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
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CHALLENGE !

Annually since 1949, the Naval War College academic year has ended in June with a week long symposium of professional, business, and military leaders from all over the country meeting to discuss with our graduating class contemporary international problems facing our nation. This year's Global Strategy Discussions were a fitting conclusion to an academic year highlighted by the enunciation of the most explicit foreign policy statement by an American president in a generation. Our theme was United States strategy, especially as it affects our national maritime posture, in light of the President's foreign policy statement to Congress in February of this year—a statement which has come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine.

In this, the first issue of the *Naval War College Review* of the new academic year, I would like to share with you some thoughts on the major points made during June's Global Strategy Discussions and put them in the perspective of what I believe to be the major challenge for the Navy in the 1970's.

As our keynote speaker, Under Secretary of the Navy John Warner spoke to the "Challenge of the 1970's" from the Navy viewpoint. The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs followed with an address on "The Formulation of Global Strategy." The third day United States Senator Harry F. Byrd spoke on "The Outlook in the Senate for Advice and Consent." Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, spoke on the next day on "The Role of the Navy in National Strategy." Finally, Professor Walt W. Rostow, former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs



addressed the subject of "Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy," reprinted in this issue.

The keynote address stressed that our national strategy for the era ahead is to be founded on three pillars, pillars which President Nixon outlined in his foreign policy statement: *Partnership, Strength* and a willingness to *Negotiate*.

Vital in this new strategy of course is partnership. As various speakers underscored, the United States is no longer going to be the world's policeman. We are going to carry less of the burden of free world security.

Clearly our country is at the beginning of a new chapter in its history. At the end of World War II, we had no choice but to assume the leadership and the primary role in guaranteeing the protection of free world nations. We were faced with the fact that many of the countries we had helped save in war were economically broken and politically weak and desperately needed help. We were the only ones capable of providing that help. Our response was positive. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Alliance were early benchmarks of a period which spans two and a half decades and which I believe forms one of the proudest and finest chapters in our nation's history.

Today, those countries that were weak and broken in the aftermath of World War II are relatively strong and

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healthy. There is every reason to believe that they are able to share with us the burdens of protecting the security of our Free World. Indeed, as the President said, we have come to expect "a more responsible participation by our foreign friends in their own defense and progress."

The second pillar of the Nixon Doctrine is strength, American strength to meet the direct challenges to our own security in today's world and to support our commitments to other nations' security, commitments which remain as firm as ever. As various speakers emphasized, we must maintain that national, unilateral strength at a level which will never permit a potential enemy to consider that he has superiority and can force our capitulation directly by military force or indirectly by blackmail. And when we speak of strength, we also mean the courage to use our military might to respond to a threat to national or free world security so that we do not, in President Nixon's words, act "like a pitiful helpless giant . . . when the chips are down."

Finally, the third pillar in our national strategy for the 1970's consists of moving from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation. Why else are we in Paris with the North Vietnamese trying to end the conflict in Southeast Asia, in Warsaw seeking to normalize relations with the largest nation in the world, and in Vienna with the Russians hoping to make SALT the most significant arms talks in history? Of course, as we all recognize, negotiation is closely tied to the other two pillars of the Nixon Doctrine—for we can only expect to have a credible hand at the conference table if we ourselves are strong and if we can be confident of the backing of strong and loyal allies.

Greater reliance on our allies and a proclivity for negotiation, however, do not mean that we are succumbing to the isolationism some in this nation would advocate. To the contrary! As the Pres-

ident continues to make clear, we are not involved in this world because we have commitments. Rather, we have commitments because we *are* involved. And I believe we shall remain so involved, honoring our commitments as we have since the end of World War II.

Inherent in the Nixon Doctrine is the requirement for a lowered profile abroad and a reduction, if not a withdrawal, of our land based forces from various overseas areas. At the same time, there is a reaffirmation of our security commitments to some 42 nations around the world. If this reaffirmation is to be recognized as meaningful, it certainly will require our continuance of a forward strategy, a forward defense posture. Clearly any such strategy, to be realistic, will have to heavily depend on seabased forces. This logically means an expanded mission, a heavier burden for the Navy-Marine Corps team in the years ahead.

With our defense budget comprising the smallest percentage of our Gross National Product since 1951, and with the nation firmly committed to bilateral and multilateral security arrangement with many nations around the world, we in the Navy are therefore faced with a tremendous challenge in the 70's, one which Under Secretary Warner so aptly called the challenge "To Do More With Less." Nor was Mr. Warner alone in stressing this point. Indeed, it was one of the main recurring themes of the entire week and was even stressed the next week by our graduation speaker, Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

And when we speak of the new military strategy, a *Blue Water Strategy*, called for by the Nixon Doctrine we must remember that it may well apply to our posture for nuclear war as well as for conventional war.

Throughout the week of our discussions the question of the survivability of our current land based strategic offen-

sive systems repeatedly was raised, particularly in light of Secretary of Defense Laird's estimate that the USSR might well achieve by 1974 a capability to destroy some 95% of our Minutemen and most of our SAC bases in a first strike effort. More and more I believe it is being recognized that the most feasible way to maintain our nuclear deterrent in the years ahead is to deploy a greater share of overall strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems to sea. Ballistic Missile Ships, the Underwater Long Range Missile System, and the Sea Based Anti-Ballistic Missile System represent three of the most promising such concepts for the future. However, the cost will be high!

On the other hand, we will clearly require modern, effective and balanced general purpose forces to meet the demands of the limited wars which one speaker cogently argued would mark the years ahead. Here again the costs will be high.

So as we scan the horizon ahead, we can recognize the difficulties and the demands that will be placed on us in the 1970's. It will not be possible to meet these difficulties, resolve these demands unless each of us in the Navy develops and exploits new and meaningful approaches which can meet our needs at modest cost. It will be an All Hands operation—like the old coaling ship operation.

Doing the best we can within our limited resources, while meeting the increased requirements placed on the Navy-Marine Corps team will indeed make this a most challenging decade.



R. G. COLBERT
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Cover: Artist Russ Vickers' concept of the USS *Raymond A. Spruance*, DD-963, a new class of destroyer scheduled for delivery in the fall of 1974.

Alexis de Tocqueville noted in his Democracy in America that the concern over domestic issues which characterized most Americans caused them to ignore military matters until an extreme danger had arisen. Once aroused, however, they were inclined to give foreign affairs their undivided attention and effort until the immediate problem was solved. This "Tocqueville oscillation" has continued into the present century with unfortunate effects. In the modern world, where both total war and military procrastination are increasingly unsuitable to the conditions of the time, Americans must constantly seek to reduce the dimensions of this oscillation and maintain a vital yet realistic place in the world.

THE DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY OR THE TOCQUEVILLE OSCILLATION

An address delivered at the Naval War College

by

Dr. Walt W. Rostow

A distinguished psychiatrist at Yale, at the time when Andy McBurney and I were there together, once was asked by a lady in a question period after a lecture, "What do the undergraduates think about sex when they discover it?" He replied in three words, "They like it."

As I thought about the subject Dick Colbert put to me, The Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy, I asked myself this question: What do the American people think about foreign policy? My general reply is, "They dislike it."

For almost two-hundred years now, the prevailing sentiment in our country has been a passionate desire that foreign policy go away and not bother us. There were, it's true, some exceptional

moments when domestic imperatives led to military action and set purposeful objectives in foreign policy. These were times of controversy. The Revolutionary War was stirred up by some rather awkward fiscal and tax problems, within the British Colonial system. Only a third or so of the American people actively supported the independence movement. There was a strong Tory minority as well as many who viewed the struggle with apathy. The War of 1812 had its Western Warhawks who saw economic advantage if we could steal Canada while the British were otherwise occupied. But it also had its vigorous opponents, some of whom drafted the far-reaching resolutions at the Hartford Convention of January 1815; one of which would have drastically limited the

warmaking powers of the Commander in Chief.

In 1846 strong domestic interests pressed Polk to seek war with Mexico in order to assure the entrance of California into the Union. Once again there was a sturdy anti-war movement hereabouts.

Finally a feverish public opinion pressed on McKinley to lift Spanish rule from Cuba after the sinking of the MAINE. But the passions of empire waned quickly in the face of guerrilla war in the Philippines and a strong anti-imperialist movement in domestic policy.

But these, as I say, were exceptional times. The prevailing balance in American thought in foreign policy, and in our security budget was to avoid, not to seek, engagement in the world, especially outside this hemisphere. On the eve of the First World War—in 1913—our national security budget was about one percent of Gross National Product, about a third the level of the security budget in Britain and Germany.

Nevertheless, the fact is that in this century, we have four times been involved in major military conflicts. How did American participation in these wars come about? How did we become a global power?

We came to where we are, I suggest, by living by Dr. Johnson's famous proposition. He said: "When a man knows he's to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully."

In 1916 Wilson won reelection on the platform: "Too proud to fight; he kept us out of war." But five months later we went to war in the face of unrestricted German submarine warfare and the palpable threat it represented to our control over the Atlantic, as well as to the survival of Britain and France.

For the next generation, we remained essentially isolationist, acutely and purposefully so, in the 1930's. In the spring of 1940, in the phoney war period, 65 percent of the American

people supported aid to the Allies under the condition that it be short of involvement in the war. Then Paris fell, Britain was beleaguered, the French coast became a base for German submarines; and by January 1941, about 70 percent of the American people were for aiding Britain even at the risk of war.

In Asia, America passively observed the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931, and then the major cities of China. In 1940-41 the Japanese moved into Indochina and toward Indonesia. Franklin Roosevelt had every interest in concentrating, at that time, American attention and American resources on rearmament at home, and aid to Britain and, then, to Russia. But he could not bring himself to accept passively the Japanese takeover of the balance of power in Asia, including control of the sea routes to the Indian Ocean and to Australia and New Zealand. He cut off shipments to Japan of scrap metal and oil, and froze Japanese assets in the United States.

Indochina was the substance of the diplomatic dialogue with Japan right down to the eve of Pearl Harbor.

At Yalta Roosevelt told Stalin that the American people would not support the present military force in Europe for more than two years. And the postwar dismantling of our armed forces appeared to support Roosevelt's assessment. Only when the balance of power in southern and western Europe was clearly threatened, by a mixture of economic weakness and Communist pressure, did President Truman respond in 1947. And he did so only after surrendering hard-won wartime commitments to the political freedom of Poland, in particular, and Eastern Europe in general.

In Korea the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then in public the Secretary of State in January 1950, drew the line of the American defense perimeter through the Tsushima Straits after American forces began to withdraw in 1949. Six

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months later South Korea was invaded. The United States responded both to protect the balance of power in the Northwest Pacific and to give newborn NATO, now confronted with a nuclear Soviet Union, some credibility.

Out of the Korean experience other pacts were formed, to make explicit the American commitment to hold the balance of power in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia; and thus to deter further overt aggression across international frontiers. After their failure in Korea, the Communists turned to guerrilla warfare as a primary tool. Hanoi decided that it could proceed with success in Southeast Asia, despite the SEATO Treaty, and later, the Geneva Accords on Laos of 1962. The United States did not react promptly and decisively to the violation of the Laos Accords. And in 1965, in consequence, we confronted a choice of fighting or seeing an area judged critical to the American interest, fall to aggression; a judgment incorporated in treaty, in a Congressional resolution, as well as in the words and actions of three successive Presidents.

Now what are we to make of this story of erratic American behavior from 1916 to 1965?

I believe it comes to this: whatever the speeches made and the postures struck during intervals of quiet, or relative quiet, the United States as a nation has behaved systematically as if it were endangered when a single potentially hostile power should seize control of the balance of power in Europe or Asia, or of course, to emplace itself south of us, in this hemisphere. But the United States has not acted regularly on this proposition in Europe or Asia. We acted only when the gallows hove into view. Between such crises we talked and behaved in ways which led a whole series of ambitious men in Europe and Asia to believe we would acquiesce in the fulfillment of their dreams for dominant power. I know no story more

worth contemplating than the statement of Vishinsky made in the presence of Americans after the Korean War. Vishinsky said that the Americans had deceived Moscow about our interest in South Korea. In quite different ways the Kaiser, and Hitler, Mussolini, the Japanese militarists, Stalin and Ho Chi Minh, could all claim to have been deceived by us. In a most dangerous century we have, time after time, permitted, even created, a gap—a gap between the image of American interests, projected by the dynamics of American domestic life, and our behavior as a nation, when the balance of power in Europe or Asia was actually at stake.

I believe this oscillation has contributed substantially to the instability of the world arena over the past 54 years. And I believe a consciousness of this oscillation has strongly shaped the policy of all our Presidents since 1945.

No man can confidently read the mind of a President of the United States. Only the President himself can know the balances struck among the immense array of factors that enter into his decisions. But I do know this much. In making his decisions on Southeast Asia in 1961, President Kennedy did not believe his option was war, if he stood firm on the treaty commitment, versus peace if he let Laos and Vietnam slide away. He believed the United States in the end would not acquiesce in the region from Saigon and Vientiane, to Singapore and Jakarta, falling under the hegemony of a potential enemy. He was conscious, too, that Burma was the military gateway to the Indian subcontinent; and that the American performance in Southeast Asia would affect profoundly the stability of other regions in the world. He believed his realistic option was to stand on the treaty commitment, whatever the cost, or see the United States engaged in a wider war fairly soon.

I know, as you do, what President

Johnson said at San Antonio on 29 September, 1967. He said,

I cannot tell you tonight as your President with certainty, that a Communist conquest of South Vietnam would be followed by a Communist conquest of Southeast Asia. But I do know there are North Vietnamese troops in Laos. I do know there are North Vietnamese-trained guerrillas tonight in Northeast Thailand. I do know that there are Communist-supported guerrilla forces operating in Burma. And a Communist coup was barely averted in Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in the world. So your American President can not tell you with certainty that a Southeast Asia dominated by Communist power would bring a Third World War much closer to a terrible reality. One could hope that this would not be so; but all that we have learned in this tragic century strongly suggests to me that it *would* be so. As President of the United States, I'm not prepared to gamble on the chance that it is not so. I'm not prepared to risk the security, indeed the survival of this American nation on mere hope and wishful thinking. I'm convinced that by seeing this struggle through now, we are greatly reducing the chances of a much larger war, perhaps a nuclear war. I would rather stand in Vietnam, in our time and by meeting this danger now and facing up to it, thereby reduce this danger for our children and for our grandchildren.

And President Nixon outlined in some detail a similar calculus, when he summed up on 3 November, 1969: "For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal from Vietnam would thus be a

disaster of immense magnitude. It would not bring peace; it would bring more war."

The heart of the tension in contemporary America over Southeast Asia has been, then, between the choices as seen by the Presidents, on the one hand, and those who came to oppose them, on the other. The Presidents have seen the real choice before us as pursuing the engagement there through to stable peace, versus a larger war, and quite possibly, a nuclear war. The opponents of their policy in Southeast Asia argue, in effect, that American disengagement from Southeast Asia would lead to peace or to a situation in which the United States would or could, passively acquiesce in safety.

There has been and there remains, a dangerous gap between the national interest as our Presidents see it, and as we have seen it as a nation at times of acute crises; and the way many Americans see it, when the danger of a major shift in the balance of power in Europe and Asia is not palpable.

