably the Siamese hope that visits to British Asian possessions, London, and Paris would enable the Siamese to minimize the suspicions of one colonial power towards the other so that Siam could escape being caught between the two imperialist states in a power struggle in Asia.

These reasons for Prince Damrong's mission are, I suggest, the more important though somewhat concealed reasons for the European trip, although the stated reasons for the mission were, of course, carried out.

The major correspondents were Prince Damrong and his half-brother, Prince Devawongse Warophakan, another brother of King Chulalongkorn, who had been named Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bangkok. Prince Damrong showed unusual skill in adapting to European diplomatic interchange with its many nuances, and the total correspondence reveals a steady maturation as the young prince developed confidence in his somewhat concealed role as diplomat. Prince Devawongse was normally the intermediary between Damrong and the King, although some of the early correspondence between the latter two was direct and rather delightfully intimate as befitted personal communication between two brothers who were close to each other.

In order to elaborate on some of the suppositions I have raised, I should like to draw on some illustrative material from the correspondence. The very first letters which Prince Damrong sent to his king indicate that he had begun to feel the full impact of his diplomat's role in Penang and in Singapore, the first stops on his trip, for his inaugural message, dated 25 July, 1891, reveals that newspaper men

and even the British Governor in Singapore were questioning him closely regarding French threats to Siamese borders; Damrong further reported that there were stories in Singapore to the effect that the trip to Russia was to develop a strong Russo-Siamese treaty. He indicated in detail how he attempted to allay all suspicions of trouble, but he specifically asked for advice on how he should reply to such queries.

It is possible that Prince Damrong may have suspected that he had said too much at the times of these first stops on his trip. Although he had replied to his questioners that his mission to Russia was simply to present a decoration, there is a hint in what he said in reply to the effect that if His Majesty the King wished a Russian treaty, he would send another royal delegation after Prince Damrong's return to Siam; the words could have been interpreted that Prince Damrong was, indeed, preparing the way for such a treaty.<sup>13</sup> However, the *Penang Gazette* and *Straits Chronicle* of August 1, 1891, and the Singapore *Straits Times* of July 29th faithfully reported Prince Damrong's denials as follows:

Some misconception of the nature of this visit to St. Petersburg exists. It may be explained at once, says our contemporary, that there is in it nothing of the nature of a diplomatic mission—in fact Prince Damrong is not a diplomat. The cause of the visit to the Russian court is simple. As a recognition of the courtesy shown to the Czarewitch during his recent stay in Bangkok, the Czar has presented to H.R.H. the King of Siam the Grand Cross of St. Andrew, the highest order of Russia, and, as an international courtesy, Prince Damrong is now being sent to Russia to personally invest the Czar with the Order of CHAKRI, which is the highest Order conferred by the Royal Family of Siam.<sup>14</sup>

Damrong's second letter, dated July 28, 1891, again reported on English suspicions concerning the visit to Russia. He wrote:

The Governor [of Singapore] invited Mr. Morant<sup>15</sup> to a separate dinner, and I understand he tried to ask all kinds of questions. . . . He was wondering why the Russians, who have no geographical interest and no outstanding relationship with Siam, had such a great interest in the country to the point that the Siamese had decided to send a mission. Mr. Morant tried to explain that it was only a personal mission aiming at the Emperor and to the Tsarevich, and that it had nothing to do with the relations between the two countries.<sup>16</sup>

A more accurate indicator of Siamese hopes regarding Russia is revealed when the priority placed on the visit to Russia over the visits to other countries becomes apparent in the correspondence. A

whole series of telegrams and letters relates to the fact that King Chulalongkorn wanted Prince Damrong to visit Russia *first*, for this action was intended to show Russia that Siam deemed her to be the most important and powerful country in Europe, and the visit was to reveal to the other countries of Europe the importance of the Siamese-Russian friendship.

The priority becomes a subject in the correspondence, however, when the Siamese are thrown into some confusion to learn after the Prince's departure, that the Russian Emperor will be unable to receive Prince Damrong until mid-November. A long letter dated August 5, 1891 to Prince Damrong from H.M. the King indicates His Majesty's feeling that if Prince Damrong waited to visit other rulers after November he would be unable to stand the cold, so reluctant royal orders permitted a change in the visiting schedule.<sup>17</sup>

At this point the Siamese were extremely nervous regarding the possibly adverse impact on the Tsar if Prince Damrong visited other heads of state before he visited Alexander III. Therefore, elaborate diplomatic process was undertaken to ascertain through Russia's Chargé d'Affairs in Berlin whether or not the Tsar would be offended. A number of dispatches relate to the Siamese effort to avoid misunderstanding with the Russian court; one is the report by the Siamese Chargé d'Affairs to his Russian counterpart which clearly stressed the priority which Siam placed on the visit of the mission to Russia.<sup>18</sup>

The Russian nonchalance over the inconvenience of the November visitation date, and the revised order of Prince Damrong's visits tended to weaken the impact that the Damrong mission hoped to make in the matter of priorities, and it was probably quite discouraging to the Siamese. Nonetheless, the importance of Russia in Siamese eyes continued, and the clearest revelation of this is indicated in Prince Devawongse's letter to Prince Damrong in August, 1891, which urges Prince Damrong to use caution in referring to a treaty with Russia, but which indicates specifically that Damrong is to ascertain the depth of the Russian Emperor's sincerity and to try to investigate the intentions of the Russians vis-a-vis their relations with Great Britain and France. He states, for example, "If the Emperor of Russia does not agree with France it could constitute an additional pressure to prevent the French from doing anything to Siam."<sup>19</sup>

Insofar as Britain's curiosity over the Siamese visit to Russia is concerned, Prince Devawongse was apparently delighted at the British interest. In a communication sent in August, 1891, to Prince

Damrong, the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed the opinion that Britain must be kept in an interested but uninformed state. He was pleased at the denials concerning Russo-Siamese treaty relations which Prince Damrong had imparted to Singapore newspapers, for he felt these would erase British suspicions that Siam was becoming politically involved with Russia in important ways, and by neutralizing the suspicions, Britain would be robbed of reasons for invading Siam while the Siamese were still unprepared. However, he felt it worthwhile to keep Britain interested in Siam—in other words, to have her suspicious but without giving her grounds for reaction. By this method the Siamese hoped to gain greater respect from Britain.<sup>20</sup> Devawongse states: "It seems to me that they [the British] are now much more interested in what we are doing than before. This is a direct result of your mission to Russia."<sup>21</sup>

The utilization of decorations for the other crowned heads and officials of the various courts of Europe was for the purpose of gaining friendship for Siam and certainly at least sympathy beyond neutrality if Siam were to be threatened by either France or Britain. Although Prince Damrong may not have been designated as a diplomat, he certainly revelled in the activities wherein he exercised the fringe diplomacy which involved him in the full ritual of diplomatic courtesy and celebration. If any criticism is to be levelled, it might be to the effect that Prince Damrong perhaps was too lavishly generous with the decorations he was given authority to present, with the result that the full effect of decoration presentation must have been a bit diluted. Possibly this was no more true than it was in other countries, for this was the golden age of decoration giving. However, as is sometimes the case where quantity looms larger than quality, there were errors and discrepancies in the lists, and there was even a letter from a total stranger requesting that a Greek naval officer be decorated.<sup>22</sup>

The extremely varied nature of Prince Damrong's assignment is revealed by correspondence reporting on and relating to the education of four of King Chulalongkorn's sons who were in Europe. Prince Damrong was given the responsibility for checking on the educational plans for the young princes, and again there are incidental diplomatic undertones which cause the young men almost to be pawns in Siam's bid for international recognition. Damrong decided that Prince Chira should be sent to Denmark for schooling with emphasis on the military arts; however, he expressed concern over possible French reactions to this decision in a letter in which he states:

In sending the Prince to Denmark, I hope it will not offend the French. Since France is attempting to gain more favorable relations with Russia, we should not offend the French.<sup>23</sup>

To placate the French, Prince Damrong reports in the same letter that he is planning to send another of the princes (Prince Prawit) to France to learn French.

In the final analysis, it is curious that there is so little in the collection of correspondence relating specifically to the visit of the mission to Livadia where the Tsar received Damrong in Russia. The visit is duly reported both in letters and in the London *Times*,<sup>24</sup> but somehow it seems anticlimatic. That part of the mission the Siamese had initially intended to be the most important simply didn't come off significantly. But the Siamese had protected themselves so well against possible loss of face with the obvious covering purposes which were successfully carried out that the mission could be called a success. As a matter of fact, the British were especially responsive to Prince Damrong and his mission, and in some ways the Prince felt that his visit to Great Britain was the most successful visit made by the mission.

In all probability it was far more successful for the Siamese than even the externals suggested. True, in gambling parlance, they picked a horse destined to be a loser in Russia, and they failed to gain material support from Britain when the chips were down in the trouble with France. However, by being among the earliest of the non-western peoples to adopt western diplomatic practices they involved themselves with the British in ways which produced a friendship which may have prevented British seizures of Siamese territory when France made her grab in 1893. The British espousal of the use of Siam as a buffer state between the British interests in Burma and the French in Indochina can, indeed, be interpreted as an act of friendship towards Siam as well as an act of self-interest. In any case, in spite of the necessity to cede Malaysian territories to the British early in the twentieth century, the Anglo-Siamese friendship was deemed to be paramount during the remainder of Chulalongkorn's reign—and for this friendship a degree of thanks should go to Siamese adventures in fringe diplomacy as undertaken by Prince Damrong Rachanuphap in 1891.

1. John Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London, 1828), p. 133.

2. Vajiranana National Library, *The Crawfurd Papers. A Collection of Official records Relating to the Mission of Dr. John Crawfurd sent to Siam by the Government of India in the Year 1821* (Bangkok, 1915), p. 9.

3. *Ibid.*, p. iii.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.
5. George Finlayson, *Mission to Siam and Hue, the Capital of Cochin-China in the years 1821-22* (London, 1826). Finlayson was attached to the Crawford mission as surgeon and naturalist.
6. John Bowring, *The Kingdom and People of Siam with a Narrative of the Mission to that Country in 1855* (London, 1857). Two vols., v. II, p. 141.
7. Tej Bunnag, *The Provincial Administration of Siam from 1892 to 1915: A Study of the Creation, the Growth, the Achievements, and the Implications for Modern Siam, of the Ministry of the Interior under Prince Damrong Rachanuphap*. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Oxford University, 1968, p. 78.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
9. Sutcharit Thawonsuk, *A Biography of Prince Damrong Rachanuphap*, (In Thai). (Bangkok, 1965), 3 vols., vol. II.
10. Tej Bunnag, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
11. Ministry of Fine Arts, *Prince Damrong's Mission to Europe*, B.E. 2434 (1891) (In Thai) (Bangkok, 1968). It is particularly appropriate to have had this series of documents pertaining to Prince Damrong and his mission published in honor of Prince Damrong's son, for it was Prince Damrong who originated the idea of cremation volumes (books distributed at cremations to honor the deceased) as a means of publishing and preserving important documents pertaining to the history of Siam.
12. *Bangkok Times*, Feb. 18, 1891; March 21, 1891.
13. *Prince Damrong's Mission to Europe*, pp. 2-3.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 45.
15. Sir Robert Morant, an English educator in Siamese employ, was returning on home leave with Prince Damrong.
16. *Prince Damrong's Mission to Europe*, p. 10.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 22. It would appear that at this time the Siamese had an almost exaggerated fear of the European winter. King Chulalongkorn had not yet visited Europe himself, and Prince Damrong openly avoided cold seasons wherever he travelled throughout his life.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-60.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

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## Abstract / Résumé

The political treaty had not yet been ratified by France when London sent Paris a protest concerning the commercial treaty which was a particular interest to the English. Because of the situation in Europe and the support given France by Queen Victoria in the face of the war preparations of Bismarck, this British government protest was promptly satisfied. Falling in step with the English, the Germans announced their intention to establish consulates in Tonkin. Conversations were held between the French Ambassador to Berlin and the Chancellor of the Reich on the subject of North Vietnam. The result of these confidential meetings was that Bismarck agreed not to hinder French expansion overseas, in spite of pressure from German businessmen who were interested in establishing themselves in Tonkin. To the German Chancellor, this had the advantage of diverting French attention from Alsace-Lorraine, and perhaps also of placing the French and the English in opposition to one another.

The reactions of England to the Treaty of 1874, the designs of Germany on Tonkin, and the settlement of the French in Vietnam, resulted from the growing rivalry of the European powers in the race for new avenues of commerce. In this rivalry, France and England lost no time in claiming the principal roles.

Spain, which had remained a bystander from the beginning of the Cochinchina expedition, negotiated with Hue, with French approval, a commercial agreement of only slight value. This treaty, signed in January 1880, and never put into operation, was the only contact between Spain and Vietnam.

China, which until this time had held suzerainty over Vietnam, reacted to the 1874 treaty. The treaty had been the object of discussions between Paris and Peking and among lawyers as well. It had played a major role in the Franco-Chinese controversy which was soon to end in the armed conflict of 1884-85 in Tonkin.

As for the Vietnamese population, after the negotiation of the Treaty of 1874, they came to understand clearly that the existence of Vietnam as a state was in question and that their national independence had been seriously compromised. The armed struggle, directed by the intellectuals since the time of the occupation of Cochinchina in 1862, simultaneously against the foreign occupation and against the Court of Hue which they considered to be defeatist, now spread throughout the country.

# La Pénétration Française au Vietnam :

*Après le Traité de 1874*

NGUYEN XUAN THO

## II

APRES LE TRAITE DE 1874: REACTIONS INTERNATIONALES  
ET VIETNAMIENNES

Le traité signé entre la France et le Viêt-Nam le 15 mars 1874 suscite des réactions les plus diverses. Il contient des points contradictoires.

Le premier à le critiquer fut le successeur de l'amiral Dupré, l'amiral Krantz.

Dans son rapport du 11 août 1874 au ministre de la Marine, il écrivit, non sans réticence, que ce traité était imparfait, donc lourd d'orages locaux et de complications internationales. Pour le nouveau gouverneur de Cochinchine, il importait que le "plénipotentiaire fautif" c'est-à-dire son prédécesseur, l'amiral Dupré, fût mis en demeure par le nouveau ministre de la Marine, l'amiral de Montaignanc, de revenir à Saigon, "afin de lécher de sa propre langue un ours aussi hirsute". Et Krantz continuait:

L'Empire d'Annam ne veut pas et ne voudra jamais admettre le mot "Protectorat", et les ambassadeurs annamites ont d'ailleurs repoussé la prédominance du texte français; si la Chine vient à envoyer des troupes au Tonkin, quelle sera notre attitude, attendu que la Chine a toujours considéré l'Annam comme son vassal? Que ferez-vous si un sujet allemand, condamné par notre consul au Tonkin, en appelle à son gouvernement? Comment pourrez-vous rembourser à l'Espagne le montant de l'indemnité de guerre que lui doit encore l'Annam, pour le prélèvement de la moitié des droits de douane dans les trois ports ouverts, vu que les frais de cette douane dépasseront toujours ses bénéfices, le commerce avec le Yunnan étant illusoire et même nul à la période des basses eaux? Quels besoins avons-nous d'étendre notre 'protectorat' alors que notre récent établissement en Cochinchine eût raisonnablement dû, au contraire, être restreint?<sup>17</sup>

Le traité politique n'était pas encore ratifié que le gouvernement anglais remettait, le 29 juillet 1874, au ministre français des Affaires étrangères, par les soins de son ambassadeur à Paris, une protestation relative aux deux traités.

Mais c'est surtout le traité de commerce qui intéresse le gouvernement de Londres. Le 15 novembre 1874, un mémorandum anglais est

remis au gouvernement de Paris pour protester contre les droits de juridiction attribués aux consuls français, le privilège en vertu duquel ces consuls seraient appelés à prononcer sur les difficultés pouvant survenir entre des étrangers et l'administration des douanes, enfin les faveurs stipulées au profit des bâtiments chargés de marchandises provenant ou à destination de Saigon.

Au moment où, en Europe, la France cherchait des alliés pour faire face à une éventuelle menace de son voisin de l'Est; après que la reine Victoria venait de prendre position en faveur de la France devant les préparatifs de guerre de Bismarck en écrivant une lettre personnelle à Guillaume Ier, cette protestation du gouvernement britannique méritait une attention toute particulière de la part du gouvernement français.

Le duc Decazes, ministre français des Affaires étrangères, chercha un terrain de conciliation. Moins attaché à un traité politique conclu en dehors de son action par un marin, diplomate occasionnel, gouverneur de la Cochinchine, que son collègue de la Marine, plus sensible à celles des réclamations qui visaient le port de Saigon, il abandonna, par voie d'interprétation, le privilège exclusif de juridiction, caractéristique du protectorat plus ou moins déguisé conféré à la France par le traité du 15 mars 1874,

Dans sa réponse du 24 mars 1875 au gouvernement de Londres, le ministre français des Affaires étrangères fait ressortir le caractère temporaire du traité de 1874, reconnaît le caractère facultatif de la juridiction des consuls français, accepte le principe de l'admission éventuelle, dans les ports ouverts, de consuls étrangers, seuls investis de la juridiction de leurs nationaux.

Les modifications exigées par Londres sont ainsi satisfaites; cependant elles ne furent jamais prises en considération par Paris. Ce fut néanmoins la première brèche ouverte dans les traités, qui permet de redouter l'immixtion au Viêt-Nam d'influences rivales. Les partisans d'une politique énergique devaient s'en souvenir.

Par cette brèche, les Anglais ne cherchèrent pas à passer. Mais d'autres marquèrent bientôt leur désir d'en profiter. Les Allemands, les premiers, annoncèrent leur intention d'établir des consulats au Tonkin.

Dès 1874, l'impérialisme anglais avait consolidé ses positions dans l'Asie du Sud-Est, par l'établissement du protectorat britannique sur les sultanats de la presqu'île de Malacca et les protestations de la Cour de Saint-James auprès de Paris rentrent dans le cadre de la politique d'expansion coloniale de l'Angleterre, coïncidant avec l'époque des crises et des dépressions, en Europe, entre 1870 et 1880; de son côté,

l'Allemagne, dont l'économie nationale avait atteint, en 1873, un degré de prospérité encore inconnu et qui aboutit bientôt à une crise industrielle, à la recherche aussi de nouveaux débouchés, ne peut pas se désintéresser du Viêt-Nam et laisser à la France seule le bénéfice de son commerce dans cette région.

Parallèlement à ces demandes à Paris, les puissances s'efforçaient d'agir sur les lieux mêmes. Comme le gouvernement français venait de recevoir le mémorandum anglais, Sir Brooke-Robertson, consul britannique à Canton se rendit à Hanoi. De leur côté, les Allemands aussi ne manquaient pas de chercher des contacts avec les autorités vietnamiennes. Le 6 avril 1875, l'avis allemand "Wolf" arrivait à Haiphong. A Tourane, son commandant se mit en rapports avec les autorités vietnamiennes, qui, immédiatement, rendirent compte à leur gouvernement du désir du commandant d'aller à Huê, soit avec son navire par Thuân-An, soit par terre, pour voir l'Empereur, et traiter au sujet du commerce.

Avant de répondre à cette démarche, la Cour de Huê jugea utile, pour s'éclairer, de demander conseil au chargé d'affaires de France dans la capitale. Celui-ci lui conseilla de donner des ordres pour que le navire soit accueilli avec tous les égards dûs aux nations étrangères en temps de paix, et de charger les autorités de Tourane de recevoir la visite du commandant, à titre de représentant de la Cour; si cet officier demandait davantage, il fallait le prier d'exposer le but de sa visite ou de sa mission, dans une lettre qui mettrait le ministre des Relations extérieures du Viet-Nam à même de lui répondre en connaissance de cause.

Le commandant répondit aux autorités locales qu'il n'avait pour mission que de visiter les autorités du pays, et qu'il quittait Tourane pour se rendre à Qui-Nhon. . . .

A la même époque, l'ambassadeur de France à Berlin, M. de Saint-Vallier, eut plusieurs entretiens avec le chancelier Bismarck sur le Tonkin.

En novembre 1878, au cours d'une conversation de caractère intime, Bismarck entretint Saint-Vallier de l'embarras que lui causaient les ardeurs colonisatrices des armateurs et négociants des grands ports de commerce allemands, Hambourg, Brême, Stettin. Le Prince confiait à l'Ambassadeur que ses idées personnelles étaient opposées à la création de colonies allemandes au delà des mers. Il y voyait pour l'Empire un danger et une source de dépenses, et il avait repoussé diverses tentatives récentes, notamment l'offre du sultan du Maroc de lui céder un port, et celle du Danemark de lui vendre l'une des Antilles. Cependant il ne pouvait méconnaître qu'une puissance, ayant

un commerce aussi étendu et un besoin d'expansion aussi grand que l'Allemagne, avait intérêt à créer, dans des comptoirs et des factoreries, à défaut de colonies, des débouchés pour son commerce dans des contrées lointaines. D'autre part, il ne voyait pas sans regret l'immense courant de l'émigration allemande se perdre aux États-Unis, sans profit pour la mère-patrie.

Ces réflexions le conduisaient à admettre l'établissement de comptoirs allemands dans certaines régions éloignées, en Océanie, en Asie, peut-être en Afrique méridionale. Et il ajoute, en parlant du Vietnam:

... Des explorateurs allemands me pressent de profiter du moment où le terrain est encore libre pour fonder des établissements au Tonkin et sur les rives du fleuve Rouge, qu'ils me représentent comme l'unique artère navigable permettant de faire pénétrer nos marchandises jusqu'au coeur inabordable jusqu'ici de la Chine méridionale.

J'ai objecté à nos voyageurs que le Tonkin me paraissait être dans l'orbite naturelle des possessions de la France en Cochinchine, et qu'il y avait même eu, il y a quelques années, un traité de 1874 entre la France et l'Annam, reconnaissant une sorte de droit pour la France d'établir son protectorat sur le Tonkin.

Mais nos voyageurs répliquent que la France n'a donné aucune suite à ce traité, qu'elle semble avoir renoncé à tout projet sur le Tonkin, et qu'elle s'en désintéresse tellement qu'elle a laissé les pirates chinois prendre possession du fleuve Rouge et fermer cette voie au commerce.

Il suffirait, d'après eux, d'une expédition peu coûteuse pour purger le fleuve de ces malfaiteurs, rouvrir la navigation au commerce européen, et assurer sa sécurité en établissant quelques postes fortifiés sur les rives.

Je n'ai accueilli ni repoussé ces suggestions, tenant à m'en entendre avec vous (en s'adressant à l'ambassadeur) avant d'arrêter une décision; je ne voudrais pas aller sur vos brisées, ni contrecarrer vos vues; je vous prie donc de demander, dans une forme toute amicale et privée, à M. Waddington, si votre gouvernement entend se prévaloir de ce traité avec l'Annam, et en exécuter les stipulations en ce qui touche le Tonkin, ou bien s'il se désintéresse de ce pays et renonce à y établir son protectorat et à assurer la sécurité et la police du fleuve Rouge. Votre réponse décidera de notre conduite. . . .<sup>18</sup>

Par lettre particulière, afin d'assurer le secret de cette communication à laquelle Bismarck tenait à donner un caractère tout à fait confidentiel, Saint-Vallier fit part de cette confiance du Prince à son ministre des Affaires étrangères, Waddington.

Sous la même forme, le ministre répond à l'ambassadeur, le char-

geant de remercier vivement le Prince, et de lui faire connaître que la France regardait la possession du Tonkin comme nécessaire à la sécurité et au développement de sa colonie de Cochinchine. Le gouvernement français comptait toujours exécuter le traité avec le Viet-Nam et affranchir le fleuve Rouge en détruisant les pirates chinois; seulement, il ne pouvait indiquer l'époque où il accomplirait cette entreprise dans ces parages, mais ce serait probablement prochain.

Le Prince ne fit aucune objection à cette réponse, mais il formula une réserve: au cas si la France abandonnerait, par la suite, ses projets au Tonkin, et où elle renoncerait au bénéfice du traité de 1874, il pourrait reprendre sa liberté d'action.

Bismarck n'aborda plus cette question avec Saint-Vallier, cependant, à différentes reprises, les feuilles officieuses de la Chancellerie, rédigées sous son inspiration, continrent des articles dont la conclusion était qu'en présence de l'inertie de la France, qui laissait le fleuve Rouge livré aux pirates chinois, il serait de l'intérêt de l'Allemagne d'assurer à son commerce cette voie féconde, en détruisant les pirates et en fondant des comptoirs fortifiés sur les rives du fleuve.

Plus tard, appelé à la tête de la direction des affaires politiques au ministère des Affaires étrangères, Saint-Vallier revint plusieurs fois sur cette question, dans les lettres particulières à ses ministres successifs, MM. Waddington, Freycinet, Barthélemy de Saint-Hilaire, de 1879 à 1881.

En fait, si les commerçants allemands sont assez disposés à prendre pied au Tonkin, Bismarck ne fait rien pour empêcher l'expansion de la France outre-mer; dans son esprit, cela a l'avantage de la détourner de l'Alsace-Lorraine, et peut-être aussi de l'opposer aux Anglais.

Le 26 juillet, Freycinet, ministre français des Affaires étrangères, peut déclarer formellement à Jauréguiberry, son collègue de la Marine et des Colonies: "L'Allemagne m'a fait savoir qu'elle verrait sans aucune jalousie que nous implantions notre domination au Tonkin."

L'Allemagne est donc quelque peu responsable de la poussée coloniale française. Le Chancelier du Reich n'a-t-il pas en outre déclaré: "Je laisse à la France la direction de toutes les frontières, sauf celle du Rhin"?

Les réactions de l'Angleterre devant le traité de 1874, les convoitises de l'Allemagne sur le Tonkin, y compris l'implantation de la France au Viet-Nam, résultent de la concurrence croissante des puissances européennes pour une course aux débouchés commerciaux. On recherche des pays neufs, riches en matières premières, où la main-d'oeuvre soit bon marché, commodes pour l'exportation des capitaux, où l'on pourrait se défendre contre la concurrence étrangère, en un

mot, y établir son propre monopole. Les pays lointains et insuffisamment développés, dont le Viet-Nam, sont les territoires les plus appropriés à cette exploitation.

Dans cette rivalité, la France et l'Angleterre ne tardèrent pas à tenir seules le premier rôle.

L'Espagne, qui s'est tenue à l'écart depuis l'expédition, s'intéresse à l'offre de la France d'ouverture de consulats. Par la voie de son consul à Saïgon, le gouvernement de Madrid informe le gouverneur de la Cochinchine de son intention de conclure un traité de commerce avec le Viet-Nam, et invite son représentant à solliciter les bons offices du chargé d'affaires de France auprès de la Cour de Huê pour proposer au gouvernement vietnamien l'ouverture des négociations.

Jusqu'ici la France s'est réservée la part la plus importante de profits dans les négociations avec le Viet-Nam; l'ancien allié malheureux, l'Espagne, a été peu à peu oublié; il est bien naturel que cette dernière ait droit à quelques petites faveurs auprès de la France plutôt que l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne.

Ce traité commercial, sans grande valeur, sera signé le 27 janvier 1880. Ce sera le seul contact entre l'Espagne et le Viet-Nam.

Le 27 février 1875, le duc Decazes, ministre français des Affaires étrangères, envoya des instructions au comte de Rochechouart, ministre plénipotentiaire de France à Pékin, lui demandant de porter à la connaissance du gouvernement chinois le traité de 1874.

Le nouveau chef de la diplomatie française, qui venait de remplacer le duc de Broglie, était décidé à pratiquer une politique étrangère prudente, en attendant que l'ordre et le travail permettent à la France de panser les plaies de la guerre de 1870 et de redresser sa situation. Le mot de "Protectorat" ne figurait ni dans le traité, ni dans sa lettre au ministre de France à Pékin. En outre, il soulignait particulièrement l'article II du traité, aux termes duquel la France reconnaissait la souveraineté de Tu-Duc et de son entière indépendance vis-à-vis de toute puissance étrangère et lui promettait aide et assistance. Decazes demandait à Rochechouart de faire ressortir au Tsongli Yamen<sup>19</sup> les avantages que la Chine pourrait retirer de l'ouverture à la navigation du fleuve Rouge, depuis la mer jusqu'au Yunnan. Il invitait, en outre, le ministre de France, dans la mesure où les circonstances résultant des changements de règne lui permettrait, de dissiper la défiance du Tsongli yamen.

En effet, l'empereur Kouang-Siu, âgé de quatre ans, venait de monter le trône. Pendant la minorité de l'empereur, une femme dont la personnalité devait, de 1860 à sa mort, en 1908, marquer profondément l'histoire de la Chine, l'impératrice douairière Tseu-Hi, détenait

tous les pouvoirs de son jeune neveu qu'elle fit monter sur le trône à la mort de son fils, l'empereur T'ong-Tche.

Dans sa lettre du 24 mai 1875 au Tsongli yamen, accompagnant la communication du texte du traité de 1874, le ministre de France à Pékin déclarait notamment:

... C'est à la France qu'il appartient de veiller à la sécurité et à l'indépendance de S.M. Tu-Duc et le gouvernement chinois comprendra combien il est nécessaire, pour le maintien des bonnes relations qui existent entre la France et la Chine, de donner des ordres les plus sévères aux autorités du Yunnan pour les engager, non seulement à empêcher de nouvelles bandes chinoises d'entrer dans le royaume d'Annam, mais même à rappeler celles qui s'y livrent actuellement à toutes sortes de sévices.<sup>20</sup>

Il demandait, en outre, l'ouverture de négociations pour l'accès du fleuve Rouge au commerce étranger.

En répondant au diplomate français, le 15 juin 1875, le Prince Kong, président du Tsongli yamen, lui faisait remarquer qu'en fait, dans le traité en question, rien n'indiquait que le Yunnan dût être ouvert au commerce étranger, que les troupes chinoises stationnées au Tonkin avaient été envoyées, sur la demande du gouvernement vietnamien, pour la répression de la piraterie, enfin, que le Viet-Nam était tributaire de la Chine.

Dans les conversations entre le président du Tsongli Yamen et le ministre de France à Pékin au sujet de la suzeraineté chinoise sur le Viet-Nam, une erreur de traduction s'était glissée, faisant croire au diplomate français que la Chine avait renoncé à son droit de suzeraineté sur le Viet-Nam. Kong aurait déclaré que; "L'Annam, appelé autrement Viet-Nam, est depuis toujours tributaire de la Chine": cette phrase fut traduite par l'interprète en: "L'Annam est la contrée appelée également yué-Nam (Vietnam), elle a été tributaire de la Chine. Autrement dit, le Viet-Nam n'était plus tributaire de la Chine. S'appuyant sur cette traduction, le ministre de France en déduisit que la Chine avait renoncé à son droit de suzeraineté sur le Viet-Nam; aussi, dans sa lettre en date du 19 juin à Decazes, Rochechouart écrivit que: "... Le Prince ne parle de la vassalité de l'Annam à l'égard de la Chine qu'à l'état passé, ce qui est une reconnaissance tacite de la situation actuelle."

