# MI Magazine

January-February-March 1975

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SGM

New Department:
'As I See It' by the ACSI,DA

Added Feature:
Insert,Communist Block Machine Guns

The Commandant's Corner

One of the most important contributions that each of us can make toward the goal of "winning the first battle," in the event of another war, is that of speeding the dissemination of intelligence to the person and place where it will do the most good. We must never forget that:

INTELLIGENCE IS FOR COMMANDERS

-- and anything that gets in the path of this goal is basically wrong. In the search for better ways to support this concept your Intelligence Center and School recently undertook a major project entitled "Integration of Intelligence from All Sources." This TRADOC-directed project is a matter of urgent concern to senior members of our military establishment, and USAICS is the TRADOC Executive Agent. From time to time, many of you will be contacted for assistance in developing an all-embracing systems approach to the problem, and the necessary follow-through to eliminate all sticking points in the way of providing battle commanders the best possible view of the enemy threat in their areas of operations. I solicit any ideas you have on this subject plus your reports of anything new you are doing to accomplish our mutual goal.

HARRY H. HIESTAND
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Promoting Professionalism in Military Intelligence

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Features:

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ABOUT THE COVER: Artist W.D. McGinley illustrates two of the Communist bloc heavy machineguns to herald the handy arms fold-out included in this issue.

DETAINEE BOAT:

The Floating Interrogation Facility

by Captain John B. Haseman

The radio operator at the brigade command post called to the interrogators and told them that five captured prisoners of war were on their way in for questioning. A few minutes later a helicopter landed and the prisoners were brought in to the interrogation facility. Less than ten minutes later, vital information concerning enemy dispositions and strength was radioed to infantry units in combat a short distance away. The coordination between the combat unit and its supporting interrogation team was smooth and timely.

The scene was the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam, the command post and interrogation center were on ships, the helicopter landed on a floating landing pad, and the combat troops were based on ships. The entire episode was a routine event in the course of intelligence support provided to the 9th Infantry Division's Mobile Riverine Force. The interrogation facility was the 9th Military Intelligence Detachment's Detainee Boat, the only facility of its kind used in the Vietnam War, and probably one of the few facilities like it used by the armed forces of any country.

When the 9th Infantry Division was deployed to the Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam, unusual and unorthodox tactics and methods

were required to accomplish "ordinary" missions. The 'Old Reliables' operated throughout the Mekong Delta's maze of waterways, water-logged rice paddies and small, but thick, stands of jungle. The challenge of operating in any area with few land transportation routes, where command posts shifted from day to day, and where the combat elements operated from ships instead of dry-land base camps, was a formidable one.

Just as the infantry units had to adopt new methods to cope with a strange environment, so did the combat support elements. The 9th Military Intelligence Detachment's boat was a unique and one-of-a-kind facility designed to provide intelligence support to the 2d Brigade-- the Army's component of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF).

The MRF, a waterborne Army/Navy element, was the first of its kind since the Civil War. It combined one brigade of infantry and the U.S. Navy's Task Force 117, a flotilla of barracks ships, barges and assault craft. Operating from the 9th Division's forward base camp at Dong Tam, Dinh Tuong Province, Republic of Viet Nam, the MRF conducted combat operations in most of the provices of South Viet Nam's IV Corps. The barracks ships quartered the men and acted as local administrative headquarters. Ships and barges of all sizes served as tow-ships, supply rooms, ammunition storage points, helicopter landing pads and recreation centers. Even 105mm howitzers, elements of Division Artillery, were loaded on barges for transport with the MRF.

The Detainee Boat was a Mark VIII Mechanized Landing Craft, organic to the 1097th Transportation Company. This "Mike Boat" was made available for use as a floating interrogation facility. Initially, it was enclosed and the open cargo space became detention space. Quarters were provided for an interrogation team, military police, and civil affairs personnel. Two interrogation rooms were also constructed. The boat's crew was quartered in the stern. All in all, it was crowded, but very functional.

The deployment, to provide the best possible utilization of the boat and its personnel, was established through experience. While the MRF was on "stand down" at the Dong Tam Base Camp, the interrogators functioned as part of the regular land-based interrogation element. When the 2d Brigade received an operational mission requiring riverine movement, the Interrogation Section was notified by the Brigade S2 Office and reported aboard the boat.

The S2 Officer briefed the interrogators on the mission, destination and anticipated scope of the forthcoming operation. Normally, each team remained with the MRF for the entire operation to provide continuity and on-the-spot tactical knowledge. Each team usually consisted of one US interrogator, one interpreter, and one interrogator from the attached 14th Military Intelligence Detachment (ARVN).

The water borne interrogation team provided tactical intelligence on an immediate basis to the 2d Brigade S2 and provided initial screening and classification of all detainees apprehended during a riverine operation. By using helicopters to transport detainees to the interrogation facility, and with the immediate proximity of the Brigade intelligence and operations radio net, tactical intelligence was often in the hands of maneuver units less than 15 minutes after a detainee was captured. Quick verbal reporting of tactical intelligence was of primary concern; preparation of written interrogation reports was accomplished during operational lulls or after return to the Dong Tam Base Camp.

The Detainee Boat enabled the interrogators to quickly determine which detainees were lucrative and to screen out innocent civilians prior to movement to the Main Brigade Collection Point. Forward deployment enabled the interrogators to support operations conducted in two or more areas simultaneously and to collate information obtained from various enemy contacts. Without the floating facility, the time lag between capture and extraction of usable information would have been a matter of several hours rather than just a few minutes. In the Delta, this difference meant the difference between military success and the proverbial "empty sack."

Through experience, the Detainee Boat became a valuable asset not only to the Division's intelligence operations, but to other aspects of operations as well. Representatives of the Division G5 Section were assigned to the boat to assist in processing the many innocent civilians who composed the majority of the individuals captured. Civic Action representatives provided regular programs for innocent civilians and operated as a liaison section to return them to the local authorities. Programs designed to reinforce the image of the Government of South Viet Nam were presented to all detainees processed on the boat. Comfort kits were also distributed to innocent civilians prior to their release.

By using the Detainee Boat as a screening point, interrogators were able to identify

innocent civilians immediately, separate them from prisones of war and process them for release. This freed the Brigade Main Collection Point from a massive tie-up and at the same time engendered good will among local civilians by quickly returning them to their homes.

The flexibility of the Detainee Boat and its interrogation team is best illustrated by its performance during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Accompanying seven infantry battalions in combat in four Delta provinces, the interrogation team on board the boat processed captives from five different Viet Cong battalions. It provided immediate support to 9th Division forces engaged in fighting in the cities of My Tho, Vinh Long, Ben Tre and Can Tho. The rapid changes in battlefield command posts during the period from 31 January to 5 February 1968 would have made ordinary interrogation support difficult if not impossible. However, the floating interrogators were able to quickly identify the elements with whom the Division was in contact and to assist in evaluating the extent of the Tet Offensive in the Delta. For its superb actions during this period, the 9th Division's 2d Brigade was awarded the U.S. Presidential Citation, an honor in which the Detainee Boat interrogation team members were specifically included.

The boat had a much traveled history during the two years it supported the 2d Brigade and the MRF. It traveled from within sight of Saigon to as far away as the almost impenetrable U Minh Forest; it operated in the wide reaches of the Mekong River and its tributaries, and along canals scarcely wider than the boat. At one time or another it rendered vital intelligence support to 9th Division troops in 13 provinces of Military Region IV.

The small boat provided invaluable intelligence support 24 hours a day to the 9th Infantry Division. Using a conservative estimate, the interrogation teams on it processed 2,000 hard core prisoners of war out of the over 7,200 detainees. This unique Detainee Boat, the only one of its kind to be used in Vietnam, has become an integral part of the heroic history of the 'Old Reliables.'

Captain John B. Haseman was responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Detainee Boat as Chief, Interrogation Section, and concurrently Commanding Officer [Forward], 9th MI Detachment, from January to July 1968. CPT Haseman is currently stationed in Thailand.

The Professional Reader

Electoral Politics in South Vietnam, John C. Donnell and Charles A. Joiner (editors), D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, MS 1974. 185 pgs. $14.00.

This book contains a series of essays originally presented to a conference of the Asia Society in New York in 1971, and subsequently revised. It provides a detailed insight into the background and conduct of elections in the Republic of Vietnam, beginning with the Presidential Election of 1967 and continuing through the Upper House (Senate) elections of 1973. While the book is academic in nature, there is a great deal of material of interest to the average reader with an interest in Vietnamese politics.

Of particular interest to the professional military man, this collection provides a background of internal political movements that will supplement the soldier's military knowledge

and recollections of Vietnam. United States policy in Vietnam included, as part of our national goals, the establishment of a viable political system of democracy and stability in South Vietnam. This aspect of national policy has always been overshadowed by the military conflicts and national-level politics of Vietnam.

Mssrs Donnell and Joiner have taken the internal political maneuvering of the Vietnamese and placed them in context with the major military events of the past seven years. The book places political events in perspective and provides new background information on the causes and results of such widely-publicized political events as the uncontested 1971 Vietnamese Presidential elections.

It has often been said that the mere attempt by the Vietnamese people to organize and conduct elections in the midst of all-out warfare is in itself a major accomplishment. The editors have expanded on this concept with a wealth of detail, supporting tables and electoral statistics, providing the reader with a valuable look at the Vietnam conflict from a new and interesting perspective.

CPT John B. Haseman

by Major General Harold Aaron

As I See It

From the Desk of the ACSI

I have been asked to contribute a column to each issue of *MI Magazine*. I'm delighted to do it, not only because it gives me a chance to put some of my thoughts before you and indicate some directions military intelligence is tending, but also because it contributes to the furtherance of that dialogue that I think is so vital to the future of our profession.

Intelligence, of its very nature, is a compartmented field of endeavor. The need for limitation in access to certain information and techniques leads, it seems to me, to a lack of communication between the fundamental intelligence disciplines. It is as if we, having become accustomed to reticence about our particular daily work, have stopped talking about our profession, even in general terms, with our fellow professionals. This is not at all a desirable state, as I am sure all will agree, and may in the long run even be of positive disservice to the Nation. A real breakthrough in the day-to-day craft of intelligence may be lying dormant in an MI specialist's mind somewhere, requiring only a spark of cross-fertilization in an exchange of ideas with a fellow professional to bring it to realization. The purpose of this small column, then, is to contribute to that wider dialogue that I am sure is opening. The appearance of *MI Magazine* as a professional publication is an encouraging sign of this.