What is the basis of this gap? It arises, I believe, from the nature of democracy, and particularly democracy in the United States. Alexis de Tocqueville stated the problem vividly a hundred and thirty-five years ago. In *Democracy in America* he describes the overwhelming attraction of civil life for Americans "placed in the midst of the wilderness where they have, so to speak, no neighbors." He believed "the excessive love of the whole community for quiet" would lead Americans to ignore military problems until they became acute, and then they would turn to deal with them late, but wholeheartedly. It was an awareness of what we might call "Tocqueville behavior" by Americans between 1916 and 1947 which led President Truman to face up to Stalin's threat in Europe before it became a purely military threat. Our Presidents have understood how dangerous the Tocqueville oscillation might be in a

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nuclear and highly interdependent world.

And they have understood something else imposed on us by the coming of nuclear weapons. They have been conscious in Korea and Southeast Asia, but also in the Middle East and in Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crisis, that danger lay not merely in a late reaction, but in a wholehearted turning to war, engaging in Tocqueville's phrase, "the full passions of the people." There is no rational place for total war in a nuclear age.

Contrary to older American instinct, then, we have been trying to deter threats to the balance of power in Europe and Asia in a forehanded way, and when challenged, to use limited, rather than total force. This has been difficult for us Americans, given our history and our national operating style. It has been made more difficult by two other strands of thought and feeling at work in our domestic life in recent times.

First, the feeling that the United States is, in some sense, overcommitted or disproportionately committed on the world scene. Second, an opinion among some that the fate of Asia does not, in fact, matter all that much to the United States. I shall say something about each of these factors in turn.

First, the question of American overcommitment. After the Cuba Missile Crisis, I took stock with some of my colleagues in the State Department (including Dick Colbert) of the forces which gathered strength after that historic event. One fact was central. The fear of Moscow, rightly or wrongly, was considerably reduced in the world, once the technique of nuclear blackmail was faced down by President Kennedy; and, partially in consequence, the Sino-Soviet split became more overt and more intense. In every part of the world this reduction in fear and tension led to an increased desire of nations to take a larger hand in shaping their own destiny. The image of a bipolar world was

weakened, both by Khrushchev's failure in the Caribbean and by the evident disarray of the Communist camp. There seemed to be more opportunities for old-fashioned nationalism and for the nation-state. In the United States there developed a feeling that the Communist threat had been reduced, and somehow, the world ought to be more manageable with less American effort, cost, and commitment.

Analyzing these trends I concluded that the problems actually confronted demanded stronger and more effective regional cooperation—if the nations of the world in fact, were to forge a destiny increasingly independent of the major powers. If rich European nations of sixty million could not handle their problems without effective regional cooperation, how could nations in the less-developed areas do so on a nationalist basis? As for the United States, I concluded, that the heart of the problem was not excessive commitment, but a sense of excessive loneliness in bearing the burdens of the world. Our actual outlays for security purposes were, in fact, declining slightly in the first half of the 1960's, as a proportion of GNP. But the American image was one of our carrying an unfair share of the task of maintaining minimal order and progress in the world arena.

I cite this exercise, which was set out formally in a paper dated April 1965, because it preceded our full engagement in Vietnam. The paper commended increased American support for regionalism in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, as well as for continued support of regionalism in Western Europe. And it commended increased American effort to move toward a more equal sharing of the security and economic burdens of the world community.

Quite independent of the State Department's Policy Planner, President Johnson had come to a similar conclusion. And in one of the least-noted, but

most important foreign policy developments in recent years, President Johnson moved systematically, particularly from 1966 on, to make the encouragement of regionalism central to American policy in Latin America, Africa, and Asia; and to shift our global arrangements in monetary affairs, in trade and aid, on to what he called a partnership and fair-share basis.

President Johnson articulated this strategy fully in a speech in New Orleans on 10 September, 1968. Warning, as he came close to the end of his term against isolationism, he stated this alternative doctrine: "We have always hoped and believed that as our friends and allies grew in strength, our burden would grow less lonely. We have been moving over the last few years toward a long-run position in which the United States would be able to assume its responsibility in enterprises of common concern, but our partners would be able to assume theirs. I believe the day will soon come which we have been building toward for twenty years, when some American President will be able to say to the American people, 'The United States is assuming its fair share of responsibility in promoting peace and progress in the world, but the United States is assuming no more, or no less than its fair share.'"

President Nixon's foreign policy paper of 18 February, 1970, was as you know, in much the same spirit.

What is it then, that the United States is trying to accomplish? First, our Presidents have recognized that the American interest in avoiding domination of Europe or Asia, and indeed, Latin America or Africa, by a potentially hostile power, is an abiding interest of the United States. It is heightened, not diminished, by the nature of modern weapons and means of communications. Second, they recognize that this negative interest is fully shared by the smaller nations of these regions. In fact, this convergence between our

interests and theirs, has been the underlying strength of American postwar diplomacy.

The nations of Europe do not wish to be dominated by Russia, or Germany, or United States. The nations of Asia do not wish to be dominated by China, or Japan, or Russia, or the United States. The nations of Africa, south of the Sahara, wish to forge their destiny without the military presence or political dominance of any major external power. The wisest leaders of Latin America wish not only to keep extra-continental powers out of the security affairs in this hemisphere, but they wish to build societies in a regional structure, which would permit them to deal with the Colossus of the North, from a base of greater strength and greater dignity. That is the underlying political objective of movements toward Latin American economic integration.

The United States has been able to throw its weight behind regionalism in all these areas, because our interest does not require that we dominate, and because the stronger the regional organizations, so long as they are not dominated by a potentially hostile power, the more likely they are to resolve their own problems, and reduce the level of American commitment and concern.

Third, the Presidents have recognized that the pace at which the United States could safely step back, had to be delicately adjusted to the rise of strength and cohesiveness in the regions. They recognized in Europe, for example, that a premature and excessive pullout of American forces from NATO, would lead not to a new and better balanced Atlantic equilibrium, but to crisis—a crisis as dangerous as, or more dangerous than the Berlin crises of 1948-49 and 1961-62.

The exercise called Vietnamization, if I understand it correctly, is an even more delicate exercise in shifting the balance of responsibilities in Southeast

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Asia in ways that would avoid collapse of the region, chaos, and a larger war.

The strategy of our moving back in degree as the strength and cohesiveness of others permit them to take a larger hand in shaping their destiny, while avoiding a collapse of the balance of power in regions of vital interest to the United States, is certainly the most subtle and difficult task of foreign policy ever undertaken by the United States.

This is so because historically America has performed best when it faced a palpable and acute problem. One widely recognized and defined in common terms and in the solution of which we could roll up our sleeves and address our full energies, talents, and resources in a straightforward way. The First World War, once we were in it, was a problem of this kind; the Great Depression after 1933; the Second World War after Pearl Harbor; Stalin's challenge in western and southern Europe in 1947; the race to put a man on the moon after the Soviet launching of the first Sputnik. These slambang, straightforward affairs fitted well the national style.

Now we are trying to do something quite different. After the Second World War we moved into vacuums of power—not to build an empire—but because the cost of not moving in was judged—case by case—more dangerous than the reluctant acceptance of additional responsibility in a war-weakened world. Now a quarter-century later we are trying to manage a redistribution of responsibility in which we will do less, others will do more, without inducing major crises or chaos on the world scene. We are trying safely to withdraw in degree from the preponderant positions we initially built after 1945. We are trying to exploit constructively the gathering strength of others on the world scene, their desire increasingly to shape their own destiny without being dominated by any major power including the United States, and

the fact that the abiding American interest is satisfied by an essentially negative proposition—that no potentially hostile power hold the balance of power in Europe and Asia.

This is the complex pattern of policy which our Government has been trying to pursue in recent years in order to reconcile abiding American interests and the widespread sense in America that we were somehow, overcommitted or disproportionately committed in the first postwar generation.

The pursuit of this policy is obviously complicated by many forces in our domestic life: an economy subject both to rising unemployment and rising prices, which is not developing enough real resources for public purposes, from the tax base; an infirm balance of payments position; acute racial tension; massive tasks of urban rehabilitation; the cleaning of the air and water; an ardent margin of the affluent young, affronted by the ugliness of war, racial inequity, and other gaps between American aspiration and performance, who have been led to believe that a quick route to the humane and decent life they seek, lies in confrontation and violence and destruction.

I cannot, evidently, deal with all these features of the domestic scene here: the reactions they set up in our political life; and their playback effects on our ability to conduct the mature and subtle foreign policy which our interests require and to which we have been committed.

But I will say a few words about one view to which some Americans have come, in part driven by these domestic pressures: the view that the United States can safely abandon its interests in and its commitments to Asia and let the forces at work there find their way to chaos or equilibrium, war or peace, without American participation. Let me quote the words of John Gardner, whom I regard as a good friend as well as an old and respected colleague.

Anguished by the intensity of our domestic debate and the urgency of our unsolved domestic problems, he counsels abandonment of our role in Vietnam and of our peacekeeping commitment in Asia. I quote him as an eloquent and sensitive representative of a good many Americans whose views on Vietnam and Asia have changed. Here is a passage from an interview with Gardner published in *The Christian Science Monitor*, 8 June of this year. He was asked what should the President do about Vietnam. He began:

I think that if the President would set a date, a terminal date (the questioner broke in: 'You're speaking about getting troops entirely out?') that's right, he said, it would be extremely helpful. I think if we would finally relinquish the notion that the word winning or losing has any relevance whatever any more with respect to Vietnam. The whole relevance of those two words is a thing of the past now. If he, as the President, would relinquish what appears to have been his conception in his last Press Conference that we might conceivably be the peacekeeper in the Asian world, I think we could move expeditiously to get out of Vietnam and I think it would produce very considerable change in our national mood. Then I think, moving vigorously on domestic priorities, would be the next order of business. And the nation is ready for it. People are hungry for it. Americans are not people who want to turn their backs on their problems.

Elsewhere in this interview, Gardner said: "Nothing we could possibly be accomplishing in Southeast Asia could balance or compensate for what the war is doing to this country."

This is a solemn proposition. It ought to be discussed dispassionately, with care, since we all recognize the burden that's thrown upon our national life by the war in Southeast Asia. The proposition is, as I understand it, that the United States should promptly withdraw its forces and commitments from Vietnam whatever the consequences may be in Asia and on the World scene.

Contrary to every conceivable political and personal interest, three American Presidents—and one might add indeed, President Eisenhower as a fourth—decided that the forces set in motion by such a decision risked a larger war in Asia and dangerous instability in other regions of the world. I believe no citizen taking a contrary view can, in good conscience, ignore the lines of argument that led our Presidents to this conclusion. For the risk of a larger war—quite possibly a nuclear war—should weigh heavily in the scales in assessing how much of a burden we can afford to bear at home.

Now I would not pretend to reconstruct fully the lines of argument which led the Presidents to this painful judgment; although in two cases I have some knowledge of their thoughts. But I would offer my own brief summary of at least some of the possible or probable causes of unconditional, immediate withdrawal from commitment in Vietnam and Asia.

First, the withdrawal of American commitment in Southeast Asia would change the terms of the debate going forward in mainland China. Powerful forces are at work there to move post-Mao China toward the long-delayed concentration of its energies and talents on the modernization of its life. American withdrawal would, in my view, inevitably lead Peking not to concentrate on its domestic tasks, but to exploit its new opportunities to the South. No one can predict the precise form in which a nuclear China, with huge ground forces, would exercise its

power in the vacuum we would create. But I can not believe that Peking would remain passive. Indeed, it is not passive now: in its influence on Hanoi; its roadbuilding in Laos; and its actions elsewhere.

Second, the nations of Southeast Asia, certainly as far as Singapore—quite possibly as far as Indonesia—would lose their independence, as for example, Lee Quang Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, believes; or be thrown into a protracted military or quasi-military struggle which would disorient for some of them, exceedingly promising paths to economic, social and political development.

Third, Burma in particular, would either fall under Communist domination or become the scene of an Indian/Chinese struggle. For Burma, not Tibet, is the point of critical strategic danger for the Indian subcontinent; a proposition consistently made to me in private, with equal lucidity, by high and responsible officials of both India and Pakistan.

Fourth, almost certainly Japan and India would quickly acquire nuclear weapons, and quite possibly the Nonproliferation Treaty would die elsewhere in the world as well. It is perhaps not generally understood that the willingness of many nations to forego the production of nuclear weapons is based on a carefully balanced calculation—a calculation that relies upon the United States, explicit or implicit, to provide marginally greater security at less risk than going it alone on the basis of a national nuclear capability. The policy Gardner proposes would shift that marginal calculation. An America that walked away from a treaty commitment because it could not deal with its domestic problems—after bringing into the field a half million of its armed forces, and encouraging a small ally to fight desperately for its independence—that kind of America might not be

regarded as a reliable ally on such a mortal issue in Asia or elsewhere.

Paragraph I of Article X of the Nonproliferation Treaty, opens with this sentence: "Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." I believe an American withdrawal from a treaty commitment in a critical part of the world on the grounds that its domestic problems did not permit it to continue to honor that treaty could well be judged an extraordinary event related to the subject matter of the Nonproliferation Treaty, jeopardizing the supreme interests of nations which now depend upon us. We should be quite clear that whatever public postures they may strike on one issue or another, India and Japan, as well as many others, count on our nuclear deterrent and the will, as well as the hardware, that gives it meaning.

Fifth, I would put a question which every American must answer for himself, out of his knowledge and sense of our country, its history, and its character. The question is this: at home, would the United States observe these consequences of its decision passively? Would we turn with energy and pride and unity, to clean the air and the water and deal with the ghettos, the racial inequities, as we read of Hue-like slaughter in Vietnam and elsewhere? Of an Asia thrown into chaos or worse? Of a world gripped of a proliferating nuclear arms race?

And what of the effects of all this in Moscow? Cairo?

I for one, do not believe that we would remain unified and passive. I agree with Gardner that Americans are not people who want to turn their backs on their problems. We might repeat what I called the Tocqueville oscillation, in a peculiarly dangerous way. But I do

not believe that we Americans in the end, will turn our backs on Asia and on the world.

For what is Asia? Asia is the place where about 60 percent of humanity now live and will continue to live. In the year 2000, which is not so far away, Asia's population will be about ten times that of the United States—say, 3.7 billion souls. There are some I know, who regard Asia as primitive, in no way to be compared to Europe, in potential importance to the United States. But as anyone who has recently been to Asia knows, it is a region on the march. We are all familiar with the extraordinary growth of Japan, now the third industrial power in the world and closing fast on a sluggish Soviet Union. But in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and in Malaysia and Singapore, and in India, Pakistan, and Iran as well, the modernization of these old societies is moving forward swiftly. And Indonesia, too, is coming out of the chaos in which Sukarno left it. Mainland China has been virtually stalled for a decade, set back first by the failure of the Great Leap Forward, and then by the Cultural Revolution. But sometime in the years ahead the great natural gifts of the Chinese on the mainland will come to be focused on the modernization of that society in more or less rational ways.

Around about the year 2000, then, we shall face across the Pacific almost four billion people, who by that time will have acquired the capacity to use most of then-existing technology. They will have reached, or be close to reaching the stage of growth I have described as technological maturity. In income per capita they will not be rich. They will average, perhaps, only about \$350 per capita. The average brought down by the low starting point and heavy weight in the Asian index of the Indian subcontinent and mainland China. But Asia will be a formidable center of power, a major factor in the kind of life Americans—that is to say, our children and

grandchildren—will then lead.

Right now I believe the kind of Asia that will exist in the year 2000 is being determined.