Il ajoutait: "Il me semble, en tout cas, qu'il serait utile que le roi Tu-Duc notifiât au gouvernement chinois le traité, de façon à ce que le Tsongli yamen ne garde aucun doute sur la réalité de son existence. . . ."<sup>21</sup>

Le traité franco-vietnamien de 1874 avait été l'objet d'après discus-

sions entre les gouvernements français et chinois et entre juristes. Il avait joué un grand rôle dans la controverse franco-chinoise qui devait bientôt aboutir au conflit armé de 1884-85 dont le Tonkin fut le théâtre.

La Chine avait de sérieuses difficultés avec la Russie (affaire de Kouldja) et avec le Japon (affaire de Corée); elle se souciait fort peu du traité de 1874 et ne souleva aucune protestation sérieuse le lendemain de la notification. Elle devait bientôt reprendre ses activités diplomatiques pour protester contre ce traité, au lendemain du traité de Kouldja (1881), quand le marquis Tseng Ki-Tseu fut nommé ministre plénipotentiaire de Chine à Paris, et à la nouvelle de l'aggravation de la situation au Tonkin.

Au surplus, le Céleste Empire était tenu, à Paris, pour "négligeable", au point de vue militaire et diplomatique.

Parmi les puissances qui pouvaient être les plus intéressées donc, seule la réaction de l'Angleterre a été plus ou moins prise en sérieuse considération par la France. Satisfaction de principe lui a été aussitôt accordée sur les points de droit incriminés. Elle s'en tiendra là; son attention est, à ce moment, concentrée sur le Proche-Orient: la suprématie économique sur le canal de Suez, le renforcement de ses positions dans la Méditerranée orientale retiennent toute son attention.

Au lendemain des traités de 1874, il apparaît très clairement que l'existence du Viet-Nam en tant qu'Etat est mise en question et que l'indépendance nationale est fortement compromise. Cette appréhension commençait à prendre forme parmi la population vietnamienne; elle est partagée au moins par les plus conscients des responsables de la direction des affaires du pays.

En même temps que les graves événements se succédaient et se précipitaient, mettant en jeu l'avenir du Viet-Nam, un courant "réformiste" se faisait jour dans le peuple, inquiétant la Cour de Huê. L'exemple donné par le Japon en inaugurant, en 1868, l'ère Meiji, l'ère du Progrès, fut suivi par le Viet-Nam; le même se formera en Chine après la défaite de 1895 par K'ang Yeou-Wei et Leang K'i-Tch'ao.

Animés par des hommes de coeur tels que Phan-Thanh-Gian, en 1864, ou Nguyễn-Truong-To, en 1866, ou Dinh-Van-Diên, en 1868, ou Pham-Phu-Thu, en 1874, ou plus tard, par Pham-Kiêm, en 1881, et tant d'autres . . ., des projets de réformes, dignes d'intérêt, émanant de personnes ayant voyagé et vécu à l'étranger, conscients de la faiblesse de leur pays et de leur retard sur ceux d'Europe, désirant sincèrement le relèvement et la grandeur nationale, ne trouvent pas malheureusement auprès des milieux dirigeants l'accueil favorable qu'ils méritent largement.

Parmi les hauts dignitaires de la Cour, seuls Phan-Thanh-Gian et Pham-Phu-Thu étaient animés d'un esprit nouveau et partisans d'une véritable rénovation nationale. Ayant l'occasion de voyager en Europe et de constater la force et la richesse de la civilisation occidentale, Phan-Thanh-Gian voulait la faire profiter à son pays; pour avoir admiré cette civilisation, il a été soupçonné à tort par la Cour de Huê d'être un "francophile". Pham-Phu-Thu, qui avait été en France et Espagne avec Phan-Thanh-Gian, soumettait, en mars 1865, à Tu-Duc, un rapport demandant la création des écoles navales, l'enseignement des langues étrangères, le développement de l'industrie, l'exploitation des mines et des richesses nationales, etc. . . . De nouveau, en 1873, puis en 1874, il proposait à la Cour de réorganiser sans délai l'armée suivant les techniques modernes, d'ouvrir le pays au commerce étranger, de chercher parmi les puissances européennes des alliés, d'installer un consulat à Hong-Kong pour faciliter les relations avec les pays étrangers.

Seul le ministre de la Guerre Trâ-Tiên-Thanh apportait son appui sans réserve aux idées nouvelles de Phan-Thanh-Gian et de Pham-Phu-Thu; il défendait, en outre, les lettrés qui soumettaient à la Cour des projets de réforme et de modernisation du pays dignes d'intérêt.

En 1866, Nguyen-Truong-To proposa à la Cour la séparation du pouvoir administratif et du pouvoir judiciaire, l'introduction, dans l'enseignement, des sciences exactes, l'envoi à l'étranger des étudiants, la prospection et l'exploitation des mines, la modernisation de l'agriculture, le développement de l'industrie et du commerce, la réorganisation de l'armée, la construction des routes et des chemins de fer, etc. . . . Pour faire face à ces dépenses, il avait prévu une réforme des finances nationales fondée sur la protectionnisme et la justice fiscale. Originaire du Nghê-An, catholique, Nguyễn-Truong-To avait suivi Mgr. Gauthier à Hong-Kong, puis en France; il est rentré au Viet-Nam en 1861.

Un lettré de Ninh-Binh, Dinh-Van-Diên, soumettait, en 1868, un projet pour l'exploitation des mines d'or, la construction des chemins de fer, le recrutement des ingénieurs et des professeurs européens pour l'enseignement des techniques modernes. Un autre lettré de Thai-Binh, Bui-Viên, proposait l'ouverture du pays au commerce étranger; il a été envoyée par Tu-Duc en Chine pour établir des relations commerciales.

Cependant, à la Cour, on rencontrait des opposants très décidés à ces projets de réforme. C'étaient Vo-Trong-Binh, Truong-Dang-Quê, Nguyễn-Tri-Phuong et la Reine-Mère.

Le sérieux obstacle, pour les partisans de la réforme, provient de la guerre de conquête menée par la France au Viet-Nam; les opposants

composés pour la plupart d'anciens serviteurs de la Couronne et dirigés par la Reine-Mère, trouvent dans cette guerre un bon prétexte pour écarter leur pays de tout ce qui pourrait le rapprocher de ces "barbares de l'Occident". C'est la raison pour laquelle la Cour rejette en bloc tout ce qui peut apporter au Viêt-Nam les bienfaits de la civilisation européenne.

Nguyễn-Hiệp, ambassadeur du Viêt-Nam au Siam, a connu la même déception. A son retour de Bangkok, en 1879, celui-ci a beau expliquer à la Cour les avantages de l'habile diplomatie du Siam qui a su tirer profit des rivalités franco-anglaises pour préserver son indépendance; il n'a pas été non plus écouté. Il en a été de même pour Lê-Dinh qui, renté de Hongkong en 1881, avait voulu montrer à Huê les bénéfices que le Viet-Nam pourrait tirer en suivant l'exemple du Japon et de la Chine qui ont ouvert leur pays à la pénétration européenne et à des échanges commerciaux.

Ces entraves portées à la modernisation du pays sont d'autant plus facilitées par l'absence, dans la société agricole vietnamienne, d'une classe de bourgeoisie maissante, enrichie par le commerce, pour faire pression sur les milieux dirigeants en vue des échanges internationaux et de l'ouverture du pays.

Quant à l'opinion publique, le peuple et la grande majorité des lettrés ignoraient à peu près complètement de ce qui se passait en dehors des frontières de leur pays. Les moyens d'information n'existaient pas. Les pays d'Occident sont, à leurs yeux, "barbares", parce qu'ils ont introduit la guerre au Viet-Nam. Le sujet proposé, en 1876, au concours triennal de Huê: "La modernisation a-t-elle été favorable au Japon?", est traité dans un sens négatif par presque tous les candidats, bon témoignage de cet état d'esprit.

Soumis à l'influence culturelle de la Chine, la plupart de ces lettrés et des dignitaires de la Cour, qui n'étaient jamais allés à l'étranger, étaient totalement ignorants des progrès techniques et scientifiques accomplis dans les pays d'Europe; ils ne pouvaient concevoir d'autre civilisation que celle du monde chinois.

La civilisation chinoise séparait radicalement le savoir du travail manuel. Le groupe intermédiaire des techniciens et des scientifiques n'existait pas. Le savoir, très respecté, était essentiellement spéculatif; le lettré se laissait pousser les ongles: mains à jamais exemptes du contact avec les choses. Les examens impériaux insistaient surtout sur la récitation de textes classiques et sur la maîtrise d'un style raffiné et littéraire, aucune discipline scientifique ou technique ne figurait au programme. Encore au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, l'éducation classique orthodoxe

ne comprenait même pas l'étude de l'arithmétique élémentaire. Dans l'ensemble, une telle éducation conduisait à surestimer l'importance des valeurs et des principes, aux dépens de réalisations matérielles.

Cet état de choses explique la curieuse réaction des lettrés, tant Vietnamiens que Chinois, lorsqu'ils se trouvèrent pour la première fois en contact avec l'Occident. Et la foi inébranlable dans un mode de gouvernement qui avait assuré une stabilité millénaire concourt aussi à expliquer cette obstination, qui tenait du suicide, des mandarins-lettrés à refuser d'admettre le besoin de changements, bien qu'ils aient eu maintes fois l'occasion d'expérimenter la force dévastatrice des armes occidentales. Accepter la technologie et l'organisation occidentales serait revenu pour eux à partager leurs pouvoirs avec des gens dont l'éducation et les habitudes de pensée étaient complètement différents des leurs. Ceci aurait impliqué non seulement la diminution de leur puissance, mais aussi le renoncement au prestige de l'enseignement classique auquel les mandarins devaient une grande partie de leur autorité.

Les reculs successifs du gouvernement de Huê indignèrent la nation toute entière. Si Tu-Duc et les mandarins, défaitistes, sont responsables de l'asservissement et de la décadence du pays, bon nombre de lettrés, patriotes ardents, vivant auprès du peuple, ayant volontairement renoncé à la carrière mandarinale, se mettent à la tête de la révolte ouverte contre l'Empereur et sa Cour.<sup>22</sup> Le parti "Van-Thân", formé dans le Nghê-An dès mars 1874, dirigé par Trân-Tân et Dang-Nhu-Mai, groupant trois mille lettrés, prit les armes contre la Cour de Huê. Ils protestaient contre le traité de 1874 et leur action était dirigée à la fois contre les "Occidentaux" et la "fausse doctrine". Ils réussirent à s'emparer de Ha-Tinh, mais furent anéantis, après une sanglante répression, par Nguyen Van-Tuong.

En juillet 1874, éclate une révolte des "partisans des Lê", dans la province de Hai-Duong; ce fut Tôn-Thât-Thuyêt qui réprima ces révoltes et dispersa les soulèvements de Co-Loa et de Son-Tây.

A la même époque, les Pavillons Jaunes qui jusqu' alors pillaient la région de Tuyên-Quang, s'installèrent à Vinh-Tuong. Ils continuèrent à rançonner les populations, et semèrent le désordre. Les troupes vietnamiennes, ayant à leur tête Tôn-Thât-Thuyêt, livrèrent en 1875 une bataille décisive aux rebelles, capturèrent leur chef Houang Tch'ong-Ying. Les bandes se dispersèrent; peu à peu la haute-région du Tonkin fut débarrassée de ces bandes, et la paix s'y rétablit.

Mais, en 1878, des bandes chinoises, sous les ordres de Li Yung-Choi, pillèrent la région de Lang-Son. Leur chef, chinois d'origine viet-

namienne, général de l'armée chinoise, prétendit alors descendre de la famille impériale des Ly (et non pas des Lê), qui régna en Cochinchine jusqu'en 1802. Ce nouveau prétendant qui, grâce à sa fortune considérable gardé sous ses ordres des soldats qu'il commandait déjà pour le compte de l'empereur de Chine, et y avait ajouté des bandes de pillards avait, prétend-t-on, cent mille hommes, campant à la frontière du Tonkin.

Les autorités de Huê, pour se débarrasser de ce dangereux prétendant, ne demandèrent pas l'aide des Français, comme prévoyait le traité. Et ce ne fut certainement pas le peu d'activités officielles que manifestait la France qui les en dissuada. Elles trouvèrent tout naturel de s'adresser au commandant de la province chinoise de Kouang-Toung, Fong Tseu-Ts'ai, pour qu'il envoie des troupes contre son ex-collègue. Celui-ci fut capturé, en 1879, par les troupes vietnamiennes et livré aux Chinois.

Quoique devenus Etat indépendant, le Viet-Nam a toujours gardé l'habitude de porter des présents aux empereurs de Chine, obligation, comme nous l'avons vu, de pure courtoisie dont le seul but est de conserver des relations de bon voisinage. Cette tradition, transmise de génération en génération, Tu-Duc la conserva, en dépit du traité signé en 1874 sous l'effet de la contrainte avec la France; il pouvait se fonder sur la clause d'après laquelle "la France reconnaît l'entière indépendance du Viêt-Nam".

Après la dure leçon de 1874, au lieu de chercher un appui du côté du peuple comme il aurait dû le faire, de réorganiser le pays en l'ouvrant aux techniques occidentales en imitant l'exemple du Japon, Tu-Duc continue de regarder vers la Chine féodale, malgré ses retentissantes défaites devant les Occidentaux. Ce concours des forces régulières chinoises des districts frontières pour la répression des bandes de Li Yong-Choi ou des Pavillons Jaunes de Houang Tch'ong-Ying le prouve.

En 1875, à la mort de l'empereur chinois T'ong-Tche et à l'avènement de Kouang-Siu, Tu-Duc fit part aux autorités chinoises des deux Kouang—dont dépendent ses relations avec la Chine—de son intention d'envoyer une mission spéciale pour porter des tributs exprimant à la fois ses condoléances et ses hommages à la Cour de Pékin. Sur le rapport du gouverneur général Lieu Tch'ang-Yieou, Pékin l'en dissuada.

Insistant davantage encore, l'année suivante, Tu-Duc fit connaître au gouverneur du Kouang-Si que le moment était venu pour envoyer le tribut quadriennal et se renseigner sur la date où ses envoyés pourraient être reçus. Avec le consentement de Pékin, une ambassade

vietnamienne dirigée par Bui-Van-Di franchit la frontière chinoise, le 18 septembre 1876, par la "Porte de Chine".<sup>23</sup> Cette mission arriva à Pékin au début de 1877 et repartit en fin d'année.

Ce geste, parfaitement conforme au traité de 1874, mais présenté par les autorités françaises comme un "acte de perfidie", et qui constituera l'un des griefs invoqués en 1882 pour justifier un nouveau coup de force contre l'indépendance du Viêt-Nam n'est pas entièrement approuvé par tous les Vietnamiens.

Apprenant l'envoi d'une ambassade vietnamienne à Pékin, le 28 septembre 1876, le consul de France à Hanoi, Kergaradec, écrit à l'amiral Duperré, gouverneur de la Cochinchine, pour attirer son attention sur cette grave question en exprimant la crainte que "cette mission étant la première que les Annamites envoyaient à Pékin depuis la conclusion des traités de 1874, des façons d'agir bonnes ou mauvaises de l'ambassadeur pourraient, plus tard, être invoquées comme des précédents."<sup>24</sup>

L'amiral Duperré, en communiquant cette lettre au ministre plénipotentiaire de France à Pékin, vicomte Brenier de Montmorand, ajoutait, dans sa lettre en date du 28 octobre 1876:

. . . M. de Kergaradec soulève une question sérieuse, celle des nouvelles relations qui devraient exister entre l'Annam et la Chine.  
( . . . )

Si dans l'article II, il est dit que la France reconnaît *l'entière indépendance de l'Annam vis-à-vis de toute puissance étrangère, quelle qu'elle soit*, dans l'article III, il est également dit que le Roi d'Annam s'engage à *ne rien changer à ses relations diplomatiques actuelles*. La contradiction est flagrante, et si nous nous armons du texte de l'article II pour faire disparaître toutes traces des anciennes relations entre la Chine et l'Annam, ne sommes-nous pas exposés à rencontrer de la part de l'un des gouvernements intéressés, de chacun d'eux peut-être, une opposition formelle basée sur les termes précis de l'article III?<sup>25</sup>

Duperré ne partage pas les craintes de Kergaradec, il n'attachait aucune importance à "cet acte de pure courtoisie, qui n'impliquait pas la pensée de resserrer un lien de vassalité disparu."<sup>26</sup>

Si le gouverneur de la Cochinchine ne se préoccupait pas de l'envoi en Chine de cette ambassade vietnamienne, le ministre français des Affaires étrangères ne partageait pas son opinion.

Le duc Decazes considérait que la présence des troupes chinoises chargées d'occuper, à la demande du gouvernement vietnamien, les districts frontaliers, était de nature à inspirer des doutes sur le véritable état de choses que la France avait entendu établir au Tonkin et paraissait contraster fâcheusement avec les déclarations de la France en vue

d'effacer toute trace de vassalité du Viêt-Nam à l'égard de la Chine. Il se demandait si l'indifférence témoignée par la Chine lorsqu'il s'était agi de la lointaine Cochinchine ne se retrouverait toujours au même degré lorsqu'il s'agirait de son voisin immédiat, le Tonkin, que ses armées, au surplus, avaient eu l'année précédente, la faculté de parcourir librement.

Désirant être exactement renseigné sur cette question afin de se guider dans l'adoption d'une politique à cet égard, le ministre des Affaires étrangères demanda au ministre de France à Pékin de lui faire parvenir des éclaircissements.

Si le duc Decazes, en se fondant sur l'indépendance du Viêt-Nam pensait qu'une fois ce pays affranchi de la suzeraineté chinoise, la France pourrait y exercer facilement la politique qu'elle entendait imposer, tandis que l'amiral Duperré ne s'inquiétait pas des rapports de Huê avec Pékin, c'est qu'il ne cessait de croire à un protectorat tout platonique sur le Viêt-Nam.

Brenier de Montmorand conseillait, lui aussi, la prudence. Dans sa réponse du 30 septembre à son ministre des Affaires étrangères, il écrivait que si la Chine n'avait fait aucune objection, ni demandé aucune explication au sujet du traité de 1874, il fallait chercher la raison de son silence non dans son acquiescement, mais plutôt dans son désir de n'attirer, pour le moment, sur elle aucune complication, ou bien qu'elle ne saisissait ni la portée, ni la signification du mot "protectorat".

Se référant à la déclaration du prince Kong, président du Tsongli yamen, il maintenait que "la Chine ne pouvait refuser protection et assistance à son vassal", le ministre de France à Pékin faisait observer que le Viêt-Nam semblait, en fait, avoir deux protecteurs: la France et la Chine.

Plus tard, dans sa lettre en date du 25 mars 1878 où il faisait part au ministre des Affaires étrangères, Waddington, du retour de la mission vietnamienne au Viêt-Nam, Brenier de Montmorand émit l'opinion suivante:

N'y a-t-il pas quelque chose de plus que bizarre dans ce fait qu'un chef d'Etat, se faisant traiter par nous d'Empereur, de Prince Souverain, auprès duquel nous accréditons une légation, et qui, d'un autre côté, persiste malgré tout à n'être pour la Chine qu'un prince de seconde classe, en vertu de l'investiture qu'il a reçue d'elle et à laquelle non seulement depuis 1849 il n'a opposé aucune protestation publique et solennelle mais encore dont il continue d'accepter les charges!<sup>27</sup>

Les Français ne sont pas les seuls à se plaindre de ce comportement

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de la Chine envers le Viêt-Nam et de cette soumission servile de la Cour de Huê; les Vietnamiens, intéressés directement, le sont encore davantage.

De plus l'obstination de Tu-Duc à ne regarder que vers la Chine féodale était dangereuse à différents points de vue: D'abord, depuis la fameuse "Guerre de l'Opium", la Chine n'est plus une nation puissante que le Viêt-Nam surestime. Mais aussi, ces avances systématiques, faites en pure perte, alarmaient les Français, et, inconsciemment, contribuaient à les pousser à un nouveau coup de force. De même l'arrivée des troupes régulières chinoises, avec l'autorisation de Tu-Duc, pour organiser en commun avec l'armée vietnamienne la chasse à Li Yong-Choi et la répression de la piraterie, inquiète Paris.

Le 30 décembre 1878, le ministre de la Marine et des Colonies écrit à son collègue des Affaires étrangères une lettre autographe, annotée "Très confidentielle afin que le gouvernement espagnol, prévenu de nos projets, ne cherche pas à les entraver", la situation au Tonkin est évoquée:

Notre situation au Tonkin a causé de fréquentes et légitimes préoccupations à nos deux départements, et nous avons été maintes fois conduits à déplorer le manque de précision et les lacunes du traité qui nous lie à cet égard avec la Cour de Huê.

En effet, cette convention contient, en ce qui nous touche, la plus grande partie des obligations qui incombent à cette nation investie d'un rôle de protection, sans aucun avantage résultant de cette position. Tandis que l'Annam peut requérir notre appui contre les dangers intérieurs et même extérieurs qui menacent sa souveraineté, dans ce pays, nous se saurions, vis-à-vis des nations étrangère, exciper de ce rôle pour réclamer le droit d'exercer une action prépondérante sur la politique du dehors.

La conséquence de cet état de choses ambigu a été de pousser l'Angleterre, puis l'Allemagne à réclamer la faculté d'établir, au même titre que nous, des consuls accrédités auprès de S.M. Tu-Duc. L'Espagne, renchérissant sur ces réclamations, émet aujourd'hui la prétention de nous faire accepter ses agents comme pouvant, au besoin, suppléer les nôtres dans la perception des droits de douane.

Cette situation, ai-je besoin de le dire, tient à ce que la convention de 1874, visiblement rédigée en vue de l'établissement de notre protectorat sur le Tonkin, n'en a pas prononcé un mot. Il en résulte que nos représentants, bien qu'appuyés d'une force armée, ont le titre et la qualité de consuls, et, comme ils n'en ont pas encore obtenu l'investiture, ils ne sont en réalité, ni des agents d'un protectorat qu'ils exercent cependant en partie, ni des agents consulaires puisqu'ils n'ont pas le droit de juridiction.

Les évènements dont le Tonkin est en ce moment le théâtre (troupes chinoises à la frontière tonkinoise) viennent ajouter une complica-

tion de plus à des difficultés déjà complexes, et nous ne saurions échapper à la nécessité d'envisager les conséquences qu'une insurrection sérieuse peut avoir sur notre politique dans cette contrée.

La souveraineté de l'Annam est, vous le savez, très contestée au Tonkin, et la faiblesse des moyens dont cet Empire dispose, livre le pays vassal à de continuelles perturbations. Que ces leviers de boucliers soient suscitées par les éternels prétendants de la dynastie des Lê, ou qu'elles proviennent les aventuriers chinois qui, au Yunnan, se répandent, tant du côté du Céleste Empire, tantôt dans les provinces du Sud, elles trouvent un aliment incessant dans une population mécontente et incomplètement soumise. Aussi nul ne peut dire si une échaffourée de la nature de celle qui se produit aujourd'hui se terminera par une simple émeute, ou si elle prendra des proportions d'une révolution. Il est donc on ne peut plus vraisemblable que, d'un moment à l'autre, nous pourrions nous trouver enveloppés par une révolution triomphante.

Quelle devra être notre attitude dans cette éventualité? Et ne devons-nous pas saisir avec empressement l'occasion qu'elle ferait naître pour sortir d'une situation où notre dignité peut se trouver compromise? Telle est la question qui me semble se poser naturellement, et sur laquelle je crois devoir demander votre avis.

L'intérêt considérable qui s'attache à la solution nous conduira peut-être, si vous l'envisagez au même point de vue que moi, à porter devant le conseil des ministres, car elle touche à des points très délicats de la politique extérieure de la France.

Dans ma pensée, soit que l'Annam, impuissant à maintenir son autorité, réclame notre intervention armée pour la faire respecter, soit que les rebelles réussissent, par une action énergique et rapide, à se rendre maîtres du Tonkin et qu'il nous faille traiter avec eux, j'estime que l'établissement de notre protectorat effectif doit sortir de l'une ou de l'autre de ces hypothèses.

Voici quels seraient alors les avantages principaux qui devraient en résulter pour nous:

(1) les droits de douane seraient maintenus et perçus à notre profit après le paiement intégral de la dette espagnole, et nous devrions y trouver les moyens de solder les frais de notre occupation.

(2) Nous aurions le droit exclusif de régler les relations extérieures du pays, et les représentants des différentes nations devraient être accrédités auprès de nous.

Nos agents seraient chargés de rendre justice, tant à l'égard des Français et des étrangers qu'à l'égard des indigènes dans leurs rapports avec nos nationaux et avec les étrangers.

Fidèles, d'ailleurs, à la politique libérale que nous avons toujours pratiqués dans l'Extrême-Orient, nous continuerons à assurer aux différentes nations européennes qui fréquentent ces parages, les avantages stipulés en faveur de nos compatriotes; notre position nouvelle ne ferait que augmenter les garanties déjà acquises, à cet égard, aux étrangers. . . .<sup>28</sup>

Cette lettre porte, sans aucun doute, le germe d'un nouveau coup de force au Viêt-Nam; le traité de 1874, que la France vient de signer avec le Viêt-Nam, et qui a été ratifié par les deux gouvernements, peut, dès ce moment, être considéré comme un traité mort-né.

Ayant perdu ses provinces du Sud, Tu-Duc sait fort bien que, tôt ou tard, il perdra celles du Nord: le traité ne lui accorde qu'un répit dont il ne sait pas, du reste, profiter; par ailleurs, le peuple est mécontent. Il finit par ne savoir que faire. . . . Faible, il n'a aucune force morale pour le soutenir; mal entouré, il n'a aucun sens politique; cependant, coûte que coûte, il désire récupérer les provinces cochinchinoises perdues. Il va tenter un nouveau moyen: attirer la compassion du représentant français à Huê, dans l'espoir que celui-ci interviendra auprès de son gouvernement en sa faveur; c'est que ce représentant est Philastre, celui qui a fait échouer les projets de Francis Garnier, celui qui a signé la restitution d'Hanoi; et Tu-Duc, bien à tort, en déduit que, si ce Français a agi de la sorte, c'est uniquement par amour de la justice, et par sympathie pour le peuple vietnamien et son Souverain. Et c'est ainsi qu'il lui écrit une lettre autographe pour lui parler du rachat des six provinces du Sud. Cette lettre, il termine ainsi:

. . . Je n'ai que des intentions loyales vis-à-vis de la France, mais si une ombre douteuse obscurcit encore nos relations, outre les questions de différences entre moeurs, différence que vous savez apprécier, cela tient, vous le savez, à l'amertume de mes derniers jours. Pour des causes diverses dans lesquelles, entre mes fautes, j'ai amoindri l'oeuvre de mes ancêtres, je vois le terme de ma vie approcher sans espoir de réparer le mal. Pourquoi faut-il qu'après avoir contribué à édifier l'oeuvre, la France en soit venue à la détruire? Vous êtes animé, Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires, des sentiments de la justice et de la sincérité. Vous avez étudié nos doctrines, et vous savez les apprécier. N'est-il donc pas des moyens au prix desquels je puisse réparer le mal servenu?<sup>29</sup>

A cette lettre du 10 mars 1879, Philastre répond le 10 avril:

. . . Au point de vue de la France, ce n'est pas une question d'avantages matériels sur laquelle elle s'obstine. Loin de là! Elle ne tient compte que des conséquences naturelles du devoir qui lui incombe, et elle se borne à accomplir ce devoir.

Mais l'Annam est-il donc le seul Etat qui ait eu à souffrir d'une diminution de ses frontières? Le territoire des six provinces de la Basse-Cochinchine n'est-il donc pas essentiellement une terre du royaume du Cambodge?

Pour les divers districts des trois provinces de Biên-Hoa, Gia-Dinh et Dinh-Tuong, les premières conquises par l'Annam, les populations cambodgiennes avaient depuis longtemps été complètement

détruites. A supposer que précédemment le Basse-Cochinchine ne fût pas devenue un territoire français, la population cambodgienne qui habite les trois autres provinces de Vinh-Long, An-Giang et Ha-Tien eût, sans aucune espèce de doute, été exterminée comme le reste.

Ces peuples de race cambodgienne sont, au même titre que les autres habitants de la Basse-Cochinchine, les enfants du gouvernement français: quelles raisons pourraient donc faire que la France les abandonnât?

Ce qui précède explique comment, sans désirer opprimer injustement l'Annam, la France ne veut pas cependant consentir à entendre parler de rachat.<sup>30</sup>

Tu-Duc ne savait pas que, cette lettre, son ministre Nguyễn-Van-Tuong l'avait lue avant lui, Philastre l'ayant montrée au ministre quand celui-ci était venu, le 8, sur l'invitation secrète du chargé d'affaires de France, pour en prendre connaissance avant qu'elle soit expédiée officiellement.

Profitant de l'exposition universelle de 1878, Tu-Duc envoya une ambassade à Paris. Conduite par le ministre de l'Intérieur Nguyễn-Tang-Doan, cette ambassade avait pour mission de porter des présents au Maréchal de Mac-Mahon, Président de la République, et de lui demander la rétrocession des six provinces du Nam-Bô. Arrivée à Paris le 7 mars 1878, l'ambassade fut reçue par le Président de la République, puis par le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Waddington. Quand l'ambassadeur exposait à ce dernier le but de sa mission, celui-ci lui opposa une fin de non-recevoir d'autant plus énergique qu'à ce moment l'atmosphère et le personnel politiques de la France étaient en voie de renouvellement.

La France a repris confiance en elle; le parti républicain qui prend le pouvoir veut l'application bilatérale traités.

L'ambassade quitte Paris, arrive à Madrid le 10 mai et rentre à Saïgon le 2 septembre 1878.

17. Reproduit par J. Marquet et J. Norel, ouvrage cité, pp. 80 à 82.

18. "Mémoires & Documents Asie", Tome 38, pp. 373 à 376.

19. Sous le règne de l'empereur K'ien-Long (1736-1796), la Chine avait six ministères réguliers et séculaires: Fonction Publique, Finances, Rites, Justice, Guerre et Travaux-Publics. Il y avait en outre des départements spéciaux tel que le département des Territoires dépendants. Celui-ci s'occupait des affaires concernant la Mongolie et le Tibet, tandis que le ministère des Rites fut chargé des rapports avec les États tributaires.