One of the marks of a true profession such as ours is a shared body of knowledge. *MI Magazine* is a valuable contribution to that body of knowledge, and I hope *"As I See It"* will have some impact on the readership within the framework of *MI Magazine's* goals.

"As I See It" will deal with new developments, with ideas and concepts, and with matters I think ought to be brought to the readership's attention. It will deal with both fact and opinion, and should engender some reaction. I encourage response, whether it takes the form of a letter or suggestion sent to the magazine or my office, or - better yet- takes the form of an idea you share with your colleagues to make the profession better or mission accomplishment more effective. And, if you have a topic you'd like to have me address in a future column, let's hear about it. After all, dialogue is ever a two-way street, and it does no real good if the topics are only chosen by one side of a conversation. So, let's hear from you.

Many young, technically-trained people in MI tend to shy away from technical intelligence, finding a comfortable niche in the other disciplines of intelligence. Part of this is due to historical accident, related to the manner in which we produced tech intel until the mid-60's, but part of it may result from some misunderstanding of what it's all about. *As I See It*, we are tending to neglect Tec Intel to some degree, and we cannot afford to do so. Maybe a short look at the problem will make its position clearer.

In the early 1960's, the Department of the Army combined the Army's technical intelligence production, formerly a responsibility of the technical services, into the US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Office of the Surgeon General, and the Missile Intelligence Command. With this reorganization the technical services slowly deleted their small, but effective, technical intelligence units, which were the nucleus for technical intelligence support to the tactical commander in time of war. As a result of this reduction of capability, the Army has lost a pool of manpower capable of providing the commander with "on-the-

ground" technical intelligence. Current reorganization of military intelligence units above the division level have paid little attention to the importance of technical intelligence. Why my concern?

The modern day battlefield most certainly must be considered sophisticated and technically oriented. Further, we note that experience in Vietnam and the Middle East easily pointed out the need for a rapid capability to identify weapons and equipment not only for tactical reasons but also to employ captured weapons and equipment to the advantage of the tactical commander. This requires the assistance and expertise of trained, experienced technical intelligence specialists.

Military intelligence has long assumed that in the term "technical intelligence," to emphasize the term technical was more significant than the term intelligence. Both the technical services and military intelligence planners have failed to interact to give us a much needed professional combat technical intelligence capability.

Technical intelligence in the Army cannot be "pushed aside" as a non-essential. We should look closely at re-vitalizing our technical intelligence capability in the Army through development of skills both in the intelligence career field and the technical services. Combining the military intelligence and technical skills into a cohesive, effective capability will insure the response needed to the commander.

Military intelligence should assume the initiative in expanding the Army's technical intelligence capability. It is time for a close, critical look at this element of intelligence which has lost its identity but most certainly not its importance.

From time to time we all hear the age-old lament that we are lacking intelligence on a whole range of subjects and, therefore, cannot provide our consumers with the information they need to satisfy their planning and development requirements. Collection gaps do occur and we all have experienced production gaps from time to time. But there is yet another gap - an exploitation gap - which is particularly disturbing to me, since it indicates that we are not making full use of all the intelligence we have in our files. How many of the collection and production gaps would be filled if we eliminated these exploitation gaps?

I am referring to a mass of material ranging from foreign open source materials to highly classified documents. I have noted that, all too often, these documents are exploited only to answer specific consumer questions and are not exploited in their entirety. For example, if a question is asked on the employment of artillery by some nation of interest, documents and reports bearing on the subject are exploited to answer that specific requirement; the remaining information in the documents examined on other military matters may not be extracted and collated with other information. It's lost. Why? The usual answer is lack of time. Whatever the reason, I don't think we can afford to fail to get all the mileage we can out of our materials in order to give the best possible service to consumers of Army intelligence. All Army intelligence producers should consider this problem area and devise ways we can take corrective action.

A related problem is that of dissemination of completed intelligence products, and that includes those supportive intelligence efforts which are prepared specifically for studies and plans. Products are often prepared in answer to specific consumer requirements, forwarded forthwith to the requestor, and that's the end of it. Little thought is given to other agencies which might have interest in the subject matter. I think you will agree that this is an extremely wasteful practice. Again, we are not getting the best mileage possible out of our efforts. There is seldom any reason that would preclude sending copies to USAREUR, or to TRADOC, or to DIA, for example. *As I See It*, the solution is one of awareness. All we need to do is to be continually awake to the intelligence interests of all Army Commands, CONUS and overseas alike, as well as of other DOD intelligence agencies. Most important, we all must be finely tuned to the needs of the troop commander and willing to act to satisfy these needs.

If we are all more conscious of the need to exploit completely all of the materials available to us and then make full and complete dissemination of the resulting products, the quality, quantity, and utility of Army intelligence will be greatly enhanced.

I have been involved in the effort to upgrade the combat intelligence support to the division for some time. *As I See It*, this is a matter of prime importance both in view of the current efforts to realize 16 Active Army divisions within the Army's personnel ceilings and in view of the larger intelligence burdens that will devolve on the lower formations upon full implementation of the Echelons Above Division concepts. I view our efforts to establish a TARS-75 combat intelligence company in all combat divisions as the key to providing intelligence expertise where

it's needed. This organization will help close a long-acknowledged gap of processing the ever increasing volume of intelligence information. A central theme in the intelligence lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War is the recognized need for this type of combat intelligence company, particularly the division Battlefield Information Coordination Center (BICC). The division BICC represents the focal point for coordinating the collection effort, for integrating SI with collateral information and for insuring timely dissemination. I don't think this can be achieved without the benefit of the division BICC and its dedicated secure communications net, despite all our best intentions to support the combat units. In my estimation we cannot move soon enough in integrating this new combat intelligence company into the force structure.

I had hoped we could get an early start on the division BICC Army-wide to achieve full strength all-source intelligence centers with the extra BICC personnel spaces being obtained from other intelligence resources. Many viewed this as piecemealing TARS-75 though, and have suggested and advised holding until the combat intelligence company is finally tested and approved. But in any case, local efforts to establish all-source centers are encouraging, and *As I See it,* should be continued.

As I See It, we must all keep in mind the ever increasing importance of automation in support of our intelligence production and dissemination efforts. The sophistication of collection systems, which are constantly increasing the volume of data to be processed, coupled with the relatively austere manning levels we face in the future, demand increased reliance on ADPS to get the job done. We are aggressively expanding our automated support systems here at OACSI and actively exploring ways our strategic intelligence data handling systems (IDHS) may interface with, and support, tactical intelligence ADP systems. In view of this trend, I encourage all of you to take full advantage of opportunities to futher your knowledge, skills and experience in the operation and management of data automation.

Finally, I have noticed with interest over the past several months the increasing number of MI officers who have taken the plunge and are now writing for publication and getting their views in print. Those who have published have my appreciation, and I most heartily encourage others to do likewise. Now, since we have established our credentials, so to speak, I would encourage you all to seek out other journals, either of a regional nature or an academic discipline. There is no doubt but that the notion of a "military mind" is not valid today, nor will it ever be, as long as each of us continues to seek out and encourage outstanding young officers to make their ideas known to their fellow professionals and fellow citizens.

And That's How I See It …

MI AVIATORS: The Army Aviation Annual Written Examination, required by AR 95-1, normally is administered to each Army aviator in April, May or June by Instrument Flight Examiners. Upon reassignment from an area or position where the written examination requirement was waived, an aviator must take the current available examination within 90 days after reporting to the new station. Maintenance of current instrument qualification is mandatory for all instrument qualified aviators unless exempt under one of the following circumstances:

(1) An aviator assigned to positions which prohibit or excuse flying in accordance with AR 95-1.

(2) All aviators, commissioned or warrant, assigned to courses of instruction 90 days or longer in duration, are prohibited from performing aircrew duties while attending such courses, except when flight training is the primary purpose of such courses or where flying by a particular aviator under instruction is ordered in support of aeronautically-oriented research.

(3) Instrument requirements are waived during the period of excusal or medical restriction. Upon termination of excusal status, renewal of instrument rating will be accomplished in accordance with AR 95-63. All aviators in an excused status under this provision must maintain required physical standards and complete the annual written examination. (ATSI-LG-MD)

The 403d MID (S) has been affiliated with the Florida Atlantic University since May 1972. The eight-man unit was forced with Latin American area and geographic science expertise orientations, and currently supports the Geographic Sciences Division of the Engineer Topographic Laboratories, Fort Belvoir. Basic research on a new method to produce regional studies has been the unit project during the past two years training.

The Caamano Expedition of 1973:

Twilight of the Cuban Insurgency Doctrine?

by Major Brian J. Bosch

In the first week of February 1973, the long-discussed but little-expected arrival in the Dominican Republic of ex-Colonel Francisco Caamano Deno took place. Since his 1967 disappearance, the former leader of the "Constitutionalists" had become a shadowy figure whose return to his homeland was anticipated eventually in the front of an invasionary force. It was assumed by most that Caamano was in Cuba, although it had never been clear if he was a welcome guest or merely an irritating responsiblity of Fidel Castro.

Caamano's reappearance in February 1973 proved that if he had not been sent by Cuba, he at least had some form of doctrinal support from that country. The former Domincan officer's preparations had been clearly directed toward the objective of conducting a classical rural insurgency in the manner of Castro two decades before, in the Sierra Maestra. From a planner's point of view, the area Caamano chose in the Dominican Republic for his operation was adequate if analyzed superficially. His intention was to operate in the San Jose de Ocoa region at the foothills of the Central Cordillera, the highest range in the Caribbean. It was a sector of the Dominican Republic that had been cool toward the Administration of President Joaquin Balaguer, and friction with Government security forces had not been uncommon in the recent past. Mobility for regular Dominican troops was difficult, and targets of opportunity for guerrilla raids were available (the most significant physical objective in the area being Alto Bandera Mountain, the location of the Dominican Republic's center of communications). In what appears to be an almost slavish copy of the Cuban experience of 1956-58, Caamano seemed to be preparing to establish a rural insurgency in that zone with the purpose of creating a rallying point for insurrection in the capital. Santo Domingo had been the scene of the 1965 Civil War, and pockets of residual discontent still remained in the city.