It is being determined by the outcome of the debate on the mainland concerning post-Mao Chinese domestic and foreign policy and priority. It is being determined by the Japanese and Indian decisions on the Nonproliferation Treaty. It is being determined above all, by a growing sense of regional cooperation that has emerged since the United States honored its commitment to South Vietnam in 1965 at a time of mortal danger to Southeast Asia.

Each of these factors will be drastically affected by the way we conduct ourselves in Southeast Asia. If we patiently, painfully, see it through to an honorable, stable peace in Southeast Asia, there is a decent hope that the Asia that emerges will not be dominated by any single power. It could be an Asia in which the inherent weight of mainland China is balanced by the cooperative efforts of others living in the great and vital arc from Seoul and Tokyo, to Karachi and Teheran—an Asia not hostile to China, but offering to it no temptation to expand; an Asia to whose multilateral efforts Japan could make an enormous contribution; an Asia where nuclear proliferation did not happen; where the guarantee of the United States remained good; but whose inherent strength and cooperation permitted us to fall back to a role of even-handed partnership across the Pacific.

That outcome is not assured; but it is a decent hope, because it is rooted in a political reality—the political reality that most Asians share with the United States, the abiding interest that the region not be dominated by a single power.

If we do not see it through to an honorable and stable peace in Southeast Asia, we could confront a very different and dangerous concentration of power

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across the Pacific which would alter the whole setting of American society and its inner life, and pose dangers greater than those that came upon us at Pearl Harbor. I disagree, therefore, with John Gardner's dictum that "nothing that we could possibly be accomplishing in Southeast Asia could balance or compensate for what the war is doing to this country."

The state of Asia and America's long-run relation to Asia is at stake, and this is a very great matter indeed.

Now, neither as a former public servant, nor as an active teacher, nor as a social scientist, nor as a man, am I insensitive to the cost of our commitment in Southeast Asia and the war in which we are still engaged. Clearly, the war in Vietnam has contributed substantially to student unrest in the United States. But I do not believe the war is primarily responsible for the restlessness and dissatisfaction of the young. Student unrest is a global phenomenon in the developed—the richer—countries of the world.

Clearly, the war has diverted substantial resources from private or public purposes. But I do not believe it is primarily responsible for the slackening in allocations to the cities, or education, or for the present state of racial tension. The net cost of the war in Vietnam—what we would actually save by abandoning the effort—is less than 2 percent of our GNP. The figure is declining, it is not rising. At a normal 4 percent growth rate, it is less than half the annual increment in GNP we should have available to allocate to new private and public purposes. I regret every nickel of it, as I regret even more every casualty of the war, whether American or other. But with a GNP approaching a trillion dollars, we obviously command the resources in the United States to do far more in the public sector if we manage the economy well and generate the political will to allocate those resources wisely. And while the war in Vietnam is

not irrelevant to the problem of bringing the Negro to full citizenship in our land, I do not believe for one moment that it is a critical barrier.

The coming of stable peace in Southeast Asia would surely ease some of the strain in our domestic life; but our domestic problems have different and deeper roots and must be dealt with essentially in their own terms.

In considering our domestic life in relation to our foreign policy, I would make one further and related point. Historically, in this century, we have had domestic and foreign policy crises in sequence. Wilson had time to launch his New Freedom Program after his election in 1912, before confronting the realities of the First World War. For good or ill—and probably for ill—Franklin Roosevelt could launch his New Deal Program in an America locked into isolationism; and that program had run its course well before the outbreak of the Second World War. President Truman could face the Cold War crises of 1945 to 1952 from a base which did not generate acute pressures for domestic innovation. He was, in fact, well out in front of his Congressional support in proposing domestic legislative innovations. But since 1963—say, from the Civil Rights March on Washington of August and the assassination of Diem in November—our political life has been strained by simultaneous crises of an acute kind, at home and abroad.

I can easily understand the instinct of Gardner and others, somehow to get "abroad" off our neck so we can wholeheartedly turn to affairs at home. And I believe history will record that President Johnson faced—and now President Nixon faces—challenges of unique severity because of this convergence in time of domestic and foreign crises. But history is ruthless with those who build their policies on illusion. And I believe it is an illusion to hold that America at this time in history, can safely walk

away from its commitments and interests in Asia, or in Europe, or in the Middle East. I see no other viable course—in an age of nuclear weapons and modern communications, where the global community is being pulled closer together every day—than to play a responsible role on the world scene, to move patiently and cautiously toward a world of partnership and fair shares while continuing to grapple at home with a long agenda of unfinished business in this rich, but troubled society of ours.

For I believe it equally an illusion to hold that we can be callous about the cities and the race problem, or that we can for long safely live with a mixture of economic stagnation and inflation.

Yes, our problems are multiple and they are complex. And they will not yield to a conventional American short-term burst of energy and enterprise. They require extraordinary perception, maturity, and balance. But with this practiced democracy of ours, approaching its second century of continuous life under the Constitution, commanding a unique concentration of material and human resources, we ought to be able to meet these challenges.

The outcome is not certain. It will require the best that is in us. We must set aside the notion that soft options are available, either at home or abroad. We must reach out to try to understand each other—where we are—what makes up our common agenda, and then act on it together.

A decade ago the challenge was put very well in these terms:

Can Americans achieve enough agreement on their aims to act in concert? The answer is unequivocally yes. We want peace with justice. We want a world that doesn't live under the fear of the bomb; a world that acknowledges the rule of law; a world in which

no nation can play bully; and no nation need live in fear.

How many Americans would disagree with that purpose? Is it easy? Have we achieved it? Read your morning paper.

We want freedom. We don't think man was born to have someone else's foot on his neck, or someone else's hand over his mouth. We want freedom at home and we want a world in which freedom is possible. Who would disagree with that as a national aim? Who would call it easy? Who would say we achieved it?

We believe in the dignity and worth of the individual, and it's our unshakable purpose to protect and preserve that dignity. We believe that every person should be

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Walt W. Rostow is a recognized international authority on economics and economic history and has written many prominent books and articles in the field. Graduating from Yale in 1936, he attended Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar and completed his Ph.D. degree at Yale in 1940. He also holds M.A. degrees from both Oxford and Cambridge.

After serving in the Office of Strategic Studies during World War II, Professor Rostow taught American history at both Oxford and Cambridge prior to returning to the United States. In 1950 he joined the faculty of Massachusetts Institute of Technology as Professor of Economics and senior staff member of the Center for International Studies, where he remained for ten years. In January of 1961 he was appointed as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In November of that year he was designated Chairman of the Policy Planning Council of the State Department. Selected as Special Assistant to President Johnson in 1966, Dr. Rostow left Washington in 1969 to become Professor of Economics and History at the University of Texas.

enabled to achieve best that is in him, and we are the declared enemies of all conditions such as disease, and ignorance, and poverty, which stunt the individual and prevent such fulfillment. We believe in equality before the law, equal political suffrage, and dearest of all to Americans, equality of opportunity.

To the extent that we've made progress on these matters, we've done so through fierce and faithful effort. Courageous men and women have spent lifetimes of effort, endurance, and frustration in pursuit of these aims. Others have fought and died for them. And the same measure of devotion is required today. The fact that millions of men and women have died violent deaths defending the ideal of individual freedom does not insure the survival of the ideal if we cease paying our tithes of devotion.

These words were written by John Gardner in an essay called "Excellence," published in 1961. I do not quote them now to score off an old and respected

friend; for Gardner and others have painfully come to the conclusion that we cannot both keep a society of quality and excellence at home and support our search for a decent and stable peace in Asia. In all conscience, the decade since his words were written has been a bruising, difficult, dangerous—but I would also say—a creative period in the life of America and the world community. Looking at what we have experienced, and having lived through it, knowing a little of its lacerations, I can understand why some would draw back to a more limited vision of our agenda.

But I do not. I believe withdrawal to a search for the good life at home in a world of war and chaos and deepening danger, is an illusion. And neither we nor humanity at large can afford another Tocqueville oscillation. There is no other rational way for America than to go forward on both fronts, increasingly sharing the burdens abroad with those capable and willing to play their part. Despite the debate that swirls around us, I believe deep within our nation is the understanding, the strength, and the will to do so.

Research and development are important to military planners because they create options and alternatives for future national strategy. The crucial lead which the United States enjoyed in the 1960's in the deployment of solid-fueled ICBM's and Polaris SSBN's was due in large measure to the resources allocated for technological research in the previous decade. Today, however, the U.S.S.R. is on the point of overtaking the United States in terms of expenditures allocated for basic research. If this trend is not corrected, the future may see the U.S.S.R. assume the initiative in military technology.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE FUTURE AND THEIR IMPACT ON STRATEGY

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.

I am grateful to have this opportunity to discuss with you the important influence that science and technology have on our strategic capabilities. Today this Nation has both land-based and sea-based strategic nuclear deterrent forces because we did the necessary research and development in the 1940's and 1950's. The R&D that we did in the 1960's will give us strategic weapon choices through much of the 1970's. At the same time, the R&D we did not do—but should have done—will show up as limitations on our future strategic choices.

The Defense program of research and development—the establishment of a scientific and technological base—is really a business of creating options. It enables the Secretary of Defense and the President to choose between alternate systems in striving to achieve

national goals. It is our job to make sure that the future strategic options we offer to Mr. Nixon's successor are better than those provided Mr. Kosygin's successor.

Our R&D programs are not conducted in a departmental vacuum, but interact with national policies and goals. For example:

New U.S. policies may change R&D programs: On 25 November 1969 President Nixon announced that the United States would not use biological weapons, even in retaliation. As a result of this policy, our R&D program in that area was redirected to be concerned solely with defensive measures.

New missions may stimulate the search for new technology: The necessity for tracking enemy forces in the forests of Vietnam led to the development of remote sensors and the

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conception of the instrumented battlefield.

New technology may change national policies and missions: The most outstanding examples of this interaction between Defense R&D and national goals are our nuclear weapons and ICBM technology.

Today I want to talk about three topics that will absorb much of your time and attention throughout your careers: The important strategic goals of our R&D programs, the conditions and influences that may adversely affect our future strategic capabilities, and the actions we must take to forestall adverse effects.

Defense Goals. For purposes of analyzing our R&D programs, our broad defense goals can be grouped into three general categories. First, we must maintain our nuclear deterrent. This involves both our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses and the continued survivability of our nuclear forces. Second, we must strengthen our tactical forces—to counter known threats on land, in the air, and at sea and to remedy deficiencies disclosed in Vietnam. Third, we must maintain a strong base in science and technology nurtured by a vigorous R&D program.

Poseidon and Minuteman III are both in the flight-test phase, and results are encouraging. The success ratio is about 70 percent, high for this stage of development testing; and it gives us confidence that we will deploy reliable systems on the scheduled operational dates—1970 for Minuteman III and January 1971 for Poseidon. These two weapon systems will increase our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses.

A major step toward improving the survivability of an adequate fraction of our land-based strategic missile forces is the Safeguard system. As stated by President Nixon, the objectives of Safeguard are to protect our population against limited attacks from the

Chinese, as well as accidentally initiated attacks from any source, and to assure the survival of a sufficient level of our land-based strategic forces against an attack by the Soviet Union. About Safeguard Mr. Nixon said, “No President with the responsibility for the lives and security of the American people could fail to provide this protection.”

There are other ways to meet the growing threat to Minuteman posed by Soviet ICBM's. We could relocate some of the Minuteman force in hard-rock silos, which have greater survivability than the soil silos in which the missiles are now deployed. And part of the Minuteman force could be moved into a new “shelter-basing” configuration, in which the missiles are located on truck-type transporters that could go on warning into dispersed and hardened shelters, increasing the uncertainty of Soviet targeting.

Each of these options has its advantages and disadvantages, and we are not sure that the problems of land-based missile survivability can be solved permanently. In any case, as a backup system, we could place greater emphasis and dependence on our sea-based missile forces, which now consist of Polaris and Poseidon. The Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS) is a new program aimed at assuring for us a sea-based force on which we can rely in the future.

The ULMS submarine would deploy an intercontinental-range ballistic missile whose operating area would be expanded by a factor of 10 to 15 over that of Polaris—greatly complicating an enemy's defensive efforts. The new submarine would be quieter and optimized for its role and would operate from ports in the continental United States, an innovation obviating dependence on foreign bases. Also, ULMS would provide for the orderly replacement of the present SSBN's at the end of their operating lives. We are examining this concept very carefully. With the funds

we are requesting for FY 1971, a deployment decision could be made in the early 1970's.

We remain confident that our B-52 bomber force is still effective today. Since the Soviets could develop a capability to blunt the deterrent value of this force, however, we are moving toward engineering development of a new strategic bomber, the B-1. If circumstances warrant its deployment, the B-1 could be operational in late 1977 or 1978. Equipped with the standoff air-to-surface armed decoys and missiles, SCAD and SRAM, this bomber aircraft would be able to deal effectively with improved Soviet air defenses.

In summary, our major strategic programs are designed to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. Our strategic forces must be capable of surviving a Soviet attack if they are to continue as a credible deterrent. To ensure their survivability, we must start a major restructuring of our strategic forces. This is probably a valid case now, even if the Soviet threat does not continue to grow. Substantial progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), of course, would help to keep these problems within reasonable bounds.

Weapons, Equipment, and Operations. The war in Vietnam has revealed deficiencies in our equipment and operating procedures. It has also disclosed to potential enemies much of our current military technological capabilities. We need to correct both of these situations.

Land warfare, which embraces all aspects of close combat, fire support, field Army air defense, and battlefield surveillance, is undergoing major changes. The most significant development activity in the area of close combat is aimed at overcoming the numerical superiority possessed by the tank forces of the Warsaw Pact nations. Another particularly critical problem that now accounts for a substantial portion of our casualties in Southeast

Asia is posed by mines and boobytraps. We are making some progress against this tactic, although it strains our present technology.

In the area of fire support, it is planned to start, late in FY 1970, a prototype competition for our first optimized close-support aircraft in over 20 years.

With regard to air defense, the Red-eye, Chaparral and Vulcan systems are being deployed, and we are redirecting our RDT&E efforts to the SAM-D system. This surface-to-air missile is intended to prevent modern counter-measures technology from negating our air defenses in the way we overcame the Soviet-developed SAM's deployed in North Vietnam. In battlefield surveillance, we are concentrating on exploiting the remote sensors developed for the war in Southeast Asia to give us an altogether new combat capability based on the concept known as the instrumented battlefield.

The fleet's offensive and air defense operations, ocean surveillance, and anti-submarine and submarine warfare are the building blocks of our ocean control capability. To meet the Soviet naval threat, we need to improve our antiship offensive operations. Our major R&D effort in that direction centers on the development of Harpoon, a standoff antiship missile system that can be launched from a surface as well as an airborne platform.

The Soviet antiship missile threat is of great concern to us. In a major effort to strengthen the defense of our surface ships, we are developing two systems—the Aegis advanced surface missile and the Phalanx high-rate-of-fire gun. These weapon systems will provide close-in backup defense against attacks that might penetrate the longer range defenses.

The capabilities of the Soviets' submarine force have increased at a rate exceeding our prior estimates. If we are to retain the ability to counter that

force, we must continue our R&D programs in antisubmarine warfare with vigor and imagination. Among the important programs we started this fiscal year are the S-3A, the SSN-688, and the DD-963. We are carefully examining new technical alternatives as they appear.