Puisque la Chine se considérait comme un empire universel, il n'y avait pas de ministère des Affaires étrangères proprement dit chargé des relations avec les États indépendants. Dans les affaires avec les pays étrangers, les gouverneurs généraux du Tche-Li et des deux Kouangs furent munis de pouvoirs étendus.

En 1861, on créa un département spécialisé chargé des affaires commerciales avec les diverses puissances étrangères, ou "Tsongli yamen" sous sa forme abrégée. C'est le précurseur du ministère chinois des Affaires étrangères. Dans les milieux officiels chinois, il était souvent aussi désigné sous le nom de "Yi-chou" (bureau de traduc-

tions) ou "Tsong-chou" (bureau central). Le Tsongli yamen ouvrit officiellement ses bureaux le 11 mars 1861.

Au cours de son existence, le Tsongli yamen eut deux présidents : le Prince Kong de 1861 à 1884, et le Prince K'ing, de 1884 à 1901.

Au sein du Tsongli yamen, il y eut cinq directions: Direction de la Russie (y compris les affaires du Japon); Direction de l'Angleterre (y compris les affaires de l'Autriche-Hongrie); Direction des Etats-Unis (y compris les affaires de l'Allemagne, de l'Italie, du Pérou, de la Suède, de la Belgique, du Danemark et du Portugal); Direction de la France (y compris les affaires de l'Espagne); Direction de la Défense maritime.

20. Livre Jaune, 1ère Partie, Affaires du Tonkin, pp. 36 à 38.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 46 à 48

22. Il ne faut pas confondre Lettré et Mandarin. Tous les mandarins sont des lettrés, mais les lettrés peuvent ne pas se présenter au concours de mandarinat qui donne accès à la fonction publique. Les nationalistes suivirent les cours mais refusèrent les postes officiels.

23. En vietnamien: "Ai Nam-Quan", en chinois: "Tchen Nan Kouan".

24. Livre Jaune, 1ère partie, pp. 60 & 61.

25. "Mémoires & Documents Asie", Tome 34, pp. 72-73.

26. Livre Jaune, 1ère partie, pp. 60 & 61.

27. Livre Jaune, 1ère Partie, p. 76.

28. "Mémoires & Documents Asie", Tome 34, pp. 408 à 411.

29. "Mémoires & Documents Asie", Tome 35, pp. 128-129.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.

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## Abstract / Résumé

Cet article est le fruit de deux années de recherches à pied d'oeuvre dans le Sumba oriental. Il se propose de démontrer combien l'étude minutieuse de toutes les phases de travail dans un village peut servir à la compréhension des structures symboliques. Le travail caractéristique des femmes est la fabrication de tissus précieux qui sont importants tant comme signes de richesse que pour servir de costumes de cérémonie. L'auteur, se servant de données empruntées aux mythes, aux rites, aux règles sociales du district de Kapunduku et à leur terminologie, montre que les différentes étapes du travail des tissus constituent la métaphore-clé du cycle de vie sumbanais, en particulier pour ce qui est de ses aspects strictement féminins tels que la naissance et le soin des enfants, la cour faite à la jeune fille, et les responsabilités sans cesse renouvelées qui vont de pair avec les négociations rituelles de la vie sociale des adultes. Reconnaître la place de chaque étape du travail à l'intérieur du cycle de production tout entier, c'est découvrir des termes, des références, des actions et des événements de l'ordre social dont le sens serait resté obscur.

Les hommes se chargent du cycle des moissons, de l'ordre des rites et d'arranger les mariages. On peut observer l'intégration harmonieuse de ces tâches dans l'ensemble des cérémonies rituelles de la récolte; elles sont formées sur le modèle des rites nuptiaux, et la moisson se célèbre comme un mariage. La connaissance des modes de travail révèle une structure symbolique principale unique qui a trait aux activités des hommes: le mythe de la récolte raconté devant la communauté réunie. En effet, comme l'a montré Adams en 1970, la façon dont le mythe fluctue quant au style, au contenu et au niveau de l'action est parallèle aux différentes phases du cycle annuel agricole.

L'auteur souligne combien il importe de tenir compte des travaux des hommes et de ceux des femmes pour interpréter les structures symboliques. Un bon exemple en est l'histoire favorite du créateur originel du domaine de Kapunduku et de sa femme. On peut comprendre ce mythe comme l'esquisse de ces divinités ancestrales vaquant à leurs travaux essentiels: les hommes occupés à parcourir les huit étapes nécessaires pour atteindre à la perfection rituelle, tandis que la femme est occupée à teindre des tissus en noir, ce qui implique la fécondité attendue de la mère originelle, n'abandonnant sa tâche que pour suivre leurs traces.

C'est la métaphore des modes de travail qui permet de croire à ces personnages en tant que divinités-archétypes dont les Sumbanais désirent suivre les traces.

## Work Patterns and Symbolic Structures in a Village Culture, East Sumba, Indonesia

M. J. ADAMS

THOROUGH CONSIDERATION of all phases of village work may contribute to an understanding of symbolic structures. We are familiar with Lévi-Strauss' demonstrations (1966) in 'totemic logic' in which, for example, animal motifs provide a parallel series characterizing symbolically likenesses and differences among social groups. In this paper I will show that procedures and schedules of work provide metaphoric schema for a number of symbolic systems, such as myth, ritual and other formal social patterns.

The data are drawn from my fieldwork in 1969 on Sumba, a small island east of Bali, in Indonesia. In a traditional kingdom,<sup>1</sup> such as Kapunduku on the northeast peninsula (population 7,000), the royal ruler resides in a capital village, set on a hilltop, accessible only with difficulty. There, each of the several patrilineal clans possesses a large peaked house as headquarters and temple for the worship of a clan founder-ancestor. (Figure 1).

These clans unite also to worship the Founder-Deity of the capital itself, the official ancestor of the king. This Founder established the formal rules by which the people of Kapunduku order their lives. Management and leadership are the exclusive prerogatives of men, but women's participation is required in important economic and religious activities.

The basis of livelihood is agriculture, carried on in fields far from the hilltop village. The crops are rice, essential for offerings, and corn, the staple of diet. Although each clan works its own land, the community follows a common work calendar. And on Sumba, there is a special character to the yearly work rhythm. For several months the population lives in garden huts near their distant fields, but for most of the dry season, they reside in the peaked house-temples at the capital or ceremonial center. There they perform many rituals and hold festivals which feature buffalo sacrifice, singing and dancing, during which colorful costumes are worn by men and women.<sup>2</sup>

The making of these ceremonial garments offers an important example of work schedules as a master metaphor. First, perhaps because we tend to regard textiles and their decoration as a matter of

fashion or minor artistic expression, I should stress the special significance of textiles in Indonesian cultures.

Decorated textiles are one of the major art forms of Indonesia. Their exceptional importance as ceremonial costume, as wealth in ritualized gift exchange, and as sacred objects in themselves, in the form of hangings and banners, has been stressed by ethnographers (see Jager-Gerlings, 1952) and is readily evident to visitors to the islands or to museum collections.

Not only does the ritual use of decorated textiles mark every social stage of an individual's life but textiles hold an important symbolic position in the intellectual order, for they represent the feminine half of conceptual totalities. The concept of a unity as a combination of masculine and feminine elements (which are contrasting but complementary) is a fundamental feature of Sumbanese thought. We see this clearly at marriage which, on Sumba, is not a personal matter but represents an agreement of basic economic and political importance among various social groups.

Legal marriage rests on the exchange of gifts considered 'masculine' in character, that is, weapons or metal ornaments and, offered as brideprice by the groom's side in exchange for textiles, the feminine counter-gift presented by the bride's relatives. In general, textiles are seen as a symbol of the feminine element in the conceptual structuring of the community.

The painstaking efforts and disciplined talent that are devoted to the decoration of textiles, then, are concomitants of their importance and value—and perhaps we should not be surprised to find that the work itself provides a structure for symbolic meanings.

In myth, ritual and social rules on Sumba, the stages of textile work are consistently linked to the progressive development of individual human life. These stages provide an overarching metaphor for the phases of the Sumbanese life cycle.

In the main, the textiles I refer to are the men's mantles consisting of a pair of rectangular cotton cloths, especially those dyed in blue or in combinations of blue and rust, one worn over the shoulder and the other around the hips. (Figure 2). Blue is the traditional basic dye, while rust belongs specifically to the royal class. The pair is identical because the two are processed together.

Textile work takes place according to a traditional time schedule which depends on seasonal products and other work, particularly in the fields. The minimum time is two and one-half years but the normal time for a good pair of mantles is four years. Four is considered the ideal number relating to human affairs.

The procedural stages of textile work together with symbolic references to them may be described as follows:

The metaphoric parallel begins with the mud of the rainy season in which cotton is planted. This mud, consisting, according to Sumbanese views, of masculine rain and feminine soil, symbolizes human conception. This is evident not only in the ritual of marriage but also in textile work itself. At the end of the marriage celebrations, members of the wedding party are daubed with mud amidst great hilarity and intense feeling, and the ritual bath of the muddied bride and her servants marks the end of the ceremonies and the beginning of her status as a wife.

The characteristic work of women in the early part of the rainy season, besides planting, is mud-dyeing. At this time, garments for everyday wear are dyed black by boiling plants and soaking the mixture with the cloths in mud-basins along a river bank to set the dye. This is the only "hot" dye-process the Sumbanese use. Women sit right in the mud and are extremely embarrassed to be seen at this work. These black-dyed cloths are regarded not as decoration but as common requirements for Kapunduku female identity, just as the process of conception is common to all women.

The product of conception, the live foetus, is likened to the ball of raw fluff produced by the cotton plant. This parallel is evident in the story of the birth of the Great Founder and Creator Deity of Kapunduku, Umbu or Lord Hamala, when as a clot of uterine blood, he drops from his mother's womb into a cotton field.

After being picked up and wrapped in a ball of raw cotton, he is placed in a sacred gong at the capital. The ten-month period of his development into a human child whose 'birth' cries lead to his discovery parallel, in season and duration, the time fixed by custom for the planting, harvest and preparation of cotton yarn. In the story, his foetal development is assured by the constant beating of gongs. This reflects a major work step of this period, the beating of raw cotton, the sounds of which ring through the valleys throughout the dry season. Subsequent work, spinning and winding, is the common work of mothers and their small children.

The technique of decorating the men's textiles is a form of tie-dyeing in which the designs are dyed onto the yarn strands before weaving. On Sumba, blue and rust colors made of local natural dyes characterize the men's cloths. First the yarn is wound around two beams separated in distance according to half the desired length of the eventual cloth. Then, according to the shape of the designs, small bunches of the yarn strands are tied with leaf strips which protect

those covered areas during subsequent dye-baths, so that when the ties are removed the designs appear as white areas against dark, dyed backgrounds.

The tying-in of the designs is symbolically linked to the development of the arts of maturity, and the blue-dye process to nubility. Prior to being married off, young girls are taken from their family homes and brought into the service of the large royal households. It is during this courting period they learn the art of blue dyeing.

In making the dye from indigo plants, the water in which the plants are soaking remains clear until powdered lime is added. The subsequent stirring and beclouding of the blue-dye waters is used in love songs as a description of the dizzying effects of youthful falling in love.<sup>3</sup>

The blue dye is indissolubly linked with the decoration of the yarn, the designs appearing as a function of the dye. Correspondingly, maturing young people are tattooed indelibly on their arms and chests with the blue dye in motifs identical to those on the textiles. The lime powder used in the blue dye is the same ingredient added to the quid of betel which renders the slightly narcotic chew pleasantly agreeable instead of puckeringly bitter. It is just while courting that young people learn to chew betel and their servicing each other with betel ingredients, especially the offering of lime powder in the girl's hand, are hallmark, telltale actions. Therefore girls being courted will have tiny blue designs tattooed on their fingers and palms to charm their lovers further when offering lime.

Much of the courting lovers' conversational play calls for agile wit, puns, puzzles, verbal deceits, and proffering or rejecting intellectual trickery. These several examples illustrate the intricate symbolic parallels between the "designing" stage of textile work and the preoccupations of nubile youth.<sup>4</sup>

After the dyeing of designs onto the strands is complete, the bundles of yarn are starched (in a cooked vegetable solution) preparatory to weaving. At first sight it may seem strange to link this procedure to the custom already mentioned of applying mud and other dark, sticky substances to the bride and her attendants. However, the Sumbanese make clear that the notion of stickiness connotes intercourse. A well-known euphemism for pregnancy appears in the early part of harvest stories, sung by an Elder as follows:

*Ningu na ma karitaku, oh anakeda,*

*Lai Rambu Lumbu Babangu.*

There is something that has stuck, oh children,

To Lady Lumbu Babangu.

This sentence announces to the audience, which on this occasion properly includes many young people, that the mother, Lady Lumbu Babangu, has conceived and that the birth of the hero is to be expected. However, in contrast to the repeated daubings of the bride with fertile mud, we may see the single bath of the yarn in the cooked (therefore, sterile) starch as a parallel to the conventional belief among the Sumbanese that occasional premarital encounters do not lead to pregnancy.

In textile work, the next task is the setting up of the loom. On Sumba, the loom is a simple, two-beam, frameless type, so that this work-process means chiefly separating the warp strands and installing a stringed bar or heddle. (Figure 3). The heddle is the essential element of a loom because it is the means of negotiating the union of warp and weft that produces a cloth. This work is usually done by an old woman, an expert, because it requires a clear technical understanding of the weaving process. Setting up the loom is comparable to the stage in life requiring the most intellectual skill, the arrangement of marriage by the elders. For the Sumbanese, marriage is a matter to be arranged between family groups by a go-between who has mastered the ceremonial language in which negotiations must be carried on. An evidence of the implicit link for the Sumbanese between the loom and the negotiator is that he is called *wunangu*, the word for heddle.

The language of the *wunangu* consists of a series of paired images which draw on the plants, animals, objects, and actions of the surrounding world in order to characterize the positions of the negotiating parties. It is no wonder then that the Sumbanese frequently identify the figurative images on the textiles, which are fixed in place by the actions of the heddle, in descriptive phrases from the *wunangu's* ritual language. (For examples and discussion of designs, see Adams, 1971).

The process of adult social life consists of a recurring series of formal negotiations among in-law groups over many matters, such as food and gift exchanges, visits, reconciliations and cosponsorship of religious rites, all of which are marked by household prayer ceremonies and feasts, and all of which, like the repeated actions of weaving, are conducted by means of the *wunangu*, the heddle or go-between.

In the light of this metaphoric parallel, we can understand why, unlike many other societies, girls on Sumba are not permitted to weave, a task considered proper only to mature, married women.

The completion of weaving and the cutting of the finite, circular

cloth mark the end of textile work, and, in the symbolic parallel, the end of human life. Decorated textiles are an essential requirement of burial—as shrouds and as grave gifts for the voyage and entry into the Afterworld, where life is renewed in the continuing form of descendants.

In sum, we can see the textile work as a conceptually feminine metaphor of the Sumbanese life cycle, especially those aspects of life belonging to the feminine sphere, birth, nurture of children, receptive courtships, and recurring responsibilities entailed by the negotiated rituals of social life.

Recognizing the place of each phase of work within the whole cycle of production illuminates the meaning of many otherwise puzzling terms, references, actions and events in the social order.

Thus far I have used evidence selected from different media, so to speak—life actions, myth, ritual, language—to show the existence of a master metaphor in the minds of the Sumbanese which provides them with convenient, intelligible ways to phrase symbolic action and expression. Work schedules are important also as an archetypal pattern within a single symbolic form, particularly in stories about deities or myths. To interpret these, work patterns from the sphere of men's activities must also be known.

Outstanding preoccupations of Sumbanese men are the management of the crop cycle and the ritual order (from simple prayer rites to mammoth festivals) and the arrangement of marriages. (Figure 4). These are not isolated tasks but coexist in harmonious integration in the minds of men. For example, we see that the entire complex of seasonal rites for the crops are patterned after those of marriage ritual and that finally the harvest itself is celebrated as if it were a wedding.

In crop-cycle ritual, the harvest myth, told before the assembled community the night before cutting the crop, is the most noteworthy element artistically and intellectually. Appropriately enough, before the harvesting-cum-wedding begins, the myth tells of a young man's search for his heavenly bride, a figurative parallel of the community's effort to produce a successful crop.

More to the point, this type of myth provides an excellent example of the shaping of basic sequences and story substance according to the work patterns of men. As I have discussed in more detail elsewhere (Adams, 1970), the changes in style, content and level of action in the myth parallel the distinct phases of the agricultural work-year.

In closing, I will offer a summary of a myth which underscores

the importance of taking into account the tasks of both men and women when interpreting symbolic structures. In managing the ritual order, Sumba men favor processional movement and the use of certain numbers for ordering sequences of time and action. The perfect number, that which fulfills, is eight and movement through eight stages implies complete and perfect ritual, partaking of the nature of deities. The Founder-Ancestors descended from the Upperworld in eight stages and they established a community of eight levels which is the source and synonym for the proper order, the rules of Sumba society. Thus the population proceeds from one great festival to the next, set apart at eight-year intervals; for a festival, they appoint eight functionaries, make prayer offerings at eight sacred places, and so on.

One of the favored myths of the Elders tells how the Founder and Creator-Deity, Umbu (or Lord) Hamala met and won his future bride, a very puzzling story that seems to lack any features appropriate to proper Sumba marriage, especially of the complex ritual that characterizes aristocratic matches.<sup>5</sup>

On returning from surveying his betel gardens, Umbu Hamala encounters Rambu (Lady) Hana with her servants dyeing textiles in mud-basins at the riverside. "Ha, Umba," she calls out to him, "Give us a little betelchew. We've been here for days and have run out". While they share betel she holds his betel pouch on her lap (an action characteristic of lovers). While she is busy with something else, he rides off, leaving behind his pouch, a strange event because a betel bag, considered the ultimate repository of a man's spirit, is carefully guarded and is misplaced, a restorative ceremony is required. (Figure 5) Noting his oversight, Rambu Hana calls after him. Already some distance up a nearby hill, he turns and orders her to bring the pouch to him. Just as she reaches the spot, he rides away to the peak. "What's the matter, Umbu, why don't you wait for your betel bag?" she cries. "Bring it here," he commands, "I am waiting for you." But again as she nears he rides off to another pinnacle, followed by the expostulating Rambu Hana.

This halting pursuit is repeated eight times and with the eighth one, they reach the great, original capital village where, we are told at the end, the marriage takes place.

In light of the elaborate etiquette of royalty, this almost ludicrous view of the Great Creator-Founder and his first wife would be puzzling if we did not consider their image in relation to the characteristic work of Sumba men and women. For in this story they are seen at their typical cultural tasks, the man engaged in the eight

processional stages essential to achieving ritual perfection and she immersed in textile work with its fecund implication, suitable to the Mother Deity who later in the cotton field will drop the supernatural clot-infant, mentioned earlier, who eventually replaces his father as a younger and more powerful Founder-Deity.<sup>6</sup>

To search for sense in the story through simple comparison with marriage customs of royalty would be futile. It is the metaphor of work pattern that gives the story its validity, that makes these characters believable as the archetypal Sumbanese Deities. Thus, the Elders feel the myth is just right, fitting and appropriate for their deified progenitors in whose steps the Sumbanese wish to follow.




Figure 1. Hilltop site of former capital village of Kapunduku, East Sumba. At lower right near gardens of corn, one of the peaked house-temples of the present ceremonial center is visible. Famed Sandalwood horses graze on riverbanks at lower left.



Figure 2. At center, Prince of East Sumba (Umbu nai Luta, Palai Malamba clan, Melolo district) displays traditional pair of colorful cotton mantles, dyed in blue and 'royal' rust. Aides at his sides wear cloths decorated only in blue and white.



Figure 3. Women's work in East Sumba. Weaving a panel for a man's mantle at a two-beam-frameless loom (the so-called backstrap type). Heddle is the white stringed bar in the center of the group of three horizontal bars. (Craftswoman: Rambu Windi, Kambera district).



Fig. 14 Field photographs, M. J. Adams.

Figure 4. Men's work. Kapunduku men attend ritual chanting by famed Spokesman (Wunangu: Ndapungu Lalu Pingu of Prai Natangu), at lower right, in a seashore ceremony honoring the arrival of the Founder-Deity, Umbu (Lord) Hamala.



Figure 5. Betel pouch, worn over the shoulder by men. East Sumba. (Basel Museum of Ethnology, IIC9079).

Fig. 5 Courtesy, Museum of Ethnology, Basel, Switzerland.

1. The present Indonesian Government does not recognize titles of nobility but, by virtue of tradition, local aristocracies on Sumba retain considerable economic and moral authority. The district I describe is typical of those found on Sumba.

2. Today the clans build their peaked house-headquarters along the riverbanks in the Kapunduku valley, nearer their fields, but they still maintain their traditional social and religious bonds. The ceremonial center is now located at the foot of the former hilltop capital (See Figure 1).

3. In a song to a girl named Mai Nggiri, the lover's plaint goes as follows (Melolo dialect):

<i>Na ma winguja na kaba, Nggiri,</i>	The one who spins it, the cocoshell,
<i>Na kaba na ma mbiara, Nggiri;</i>	The cocoshell that is broken;
<i>Na ma kaurunjai na wuora, Nggiri,</i>	The one who stirs the dye-water,
<i>Na wora na ma muru, Nggiri,</i>	The dye-water that is blue,
<i>Ee, djaja bi ku linggunja, Nggiri.</i>	And that's why I'm 'singing this song' to you, Nggiri.

In the first couplet, the reference underlying the imagery is the winding of yarn on a frame ("warping"), preparatory to tying or any kind of weaving, which is done by quickly circulating the ball of yarn set in a cocoshell. According to the singer, Umbu Tanangundju, the couplet indicates that love spins the lover's head producing strange sounds, like a broken cocoshell that is whirled. The stirring up in the second couplet also reflects the lover's dizzy, disturbed state. Only when the blue water has settled, does sediment useful for dyestuff form.

4. The essential link is, I feel, between nobility and decorating by dyeing, therefore stages of work on woven textiles decorated with dyed yarns accord also with the phases of the metaphor.

5. The following summary is based on the narration of Umbu Meta Taradjawa of Baha Djala village in Kapunduku. His title, Umbu (Lord), is honorary, based on his role as personal spokesman (wunangu) and deputy of the former king (Umbu nai Meta).

6. In view of the subtle economy of Sumba myths, limiting the objects associated with these two deities to such fundamental cultural elements as betel chewing and mud-dyeing is probably significant, for these convey an ur-setting appropriate to the image of the primal pair, the founders of Kapunduku culture.

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## Southeast Asian Archives / Notes et Documents de l'Asie du Sud-est

Translation from Nghiêm Thâm, *Tìm Hiểu Đồng Bào Thượng: Hai Phiên Vương của Triều Đình Việt Nam hồi trước, Thủy Xá và Hỏa Xá*, (Seeking to understand the Highland People : The two Tribal Kingdoms of the Vietnamese Court in the Past, the King of Fire and the King of Water), *Quê Hương*, 31 (January, 1962): 130-150.

DONALD E. VOTH

### *Translator's Note*

In volume 1 of *Southeast Asia: An International Quarterly*, (Winter-Spring, 1971), pp. 153-163, Sokichi Kimura published an annotated translation of that part of the *Đại Nam Chính Biên Liệt Truyện Sơ Tập (Liệt Truyện)* which deals with Luang Prabang. In the translator's introduction, Mr. Kimura mentions that the *Liệt Truyện* includes information about the King of Fire and the King of Water, sorcerer kings of the Jarai tribe of the Central Highlands.

Some time ago Professor Nghiêm Thâm of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Saigon and Curator of the National Museum in Saigon, wrote a serial article in *Quê Hương* entitled: "Seeking to Understand the Highland People." [*Quê Hương*, 25 (July, 1961): 129-139; 26 (August, 1961): 106-123; 27 (September, 1961): 191-211; 28 (October, 1961): 129-141; 29 (November, 1961): 140-162; 31 (January, 1962): 130-149]. In the January, 1962 installment, Professor Thâm presented translations into the National Script (quốc ngữ) of excerpts from several historical documents of the Nguyễn dynasty, all dealing with the relationship between the court at Huế and the "kinglets" of the Jarai in the Central Highlands. One of the documents he used was the *Liệt Truyện*. His article also included a discussion of a similar relationship with the court of Angkor.

I have translated this last installment of Professor Thâm's article into English, and present it here with his permission, in its entirety. A little less than half of it is occupied by the text from the *Liệt Truyện*, which I, hereafter, translate as the *Official Biographies of Đại Nam*.

This is, of course, a translation of a translation, of which the reader should be aware. One of the problems this creates is a complex system of footnotes and commentary. All of my notes are indicated by an asterisk. Thus, these footnotes and the totality of the text, are my rendering of Professor Thâm's article. Where the transition from Professor Thâm's

commentary to translations from historical documents seemed confusing I have indicated such transitions in footnotes.

Obviously, I may have misinterpreted Professor Thâm<sup>2</sup>'s article at some points. For this I apologize to him in advance. I also express my appreciation to him for allowing this article to be published in English. Historical materials such as these on relationships between Highland and Lowland people of Vietnam are nowhere available in English, and far too rare, even, in the National Script of Vietnam.

#### INTRODUCTION

In two preceding articles I have surveyed the customs of the Jarai tribe and the legends of all of the highland people regarding the two Jarai leaders called the Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá and the Thuý<sup>2</sup> Xá.<sup>1</sup> In this article I present some historical data regarding the two Jarai chiefs. For the relationships between the Thuý<sup>2</sup> Xá and the Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá and the Cambodian court, I have used the following sources: Moura,<sup>2</sup> *Le Royaume du Cambodge*, E. Leroux, Paris, 1883, and Henri Maitre, *Les Jungles Moi*, Larose, Paris, 1912. For the relationships between the two Jarai chiefs and the Vietnamese court I have used the information recorded in the following documents: The *Hoàng Việt Địa Dư Chí*, the *Đại Nam Chính Biên Liệt Truyện*, the *Khâm Định Đại Nam Hội Điển Sù<sup>2</sup> Lê*, and the *Lịch Trình*,<sup>3</sup> *Hiến Chương Loại, Dư Địa chí* by Phan Huy Chú.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Lê Phục Thiên, Chinese expert at the Institute of Historical Research,<sup>5</sup> has generously assisted me in the translation of the documents listed above. I want to express my appreciation to him.

#### RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND THE HOÀ<sup>2</sup> XÁ AND THE THUÝ<sup>2</sup> XÁ

Until the end of the 19th century, the King of Cambodia had an emissary deliver large amounts of tribute to the Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá and the Thuý<sup>2</sup> Xá. The origin and the reason for that relationship have not yet been explained. Perhaps it had existed for a long time, since the 7th century or since the time that the highland region of Central Vietnam was dominated by the Cham. Very likely the two Jarai chiefs assisted the Khmer king during a time of difficulty and the court of Angkor sent the two Jarai numerous gifts as an expression of appreciation.

In a report read at the *Académie des inscriptions et Belles Lettres*

in France in 1903, Adhemar Leclere revealed that he had discovered a charter of the temple at Samboc (Cambodia). In this charter there is a complete list of the gifts which the king of Cambodia sent to the two Jarai chiefs.

This charter indicates clearly that the custom of the Cambodian king of sending gifts to the Hoá Xá and the Thuý Xá had existed for a very long time.

"From the ancient past until now, it is said that every three years one must go up and salute the Thuý Xá and the Hoá Xá."<sup>6</sup>

This charter was made in 1601. There is a large amount of information in the charter, including the manner in which the gifts were delivered once every three years. Since the governor of the province of Samboc was assigned to offer gifts to the two Jarai chiefs and to receive messages and the gifts sent to the Cambodian court by the two chiefs, he was allowed to appropriate half of the tax of the province of Samboc as compensation.

The mission which delivered the gifts to the Jarai included three emissaries. In the charter of Samboc the rituals which the Cambodian emissaries had to follow when delivering the gifts to the two Jarai chiefs were outlined in great detail.

"Before offering the gifts, the emissaries must take the (Salmnor?) fruit and wash themselves in order to be pure. Then all of the gifts can be displayed in two rows. One official of the mission, in the name of the king of Cambodia, speaks with the Hoá Xá and the Thuý Xá, using an interpreter to interpret the words into Jarai. Then this emissary sits between the gifts and repeats the previously spoken words three times. When the emissary congratulates the Jarai Kings, musicians play (praise) according to Jarai custom. After that the chief emissary of the mission offers, from the king of Cambodia, the royal letter of the "prah chan tongvek krung kamonjadhpati sivisirin Indipat . . .," who is at the head of all people. After that, in the name of the king of Cambodia, the emissary enumerates all of the gifts which are being brought to the land of 'Srok Ayonapar.'<sup>7</sup> After offering the gifts the emissary indicates that the king of Cambodia stands at the rank of uncle to the Thuý Xá and Hoá Xá, and that they are his nephews. He states that he wishes them prosperity and the continuation of their titles. He charges them to continue to guard their supernatural sword, to continue to be the 'ammachas' (kings) of the Rhade, Jarai, and Phong (Mnong?), as they have been since antiquity. He hopes that they may continue to guard the roads and the jungles, resist all enemies, that they may be powerful, blessed, and prosperous, and he prays that all of the divinities, all of

the spirits of the jungle, and all of the souls of the villages (arakh) may help the Jarai chiefs to have a long life, many possessions, and may help them to have enduring and firm authority.

The gifts which the Cambodian king sent to the two Jarai were the following: "Two male elephants, two red palanquins (to be used on the backs of elephants) with ornaments of stars, sixty buffaloes, two embroidered pieces of material to make loin-cloths, two tunics with stripes, two mattresses, two head pillows, two pillows to support the arms, two mats made by the province of Pursat, two mats made of (fine thread?), two mosquito nets, two sets of utensils for eating rice, two sets of utensils for drinking, two suits of red clothes, two pair of drums, two pair of large and small flutes, two parasols with long handles, two bowls of five colors, one hundred rice bowls, one hundred soup bowls, one hundred hand towels, one hundred bowls with a fringe on the edge, two vehicle loads of salt, five hundred bars of iron, twenty bars of lead, two pair of combs, four wood chisels with a handle and a sheath, two loin-cloths to use for rituals, each of which was five half arm-lengths long, two hundred sewing needles, two pieces of (lomtong?) material, two pieces of silk for the dancing women, for the supernatural sword (prah khan), and for the supernatural whip of rattan, two head towels made of red silk five half arm-lengths long, a string of (phti) beads 20 (ampans?) long, two small bowls of brass, two hundred small bowls of porcelain, two knives (kombet prea?), two knives to peel rattan, two knives to cut trees in the jungle, two fans of paper, two hundred rings of brass, two red hats, ten weights of areca nut and (gamlier?) fruit, ten weights of tobacco, two musical instruments with one string, two musical instruments with three strings, and two musical instruments with three strings strung upon a coconut shell, two flutes (flageolets), two trays with feet used to contain ritual water, two bowls of bamboo with covers to place upon the trays, two trays of wood used to contain the ingredients for chewing betel, two knives to cut areca, two lime vases of brass, and two different trays to contain areca." After all this the charter says:

"If one of the kings is dead and the other still living a female elephant and a male elephant will be sent bearing a prepared (prasoda?) to bear his body".