Analysis reveals, however, that in conception, the plan was weak because the Santo Domingo of 1973 was not the Havana of 1959, (nor for that matter, the Santo Domingo of 1965) and San Jose de Ocoa was not the Sierra Maestra. Even so, whatever merit the plan could have had was of little importance because Caamano's implementation was characterized throughout as clumsy and ill-timed. The result was one of the shortest rural insurgencies in the history of Latin America.

From the inception, Caamano and his eight colleagues were at a disadvantage. Their first logical step would have been to develop a base of operations in the San Jose de Ocoa mountainous area. To complete this fundamental phase, the prerequisite should have been a clandestine landing followed by an unobserved movement approximately 25,000 meters north to his future base camp site. Caamano never had the luxury of operating on his own terms, however. From the outset, his presence was known by the Dominican Armed Forces via a member of the natural intelligence net of that country - the peasant. Discovery of the guerrillas' mother ship, the *Black Jak,* on the beach; the route of their journey through numerous villages; and the guerrilla band's arrival in the Tetero Mejia Peak area were reported rapidly. Consequently, Caamano lost the opportunity to lay a foundation for his future activity.

The second factor that evidently was not considered seriously enough by Caamano and his Cuban sponsors was the reaction of the Dominican Armed Forces. When Caamano left his homeland in the beginning of 1966, the military establishment that he knew was much different from that institution in 1973. The Dominican Republic had, at the time of the guerrilla landing, five tactically structured and equipped infantry battalions (two of these units coincidentally had held exercises earlier near San Jose de Ocoa). The Dominican officers in these field units had attended basic and middle level infantry courses at the new Schools Command at San Isidro, and the Army General Staff and Secretariat of the Armed Forces were manned by officers who had graduated from a command and staff course. Four of these five tactical battalions were rapidly concentrated in the San Jose de Ocoa area, and staff course graduates immediately assumed key positions of strategic and tactical levels. At the national level, Rear Admiral Ramon Jimenez, Jr., Secretary of State of the Armed Forces, created an *ad hoc* joint staff to assist him in the direction of the multi-sided operation. The J2 and J3 were young officers with staff college credentials. This resolute response resulted in the second major failure of Caamano's expedition.

The third and highly critical factor which contributed to Caamano's inability to achieve even a glimmer of success was the decision of the Dominican Government to prevent a second front's opening. Before the full significance of Caamano's presence was understood by the people of the city of Santo Domingo, the capital was placed under strict surveillance by security forces. Potential agitators were neutralized and illegal weapons confiscated. This action, led principally by Brigadier General Jose Cruz Brea, then Chief of National Police, could easily have been the most important step in the entire process of assuring national stability. To appreciate better the Dominican Government's reaction, it must be remembered that Caamano was more than an insurrectionary colonel; he had been the "President" of the rebels in the

latter phases of the 1965 Civil War. At that time, he was both a political and military leader, who, at least nominally, had been the chief of various extreme elements in the *barrios* of the capital. Therefore, to make the decision to deny Santo Domingo as a battlefield for Caamano in 1973 was based on sound historical evidence. Possibly, judicial rights were infringed upon in some cases, but there can be little doubt that if radical Leftisit terrorists in the capital desired a

coordinated action with the newly arrived guerrilla band, the opportunity was decisively snatched from their grasp.

The rural urban zones of potential conflict were not the only considerations for Dominican military planners during the first week of February. The Dominican experience after World War II pointed toward a north coast landing of possibly larger proportions. Whatever the justification for anxiety concerning a conventional landing (as had occured in 1949 and 1959), it was a factor that weighed heavily on the minds of the Dominican decision makers. The result was the judgement that it was necessary to retain forces as a reserve to deploy somewhere along the 144 mile coast from Monte Cristi to Samana. The possibility of a second maritime incursion was given fuel by numerous

sightings made of boats offshore. Although these reports proved not to be of a military nature, a failure to investigate the vessels, even though they were apparently of small number, would have been a delinquency on the part of the Dominican security establishment.

Consequently, resources had to be distributed strategically for three objectives: to dominate the beginnings of a rural insurgency, to control a potential urban insurrection, and to prevent a possible second amphibious landing. The result was a delicate, balanced deployment of assets. A task force had to be structured to fix the guerrillas and then to engage them in combat. A two battalion-sized task force was created from elements of the Army's 1st Brigade and 6th Battalion and was ordered to the guerrillas' operating zone on the 5th of February. A staff was structured, and a command post was established at San Jose de Ocoa. The concept of the operation was reasonable, but the difficult terrain and adverse weather conditions immediately revealed logistical and command and control problems. Despite the awkwardness of the initial deployment, contact was made with the guerrillas during the evening of February 5th. Although the Dominican Army suffered casualties and the guerrillas were able to evade capture, a pattern was revealed quickly. Caamano and his men were being pursued before they had had the time to recruit peasants to their side. While the guerrillas were being confronted, the situation had unfolded sufficiently in the capital so that the Government could conclude that the urban situation was well under control. For that reason, the leadership of the Armed Forces made the decision that Santo Domingo would be able to proceed under surveillance of General Cruz Brea's policemen with no more than psychological support of a handful of armored vehicles and a small reserve of military personnel from the 1st Brigade and Fort Ozama. With the capital secure, Admiral Jimenez ordered two more units, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Brigade and the Air Force Special Forces Group (an infantry unit), into the rural zone of operations.

At the same time, command and control problems were streamlined in the San Jose de Ocoa area. The advance command post was moved closer to the maneuver units. The main command post in the town of San Jose de Ocoa took over combat service support funcitons. Logistical sluggishness caused by the difficult terrain was soon smoothed out. Brigadier General Juan Beauchamps Javier, an officer

known throughout the Armed Forces as a strong leader, and Brigadier General Ramiro Matos Gonzalez, an outstanding organizer and planner, were tactical commander and operations officer, respectively. Key staff officers of the task force represented the three services, but all were experienced in ground operations. The entire operation was monitored closely by the Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General Enrique Perez y Perez.

The tactical situation continued to develop through the use of peasant intelligence. Caamano never regained his equilibrium. On his fourth day in the mountains, he was forced to lighten his load by abandoning much of his food, material he had planned to use for civic action, and some ammunition. Three days later, eight packs were left behind in the wake of a firefight with Government troops. On the morning of the 16th of February, he engaged an Army patrol, and by 1530 hours of the same day, he and two guerrillas were overtaken, engaged in an exchange of fire, and killed. Their corpses revealed that they suffered from a lack of provisions, were only lightly armed, were in an area where no food grew and were traveling without volunteers. Less than two weeks after he landed at Caracoles Beach, Caamano was dead.

With the destruction of the potential national-level leader of the abortive insurrection, the neutralization of the remaining guerrillas was short lived. On 23 March after being pursued for approximatley 30,000 meters across extremely difficult terrain, two more guerrillas perished in a firefight with regular troops. It was discovered later that a sixth died of exposure, alone in the hills. A seventh was captured alive, and the eighth and ninth obtained political asylum in foreign embassies. According to the statement of surviving guerrilla, Claudio Caamano Grullon, after he was safely in Mexico, six days after the death of Caamano, the remaining members of the band decided that the whole affair was lost. Their decision was to flee for their lives. In less than two months, one of the most clumsily mounted invasions in the history of irregular warfare was obliterated with minimum hardship to the defending nation's people.

The defeat of Caamano in this incredibly short period is a true credit to the Dominican Republic if one considers that other Latin American insurgencies have spanned the careers of their officer corps. In the face of a multi-sided threat, decisions which revealed resoluteness and determination were made at the critical moment by the leadership of the Dominican Armed Forces and National Police.

In reflection, what appears completely inexplicable is the manner in which Caamano mounted his expedition. It is well known that he was a man of only average attributes and no advanced military training and that his 1973 operation was too expensive to be undertaken without sophisticated support. Consequently, it is a logical assumption that Caamano was given the blueprint for his insurrection by Cubans. The question that must be asked is: How can it be possible that there are still Communist politico-military planners in 1973 who continue to subscribe to the Cuban experience of 1956-58?

The events in Cuba during the first days of December 1956 caused Fidel Castro, contrary to his original plan, to take the remaining twelve of

The defeat of Caamano....is a true credit to the Dominican Republic if one considers that other Latin American insurgencies have spanned the careers of their officer corps.

his eighty-two men from the beach into the Sierra Maestra. The irresolute Batista Government, a sympathetic international community, and a willing peasantry gave Castro the advantage of remaining there for two years. The success of this extemporaneously planned expedition evidently so impressed the followers of Castro that they have placed their own interpretation to the facts of history and concluded that Sierra Maestra could be transplanted to Bolivia or to the Dominican Republic. It would appear that the Cuban form was distant from reality even in 1967, when Che Guevara died without Bolivian peasants at his side. In the Dominican Republic case, Caamano faced a resolute foe, a Western World that knew of Castro's ways, and a peasantry that historically supported its Government. The final proof of the bankruptcy of the Cuban Doctrine was the pathetic destruction of Caamano and his men in the Dominican hills.

Major Brian J. Bosch is the Commanding Officer of an MI Unit. The article is the result of his tour as Army Attache in the Dominican Republic.

by LTC Glenn F. Hargis, Chief, Security Branch

Your Enlisted Evaluation Report Weighted Average (EERWA) is 40 percent of your MOS evaluation score. The other 60 percent is the MOS test itself. An outstanding EER record is an important and desirable achievement; however, it cannot offset poor performance on the test.

I suggest that every enlisted member become familiar with the details of the Enlisted Evaluation System. For a thorough overview, you can begin with a review of DA Pamphlet 611-B.

Enlisted Branch Notes

ALTERNATES FOR 96B

A few comments to those of you in grades E6 and below holding MOS 96B are appropriate. I realize that some of the attractive reenlistment options open to many others are not often available to analysts because of our balanced-to-overstrength posture worldwide. This is regrettable, but there are other possibilities worthy of consideration. The intelligence field offers many opportunities for training and assignment.

An individual does not have to feel restricted to one MOS. As an example, 96D is short worldwide in the lower grades and presents interesting career enhancement for qualified individuals who desire to become proficient in more than one aspect of intelligence work.