The air-interdiction mission embraces four aspects—counterair, defense suppression, deep strike, and tactical reconnaissance. Recent actions affecting the Air Force F-15 and the Navy F-14 air superiority fighters will have a major impact on our future air warfare capabilities.

The Navy's needs in fleet air defense will be fulfilled by the F-14A and its long-range Phoenix missile system. The following F-14B and C aircraft, equipped with an advanced engine and new avionics, will represent major improvements in the Navy's fleet defense and air superiority.

Science and Technology. To support and strengthen our base of military science and technology and avoid falling behind other nations' achievements, our fundamental need is to know what developments in weapons are possible and practical. In critical areas involving long lead times—for understanding as well as development—we cannot afford to be taken by surprise by the scientific and technical performance of other countries.

Defense research and exploratory development are aimed at both targets of opportunity and identified needs. Our goals are to fulfill recognized requirements in military technology and, by exploiting new technical opportunities, to make possible the acquisition of new and superior technology.

The final, very important role of our science and technology is to provide a hedge against uncertainties in our knowledge of Soviet and Chinese weapon developments. Research and development work in three major ways to

provide this hedge. First, if we are abreast of the latest technological advances, we can evaluate fragmentary intelligence information about Soviet developments and weapons deployment with some confidence. Second, we can start various exploratory developments so that, if our evaluations are correct, we can quickly deploy new systems to meet the threat. Third, by the knowledge of our own R&D programs, plus what we see going on in other countries, we can decide whether to accelerate the development—or even the deployment—of new military systems.

We have seen how Defense research and development interact in various important ways with national policies and goals and that our scientific and technological base provides new weapons and defenses that allow decision makers to choose among alternative strategies and gives us a lead time in which we can react to threats before they become realities. It is important, then, that we understand the condition of research and development in the Department of Defense.

Adverse Influences. National and global patterns are changing, and in these changes there are factors that affect our R&D base both absolutely and relatively. In this regard, I have no doubts about the adequacy of our R&D base today. I believe we have programs and weapons equal to the challenge of the Soviet SS-9's—including its triple warhead—and SS-11's; and I am convinced that the leaders in the Kremlin understand this. But I am deeply concerned about the dangers that will confront us 10 or 20 years from now. Today the Soviet Union has a good chance to take over world leadership in technology. This is a serious conclusion, and I assure you I would not state it unless I were sure of the data on which it is based.

The trends are quite clear. Ten years ago Soviet spending on national R&D

was 50 percent of ours, while today it is at about the 80 percent level. If present trends continue, the crossover point will come in a few years. More important, the crossover point in funding for defense, atomic energy, and space has already arrived. In terms of equivalent purchasing power, the Soviet Union is now funding R&D in these areas at \$16 to \$17 billion annually. Our expenditures in the same areas are \$13 to \$14 billion per year. The Soviet rate is increasing by 10 to 13 percent per year—a rate which will double their effort in 6 to 8 years. The corresponding U.S. effort is actually declining.

As you know, there are people in our country who are simply opposed to technology, blaming it for much of the environmental deterioration and other problems we face. Some would curtail defense expenditures in favor of efforts devoted to domestic issues. President Nixon spoke of this in his Foreign Policy Report.

Defense spending is of course in a special category. It must never fall short of the minimum needed for security. If it does, the problem of domestic programs may become moot. But neither must we let defense spending grow beyond that justified by the defense of our vital interests while domestic needs go unmet.

Finally, it seems amply clear that the Congress will not increase Defense R&D funds until the Pentagon puts its own house in order.

Remedial Actions. We have initiated action to remedy some of our problems. First, Secretaries Laird and Packard have moved strongly to decentralize management, and this has led to the redefinition, clarification, and delegation of responsibilities in the weapons acquisition process.

In the past the Department was often placed in the position of trying to fulfill

overstated requirements with underdeveloped technology. Now we will review in detail the user's actual needs and then ask only for the technological capabilities needed to satisfy those minimum requirements. Next, we must ensure that the development has been completed fully before we make the production decision. The functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (including my office) and the military services have been redefined. In this action the services are delegated more authority to run programs, once they have been approved.

Another broad category of remedial actions is mission analysis. By that I mean the development of new policy and planning instruments similar to the development concept papers (DCP) that we have used in the past. The new area papers, which impose an explicit analytical discipline, just as the DCP's have done, will treat DOD-wide needs in areas such as air-to-ground attack, electronic countermeasures, and air defense. We are formulating essential performance, cost and schedule requirements, and establishing clearer priorities.

One aspect of program management that we have been emphasizing this past year is scheduling by achievement, in order to assess and minimize technical risks and uncertainties at the most effective times. We do this by using the concept of milestones in carrying out major system contracts. Applying this concept widely and systematically—and explicitly in contracts—is one of the most important innovations in management since I became Director of Defense Research and Engineering. It requires that specific achievements, such as avionics integration or successful flight test, be confirmed by hardware tests before additional major financial commitments are made.

Finally, the crucial point and future challenge in all of our actions is to design to a price, instead of trying to control costs after the fact for the new

systems we require. All of us in the DOD are giving this type of cost consciousness absolutely first priority.

The single most influential long-range goal is to eliminate the cause of a syndrome that has appeared in the last decade—the use of the most advanced technology in every system, regardless of the cost. This syndrome pervades much of the initial design thinking at the working level throughout the DOD and the defense industry. We must make the message heard all through the system that we will not stand for unnecessary complexity and that price has as much priority as any other requirement. All of our new management actions have as their unifying theme the control of costs and the systems-acquisition process itself—all of this within a reshaped management environment that fixes accountability more clearly and delegates greater authority to the services.

If our Nation is to cope with future challenges to its security, we must keep our defense strong. I believe that science and technology will play an important role in this endeavor—but so will opera-

tions, logistics, and other functions of our Defense organization. I am confident that, whatever assignments you may receive, you will do your part in contributing to the security of this country of ours. This is, after all, our duty and our profession.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., has served for many years as a prominent adviser to the Government on scientific matters. He completed his Ph.D. degree in physics from the University of California in 1952 and

accepted a position with the Livermore Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, of which he became director in 1961. During the past two decades he has served on the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, the Army Scientific Advisory Panel, the Ballistic Missile Defense Advisory Committee, and as a consultant to the President's Science Advisory Committee. In 1965 he assumed his present position as Director of Defense Research and Engineering.



The determination of United States strategy has become a more or less incidental byproduct of the administrative process of the defense budget.

Maxwell D. Taylor: The Uncertain Trumpet, 1960

Many students of naval strategy do not realize the extent to which the Soviet Union's newly expanded naval and maritime establishment is dependent upon the Baltic Sea for port and yard facilities. The Soviet Union, being aware of the Baltic's importance, has consistently sought throughout her history to exert control over the Baltic and its exits. The strategic importance of this body of water to Soviet maritime strategy has forced Moscow to divert considerable resources into defensive preparations along the Baltic littoral and to the development of amphibious forces capable of seizing strategic waterways leading to the North Sea.

RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC SEA: 1920—1970

A research paper prepared
by
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During the civil war which followed the Russian Revolution, Russia's naval power in the Baltic was reduced to insignificance. The Baltic Fleet lost the political confidence of the Government as a result of the Kronstadt mutiny of 1921, and its material and morale degenerated further in the confusion and chaos of the times. The Bolsheviks were too exhausted to continue their efforts to enforce their authority upon the Baltic States and Finland, and they accordingly accepted the independence and new frontiers of these states in 1920. The Soviet territory on the Baltic was confined to a narrow, icebound loophole at the eastern extremity of the Gulf of Finland, a foothold smaller than at any time since Peter the Great and one difficult to defend in the light of the rapid increase in aircraft technology. The Estonian boundary was less than 90

miles from Petrograd, and the Finnish boundary was but 23 miles distant.

Leningrad, thus renamed in 1924 on Lenin's death, remained a key center and the symbol of the October Revolution, even though it had ceased to be the capital since 1918. At that time the Government, threatened by a German advance, moved back to Moscow. With over 3 million people, Leningrad continued to be an industrial and cultural center of the first rank, and it became again the most significant port for foreign trade. The city in 1939 accounted for a tenth of all Soviet production. The security of this city was therefore a vital interest of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviets' first effort to increase the city's security was taken at the first disarmament conference of the League of Nations in 1925. There the Soviet delegate proposed that

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warships of nonriparian states not be allowed in the Baltic.¹ This effort was futile, however, as the proposal was not even discussed.

In 1927 the Soviet Government, apparently abandoning her efforts to improve her position by serious negotiation, proposed "complete, immediate, universal and simultaneous disarmament."² This tactic in later years became all too common. The Soviets sought to gain a propaganda advantage by making an apparently generous offer to which impossible and nonnegotiable conditions were attached. After the inevitable rejections, the assertion could then be made that all attempts were frustrated by the capitalistic countries.

One year later the First Five Year Plan was started, and it included a program to create a modern shipbuilding industry.³ During the Second and Third Five Year Plans, shipbuilding construction was increased. Also, many seaplanes were built and bought, and great attention was given to submarine construction. By 1940 the Soviets had an inventory of about 175 submarines, and the Red navy was regarded as numerically having the strongest submarine force in the world.⁴ Even at the time of her entrance into World War I, Russia had almost as many submarines as Germany.⁵

In 1931, in preparation for the disarmament conference to be held in 1932, the Soviet Union published an official account of the strength of its fleet. When the disarmament conference failed in 1933, the Soviets opened discussions with French and Italian naval architects and shipbuilders on the construction of major warships.⁶

In the mid-1930's a group of Soviet naval officers sought to alter the mission of the Soviet Navy from one of coastal warfare in liaison with the army to a high seas role backed by a fleet of capital ships. However, the great purge of 1937-1938 removed thousands of officers and the nation of a high seas

fleet. This drastic reduction in the Soviet officer corps adversely affected the operational readiness of the Baltic Fleet, a situation from which it was not able to recover before becoming involved in World War II.⁷

At the same time they were developing a naval capability, the Soviets were actively seeking security for their border areas by diplomatic means. In 1932-1933 the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Litvinoff, pressured Estonia, Latvia, and Poland into a nonaggression pact, which proved to be but a prelude to Moscow's takeover of these countries by military force.⁸

The rise of Hitler in 1933 presented new security problems—the indirect contest between Italy and Germany against Russia in Spain during the civil war (1936-1939), the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was signed by Germany, Japan, and Italy in 1936 and 1937, the German annexation of Austria in 1938, and the Munich crisis arising out of the desertion of Czechoslovakia. This was hardly mitigated by the apparent ineffectiveness of Britain and France in face of the fascist challenge to the security of the Soviet Union and the peace of Europe. There was evidence that these states secretly hoped that Germany would turn against the U.S.S.R. and away from Western Europe. In light of these events, Stalin apparently gave up any hope that France or Britain would take any action against Hitler and sought other means to ensure Soviet security.⁹

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Memel, Britain and France, now thoroughly alarmed at Hitler's ambitions and bad faith, began negotiating with the U.S.S.R. for a military alliance. Stalin demanded the right to send Russian troops into Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States, but these countries were naturally unwilling to allow this, and Britain and France were reluctant to put pressure upon them to agree.¹⁰

On 23 August 1939 the world was astonished to learn of the signing of a commercial treaty and a nonaggression pact for 10 years between Germany and the U.S.S.R. The Soviets placed great emphasis on a secret protocol appended to the pact which gave Moscow a free hand in Estonia, Latvia, parts of Finland, Poland, and Rumania. Germany was allowed similar liberties in Lithuania and western Poland.^{11, 12} Upon Stalin's suggestion, this line of demarcation was amended in the treaty of friendship signed 28 September 1939. This provided for the greater part of Lithuania to be added to the Soviet sphere of interest.¹³

Soon after the secret treaty, Moscow demanded the right to establish bases and place Soviet troops in each country, in each instance guaranteeing freedom and political integrity of the state concerned. Each country objected strongly, but Moscow massed troops and made threats of military invasion, solemnly repeating again and again that it would not interfere with the internal affairs of these states. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania finally succumbed to Soviet pressure and threats and allowed them the bases. Finland refused and was attacked in November 1939. Finland, though she had only 2 percent the population of the U.S.S.R., gave an excellent account of herself and staved off defeat for many months. By the time the Russo-Finnish war was concluded, the Soviets possessed the same extended coastline in the Baltic as after the third Polish partition a century and a half before. The Finnish frontier was now a hundred miles from Leningrad, the Russo-German frontier more than 500 miles.

There were other issues dividing the German and Soviet Governments. In an effort to restore the friendly atmosphere of a year before, Germany invited Molotov to Berlin to discuss further the relationship between the two countries. Molotov arrived on 11 November 1940. Hitler recognized the U.S.S.R.'s need

for safe warm-water ports and assured Molotov he was not interested in any eastward expansion.¹⁴ On the following day, however, the conflicting aims of the partners became so obvious that there was little hope for a further understanding. Molotov raised points concerning security for the Soviet Union in Bulgaria, on the Bosphorus, and in the Dardanelles. Not one of his questions was satisfactorily answered by Hitler. Hitler's unwillingness to acknowledge any Soviet interests in Europe was clear in the discussions. That same evening, during a conversation with Von Ribbentrop, Molotov emphasized Soviet interests not only in the Balkans, but also in free passage out of the Baltic.¹⁵

It should be mentioned that after his return to Moscow, a memorandum concerning the questions negotiated in Berlin was handed by Molotov to the German Ambassador on 25 November 1940. The Soviet Government never received a reply. It was clear to Hitler that most of Russia's ambitions were directed against what he considered German interests. Thus on 18 December 1940, 5 weeks after Molotov's visit, he issued the famous order known by the code name "Operation Barbarossa." It began with the following words: "The German armed forces must be prepared . . . to crush Soviet Russia in a swift campaign."¹⁶

The performance of the Russian Baltic Fleet in World War II was worse than in World War I and can be omitted. Much more relevant are Stalin's political efforts to expand Soviet influence in the Baltic area after the war.

After the German attack on Russia in June of 1941 and the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and the Axis Powers in December of that year, an entirely new diplomatic situation presented itself. Many conferences took place, and in all of these the territorial claims of Russia and her desire to increase her sphere of

influence were unmistakable.

In the discussion of strategy and postwar objectives with British Foreign Minister Eden in Moscow in December of 1941, Moscow, in spite of their poor military situation, demanded considerable territorial compensations. Stalin requested the recognition of Soviet boundaries as they were before the German attack and, in addition, hinted that the Soviet Government was very interested in carrying its frontiers into East Prussia and that it needed additional air and naval bases in Finland.

Churchill, who was underway to Washington, reacted violently and telegraphed his War Cabinet: "Stalin's demand about Finland, Baltic States . . . are directly contrary to the first, second, and third articles of the Atlantic Charter to which Stalin has subscribed. There can be no question whatsoever of our making such an agreement with the United States."¹⁷ But 3½ years later—in the Conference of Potsdam—the incorporation of the Baltic States and the restoration of the 1941 Finnish-Soviet frontier plus the occupation of Porkkala were no longer issues. When Stalin repeated his request of Tehran for at least one ice-free port in the Baltic and named the city of Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia, he had the sympathies of the President and Churchill.¹⁸ By the displacement of Poland in a westerly direction as far as the Oder River and the establishing of the adjacent Soviet Zone of Occupation as far as the River Trave, the sphere of Russian influence in the Baltic to the west expanded as never before.