The three emissaries must bring the (prosada?) right to the place. The two Jarai kings, on the other hand, sent the Cambodian king a little elephant ivory, a rhinoceros horn, and each one of them sent a piece of wax upon which he had made the imprint of the thumb of the right hand. Moura says that the piece of wax was very large

and that the gifts also included two gourds, one filled with rice and the other filled with sesame seed. These meager gifts affirm the legend of the Jarai regarding the supernatural sword. This legend states that Po Thi advised the Jarai to live harmoniously with Cambodia. The Jarai possessed the supernatural sword and the Cambodians possessed the sheath. Therefore Heaven wanted these two peoples to unite. However, when Heaven gave the Cambodians the sheath of the sword, which was less valuable than the sword itself, it was implied that, in the gifts exchanged between the two countries, the part of the Cambodians had to be greater.<sup>8</sup>

Although the values of the gifts of the Jarai chiefs is inconsequential in contrast to those of Cambodia, these meager gifts have a special importance. All of the two chiefs possessions had supernatural power, consequently these gifts were considered to have the special powers of the spirits of the jungle and the mountains, and for this reason they were very valuable.

Moura writes: "When the gifts of the Hoá-Xá arrived at the Cambodian capitol they were transmitted to Hindu priests, the persons who had the authority to keep the supernatural sword of all the Khmer kings from the ancient past. . . . They used the wax to make candles which they burned on altars during festivals. In drought years, during epidemics, when there were floods, and when there was war they sprinkled a little rice and sesame seed upon the earth in order to cool the wrath of the spirits."

An official document of the Khmer court produced by Leclere confirms the words of Moura:

"Each time the Khmer king decided to end a drought, in order to procure rain, he had to pray the five 'Kshatriyas', or the spirits who protect the Khmer king: Narayano, Shiva, Ganesa, Kajjayana, and Prah Khan. He had to bring elephant tusk, rhinoceros horn, and the shirt of the Hoá Xá and Thuý Xá, sprinkle sacred water upon them, and mimic the cry of a frog."

Although the Khmer empire met much misfortune, the emissaries continued to be sent to the two Jarai chiefs.

In 1845, the two Jarai chiefs failed to send their customary tribute to the Vietnamese court, even though in 1841 they had been granted the rank of 8th level Mandarin by Thiệu Trị. King Ang Du'ong of Cambodia was at war with Vietnam and the Hoá Xá was very lavishly received by the Cambodian court. However, when he returned a member of the mission died along the way. The next year the Hoá Xá sent someone to request Ang Du'ong, the Cambodian king, to return the bones of the Jarai messenger who had died in

Cambodian territory. Because he could not locate them the Cambodian king sent gifts to the Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá instead.

When King Norodom ascended the throne (1859), however, the custom of sending gifts to the two Jarai chiefs was abandoned.

After not having received gifts from Cambodia for several years the Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá finally sent someone to the Cambodian court to investigate. Norodom did not even answer, nor did he send any gifts.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE COURT AND THE  
THUY<sup>2</sup> XÁ AND HOA<sup>2</sup> XÁ

During the expansion to the south of the Vietnamese people, they necessarily had contacts with the highland people. In the 16th century when Vietnam succeeded in seizing the province of Quảng Nam, in the year 1540 Bùi Tá Hán was appointed to supervise Quảng Nam. Gradually Bùi Tá Hán was able to gain control of all of the tribes in the mountainous region. The provinces of Quảng Ngãi, Bình Định, and Phú Yên gradually came under the control of the Vietnamese court.

Having seized Phú Yên (1611) the Vietnamese followed the example of the Cham, and followed the Ba River to go up into the highlands.

However, Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá and Thuy<sup>2</sup> Xá had already submitted themselves to the Nguyễn kings in Huế since 1558. Every three years these two chiefs brought tribute to the province of Phú Yên. This continued until the end of the 19th century.

Around the end of the 19th century, because of a dispute between Thailand and the French government in Indochina regarding hegemony over the area along the left bank of the Mekong, a Captain Luce was chosen to find documents which would prove the hegemony of Vietnam over the highlands.

The government used evidence in the *Khâm Định Đại Nam Hội Điển Sự Lệ* and the *Đại Nam Chính Biên Liệt Truyện* to demonstrate that the Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá and the Thuy<sup>2</sup> Xá had submitted to the Vietnamese court since the 16th century. Thus Thailand was forced to abandon her intention of invading the highlands of Central Vietnam.

We will now examine all of the Vietnamese historical documents which speak of the two chiefs of the Jarai, the Thuy<sup>2</sup> Xá and the Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá.

In addition to *The Collection of Official Administrative Regulations* and the *Official Biographies of Đại Nam*, the *Royal Geography of Vietnam*, the *Geographical Annals* by Phu'ong Đình, and the

*Official Summary of the Royal Court* also have information regarding the Thuỷ Xá and the Hoả Xá.<sup>9</sup>

*Geographical Annals* by Phư'ng Đình has been translated into the national script (Quốc Ngữ) (the translation of Ngô Mạnh Nghinh, Tự Do Publishers, Saigon, 1960). The information about the two countries of Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá are mentioned on pages 198-200.

In this paper I shall examine all of the documents of the Vietnamese court. These documents have never been translated into the national script. In 1960, Mr. Tô Nam and Mr. Nguyễn Đình Niệm for the first time prepared a rough translation for publication in *Văn Đản* (Nos. 23 and 24).

However, before presenting translated excerpts from these documents, it is necessary to say a few things about them.

THE COLLECTION OF OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS (KHÂM ĐÌNH ĐẠI NAM HỘI ĐIỂN SỰ LỆ:)

According to Pelliot this work was made following an order of the king in the years 1842, 1845, and 1850, and it included 87 volumes in which there are 262 books. They refer to the six ministries and the offices of the Imperial Capital. In the *Hội Điển* (Abbreviation for above) there are many volumes which have many references to history. For example, the volumes which speak of the Ministry of Rites have records about the relationships of Vietnam with foreign countries (Books 128 to 136). However, in the set of the *Hội Điển* which belongs to the School of the Far East<sup>10</sup> at Hanoi as well as in the one of the Cabinet at Huế (at the present time at the institute of Historical Research in Saigon) the contents which speak about the relationships between Vietnam and the European countries are missing. Perhaps these contents were destroyed when the French first arrived and administered the country. Nevertheless, the pages regarding relationships with China, with all of the subordinate barbarians, with the tribute barbarians, as well as with all of the subordinate countries (such as Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Cambodia, the land of Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá), and the relationships with Thailand and Burma are recorded in the *Hội Điển*.<sup>11</sup>

ROYAL GEOGRAPHY OF VIETNAM (*Hoàng Việt Địa Chí*)

This was written by Phan Huy Chú under the court of Minh Mạng in 1883<sup>12</sup> and it now has three editions:

One edition was printed in 1833 under the Minh Mạng court, in Huế.

One edition was printed in 1872 under the court of Tự Đức, in Đê Ngân (Chợ lớn).

One edition was printed in 1907 under the court of Duy Tân in Huế.

All three editions are at the Institute of Historical Research. This book discusses all of the provinces in territorial Vietnam, using ancient concepts of geography. Much historical material can be found in this book but it is not very accurate.

OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHIES OF ĐAI NAM (*Đại Nam Chính Biên Liệt Truyện*)

This work is made up of 33 books. It was printed in 1889 under the court of Thành Thái. All of the affairs taking place under the court of Gia Long (1802-1820) are recorded in it: Biographies of all of the king's wives, all of the famous people, all of the heroic women, all of the uprisings, and also information about foreign countries.

The *Royal Geography of Vietnam*, book one, pages 12a to 13a, tells us about the position, and very superficially about the customs of the highland people. It does mention the Hoả Xá and Thủy Xá.

ROYAL GEOGRAPHY OF VIETNAM 13, 14 (*Hoàng Việt Địa Dư Chí*)  
Book one (From pages 12a to 13a)

Province of Quảng Nam:

The prefecture of Hoài Nhân includes three districts. His majesty the king changed it into the prefecture of Quy Nhơn, which now, with the market of Bình Định, includes 3 districts, 6 dependencies, 7 cantons, and 124 villages.<sup>15</sup>

The district of Bông Sơn (2 cantons, 23 villages)

The district of Phú Ly (3 cantons, 60 villages)

The district of Tuy Viễn (2 cantons, 33 villages)

The prefecture of Hoài Nhân is on the south of the province of Quảng Nam, on the west it is bordered by Laos, on the south it connects to the seashore of Champa. The previous court<sup>16</sup> took the Thạch Bi mountain to be the borderline with Champa. From that line of mountains in the distance streams of water run directly out to the sea. Thạch Bi mountain is higher than all of the other mountains.

When Lê Thánh Tông pacified Champa he placed a stone at the peak of the mountain as a monument to define the border. He entrusted sovereignty over the land of Nam Bàn to the west of that mountain to a distant offspring of the Cham king. One must travel 14 days to get from the prefecture of Hoài Nhân to the highland region. That country has more than 50 mountains among which is Bà Nam, which is very tall and which dominates one part of the region. The two kings Thuý Xá and Hoả Xá live in thatched houses of wood on the east and the west sides of it. Each king has several hundred servants. They use a knife to dig the earth and they burn the trees and grass when planting their crops. They plant in the first month and harvest in the fifth month. They do not know how to harvest, they merely pluck off the seeds of rice. Nor do they know the days of the calendar. When they go to collect taxes accompanied by their soldiers, the kings ride on elephants leading several tens of people to a village of the savages. They hold up their gongs, and beat them three times. The people in the village then come out and prepare a grass house for them because, according to a superstition, any house which the king enters will have bad fortune. Therefore he dares not enter. Depending upon the size of the village, the people willingly bring and offer to the king brass cooking pots, white material, sugar cane, and clusters of bananas. The king accepts everything and never repudiates anything. Having received the gifts, the king proceeds to another village. Both of the kings Thuý and Hoả are black and ugly, but their primary and secondary wives are both pretty and dressed in colorful clothes. While the two kings are still alive there is a star on the mountain called the Du'ong star, emanating light like a torch. Sometimes it is large like a piece of cloth. It usually comes to the place where the king lies, and there are times when it flies up into the heavens like a piece of very white silk. When the king dies, the barbarians observe the house over which the star resides. They say: "There is the appointment of the heavens, for the head of that household to become the king." Thus he is made king. From the ancient past until now this has been the custom. In the Land of Water<sup>17</sup> there is a citadel of white stone (White Stone City), about four mầu large<sup>18</sup> having four openings. In this citadel there is a stone elephant, a reclining stone horse, and it is called the pagoda of Hy Hò. But the two kings do not dare to go and stay in the citadel. After a new king ascends the throne, only then can he enter the citadel and spread a mattress upon the stone elephant and the stone horse, and after that he can take the throne. There are 40 or 50 chiefs of the barbarian people

who come and pay homage. Having finished the ritual, the king again returns to his house below the mountain.

The prefecture of Hoài Nhân has the citadel of Đô Bàn which was the place of residence of the Cham king in the past. It is beautiful and strong, even now remains are still there (The citadel is in the district of Đa Giang, in Phú Gia. Within it there are 35 towers). In general the natural resources of the prefecture of Hoài Nhân are as rich as the two prefectures of Tu Nghĩa and Thăng Hoa. There are many natural resources such as aloewood, Tóc wood, rhinoceros, gold and silver, turtle shell, brocade, beeswax, honey, paint, betel, pepper, salted fish, very good lumber, and the amount of rice is so great that it cannot be related. Horses are born in the mountainous areas and they live there in herds of thousands. It is normal for the people of that area to ride horseback to market. The prefecture of Hoài Nhân has many rivers, much beautiful scenery, and there is also a very extraordinary fountain of hot water from which the stream rises thickly.<sup>19</sup>

The summary volume of the *Official Biographies of Đại Nam* from pages 33 to 46, speaks of the relationships between the Thủy Xá and the Hoả Xá and the Vietnamese court.

In the year 1470 Lê Thánh Tôn (1460-1497) seized the land of Champa and established the three countries of Champa, Hoá Anh, and Nam Bàn. Nam Bàn is the highland region of the former Champa. The Nguyễn Lords continued to have someone bring gifts to the Thủy Xá and Hoả Xá and they, in return, sent their products to the Vietnamese Court.

The summary volume of the *Official Biographies of Đại Nam* has information about the relationship between Vietnam and the Thủy Xá and the Hoả Xá up until the year 1846.

OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHIES OF DAI NAM, *Summary Volume*, *Đại Nam Chính Biệt Liệt Truyện*, Book Thirty-two (Pages 33 to 46) \*20

The two countries Thủy Xá and Hoả Xá are in the land of Nam Bàn. When King Lê Thánh Tôn succeeded in defeating Champa, he established the noble descendents of that country in the land of Nam Bàn.<sup>21</sup> He established the mountain of Thạch Bi, with 50 villages on the west, as the boundary. In that country there is the mountain of Bà Nam which is very high. The king of Thủy Xá is on the east and the king of Hoả Xá is on the west of that mountain.

The Nguyễn court, at the beginning, realized that the countries

of Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá bordered on the province of Phú Yên. Every five years they sent someone to bring gifts to the two kings of that country. They sent gifts like brocade tunics, brocade hats, cooking pots, pans of iron, all kinds of china including bowls, plates, etc. After having received the materials offered, the kings of the two countries offered local products such as deer horns, wax, antlers, bile from bears, and male elephants.

During the reign of king Thế Tông Hoàng Đế<sup>22</sup> the thirteenth year (tân vy,) the king of the two countries of Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá sent an emissary with tribute. The emperor rewarded them generously and afterwards the emissary of the two countries regularly came to court with tribute. It was only after the Tây Sơn rebellion that they stopped paying tribute.

At the beginning of the reign of Gia Long the emissary of the two countries of Thuỷ Xá came to the province of Phú Yên to offer gifts, and he was rewarded liberally and allowed to return.

At the beginning of the reign of Minh Mạng the chief of state of the land of Thuỷ Xá, Ma Ất sent an emissary to bring the gifts which the Nguyễn court had given them previously in order to serve as proof of his position. He brought such things as a brass candle holder, high quality wax, to the fort of Phúc Sơn in the province of Phú Yên and asked for a ceremony of tribute.

The third year of Minh Mạng (Nhâm Ngọ),<sup>23</sup> Ma Ất died and the tribute mission did not materialize.

The fourth year of Minh Mạng, Quý Vĩ,<sup>24</sup> the people of the land of Thuỷ Xá crowned the younger brother of Ma Ất, Ma Môi, to be the king. Ma Môi tried hard to resist, and only agreed to watch after the country temporarily, but he sent an emissary to offer tribute. The emissary had not yet had a chance to go when Ma Môi himself died. His child, Ma Lam (in Confucian characters "Cham"), took the throne. He wanted to request communication with the Nguyễn court, but could not find anyone to undertake the missions.

In the 10th year of Minh Mạng, Kỷ Sửu,<sup>25</sup> the third month, Thánh Tổ<sup>2</sup> Nhân Hoàng Đế<sup>26</sup> saw that the two countries did not send tribute, so he sent a military officer to go and investigate the situation. This man's name was Nguyễn Văn Quyên. When he arrived in the highlands Ma Lam received him happily and explained the situation to him, and then sent several of his subordinates called Ma Diên and Ma Xuân to bring an elephant tusk and follow the military officer Quyên in order to pay tribute to the court. The mandarin of the city<sup>27</sup> sent a report up to the king and the king issued a decree rewarding the chief of state of that country with a piece

of muslin with red design, one muslin with green design, and 20 pieces of high quality muslin. He gave Ma Diên all kinds of silk, clothes, and a weight of silver. The king also asked whether the land of Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá were two countries, or one country. The emissary replied: "The land is the land of Hoả Xá, and the chief of state calls himself the king of Fire. I have never heard of the land of Thuỷ Xá, previously it was called the Thuỷ Xá because the interpreter made a mistake." From that time the country was called Hoả Xá when its tributary missions arrived at the court.

During the 12th year of Minh Mạng<sup>28</sup> a messenger went to offer tribute at Phú Yên and the king had him enter the capitol to pay his respects. The king summoned him into the court and asked: "Now you come to pay tribute because of the faithfulness of the chief of the chief of state, and as for the people in the country, do they also desire to do so."

The messenger replied: "The chief of state of my country has respected and loved his majesty's transforming moral excellence<sup>29</sup> for a long time, and he has also heard the old people in his country say that if they knew how to be faithful and venerate his majesty's vast kingdom they would be happy and peaceful and the crops would be good. Because of that, from the chief of state to the people of my land, we all want to be his majesty's subjects that we may depend upon his grace." The king decreed that he should be rewarded and allowed him to return, and again established the interval for paying tribute by the land of Hoả Xá as the years Ty, Mão, Ngọ, Dậu<sup>30</sup> or every three years. The tribute was to include two elephant tusks and two rhinoceros horns.

In the 15th year of Minh Mạng<sup>31</sup> the land of Hoả Xá sent an emissary to pay tribute and the king rewarded the emissary with a set of clothes for mandarins of seventh rank.<sup>32</sup> The king also told him to practice wearing the royal clothes so that when the emissary came to venerate and wait upon the king he might be correct according to the rites. The king praised him and made a decree to the Ministry of Rites as follows: "This land is at a distant and remote place. It is a land in which they tie knots in strings to keep records. It is a land in which people make swidden fields and harvest rice for a living, and a land in which the customs are still archaic and simple. However, their heads have hair, their mouths have teeth, and they have been endowed with innate knowledge and ability by nature. Therefore, why could they not do virtuous things. Because of this my illustrious predecessors brought the civilization of the Chinese to them in order to change their tribal customs, using the ritual cere-

monies to instruct them and stimulating them to use the tunic and skirt in the place of bare skin. Because of this, this land offered tribute and clearly demonstrated its fidelity to the king. It is certainly a land that has fidelity." He decided that the chief of state of that land, whose name was Lam, could take the surname Vĩnh and the given name Bảo, and in the decree he wrote clearly that he was the king of Hoả Xá in order that his dignity and position might be known. The emissary, who was named Duyên, was renamed Lĩnh, and the other one, who was name Tài, was renamed Kiêu, and they were both rewarded with cloth and money according to their rank.

In the 18th year of Minh Mạng,<sup>33</sup> in the eleventh month, the great ceremony celebrating the seventieth birthday of Thuận Thiên Cao Hoàng Hậu<sup>34</sup> occurred and the chief of state of Hoả Xá sent an emissary to bring local products to congratulate her for her longevity. The king feted him and allowed him to return.

In the 12th month of that year, the chief of state of Hoả Xá called Vĩnh Bảo died and the people of the land chose a nephew called Liệt to be king in accordance with their custom. An emissary was sent to pay tribute. The king told the new chief of state that he could use the surname Vĩnh but that he should keep the given name Liệt as before. He also rewarded him with a formal letter of recognition and very liberal gifts.

In the 21st year of Minh Mạng in the fourth month<sup>35</sup> there was the celebration of the fiftieth birthday of Thánh Tổ Nhân Hoàng Đế.<sup>36</sup> The chief of state of Hoả Xá sent an emissary to offer congratulations as well as to pay tribute, and he was liberally rewarded by the king and allowed to return.

In that same year, the mandarin officer of Trấn Tây,<sup>37</sup> Truong Minh Giảng, sent a letter to the king saying: "The province of Sơn Tĩnh informs me that there is a tribal chief Thủy Xá with two servants and two elephants who has come to the tribes of Phú Non<sup>38</sup> near the district of Sơn Bảo. This fellow sent a person to speak with the authority of the district, who calls himself Liệt, and announced that he wanted to make a visit. When he was questioned again, Liệt said: "In the past, the tribal chief of the state of Thủy Xá knew the king.<sup>39</sup> Once every three years the king sent a person bearing gifts to the tribal chief of state. This person also has magic so that whenever he goes out many people bring him gifts. This time he came only for a few goods, he had no other objective."

Seeing this report the king issued a decree: "From the time of childhood we have heard the name of the two countries Hoả Xá and Thủy Xá. Since that time only the land of Hoả Xá has, with

a sincere heart, offered tribute, and the land of Thuỷ Xá has not been heard from. Now the tribal chief of the state of Thuỷ Xá appears to arrive from a strange and distant place, why should we be afraid to take appropriate action and help him and demonstrate to him our magnanimity. On the very day that you receive this letter, if the tribal chief is still in the area of So'n Bốc, you must immediately receive him warmly and ask him what is the origin of his tribal group. Ask him how long they have been there, what are the borders of their area, which mountains, rivers and cities they have, and what the rulers and people are like. You must also ask them whether their area is worthy of being called a country or not, or whether they are, in fact, in caves like the Lao tribes. You must ask them what the customs of their people are and whether they know how to distinguish between the rank of a king and his subjects.<sup>40</sup> Everything must be cleared up, and then the tribal chief may be allowed to return. If he has already returned before you get this letter, you must turn immediately to Liệt and ask of him all of the items of information above. You must also ask what kind of magic the tribal chief has. You must ascertain all of these facts clearly in order to report to the king."

However, when the decree arrived, the chief of state of Thuỷ Xá had already left. Tru'ng Minh Giảng reported this to the king, and the king issued an order to the officer of Trấn Tây to send an industrious mandarin<sup>41</sup> from the area to take with him a certain Mật who knew the route and an interpreter and go to the land of Thuỷ Xá. He was also to take with him some gifts which the tribal chief would appreciate as gifts from the officer of Trấn Tây. In his conversation he should tell the chief of state of that country: "The authority and virtue of the imperial court are liberal and have stimulated many areas to submit themselves, including the land of Hoả Xá, which has respectfully and faithfully submitted tribute because she has already benefited from magnanimity and protection. Apparently the land of Thuỷ Xá borders upon Hoả Xá, but until now, because the route is disrupted, she has not yet come to offer tribute. If she now voluntarily sends an emissary to pay tribute, she will probably be received by the court and will be praised and rewarded. If she does not want to offer tribute, there is no need to force her." This was also to be used as an occasion to inquire about the mountains and rivers, the land, etc., when it was convenient and to make a report back to the king to clarify the situation.

The king's decree was sent and the court received the report of Trấn Tây saying: "According to the information of one Kê and

one Mậ̣t, the two lands of Hoạ̉ Xá and Thuỵ̉ Xá, although they are small, have spirits more powerful than those of Lạp Man.<sup>42</sup> Last year the king (of Cambodia) sent them<sup>43</sup> to bring ritual offerings in order to appeal to the spirits of those two countries for help. On their trip they followed a road to the east of the district of So'n Bôc, and it takes 15 days to get to the residence of the king of Thuỵ̉ Xá. This place borders upon the land of Hoạ̉ Xá to the east and upon the district of So'n Bôc to the West. The south borders on Đìền Đìền, and the north borders on Mán Lai.<sup>44</sup> The populated area has mountains on three sides and on the fourth it has large and vast fields. In it there are about a hundred residences. The chief of state is in a thatch house with seven rooms which is located in the eastern part of the district. There is no fortress. In the house of the chief of state there are two altars to the spirits. There are about 14 or 15 relatives and servants in the house. From the residence of the chief of state of Hoạ̉ Xá to the residence of the chief of state of Thuỵ̉ Xá is about a three day trip. The house and personnel of the chief of state of Hoạ̉ Xá are like that of the chief of state of Thuỵ̉ Xá. The only difference is that Hoạ̉ Xá has a pagoda to worship the spirits, and the whole area around his location is a plain, there are no dangerous mountains or streams. When Kệ and Mậ̣t brought the ritual offerings to the two countries the chief of state of Thuỵ̉ Xá and the chief of state of Hoạ̉ Xá gathered about 20 of the tribal people together, killed a buffalo, and worshipped the spirits and prayed to them for the king.<sup>45</sup> They did not allow Kệ and Mậ̣t to watch. After worshipping they gave Kệ and his companion each a bowl of buffalo meat and said: "If you don't eat you will become ill." They mixed wine with clear water, poured it into a vase, and used bamboo tubes to suck it up and drink it. Those two lands have no mandarins or soldiers, and they do not establish punishments. The people are illiterate, and when they have a loan they use a string with knots to keep record of it. In order to make a living the tribal people cut the trees, dig up the earth, and plant. They do not know how to plough and harrow. The people never pay tax throughout the whole year and the chief of state doesn't demand anything. Whenever the chief of state goes out, if he doesn't go far he has three servants with him; if he goes far he still doesn't have more than 10 servants, riding three elephants, and using leaf hats to shade their heads because they don't have parasols. As to the customs, when a boy and girl love each other the family of the boy brings betel and wine to the family of the girl and invites the neighbors to eat and drink in order to establish the marriage. Most of

the men remain in the household of their wives, very seldom do the women go to the households of their husbands. Whenever a person dies they do not use a double coffin.<sup>46</sup> They place the corpse upon a bed, the children and relatives mourn, and everyone places a small handful of rice into the mouth of the dead person. When the mouth is full of rice, the last person uses his fingers to get the old rice out and then he stuffs more rice into it. After having the corpse in the house for three days they carry it and the bed and lower them into the grave and set up a grave marker. The children dress as usual, they only let down their hair for three months to express mourning. On the anniversary of the death they bring ritual offerings to the grave and worship.

As for music, both in happiness and in sadness the tribal people use large and small brass gongs, a cymbal, and a drum.

Kê and Mậ heard that the land of Thuỷ Xá had two large stones and a piece of rattan whip, and that the land of Hoả Xá had a short knife,<sup>47</sup> all of which are very sacred objects passed on from ancient times. They don't know how effective they are and the chiefs of state do not allow foreigners to see them. Only when an ill person from the population is in the house do they bring offerings and pray and they are healed. Because of this people regard those objects as spirits. All of the village chiefs in the land must bow when they approach the sacred objects and they dare not look straight on because the people fervently venerate the spirits.

The tribal people also say that from the ancient past until now the two chiefs of Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá never dared to be together, because if they see each other one of them will die. When the chief of state is old and passes the throne to his successor he does not pass it to his child because that would not be beneficial.

When Kê and Mậ asked to be excused to return to their homeland each chief of state sent the king<sup>48</sup> two gourds of glutinous rice, two gourds of sesame seed, and one piece of wax in which they had made the imprint of their hand. They instructed Kê and Mậ to tell the king when they returned: "When you have fierce winds, heavy rain, drought, or epidemics, light these two pieces of wax and pray to the kings of Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá and ask them for help. Then sprinkle around a small handful of the rice and sesame. If you pray in this manner everything will be as you wish. Each chief of state also sent the king a servant, an elephant tusk, and a horn of an ox as a token payment.

The report of Liệt<sup>49</sup> continues: "In the previous year, I went to trade and passed by the land of Thuỷ Xá. I went from the district

of So'n Bôc to the place of residence of the chief of state of that country in about six days, and it took about two more days from the residence of the chief of state of that country to that of the chief of state of Hoả Xá. The eastern border of Thuỷ Xá touches Hoả Xá, the west touches Mán Phủ Non near the districts of So'n Phủ, So'n Bôc, and Quê Lâm. To the south and north it borders on groups of tribes and I don't know exactly what its area is. There are many mountains and ravines, but they are low and shallow and have no names. This large area has about 100 residences. The house of the chief of state has no fortress or guard, and it has about 20 slaves. The chief of state, like the people, plants rice for a living. According to tradition a person is raised to the throne because the ancestors left a rattan whip to worship as something sacred. Near the house of the chief of state there is a pagoda which contains supernatural power that grants anything they request. There is no other magic. Only when the people are ill do they bring offerings to the house of the chief of state and ask him to pray. If they are not ill they do not come to his house at all throughout the year. There are times when the chief of state goes to the hamlets to appeal for money and goods or revenue. Then the people bring out to him a few of their products but they do not have a law requiring payment of regular taxes. Regarding daily life, the people of Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá, just like the tribes of Laos, do not yet know status, the place of the king and his subjects.<sup>50</sup>

Having seen this report the king issued a decree to Trấn Tây to send Mạt to the land of Hoả Xá to inquire again about everything. However, the local soldiers and the people of Trấn Tây rebelled, so the mission did not materialize.

In the seventh month of the twenty-first year of Minh Mạng<sup>51</sup> an order from the Ministry of Rites directed the province of Phú Yên to send someone to Hoả Xá to ask about the situation and to ascertain the most convenient routes to the land of Thuỷ Xá. In the twelfth month, the province of Phú Yên sent a report saying that she had sent Lê Văn Quyên, the administrative official of the fortress of Phúc So'n, in pretense of trading with all kinds of silk, tunics and skirts, a candle holder of brass, and white salt, to the two countries of Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá. These gifts were to be given to the chiefs of state of these countries, and they were to take the opportunity to find out about the situation.