For those whose interests or talents are toward languages, there are continuing worldwide requirements for interrogators. Training in MOS 96C and courses at the Defense Language Institute will be available during FY 76. MOS standards are listed in AR 611-201. Your training NCO and career counselor can give further details regarding application procedures and reenlistment options.

IMPORTANCE OF MOS TESTS

I want to reemphasize the importance of scoring well on the written MOS test. In the "whole person" concept, every aspect of your record becomes important. Periodically, I get requests to review files to determine why a favorable personnel action was not made. Many individuals state, 'my EER scores are outstanding." This may well be true, but that is not enough.

REVISIONS FOR PROMOTION

E-4s recommended for promotion to the grade of E-5 must now achieve a minimum of 80 as their MOS Evaluation Score (ES) in order to be eligible for that promotion. In the past, a score of 110 was required with a waiver obtainable to a score of 100. The requirement is now set at 100, waiverable to 80.

Since this change increases the number of soldiers competing for promotion to E-5, it underscores the importance of the commander's recommendation and the responsibility of the local promotion board.

Guidelines requiring an Evaluation Score of 110, waiverable to 100, for the promotion from grade E-5 to E-6 have not been modified by the revised policy.

SELECTIVE DEFERRED MOVEMENT PLAN

To avoid exceeding maximum strength limits overseas, MILPERCEN's EPD has implemented a plan to delay or, in some cases, cancel assignment instructions assigning non-combat personnel to Europe or Korea.

The first phase, in operation now, affects service members who would normally have had overseas arrival months of March or April 1975. In these cases, new arrival dates will be set for either July or August.

In cases where such delays would cause personal hardship to the soldier because he has already taken his children out of school, cleared his quarters, or was already in transit to his overseas assignment, he would proceed according to original instructions.

In a case where a service member would not be able to complete at least 12 months of an

overseas assignment because of the delay, he will be deleted from current assignment instructions by EPD.

STABILIZATION WHEN EXTREME FAMILY PROBLEMS ARE A FACTOR

A soldier who receives an approved reassignment when extreme family problems are a factor (Chapter 3, AR 614-200) will normally be stabilized for a period of one year. Upon arival at the new duty station, a soldier in this category will have the Assignment Eligibility and Availability (AEA) Code "s" placed in item 34 of DA Form 2. However, no further action in accordance with AR 640-2-1 is required, since the code has already been entered on the EMF by MILPERCEN.

If the problem is resolved before the stabilization period ends, HQ DA (DAPC-EPA-C) will be advised by message. Included in the message will be information that the individual is available for worldwide assignment, or that the enlisted member is entitled to another AEA code which will limit assignment eligibility.

The submitted code will be entered on the EMF by MILPERCEN. Termination of the stabilization period and withdrawal of AEA Code "S" does not necessarily mean that the soldier will be reassigned. Subsequent moves will be based primarily on military requirements.

Professional Reader

The Ultra Secret, F. W. Winterbotham, Harper & Row, New York, 1974. 199 pgs, index. $8.95.

Winston Churchill called it, "my most secret source." Dwight Eisenhower wrote, it was "of priceless value to me." *Ultra* gave "those top Allied commanders who received it the unique experience of knowing not only the precise composition, strength and location of the enemy's forces, but also, with few exceptions, of knowing beforehand exactly what he intended to do in the many operations and battles of World War II." This special source is the subject of *The Ultra Secret*, a fascinating book by F. W. Winterbotham.

A member of the British Secret Service since 1929, later Deputy to the Chief of the British Secret Service, Winterbotham was specifically in charge of the *Ultra* secret. He tells how a model of a German Enigma cypher machine was developed by the British from information provided by a Pole who had been smuggled to France, and worked as a laborer in the German factory which produced the Enigma machine.

As European relations strained almost to the breaking point the ability to intercept and decode Germany's most secret communiques was an intelligence *coup* for the British. When the war began, Winterbotham formed "Special Liaison Units" (SLU), which were assigned to the staffs of the top Allied commanders as the need-to-know arose. The SLU dealt with the highly compartmentalized information being gleaned from the German signals traffic, and developed into a world-wide network. "Ultra" was the classification designated for this particular type of intelligence.

Because of the necessity of a highly restricted dissemination of Ultra material, Winterbotham codified special security regulations which would protect the valuable source from compromise, and in his book, he discusses several actions which could have "blown" the source. For example, the Americans knew, from an Ultra message, precisely where Admiral Yamamoto would be inspecting an island base. (The Germans had convinced their allies of the security of the Enigma code, thus the Japanese used a variation of it.) The Admiral's death, planned to be a devastating psychological blow to the Japanese forces, might easily have caused them to tighten the security of their cypher system.

The major battles of World War II are examined in terms of how Ultra affected the outcome. Because of the author's personal contact with the major Allied military leaders, he has unusual insight into each commander's appreciation of the special intelligence provided by SLU. Where Field Marshal Alexander, General Dempsey, and George Patton, among others, used Ultra to maximum effect, Mark Clark and General Montgomery made little apparent use of the itelligence.

Winterbotham acknowledges that the Naval War in the Atlantic and the island hopping Pacific War are not in his area of knowledge and leaves those battles for other to comment upon. He makes no mention of our then Soviet allies, in terms of what special intelligence was shared with them. *The Ultra Secret* is an intriguing history of what happens when the goal of intelligence, foreknowledge of the enemy's intentions and capabilities is achieved. This is a book that will be of abiding interest and value to any student of intelligence.

B. P. Woodrow

U.S.A.I.C.S.
Notes

CBTI CO [DIV]: The first in a new series of combat intelligence organizations designed to meet the needs of modern warfare, is soon to be organized at Fort Hood, Texas. Designated the Combat Intelligence Company, Division (CBTI Co (DIV), the unit will be organized under test TOE 30-19T (experimental). The new company will be organic to the division, rather than attached from the field army MI battalion, as is the case with current divisional military intelligence detachments. The Battlefield Information Coordination Center (BICC) is one of the unique features of the new company. The BICC will be incorporated into and become an integral part of the G2 operations. The company is designed to provide for the management and integration of intelligence from all sources, and will provide intelligence specialists for the collection, processing, analyzing and disseminating of combat intelligence obtained or developed in support of the division. Incorporation of the BICC into the division intelligence element will greatly improve the intelligence planning effort, streamline the handling and processing of large volumes of information, and expedite the production of intelligence. The heart of the BICC system will be the establishment of a dedicated intelligence communications network throughout the entire division. Another feature of the company is the amalgamation of the unattended ground sensors, and ground surveillance radar platoons into the company, providing more efficient centralized management of these intelligence collection assets. (ATSI-CTD-DT)

RESERVE OFFICER EXPERTISE: USAICS is planning a method of employing the talents of Reserve Component officers more effectively. A Human Resources Data Bank (HRDB) questionnaire is being developed exclusively for Reserve Component officers not on extended active duty. The questionnaire will enable the Reserve Component officers to make their special skills and areas of expertise known to USAICS. This information will provide a data base which USAICS will draw upon to assure maximum utilization of mobilization designation (MOBDES) personnel during annual active duty training (ADT) and others who may be needed or available for short term assignments to special projects. The result will be a better matching of the needs of USAICS with the qualifications of the individual, thereby providing the opportunity for more efficient and rewarding assignments. The questionnaires should be ready by April 1975 and will be mailed to those Reserve Component officers currently assigned to USAICS as mobilization designees and to those who have served as Military Intelligence officer Advanced Course, Nonresident/Resident (MIOAC, NR/R (C-23) program during 1975. Reserve Component officers interested in completing the questionnaire are encouraged to contact the Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TER, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613. (ATSI-TER)

AG. PUBLICATIONS: The Army-Wide Training Support Department, US Army Intelligence Center and School (AWTSD, USAICS), does not distribute Department of the Army (DA) publications required as reference materials to training packets. The only exception to this rule is for the Army Correspondence Course Program, where some subcourses administered by USAICS require DA reference materials. However, distribution is made only to enrolled USAICS Correspondence Course students. In all other instances, DA publications must be procured through normal AG Publications supply channels. (ATSI-TER)

TESS - THE EPITOME OF WEATHER SUPPORT: The Meteorological Branch, Materiel Systems Development Division, Office of the Deputy Commandant for Combat and Training Development prepared a Tactical Environmental Support

System (TESS) study which is in its final coordination phase. The TESS study matures an all-inclusive Army Meteorological plan which contains recommended doctrinal, organizational and materiel improvements for meteorological support to the US Army. This comprehensive plan, once approved and implemented, will encompass all areas associated with the development system. Primarily, the joint FM 31-3/AFM 105-4 (Weather Support for Field Army Tactical Operations), will be rewritten to incorporate new, updated doctrine, and to provide current real-time guidance to both services in weather support to the US Army. Also, an outgrowth of this study will be the reinvigoration of old weather systems and identification of new materiel requirements. Training doctrine by which weather will be taught as a positive means for decision-making effloresces as a result of this study. Military intelligence and signal organizational composition will be improved to properly accommodate USAF Weather Teams so that they can attain maximum mission accomplishment. The entire gamut of weather support will be revolutionized by this study affecting both the US Army and US Air Force. (ATSI-CTD-MS)

MOS Test Study Guides: Study Guides for the August 1975 evaluation of MOS 96D are scheduled to have been distributed by the US Army Enlisted Evaluation Center before 1 May 1975. Eligible enlisted personnel who hold any skill level of this MOS as either PMOS or SMOS should obtain a copy of the Study Guide from their unit Personnel Section by 1 May. Alternate sources for guides are either the Test Control Officer (TCO) or the Army Education Center at the individual's station. In the event that Study Guides are not available from any of these sources, *units* (not individuals) may obtain the required copies by submitting written request to:

> Commander
> US Army Enlisted Evaluation Center
> ATTN: PCEC-A-PD
> Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 46249
> (ATSI-CTD-DT)