In seeking his claims for territories and influence, Stalin skillfully exploited the differences between Roosevelt and Churchill. At the last day in Tehran, when the new western frontiers of Russia and Poland were discussed, it was agreed that the "European Advisory Committee" in London would undertake the task. Roosevelt again proposed that there should be two regions of

Germany under the United Nations or some form of international control. These were:

1. The area of the Kiel Canal and the city of Hamburg.

2. The Ruhr and the Saar.

Churchill opposed and made an alternative proposal, but Stalin preferred the President's plan.¹⁹ President Roosevelt also had raised the question of assuring the approaches to the Baltic Sea, having in mind some form of trusteeship to insure free navigation through the approaches. Stalin expressed himself favorably in regard to this question.²⁰

The Kiel Canal with the city of Hamburg was again a subject of territorial negotiations in Potsdam. It is significant that on 17 July 1945 Copenhagen Radio stated, causing high tension in Denmark, that Russia had demanded at the Potsdam Conference that all the entrances to the Baltic from the North Sea, including the Kiel Canal, should be placed under international control and that the U.S.S.R. should share in this.²¹ But the attitude of the U.S. President Truman was apparently changed, presumably by memoranda of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States.²²

Not to be omitted in the Soviet claim of territory was the struggle for the island of Fehmarn in the western Baltic. As already mentioned, there existed a European Advisory Commission in London, which was created at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in October 1943. The main task of this body was to make plans and recommendations upon the terms of surrender and the posthostilities period. The representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union were the Ambassadors in London, Mr. Winant and Mr. Gusev; the British representative was Lord William Strang.

In discussing the boundaries of the Zones of Occupation in Germany, Mr. Gusev attempted to secure the allocation of the island of Fehmarn in the Baltic to the Soviet zone. He fought

stubbornly to gain this further advance of Soviet influence in the Baltic. But Lord Strang no less stubbornly resisted, though the Foreign Office had authorized him to give way. He continued to stand fast, and Gusev dropped his demand.²³ It is hard to imagine what the current Baltic strategic and political situation might be had Lord Strang agreed to the Russian demand for the island of Fehmarn. The Warsaw Pact Powers could control the Kiel bay and the southern access to the important waterway, the Great Belt. The distance from Fehmarn to the opposite Danish island is 10 nautical miles, to Kiel 35 nautical miles, and to the port of Husum at the North Sea side of Jutland, 70 nautical miles. The credit for preventing a decisive step of the Soviets on their route to the North Sea and the command of the Baltic is due largely to Lord Strang.²⁴

Summing up the results of the conferences, it is apparent that the Soviets did measurably enhance their position in the Baltic. At the Yalta Conference, Stalin was in a strong bargaining position. The military superiority of his armies had been established. President Truman went to Potsdam in July 1945 with some doubts and misgivings.²⁵ The American and British representatives recognized that they had only three choices: agree with Moscow, drop the question without decision, or come to an open break. The Soviets demonstrated with remarkable clarity an ability to obstruct any decision that impinged upon their interests, and every such issue resulted in the second choice.

At the end of the war "the Soviet Union emerged at this time [Potsdam] as the unquestioned all-powerful influence in Europe."²⁶

In the Baltic, Moscow had gained a coastline of about 500 nautical miles under her direct control and another 350 nautical miles under the control of Warsaw Pact Powers. The 600 nautical

miles of the Finnish coastline were at least neutralized.

Never before in her history had Russia held such influence in this "Mediterranean of the North" as at the end of World War II. At once the Soviets began to consolidate their might in the conquered areas and to increase Russian influence and seapower in the Baltic. The inconvenient question of self-determination of the Baltic States and East Prussia was solved in the traditional Russian manner by expulsion, deportation, pursuit, imprisonment, forced citizenship, and Russification.²⁷

In the eyes of the Soviets, the Baltic is a peripheral sea under the predominance of one riparian state. They are essentially claiming that the Baltic is not a part of the high seas, but is a "closed sea." For any traffic and trade in the area, the Baltic should be only the point of destination or departure, and it should not be an open sea for any other maritime operation. Warships of any other than the adjacent states should not be admitted. At the Geneva Sea Conference in 1958, Ukraine and Rumania attempted, in defining the high seas, to add the following supplementary paragraph: "For certain seas a special regime of navigation may be established for historical reasons or by virtue of international agreements."

Khrushchev manifested in 1957 that the Baltic should be a sea of peace, and the Soviet Union supported the motion of the Ukraine and Rumania. However, having no chance of acceptance, the motion was withdrawn.²⁸ The Baltic Sea remains part of the high seas, but this fact is under constant pressure by the Soviet Union.

As everywhere in the high seas, the principle of the freedom of the seas has already been reduced by the extension of the territorial sea and by the extension of sovereign rights to the Continental Shelf. The Soviet Union claims for her territorial waters, 12 nautical miles;

Sweden and Finland, 4 nautical miles; the other states, 3 nautical miles. By the enclosing of gulfs and by the establishing of basis lines, all territorial waters are now increased, and the high seas space in the Baltic has become smaller. Because the whole Baltic Sea can be classified as a "continental shelf," renewed negotiations concerning rights in the Baltic can be expected.

It is well known that the Soviet Baltic Fleet is the strongest fleet in the Baltic. The ratio between the Baltic Fleet plus the navies of Poland and East Germany as opposed to the two NATO navies of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany is 5:1. If the Swedish Navy were added to the Western side, the ratio would be 4:1.

There are four main categories of Russia's Baltic naval strength:

1. About 80 submarines, most of them of modern type, including nuclear submarines.

2. A large surface fleet, including cruisers and large, modern, destroyer-type vessels equipped with SAM and medium- and long-range SSM. The missiles have both conventional and nuclear warheads.

3. Nearly 200 patrol craft and ASW vessels, among them the highest number of OSA/Komar boats of all four Soviet Fleets.

4. A very modern amphibious capacity for the embarkation of at least one division, plus marine infantry to support this capability.

Although the number of Baltic ships is impressive, a great number of these naval forces are not really suitable for the special characteristics of warfare in the Baltic. Of the submarines, only a few can be employed in the eastern and middle Baltic. The others are superfluous, especially the nuclear submarines. The guided missile ships and patrol craft are too numerous for Baltic use only. There is therefore far more of this type force than is needed in the Baltic. On the other hand, amphibious

forces are well suited for assaults in the western Baltic, especially against the Danish islands and possibly against Sweden. The strength of army and air force divisions of the Warsaw Pact forces in the western Baltic area gives the Soviets the capability to seize and secure the exits of the Baltic. Should general hostilities erupt, such a strategy would insure the passage of the significant Warsaw Pact subsurface and surface forces into the North Sea and the Atlantic. Secure exits would guarantee the passage of these forces to and from the great shipyards and training centers in the Baltic.

By seizing the exits, the Soviets would have reached the goal which the Germans in two world wars could not attain—to have entire supremacy in the Baltic. The U.S.S.R. could make the Baltic a Russian internal sea and reduce the fear of attack on the northern sea flank.

Like the Mediterranean in the south, the Baltic in the north has always been a most important tradeway connecting the riparian peoples. From the Russian point of view, the Eurasian block belongs together. Western Europe is the head of this huge landmass or, as the Kremlin says, "the balcony of the great Russian house."²⁹ It seems unbearable for the Russians that the natural accesses of their mighty country to the Atlantic are still locked by small nations. Despite the gain of coastline, this coast is still threatened by potential enemies. It is an open flank of the vulnerable heartland. Therefore, the Soviets, with their traditional emphasis on a defensive role, depopulated the coastal regions and built up extensive and expensive coastal defenses, including radar and missile sites in addition to an enormous fleet.

* * * * *

The Baltic Sea is important to the Soviet Union for several reasons. Its

location provides an avenue to a vulnerable flank from which the Soviet heartland can be threatened. The Soviets, fearing this eventuality, have invested sizable resources into constructing large naval and air forces capable of commanding the Baltic from the outset of any conflict. In response to the U.S. deployment of Polaris submarines and attack carriers equipped with long-range strike aircraft, the Kremlin has felt it necessary to develop a "blue water" strategy designed to engage these vessels with their lethal cargo as far from the home waters as possible. Control of the entrance to the Baltic would make it feasible for them to shut enemy warships out of the Baltic entirely.

A second reason for the Baltic's great importance is the existence of a sizable proportion of the yards, drydocks, submarine training facilities, and construction facilities which provide the logistical support of the newly augmented Soviet maritime establishment. A sizable proportion of the naval forces which would be required to intercept American carriers or submarines at a distance from the U.S.S.R. must pass through the Baltic en route to and from their bases and yards. The possibility that a small state such as Denmark could, in cooperation with NATO, effectively close the Baltic and frustrate this strategy is unacceptable to the Soviets, and they doubtless place a high priority on gaining uncontested control of this valuable area. Such control would also be a necessary preliminary to any attempt by the Soviets to seriously interfere with the maritime traffic which supplies Western Europe with vital fuel, ore, and military supplies. The Soviet Northern Fleet, handicapped by ice and a shortage of facilities, would have difficulty in accomplishing such a mission independently. While NATO forces could block the Baltic entrance with mines or other weapons, such an operation would be no simple matter unless the adjoining coastlines remained

in friendly hands.

To counter her disadvantages in the Baltic, the Soviet Union may well have contemplated an amphibious assault. Such an assault, carried out by the growing Soviet maritime capability in the Baltic and supported by the Baltic Fleet, would be difficult to counter with anything less than a major NATO naval force. An operation as such could be supported with a drive by the Red army and satellite forces into the Jutland peninsula. The Soviets have the resources to successfully conclude such an operation, and it is not impossible that they might initiate an action in this area, taking care to proclaim in advance the limited nature of their objectives. The West must be alert to the possibility of such a sortie.

Throughout its history the Soviet Government has consistently attempted to increase its influence and control in the Baltic. In recent years these efforts have been paralleled by the growth of the Soviet maritime establishment, a

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Capt. Erwin M. Rau graduated from the German Naval Academy in 1939 and was first assigned to the heavy cruiser *Bluecher*. During the Second World War he served in three minesweeping squadrons and attended the German Naval War Academy. After assisting in postwar minesweeping operations, Captain Rau was released from military service as a result of the Allied demilitarization of Germany. Since reentering the naval service in 1956, Captain Rau has commanded a minesweeping squadron, a destroyer, and a destroyer squadron. A recent graduate of the Naval Command Course at the U.S. Naval War College, he is presently serving as Type Commander Destroyers at Kiel, Germany.

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large part of which must utilize the Baltic for overhaul and logistical support. There is little difference in substance between the desires of the czars to achieve a "window" in the Baltic and

the present efforts of the Kremlin to gain control of that area. Moscow's seapower was planted in the Baltic, and a major part of it remains dependent upon it.

FOOTNOTES

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4. *Ibid.*, p. 401.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
6. David Woodward, *The Russians at Sea* (London: Kimber, 1965), p. 203.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
8. William G. Bray, *Russian Frontiers: from Muscovy to Khrushchev* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 227.
9. D.M. Sturley, *A Short History of Russia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966, c. 1964), p. 250.
10. B.H. Sumner, *A Short History of Russia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1949), p. 257.
11. Sturley, p. 250.
12. "Secret Additional Protocol" to the "Treaty of Nonaggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," Germany, Auswärtiges Amt., *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* (Washington: U.S. Dept. of State, 1948), p. 78.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
14. Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies; a Memoir-History of German Soviet Relations, 1918-1941* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 323.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 324.
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17. Winston L.S. Churchill, *The Second World War: the Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), v. III, p. 630.
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22. U.S. Dept. of State, Historical Office, *The Conference of Berlin*, v. II, p. 649, 1420-1422.
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24. *Ibid.*
25. Bray, p. 148.
26. William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 426.
27. Wolfgang Hoepker, *Die Ostsee ein Rotes Binnenmeer?* (Berlin: Mittler, 1958), p. 17.
28. G. Moritz, "Legal Problems of the Defense of the Baltic Sea Area," Lecture, German Ministry of Defense, Bonn: 1964, p. 2.
29. Gerhard Bidlingmaier, "The Strategic Importance of the Baltic Sea," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1958, p. 30.

The strength of the U.S. Navy depends directly upon appropriations received from Congress and upon public support for those appropriations. In recent years public and congressional opinion has demanded a closer scrutiny of defense contracts and a reduction in their size. It is thus increasingly important that civilian organizations such as the Navy League continue to publicize the need for a strong U.S. Navy and maritime establishment.

OBJECTIVES AND INFLUENCE OF THE NAVY LEAGUE

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Mr. Morgan L. Fitch, Jr.

During the past few years, there has been an increasing tendency on the part of Congress and the American people to scrutinize defense expenditures closely and reduce them in size. Many criticisms of the military and defense contractors have been aired. The military in general and the U.S. Navy in particular have not replied effectively to these criticisms. This has been due partly to Government constraint and partly to the Navy's traditional apolitical stance in public affairs.

In this situation the role of civilian organizations oriented toward the Navy which seek to present the Navy's case to the public is becoming increasingly important. The U.S. Navy is in greater need today of such civilian organizations than it was a few years ago, and unless the Navy can convince the public of the need for an adequate naval force, that force will deteriorate. In elucidat-

ing this proposition, I will elaborate some functions of such civilian organizations and indicate how a navy can make its mission understood.

The public, catalyzed by the students, is asserting a greater direct effect upon the policies of Government. The students are focusing more directly on the problems of society and are actively doing something about it. A news commentator has epitomized the situation in noting that what the students *oppose* is right, but what they *propose* is wrong. The public is bringing greater pressure upon the legislators and the administrators in respect to specific issues. However, it should be understood that the arsenal of public recalcitrance has not even begun to be tapped. Indeed, the current hue and cry of the students, militants, and media are minor compared to the avalanche of an aroused public.

The university situation is particularly disturbing. A year ago the students were focusing their attention on the draft, recruiting on campus by defense industries and the military services, and the Vietnam conflict. While the campus has continued to focus on Vietnam, and now Cambodia, greater emphasis has been directed against military officer training programs on the university campus and against university involvement in defense contracts. It is to be noted that the draft is being changed, military officer training programs are being emasculated from college curricula, and defense contracts with universities are being reevaluated by both universities and the Defense Establishment.

Public doubt has caused the Congress to revolt against traditional practices of providing defense appropriations, and Congress is requiring considerably increased justification for defense spending. Considerable notice has been given the so-called military-industrial complex, and the foibles of this arrangement are in issue. Authorization for antiballistic missiles installations almost was defeated by the Congress, and currently the Congress is debating circumscribing present military actions in the field. Presently, some Congressmen are asserting equal control over military deployment to that of the President. Of more immediate importance to the U.S. Navy is a public debate over its force levels, including the numbers of carriers and nuclear submarines. The Congress attempted this year to further circumscribe the public information capability of the Navy, as well as the other military services, and this was but a further manifestation of a trend toward restriction upon information out of the military services.

The administration has initiated and received a report on an all-volunteer military service. The price tag is substantial, and questions are being raised in the civilian community as to the desirability of a wholly professional

Military Establishment. The administration has placed the Navy and other services into the field of sociology in compelling them to accept a large number of enlistees who are below its qualification standards. As a result, recruit training is involved in literacy training and is faced with a large number of disciplinary problems from this substandard group. It has been suggested that the Naval Reserve engage in teaching courses in remedial reading in the communities and that naval training centers be used in local neighborhood problems wholly unconnected to any naval mission. These are undertakings being imposed for the believed good of the people in this country but are generally foreign to traditional missions of a navy. However, in the Vietnam conflict the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have been involved in pacification, Vietnamization, medical care, and rebuilding of villages and quarters, and many of these are, at least, unusual Navy and Marine Corps missions.