When he returned, Lê Văn Quyên reported: "The land of Thuỷ Xá (previously called Hoả Xá by mistake) is bordered on the west by Hoả Xá, on the east by the fortress of Phúc So'n (under the ad-

ministration of Phú Yên) and the tribe of Thạch Thành,<sup>52</sup> and on the north it is bordered by the Hoàng tribe of Bình Định. The land of Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá borders on So'n Phũ<sup>2</sup> on the west, on Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá on the east and on the north and south it borders on different tribal groups. Both countries, although they have a chief of state, do not have armies or fortresses. The kings, like the local chiefs, make rice fields for a living and weave cloth for their clothing. The only reason the people anoint a king is because he possesses some sacred object. Because of this he is worshipped like a saint. As for the local chiefs, they have the power of life and death over the people, and are frequently at war. The chief of state does not involve himself in these affairs. Traditionally, when there is too much rain and they pray for sunshine, they call the king of Hoả.<sup>53</sup> When it is hot and they pray for rain they call the king of Thuỷ.<sup>54</sup> Quyên arrived at the land of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá and hired a person to lead him to the land of Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá. Along the way he saw a place where there are two mountains and where the landscape was as steep as the roof of a house. The water ran down opposite sides from this place and this is where the two countries of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá and Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá meet. After two days on the road he arrived at the residence of the chief of state of Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá. Three directions were mountainous, and one direction had immense fields with a population of more than one hundred houses. There were no fortresses. The chief of state lived in a house which looked as follows: in the center room there was a bamboo platform, on both sides of which there was a shelf into which a parasol was thrust, and upon which gongs and drums were hung. In the room at the left hand there was a large brass cooking pot, an earthenware vase, a lacquer box inlaid with mother-of-pearl, and two lacquer trays. Beside the house there was a buffalo pen and an elephant pen. Inside the house there were more than 10 men and women going in and out but the chief of state was not to be seen. After waiting a bit Quyên witnessed the arrival of two local chiefs and 20 highland men, all grasping short knives. They said to Quyên: "From the past until now, the lowland people have never come here. You must have a pig and a jar of wine and three baskets of white salt before we will tell the chief of state to come out and meet you." Quyên immediately had someone buy all the offerings that they required. The local chiefs and highland men slaughtered the pig and hung the meat above and below the bamboo bed. Presently the chief of state came out, a person about 70 years of age, with his head bound in a turban of white material, and a loincloth of white material which exposed his calves and knees. His hands were mottled. He stood

before the bed and softly prayed several sentences and then got upon the bed and sat down. Then he ate three pieces of meat, placed a bamboo pipe in the jar and drank lots of wine. The people who were standing at both sides beat the gongs and the drums, while four men in the house went out and danced a tribal dance. The local chiefs all bowed. After the chief of state had eaten and drunk, he called Quyên to sit near him and said: "This is the land of Hoả Xá which previously, with the land of Thuỷ Xá, offered tribute to the sacred court."<sup>55</sup> He pointed to the large brass cooking pot and the earthen jar in the room at the left, and continued to speak. "These are the things that the sacred court rewarded to us, which we forever venerate as our national treasure. However, the tribal people are limited in their knowledge and dare not go far, and, consequently, there is no one to go as an emissary. Previously we united our tribute with the land of Thuỷ Xá and several times in the recent past we have prepared tribute, but we did not hear from the land of Thuỷ Xá. Because of this our feelings of respect for the sacred court have not been able to be expressed. If, in the future, we can send tribute with the land of Thuỷ Xá, and order our children to observe this custom, that would be our true desire."

Quyên accepted the statement and returned to the land of Thuỷ Xá and brought the message of the chief of state of Hoả Xá to Vĩnh Liệt (the chief of the state of Thuỷ Xá). Vĩnh Liệt replied: "Regarding the last several times, the truth is that he is from the present generation and isn't well informed." Quyên asked: "Why did the land of Thuỷ Xá last year pretend to be the land of Hoả Xá?" Vĩnh Liệt said: "My country is Thuỷ Xá and the reason for pretending to be Hoả Xá was the fault of the emissary who apparently made a mistake, truly I don't know about it." Quyên asked the emissary, who was called Ma Sanh. Ma Sanh replied: "We are not literate, we only heard that the name of the country was Y-Di Y-Ong. Di means water, and the land to the west is Y-Phun Y-Ong. Phun is fire. The previous time the ministry asked about the two words Thuỷ and Hoả, I didn't know which was Thuỷ and which was Hoả, therefore I merely agreed in order to get on with the ritual; therefore I made the mistake of calling it Hoả Xá."

According to this information, for as long as tribute has been offered it has been from Thuỷ Xá, and the country that has not yet been able to offer tribute is Hoả Xá. The reports of the Trần Tây officer, of Kê, Mât, and Liệt indicating that the land of Thuỷ Xá is to the west and Hoả Xá to the east are all in error because there was an error from the very beginning.

During the first year<sup>56</sup> of Thiệu Trị, in the second lunar month, the Ministry of Rites corrected the national title of Thuy Xá (previously called Hoả Xá, but now changed to Thuỷ Xá) in compliance with the royal decree. It was also approved that the chief of state of Hoả Xá, whose name was Ma Thất, should be called by the surname Cừu and the given name Lại, and that he should be allowed to offer tribute together with the land of Thuỷ Xá. The schedule of tribute was to be determined by the decree of the twelfth year of Minh Mạng; every three years they should bring tribute once, that is, on the years Tý, Mão, Ngọ, and Dậu. It would be the responsibility of the chief of state of Thuỷ Xá to send an emissary with the tribute (Thuỷ Xá must bring two elephant tusks and two ox horns and Hoả Xá must bring one elephant tusk and one ox horn). The emissary must come to the imperial inn<sup>57</sup> of the province of Phú Yên and pay homage indirectly,<sup>58</sup> offer the tribute, accept the letter of reward, and then return to his homeland and deliver the gifts which the king had given to Hoả Xá.

In the sixth month of that year each of the two lands (Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá) sent an emissary to the imperial capital to pay respects to the new king<sup>59</sup> and to congratulate the king upon having ascended to the throne. After the rites were completed the king gave the chiefs of state of those two lands sets of silk clothing, official letters of recognition and colored sild, because they greatly admired the ritual clothing<sup>60</sup> of the imperial court.

In the sixth month of the third year of Thiệu Trị<sup>61</sup> an emissary with tribute arrived at Phú Yên and said that the two lands were suffering from famine and disease, and that they were desperate. The king had pity on him, allowing him to pay homage indirectly at Phú Yên, rewarding him and allowing him to return home immediately.

In the twelfth month of the fourth year of Thiệu Trị,<sup>62</sup> on the New Year, the king rewarded both of the chiefs of state. He gave them one mandarin's calendar and 50 people's calendars.

In the fifth month of the sixth year of Thiệu Trị<sup>63</sup> for the celebration of the fortieth birthday of Hiến Tô<sup>2</sup> Chương Hoàng Đế,<sup>64</sup> the two lands sent an emissary to offer both congratulations and the usual tribute. The king rewarded each of the two emissaries with a set of ritual garments for military mandarins of the fifth and sixth ranks, and after entertaining them he allowed them to return. The emissaries were named Sơn Thí and Kiêu MỘC.

From that time on the two countries sent an emissary with tribute every three years. As to their customs, the people of the two lands

of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá and Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá count the nights rather than the days, they count the years by the harvests, and they do not count the days and months in the year. They call their officials lung. They do not call their emissaries lung, but rather ma. The people of the two lands do not dare to wear clothing with designs, therefore all of the silk given to them must be plain (without design or pattern).<sup>65</sup>

In the book, *The Collection of Official Administrative Regulations*, there are many sections which speak of the relations with Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá and Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá.

In this historical document the Vietnamese court called Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá and Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá “The dual countries of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá and Hoà<sup>2</sup> Xá” because the two leaders of the Jarai were called the “kings” of those two countries.

Excerpts Translated from: COLLECTION OF OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS<sup>66, 67</sup> (*Khâm Định Đại Nam Hội Điển Sự Lệ*), Book 134, pages 3a and 3b

In the fifteenth year of Minh Mạng<sup>68</sup> this decree was issued:

The land of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá is distant and remote and her customs are simple and archaic. All this time she has offered tribute, demonstrating her fidelity.<sup>69</sup> This is truly a country that has fidelity.<sup>70</sup> We greatly praise the chief of state of that land whose name is Lam and now we give him the surname Vĩnh and the given name Bảo in order that he may know his close, subordinate relationship to us and increasingly adopt the good and beautiful customs and culture.

It is also decreed that:

The land of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá, although it is remote and distant and a small country, has uniformly simple customs transmitted down from the ancient past. That land has never had a rebellion, it knows clearly the relation of fidelity between king and subject, it is truly a country that has fidelity.

Now we have already established his surname and given name. Whenever a decree is issued it must be indicated clearly that it is to the king of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá. The Ministry of Rites must transmit the order that from now on, whenever that land offers tribute and submits letters it must be indicated clearly that it is from the king so that he may be addressed properly.

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In the tenth<sup>71</sup> year of Minh Mạng the land of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá selected two emissaries called Ma Diên and Ma Xuân to offer an elephant

tusk. They asked permission to come to the court to have a tribute ceremony.

Page 27:

In the twelfth year of Minh Mạng<sup>72</sup> it was approved that the land of Thủy Xá should bring tribute of local products amounting to two elephant tusks and two sets of rhinoceros horns.

Page 16:

In the fifteenth year of Minh Mạng<sup>73</sup> it was decreed that: the land of Thủy Xá is far away and remote but she is not daunted by the difficulty and danger and follows the tribute schedule exactly so she is certainly worthy of praise. This time, allow the whole mission of that country to come to the capitol to have an audience with the king in order to satisfy the affectionate attitude of this person from far away. Send Đặng Đức Thiêm, and Nguyễn Văn Hoả to the province of Phú Yên with a mission made up of a boat, ten soldiers, and an interpreter, to escort that emissary and his tribute by sea to the imperial palace.

Page 4b:

In the eighteenth year of Minh Mạng<sup>74</sup> it was reported to the king that the chief of state of Thủy Xá, who was named Liệt but who had been awarded the name Vĩnh, was continuing to use the name Liệt as usual in order to clearly emphasize the geneology of his vassal country.

The emissary's assistant from that country who was called Thốt was renamed Sơn Bút in order to avoid vulgarity.<sup>75</sup>

Page 27:

In the first year of Thiệu Trị<sup>76</sup> the land of Hoả Xá asked to be allowed to pay tribute with the land of Thủy Xá. It was approved that the land of Thủy Xá would pay tribute of two elephant tusks and two rhinoceros horns, and that the land of Hoả Xá would pay tribute of one elephant tusk and one rhinoceros horn. Whenever the time for the tribute came, the land of Hoả Xá would send her tribute with that of Thủy Xá and the latter would send an emissary to deliver it.

That year the two countries of Thủy and Hoả Xá sent an emissary to respectfully offer in the fidelity ceremony,<sup>77</sup> six weights<sup>78</sup> of aloe wood (four from Thủy Xá and two from Hoả Xá).

They also offered in the ceremony<sup>79</sup> four elephant tusks, three rhinoceros horns (the land of Thủy Xá gave two elephant tusks and two rhinoceros horns and the land of Hoả Xá gave two elephant tusks and one rhinoceros horn).

In the first year of Thiệu Trị<sup>80</sup> a letter was sent to the king of

Thủy<sup>3</sup> Xá named Vĩnh Liệt as follows: "Your country maintains its subordinate position, prepares for the tribute ceremony very faithfully, and has already benefited from our magnanimity for a long time."

"In the twenty-first year of Minh Mạng the twelfth month the twenty-eighth day<sup>81</sup> my imperial<sup>82</sup> father rode the dragon's vehicle to wait upon Heaven. I respectfully obey the desires of my father<sup>83</sup> and bow to the will of the people and ascend the throne as emperor from the twentieth day of the first month in the first year of Thiệu Trị. I will follow the great law and advise all of the small countries. This decree concerns the matter of the promotion of individuals who will be mandarins in the localities in charge of tribute. I hear that the habits and customs of your land are very simple and that you have frequently shown your desire for the tunic and hat of the imperial court. This is worthy of praise. Therefore, we reward you with a suit *mãng phục*<sup>84</sup> in order to honor you. According to the report of the provincial official of Phú Yên, your land is the land of Thủy<sup>3</sup> Xá but for a long time it has been called Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá because of a mistake by the interpreter. Now we approve that it be changed to Thủy<sup>3</sup> Xá so that it may be addressed correctly. And as to the affair of Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá desiring to follow the old rule of offering tribute with your country, which has already been reported by my subject provincial official, it is approved that your two countries may unite to pay tribute but you must rely upon the provincial official to bring the gifts to the court. You have already benefited from the magnanimity of the king, so you must become gradually more studious and faithful. You must worship the large country and fear Heaven; you must be careful not to oppose the Way of Heaven. Be friendly with all neighboring countries and watch the borders, in order that you may benefit from the widespread and profound magnanimity of the king.

It is also approved that the king of Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá, whose former name was Ma Thát, may take the surname Cửu and the given name Lại in order to be addressed correctly. The principal emissary of the land of Thủy<sup>3</sup> Xá, who is named Thí, may be called by the surname So'n but he may still keep the name Thí. The assistant emissary who is named Tài, may take the surname Kiêu<sup>3</sup> and the name of Mọc.

Page 18a:

In the first year of Thiệu Trị<sup>85</sup> it is decreed as follows.

From the past until now the land of Thủy<sup>3</sup> Xá has offered tribute. Because the language of the emissaries could not be clearly understood, the translator mistakenly said that it was the land of Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá.

Only now after inquiry do we know that to the west of Thuỷ Xá<sup>2</sup> there is the land of Hoả Xá<sup>7</sup>, which has requested to be allowed to offer tribute with the land of Thuỷ Xá<sup>2</sup> because of her attitude of respect. The Ministry of Rites is ordered to change the national title of those two lands and to allow them to offer tribute together. Therefore this must be considered carefully and obedience achieved. Respectfully carry it out.

Respectfully follow the decision that from now on each time tribute is due, the land of Hoả Xá<sup>2</sup> may offer tribute together with Thuỷ Xá<sup>2</sup> but the land of Thuỷ Xá<sup>2</sup> shall be responsible for bringing it.

Page 18b:

In the third year of Thiệu Trị it is decreed that:<sup>86</sup>

According to the report of Phú Yên the two lands of Thuỷ Xá<sup>2</sup> and Hoả Xá<sup>7</sup> chose an emissary and entrusted to him the bringing of local products to offer as tribute. He awaits at Phú Yên for permission to come to the court for the tribute ceremony. Furthermore, those two countries are at a distant and remote place and they have sought the fame and civilizing influence of our court for a long time. According to the report, those countries have this year met famine and disease and their situation is very desperate. Nevertheless, the mission has still traveled this great distance through many dangers to obey the schedule of tribute, this truly represents a respectful attitude which is worthy of taking into consideration. Therefore, the provincial official must issue an order granting the rewards and entertainments, but he must have the emissary come to the imperial inn<sup>87</sup> of the province to pay homage indirectly, after which he may be allowed to return home; thus saving him from having to come to the capitol. Only in order to demonstrate our whole-hearted appreciation of someone so far away do we thus reduce the distance that he must travel on the difficult road.

Page 28:

In the fifth year of Thiệu Trị it was decreed as follows:<sup>88</sup> Next year I will celebrate my fortieth birthday. Previously, according to the report of the provincial official of Phú Yên, the two lands of Thuỷ Xá<sup>2</sup> and Hoả Xá<sup>7</sup> requested permission to choose an emissary to go to the imperial capitol for the birthday celebration so that they might have an audience and pay homage, offering both congratulations<sup>89</sup> and tribute<sup>90</sup> in order to express their attitude of fidelity.

Having communicated to the Ministry of Rites that they consider this affair, now, according to the report of the Ministry of Rites, it respectfully arranges all of the items mentioned above. Fur-

thermore, the land of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá and Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá respect the customs, they wish to see the illustrious palace of the imperial court, and they voluntarily request permission to offer congratulations out of a faithful attitude, which is very praiseworthy. Therefore, grant to the emissaries of those two lands the privilege of coming to the imperial capitol on the very time of the birthday celebration, allowing them to offer congratulations according to their rank in order to satisfy those from far away who have an attitude of respect. Give permission to receive all of the gifts which those two lands bring in congratulations and reward them. Also grant to them that they need not offer tribute at the end of the year. When the next period of tribute arrives they need not come to the imperial palace to pay tribute.<sup>91</sup> Grant this favor in order to demonstrate our esteemed attitude of affection.

In the sixth year of Thiệu Trị the two lands of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá and Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá sent an emissary to offer congratulations at the Great Festival. They offered three elephant tusks and three rhinoceros horns (the land of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá offered two elephant tusks and two rhinoceros horns. The land of Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá offered an elephant tusk and a rhinoceros horn.)

Page 29:

In the first year of Tự Đức<sup>92</sup> the land of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá and Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá requested permission to send an emissary to the capitol to offer tribute in the fidelity ceremony. They sent deer's antlers, a five tiên piece of money, one weight of aloe wood<sup>93</sup> two weights of tôc wood.<sup>94, 95</sup> They also sent, for the congratulatory celebration, one elephant tusk and one rhinoceros horn.

The king issued a statement saying that from the past until now the two lands of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá and Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá have been very respectful and obedient and they have been listed with the rank of tribute paying localities for a long time. Now the king of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá called Vĩnh Liệt asks permission to send an emissary to the imperial capitol to offer gifts for the two celebrations: swearing fidelity and congratulations. The tribal chief of the land of Hoả<sup>2</sup> Xá also requests to follow the tradition of offering tribute and giving gifts together with the land of Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> Xá. According to the report, these two countries are determined to pay tribute with all their heart, which is worthy of praise; therefore, allow them to follow their desire. On the middle week of the fourth month allow the emissary to come to the imperial capitol to have an audience with the king in order to satisfy the desires of these persons from far away. Tell the official (Phú Yên) to inform the two countries of this decision.<sup>96</sup>

The book *Official Summary of the Royal Court*, the edition which is in the national script and which was printed in Huê in 1925, tells us about the relations of the two Jarai leaders with Vietnam until the end of the court of Tụ Đứ<sup>2</sup>c (1847-1883).

In 1848 king Tụ Đứ<sup>2</sup>c "gave a formal letter and silk goods to the lands of Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá. Both of those lands asked permission to send an emissary to swear fidelity and offering congratulations. The king granted it."

In 1868, on the occasion of the fortieth birthday of Tụ Đứ<sup>2</sup>c, Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá offered the congratulatory ritual, they asked to come on the day of the birthday celebration to pay their respects. The king allowed the province of Phú Yên to receive the ritual gifts but he did not require that they come to the imperial capitol to pay tribute.

In 1869 Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá ordered the chief emissary Kiêu Linh and the assistant emissary So'n Lý to offer gifts for a congratulatory ritual. (Each country brought an elephant tusk.)

After the court of Tụ Đứ<sup>2</sup>c, Vietnam lost her independence and the French replaced the court of Huê in relations with the minority peoples in the highlands.

In 1941 the French organized an allegiance ceremony for all of the highland people at Banmethuot and Thuỷ Xá was invited to take part. Unfortunately, that year two large elephants died right during the allegiance ceremony. The Rhade said it was because the Thuỷ Xá was there that the disaster occurred.

After the French dominance, the highlands of Central Vietnam again returned to the government of Vietnam. The two Jarai leaders Thuỷ Xá and Hoả Xá still exist in the province of Pleiku.

I hope that some day soon I will have occasion to return to Cheo Reo in order to examine more thoroughly the facts regarding the Thuỷ Xá and the Hoả Xá.

\*1. Hereafter these titles will not be translated. They will be used as they appear in the text: Thuỷ<sup>2</sup> or Thuỷ Xá (Water, Kingdom of Water, or King of Water), and Hoả<sup>2</sup> or Hoả Xá (Fire, Kingdom of Fire, or King of Fire). The Jarai terms are potao pui and potao ea, both of which refer to a person, or more specifically, to a formal social role with no implication of "kingdom" or "country". It will be seen that the Lowland writers do not use their terms Hoả Xá and Thuỷ Xá in this restricted sense.

2. J. Moura, *Le Royaume du Cambodge* (2 vols.).

\*3. Apparently this is a typographical error. The title is *Lịch Triều Hiến Chương Loạ, Du Địa Chí*.

\*4. These documents are described briefly later in the text, by professor Thâm. According to Emile Gaspardone, "Bibliographie Annamite," *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient* (BEFEO), Vol. 34, 1934, No. 1, p. 32, and Lê Thanh Khôi, *Le Viet Nam*, Paris 1955, pp. 66, 324-349, and 348, the following are rough translations of the titles of the documents:

*Hoàng Việt Địa Du Chí, Royal Geography of Vietnam* (By Phan Huy Chú.)

*Đại Nam Chính Biên Liệt Truyện*, *Official Biographies of Đại Nam* (frequently abbreviated "Liệt-Truyện.")

*Khâm Định Đại Nam Hội Điển Sự Lễ*, *The Collection of Official Administrative Regulations* (This document is frequently abbreviated "Hội Điển.")

*Lịch Triều Hiến Chương Loại Chí, Du Địa Chí*, (The title of the complete work by Phan Huy Chú is *Lịch Triều Hiến Chương Loại Chí, The Regulations of the Successive Dynasties by Subject*. The "Du Địa Chí" above refers to the first of 10 parts. This first part is on "Geography".

Although Professor Thăm mentions the *Lịch Triều Hiến Chương Loại Chí*, he presents translations only from the *Hoàng Việt Địa Dư Chí*. Apparently he assumed, as is suggested by Trần Văn Giáp, (ed.), *Lược Truyện Các Tác Giả Việt Nam* (Survey of Vietnamese Authors), Nhà Xuất Bản Sư Học, Hanoi, 1962, p. 89, that the latter work was essentially the chapter on *Dư Địa Chí* (Geography) of the former. I have not been able to verify this assumption.

\*5. of Saigon.

\*6. The English translation of these excerpts from Leclere's report has benefited from use of the original French version which can be found in Henri Maitre, *Les Jungles Moi*, Paris: Emile Larose, 1912, pp. 450-454.

7. Ayonapar may come from the two names of the rivers Ayun and Apah. Ayun is a branch of the river Apah. The highland people call the Ba River the Apah. Because of this name "Ayonapar" we know that the kings of Thủy Xá and Hoà Xá were already at the area of the Ba River.

\*8. On this legend see: Dr. Claude Bernard Jouin, "Legende du Sadet du Feu," BSEI, N.S. XXVI, 1951, pp. 73-85. The term "Heaven" is a translation of Vietnamese "Trời", which means "sky", "heaven", and "God", or "the divine being".

\*9. Two documents are mentioned here that were not discussed previously. The *Geographical Annals* by Phương Đình is the translation for *Phương Đình Địa Dư Chí*, by Nguyễn Văn Siêu (1795-1872) whose pen name was Phương-Đình. See Trần Văn Giáp (ed.), *Lược Truyện Các Tác Giả Việt Nam* (Survey of Vietnamese Authors), Nhà Xuất Bản Sư-Học Hanoi, 1962, page 421. *The Official Summary of the Royal Court* is a translation of *Quốc Triều Chính Biên Toát Yếu* by Cao Xuân Dục (1842-1923). In fact, in this part of the text professor Thăm has written *Quốc Triều Hiến Chương Toát Yếu* but I have not been able to find any reference to such a document. In the following paragraphs Professor Thăm himself speaks of *Quốc Triều Chính Biên Toát Yếu*. Apparently this was an error.

\*10. Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient.

\*11. "Barbarian" above is a rendering of Mán and Man. Elsewhere this term is also translated "tribe", "tribal" in this text.

\*12. Apparently a typographical error. Should be 1833.

13. *Royal Geography of Vietnam* completed by Phan Huy Chú in the 14th year of Minh Mạng (1833). Printed with wood blocks in Saigon in 1872.

\*14. Here begins the translation of the *Royal Geography*.

\*15. Respectively, these political units are Huyện, Thuộc, Tổng and Xã. Prefecture is a translation of Phủ.

16. Lê Court.

\*17. Thủy.

\*18. One Tonkinese mẫu equals 0.36 hectare.

\*19. This ends the translation from the *Royal Geography*.

\*20. Here begins the translation from the *Official Biographies*.

21. In the year Canh(Thìn) (1470), the first year of the Hồng Đức period, the king of Champa, Tra Toan, wanted to invade Vietnam. He sent an emissary to request aid from the Minh and then sent an army to attack and destroy the area of Hoà Châu. King Lê Thánh Tôn divided Champa into three countries, two of which were renamed Hoà Anh and Nam Bàn. He also seized the land of Đồ Bàn, the land of Champa, and the area of Cô Lũy of Champa and established the area of Quảng Nam in 1471.

22. Thế Tông Hoàng Đế: King Nguyễn Phúc Khoát (1738-1765) was anointed as Thế Tông Hiến Võ Hoàng Đế. This was the year 13 (Tân Vỵ), or the year 1751.

23. 1822.

24. 1823.

25. 1829.

26. Posthumous name of Minh Mạng.

\*27. The "city" here and above is a "trần", which probably refers to the provincial capital of Phú Yên.

28. 1831.

29. Virtue that transforms people.

\*30. Years are reckoned in "centuries" of 60 years each, by combining two series

of characters, one which has 10 characters and, consequently, is repeated 6 times, and one which has 12 characters and is repeated only 5 times. This gives, of course, 60 unique combinations. (P. Huard and M. Durand, "The Lunar Calendar and Traditional Vietnamese Holidays," *Việt-Mỹ*, 9 (June, 1964): 2-8). Here the writer has simply used the second character in the pair, which is the 12 character series, to indicate the specific years when tribute should be paid. The 12 characters and the animal equivalents are tý (rat), sửu (buffalo), dần (tiger), mão (cat), thìn (dragon), ti (snake), ngựa (horse), mùi (goat), thân (monkey), dậu (chicken), tuất (dog), and hợi (pig).

31. 1834.
32. Clothing worn by the mandarins of seventh rank when waiting upon the king.
33. 1837.
- \*34. Gia Long's second wife and the mother of Minh Mạng.
35. 1840.
36. Posthumous name of Minh Mạng.
- \*37. The "protector" of Cambodia.
- \*38. Pertaining to Cambodia.
39. Reference to the king of Cambodia ("phiên vương").
- \*40. I.e., are civilized.
41. Cần viên, a mandarin who works industriously.
42. Cambodia.
- \*43. Kế and Mật.
- \*44. Some tribal group.
- \*45. Of Cambodia.
46. Quan quách, Quan is the internal coffin, and quách is the external coffin used for burial.
- \*47. The flaming sword.
- \*48. Of Cambodia.
49. Liệt was the district chief of the district of Sơn Bốc (Cambodia).
- \*50. I.e., are not yet civilized.
51. 1840.
- \*52. Does this refer to Bạch Thạch Thành (White Stone City) mentioned previously? If so, it may well be the remains of a Cham structure in the Bandon, Ea Suop area, known locally and on French maps as Yang Prong.
- \*53. Fire.
- \*54. Water.
- \*55. Of Vietnam.
56. 1841.
57. Hành Cung: A palace built in the provinces outside of the capitol in order to have a room for the king to rest when he was traveling.
58. Vong bái: To be far away and look towards the capitol and pay homage.
- \*59. This is translation of "Tiễn Hư'ng" which is the name of the formal ceremony required of all subordinate countries when a new king was installed in the royal court. It was an indication of fidelity.
60. Phẩm Phục: Tunic and hat of the mandarin determined by their rank.
61. 1843.
62. 1844.
63. 1846.
64. Hiên Tô<sup>7</sup> Chương Hoàng Đế: Post-humous name of king Thiệu Trị.
- \*65. Here ends the translation from the *Official Biographies*.
- \*66. Here begins the translation from the *Collection of Official Administrative Regulations*.
67. Prepared from the 6th month of the 3rd year of Thiệu Trị (1843).
68. 1834.
- \*69. "Thân thuộc" can be translated "relative", "kin" and here apparently implies closeness of relationship as well as subordination.
- \*70. "Đạo Nghĩa" here is the general Confucian term normally translated "fidelity".
71. 1829.
72. 1831.
73. 1834.
74. 1837.
- \*75. The native names of these highland people were considered unsophisticated or vulgar.
76. 1841.
- \*77. "Tiễn Hư'ng" see above footnote number 59.
- \*78. Cần.

- \*79. Congratulating Thiệu Trị upon ascending to the throne.
- 80. 1841.
- 81. 20-1-1841.
- 82. The king's father has died.
- 83. The advice given by Minh Mạng while still alive.
- 84. Mandarin's garment with an embroidered dragon with four claws.
- 85. 1841.
- 86. 1843.
- 87. Hàng Cung: Palace built in all of the provinces outside the capitol to be used by the king when he is on a tour.
- 88. 1845.
- 89. Khánh Hạ: Rejoice about something good.
- 90. Tuế cống: Every year a subordinate country must send an emissary offering goods to the superordinate country.
- 91. The emissary only needs to bring the tribute to the province of Phú Yên and have it transmitted to the court.
- 92. 1848.
- \*93. Trâm hương: An aromatic wood which is heavier than water.
- \*94. Tộc hương: A wood similar to Trâm hương, but lighter than water.
- \*95. According to E. M. Durand, "Les Mois du Son Phong", *Bulletin de Géographie Historique et Descriptive*, 1900, no. 3, pp. 313-314, Trâm hương and Tộc hương come from the same tree, the former being heartwood and more valuable and the latter coming from just beneath the bark. Tộc hương could, thus, also be translated "aloe".
- \*96. Here ends the translation from the Collection of Official Administrative Regulations.

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## Abstract / Résumé

Dans quelle perspective doit-on considérer l'offensive nordvietnamienne d'avril? Dans l'article intitulé: "Est-il trop tard pour mettre fin à la guerre du Vietnam?", l'auteur soutient que cette offensive pourrait être un prélude au renouvellement des négociations. Chacun des principaux combattants en sortirait peut-être mieux enclin à négotier la question du potentiel militaire qu'il conserverait dans le Sud-Vietnam. En ce qui concerne le Nord, une telle concession pourrait s'expliquer par l'infiltration dont il demeure capable et par le pouvoir qu'il conserve de mener des offensives sur le plan local. En ce qui concerne les Etats-Unis, leur denier atout consisterait dans la possibilité d'une guerre aérienne. Chacun des antagonistes se trouve capable, en manipulant ces éventualités, de réduire le niveau des violences ayant trait à la guerre, de façon matérielle et de façon dramatique, dans le désir de mettre officiellement fin à la guerre, ou d'y arriver selon un principe de *quid pro quo*, et ceci sans laisser tomber ses alliés.

L'offensive d'avril est replacée dans le contexte nordvietnamien: le besoin qu'Hanoï éprouve de rappeler à ses alliés la nature essentielle de la guerre du Vietnam, face à la lutte contre l'impérialisme. Cette offensive diffère de celle de Têt 1968 en cela, de même qu'en l'absence du soulèvement politique qui doit entrer dans la composition d'une guerre révolutionnaire. L'offensive en question est donc entreprise par mesure de représailles, entreprise habile mais conventionnelle, contre la guerre aérienne actuelle. C'est aussi une partie intégrante de la stratégie qui consiste à "combattre pendant qu'on négocie," stratégie employée par Hanoï depuis le début des années 1960.

En considérant l'offensive dans cette perspective, l'article souligne le besoin d'efforts diplomatiques continus qui entreprennent de mettre fin à la guerre. Bien plus, raisonne-t-on, la seule proposition sur laquelle Washington et Hanoï puissent arriver à un agrément est de mettre fin à la guerre, vu que Saïgon s'attend et se prépare à obtenir moins qu'un accord politique. La raison principe est qu'aucun des deux Vietnams n'a les institutions ou les procédures nécessaires à la transformation du conflit militaire en conflit politique. La conception qui domine à l'heure actuelle au Sud-Vietnam est que l'après-guerre ne sera pas consacré à la paix mais à la lutte politique.