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE UNDER EAD: While final decisions are pending on the combat intelligence orgaizations to support the Echelons Above Division (EAD) corps, indications are that corps level assets, less than USASA, will be configured into two combat intelligence battalions. One battalion will have interrogation, counterintelligence, ground reconnaissance (LRRP) and intelligence support (battlefield information coordination center (BICC) and technical intelligence) companies. The other battalion under consideration is designed to provide corps level aerial surveillance and imagery interpretation capabilities. This battalion is unique in that it will provide, by doctrine, imagery interpretation sections to division, armored cavalry regiments, separate brigades or air cavalry combat brigades of the corps. This battalion will also assume the functions now performed by the military intelligence battalion, aerial reconnaissance support (MIBARS). It will provide two imagery interpretation platoons to be collocated with the supporting USAF reconnaissance element and fixed and rotary wing Army aircraft to insure rapid delivery of aerial imagery throughout the corps area. The strength of the two battalions is in the neighborhood of 1400 personnel. The management is dramatically improved by a proposed group headquarters augmentation to be authorized for extended combat operations. The proposed intelligence concepts afford maximum economy by using the TOE spaces and critical intelligence specialities previously available in the field army while, at the same time, providing the minimum essential intelligence capabilities for the EAD corps. The corps package represents a milestone in the redesign of the total tactical intelligence system extending from maneuver battalion through corps. Most importantly, it is a system to integrate intelligence with operations and insure success in combat. (ATSI-CTD-CS)

ARTEP FOR MI COMPANY [AERIAL SURVEILLANCE]: The TRADOC/FORSCOM approved Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 30-79, with an accompanying training circular, TC 30-(), covering OV-1 Aircrew survivability was delivered to FORSCOM in February 1975. Both the ARTEP and the TC were distributed to selected active and reserve units for a year-long evaluation prior to final approval as a DA publication. ARTEPs, which are replacing ATP/ATT, are designed for the unit commander as a performance oriented training and evaluation guide. ARTEPs for MI Company (Corps, Division, Separate Brigade, ACR) and other MI units are being prepared. (ATSI-CTD-DT).

A native of Ottawa, Ilinois, Wagner graduated from West Point in 1875 and was commissioned in the 6th Infantry. He served six years on the Plains, participating in the Sioux (1876-77) and Ute (1880-81) Campaigns. From 1881 to 1885, he was Professor of Military Science at East Florida Seminary at Gainesville. Wagner was promoted to first lieutenant in 1882. Returning to the

Colonel Arthur Lockwood Wagner (1853-1905)

Long accepted as a luminary of American military education, Wagner has received little notice for his contribution to American intelligence. He was one of the most influential figures in American military intelligence and wrote the first book in this country on tactical intelligence.

American Military Intelligence Leaders

by Major Marc B. Powe

Wagner also headed the War Department intelligence agency at an especially critical time, and trained many of the men who became key commanders and intelligence chiefs during World War I.

frontier, Wagner spent a year at Fort Douglas, Utah, before being detailed with his regiment to the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth. (predecessor of the Command and General Staff College). He was assigned as an instructor of military art and was to spend the next 11 years with the school.

In 1889, Wagner published his first book, *The Campaign of Koniggratz*, based on a visit to Franco-Prussian War battlefields. His reputation steadily grew as one of the Army's authorities on military history and tactics - and he was even

promoted to captain in 1892! Wagner was on his way.

In 1893, Wagner produced *The Service of Security and Information.* The preface to the first edition (of at least 14) describes the book's purpose as "an earnest attempt to meet the demand, often expressed, for an American text book on the subjects herein discussed." Wagner explained that, in the absence of any American doctrine, he had distilled European theory through American military experience. The result was a book which still seems fresh today. Its contents range from march security and outposts to spies and press censorship. The book was adapted as a text for West Point and various service schools, and for promotion examinations. Since Wagner was also preaching the gospel of the need for intelligence from the platform of Fort Leavenworth, it is small wonder that his ideas had wide influence.

His next book, *Organization and Tactics,* appeared in 1895. Once again, he stressed the need for military intelligence and for a staff intelligence officer. (Doctrine did not require such an officer on tactical staffs until World War I.) In 1896, Wagner was promoted to major, Staff (i.e., detailed away from his regiment) and a few months later, sent to Washington to take charge of the Military Information Division, Adjutant General's Office - the War Department's intelligence agency.

When Wagner arrived in 1897, the MID, which had grown rapidly since its creation in 1885, was busily collecting information on Cuba, the Philippines, and Spain, in anticipation of hostilities. The new chief ordered re-doubled efforts and took a leading role in the production of maps and estimates. When the war began, the MID had done an excellent job of providing information - a fact recognized by the post-war commission investigating War Department failures.

Wagner, a new lieutenant colonel, quickly got himself sent to General Shafter's headquarters at Tampa to practice what he had always preached: establishing a Bureau of Military Information in the field. Unfortunately, Shafter did not think he needed intelligence on the Spanish, and declined Wagner's services. Undaunted, Colonel Wagner attached himself to General H. W. Lawton's Second Division, and conducted front line reconnaissance from the landing at Daiquiri to Santiago. He subsequently served in Puerto Rico before returning to Washington in the Fall of 1898. Wagner's account of the war, *Report of the Santiago Campaign,* was published posthumously.

His career then took him briefly to the Department of the Dakotas; to the Philippines (where he became seriously ill) from 1899 to 1902; and eventually, back to Fort Leavenworth as assistant commandant of CGSC. The new Army War College in Washington needed his

In 1893, Wagner produced The Service of Security and Information......Its contents range from march security and outposts to spies and press censorship.

experience more, and Wagner's final assignment was as assistant director of the War College.

Wagner's reputation was such that it had been widely assumed for years that he would be a general (he was made colonel in 1901). It seemed expecially painful to his friends that he died the day his commission as a brigadier was to be signed.

Arthur L. Wagner left an important legacy to American intelligence. His influence on the Army education system was very great, and it was precisely through this medium that his many students came to appreciate intelligence - and to follow his precepts in World War I.

His next book, Organization and Tactics, appeared in 1895. Once again, he stressed the need for military intelligence and for a staff intelligence officer.

Beyond that, he was also a practioner of military intelligence - supervising, processing briefing President McKinley, and, if necessary, going to get the information himself.

Major Marc Powe is currently assigned with the Military Personnel Center, Department of the Army. He is a former instructor at the Intelligence Center and School, and completed the C&GS course during 1974.

The Ultimate Ground Sensor System

by Major James B. Channon

Shortly before the break of dawn, SGT Jones discovered traces of an enemy patrol that had passed through the company defensive position. This was the third night the company had been penetrated. He grumbled and shuffled to the CP to tell the old man. B Company agonized over the ground sensor systems they were using to detect the enemy. If it wasn't batteries, it was calibration, supply parts, or some other fool thing. They just weren't that dependable. SGT Jones was the only NCO left in the company who could detect the enemy using his old squirrel-hunting skills. The troops had learned to set up their radar, and other detection gear "by the book." Every night they concentrated on keeping the gear operating and each took turns alertly manning the different types of equipment. The others slept. All, except SGT Jones,

who always found some place far away from the hum of the machinery to watch the stars. At least, that's what the men said he did. He took a lot of grief about his country ways.

One day, to the great surprise of all, SGT Jones was found reading a book. The troops couldn't let this obvious paradox pass.

"Watcha readin', Jones, a recipe for cornbread?" they said.

"No," he said in his slow, deliberate way; "it's a technical book on the characteristics of a sensor system."

"Welcome to the electronic age, Jonesy. Find anything to replace this old second generation hardware we have now?"

"Maybe."

"Is it in the supply system yet?"

"Yep."

"What are its performance characteristics?"

"Well, it says it detects the smell of things at one-hundred-millionth of an ounce."

"Man, that's a sniffer!" one commented.

"It can also scan visually at 4.3 million bits per second," Jones said.

"The same system?"

"Yep, and it says here that if they lowered the sound detection threshold just ten decibels, the tiny movements of air molecules in the tubing would register."

"All in this one package?"

"Yep!"

"Yeah, but what's the weight of a multiple detection system like that?"

"Ain't too much, but that's no problem - it's a self-sustaining mobile unit."

"This is too good to be true. Of course, they probably cost so much they will only authorize one per brigade."

"No, we already have over a hundred authorized in this company."

"Say no more, pal; I want to get that sensory wonder on requisition for the company - what's the nomenclature?"

"It's ... Man," SGT Jones said quietly, and shuffled off to some lonely spot where he could optimally employ himself. Although B Company was full of the most versatile and highly developed ground sensor systems in existence, only one person understood the power of his detectors and the best way to employ them. His nomenclature was "Jones," but I'm not sure if he's still around. Seems like he retired with that last group of old farm boys and Indians.

SMELL

The novice must be sensitive to what he's supposed to smell, especially since in the beginning the entire outdoors is a new and strange smell to him. He needs to understand how the wind can carry smell to him as well as carrying his smell to the enemy if he hasn't bothered to disguise it. He should know that after some time the smell will be concentrated closer to the ground and he must get his nose down into it. Thus, the natural success of the dog with his nose busily working at ground level. Different foods produce different smells in perspiration of man and animals. And the list continues.

The point is that smells are generated and travel in predictable ways. So, if the soldier understands the nature of scent and its detection, he can employ his beautifully effective nose to find and exploit the enemy.

SOUND

There is the story of the German general on the Eastern front who spent some time each evening in the quiet just outside his headquarters. One night, rather late, he ordered all of his front line units to move immediately some miles to the rear. This action, seemingly completely out of keeping with the intelligence reports and orders for the day, baffled his staff and subordinate commanders. The following morning, the Russians unleashed the largest continuous artillery barrage known to warfare. The rounds fell harmlessly on thousands of empty German positions.

When you think of it, it must have caused some racket to move thousands of artillery pieces into place during the darkness. These sounds might have gone unnoticed sprinkled among the sounds of evening and occasional artillery barrages. To notice the difference, a man must listen to the routine before he can detect the unusual. This means some time, effort, and concentration are involved, but we each have the necessary equipment installed to do the job.

A man can be trained to detect the sounds of a moving enemy, identify specific fighting vehicles, determine the size of an opposing force in a fire fight, as well as locate and avoid enemy firepower. The soldier can place his helmet on the ground, and by pressing his ear against it, he can detect sounds carried by vibration in the ground.

The wind pushes noise further than normal on occasion, and the soldier must learn to stay on the windward side of a tree line if he wants to hear anything other than the sound of leaves. Techniques that require an understanding of the properties of sound can be a powerful tool in the head of a trained soldier. Lend an ear.