These various forms of public involvement are mentioned to show the significant impact which the people are having upon the Military Establishment generally, including the U.S. Navy. This involvement has seriously reduced the force level of the Navy, eroded its manpower, and affected its sources of personnel. At the same time, the capability of the Navy to defend itself has been sapped. Accordingly, the Navy's need for Navy-oriented civilian organizations is probably more acute now than it has ever been, assuming, of course, that this Nation is to defend itself and support its allies. A ship can hardly exist without a keel, and a navy cannot long remain in being without the support and understanding of the people.

Before becoming more specific, three aspects of the present situation should be noted. First, you should not confuse the day-to-day reporting in the media with the feelings of the American people. This reporting is becoming

increasingly misleading and inaccurate, and this fact is being documented. It is a combination of a play upon the emotions of the public and a crass attempt to sell papers or obtain ratings. Second, the student confrontations on various issues should not be considered to reflect the attitude of the American people. We find that the student positions are largely based upon emotion and cannot be sustained, if for no other reason, because the group is being largely replaced year by year without leaving any effective continuing structure. In actual confrontation, I have found that the student positions are generally not based upon logic or reason, and, while simplistic solutions are offered, they have not been meaningful alternatives. This does not deny the effectiveness of the students in catalyzing action by the people and Government. Third, the longer range effect of the present situation upon the below-college group and the integration of the present college students into the establishment is indeterminate at the present time. Briefly, the present situation is very confusing, and its future impact remains to be seen. However, there is an immediate need for a greater understanding by the people.

Accordingly, a navy must find effective communication with the public. Several choices are open to it.

1. It can use its own public information capability. However, as indicated, this has been consistently restricted to the U.S. Navy.

2. It can rely upon the legislators to understand its problems by presenting its information to the legislators. As indicated, this support by the U.S. Congress has been eroding.

3. It can place its destiny in the hands of an administration, but this has resulted in consistent reduction in Navy capability in the United States as well as imposition of nonnaval missions.

4. It can foster a strong Reserve force which can bridge the Navy with

the civilian segment. However, this force has been consistently shrunk in the United States to a point where its continuance is now in question.

5. It can promote an industry relationship, but the "military-industry complex" is currently under attack in the civilian sector.

6. It can seek public understanding on a much broader base through appropriate liaison with the people. This is what Navy-oriented civilian organizations are all about.

In the United States we have a plethora of civilian organizations which are already in being. These include the political parties, service groups, business and labor groups, veterans groups, educational groups like the Navy League, military groups, and youth groups.

Almost all of these organizations have regular meetings and parochial publications. The most cost-effective way of achieving public understanding is to utilize the existing structures of these organizations. This can be done by providing information, speakers, and assistance to these various groups. However, this will not happen automatically, and this relationship can be catalyzed by the Navy League or another military service-oriented group. Joint meetings of the Navy League with other civilian groups is quite effective.

There is always a tendency for one to talk to one's friends, and it is much easier for a naval officer to talk to a favorable group than to an unfavorable group. It is necessary to assess the utilization of naval personnel, which is in short supply, to see that enough of them are exploring new horizons. The effectiveness of a Navy-oriented civilian group can be measured by the number of outside contacts which are provided to the Navy. The Navy League of the United States endeavors to provide speaking platforms and foster opportunities for publication of the seapower story.

In having the opportunities to talk to

various groups and people, the personnel should gain the opportunity of assessing the feelings of the people. Too often, the speaker flies in, makes a speech, and flies back to his home base. He has said his piece, but he has missed the opportunity to learn something. Here, the Navy League can provide and has provided meaningful opportunity for dialog.

Because of the difficulties in determining the status of a navy with the public, which is referred to as its "image," the navy needs to measure its image on a realistic basis and then implement the findings. The U.S. Navy did this some years ago with a professional survey which resulted in the Harris report. It is now out-of-date. The Navy League of the United States has, in cooperation with the Commandant of the Ninth Naval District and a Naval Reserve Public Relations Company, conducted a new survey and is in the process of constructing a program around the results of the survey. This effort, if continued on a cooperative basis and if viewed objectively, portends an extremely meaningful undertaking and should lead to improved recognition and retention.

While fostering the relations with the public is extremely important, the long-range future of the U.S. Navy is bottomed on the youth of this country and its ultimate interest in a navy. A current debate is being waged, however, as to the extent of involvement of the U.S. Navy with youth. It is argued, on the one hand, that it is the duty of youth groups to deliver up Navy-oriented young people, and, therefore, the U.S. Navy should not be concerned with young people under enlistment age. On the other hand, it is argued that there is tremendous competition for young people in the United States, and if the Navy is to gain qualified and properly motivated young people it is going to have to become more involved in the youth of this country.

Presently, the U.S. Navy has a rather disorganized and somewhat sporadic liaison with youth. It contacts youth through its recruiting program, which is directly geared to immediate personnel requirements. By law, it maintains a NJROTC program in high schools, and there are now 78 units established with 20 to be formed in the next year. This program includes course work in oceanography, meteorology, celestial navigation, and naval orientation. However, various States have banned military courses in the high schools, and the attacks on the college campuses upon ROTC programs indicate a possible threat to this program.

The U.S. Navy provides limited support to the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Corps which numbers some 7,000 cadets. This corps is like the Sea Cadets in many of your countries and trains on the Naval Reserve curricula for enlisted men. The U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Corps is not part of the Navy and is not trained by the Navy. It is a Federal corporation, and its

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Mr. Morgan L. Fitch, Jr., received a B.S. in chemical engineering from the Illinois Institute of Technology in 1943 and following World War II entered the University of Michigan where he earned a doctor of law degree (J.D.). He served in World War II as a naval officer, experiencing many of the actions in the Western Pacific aboard aircraft carriers. Mr. Fitch has had a long association with the Navy League, serving as National President from April 1965 until May 1967. During his affiliation with the Navy League, he directed considerable effort to promoting the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Program and the Navy League's Shipmate Program. He was twice awarded the Distinguished Public Service Award of the Secretary of the Navy in 1960 and 1965. Mr. Fitch is a partner of Anderson, Luedeka, Fitch, Even and Tabin of Chicago, Illinois.

officers are volunteers serving without pay. The Navy League of the United States has provided substantial financial support and leadership for the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Corps. Its growth is largely limited by limitations upon support by the U.S. Navy.

The Boy Scouts of America has a Sea Explorer program numbering some 20,000 young people. This program ranges from sailing to scuba diving, from oceanography to seamanship, and is broadly divided between sea discovery and yachting skills. The Navy provides practically no support at the national level, which is to be distinguished from the substantial Air Force and Army support to scouting. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy is a substantial beneficiary of Sea Exploring.

The U.S. Navy, through its Office of Naval Research, lends support to a Science Cruiser program for high school students and, through the Naval Air Training Command, is a sponsor of a model airplane competition.

The current limited undertakings of the Navy Department with youth, even assuming that it is doing all that it can do, may cost it dearly in the future. It is today's youth which become the college students of tomorrow and the public of the future. If enough of the youth are not oriented to the sea today, then you can expect a very limited navy in the future. This is especially true for the reasons outlined in the beginning, namely the increasing control of the public over the destinies of the U.S. Navy.



The Navy of the United States is the right arm of the United States and is emphatically the peacemaker.

Theodore Roosevelt, 1858-1919

SET AND DRIFT


22D ANNUAL GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS

The week of 15 to 19 June found some 208 distinguished and prominent civilian guests of the Secretary of the Navy, 32 active flag and general officers, and 125 senior Reserve officers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard taking part in the 22d Annual Global Strategy Discussions with the students, faculty, and staff members of the Naval War College. These annual discussions are the culmination of the year's academic activity at the Naval War College and provide an opportunity for a valuable exchange of ideas between the students and faculty of the college and the selected representatives of a wide range of professional interests. The discussions bring together the divergent viewpoints of business, labor, the clergy, the bar, the media, the academic community, Government, and the Armed Forces in an effort to arrive at an understanding of the problems confronting the United States in formulating and implementing global strategy.

The major theme of the group discussions during the week was the Nixon Doctrine and the prospective role of the Armed Forces in implementing it. In the course of the discussions the participants examined American foreign policy in terms of specific geographic areas—Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Pacific, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. They then discussed alternate strategies for each area.

Highlighting the 5-day program were scheduled guest lecturers, each a recognized authority in his particular field.

These speakers addressed the participants on subjects of major significance which must be considered in the formulation of global strategy. On the opening day of the discussions, Vice Adm. Richard G. Colbert, President of the Naval War College, delivered his welcoming remarks. These remarks were followed immediately by an address entitled "The Challenge of the Seventies," which was delivered by the Honorable John W. Warner, Under Secretary of the Navy. On the second day of the discussions the Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, commented at length on "The Formulation of Global Strategy." On Wednesday, 17 June, the Honorable Harry F. Byrd, Jr., U.S. Senator from Virginia, addressed the participants on "The Outlook in the Senate for Advice and Consent." The following day, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, the recently appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed "The Role of the U.S. Navy in National Strategy." The discussions ended on Friday, 19 June, with an address by Dr. Walt W. Rostow, Professor of Economics and History at the University of Texas. Dr. Rostow discussed the "Domestic Determinants of U.S. Foreign Policy."



GRADUATION EXERCISES OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

MONDAY, 22 JUNE 1970

Highlight of the Naval War College 1970 graduation ceremony was an address by the Honorable L. Mendel Rivers, Democratic Representative from South Carolina and Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. His address, titled "The Challenge of the Seventies," reiterated the difficulties which the armed services are likely to encounter in the coming decade and the dedication and patriotism which will be required to meet them.

Congressman Rivers warned the graduates that in the immediate future they are likely to see cutbacks in defense spending which will make it necessary for the various services to accomplish their missions with a minimum of hardware and personnel. This will entail certain risks to our national security, but the mood of Congress is to increase the funding of domestic programs while reducing spending on national defense.

Still another problem which the military must face within the next decade is the problem of public relations. The general public will be infected with a post-Vietnam syndrome in which it is likely to exhibit less regard for the Armed Forces. Certain segments of public opinion will be vocal in their opposition to what they regard as militarism and the "military-industrial complex," and, as a result, the military services will be operating in an unfavorable environment.

As Chairman Rivers stated:

In the years ahead you are going to need all the inspiration and all the knowledge that this great college has given you, because you will be asked to assume greater responsibility in a time more difficult for a military man than any of your predecessors ever faced.

You will be operating often in a nonmilitary environment, even an antimilitary environment. You will need tact and patience and fortitude and an ability to communicate with those who start off with a bias against your service.

The great danger in this retrenchment, according to Congressman Rivers, is that cutbacks in military spending may result inadvertently in a return to the doctrine of massive retaliation. When funds become scarce, the tendency will be to spend them on maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent at the expense of conventional forces, and this, in its turn, will promote the concept that this deterrent should be used on a broad basis. This trend would be destabilizing globally and would increase the chances of a major conflict.

The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee expressed great concern over the fact that the decline in the defense expenditures by the United States coincided with an expansive military buildup on the part of the Soviet Union. The phenomenal increase in Soviet strategic missile forces and the growing fleet of Soviet attack submarines were cited as being especially ominous.

There is definitely a prospect, also, that the overall cutbacks for defense will leave the Navy bearing a larger share of the U.S. defense burdens. A possible reduction in foreign bases, the Nixon Doctrine, and the often cited "Rimlands Strategy" all imply a greater role for seapower in the years ahead.

In his summation, Congressman Rivers urged the graduates of the War College to be proud of their country and to be willing to make sacrifices for it.

I urge you not to be complacent about the future and don't for one moment think that someone else will do the job that has to be done to restore sanity to the

direction in which this Nation is going. Discuss it with your friends, your relatives, your family every chance you get.

You can walk away from this challenge or you can meet it and guide it. Don't apologize to anyone for being a member of this great profession. . . . Your forefathers fought for this Nation, and you have fought for this Nation.

You may have to fight for this Nation again. . . .

We are now in the most serious decade in our history. Whether we survive to enter another decade will depend to a very large measure upon the extent of your wisdom, the degree of your motivation, your stability, your integrity, and, above all, your patriotism.

List of Graduates

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PRISONERS OF WAR

AS INSTRUMENTS

OF FOREIGN POLICY

Until the middle of the 20th century there was a slow but definite progression toward more humane treatment for prisoners of war. Beginning with the Second World War, however, prisoners were increasingly used for political purposes and subjected to harsh and callous treatment. The United States has experienced this retrogression firsthand in both Korea and Vietnam. It is anxious not only to protect the welfare of its own prisoners, but also to restore and broaden the practice of providing humane treatment for all prisoners of war.

A research paper prepared

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Historical Development of the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Prisoners of war historically have been used as instruments of foreign policy. From ancient times to the Vietnam war there has been a growing concern for the humane treatment of prisoners of war. This trend is evident from an examination of the attempts to codify the standards of treatment accorded to prisoners into recognized rules of international law. This change of standards falls logically into four stages. The division between these stages is not sharp and precise. Rather, overlapping appears as the new method of treatment replaces the old in gradual transition. Nevertheless, a definite progression is noticeable in which each mode of handling prisoners became, in turn, the generally accepted practice.

It is during the last stage, the 20th

century, that the most definitive rules for humane treatment of prisoners of war have been developed into international law in the aftermath of World War II. It seems a paradox, though, that concurrently the actual treatment of these victims of war has degenerated to the treatments common during the earlier stages.

In ancient times, from the first armed conflicts recorded in the history of mankind, the almost universal fate of the captive was death.¹ He was either slaughtered on the battlefield, tortured and put to death after the battle, or used as a sacrificial offering. The circumstances varied, but his fate was almost inevitable. Testimony of this practice is given in ancient historical writings, including the Old Testament, as well as in scenes depicted on bas-reliefs.²

The transition to the second stage also took place in ancient times. It probably was largely motivated by economic considerations. Ancient conquerors came to the realization that profit was to be gained by sparing the lives of captives and making them their slaves. Gradually it became the accepted custom to make slaves of those captured in battle. Entire nations were subjected to slavery. In fact, captivity resulting from battle was the origin of the practice of slavery.³ The Romans generally enslaved their prisoners, although they also killed some outright and developed others as gladiators.