# Is It Too Late To End The Vietnam War ?

ALLAN GOODMAN

## *Author's Note*

FOR SOME TIME NOW, many critics of the Nixon Administration's policy toward the Vietnamese negotiations believed that the U.S. was doing too little to end the war. Gliding through a series of withdrawals keyed to domestic politics did not represent to us a policy that governed American participation in the war, but merely the form of that participation. In the summer of 1971, consequently, I prepared for a private group a case for a cease-fire initiative on Vietnam. I argued that, in sharp contrast to the large number of initiatives on the Communist side in Paris, the U.S. had made no public response. We had not, in my view, gone the distance in searching for ways to end the war. During the summer and fall, this was particularly evident in the absence of a substantive response to the VC's Seven Points. They signalled a flexibility, later confirmed, on Hanoi's part that might have made possible a negotiated end to the military conflict.

Of course, the revelation of Henry Kissinger's private meetings in Paris at that time, culminating in the Administration's October 1971 secret proposal made the arguments I advanced academic. These initiatives, made public by the President on 25 January, 1972—regardless of the domestic political considerations that motivated them, as openly discussed by Professor Kissinger in his 26 January press conference—represent precisely the kind of proposals that should in my view have been made in response to the Seven Points. As far as can be determined now, the initiative rests with Hanoi.

Should the April offensive be taken as indicative of Hanoi's response? This article suggests that it should not. By putting the April offense in the context of the diplomatic and political events surrounding it, I argue that the prospects for a negotiated end to the war are not dim. Consequently, the article reflects my own opinion that it may not be too late to end the Vietnam war.

The North Vietnamese April offensive is a prelude to breakthrough in the possibilities for a negotiated end to the Vietnam war. Each of the principal belligerents may be increasingly prepared to negotiate on what each can do most easily to sustain the high level of

violence associated with the war in 1972. For Hanoi's part, such give lies clearly in the area of its ability to infiltrate and then conduct localized offensives in the northern coastal and the central highlands area of South Vietnam. To the U.S., its remaining trump card as the American presence dwindles, is the air war. By manipulating these military capabilities both sides can materially and dramatically move to lower the level of violence associated with the war, to end it on a formal or a *quid pro quo* basis, and to do so without abandoning its allies. On the face of it, to construe the April offensive as a move toward a resolution of the war—and to write about it whilst it is still underway—is patently preposterous. When placed in the context of the war as it has developed in the early 1970's, however, the thesis of this article can be supported.

#### THE APRIL OFFENSIVE IN CONTEXT

Ever since the North Vietnamese Politburo decided to transform the Revolutionary War it was fighting in the South into a small unit war of professionals and technology,<sup>1</sup> it had to move on two fronts that required urgent action. Domestically, Hanoi faced a poor economic situation—compounded by the worst floods in modern history—that could not sustain the large unit war it had been fighting. While the North Vietnamese (DRV) are clearly not faced with the prospect of imminent starvation, the floods of 1971 have increased their dependence upon allies precisely at a time when such dependence, particularly if coupled to a military one, signals substantially reduced room for maneuver between allies of increasingly similar tendencies. Indeed, more urgent than even the domestic front, the DRV's relations with its allies, given the new warfare it began to practice, required overhaul. The April offensive was designed, in part, for that purpose.

As it assumed the greater part of the combat burden in South Vietnam (GNV), 80% of the fighting in 1970, Hanoi's forces suffered the most. It accepted a combat burden at a time when, despite the pronouncements of the early Nixon Administration, the ground combat was for a time the most intense and costly of the war. It did so also during a time when two additional fronts were opened by US-GVN operations in Cambodia and then Laos, and while the Ho Chi Minh trail and parts of North Vietnam itself were under the most intense air attacks they had ever known. To sustain the fighting under these conditions required the change in tactics which the Politburo supported by early 1970. Hanoi also required

sustained, if not growing support from its socialist allies. In its external relations, however, the DRV must have found its cause greeted with less than active sympathy.<sup>2</sup> It found a Communist world divided into factions, where the major states tended increasingly to follow parochial interests that altered the priority given to the Vietnam war effort, and where accommodations and peaceful coexistence were gaining acceptance across the very factions that Hanoi had in the 1960's successfully manipulated to its advantage.

Without the resources of its allies,—and given the ground war from 1968-69 and, thereafter, the air war from 1970 to the present, such resource needs were substantial, equalling in dollar amount what the U.S. was giving to support the GVN's war effort—even the changed tactics could not be effectively supported. As Hanoi's need for external support probably exceeded that of any previous time, it found its socialist and Communist allies either hard pressed themselves or less ready to respond at the levels needed.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, and as surprising as the fundamental nature of the Chinese concern over the future of Taiwan may have been to the U.S. in Peking, the Shanghai Communique must have been even more surprising to Hanoi, as the leadership discovered that to China the Vietnam war may well have taken second or even third place (ranking also behind the need to secure the Sino-Soviet border) in overall priorities.

Given what must have appeared to Hanoi as a softening toward the West and principally toward the United States in the Communist world, the leadership in Hanoi may well have reasoned that it needed to demonstrate the fundamental nature of the war in Vietnam *vis a vis* the role it played in the struggle against imperialism.<sup>4</sup> As long as the conflict remained at a low level, as it had in 1970 and 1971, the case of the North Vietnamese must have appeared less pressing to its Allies and the U.S., steadily withdrawing its troops, less bellicose. For the U.S. to accept the winding down of the war must have represented to Hanoi the first signs of the war weariness they had long sought to encourage. But for Hanoi's allies to do the same, particularly when domestic problems would require increasing aid from abroad, would be disastrous. Hence, the April offensive.

Unlike the Tet Offensive of 1968 which was intended to be a "General Offensive *and* Uprising", the April offensive appears thus far to lack the latter component. While the documentation now available suggests that the party in the South had urged armed uprisings as appropriate and practicable in 1971-72,<sup>5</sup> there is as yet no evidence to suggest that the current offensive was to be dependent upon such uprisings. Indeed, when the full text of COSVN 43 be-

comes available, it will show that such uprisings were mentioned in passing and the strategy described in the document will indicate that the offensive was designed possible to support the uprisings rather than (as is customary) vice-versa.<sup>6</sup>

As a response to the punishment meted out by U.S. air forces, the pacification program on the ground, and the relative stability that the Saigon regime and economy had enjoyed throughout 1971,<sup>7</sup> the April offensive was a skillful retaliation maneuver, designed to remind friend and foe alike of the war. As such it began more than two months earlier with stepped-up infiltration of North Vietnamese regular troops across the DMZ and an increase of traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail.<sup>8</sup> The levels of these movements were so high that U.S. and South Vietnamese analysts were predictably alarmed, and began an almost weekly cant of predicting a major offensive, which they thought would occur around Tet. Haunted by the image of Tet 1968, such analysts and their governments were loath to let the possibility of a recurrence be officially ignored and subsequently to have an offensive begun. But Tet offensives are historically rare in Vietnamese warfare. During the war against the French the Viet Minh launched such an offensive, taking advantage of the difference in time between the northern and southern zones. Having celebrated Tet in the North, Viet Minh battalions moved on an unwary south that had just begun to celebrate the event. While tradition may mitigate against using Tet for military advantage, the basic reason against an offensive at that time is climatic. What is needed most during an offensive is protection from aerial bombardment, and this with rare exceptions (as was evidently the case in early April) is provided only during the May-November summer monsoon.

What the analysts were seeing, in the increases in infiltration and in activity along the trail was the preparation for the April offensive, and they knew it. Only the expectation that North Vietnamese troop movements would lead to a major offensive would have precipitated the resumption of the air war over North Vietnam. The seriousness of the offensive expected by the U.S., thereby, is indicated by Mr. Nixon's precipitous-looking precautionary actions in January; stepping up the air war as he was preparing to leave for Peking and doing so within nine months of the U.S. presidential elections. From a level of "protective reaction" strikes against North Vietnam in 1971 that averaged only about one per month, air operations in 1972 resumed their pre-U.S. withdrawal and Vietnamization level.

International press and public opinion reaction to the air war, considering the malaise with which the Vietnam war had been treated

ever since Bangladesh, was vehement in denouncing the U.S. move. Both the resumption of the air war in response to infiltration and public criticism of the United States could hardly have been unexpected by Hanoi. Claims of infiltration, particularly if they are linked over a several month period to claims of imminent offensives that never materialize, have never won the U.S. much support when it comes to the air war. However real infiltration may be, to respond to it by resumption of the air war has always put the U.S. at a psychological disadvantage. Foreign (i.e., non-Vietnamese) skepticism of infiltration figures and reports is simply too widespread. From Hanoi's perspective what probably happened was this—real and substantial increases in infiltration were designed to provoke the U.S. into an air war response. Widely publicizing the devastation wrought by the B-52s, and opening the ugly wound their image represented in American and international politics, Hanoi could then proceed with an open offensive across the 17th parallel as a justifiable gesture of retaliation for U.S. aggression and resumption of the air war.

Underlying subtle maneuvers such as these associated with the offensive on Hanoi's part, however, is a concern deeper than one of simply influencing public opinion. The war itself had to be thrust upon Hanoi's allies' minds as a fundamental (if not the fundamental) challenge that even a factional and gradually accommodating Communist world would have to face. Moreover, Hanoi had to demonstrate that it would henceforth base its diplomacy in Paris on a position of strength it had gained in South Vietnam and on behalf of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG).

The foregoing has not been intended to second-guess Hanoi. The intentions of its leaders are clear enough: they have regarded the current period (starting with the Paris talks) as one that should be characterized by "fighting-while-negotiating". Indeed, to Hanoi any settlement achievable through an attenuated negotiation process would be won, not at the bargaining table, but on the battlefield. As early as 1963, Communist concern about the need to coordinate any negotiating process with the pace at which "victory" could be achieved was reflected in this passage from a high level cadre's notebook:

It is possible that we can force the enemy to discuss and recognize a number of our democratic national rights . . . ; [in that eventuality] because we would not have sufficient conditions to overthrow the enemy and gain total victory, we could gain

victory through a step by step process until complete victory is ours.<sup>9</sup>

By mid-1967, possibly in anticipation of further non-Communist negotiating overtures (of which there had already been more than 84 since July 1962), this relationship was being spelled out in re-orientation courses. The notebook of one high level cadre, for example, explained:

According to our policy, we must fight the war and negotiate at the same time. Negotiations . . . will serve mainly to provide us the groundwork from which to launch our general offensive. Another reason is to expose the enemy's political attack upon us and to show that ours is the just cause and his the unjust. This means that the war will be settled only on the battlefield, not in the conference room.

To have negotiations, we must fight more fiercely. Only in such a situation can we authorize negotiations. . . . Thus, when hearing that negotiations are about to take place, we must attack the enemy more strongly. . . . Negotiations will follow when we are really strong. We must take precautions against the illusion of peace at all costs.<sup>10</sup>

This fundamental view of the relationship between the end of the war and the goals of the revolution lies at the heart of negotiating-while-fighting strategy. It emerges from the crucible of struggle against the French and is also linked to older struggles against foreign domination. Le Duan, for example, has written:

The problem of war and negotiation is not quite new in the history of our country. Nguyen Trai [a chief minister of the Le Loi dynasty] had once used such a strategy to defeat the feudalist elements of Ming's dynasty. Our comrades in China had also adopted the "fight-and-negotiation" policy in their struggle against the U.S. and Chiang. The same strategy was also used in the Korean war.<sup>11</sup>

And, he concluded: "Our strategy on negotiation must serve in a practical manner our concrete political aims." Adopted in 1968, this strategy represented a major change in the Communist view of the war's passing, although it had been prepared for earlier. At an April 1966 meeting of COSVN, for example, General Nguyen van Vinh (Chairman of Lao Dong Reunification Department) explained that:

Fighting while negotiation is aimed at opening another front with

a view to making the puppet army more disintegrated, stimulating and developing the enemy's internal contradictions and thereby making him more isolated in order to deprive him of propaganda weapons, isolate him further and make a number of people who misunderstand the American clearly see their nature.<sup>12</sup>

Subsequent events, of course, have not altered these expectations.

#### THE RISKS TO DIPLOMACY: FIGHTING-WHILE-NEGOTIATING

Short of such a decisive military development, “. . . fighting while negotiating implies a subtle brinkmanship between the search for immediate results to improve the bargaining position and restraint to avoid a break in negotiations. A break might occur as an accident in the exercise of brinkmanship or as a deliberate decision by one of the parties upon estimating that the gains achieved through fighting and negotiation have put a final victory within reach.”<sup>13</sup> As Vu van Thai's percipient analysis reminds us, diplomacy is required to end limited wars. If at least one side, however, is clearly committed to a negotiated end to the war and if it clearly understands what its antagonist means by a fighting-while-negotiating strategy, then it would construe an offensive such as the one launched in April by the North Vietnamese as ruling out the need for or desirability of future negotiation only at peril to the goal of a negotiated settlement. For the simple fact remains that by the end of 1971, the North Vietnamese had very little left to negotiate. Communist territorial holdings in SVN had been sharply reduced and in some places eliminated altogether.<sup>14</sup> The Thieu government had not collapsed, nor had the PRG enjoyed much success in launching the village level and urban anti-government movement that it had intended. Hanoi's position of strength was very largely one of military capability, precisely the capability it is demonstrating in the current offensive. And at no time in the past did the U.S. and Hanoi have so much in common to negotiate about. Both had remaining to them in South Vietnam essentially a military capacity, the one to launch offensives on the ground and the other to counter them in the air.

The public record of the Paris Talks reveals a persistent concern on Hanoi's part with encouraging the political disengagement of the United States in Vietnam. As Professor Kissinger revealed in his 26 January press conference,<sup>15</sup> of the two issues the Administration perceives as outstanding in the negotiations—the role of a cease-fire as part of a settlement and the nature of the political revolution

that a settlement would foster—only the latter remains a serious and perhaps insurmountable issue.

We have searched our souls to try to come up with a proposal that seems free to us and after all, the agreement by the existing government—to have a commission comprising the people that wish to overthrow them run, organize, and supervise the election, to put the election under international supervision and to resign a month before the election—is not just a trivial proposal.

The North Vietnamese position has been that they want us to agree with them, first, on replacing the existing government and secondly, on a structure in which the probability of their taking over is close to certainty . . .

Whenever in these negotiations we have said, “All right, you don’t like Thieu. How about this fellow, or that fellow, or that fellow? there is almost no one we know who they believe stands for peace, neutrality, and independence.”<sup>18</sup>

But political disengagement and political evolution are bogus issues. Both we and the North Vietnamese may be assuming that the United States had considerably more influence over politics in South Vietnam than in fact is the case. The North Vietnamese demand and our response, if the above remarks are to be taken at face value, assume that we could now intervene effectively in the political process. But the United States has never had and rarely sought such direct influence over politics in Vietnam. There is simply little reason to believe that at the time of a declining presence in and support to Vietnam, the Government of Vietnam would be responsive to United States pressure for the kind of changes that Hanoi seeks.

Indeed, the only major but still quite remote possibility of political change would involve the ouster of President Thieu by a coup. This the present offensive might serve to stimulate, but almost certainly to Hanoi’s chagrin. The impetus for a coup would more likely come from the right than from the left. Dismayed at the prospect of military defeat brought on by the ineptitude and turpitude of the present general officers of the ARVN, factions within the military might view the April offensive as the final one in a long series of grievances they have had against the regime and its internal politics. Such sentiments as the following, written by a Vietnamese soldier after the “rout” at the DMZ in April, serve to summarize the comments of many who have long suffered as a result of corruption within the ARVN:

Enemy fire was not so terrible really. I have known much worse; so we were not afraid at all, we could have stayed, but we did not want to fight the Reds . . . What for? Why should we fight them? They have never harmed us. But the corrupted Vietnamese leaders in Saigon and the Americans who live in luxury and debauchery in Saigon have harmed us. These Americans and these Vietnamese traffic in heroin and opium; they share the proceeds with one another; the Vietnamese are the high officials; the Americans are the United States officials . . . ; they live lavishly with villas, cars, mistresses; each of them spend in one night what we soldiers, with one wife and three or four children take one year to earn. That is why we all agree: (1) it is too stupid to die for nothing; (2) it is even criminal to kill the guys in the front because they do not deserve to die, they are unfortunate fellows like us; we should kill instead the corrupted leaders in Saigon and their dirty Saigon-American friends . . . who have made shambles of our country.<sup>17</sup>

Political change of the sort envisioned above would constitute political ejection rather than disengagement, reducing still further United States chances to influence the political evolution of South Vietnam as Hanoi would like it influenced.

If political evolution is for a variety of reasons not a negotiable item, what basis remains for a settlement in Paris? The only way to end the present war is for both the United States and Hanoi to cease fighting it; this must be what, ultimately, a negotiated settlement means. It means an end to the war, *and nothing more*. For the United States to end the air war, Hanoi must end and then refrain from military invasions. The April offensive, as I have maintained it was designed to, reminds both parties that their capabilities to make war and to end it are far greater than their capabilities to make peace.

#### ENDING THE WAR: VIETNAMESE VERSUS AMERICAN VIEWS


Indeed, the fundamental problem with American approaches to ending the Vietnam war is that the United States has consistently sought too much. To the Johnson administration, the negotiations were designed to bring peace and self-determination to Vietnam.<sup>18</sup> To the Nixon Administration, the negotiations were designed to provide the GVN with the capability to win a just peace for its supporters. Underlying such rhetoric has been a consistently sought objective—to prevent a Communist South Vietnam. That goal may, however, be well beyond our capacity to achieve. The deep and fundamental conflicts which served to split the Vietnamese Nationalist movement

in the 1940's are still evident today, the war is an extension of those conflicts, and though we have markedly affected the intensity and level at which the hostilities have been waged, a reduction of our role (or the complete absence of one) is not likely to alter the fact that such sources of conflict persist within and between the two Vietnams. Indeed, United States fear of a Communist victory, as in Cuba and mainland China, fails to take into account, as do such programs as Vietnamization, that a Communist movement succeeded in these polities not because incumbent nationalist armies were weak but because there were few, if any, viable *political* alternatives to Communism.<sup>19</sup> A political solution to the war in Vietnam requires the creation of effective political institutions rather than the creation and equipping of military forces alone.

But, I am not making here the point that tends to pervade current and past scholarship on Vietnam; namely, that Vietnamese society is so factional and divided as to make possible only a politics of chaos and internal conflict.<sup>20</sup> In fact, I have argued elsewhere that chaos and factionalization have been over-emphasized, and at the cost of recognizing the bases of cooperation and accommodation which exist in Vietnamese politics.<sup>21</sup> Rather, I am suggesting that internally and towards each other, *both Vietnams lack those institutions and processes which could transform the conflict from a military into a political one.* An end to the war, thus, regardless of how it was achieved (short of a clear-cut victory for one side) could not possibly be tantamount to peace or a political settlement.

Rather, the scenario that most Vietnamese with whom I have talked have in mind appears to be the following:


### *The Vietnamese View*<sup>22</sup>



Clearly, the Vietnamese view of the transformation of the conflict from a military into a political one suggests that this is a long-term process that would begin with ending the war and ultimately lead

to a political settlement. The emphasis on a cease-fire and the view of the transformation of the conflict as a complex process are, by contrast, notably absent in the American perspective as the diagram below indicates.

*The Nixon Administration* <sup>23</sup>



All non-Communist Vietnamese want an end to the current war and its violence. They seek, however, an end to the war rather than a political solution. The war must be ended so that the political struggle can continue without violence.<sup>25</sup> In Vietnam today, in fact, the term “post-war period” is not used as a synonym for peace but for political struggle. Political competition between Communist and non-Communist organizations will determine the future of government in the South, and this the Vietnamization and negotiation strategies, just as escalation and pacification in the 1960’s, have ignored.

Perhaps more than any other single feature of our Vietnam involvement, the constant search for coalescence between political forces in the South is the most glaring example of our inability to understand the need for political competition within South Vietnam. We have sought such coalescence as a prerequisite to ending the war and a political settlement. But to date, the American effort has concentrated instead upon the development not of institutions of participation but of institutions of administration such as the army and the civil service. This approach has been precisely the reverse of what was and still is required; without the development of a milieu where political competition is welcomed by the GVN, its institutions of administration have not been able to depend upon the society or its politics for support. In essence, the GVN is not prepared to make a political settlement.

Consequently, the aim of political struggle after the war would be, as it is now, the consolidation of each side’s governmental and political bases rather than their combination at the top in a coalition. Coalitions are temporary compromises that often do not provide for effective political competition. Their stability may depend as much upon great power politics as upon the mobilization of domestic

support. Vietnamese political leaders on both sides know that coalitions rarely end internal wars; they were tried and failed in their own country in 1946, and in China, South Korea, Burma, Indonesia, and Laos as well. Something less than coalition, however, would tend toward ratifying what has existed for some time—accommodations between pockets of populations that have remained under the domination of either the GVN or the VC since the war began. Viet Cong control has deep roots; so also does that of the GVN. The expression of this control in geographic and then political terms will form the basis for a political settlement.<sup>28</sup> But such political evolution is not at present negotiable.

Perhaps because the stakes today are much higher than they were in 1954, Vietnamese may well believe that a political settlement is too important to be left to the statesmen of the great powers and too important to be based, as were the Geneva Accords, upon the consensus which could be developed between them. The success of Geneva was limited; it provided a means for France to end its participation in a war. United States expectations of the negotiations yet to come should be similarly limited, recognizing also the limits of their ability to foster a political settlement in Vietnam. But, by the same token, it may not be too late to end the war.

1. Cf. Douglas Pike, "North Vietnam in 1971", *Asian Survey*, XII (Jan. 1972).

2. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

3. See, "Soviet Arms Aid to Hanoi is Down," *New York Times*, (April 13, 1972), p. 17. Based on estimates prepared by national intelligence sources. The article is the first public statement on precise levels of support to Hanoi.

4. See, for example, "Our Anti-US National Salvation Struggle is now in a very Difficult and Fierce Stage of Decisive Significance," *Thoi Su Pho* (Hanoi, August 1971), pp. 3-10.

5. See, for example, "Activation of Uprising Sections at Hamlet and Village levels: in *The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam (Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, No. 102, Part III)* Saigon, (Feb. 1972), pp. 32-34.

6. All the text of "COSVN 43" is not yet available.

7. For a summary of these developments, see Robert W. Komer, "Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam", in David S. Sullivan and Martin J. Sattler, eds., *Revolutionary War: Western Response* (New York, 1971). An interpretation of their significance can be found in my "South Vietnam and the New Security", *Asian Survey*, XII, (Feb., 1972), pp. 121-137.

8. See Arthur J. Dommen, "Laos: The Year of the Ho Chi Minh Trail", *Asian Survey*, XII, (Feb., 1972), pp. 138-147.

9. "Experiences of the South Viet-Nam Revolutionary Movement During the Past Several Years," (circa 1963), p. 40.

10. "Notes on a High Level 1967 Reorientation Course", *Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 14* (January, 1968), p. 9.

11. Le Duan, "Text of Letter to General Nguyen Chi Thanh, Viet Cong Commander in Chief for the South", released by the U.S. Mission in March 1967 in Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, No. 8 (October, 1967), p. 4.

12. Summary of Speech, released in *Ibid.*, p. 4. This last statement apparently refers to the concern of Le Duan and others at the great diplomatic pressure on the North to enter negotiations in 1966, and that Hanoi's judgment of American obduracy was not shared by its "misguided" allies.

13. Vu van Thai, *Fighting and Negotiating in Vietnam: A Strategy* (Santa Monica, 1969), p. 48.

14. Cf. "South Vietnam and the New Security", *op. cit.*, pp. 122-130.
15. The text of the conference is reported in "Viet-Nam: The Negotiating Process", *Current Foreign Policy* (Department of State Publication 8629, Feb., 1972).
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
17. Written to former National Assembly deputy Tran van Khiem, and published as a letter to the editor of the *Washington Post*, (6 April, 1972).
18. Cf. "Address by President Johnson, March 31, 1968, "Department of State Publication 8376 (5 April, 1968), and "Remarks of the President on Viet-Nam, October 31, 1968", Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs Release No. 1168 (November 1968).
19. See, for example, Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China* (Chicago, 1968); Theodore H. White, *Thunder Out of China* (Chicago, 1946), and T. Draper, *Castorsim* (New York, 1965).
20. For a review of this tendency in recent and historical studies on Vietnam, see John Whitmore, "Politics and the Writing of History on Asia: Vietnam," paper presented to the American Historical Association Annual Meeting, Boston, December, 1970.
21. See Allan Goodman, *Politics in War: The Bases of Political Community in South Vietnam*, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, forthcoming).
22. What is labelled here as the "Vietnamese View" is based upon an analysis of major recent proposals put forward by the National Progressivist Movement (the *Cap Tien* organization) in 1969, local Catholic political organizations via the *Doi Dien* magazine in 1969, Thich Tri Quang and former chief of State Phan Khac Suu in 1969, in *Thai Do* magazine, the 1970 proposal of the Unified Buddhist Church, and those suggested in interviews with Vietnamese political and governmental leaders in 1969 and 1970. For a perceptive and critical analysis of and report on the Vietnamization, see Frances Fitzgerald, "Vietnam: The Future," *New York Review of Books*, (26 March 1970), pp. 4-10.
23. Succinct statements of the Administration's view can be found in the testimony of Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 3 May 1971 in opposition to resolutions proposing a fixed date for U.S. troop withdrawals; see "Vietnam: Ending U.S. Involvement in the War", *Current Foreign Policy* (June, 1971), and in "Viet-Nam: The Negotiation Process", *op. cit.*
24. South Vietnamese tend to view the Vietnamization program as a means to continue the war with only a different mixture of American and GVN forces underlying current American policy, in their view, is the expectation that a military victory for the GVN is still possible. As one editorialist noted, From Nixon's message (i.e., the second "State of the World" message) politicians can see that Washington has still pinned great hope on a military solution in Indochina. In this situation, the war will surely become more violent and widespread in Cambodia and Laos in the near future. (Le cam Anh, President Nixon's message, "Thach Do" (Saigon, Feb., 1971).
25. In fact, some Vietnamese have suggested that the achievement of something less than complete readiness for the GVN to undertake its own self-defense is absolutely crucial to reaching a political settlement in the future. As one editorial suggested, To Vietnamize the war means to turn over all the present war to the Vietnamese, for them to settle it between themselves. That is, to try to change the nature of the Vietnam war, originally a war for people's liberation and for national independence, into a civil war—a kind of war that human history has demonstrated as being the most difficult to solve. (Tieng Chuong Dat Viet, 3 February 1971).
26. Cf. Allan E. Goodman "The End of the War as a Political Setting For the Future Development of South Viet-Nam," *Asian Survey*, XI (April 1971), pp. 341-51.

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## Abstract / Résumé

Une analyse théorique du comportement de l'Indonésie en matière de politique extérieure serait incomplète si on omettait de mentionner sa variable politique, c'est-à-dire l'équilibre interne du pouvoir. En effet l'objet de cet article est de montrer que la continuité et le changement dans la politique extérieure de l'Indonésie ont été dans une large mesure déterminés par la dynamique de l'équilibre du pouvoir à l'intérieur du système politique indonésien.

La politique de non-alignement avec les blocs, ou la politique extérieure "indépendante et active", comme les Indonésiens préfèrent l'appeler est la conséquence de l'environnement psychologique ou conditions externes et internes telles qu'elles sont perçues par les principaux leaders indonésiens. La société indonésienne a toujours eu une tradition bien établie de tolérance et de synthèse de religions et de courants philosophiques antagonistes. Cette tradition ainsi que le besoin de maintenir l'unité à l'intérieur a exigé une politique de non-alignement, et le facteur le plus important qui l'ait maintenue pendant la période de démocratie libérale fut l'équilibre interne du pouvoir.

Avec l'introduction de la "Démocratie dirigée" en 1959, les facteurs gouvernemental, politique, idiosyncratique militaire et idéologique, de même que les implications du non-alignement changèrent au point que celui-ci cessa d'être un non-alignement. Pendant la période de démocratie libérale, la structure du gouvernement et l'équilibre des forces politiques rivales maintenaient le non-alignement mais sous la "Démocratie dirigée" Sukarno eut l'occasion d'exercer un contrôle dictatorial en matière de politique extérieure. Ceci, associé à l'augmentation massive de l'armement et de l'aide militaire changea la situation au point d'encourager Sukarno à adopter une politique dogmatique et agressive l'amenant à maintes confrontations.

La vision du monde de Sukarno avait été déterminée largement par son expérience de la lutte révolutionnaire contre les Hollandais et par son idéologie de gauche. Il rejeta ainsi le point de vue selon lequel la guerre froide était le conflit majeur de notre époque et affirma que le conflit entre les forces anciennes et les forces nouvelles prédominait. Cette interprétation de la lutte fut développée en accord avec les exigences de sa politique intérieure et extérieure. Vers la fin de "Père Sukarno", le but de la politique extérieure de l'Indonésie était d'acquiescer le leadership d'une large section de l'Afrique-Asie, de construire une alliance de nouvelles forces et d'utiliser cette influence internationale afin de dominer les structures et les procédés dans l'élaboration des décisions internationales en ce qui concerne le Sud-Est Asiatique. Il devint bientôt clair, cependant,

## **Indonesian Foreign Policy: *The Linkage Between Domestic Power Balance and Foreign Policy Behavior***

**LALTA P. SINGH**

IN RECENT YEARS several scholars have applied the systems analysis to the study of foreign policy. Although this enthusiasm for a "scientific" approach for the explorations of state behavior has not yet helped to produce a workable general theory of foreign policy, we do now have a few conceptual frameworks or partial theories that are very useful in organizing and analysing data about foreign policy.

George Modelski's "input-output" model is the first rigorous conceptual framework that provides for four parameters of foreign policy—power input, power output interests and objectives. Underlying this model is the concept of equilibrium, or otherwise, among the four variables and six dynamic relationships that are developed from these variables.<sup>1</sup> Equally valuable contributions to the theoretical literature on this subject have been made by "the decision-making theorists," especially Richard Snyder and Joseph Frankel. Although Snyder's model is too complex to be workable, its emphasis on the decision-making process and the "psychological environment", i.e.,

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que l'environnement psychologique de Sukarno était très éloigné de son champ opérationnel. Il ne pouvait même pas maintenir ses nouvelles forces à l'intérieur de son pays.

Le malheureux putsch du 30 septembre apporta un changement radical dans l'équilibre interne du pouvoir et de là d'autres facteurs sociaux menant à une nouvelle orientation de la politique extérieure. On aurait tort de conclure des changements dans les relations diplomatiques et de l'abandon de toute agressivité que l'Indonésie "post-Sukarnienne" a choisi de tomber sous l'influence des puissances occidentales et qu'elle a renoncé à une politique extérieure ambitieuse.