SIGHT

The eyes, like the nose and ear, have a fantastic raw capability. And like the others, they can yield wonders if a soldier knows both how to employ eyes, and is able to clearly visualize the details for which he is looking. It has been said a man can see only what he knows. If you know him, the enemy fights in rather predictable ways. For example, he chooses defensive positions at several rather classic points on the terrain. He uses certain weapons as a prelude to attack. His bootprint is distinguishable. To the trained eye, the turret on a BMP and a T-62 as each appears over a hill are clearly different threats. A certain number of dust trails rising from the ground at a distance relay size, type and number of combat vehicles approaching.

Another entire set of signatures would be applicable to the aerial observer. But these signs are only meaningful for the person trained to see them. And so it goes.

THE POINT AND THE CHALLENGE

The skilled tracker or woodsman practices many separate techniques to make his seemingly "instinctive judgments" about where the enemy might be. Just like the master chef, if you ask him how he does it, will give you an offhand comment about how easy it is with a pinch of this and a dash of that. But just as this is uninstructive to the novice cook, most old recon types lose the young soldier of urban experience with comments like, "well, you can just smell 'em, that's all."

While mechanical ground sensor systems are necessary, technology must go through some relatively unproductive stages while it is being perfected. The "State of the art" is constantly improving, so these unproductive stages are

always going to be with us. Somewhere in the Army, the techniques for using the human senses must have been tackled in the detail they deserve. It is time these techniques were dusted off and used to bring out the inherent sensor capabilities in all of us. To get the program started:

• Intelligence officers with each division could set up short "human sensor" apreciation courses.

• Specific sensor skill challenges seen as vital could be incorporated in the Army Test and Evaluation Program (ARTEP).

• The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School could research and publish a pocket guide for the soldier for employing human senses.

I'm not suggesting that we scrap the mechanical ground sensor system, but we should augment it with our own capabilities. From almost every standpoint - cost, repair, all weather capability, multiple detection, transportability - MAN IS THE ULTIMATE GROUND SENSOR SYSTEM!

Major James Channon is currently the Chief, Educational Technology Branch, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a professional artist and a member of the Information Officer program.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Readers with tips on the techniques discussed can send them to the **MI Magazine** *for possible publication and/or passing on to other USAICS elements. Please address to Commander, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-CTD-MG, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613.*

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX DEVELOPMENT GUIDE:

Concepts and Studies Division is currently developing a procedural guide to assist the G2 in publishing intelligence annexes to operations orders. The intent of the guide is to establish a minimum number of EEI based upon possible enemy courses of action, i.e., attack, defend, delay or withdraw, reinforce, and initiate NBC warfare. The guide will provide definitive indicators for each EEI, and provide a relative ranking of division collection agencies' abilities to collect the indicators for each EEI. Comments and suggestions may be sent to Commander, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-CTD-CS (MAJ Spohn), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613. (ATSI-CTD-CS)

The Professional Reader

Allen, The Biography of an Army Officer, Heath Twichell, Jr., Rutgers University Press, N.J., 1974. 358 pages, 5 maps, 20 photographs. $12.50.

General Henry Tureman Allen's life spanned a period in which the United States was transformed from a nation still struggling along an Indian frontier into a world power with great international responsibilities. *Allen* covers the history of the Army from post-Civil War to the close of World War I, and shows General Allen's part in nearly every major move.

Allen was an ambitious and complex officer, and was by turn tactful, perceptive, and imperious. He was also a talented linguist, a diplomat, a sportsman, and a politician. General Allen was a person who never hesitated in attempting to 'feather his own nest', and in many instances succeeded - although it appears that in some cases he should have let well enough alone.

This book by LTC Heath Twichell, is highly recommended to all who are interested in our country and it's Army of this era. After reading *Allen,* one can understand why it won the Allan Nevins Prize for sound scholarship and literary excellence.

COL Randall H. Bryant, Ret.

The Almanac of American Politics — 1974, Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, Douglas Matthews, Gambit Inc., Boston, MA, 1973. 1240 pgs. $6.95 (paperback)

This information packed book is designed to acquaint the reader with politics and politicians in each state and congressional district, as well as the District of Columbia.

With over twelve hundred pages of small print, this quality reference book is an invaluable addition to any library.

MI Magazine Staff

Defence Yearbook 1974, Royal United Services Institute and Brassey's, Praeger Publications, New York, 338 pgs, numerous tables, 16 pgs of photographs. $20.00

Lord Brassey's British Naval annual was first published in 1886, with the announced purpose of reviewing the years events, drawing lessons learned, and stimulating thought. With the added sponsorship of Britain's Royal United Services Institute, this 85th issue views defense matters in the broadest scope.

Part one includes ten well written essays on strategic problems. The editors' prime concern is revealed by their devoting four articles to Soviet/US subjects. These articles study Soviet-American relations; SALT and MBFR; US/Soviet strategic balance in the Mediterranean; and the broader naval confrontation of the "blue water" navies. A comprehensive article on mainland China explores her psychological outlook as an "Elder brother to the world", as well as practical problems, and how Chairman Mao's government is coping with its new "amity" toward the US. A timely essay on the energy crisis, with insights into the problem from the Arab viewpoint, adds perspective to this problem. Other articles deal with French economics and their strivings for autonomy in the superpower context. Useful updates on the Middle East and Southeast Asia round out the Strategic Review area of the book.

A new feature of the *Defence Yearbook* is a series of short articles, most having statistical tables, on weapons technology. This section begins with strategic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons, and ends with field artillery. In between, there are twelve essays addressing most major systems. Reconnaissance satellites, remotely piloted vehicles, and electronic warfare add value and interest to this section. Electronic warfare is discussed with some facility, providing a good layman's introduction to the subject, with the author predicting an important role for this new "weapons system." The final section lists selected literature, published from June 1973 to May 1974, pertaining to defense studies. While many of the titles are devoted to British readership, overall this section is helpful to any serious defense student.

This thoughtful and stimulating yearbook provides in a concise form, insight and information to the layman, the military professional, and the student of international politics.

Colonel E.A. Rajala

PERFORMANCE-ORIENTED TRAINING

Training problems have you locked-in? Looking for a way out? Bend an ear for a moment and perhaps you will find the key to your training quandary!

The clues to the location of that elusive door opener are found in a relatively new group of training publications and directives. Look towards a new series of Army Training and Evaluation programs(ARTEP), Training Circular 21-5-1, "Training Management, An Overview," (April 1973), and Training Circular 21-5-2, "Performance-Oriented Training," (June 1974), eventually to become part of a new Field Manual 21-5, "The Management of Military Training," and the distinctly different Field Manual 21-6, "How to Prepare and Conduct Military Training," (1 June 1974)(Test edition). Stop looking for complete answers in such documents as Army Training Program (ATP) 30-5, "Military Intelligence Units (U)," (14 July 1967), and Army Subject Schedules (ASubjScd) of the 30-series, for the state of the training art has exceeded these references.

The new series complements the Chief of Staff's 1971 directive that mandatory training be abolished and that a policy of decentralized training be implemented in the Army. Under this philosophy, the authority and responsibility for the planning, conduct, and internal evaluation of training has been delegated to battalion and separate company commanders, who are identified as principal TRAINING MANAGERS. This means that the determination of specific training objectives has been left largely to the commander most familiar with his soldiers, his unit's missions, his available training resources (Human, physical, financial, and time), and other factors which affect his training. Headquarters higher than battalion remain firmly in the training picture, however, with commanders at those levels having critical responsibilities in the functioning of decentralized training.

In effect, decentralized training focuses all the Army's training effort at the unit level where the training job is actually performed. The Army-wide training system must integrate the efforts of the doctrine developers, the service schools, the training centers, and higher headquarters with the work of the battalion and company commanders/training managers and trainers. The unit training manager's job is more demanding under decentralized training than under the old mandatory training system. To not focus assistance on the training manager's responsibilities for training is to deprive him of the essential ingredients of success.

One thing that will become readily apparent to you as you explore the new look in training is the necessity to clean-up your vocabulary. Old words and phrases take on new meaning and new terminology adds spice to the training field.

ARNG REPORT USAR

Glance at the title of this article! "What is so new about performance-oriented training? The Army has always stressed practical work in its training." Until what is "new or different" about performance-oriented training is clearly understood, accepted, and applied Army-wide, progress in adoption of this approach will be more apparent than real.

The OBJECTIVE is the key!

Slightly overstated, the performance-oriented approach begins and ends with the PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE. Training should prepare personnel for job/duty performance (PREPARATION FOR PERFORMANCE). This is true for both individual and collective (team/unit) training. For a given skill, a properly structured and complete performance objective is both the training and the test. Additionally, such an objective can contribute greatly in evaluating the training needed and the training conducted for that skill.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE =

TRAINING =

TEST =

EVALUATION

With the key to training now in hand, consider other factors that will assist you in getting from behind the locked door. Direct your attention first to collective training.

Current ATP/ATT do not set forth training objectives and standards in explicit performance terms. Moreover, because they are geared to a mobilization situation, ATP/ATT must be significantly modified by those who are responsible for the preparation, conduct, and evaluation of training in today's training environment.

Enter the ARTEP, designed, organized, and structured to assist training managers and trainers in the management and conduct of performance-oriented collective training needed to prepare a unit to perform successfully in combat. Based upon the philosophy and approaches described in the new series of publication, ARTEP should be used in conjunction with these publications. The ARTEP provides guidance for the training and evaluation of all elements of a battalion (separate company) from the squad (crew/team/section) through the battalion echelon. Priorities for training and evaluation are suggested by the categorizing of missions into Levels 1, 2, and 3. The levels relate to the like numbered REDCON training levels as defined in AR 220-1, "Unit Readiness Reporting." For each Level 1, 2, or 3 mission contained in the ARTEP, a Training and Evaluation (T&E) Outline is developed. Each specifies the general conditions under which the mission is performed, the primary training/evaluation standards upon which the element is to evaluated, and the performance-oriented training objectives which describe the tasks, conditions, and standards for the mission.