Humanitarian concern for captives appeared for the first time in the third stage. Yet, the basic economic factor remained very much in evidence. Prisoners not held in slavery were returned to their homes after payment of ransom. The practice of ransom had been used previously on occasion, notably in ancient tribal warfare and by the Greeks and Romans. However, during these times the practice was more an isolated act of mercy rather than the prevailing custom. It was not until the Middle Ages that ransom supplanted slavery as the normal practice in the fate of prisoners of war, especially those of aristocratic origin.⁴ A significant codification of the practice of ransom resulted when the Lateran Council of 1179 prohibited enslaving captives who were Christian.⁵

The final stage was attained with the emergence of the nation-state system and modern international law. Humanitarian considerations became increasingly influential as the treatment of prisoners of war was addressed and defined in international agreements. Most historians trace the start of this stage to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War. This was the first international instrument to establish modern rules for the treatment of prisoners of war. It provided that prisoners of both sides

were to be freed without payment of ransom and without exception or reservations.⁶

Shortly before this Hugo Grotius, the eminent Dutch jurist commonly referred to as the Father of International Law, published in 1625 his great work, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*. Grotius exerted profound influence on the development of international law with his appeal to the law of nature as a moderating influence in the conduct of war. Although he continued to recognize the right to enslave captives, he advocated exchange and ransom instead.⁷

The fourth stage was characterized by bilateral treaties and unilateral declarations. Between 1581 and 1864 there were at least 291 international documents dealing with the treatment of the sick, wounded, and captured. One of the more important was the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Prussia in 1785. The First Geneva Convention (1864) was patterned closely after it.⁸

The first tentative step in the transition to the great multilateral treaties of the 20th century was the diplomatic conference called by Switzerland at Geneva in 1864. The 12 participating nations produced the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864 for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Soldiers Wounded in Armed Forces in the Field.⁹ Its 10 articles were the first attempt to create international law by virtue of the ratification or accession of all the great powers. This First Geneva Convention was ratified by all the powers by 1867. It was ratified by the United States in 1882 and subsequently by a total of 54 nations.¹⁰

From this time until around the turn of the century and the start of the Hague Conventions of 1899, several attempts were made to codify the rules of warfare, including treatment of prisoners. The most notable of these occurred in September 1880, when the Institute of International Law adopted a

"Manual of the Laws and Customs of War" at Oxford, England. Although never adopted, the "Oxford Manual," as it became known, influenced the treatment of prisoners of the Boer War.¹¹

The First Hague Conference, called in May 1899, produced three conventions. Convention No. II dealt with the laws and customs of land warfare and contained a section of 17 articles concerning the treatment of prisoners of war.¹² These articles were based largely on the Oxford Manual and were ratified as part of Convention No. II by 24 nations, including the United States.

The Geneva Convention of 1906 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and Wounded in Armies in the Field, drafted by representatives of 35 nations, contained 33 articles which were more comprehensive and explicit than those of the First (1864) Geneva Convention.

The Second Hague Conference, held in 1907, produced 14 conventions covering the conduct of war, which included an updating and improving of the articles pertaining to prisoners of war contained in the Hague Convention No. II of 1899.

A distinction should be made between the laws and rules of the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906 (as well as the subsequent 1929 and 1949 conventions) and laws and rules resulting from the conventions of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Both conventions are based on, and motivated by, humanitarian considerations. There is some redundancy between the two, particularly with regard to prisoners of war. Basically, the Hague Conventions codify the rules of war and attempt to restrict the use of weapons and the application of force in war. The Geneva Conventions, on the other hand, are specifically concerned with the protection of the individual against the abuse of force in wartime.¹³

The Two World Wars. The experience

of World War I demonstrated the need for increased protection for prisoners of war and the necessity of improving the provisions of the Geneva and Hague Conventions. Starting in 1921 the International Law Association and the International Red Cross (IRC) recommended review and amplification of the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1906. These efforts led the Swiss Government to issue invitations to 47 nations to attend a conference in Geneva, starting in July 1929, to revise the conventions on prisoners of war. On 27 July the delegates adopted two conventions; the Geneva Convention of 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick of Armies in the Field and the Geneva Convention of 1929 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. In approving these conventions the delegates were for the first time attempting to create international law directed toward the humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war rather than merely recording existing practices as had been done at the two Hague Conferences (1899 and 1907).¹⁴

By the time of American entry into World War II in December 1941, 35 nations had ratified or announced their adherence to the Geneva Conventions of 1929. Six additional nations announced their adherence during the war. The U.S.S.R. acceded in 1932 to the convention concerning humane treatment of the sick and wounded. However, she refused to accept as binding the convention relative to prisoner-of-war treatment on the contention that the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 was adequate. Japan never did announce adherence to the Geneva Convention of 1929.¹⁵

The cruel and inhumane treatment of Allied prisoners of war at the hands of the Japanese has been well chronicled. The saga of the Bataan Death March remains infamous. The apparent basis for this treatment can be traced, in part,

to a differing Oriental philosophy and a general antipathy for Caucasians. The Japanese interrogated prisoners of war primarily to obtain military information; they were required to perform tiring menial work under adverse conditions and were severely punished for violation of rules. The difference in diets between the Japanese captors and the Western prisoners of war also contributed to the plight of the captives.¹⁶

The Nazi regime of Hitler earned its mark in history for inhumanity. The genocide of an estimated 6 million Jews and the ruthless reigns of terror imposed in occupied areas of Europe during World War II led to the Nuremberg Trials. Despite this barbarous record, the treatment of American and British prisoners of war by their German captors, though not exemplary, did reflect conscious attempts to adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1929.¹⁷

The record of treatment of prisoners of war in the hands of the U.S.S.R. during and after World War II is atrocious. In 1939, when the Nazi-Soviet pact was still in effect, it was known that the bulk of the Polish Officer Corps had surrendered and were in Russian hands. In April 1943 the Germans announced to the world the discovery of mass graves in the Katyn forest containing the remains of some 8,000 Polish officers. The Soviets denied the allegation, labeling the German announcement a propaganda ploy. However, the Soviets, not the Germans, refused to permit an investigation by the IRC. Subsequently, it was confirmed that this mass murder was perpetrated by the Russians in 1940.¹⁸

Further indications of Soviet callousness toward human life in general and prisoners of war in particular are given in the Churchill memoirs. During the "Big Three" summit meeting at Tehran in December 1943, Stalin announced that it would probably be necessary to liquidate some 50,000 officers of the "German Commanding Staff" as a

means of insuring a permanent solution to the problem of postwar German resurgence. Churchill was so appalled by the proposal that he abruptly left the meeting.

The total number of German prisoners of war and civilians displaced to Russia to "help rebuild Russia" will probably never be known.¹⁹ Indications of the cynical and ruthless disregard of all humanitarian principles by the U.S.S.R. were evidenced at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, when Molotov announced on 14 March 1947 that 1,003,974 German prisoners of war had been released and that 890,532 were still being held. Not only was this "new" figure of 1,894,506 significantly lower than the previously announced total of 3,180,000 in May 1945, it was bland admission that 890,532 were still held captive in violation of the terms of surrender imposed on the Germans at Rheims on 7 May 1947 and the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945.²⁰

Despite repeated attempts on the part of the IRC and the Governments of the United States, France, and Great Britain, the Soviets refused inspections, negotiations, or in some instances even to reply to official queries on the subject of repatriation of German or Japanese prisoners of war.²¹ Finally, in the fall of 1950, this matter of U.S.S.R. failure to repatriate or otherwise account for prisoners of war was presented to the United Nations. Germany reported that as of March 1950 some 923,000 German prisoners of war, verified in the hands of the U.S.S.R., were still missing. Japan listed at least 376,939 prisoners of war unaccounted for at the end of 1949.

On 14 December 1950 the United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 43 to 5, adopted a resolution expressing concern over the large number of prisoners of war that had "neither been repatriated nor otherwise accounted for." The resolution provided for an Ad Hoc Commission to settle the issue.²²

The U.S.S.R. adamantly refused to cooperate with the commission investigation.²³

The harsh treatment of German and Japanese prisoners of war by the Soviets could be expected, though not condoned, based on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war by these nations. The Japanese, as mentioned earlier, treated all prisoners in a subhuman manner. The German treatment of Russian prisoners was more harsh than their treatment of U.S. and British prisoners.²⁴ The Soviets and Germans did not provide lists of prisoners of war to each other as specified by the Geneva Convention of 1929; whereas the United States and the British did exchange lists with the Germans.

In October 1941, the Red army issued a directive to all Communist interrogators which included the following instructions: "From the very moment of capture by the Red Army, and during the entire period of captivity, the enemy enlisted men and officers must be under continuous indoctrination by our political workers and interrogators."²⁵ This directive was followed by a series of other directives explaining in detail the type of information to be extracted from the German prisoners, how to conduct the interrogations, and the manner and extent of indoctrination. In general, these instructions provided for an initial interrogation of about 30 minutes on purely military matters as soon as conditions permitted. Subsequent interrogations were to be made at regimental level, again on military matters. Officers and senior NCO's were also programed for further interrogation on military matters at division level.

Upon arrival at a permanent camp, prisoners were earmarked for more intensive interrogation. The permanent camps were controlled by the "MVD," under the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, not the Ministry of Defense. It was during this period that a

fundamental evaluation was made concerning the future of each prisoner of war. The prisoner was placed in either of two categories. Either he was a subject for indoctrination or he was not, in which case he was consigned to a labor camp.

Understanding of the Soviet treatment of prisoners of war can be gained from the writings of survivors such as Sgt. Maj. Helmut M. Fehling, who endured some 6 years of captivity from October 1943 to November 1949, and Lt. Col. Wolfgang Schell, imprisoned from January 1945 to October 1955, almost 11 years. Their vivid firsthand accounts evidence the attention given to the NCO's and officers in the interrogation process leading to the fundamental categorization of the prisoners. Until this decision was made, physical pressure was applied only to selected individuals, never on a group basis. However, once it was determined through interrogation that a prisoner was not a profitable candidate for indoctrination, he was sent to a labor camp to assist in rebuilding Russia. The treatment of these "labor" prisoners, as distinct from those who were earmarked for indoctrination, was unbelievably inhuman. It was this group of labor-camp prisoners who faced a constant battle for survival and whose ranks were thinned by the hundreds of thousands not able to survive the battle. For example, of the 93,000 prisoners captured at the battle of Stalingrad in February 1943, only 6,000 survived to return to Germany through 1958.²⁶

Within months of the German invasion of Poland and Russia in June 1941, the Red Army recognized the need to employ psychological warfare in support of military operations. By early 1942 the Seventh Division of the Red Army (propaganda) was operating on the eastern front. German emigrés and prisoners of war were used. Victories of the German Armies and crudeness of the propaganda efforts initially

hampered Soviet efforts. In early 1942, in an attempt to improve the system, the Soviets established anti-Fascist schools (A-schools) staffed with selected cadres to indoctrinate prisoners of war and train them for use with the 7th Division. The A-school candidates were carefully chosen through a vigorous and repetitive interrogation screening process. The first "hard-core" groups were limited to 50 to 100 prisoners.²⁷ This initial effort of using prisoners of war as propaganda instruments to undermine the morale of the frontline troops was greatly expanded as more collaborators became available from the mounting number of prisoners being taken and as the prisoners discerned the difference in treatment at labor and political camps.

The A-schools, where students were offered lectures in Marxist-Leninist doctrines, group discussions, self-criticism, autobiographical critiques, and rigid discipline, were continued until the early 1950's. Most hard-core graduates were later transferred to East Germany to occupy key positions in the administration, party bureaucracy, and media of mass communications.

Post-World War II and the Korean War. Even before the full story of the shocking treatment visited upon millions of prisoners of World War II had completely unfolded, it was apparent that the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and conventions of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 required revision. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) prepared four draft conventions. These were reviewed by the Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross Societies at Geneva in July 1946 and the Conference of Government Experts at Geneva in April 1947. They were then considered by the 17th International Conference of the Red Cross at Stockholm in August 1948.²⁸

Finally, the draft conventions were submitted to a diplomatic conference of

59 nations at Geneva in April 1949. The conventions did not come into force until 21 October 1950, and none of the parties in the Korean war had ratified the conventions at the time of the outbreak of hostilities of 25 June 1950. In prompt response to a query from the ICRC, the United States on 3 July 1950 announced full adherence to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Two days later, on 5 July, the South Korean Government formally announced its adherence to the conventions. As with U.S. acceptance, South Korea agreed to admit representatives of the ICRC into the area and to cooperate fully with those representatives. The Chinese Communists did not state a position until 13 July 1952, when Chou En-lai announced their recognition of the conventions "since they are basically conducive to a lasting peace."²⁹

Repeated messages from the ICRC to the North Korean Government were ignored. On 13 July 1950, Pak Heu Yeu, North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed a message to the Secretary General of the United Nations stating that: "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is strictly abiding by the principles of the Geneva Convention in respect to prisoners of war."³⁰ With this message and subsequent commitments on the part of United Nations members providing forces in support of South Korea, all participants in this first war after promulgation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 had indicated adherence.

By mid-July 1950, representatives of the ICRC were admitted to South Korea to commence on-site inspection and to report concerning United Nations Command (UNC) treatment of North Korean prisoners of war.

As of 2 August 1950, the North Korean Government had not responded to any ICRC query or message on the subject. Repeated attempts, even through the Chinese Government in Peking, to gain permission for an ICRC

delegate to enter North Korea had met with silence and inaction. Finally, on 15 August, a ray of hope was seen when permission was granted for an ICRC delegate to enter China to negotiate with the North Korean Embassy representatives on entry into North Korea.³¹ This hope proved to be unfounded, and further appeal to Jacob Malik, U.S.S.R. representative on the U.N. Security Council, was ignored.

Even after presentation of lists of 5,230 North Korean soldiers held captive by the UNC in mid-September 1950, the ICRC could not elicit any communication or reaction from Pyongyang. The North Koreans did not attempt to provide packages for these captives nor did they try to get mail to or from them. The message was as clear as it had been from the Russians of World War II. The Communists, whose governments are founded on concern for the workers and peasants, were not concerned with the welfare of their prisoners of war while they were in the hands of the UNC.

The extent of the brutal, cruel, and inhuman treatment imposed on UNC captives by the North Koreans was not fully known at the time. Yet, shortly after the Inchon landings, gruesome examples were uncovered by the advancing U.N. forces. At Kumchon, Taejon, and other places, as the UNC forces advanced up the peninsula, the evidence of brutal mass executions of UNC prisoners of war and civilians was uncovered.³² The full extent of the barbaric treatment of UNC prisoners of war at the hands of the North Koreans did not become known until after the prisoners had been repatriated in August and September 1953.

In piecing together the threads of the story of U.S. Marines captured during the Korean war, a Marine author documented that of one group of 38 U.S. officers of all services captured by the North Koreans through September 1950, only nine survived to the spring

of 1951.³³ Though the numbers involved were small compared to other conflicts, especially World War II, the overall record of treatment of UNC prisoners of war in the hands of the North Koreans matches any in sheer cruelty and inhumanity.³⁴ Of the known 7,190 U.S. prisoners of war captured during the Korean war, 2,730, or 38 percent, died in captivity. This is a higher percentage than experienced in our own Civil War in the middle of the last century or of U.S. captives of the Japanese during World War II. The majority of these 2,730 who died were captured during the first 6 months of the war when the North Koreans had custody of the prisoners of war.³⁵ In addition to the 2,730 who died in captivity, 1,036 others have been authenticated as victims of battlefield atrocities, mostly in massacres such as at Kumchon and Taejon.³⁶

The intervention of the Chinese in the conflict in November 1950, in addition to changing the conduct of the war, also dramatically changed the enemy's treatment and approach in handling and processing UNC prisoners of war held captive by the Communists. The Chinese took over control of the prisoner-of-war camps starting in December 1950.³⁷ No longer was the main theme of treatment senseless beatings, public parading of prisoners before enemy citizenry who stared, spit upon, and beat them, and limited (though frequently brutal) interrogation for military information. Concurrent with the Chinese intervention came a marked change in the treatment of the prisoners.