Bien que Djakarta ait essayé d'établir des relations amicales avec les bienfaiteurs non-communistes, elle n'a pas rompu avec le consensus idéologique du non-alignement ou de la politique "active et indépendante". De même, l'Indonésie "post-Sukarnienne" n'a pas abandonné les aspirations régionales de l'époque de Sukarno. Ce qui a changé, ce n'est pas le but mais le style et la technique en politique extérieure.

the reality as perceived by decision makers, provides a researcher with analytical tools that may enable him to dig below the surface for revealing insights into state behavior.<sup>2</sup> Frankel, likewise, borrows Sprouts' distinction between the "operational" and the "psychological" environments and provides us with a number of concepts and categories for ordering data on foreign policy decision making.<sup>3</sup>

While useful as analytical constructs, the Snyder and Frankel models do not establish linkages among the environment, elite images and policy choices by introducing the notion of circular feedback. Michael Brecher overcomes this deficiency in his framework that incorporates all the preceding concepts and offers a refined and workable model. He views foreign policy as a system comprising an environment or setting, a group of actors, structures, and processes placed within a framework of continuous flow of demands on Policy (input), Policy Process, and Products of Policy (output). The decisions (output) in turn feed back into the system as new inputs.<sup>4</sup> Like Frankel, Brecher also stressed the impact of "psychological" environment or elite images on foreign policy choices. James Rosenau, whose writings are noted for theoretical insights, has gone further than the above scholars and has offered us a comprehensive linkage theory that is intended to provide a framework for both the comparative politics as well as foreign policy.<sup>5</sup> Less complicated, and probably more useful as a tool of analysis, is Rosenau's pre-theory which may be applied to explain the external behavior of societies in terms of five sets of variables—idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic.<sup>6</sup>

One would think that the contributions of Modelski, Snyder, Frankel, Brecher, and Rosenau are more than adequate to provide theoretical tools for an analysis of Indonesian foreign policy. But this is not really the case. There is at least one major element—the fluctuating domestic political power balance—that can not be accommodated in any of the variables discussed above (Rosenau's "governmental" variable refers to government's structure). In want of a better term, I will call it the "political" variable. An analysis of Indonesia's external behavior would be incomplete without a reference to the "political" variable (the domestic power balance). It is my purpose in this paper to explain the evolution of Indonesian foreign policy with the use of concepts and frameworks discussed above, with special reference to the *political* variable. It is in fact the theme of this paper that continuity and change in Indonesian foreign policy have to a great extent been determined by the dynamics of power balance within the Indonesian political system. This will be shown

by a discussion of Indonesia's external behavior in three distinct periods of domestic politics heralding major shifts in political power balance: The period of liberal democracy, the Sukarno period, and the post-Sukarno or the current period.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY PERIOD, (1945-1957)

The Republic of Indonesia, while still fighting a war of independence against the Dutch, was faced with the question of choosing sides in the cold war between the West and the Soviet bloc. Pressed by internal Communist and anti-communist forces for a pro-Soviet or pro-Western policy respectively, the Jogjakarta government steered clear of alignment with either bloc. In a major policy statement to the working Committee of the Provisional Parliament, the Hatta Government declared on September 2, 1948:

Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals? The Indonesian Government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a *passive* party in the area of international politics but that it should be an *active* agent entitled to decide its own standpoint. . . . The lines of Indonesia's policy can not be determined by the bent of the policy of some other country which has its own interest to service.<sup>7</sup>

The policy of non-alignment with power blocs, or the "independent and active" foreign policy as the Indonesians prefer to call it, emerged from "the psychological environment" or the external and internal setting as perceived by prominent Indonesian leaders such as Vice-President Hatta, Prime Minister Sjahrir, and President Sukarno who were the three major architects of the initial foreign policy in that order of importance. The "systemic" variable—the international system and its penetration in the regional environment—as seen from Indonesia militated against a policy of alignment. India, whose struggle for independence had offered a major inspiration to Indonesian nationalists, had already opted for a policy of non-alignment.

The ideological orientation of the leading Indonesian nationalists was similar to Nehru's and it precluded automatic identification with colonialist-capitalist West or communist Soviet Union. The geographical location of the country suggested that there was no press-

ing need to choose between the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. as Indonesia did not have a common border with either of them. Moreover, pragmatism dictated that she could not afford to alienate any of the bloc leaders since the recently proclaimed Republic needed their sympathy and support inside the United Nations and outside in its struggle for independence. As Ahmad Subardjo, a former Foreign Minister, has observed:

Geopolitically, Indonesia sits astride at the crossroad of South East Asia and forms a common meeting ground for the differing, and perhaps conflicting, interests that encompass us. It is to our interest and that of our neighbours that we refuse to take sides with this or that nation or group of nations—except in the interest of international peace and understanding—and keep ourselves clear of all entangling alliances directed against third parties.<sup>8</sup>

While the systemic variable encouraged an “independent” foreign policy, the societal variable dictated such a policy. The desire to achieve equality with the European states and to resist new dominations was a value-orientation that was not just common but dear to nearly all nationalist leaders. The cold war alliances appeared to them as new devices through which the older and powerful states intended to dominate the new states. As Hatta has written:

Nations that have recently become independent are strongly influenced by national sentiment and feel the need to maintain their self-respect. The memory of colonial status that bound them for centuries makes them resist anything they consider an attempt to colonize them again, whether by economic or ideological domination. This psychological factor profoundly influences Indonesia in her insistence upon an independent policy.<sup>9</sup>

The Indonesian society has a well-established tradition of toleration and synthesis of antagonistic religions and philosophical currents throughout its history. The domestic environment, characterised by diversity of faiths, and ethnic divisions that are compounded by numerous other divisions all over the archipelago, has created a readiness to accept the coexistence of mutually contradictory ideas and social systems. This philosophical tradition, coupled with the need to maintain internal unity, dictated the policy of non-alignment. As Sukarno reminded his countrymen on several occasions:

“Since the Madiun incident (the communist uprising) we have acquired the experience that in order to preserve our national unity and preserve the fruits of our struggle, we are not in a posi-

tion to choose sides between the two opposed global constellations.”<sup>10</sup>

When all is said and done, the fact remains that the most important variable that sustained Indonesia's nonalignment during the period of liberal democracy was the domestic power balance. All the cabinets during this period were coalitions of ideologically heterogeneous political parties and prominent individuals. Of the five major or influential parties, the *Masjumi* (Modernist-Islamic party) was anti-Communist and pro-Western generally. The Nahadatul Ulema (traditional-Islamic) was an anti-Communist but opportunist party. Indonesian National Party (PNI) was generally suspicious of the Western Powers. The Sjahrir-led Socialists were anti-Communists, but not always pro-Western. The Communist Party (PKI) was anti-West and pro-Moscow. President Sukarno had little sympathy with the West, and Vice President Hatta had an unfavourable image of the communist powers. It should be noted that Sumatran leaders were generally anti-Communist while the Japanese were generally anti-Western. It is not surprising, therefore, that nonalignment offered an ideological consensus on foreign policy. So much so that whenever a Prime Minister or Foreign Minister tried to push Indonesian nonalignment eastward or westward, he spelled disaster for himself, his party or faction, and for the cabinet. In 1952, for instance, the Sukiman cabinet was forced out of power for breaking with the ideological consensus on foreign policy. Foreign Minister Subardjo, a new recruit to Sukiman's faction of the *Masjumi* party and a close personal friend of the Prime Minister, had signed an agreement, without adequate cabinet consultation, with the U.S. Ambassador, Merle Cochran, committing Indonesia to accept U.S. aid under the terms of the U.S. Mutual Security Act of 1951, Section 511, which obliged a recipient to “make a full contribution” to the defensive strength of “the free world”, and “to take joint steps to further international understanding, goodwill and security.” Subardjo had accepted such a wording in a letter to the U.S. ambassador.<sup>11</sup> This secret diplomacy raised a stormy controversy. PNI, one of the two largest parties, and even a faction of the *Masjumi*, charged that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were guilty of making a formal ideological surrender in that they were cooperating with ambassador Cochran's efforts to align Indonesia with the United States. The critics recalled that the Natsir government had turned down U.S. military aid offered by The Melby mission in 1950. The MSA controversy was heightened by a widespread feel-

ing in the Djakarta elite that Cochran, who had earlier earned tremendous popularity by championing the cause of Indonesian independence, was exercising undue influence.

A careful study of the facts of the issue suggests that neither Subardjo nor the U.S. had conspired against the "active and independent" policy of Indonesia. (The same agreement, with a modified wording was concluded later.) But the elite images of the U.S. and the entire psychological environment were such that the critics had little difficulty in succeeding in their primary aim of overthrowing the Sukiman cabinet by mobilizing a defence of the symbolism and the mystique of the "independent" foreign policy. As Herbert Feith has aptly remarked, "independent and active" foreign policy became "a sort of ideological prism through which all practical policies had to be refracted."<sup>12</sup> No one, publicly at any rate, could go against non-alignment. In later years the PNI-led government of Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo, who was very much aware of the integrative functions of an ambitious foreign policy in internal politics, made it really "active" by organizing the famous Bandung Conference of the Afro-Asian countries. Thus, the Indonesian non-alignment in its formative phase was maintained largely by the domestic power balance.

#### SUKARNO'S FOREIGN POLICY, (1958-1965)

With the introduction of Guided Democracy in 1959, the governmental, political, ideosyncratic, military, and ideological variables changed and so did the content of the nonalignment to a degree that it virtually ceased to be nonalignment. During the liberal democracy period the structure of government and the equilibrium of rival political forces sustained nonalignment. Under the Guided Democracy (Sukarno-Army authoritarian rule), Sukarno was allowed a monopolistic control over foreign policy decision making. Dr. Subandrio, his Foreign Minister, was little more than his master's voice and all others in the policy elite took pride in echoing the President. The anti-Sukarno forces, especially the *Masjumi* and the Socialists that were also generally proWestern, were eliminated. The growing strength of the PKI, with which Sukarno established a mutually protective relationship against the power of the rightwing Army General Staff, helped to push Indonesian foreign policy towards the left—a shift that Sukarno could not bring about in the period of liberal democracy because of the limitations on foreign policy of

governmental and political variables. The military component of the power-input, thanks to the Soviet aid of about one billion dollars in arms by 1962-1963, made Indonesia one of the highly armed nations of the world.<sup>13</sup> The changed setting encouraged Sukarno to adopt assertive and aggressive policies on one "confrontation" after another. The ideosyncratic variable was now allowed an unchallenged role and the elite images of the operational environment became perfectly harmonious with Sukarno's own perception of international reality in the absence of a competitive system. Since it is the perception of international reality that matters rather than the international reality itself, and since this was especially true of Sukarno's Indonesia, a brief mention of Sukarno's world view is now in order.

Sukarno's world view had been determined largely by his experience of the revolutionary struggle against the Dutch and by his leftist ideology. He rejected the commonly accepted view that the cold war between the U.S. led countries and the communist states was the main conflict of our time and asserted that the conflict (or "confrontation" as he preferred to call it) between anti-colonialism and neo-colonialism—or the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO)—was the dominant conflict in the contemporary international system. As George Modelski has admirably suggested, it was a "conflict theory" of international relations which postulated that the conflict between the "new" and the "old" must end in the destruction of the "old".<sup>14</sup> Sukarno, in this way, rejected the commonly accepted three-fold division of international society (the "Free-World", the communist states and the "third world" or the nonaligned states) and suggested a two-fold division of the world—OLDEFOS vs NEFOS.

The late Indonesian President had gradually developed his view of the struggle of NEFOS against OLDEFOS in accordance with the exigencies of his domestic and foreign policies. In his address to the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (the speech, "To Build The World Anew", later became a document of state policy) President Sukarno gave the first formulation, albeit casually, of his ideas about "emerging" and the "established" forces. But he neither defined nor specified in 1960 the emerging nations and the old established forces. By implication at least the Soviet Union, a great and established power, was not one of the "emerging" nations. The communists, therefore, were not the "emerging" nations in 1960. At the Belgrade conference on the nonaligned nations a year later the Indonesian leader elaborated further on his theme of the new emerging forces. He defined them as nations which were,

or had been, engaged in the struggle for national independence. It was here at Belgrade that Sukarno spoke of the "conflict" between the new emergent forces for "freedom and justice" and the old forces of "domination": and asked everyone to believe that that "conflict", not the cold war, was the source of contemporary tensions: "Prevailing world opinion today would have us believe that the real source of international tension and strife is ideological conflict between the big powers. I think that is not true."<sup>16</sup> Declaring that there could be no coexistence between independence, justice on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other side, the Indonesian leader called upon the nonaligned countries to ally themselves with the forces that were challenging the imperialist-colonialist order.

It was at the opening of the preparatory conference of Games of the New Emerging Forces (FANEFO)—games organized to overcome the humiliation suffered during the Asian Games held at Jakarta in the Fall of 1962—that Sukarno for the first time included the communist states as well, besides the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in his description of the NEFOS. Denouncing the International Olympic Committee (which had suspended Indonesia for its refusal to allow the teams of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Israel to participate in the Asian Games) as the "tool" of the OLDEFOS, Sukarno ordered the establishment of a permanent organisation called GANEFO to resist the OLDEFOS. Stressing the history and significance of these two fond terms he observed that "the NEFOS were characterized by a desire to be free from colonialism, free from exploitation of man by man, free from poverty and so on. The Old Established Forces on the other hand, fearing for the sake of their interests, opposed the existence of the New Emerging Forces."<sup>16</sup> The list of participants made it abundantly clear that the NEFO countries were: The 51 countries from Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America present for the GANEFO, the communist countries, the Arab Palestine, Belgium, France and, above all, with the restoration of diplomatic ties the erstwhile enemy, the Netherlands. India was excluded because of Nehru's refusal to follow Sukarno's view of the world (and because it was an Indian national who had annoyed Sukarno by protesting against the exclusion from Asian Games of the Republic of China and Israel.)<sup>17</sup> Excluded also were the Republics of Korea and Vietnam, Israel, and a few pro-Western Arab states. The composition of the Executive Board of the GANEFO gave a clear cut indication regarding Indonesian aspirations for the leadership of a political grouping of the NEFOS;

while the Peoples China, the Soviet Union and U.A.R. were named Vice Presidents for Asia, Europe, and Africa respectively (the Latin American post remained vacant), Indonesia was given the honour of presiding over the Board. The willingness of some West European countries such as the Netherlands and de Gaulle's France (which, of late, had been growing unhappy with the United States) to participate in the GANEFO led to a further expansion in the area of NEFOS. In his Independence Day Address on August 17, 1963, President Sukarno described the New Emerging Forces as comprising "the oppressed and the progressive nations"—the nations of Asia, Africa, Latin America, "the socialist" countries, and the "progressive" groups in the capitalist countries.<sup>18</sup> By 1963, therefore, it became obvious that the OLDEFO were the "imperialist-colonialists" of North America, Western Europe and Australasia. Some of these could always be transferred to the NEFO group if they were on good terms with Djakarta. Similarly, the enemies of Indonesia, even if Asians, automatically would be in the OLDEFOS. A year later, with the "Crush Malaysia" campaign in high gear and with corresponding heightening of belligerency in Djakarta, Sukarno gave up all pretence of nonalignment. At the Cairo conference of non-aligned countries in October 1964, he echoed the Peking line in rejecting peaceful coexistence between NEFOS and OLDEFOS and once again tried, rather unsuccessfully, to make the confrontation between the two as the main preoccupation of the conference. Thus, under Sukarno, forging the solidarity among NEFOS, and thereby securing Indonesian leadership, and to intensify the struggle against NECOLIM became the primary item on the agenda of Djakarta's foreign policy. Behind all this lay the clever design to secure the support of the NEFOS for Sukarno's international ambitions. Once he disapproved of the projected Federation of Malaysia, he denounced it as a "neo-colonialist" plot of the OLDEFOS and called upon the NEFOS to assist Indonesia's campaign to "crush" it. In this way he sought to mobilize, the way he had gathered international support for his West Irian policy, significant world wide sympathy and support for his aspirations in Southeast Asia—the removal of the American and the British influence and the restoration of the same type of Indonesian paramountcy in the region as that of the days of Majapahit and Srivijaya empires. In addition, such a policy had the merit of rallying round two major and basically antagonistic domestic forces—the army and the communist party—behind his leadership and fortifying his domestic political power.

Thus towards the close of the Sukarno era, Indonesian foreign

policy goals were to acquire the leadership of a large segment of Afro-Asia, construct a NEFO grouping, and use this international credit for Indonesia's desire to dominate the structures and processes of international decision making regarding Southeast Asia. He was encouraged by a short-lived diplomatic success. Two documents issued after a conference in Manila (of Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines to discuss Malaysia dispute) bore the imprint of Sukarno's ideology and underlined his external aspirations. It is worth noting that both documents—the Manila Declaration and the Joint Statement—were signed by Sukarno, Macapagal, and the Tungku Ahdul Rahman in that order. The three heads of governments agreed, in the "Bandung Spirit", that the foreign bases were "temporary in nature" and "should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries". They also promised to refrain from "the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers."<sup>19</sup> A proud President Sukarno told his people in his Independence Day address on August 17, 1963:

Indonesia is no longer treated like the dummy *Togog* and allowed just to look on alone at alterations to the status quo in the region around it. . . . Indonesia is recognised as having the right and a primary responsibility to guard security and peace in the region.<sup>20</sup>

Since Indonesia's aim of ejecting Western powers from Southeast Asia coincided with Communist China's interest in the region and since the leadership in both countries had a favourable image of each other, both formed a Peking-Djakarta axis, marking the highest point of a "gradually evolving" harmony of interests.<sup>21</sup> Pakistan joined the axis in its search for friends against India. Sukarno proceeded further to expand the group and was quick to link his "Crush Malaysia" campaign with North Vietnam's and North Korea's efforts to drive the United States out of South Vietnam and South Korea. Sihanouk of Cambodia had recently broken diplomatic relations with Washington. Sukarno now proclaimed in 1965 the emergence of an "anti-imperialist" axis, the Djakarta-Pnompenh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang-Pindi axis, as the "most natural axis" that had been formed by the course of history.<sup>22</sup> In the same year, Djakarta left the United Nations saying that the world organization had become a tool of OLDEFOS. Sukarno now proceeded to build a new grouping of states called CONEFO (the Conference of New Emerging Forces) and declared it an international NASAKOM—the international counterpart of Indonesia's domestic NASAKOM

(the combination of nationalist, religious, and communist forces over which he presided). It soon became clear, however, that Sukarno's psychological environment was far removed from his operational environment. The abortive second Afro-Asian conference left no doubt that Sukarno's view of NEFO solidarity must remain a dream. The Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Indian rivalry, not to mention a host of bilateral tensions within the "third world", were far more powerful factors than the slipping anticolonialism that was the main edifice of Sukarno's ambitious NEFO structure. Ironically enough, he could not sustain even the domestic counterpart of his NEFOS, the precarious amalgam of army, communist and nationalist forces over which he presided. The September 30th (1965) putsch swept it away, and thrown away in its wake were Sukarno and his policies.<sup>23</sup>

#### POST-SUKARNO FOREIGN POLICY

The ill-fated September 30th putsch brought about a drastic change in the domestic power balance. The victorious antiCommunist General Staff led by General Suharto eliminated PKI, forced Sukarno to sign away much of his authority to General Suharto in March 1966, and then finally ousted him from power in March 1967. This change in political, though not in governmental, variable brought about a change in ideosyncratic, communications, and even societal-ideological variables and hence a major shift in foreign policy orientations. The Indonesian foreign policy swung to almost the opposite direction as the new decision makers with different views and images, especially the proWestern elements in the army, assumed power. A programme of de-Sukarnoisation was launched without delay. The Djakarta-Peking axis and "confrontation" policies had created a revolutionary fervor in Indonesia that was extremely beneficial to the communist party. The new regime not only suppressed PKI and harassed the local Chinese, it also denounced Peking for conspiring with PKI in connection with the 1965 Putsch. Peking in turn spared no superlatives in giving "stern warnings" to "Indonesian rightwing thugs".<sup>24</sup> To no one's surprise, therefore, the two countries withdrew their diplomatic missions from each other.

Thus while relations with communist countries, particularly China, deteriorated, the new regime set out to improve relations with all those countries whom Sukarno had declared enemies of Indonesia. Adam Malik, the new Foreign Minister did not delay in announcing that he would give priority to "confrontation of stomachs" over "confrontation of Malaysia". In line with this policy,

both Malik and Suharto declared that Indonesia would return to "active and independent" foreign policy, would restore friendly relations with the United States, would seek economic aid from all quarters with a view to achieve economic stabilization and rehabilitation.<sup>25</sup>

The new Indonesian leadership concluded that in order to put Indonesia's economic house in order they had to reduce their military expenditure (which had gone up to 70 per cent of the national budget) and that they had to convince the would-be creditors that the loans could be repaid. Aware of the fact that Indonesia already owed \$2.5 billion in debt to various countries, the non-Communist lenders had been reluctant to offer any aid so long as the policy of "confrontation" lasted. Even the Soviets had been holding back deliveries of military spare parts until some new agreement was to be reached on the \$1 billion Indonesia owed them.

Another important consideration in giving up confrontation was the changed power balance in Djakarta; confrontation was no longer performing the domestic functions of foreign policy as it did before September 30, 1965. Since the army and the communists had supported Sukarno's confrontation policy in order to compete for domestic political power, it was no longer necessary to continue the Confrontation. As a competent observer has rightly noted:

"Confrontation derived much of its vitality from its ability to carry out important political functions, and it was only when the changed political situation rendered it incapable of fulfilling those functions any longer that confrontation was abandoned."<sup>26</sup>

Conscious of the possibility of being branded as a tool of NECOLIM, the new regime proceeded to disengage from the "confrontation" while talking the language of the Sukarno era. Suharto, for instance, declared early in April 1966, that Indonesia would continue "confrontation" but added that his government "remained open to peaceful settlement" and that the efforts against Malaysia would have to be based on "needs of the Revolution and the people" (indicating that the latter should have priority over "confrontation".) The true thinking of the new leadership was reflected by an editorial in the army paper *Trisakti*: "We suggest a peaceful confrontation instead of physical confrontation or war that was inspired by the Indonesian communist party for the interests of China."<sup>27</sup> Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, went to Bangkok to attend a meeting of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand convened to find a peaceful settlement of Malaysia tangle. Given the Indonesian desire to make peace with Malaysia,

the foreign ministers concluded an agreement very swiftly in May, 1966. Malaysia agreed to a face-saving gesture towards Indonesia by declaring that the people of Sarawak and Sabah, the two Borneo territories in the Federation, would always have the right to determine their political status (Sukarno had always insisted on the Manila agreements of mid-1963 providing for ascertainment, to Indonesia's satisfaction, of the wishes of the two states).

Having abandoned Sukarno's costly and adventurous foreign policies, and having cancelled his extravagant prestigious projects such as the sky-scraper Nusantra House and the CONEFO Hall, the new regime proceeded to seek postponement or rescheduling of foreign debts and procurement of maximum possible foreign economic aid. The United States and its western allies were only too willing to oblige. The new regime, however, had no desire to present itself as a pro-Western country to an elite that had been fed by Sukarno on anti-Western slogans. The United States appreciated this and did not show unnecessary public enthusiasm. She encouraged Japan to take a lead in arranging economic assistance to Indonesia. Japan offered \$30 million in emergency credit and organized a "Tokyo Club" of non-Communist donors consisting of herself, the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. A team of experts from the International Monetary Fund helped Indonesian officials to draw an economic stabilization programme. The Tokyo Club met three times in the second-half of 1966 to discuss ways and means of helping Indonesia. In addition to offering a variety of new aids, the Club decided to defer payments on over \$350 million due from Indonesia. The Soviet Union, though unhappy with the suppression of the Indonesian communist party by the new regime, agreed to reschedule its loan payments in order to salvage its own diplomatic assets in Djakarta. India, eager to re-establish friendly ties with Djakarta, offered \$20 million in credits and some other countries also extended their helping hands. Ever since then the Western powers, especially Germany, the U.S., and Japan have concluded a series of agreements providing over \$500 million annually in loans to bolster Indonesian economy. It is ironic that the distinguished visitors to Djakarta since the overthrow of Sukarno have been the visitors from the U.S., the Netherlands, Australia, the U.K., Germany, and Japan—"necolim" countries against whom Sukarno had been building a world-wide front. President Suharto has paid visits to the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australia. By 1971 the United States had provided one-third of the new loans worth \$2,300,000,000 advanced to the new Indonesian regime by her non-Communist cred-

itors. After an initial reluctance, Washington has of late begun to give military aid to Indonesia, especially for its navy. The generals, some of whom see Indonesia's frontier on the Mekong river, are so pleased with the change in the U.S. attitude on the subject of military aid that they are now strongly opposed to receiving military hardware from the communist countries. The Soviet Union, by contrast, had offered no aid to Indonesia even though the latter is willing to receive it. Moscow has refused to supply even the spare parts for the jets, warships, submarines, etc., that it provided Indonesia during the Sukarno era. The Soviet magazines have published highly critical writings on Indonesia and the latter has banned several Soviet publications. Djakarta-Peking relations have remained suspended since 1966. On several occasions Djakarta took diplomatic initiatives or stands that offended Peking and Hanoi. In 1970, for instance, when the proWestern General Lon Nol overthrew the Sihanouk regime in Cambodia, Djakarta convened an unsuccessful conference of Asian states to offer diplomatic support to the new Cambodian regime. The Indonesian military has been training a small group of Cambodian soldiers in Commando techniques in response to Lon Nol's appeal for regional military support.<sup>28</sup> In October 1971, when the United Nations General Assembly voted to invite the People's Republic of China to take the Chinese seat and expel Taiwan, Indonesia voted with the United States in a clear reversal of its previous China policy, to ask for a separate vote on the expulsion of Taiwan and to declare the China question an important matter requiring a two-thirds majority for the adoption of a resolution.<sup>29</sup>

It is obvious, therefore, that the post-Sukarno Indonesia has leaned towards the West and that the new regime has asked its people to give up their belief, injected by Sukarno, that they were the leader of the "New Emerging Forces" destined to rid the earth of domination by the forces of "Old Established Order" and "build the world anew".

It would be wrong to conclude from the above account of some of the specific policies that the post-Sukarno Indonesia had opted to fall within the orbit of the Western powers and that it had decided against an ambitious foreign policy. President Suharto, Foreign Minister Malik, and other Djakarta spokesmen have, in a number of policy statements, stressed that Indonesia still adhered to an independent and active role in world affairs. In fact, they have insisted that they were only correcting Sukarno's deviations. The new regime has declined to join the Asia and Pacific Council on the ground that such a move would compromise nonalignment. Simi-

larly, the Government and the Press have flatly rejected suggestions from certain quarters that Indonesia should cooperate with Australia and others to evolve a regional defence arrangement in the wake of the British withdrawal from Singapore.<sup>30</sup> Thus, while Djakarta has endeavoured to establish friendly relations with non-Communist donors, it has not broken with the ideological consensus on nonalignment or "active and independent" policy. Similarly, Post-Sukarno Indonesia, has not given up regional aspirations of the Sukarno area. What has changed is not the aim but style and technique. The new regime wishes to be influential through a series of structures for regional cooperation. It is significant that Indonesia was instrumental in the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and has acted as a quiet conciliator between Malaysia and the Philippines in their dispute over Sabah. Malik has often spoken on the desirability of keeping nonregional influences out of Southeast Asia. Within the nonaligned world also the new regime has been endeavouring to regain Indonesia's lost influence. The elevation of Adam Malik to the Presidency of the U.N. General Assembly in 1971 shows that Djakarta has improved its diplomatic standing. Thus, while post-Sukarno Indonesia has moved towards the right of the centre of nonalignment spectrum (in direct contrast with Sukarno era), it has shown an inclination to return to the centre. It may well do so if Moscow resumes its aid to Djakarta and reduces the influence of those elements in the armed forces that have pushed for a shift in the proWestern direction.

#### CONCLUSION

The Indonesian foreign policy provides us with interesting insights into the linkage between domestic politics and external behaviour of a state. In all the three phases discussed above we notice an internal function for the foreign policy. While the foreign policy has reflected competing elites' images of the dominant international system and their view of Indonesia's place in it, the foreign policy itself has been a factor in the domestic competition for political power. The internal component of the psychological environment tends to demand an ideological consensus on an "independent and active" foreign policy. While continuity on nonalignment and an active global as well as regional role emerge as the core of foreign policy tenets, a shift to the left or right is possible in response to fluctuations in domestic political power. A shift to the far right or the far left of the non-alignment spectrum, however, would reflect a funda-

mental change in the domestic power balance. In any event, the elements of continuity and change in Indonesia's foreign policy are determined to a large extent by the dynamics of domestic political power balance.

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2. Richard Snyder *et al.*, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (New York: Free Press, 1962).
3. Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
4. Michael Brecher *et al.*, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (March 1969), pp. 75-101.
5. James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 307-338.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-149; see also James Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-92.
7. M. Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," *Indonesian Review* (Jakarta), vol. I, No. 6 (1953), p. 26.
8. Ahmad Subardjo, "Indonesia in World Politics," *Indonesian Review*, Vol. I, No. 2, Feb.-March 1951, p. 83.
9. Hatta, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
11. Subardjo's confidential letter to His Excellency H. Merle Cochran dated January 5, 1952.
12. Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: The Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 202.
13. George Modelski, *Indonesia and Her Neighbors* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1964), p. 5, see also Frederick P. Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy," *Indonesia*, No. 2, October 1966, pp. 37-76.
14. George Modelski, (ed.), *The New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Indonesian Foreign Policy* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1963), pp. ii-iv.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-44; *Indonesian Observer*, Djakarta, September 4, 1961.
16. *The Djakarta Daily*, April 19, 1963.
17. For further details see L. P. Singh, "Dynamics of Indian-Indonesian Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. VII, No. 9, September 1967, pp. 655-666.
18. *Indonesian Observer*, August 18-19, 1963.
19. For the Texts of the two documents see: *Malaysian-Indonesian Relations*, Kuala Lumpur, 1963 (Appendix); see also Bernard C. Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966).
20. Modelski, *New Emerging Forces*, p. 127.
21. David P. Mozingo, *Simo-Indonesian Relations* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965).
22. *The Indonesian Herad*, Djakarta, August 20, 1965.
23. Donald Hindley's account.
24. Department of External Affairs, *Hubungan Republic Indonesia Dengan Republic Rakjat Tjina*, Documenta Diplomatica, 1967, No. 4, pp. 182-259.
25. Embassy of Indonesia, *Indonesian News and Views*, Washington, April 15, 1967.
26. Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1969), p. 90.
27. *New York Times*, April 5 and 11, 1966.
28. *The U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, Vol. VIII, No. 10.
29. *The New York Times*, March 29, 1972, November 1971, p. 6.
30. *Merdeka* (Djakarta), June 13, 1968; and *Warta Harian* (Djakarta), June 19, 1968.