One ARTEP in the Military Intelligence subject area has been approved by TRADOC/FORSCOM and is now in the field for evaluation and validation. It is ARTEP 30-79, designed for the Military Intelligence Company (Aerial Surveillance). Seven additional ARTEP are in various stages of development, including 30-14, The Military Intelligence Company (Corps/Division/Sep Bde/ACR), and others for the Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance) and the Military Intelligence Detachment (Security Assistance Force Unit). It

is currently projected that ATP/ATT will continue in existence until Fiscal Year 1979. By that time frame, it is hoped that ARTEP will be in broad general use.

Training managers and trainers should not despair over the pace at which ARTEP are being introduced. Their training needs are now and actions must provide now answers. This is particularly true for training managers and trainers of low density Reserve Component Military Intelligence units for whom ARTEP is yet concealed in the future. Under present Army policies, reinforced by United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) directives, the principal training managers have the requisite responsibility, authority, and guidance to promulgate their own unit collective training objectives. Combing these with knowledge of the structure of ARTEP can produce a viable, mission-oriented unit training program. Such efforts can range from the standard annual training program to a 3-year cycle culminating in a test and evaluation program to determine the level of proficiency.

The promulgation of a unit training program should not occur in a vacuum. Of necessity, each higher echelon at which the commander has defined training responsibilities must be consulted during the development process. Portions of the FORSCOM Army Reserve Component Action Program (FARCAP) are of primary consideration. The Military Intelligence Direct Association Program, for example, obligates commanders of specific Military Intelligence units designated to support specific combat units to coordinate their proposed or directed missions with the supported unit commander. The derivation of effective individual and collective training performance objectives hinges upon precise identification and analysis of all tactical and administrative missions. Developing mission-related individual and collective performance objectives is primary to formulating efficient and effective training programs.

Don't overlook the increased responsibility of doctrine developers, particularly in the service schools, under the decentralized training program. They must provide the Active Army and Reserve Components with more and better support, e.g., better training literature, sound and updated doctrine, and useful advice on training techniques.

But the ultimate responsibility rests with the principal training managers and the trainers. The training manager establishes or selects the

training objectives which are critical to the accomplishment of his missions, and the trainer accomplishes one or more of these objectives.

The approach to individual training is not unlike that for collective training. The training manager first describes precisely what the soldiers must be able to do at the completion of the training (training objective). This guidance should include the standards of performance the soldiers must meet. The trainer then develops the intermediate objectives which the soldiers must perform if they are to accomplish the training objective, and prepares to conduct the training. Finally, the training is conducted in a manner to insure the soldiers' performance meets the training standards.

The Army service schools and training centers have been engaged for some time in systems engineering of the various resident training courses. This effort ultimately should provide the Army in the field - Active and Reserve Components - with literature defining precise objectives (tasks, conditions, and training standards) for use in preparing performance-oriented training programs for individuals. In the interim, what do you do to move your training activities in the proper direction?

Commanders/training managers and trainers can begin moving their training activities in the performance-oriented direction by establishing mission-essential individual performance objec-

tives. How? By using their own experience and expertise, together with a variety of training reference materials and exportable programs available through the service schools. Two valuable assists are found in the Intelligence Training Army Area Schools (ITAAS) and the Accelerated MI MOS Qualification Program, another portion of the FORSCOM FARCAP program. These are excellent sources of trainers as well as a direct source of performance-oriented training.

So far, only brief mention has been made of ASubjScds of the 30-series. Generally speaking, these publications are outdated and serve little real purpose. Limited resources affect the amount of time that the service schools can devote to updating of the documents. A new USAR School 96-hour SubjScd for MOS 17K, Combat Area Surveillance Radar Operator, has been developed for forwarded to TRADOC for approval. Do not use other ASubjScds unless you are aware of their limitations.

This article is designed to stimulate your interest in the latest developments in the training field and not to produce instant training managers and trainers. It serves also to underscore the value of training management. The key (OBJECTIVE) is now in your hand. Twist it in the lock and step out to a new world of performance-oriented training. Shout if you need help! There are people listening!

The Professional Reader

The American Heritage Century Collection of Civil War Art. Edited by Stephen W. Sears, American Heritage Publishing Co., McGraw-Hill Book Co., NY, 1974. 400 pgs, 754 illustrations. $35.00

This large format (approximately 10½ inches by 13 inches) book contains reproductions of some of the original pen and pencil drawings and water color paintings which first appeared in the 1880's in the four volume *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. The bulk of the original art was obtained by Major General William Cannon Rivers (1866-1943) in the 1920's. The American Heritage Publishing Company acquired the collection in 1973. The first four hundred plates are arranged chronologically by campaign or in specialized topical chapter. The chronology starts with political maneuvering that

signalled the opening phase of the Civil War, and ends with the everpresent aftermath and reminder of wars - monuments and cemetaries. "Yankees and Rebels" - a look at life and daily routine of soldiers - is an example of a topical chapter that adds impact to the book. There are brief narratives with each chapter, and each illustration is captioned. This volume presents, in an extremely well-done manner, many sketches that were originally rendered prior to, during, or just after battles and incidents of the Civil War. Some of the art was commissioned twenty years after the war, but even this was done by artisits that had lived the experience of the war. While the book primarily presents a collection of art and is not a history of the Civil War, this should not bother even a dedicated Civil War buff or historian. For the buff, this collection graphically portrays scenes and incidents that may have only been captured in prose before. For the historian, this collection is a part of the history. For the rest of us - it is just plain enjoyable.

CPT Terry D. Bearce

by Colonel Ransom E. Barber, Branch Chief

Officer Branch Notes

A Feature of the Military
Intelligence Branch, OPD

The decision to reorganize the Officer Personnel Directorate (OPD) along lines better suited to implement the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) has been made by our Army leadership. If you look at the tip of the iceberg, this decision can seem to be another change for the sake of change by "those Washington bureaucrats." But there's more to the decision than that. The requirement to restructure OPD derived directly from an "apples and oranges" situation we personnel managers found ourselves in -- an organizational structure for management that spoke one language and OPMS which spoke another.

Under its current configuration, OPD is organized along career branch lines. With the exception of colonels, officers are managed by the career branches -- in our case, Military Intelligence Branch. Through the years, this setup has worked well as the requirements of the Army have been expressed in terms of rank and career branch. For example, a typical personnel requisition received here at OPD would call for an MI major with cryptologic background or, for that matter, an MI major with expertise in comptrollership. With the advent of OPMS, all of this changes beginning this year. Requisitions will now be stated in terms of rank and OPMS specialty. They will call for a major with

cryptologic skills or a major with a background in comptroller work -- the career branch of the officer will not matter.

Therein lies the problem. If we were to continue as presently organized, we would be operating a rank and specialty based system with a management device that is based on rank and career branch. That's like asking a submarine driver to fly a C-141. Sure, there are similarities in the two vehicles, but I wouldn't fly with the submariner.

Hence, it seemed clear to us that the structure of OPD had to be retooled to more closely parallel OPMS. In our study of the options available, we looked at upwards of ten different ways to organize. One was to stand pat on the basis that what we had was working, so why mess with it. That option was rejected because the fact that our present setup had worked in the past didn't say a thing about whether it would work in the future. We also considered a structure with branches that contained the files of all officers, regardless of rank, within each of the 45 OPMS specialties. To us, that looked like anarchy, a span of control nightmare. Another possibility was aligning ourselves strictly along rank lines. That was rejected because it failed to meet the needs of the young officers who spend the major portion of their time serving in career branch related duties -- it's only as you get along toward the field grade ranks that you start developing alternate specialties that are often outside your basic career branch.

The upshot of all our deliberations is the organization shown in the chart.

Director
Officer Personnel
Directorate

Chief Professional Development | Chief Distribution | Chief Personnel Actions | Executive Officer

Colonels Division | Lieutenant Colonels Division | Majors Division * | Company Grade Combat Arms Division | Company Grade Combat Support Arms Division | Company Grade Cmbt Svc Spt Arms Div | Warrant Officers

Professional Development Branch | Support Branch

Professional Development Branch | Support Branch

Professional Development Branch | Support Branch

TAC/STRAT CI/HUMINT Crypto
— 13 —
13 Specialty Groupings

Military Intelligence Branch
Signal Br
Engineer Br
Military Police Br

Combat Spt Arms Branch
Aviation Br
Combat Arms Br
Cmbt Svc Spt Br

*Organized identically to LTC Division.

As you can see from the wiring diagram, the new organization of OPD is structured almost exclusively along rank lines, with the exception of the company grade divisions. In their case, the young officer is able to maintain identification with a career branch entity in that each of the career branches is represented within the company grade divisions. In the case of our field grade commissioned officers and our warrant officers, their assignment actions will be handled by specialty. When they are serving in the three fundamental specialties of Military Intelligence, i.e., Tactical/Strategic Intelligence, Counterintelligence/HUMINT and Cryptology, they will be dealing with a Military Intelligence officer who occupies that particular desk within each of the rank-oriented divisions. In fact, during the transition from the old organization to the new, our assignment officers will be exactly the same people. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Fritts will be holding down the intelligence related specialty desk in the Lieutenant Colonel's Division, Majors Arnom Harris and Jerry Campbell will be occupying the similar desk in Major's Division, while Lieutenant Colonel Al Hamel will continue to march in Colonel's Division.

Chief Warrant Officer Ralph Ochs will move to Warrant Officer Division where he will continue to handle assignment actions for all of our Military Intelligence warrant officers. The Company Grade team with Major Bob Harris as their Chief, Major Frank LaNasa as Captain's assignment officer, and Captain Dick Mitchell as Lieutenant's assignment officer will remain intact and will become the Military Intelligence Branch of the Company Grade Combat Support Arms Division. Major Wayne Stone will go to work for the Chief of Professional Development and Major Don Steiger will continue to handle personnel actions while working for the Chief of Personnel Actions.

Hence, while the organization has been altered to a considerable extent, our officers in the field will be dealing with exactly the same individuals as they did before reorganization. The desks will change, the room numbers will change, and the telephone extensions will change, but the interpersonal relationships will remain the same. I anticipate that we will be able to provide the new room numbers and telephone extensions in the next issue of MI Magazine. In the meantime, be looking for this information in Army Times; we expect to publish it there sometime during May 1975.

The timetable for the new organization is not firmly established at this writing; however, we are tentatively scheduled to have the Warrant Officer Division fully operational by the first of April, with the Lieutenant Colonel's Division and

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Major's Division following not far behind. The entire organization should be on line and functioning by late May 1975.

Now let's trace a few of the more common personnel actions through the matrix of the new organization making some comparisons to the old. Take for example, a requisition that calls for a Lieutenant Colonel with expertise in comptrollership. Under our present setup, the Chief of Distribution was responsible for farming that requistion out to the career branch that was most likely to have a Comptroller available for assignment in the timeframe called for by the requisition. With the reorganization, the requisition will go to the Lieutenant Colonel's Division which will be able to draw upon *all* Lieutenant Colonels with Comptroller expertise and in the process appreciably enhance the face-to-space-match.

Consider now a requistion calling for Lieutenant Colonel with tactical/strategic intelligence as a specialty. As you well know, the best source of officers with Tac/Strat as a primary specialty is Military Intelligence Branch. However, there are a substantial number of officers of other branches who have Tac/Strat as a secondary specialty and are well qualified for service in that area. Under the new scheme, Lieutenant Colonel's Division will be able to draw on the entire pool of officers who have Tac/Strat as either a primary specialty or an alternate specialty and, once again, we are sure that the face-to-space match will be better in the process. An article in the 19 February 1975, *Army Times* provided you with substantial detailed and authoritative information on the mechanics of carrying out an assignment action, so I will belabor that point no further in this article. There are, however, some concerns of unique interest to the Military Intelligence officer which I will attempt to address.

During the past several years as OPMS has evolved, we in Military Intelligence have similarly evolved a professional development template which we feel fits well within the structure of OPMS and is well designed to develop the best qualified Military Intelligence possible. An earlier article in *MI Magazine* addressed this template, and in shorthand form suggested that we should be developing officers who are all-source, all-process intelligence officers with an ascending pattern of command, staff and military education. The question that arises is who will be responsible for seeing that Military Intelligence officers are able to follow this career pattern. Referring back to the chart,

notice that each of the divisions contains a professional development branch in addition to the Chief of Professional Development at the policy formulation level. Officers serving in these branches will be fundamentally responsible for ensuring that there is a continuous effort to develop officers along the right lines. In addition, each of the military intelligence officers who have the responsibility for making assignments are now and will be in the future, intimately aware of the proper professional development of our MI officers.

Take for example, an MI captain whose name has just appeared on a promotion list to Major. At the time the Major's list is published, his file will be transferred to the Major's Division. One of the first actions there will be for the professional development branch to analyze his file in order to determine what sort of experience he needs during the time he will be under the personnel management of Major's Division. This analysis will then become the game plan of the assignment officer responsible for posting the officer into a new assignment. Thus, the continuity of professionally enhancing assignments will be ensured just as well under the new system as they were under the old.

As another example, consider the officer who needs advice and assistance in preparing an officer's efficiency report reclama. This is another case where the telephone extension and room number will be different, but the quality of the advice will certainly remain unchanged if not improved. His inquiries need only be directed to the Chief of Personnel Actions under whose control will be consolidated all the various and seperate personnel action desks that were previously atomized throughout the OPD structure.

Another category of question that we receive here at OPD in our own ongoing operations comes from not the individual officer but from the commander or supervisor who has responsibility for a number of officers. Up until now, this supervisor has been able to call the career branch chief when dealing with problems that affect the Warrant Officers or Artillery Officers or Quartermasters or whatever the case might be. Under the new scheme, he will simply be calling the rank structured divisions if he has a problem or question regarding Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, etc. Previously, a commander referred his question that cut across career branch lines to the Chief of Officer Distribution. Under the new scheme, his questions relative to issues that cut across rank

lines will continue to be referred to the Chief of Distribution. We anticipate that this change will have virtually no effect because it is the very rare intelligence unit or activity that is manned exclusively by Military Intelligence officers. Thus the rules of the game for obtaining information from the Officer Personnel Directorate will change, but the service or answers rendered will be equally as effective under the new scheme as they were under the old.

To my way of thinking, the effectiveness of OPD's reorganization is a direct function of education and confidence. As personnel managers here in OPD, it is our responsibility to educate the Officer Corps as to the working of our new setup and to teach you how to interface with OPD in order to obtain the advice you require and the assistance needed to get the Army's job done. General acceptance of the new organizational structure will only come with time as we gain confidence through experience. I can remember clearly my feelings when Colonel's Division was first organized. Although not a Colonel at the time, I had misgivings that the sublimation of the career branch aspects of the Officer Corps within Colonel's Division could only turn out to be a non-starter. Now that I have had the experience of being a serving Colonel under the personnel management responsiblity of the Colonel's Division, I must admit I was wrong. Personnel advice and services given to me by that organization have always been of the highest order. I am equally certain that the personnel advice and services rendered as we extend the concept that inspired Colonel's Divison throughout the OPD structure will continue to be of the highest order. It's for sure that we will have a personnel management system (OPMS) and a controlling organization (OPD) that are reading the same sheet of music.

COTAC PREREQUISITES: Appendix II, Annex H, FORSCOM Supplement to AR 350-l and Army Regulation 140-192 establish prerequisites for enrollment in the ITAAS Counterintelligence Officer/Technician/Agent (COTAC) program of instruction. Reserve Component applicants for COTAC training must have actual or approved assignments to a Reserve Component controlled MOS duty position, in addition to meeting all other prerequisites. Effective immediately, all DA Forms 145 (Army Correspondence Course Enrollment Application) submitted to USAICS for student enrollment in Phase I of COTAC must contain an entry stating that the student occupies, or has been approved to occupy, an existing MTOE/TDA position requiring MOS 9666, 971A or 97B20. The statement must include the paragraph and line number of the MTOE/TDA position against which the individual is slotted. In addition, a copy of the official orders assigning the applicant to the controlled MOS duty position will accompany the DA Form 145. Enrollment applications not meeting the above criteria will be disapproved. Individuals who do not meet the criteria for enrollment in the ITAAS COTAC course are reminded of the availability of COTAC related specific subcourses offered by USAICS. The USAICS Correspondence Course Catalog provides this information. Inquiries should be directed to the Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TER, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613. (ATSI-TER)

MOS TESTING: MOS Training Guides (Soldier's Manuals) are currently being developed Army-wide in support of EPMS. They are designed to inform enlisted personnel of the skills required to be proficient in their MOS, at their skill level. The preparation of Soldier's Manuals for intelligence MOS training has not yet been completed by the US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS). Implementation is expected to begin, by career management field, in July 1975 and be completed by April 1976. Distribution to the field is expected approximately 1-year prior to initiation of applicable skill qualification tests. (SQTs). Until this time, soldiers reviewing the DA Pam 12-series in preparation for MOS tests should be aware that the USAICS correspondence subcourses listed as recommended study materials are available only to enrolled students. Those subcourses may be obtained only through formal enrollment in the USAICS Correspondence Course Program. DA Form 145 (Army Correspondence Course Enrollment Application) should be submitted far enough in advance to allow completion of the subcourse prior to MOS testing. The USAICS Correspondence Course Catalog provides additional details. Individuals desiring further information on the Correspondence Course Program should contact the Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TER, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613. (ATSI-TER)

From The Editor...

Well, we've made it through four issues of the *MI Magazine*. On the whole, your response has been good and you appear to be pleased with our growth in each issue. We anticipate continuing to refine the magazine, making changes and improvements in line with regulations and your desires.

Since the first issue, our appropriated fund distribution list has been rearranged. We've made some significant additions, including increasing distribution to ASA units; adding 33 Defense/Army attaches, and over 30 National Guard units to our existing active Army and reserve component distribution. While we would like to increase both the number of copies sent to each unit and the number of units/organizations we send copies to, our current authorization only allows for 3,000 appropriated fund copies to be printed. Although we are right at that figure in our distribution, if any MI unit is not receiving copies now, please let us know, and we will do everthing possible to provide at least some copies.

Within the magazine, we've added a continuing department for our ARNG/USAR readers; and this issue inaugurates input from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA, to provide our readers with a closer look at the national level. On the subscription side, *MI Magazine* now has almost 1400 paid subscribers. Although the bulk of these are National Military Intelligence Association members, our other subscribers include individuals, embassies, other US government agencies and private industry.

Now for some things that need to be accomplished. The main thing that hits me is our need for more articles of different types. I'm not taking pot-shots at those that have submitted manuscripts (whether they were printed or not) - I'm aiming at those of you that are *NOT* submitting articles. To do some finger pointing: we need articles from Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels; we need more than a dribble of articles from our enlisted and Noncommisssioned Officer; and we need more articles from Warrant Officers. Currently, the bulk of our articles are provided by General Officers, Majors, Captains, and Lieutenants. It's hard to believe that these are the only ranks that have something to say to *MI Magazine* readers.

We also need articles from units and organizations. Not public relations pieces about individuals, but articles that say - here is who we are; here is what we have to offer the Army and the rest of the intelligence community. Articles of this type can range from those about the one-man DIS office, the five-man reserve MID, the MI Battalion or Group - to the national level OACSI, DIA, DIS organizations. Surprisingly enough, there are those in the magazine's appropriated fund readership that don't know what these acronyms stand for; what a five-man reserve MID is; or why a one-man DIS office exists. There are tactical MI units that are doing innovative things with training and with selling intelligence to the combat arms. MI personnel are serving in ROTC assignments; we have more females in MI - what are they doing? The list of topics that can be covered in an open, unclassified, public periodical like the *MI Magazine* is limitless. The *MI Magazine* is a place to share your programs, successes, failures, and thoughts....but they must be written before they can be shared. Individually and organizationally, it's time we started letting one another know what we are about.

We've received a lot of comment on having 'Letters to the Editor. Great! Just write us and we'll start a continuing department. Please keep your letters to around 300 words or less - that way we probably won't have to edit them.

Now for the future. The survey (October/November/December 1974 issue) results are coming in, but we need more. Please take a few minutes to complete and mail the survey. We really want to know how we can improve the magazine in line with our readers' wants. We are in the process of backing up our distribution date for the magazine. Currently we distribute at (or after) the end of the quarter. Eventually, we will be distributing the magazine during the middle month of the quarter. That means for example, that the January/February/March issue will be mailed during the middle of February rather than the end of March/beginning of April. It may take us two or three issues to readjust our schedules, but we have started sliding back with this issue.

We believe in the *MI Magazine,* and want it to continue, to improve and to grow. We can't do this without you and your support.

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