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## Books / Chronique Littéraire

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### **A History of Modern Southeast Asia: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Decolonization**

By John Bastin and Harry J. Benda. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968. Pp. ix + 214.

THIS MONOGRAPH ILLUSTRATES the unfortunate distortions which can arise when historians are obliged to conform to a publisher's prescriptions regarding organization, distribution of emphasis, and work limitations. The authors present complementary themes. Bastin deals with Western expansion into Southeast Asia and characteristic aspects of colonial governance, whereas Benda is concerned with indigenous reactions to Western rule, to the Japanese occupation, and to the process of post-war decolonization. The preliminary fourteen-page introduction covering pre-Colonial Southeast Asia is a highly abbreviated summary skilfully contrived, of Professor Benda's more meaningful article of some 33 pages which appeared in the *Journal of Southeast History* in 1962. Bastin's interpretation of some 400 years of colonial activity covers 50 pages; the assessment of indigenous reactions occupies another fifty-six pages, while the remaining 80 pages cover the story since 1942.

Professor Bastin makes little effort to curb his pro-British bias and is guilty of factual error and dubious generalization. He plays down the importance of the first century and a half of Dutch commercial influence and assigns Batavia to play "second fiddle to tunes alternately improvised by Duplex and Clive" after 1750. He accords to the Portuguese more

influence than they deserve and tries to compare the attempted French exploitation of missionary activity at Ayuthia after 1660 with the role of the clergy in the Philippines. He wrongly describes British-Indian annexation of Arakan in 1826 as an unprofitable venture and provides no adequate explanation of the causes of the Anglo-Burman wars of 1852 and 1885. British administration had much to do with declining discipline in the Buddhist Sangha of Burma, and the dyarchy constitution of 1922 had little affinity with the Council reform of 1909. The French treaty with Hue of 1874 is incorrectly characterized; the Laos crisis of 1895 involved no serious threat of Anglo-French war; the American role in the Philippines is hardly considered at all. Quite apart from such matters, it would be impossible to cover in any meaningful way in 50 pages more than three centuries of tangled Southeast Asian history.

Space limitations also preclude any detailed description of the rise of Southeast Asian nationalism, but Professor Benda reflects a thorough knowledge of the history and undertakes a sophisticated interpretation which takes the facts into account. He argues that the impositions of direct colonial rule in Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam encouraged the rise of revolutionary nationalist movements before and after World War II. Whereas in countries like Siam, Malaya, Laos, and Cambodia, where ruling princes retained popular respect and religious traditions preserved their vitality, political unrest was much less extreme. Similarly the impact of the Japanese occupation was roughly proportional to the scope of political dissent present in a particular country. The theory is intriguingly suggestive and thoughtfully argued. Benda continues his theme in the concluding chapter on Decolonization by defining the generally applicable conditioning factors and then paying special attention to the political dynamics of particular situations. Constructive adjustments in decolonization proved to be feasible, even if slow, in those countries where traditional institutions retained their functioning vitality. In revolutionary situations and those plagued by war, military dictatorships tended to take over as the essential stabilizing factor, but to the detriment of economics as well as political progress. North Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh was better integrated than was the faction-ridden South by his embodiment of the nationalist cause and by the availability of disciplined Communist direction for the decolonization process. Hanoi also attracted support from neighboring montagnard peoples in a fashion seldom achieved in Vietnam. Benda's thoughtful interpretations are tentative, but none the less persuasive and eloquently presented. The last two-thirds of the book merits careful reading, but has little relevance to the first third.

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### **The World of Southeast Asia. Selected Historical Readings**

By Harry J. Benda and John A. Larkin. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. Pp. xvi + 331.

### **The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia, 1511-1957**

Edited by John Bastin. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. ix + 179.

THESE TWO BOOKS of selected readings on Southeast Asian history are highly disparate as to both objectives and content. The 80 items included in the Benda-Larkin monograph were selected with student cooperation as part of the development of the Southeast Asian history program at Yale. It provides supplementary readings drawn from contemporary sources which portray situations existing in all regions of the area, with focus on peoples indigenous to Southeast Asia. The Bastin volume, by contrast, reproduces 30 excerpts from secondary sources designed to interpret the roles which Western colonial regimes performed in bringing Southeast Asian peoples into the presumed advantages of the modern age. Whether viewed in terms of the success achieved in attaining their respective objectives, or as to their usefulness in meeting classroom needs, the advantages are strongly in favor of the indigenously-related monograph.

The Benda-Larkin readings include a great variety of descriptive materials averaging less than four pages in length. They start with seven early reports of travelers (Chinese, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish) and conclude with nine first-hand accounts by modern travelers. The other four parts are made up of items drawn from *Indigenous Accounts* (8 to 18), *reports of the early Western Presence* (19 to 38), *the Southeast Asian Response to the West* (39 to 56), and *The Era of Decolonization* (57 to 71). Each item is introduced with a brief background statement including a detailed footnote citation of the source. The selection process itself reflects the industry of the compilers and their sensitivity to differing aspects of the Southeast Asian scene. No two groups would make the same selections. From the reviewer's point of view, the materials are overweighted on the 20th century period (approximately one-half), but all of the items are informative and devoid of special pleading. It is a scholarly performance.

Much less can be said for the Bastin selections. The secondary accounts from which a dozen or more of the items have been drawn (Day, Zaide, Herz, Harvey, for example) could not possibly be adjudged to be the best available, and a number of the better ones are easily available elsewhere. Nor is the selection adequately balanced. The inclusion of ten items from discussions of Britain's role in Malaya and Indonesia reflects

the focus of the author's interests, and the uniformly favorable interpretations in all of them mirrors the author's personal predilections. Bastin includes nothing at all on Thailand's emergence into the modern era, and his two quite uncritical references to America's role in the Philippines are lifted from an elementary textbook. The French role in Vietnam is nowhere characterized. Victor Purcell's concluding apologia for colonialism in general could easily have been balanced by a statement from Furnivall or Tinker. The selections may contribute something to British self-esteem, but it is difficult to envisage what scholarly purpose they would serve. The two books, I repeat, are highly disparate in both quality and content.

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**A Short Introduction to the History and Politics of Southeast Asia**  
By Richard Allen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. x + 306.

THIS BOOK BY SIR RICHARD Allen, who was British Ambassador to Burma from 1956 to 1962, (see R. Allen: *Malaysia—Prospect and Retrospect*, London, 1968) developed out of material assembled for lectures to American undergraduates. The author's purpose is to present "a clear and concise survey of some of the main aspects, past and present, of an area in which the United States has assumed progressively heavier responsibilities since World War II but with which most Americans are still only marginally familiar" (p. v).

The focus on a particular audience explains the frequent use of comparisons drawn from the American scene (pp. 12, 28, 48 e.g.) as well as references to the U.S. interests and role in Southeast Asia. More important, it has determined to a considerable extent the selection of material and space allotted to individual countries. We find, therefore, that one-third of the book—five out of a total of 15 chapters extending over 51 pages of the 245 paged text—is devoted to Indochina since the Second World War. In contrast there are only nine pages on Burma in the same period (pp. 104-112). The emphasis also tends to be placed on international relations rather than on internal developments within each country.

As an introduction to the politics of Southeast Asia, its appeal is likely to be limited. But for that audience to whom the book is primarily directed, the sections on Indochina are clear, objective, and relatively brief. Consequently, it may be recommended to students who wish to know something about a controversial subject from a non-partisan source and do not have much time for reading. Possibly, they and other general readers may be stimulated to pursue certain questions suggested or topics

touched upon not only in the five chapters on Indochina but also the two chapters concerned with post-war Indonesia and Malaya.

If the above mentioned seven chapters are regarded as an introduction to the politics of the region, the preceding eight are intended to introduce Southeast Asian history. Here the author neatly summarizes what is known, adopting a descriptive and chronological approach. The style is eminently readable and he skilfully links the past to the present. However, the material could have been better organized in places. For instance, chapter IV, "France and Indochina", which traces the establishment of French influence and control in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, includes a few sentences on the Thai cession of four northern Malay states to Britain in 1909 and, surprisingly, a section on the modernization of Thailand (pp. 55-9) from the founding of the Chakkri dynasty up to 1938. This is difficult to understand unless one notes that the author sees the region essentially as part of the western empires. In this respect, the chapter headings adopted are significant: viz. "France and Indochina", "The Philippines under two rules", "The Dutch and British extend their control", "Britain and Burma", and "The French regime and its enemies". Since Thailand avoided being totally absorbed by the colonial powers, the writer faced the problem of finding a place for this anomaly in his Eurocentric chapter divisions. The solution adopted is less than satisfactory. Similarly, in the chapter entitled "Britain and Burma" (chapter VII) a reader would not expect to find that six out of thirteen pages are on Burma after independence, particularly as the Burmese chose not to remain within the British Commonwealth.

The attempt to cover so much time and space on 128 pages has led to the perhaps inevitable oversimplification and inaccuracy. An example of the former occurs on p. 17 where the greater difficulty of assimilating the Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia compared to Thailand and the Philippines is ascribed mainly to the fact that pork is a basic element in the Chinese diet whereas "to the Muslims the pig is an unclean animal". Again in describing precolonial Vietnam, the author adopts uncritically J. Buttinger's view that it was the "great landowners" who opposed national unity; and further, that they did not permit the Vietnamese economy to rise above the village level (p. 47 citing J. Buttinger: *Vietnam—A Political History*, London, 1969, pp. 52-3). Among the inaccuracies are two on p. 56 regarding nineteenth century Siam. First, to say that "The British Burney mission in 1821 in quest of a commercial treaty was rebuffed and the Crawford mission of 1826, after the first Anglo-Burmese war, only secured an emasculated agreement" is incorrect. Crawford and not Burney led the 1821 mission. Burney was sent in 1825 while the Anglo-Burmese war was on although the treaty was signed after Burma's defeat in 1826. (See W. F. Vella: *Siam under Rama III*, New York, 1957, p. 118). The second statement that the 1833 convention between Siam and the United States permitted the appoint-

ment of an American consul is equally misleading. In this convention Siam merely agreed that the United States should have the same right equally with other foreign nations, if the privilege of appointing consuls was granted to any country other than Portugal. In fact there was no American consul in Siam till 1858.

For those "newly approaching this complex and fascinating field" (p. 248), the author has carefully prepared a bibliography divided into sections beginning with works which give an overview of the whole area, followed by books on Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand. Each section is preceded by a miniature bibliographic essay so that the undergraduate and general reader will find this "short bibliography" (pp. 248-72) useful.

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### **Nationalism, Revolution and Evolution in South-East Asia,**

Hull Monographs on South-East Asia No. 2. Edited by Michael Leifer. Zug, Switzerland: Inter-Documentation Company A.G., 1970. Pp. iii + 175.

THIS BOOK IS THE end-product of a colloquium held at the University of Hull in April, 1968 under the auspices of its Centre for South-East Asian Studies. The title tells one little about the papers; it is broad enough to apply to almost any conceivable collection on the politics of the region. In point of fact there are five "single-country" papers and three which are more general in scope. There are two on Burma, and one each on Malaya, Vietnam, and Cambodia. The general papers deal with: the Overseas Chinese; subversion or social revolution in Southeast Asia; contrasting views of state capitalism in Southeast Asia (and in India) held in the USSR and China, respectively.

The T. V. Sathyamurthy paper on Burma has an interesting hypothesis on nationalism generally; where colonial power persisted for a long time, strong nationalist forces emerged. By this test, the weakness of the nationalist movement in Burma is contrasted with the strength of the corresponding movements in Indonesia, India, China, and Ceylon. What did arise in the way of a nationalist movement was dominated by the pongyis. However, the pongyi leadership was damaging to the achievement of a national identity. "They made no contribution to the development of a viable nationalist ideology nor were they successful in reformulating traditional aspirations and beliefs in the form of a cohesive ideology capable of attracting national consensus" (p. 32). Later leaders were also incapable of giving nationalism an internal ideological cohesion and dynamic. This analysis is supplemented by Richard Butwell's contribution, in which he lists various characteristics of Burmese nation-

alism, the most distinctive and the most disastrous of which was the inability of the leaders to compromise. This leads to a seeming paradox. In spite of (or because of?) the inability to compromise, no government has succeeded in imposing its authority on the country, succeeded in state-building, let alone nation-building.

Ralph Smith's paper on the historical antecedents of the 'Viet-Cong' is really a footnote to the work of Douglas Pike on this topic [*Viet-Cong* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966)]. Smith brings out two points which are usually not sufficiently underlined, the role of the sects and the influence of the historical background, especially during the French period. The article by Short, "Nationalism and the Emergency in Malaya", shows convincingly that the M.C.P. leaders could not head a *Malayan* nationalist movement because their appeal was limited ethnically. His suggestion that Malayan nationalism "came of age" during the peace talks at Baling (pp. 55-56) is, however, somewhat contrived. Michael Leifer deals with authority and political succession in Cambodia, which in essence amounts to an account of Sihanouk's maneuvering to strengthen his position. The analysis takes on added piquancy in view of later events. Leifer in no sense actually predicts these (but how many commentators have successfully predicted similar events in other Southeast Asian countries?). However, he gives two significant pointers. One is Sihanouk's challenge to the Cambodian elite in November, 1966 (pp. 158-159). Another is the author's verdict (p. 172) that Sihanouk was drawing on diminishing political resources.

One of the "general" papers is on the Overseas Chinese by Go Gien-tjwan. Drawing largely on the Indonesian experience, the author exposes a number of misconceptions and ambiguities about their role. However, in spite of the forces obliging them to conform to the local cultural patterns, the myths about them still remain, resulting in, for example, the Indonesian massacres of 1965-66.

The Wertheim contribution contrasts Soviet and Chinese views of the role of state capitalism in developing countries, particularly South-east Asia. The Soviets are optimistic about the transition to socialism from regimes which practice state capitalism; the Chinese are not. Assuming that the Soviet authorities believe what they say, Wertheim is of the opinion that their conclusions can be the consequence only of inadequate field research.

The longest paper in the book is by Malcolm Caldwell, "Subversion or Social Revolution in South-east Asia?" This article makes two important valid points, which are directed at Washington, D.C. rather than at Hull, England: unless internal conditions were really bad, the oppressed would lack the will and the incentive to rise; in most South-east Asian countries rebellions have received little or no material support from the USSR or China. Nevertheless, there are important omissions in the argument. The role of ideological, as opposed to material, support

from the USSR or China is not assessed. The advantages of guerrilla fighters and the necessity of a 12-1 or 15-1 numerical superiority in order to defeat them, is not taken into account. Douglas Pike is quoted on terrorist tactics by the NLF, but is not quoted on the whole range of pressures, which may stop short of terror, which have been used by the NLF. Are "subversion" and "social revolution" mutually exclusive, or may they occur together? The author's credibility is not increased by his statement (p. 95) that in 1965 out of 2,280 babies born daily in the Philippines, 1,544 die before they are one year old; such a death rate would appear to amount to more deaths per year than actually occur in the whole population of the Philippines. His statement (p. 79) about the non-use of Russian troops in Czechoslovakia at the time of the communist takeover, will need a reference in any future editions to distinguish between 1948 and 1968.

As a whole, the book gives no coherent picture of Southeast Asia, or of any particular theme in Southeast Asia. But some of the contributions are distinguished, and there is sufficiently interesting material to justify its acquisition by Southeast Asian specialists and by libraries.

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### **Indians in Malaysia and Singapore**

By Sinnaph Arasaratnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 214 pp.

### **Indians in Malaya, Some Aspects of Their Immigration and Settlement, 1786-1957**

By Karnial Singh Sandhu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, 346 pp.

THE TWO BOOKS UNDER review, with one generic theme, give an account of the Indians, or strictly speaking, persons of Indian origin, who settled in Malaya, their adopted land, as a result of a deliberate policy of Britain, the ruling colonial power in India until 1947 and in Malaya until 1957, to import manpower from India to subserve the interests of the colonial economy in Malaya. Except for a few Indians such as traders and businessmen who were permitted to follow the Union Jack, the bulk of the Indian laborers were carried to Malaya for over a century under a scheme of "assisted immigration" of indentured labor—a scheme just a shade removed from slavery.

Here the similarity between the two books ends. Arasaratnam's book sets no specific time period and, as indicated by the title, aims to cover

Indians not only in the Malayan peninsula but also in Singapore and the Borneo territories that have been federated into Malaysia. In substance it deals primarily with the Tamil segment of the Indian population. There is a special emphasis on Tamil literature, education and political behavior or what the author calls "Tamil nationalism," "Dravidianism" and "Tamil Communalist identity" (pp. 128, 129, 130). The first five chapters, dealing with Indo-Malayan contacts before the 19th century, the Indian immigration thereafter, the Indian society in Malaya before 1945 and political and trade union movements after 1945, largely cover the same ground as in J. Norman Parmer, *Colonial Labor, Policy and Administration*, New York, 1960; U. Mahajani, *The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaya*, Bombay, 1960; and C. Kondapi, *Indians Overseas*, Madras, 1949. The last three chapters study religion and social reform, Indian education and its social effects, the integration of the Indian community with other members of the Malaysian society and future prospects. Arasaratnam's failure to cite references for many important statements and accounts is somewhat perplexing. One example is his claim (p. 66) that "caste was one of the prime causes in early disturbances among labor." The summary account of political developments after 1945 could have been substantiated from more references, if not to primary sources, at least to earlier books that have dealt with them (e.g., Mahajani, Chapter VII).

Sandhu limits his scope to studying "some aspects" of Indian immigration and illustrates how the movement of Indian immigrants resulted in changes in the population structure and the cultural landscape of Malaysia (jacket). This specificity enables him to offer a detailed analysis of the structure and texture of Indian emigration to Malaya between the 1790's and the 1930's when a bulk of Indian laborers were brought into Malaya, and of the reverse flow between the 1930's and 1957.

In addition to an Aide-mémoire, which serves as an introduction and description of "the research setting of the work" the book is divided into three parts, dealing with (1) Indian Immigration into British Malaya: Origins and Trends; (2) The Indian Population of Malaya: Growth and Associated Characteristics; and (3) Indians in the Modern Malayan Economy. The first part has five sections: Indians in pre-British Malaya; Causes of Indian immigration into British Malaya; Types of migrants and recruitment or movement; Emigration-immigration law and practice; and Flow and characteristics of migration. The four sections of the second part deal with growth and structure; patterns of distribution; settlement characteristics and ethno-linguistic composition. The third part describes Indian roles in agriculture and industry and in communications and commerce. This analysis is sustained by a substantial number of footnotes and an extensive list of newspapers and journals as well as primary and secondary sources, and a useful glossary of Indian, Malay, and other terms. There is even a photo-plate of the

license for the *Kangani* (labor recruiter), a piece of paper that gave so much power over so many to so few. A total of 43 figures and maps illustrates the text graphically. Finally, four appendices give annual figures for Indian Labor Immigration to Malaya, 1844-1941; Types and Numbers of Indian assisted labor arrivals in Malaya, 1844-1938; Total Indian Arrivals in Malaya, 1786-1957; and Total Indian Departures from Malaya, 1786-1957.

It is puzzling why the author, in an exceptionally long footnote (pp. 11-12) should dismiss Indians writing on Indians in Malaya merely as "either sojourners or temporarily or permanently domiciled in Malaya"—a description that would fit every academic specialist on a particular region; more curious is his characterization of "the majority" of these writings as appearing "to have had the same singular motive: to eulogize and publicize the position of the Indians as a whole, or their particular sector of interests or achievement, probably in the hope of improving their status." How could any truthful account of Indians abroad under the British rule (other than those written as a divide and rule tactic to alienate Indians from the indigenous people) fail to stress their impressive contribution to the local economic development and their equally staggering ill-treatment? Writings on the Blacks in the United States and the Jews in Europe (both, like Indians abroad, were ill-treated minorities) would be meaningless without an account of their achievements and contributions and their ill-treatment by the ruling authorities. To illustrate his charge, the author cites K. A. Neelakandha Aiyer's *Indian Problems in Malaya*, 1938, and states that the book was banned by "The Malayan Government". Surely not. It was banned by an alien, the British colonial power, ruling Malaya and which, as elsewhere, banned numerous books by Indian and foreign authors that criticized its imperial rule and exposed the plight of its subjects. Still curiously and curiously, the author does not mention in this particular footnote books by C. Kondapi and U. Mahajani cited above which have given greatly footnoted accounts of the semi-slave conditions prevalent among Indians in indentured labor. The description of every rubber estate (where Indian laborers were employed) as "a virtual concentration camp" by another Indian author is not such a "wild exaggeration" as the author would have his readers believe. He himself describes in detail (p. 83) how "the lot of the Indian indentured laborers . . . was generally hard, often indescribably so." In the game of fathoming motives, the author's own motives in denigrating previous Indian works on Indians in Malaya might also be questioned. Surely his present work is of such excellence that he could easily have established his claim to have produced a first full-length study of the Indian immigration and settlement without making uncalled-for criticism of earlier authors.

Arasaratnam avoids stigmatizing British rule. The two words, imperialism and colonialism, do not occur in his book. He speaks of the

return of "British military and political control over Malaya in 1945" (p. 112) rather than "British rule". Discussing the indenture system under which Indians were pressed into labor in Malaya (pp. 10-15), he avoids criticizing colonial exploitation or stating the well-known fact that the slavery of the Negroes and the indentured labor of the Indians were deliberately promoted to serve the colonial economy. Sandhu extensively details (Chapter 1) how it was precisely to serve the colonial economic interests that Indian labor was brought into Malaya, often enticed by false propaganda (pp. 64 and 79). Neither he nor Arasaratnam, unlike Kondapi and Mahajani, dwell sufficiently on the Indian nationalist agitation to abolish indentured labor. Sandhu, probably in view of the nonpolitical nature of his work, gives only one paragraph (p. 85) to discussion of opposition from "Indian nationalism." Arasaratnam, while conceding (p. 22) some credit for certain improvements in Indian labor conditions to Indian "nationalist opinion" (he does not say "Indian nationalism" but talks (p. 128) of "Tamil nationalism") gives major credit to "British conscience" (pp. 19, 20-21) ignoring the fact that it was the Indian nationalist agitation for reforms that aroused "British conscience". As Britain was the ruling power, "the final seal on the demise of indentured Indian immigration", as Sankhu puts it (p. 86), had to be set in London. But the deed of demise was drawn up in India.

The two authors reach interestingly similar conclusions about the continued vitality of Indian culture in Malaya. Sandhu approvingly cites (p. 25) Sir Richard Winstedt's conclusion: ". . . though he is (or may be) unconscious of it, from the cradle to the grave the Malay is surrounded by survivals of Indian culture." Arasaratnam concludes (p. 167) that because of revived intellectual interest by Indians, Hinduism is now "entrenched as one of the living religions in Malaya in contemporary times." Sandhu's remarks (p. 24) about "the decline and eventual demise of Indianized kingdoms of the region (Southeast Asia) and the rise of Islam in Southeast Asia" can hardly be substantiated. Islam spread only to the Malayan peninsula, Indonesia, a few Borneo areas and parts of Southern Philippines. On the mainland, the Indianized states of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and, to an extent Vietnam, continued to flourish and did not lose their Hindu-Buddhist culture even after their varying degrees of political decline under the European conquest.

In conclusion, Sandhu points out the increasing degree of urbanization among the Indians and a decreasing proportion of laborers among them, and reiterates (p. 302) that the Indians have in many ways "influenced the adaptation and moulding of the overall Malayan environment." Arasaratnam notes the growing participation of Indian intelligentsia in left-wing, noncommunal parties in the 1960's on ideological basis, and concludes that "political orientation to India has ceased" and that the new Indian intelligentsia that has moved upwards from lower social origins would like to reinterpret Indian culture in the light of its local

environment (p. 197). The younger generation favors complete merger into Malaysian and Singapore nationalities. Both the authors regard the Indian element in the Malayan society and economy as a permanent, not a transient, factor.

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### Population Trends in Indonesia

By Widjojo Nitisastro. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970. Pp. xxi + 266.

THE VALUE OF THIS study lies in its meticulous data work on Indonesian population. The book is essentially a sophisticated and critical review of all known population estimates and censuses going back to the late eighteenth century and extending through the 1961 census. The author uses this data base to evaluate past population trends and to project future population growth and composition to 1991.

This book will clearly be established as the authoritative source on Indonesia's population history. The author merits commendation for his careful and scholarly approach to his data, never venturing beyond the conclusions warranted by the material under examination. This type of data-oriented study is urgently needed in less-developed countries, but often avoided by economists because it is not the type of research work which is properly rewarded in status and prestige by the professional hierarchy.

This enhancement of our empirical knowledge of Indonesia's population provides fertile data for testing many current hypotheses in development economics. The author makes minimum use of his excellent empirical work for this purpose. His modest conclusions are summarized in the final chapter. Chief among these is the author's demonstration that it is "most unlikely" that improved health conditions produced a population explosion in Java during the nineteenth century. Dr. Widjojo's scrutiny of colonial reports containing population estimates for Java suggests, rather, that population probably grew consistently at a modest rate throughout the colonial period. This finding has important implications for our theories of interaction between the colonial export enclave and the traditional subsistence economy. It appears that population growth continued its historical trend, periodically interrupted by natural calamities, quite independent of growing colonial export activities.

The major conclusions about contemporary population phenomena are not reassuring. Although Indonesia in the 1960's probably had one of the highest rates of unemployment of less-developed countries, projections for the 1970's and beyond indicate much more rapid additions to the working-age population than during the first 25 years of Indo-

nesia's independence. (This is based upon the much higher birth reports since 1950.) Rapid growth of new entrants into the labor force will compound the unemployment problem, especially on Java. Experience in other contemporary less-developed countries suggests that even very rapid growth combined with a labor-intensive development program would very likely only enable Indonesia to avoid rapidly growing unemployment rates.

The extremely high population density on the small island of Java revealed by the 1961 census (477 per square kilometer), will be sharply increased by future population growth. Even the most optimistic of the author's four alternative population projections show a doubling of Java's population (from 62.9 million to 123.9 million) between 1961 and 1991. Although population densities are lower on the other Indonesian islands, population will presumably be growing even more rapidly than on Java. Moreover, history shows that large-scale population relocation to ease growing pressure on Java's resources, is not feasible. Hence, as the author properly stresses, a massive development effort must be accompanied by rapid spread of fertility control to avoid disastrous consequences from the uneven population distribution.

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### **Vietnam and China 1938-1954**

By King C. Chen. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. xv + 350.

THIS IS BY FAR the most important study that has yet been written on the intricate relations between China and Vietnam in the period from 1938 to 1954. The careful examination of available sources, including some unpublished materials in Taiwan, and the judicious use of interviews and correspondence with Chinese and Vietnamese leaders, such as General Chang Fa-K'uei, who were active participants in the events of those years, enable the author to disentangle the thread of intrigues and maneuvers that accompanied Ho Chih Minh's rise to power. The meticulous research and careful attention to details is indeed impressive.

The greatest contribution of the book is the analysis of Ho's dealing with Chinese authorities and of the policies of the Nationalists and Communists toward Vietnam. Ho's exploits were characterized by a shrewd flexibility that empowered him to successfully manipulate Chinese local authorities, despite the latter's belief that Ho was under their control. Professor Chen has admirably described this fascinating relationship. However, the picture would be more complete if he had probed deeper into the factors contributing to Chungking's often passive attitude towards events in Vietnam.

The success of the Chinese Communists significantly affected the fortunes of Ho and his followers, and the author devotes a chapter to discussing North Vietnam's attempts to adopt China's revolutionary model. Certainly, similarities in social and economic conditions between the two countries—not to mention Peking's willingness to supply North Vietnam with massive aid—meant that China's model had a particular relevance for Vietnam. However, despite North Vietnam's reliance on Chinese experience and support, Ho was careful to maintain his independence of action, especially in internal matters, and to balance the "pro-Chinese group" in party front organizations with a moderate group in the government machinery. For Ho was first and foremost a nationalist, and in his dealings with the French or the Chinese, he never lost sight of his ultimate objective of an independent Vietnam, free from all foreign control. To Ho, Chinese dominance was no less repugnant—perhaps even more so—than French control. To quote Ho's well-known statement, "It is better to smell the feces of the French for a little while than to eat Chinese excrement all of one's life" (p. 99).

But North Vietnam was not immune to pressure from either Moscow or Peking, as the events leading to the Geneva settlement showed. As Professor Chen points out, "North Vietnam's coming to the Geneva conference table and the peaceful settlement of the Indochinese War were not initiated by North Vietnam, but by the Cominform and by Moscow. . . . The significance of the development lies in the indication of the dependency of North Vietnam's foreign policy on Moscow and Peking and in the influence of the campaign of the Communist camp on the Western Allies" (p. 294). It is also clear that both Moscow and Peking were motivated by largely extraneous concerns. On this very important point, it will be useful to read also Robert F. Randle's *Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War* (Princeton, 1969), which lucidly discusses the motivations of the parties involved in the Geneva Conference and the limitations of the agreements of 1954 as the basis for peace in Vietnam.

In discussing the rise of Ho Chih Minh to power, the author also provides a valuable study of Ho's struggle with other Communist and non-Communist Vietnamese contenders in deciding who should be the voice of the emerging nationalism of Vietnam. Although Professor Chen describes in great detail the rise and fall of the numerous factions in the nationalist movement, one gets the impression that many of the nationalist leaders were, at best, rather shadowy figures who never posed any serious challenge to Ho. Commenting on the demise of the National Union Front, the author points out that it "suffered from the same un-solid organization without mass support" (p. 186). There is no doubt that popular support contributed greatly to the success of the Viet Minh, but the author has neither defined clearly the exact nature and extent of this mass support, nor the way in which the masses helped the course of the Viet Minh.

All in all, Professor Chen is to be congratulated for this solid, scholarly study which will undoubtedly remain the standard work on Sino-Vietnamese relations on the period covered for some time to come.

Ka-che Yip  
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## Communications

. . . It was interesting to note that Mr. C. A. Fisher, in his article, "A View of Southeast Asia," did mention Carl Sauer's hypothesis that the earliest form of agriculture was developed in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, he has not kept up with the archaeological work which has strongly supported this hypothesis. There is no need to present here a more up-to-date view of Southeast Asian prehistory as quite a number of articles have appeared and are appearing on this subject. It might be of value to those of your readers who are not acquainted with the recent archaeological work, however, to present a brief bibliography on this material.

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