The Chinese publicly referred to their policy as the "Lenient Policy." Initially, the UNC prisoners could not believe they were not to be shot or otherwise maltreated upon capture. Rather, the Chinese advised most prisoners that they only wanted to help them now that they had been "liberated from the control of the imperialists."³⁸

By January 1951 the Chinese had established their first model indoctrination center at a permanent prisoner-of-war camp near the Yalu River town of Pyoktong. Designated "Camp 5" by the Chinese, it became known facetiously among the UNC prisoners as "Peaceful Valley."³⁹ Originally about 300 American prisoners of war were selected for this pilot indoctrination center and institution of the "Lenient Policy." Here the pattern of treatment quickly became abundantly clear. Calculated leniency was shown in return for "cooperation"; harassment, mental and physical pressure for neutrality; and brutality for resistance to their "leniency."⁴⁰

To the Chinese, cooperation meant attending classes on the Marxist-Leninist theories; informing on fellow prisoners who resisted; signing documents and petitions seeking peace or acknowledging the "rightness" of the Communist cause; broadcasts of the same type propaganda or even stronger denouncements of the "American Wall Street warmongers"; and making self-accusations before fellow prisoners. These "progressives," as the cooperators became known, found themselves under mounting pressure to succumb to the increasing demands of the Chinese indoctrination program. This trend, so easy to discern in a position of comfortable reflection, was not apparent to many subjected to the treatment under the conditions existing in "Peaceful Valley." Paradoxically, many prisoners became progressives to be relieved of the physical and psychological pressures imposed by the Chinese captors. The same held true for the "neutrals," or those who gave indications that their will might be broken, but had not yet overtly cooperated.⁴¹

The misnomer of the "Lenient Policy" became strikingly apparent to the "reactionaries," or resisters to Chinese indoctrination. The cases of Capt. Jesse V. Booker, USMC, and Maj. John

J. Dunn, U.S. Army, are typical of the treatment visited on "reactionary" prisoners. Booker was the first marine to be taken prisoner in the Korean war. Flying from the decks of the U.S.S. *Valley Forge*, his plane was shot down on 7 August 1950. Dunn had been serving as an adviser to Republic of Korea (ROK) forces whose positions had been overrun by the Chinese near Kunu-ri in November 1950.⁴² These officers were subjected to frequent and incessant interrogation centered on their political beliefs and family backgrounds. They were kept awake by beatings and blowing smoke into their forcibly opened eyes. Still refusing to cooperate, they were tied to stakes in the open or placed in cramped solitary holes in the ground and left naked for hours on end in the subfreezing weather of the winter of 1950-51 in the Yalu River valley. Still not willing to do the bidding of their captors, both Booker and Dunn were separately and repeatedly exposed to the threat of execution, in which the "game of Russian roulette" was played by the Chinese interrogators.⁴³

While the Chinese took control of the UNC prisoners of war in Communist hands, they did permit their North Korean comrades to participate and presumably learn the principles of interrogation and indoctrination for political objectives. "Pak's Palace" on the outskirts of Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, was named for Major Pak, the North Korean chief interrogator. This infamous center was singled out in the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoner of War Report of 1955 as being "the worst camp endured by American prisoners of war."⁴⁴ Captain Fink, a U.S. Marine officer, was questioned in 1951 by a Russian female interrogator over a period of several days. The interrogations were punctuated with repeated beatings of Captain Fink for nonresponsive answers.⁴⁵

Even before the Chinese intervention in the Korean war, Communist use of

prisoners of war for political purposes was evident. In late August 1950, Jacob A. Malik, U.S.S.R. delegate to the U.N. Security Council, issued a statement to the world press claiming to have received a cable of protest to the war signed by 39 captured U.S. officers. The protest was "against further senseless bloodshed in Korea." The names of the 39 officers were released and included "Capt. Jesse V. Booker."⁴⁶ In light of the treatment subsequently inflicted on Booker, it is doubtful if the Communists ever obtained Booker's signature on the protest. Indeed, the majority of the officers whose names were released subsequently denied under oath having signed the protest.⁴⁷

This early and rather clumsy propaganda attempt was greatly refined and improved after the Chinese took over control of the prisoners of war in December 1950. In January 1951 the Chinese circulated the "Stockholm Peace Appeal" in "Peaceful Valley" and other camps with indoctrination centers. This appeal had been issued just prior to the North Korean invasion of South Korea as a result of a Stockholm meeting of the "Communist World Peace Committee" in May 1950.⁴⁸ In circulating this appeal, peace committees were formed in the prisoner-of-war camps to develop and sign a petition to the U.N. appealing for peace. This petition was sent to the U.N. in February 1951 with the signatures of many American prisoners of war.⁴⁹

Concurrent with the success of the U.N. spring offensive of 1951, the North Koreans on 8 May 1951 lodged a formal protest to the U.N. charging the U.S. forces with germ warfare.⁵⁰

It was at this time that the Communists tried to substantiate these charges by a program aimed at gaining the cooperation of largely U.S. Air Force flying personnel.⁵¹ On 16 May 1952 the signed confessions of two captured U.S. lieutenants appeared in *People's China*, a Peking newspaper, and

were announced to the world.⁵² Despite the failure to have their allegations proven with the aid of confessions of American prisoners of war, grave doubt on the matter was created in world public opinion.

In the aftermath of the Korean war, Communist attempts to use prisoners of war and their families to weaken the opposition came more clearly into focus. In testimony before a U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities in June 1956, FBI witnesses and former U.S. prisoners of the Korean war exposed the extent of the Communist efforts in this area. "The Save Our Sons Committee" (SOSC) based in Argo, Ill. became active in 1952 and remained so until October 1953, the month following the repatriation of the Korean war prisoners. The SOSC consisted of two native-born American women, identified by FBI agents as members of the American Communist Party. These women obtained the names, camp locations, and other particulars of American prisoners from Communist sources. They wrote letters to the parents and friends of these prisoners, encouraging them to sign petitions and letters to Congressmen and newspapers. They were able to correspond directly with the American prisoners in a matter of days, whereas mail between prisoners and next of kin was normally not allowed by the Communist captors. Though these two women repeatedly claimed the "fifth amendment" during the hearings, facts presented by other witnesses clearly established Communist efforts in this area.⁵³

The major issue of the Korean Armistice Negotiations was voluntary repatriation. A convincing position is that the UNC demands, insisting on voluntary repatriation, were in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, specifically articles 7 and 118. Article 7 provides that prisoners may under no circumstances renounce, in whole or in

part, rights secured to them by the convention. Article 118 states that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities. The opposing humanitarian view of not forcing some 87,000 people to be committed to return to control of regimes they abhor also has merit. It would be difficult to ignore the lessons learned from the Soviet treatment of repatriated personnel at the end of World War II.

Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, the initial Chief UNC Negotiator from July 1951 until 22 May 1952, differed strongly on this point, although his position as UNC negotiator required him to support it. He felt the voluntary repatriation issue cost our prisoners an extra year of captivity and cost the UNC an additional 50,000 casualties. Joy later contended that the welfare of ex-enemy soldiers was placed above that of our own personnel in Communist prison camps and those still fighting in the battleline.⁵⁴

To date, international law has not codified the principle of voluntary repatriation. Yet the signed armistice itself may sustain the principle as a precedent. In any event, this principle is Korea's legacy to Vietnam. Consideration must be given this principle to insure success in obtaining the release of our prisoners of war in the months ahead.

Vietnam. Major conflicts have given impetus to changes in international laws which have been increasingly concerned with the humanitarian treatment of prisoners and other victims of war. The Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949, following World Wars I and II, respectively, illustrate this. No change occurred following the Korean war. Resolution of the voluntary repatriation issue stemming from the Korean armistice was heralded as a significant precedent by President Eisenhower. Yet, the

impact of this precedent on international law is a matter of conjecture at this time. With this possible exception, international law relative to the treatment of prisoners of war is essentially the same for Vietnam as it was for the Korean war.

Shortly after the introduction of American forces into the Vietnam war, the ICRC in June 1965 reminded the Governments of the United States, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam, by letter, of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of their previous commitments to adhere to the conventions.⁵⁵ The ICRC also indicated it would attempt to deliver the letter to the National Liberation Front (NLF), the political arm of the Viet Cong.

All parties, including the NLF, replied to the ICRC letter. The United States and South Vietnam gave unqualified assurance of their compliance with the conventions and authorized the ICRC to send designated inspection representatives.⁵⁶ North Vietnam's reply was not as straightforward. It was a lengthy reply couched in terms that make it difficult to isolate truly responsive portions. The letter did state that "pilots" would be regarded as "major criminals" and liable to the laws of North Vietnam, "although captured pilots are treated well."⁵⁷ Clearly, North Vietnam was saying officially that they treated pilots well, but reserved the right not to do so. The NLF flatly refused to be bound by the Geneva Conventions; however, they affirmed that "prisoners held were humanely treated and that, above all, enemy wounded were collected and cared for."⁵⁸ Upon sending troops in support of South Vietnam, all other nations (notably Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines) acknowledged the Geneva Conventions as binding. Thus, all active participants in the Vietnam war, except the NLF, formally announced their general adherence to the conventions.

The record of the United States in Vietnam relative to the treatment of prisoners of war has not been officially questioned by the enemy. However, two major issues have arisen, one involving overt actions of the South Vietnamese. In each instance attention to the issues has been "self-generated," being instituted by Americans, not the enemy.

As early as 1964, reports began reaching the United States concerning maltreatment of Viet Cong prisoners of war by South Vietnamese captors. These reports continued through 1965, the time of American commitment to the ground war, and concerned enemy personnel initially captured by American forces as well as those captured by South Vietnamese forces. In a few instances American personnel were pictured observing the alleged maltreatments. These instances apparently took place at the scene of the fighting or during evacuation from it.⁵⁹ There is little doubt that instances of maltreatment occurred. There has never been a war in which some frontline maltreatment has not taken place.⁶⁰ The announced American position was that these incidents of maltreatment were alleged against an ally, South Vietnam, which bore responsibility for handling prisoners, not the United States. This initial American position was legally correct but morally questionable. There is "no provision in the Geneva Conventions making a nation responsible for violations committed by its allies."⁶¹

Initially, American ground forces turned over enemy prisoners to the South Vietnamese forces as soon as possible. Mindful of the maltreatment charges, the U.S. forces changed procedures in 1966 and retained custody of captured enemy until delivered to rear area camps.⁶² No similar charges were made after this until 1969, when release of information alleging the unlawful killing of some 100 South Vietnamese civilians at the Song My hamlet of My Lai, South Vietnam, on 16 March 1968.

At this writing, a number of American fighting men are awaiting trial on charges resulting from actions at My Lai. Fourteen others have been charged with repressing information concerning the incident and may be brought to trial.⁶³

The South Vietnamese operate the prisoner-of-war camps containing some 31,500 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong prisoners of war. There have been documented cases of maltreatment in the six camps operated by the South Vietnamese. Significantly, complaints in these cases have been filed by the ICRC representatives having access to the camps for inspection.⁶⁴ The prisoners are permitted to send and receive mail. An accounting of the prisoners is made and lists are made available to North Vietnam and the NLF.⁶⁵ Every effort is made to comply with the Geneva Conventions and requests of the ICRC representatives.⁶⁶

The story of treatment of allied prisoners of war (United States, South Vietnam, South Korea, Australian, and others) by the North Vietnamese (and their confederates, the Viet Cong, under the NLF) is far from complete. That which is known is available from two sources; the information the North Vietnamese have seen fit to disclose for propaganda and political purposes and from questioning of released or escaped prisoners.⁶⁷ Even with the limited sources of information available to date, the complete disregard of international law by North Vietnam is abundantly clear. Equally clear, and of greater concern, is the callous treatment of prisoners of war by the North Vietnamese. They have shown the same characteristics of Communists in previous wars: a complete disregard for humane treatment; a concerted effort to use prisoners for propaganda purposes; and an utter disregard for the welfare of their own people once captured.

In mid-July 1966, broadcasts from Radio Hanoi and dispatches from

Communist newsmen served notice that captured American flyers were to be tried as war criminals, and American prisoners were paraded, manacled, in the streets of Hanoi, presumably to whip up local public support. Photographs of these happenings were taken and disseminated in the world press.⁶⁸ This brazen effort at political blackmail backfired. The obvious intent of conducting trials of these prisoners to force a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam and gain world sympathy was a miscalculation. U.N. Secretary General U Thant, the Pope, and American organizations opposed to the war in Vietnam sent appeals to Ho Chi Minh to stop the scheduled trials. Even the so-called U.S. Senate "doves," spearheaded by Senator Frank Church, issued strong statements against the trials.⁶⁹ On 23 July 1966, Ho Chi Minh backed down and announced that "no trials were in view." It appears that when Ho Chi Minh realized he was losing support for his political objectives, particularly from within the United States where a hardened unified American position might result, he relented.

Earlier, in June and September 1965, following trials and execution of Viet Cong terrorists by the South Vietnam Government, the Liberation Radio of the Viet Cong announced that American prisoners of war had been executed in retaliation for the trial and execution of the terrorists. Irrespective of the legal or moral issues concerning acts of reprisal, the wanton murder of American prisoners in retaliation for an act of South Vietnam is clearly neither legally nor morally valid. The ICRC concurred in this view in filing formal complaints and requesting permission to investigate.⁷⁰

The execution of one of these victims, Capt. Humbert R. Versace, was confirmed in December 1968 by Maj. James N. Rowe when he escaped after being a prisoner of the Viet Cong for over 5 years.⁷¹ Rowe and Versace had been among a group of eight prisoners

captured by the Viet Cong in October 1963 and held in the delta region of South Vietnam. According to Rowe, three of the prisoners died during captivity in 1966 and 1967, while the other three were released through Cambodia in October 1967.⁷²

The story unfolded by Rowe substantiates that the Viet Cong follow the same pattern already established by the Communists for treatment of prisoners of war. Immediately after capture Rowe was given an ICRC data card to fill out.⁷³ Appended to this card was a lengthy questionnaire concerning full details of personal and military history, training, and military intelligence. Rowe refused to fill out the questionnaire; then started the established Communist treatment. Rowe was subjected to isolation from human contact and placed in a confining, uncomfortable cage as conditioners for the inevitable indoctrination. Part of the indoctrination included explanations that Rowe was a criminal having no rights and that his captors had the right to execute him. The reason given for not executing him was the "lenient policy" of the Viet Cong. Upon "failing indoctrination lessons," Rowe was sent to a punishment camp where he was subjected to treatment even worse than before. His diet of rice and salt, without water, severely strained his stamina and will to survive.⁷⁴

The politically inspired, unpredictable releases of other groups of American prisoners, either to peace-seeking antiwar Americans in Cambodia or at arranged meetings in cleared areas of South Vietnam, also provides insight to prisoner-of-war treatment by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. The stories of some of those men have not been published for fear of jeopardizing those remaining as prisoners. What has been told is another chronicle of cruel and inhuman treatment by the Communists. In August 1969, Navy Lt. Robert F. Frishman, upon his release, related his experiences as a prisoner of war of the

Communists, which included solitary confinement, imprisonment in a cage, being bound in straps, removal of his fingernails, being denied food and medical care, and being dragged along the ground while suffering a broken leg. Seaman Douglas Hegdahl, released at the same time after over 2 years of captivity, was also maltreated. He had lost over 60 pounds since his capture and had spent 7 months and 10 days in solitary confinement.

The experience of Lt. (jg) Dieter Dengler, USN, during 1966 presents a stark example of treatment at the hands of the Communists in Southeast Asia. Dengler was captured but later managed to escape to U.S. lines. Captured by the Pathet Lao and turned over to the North Vietnamese, Dengler was spread-eagled on the ground and left to the mercy of insects. He was tied in position and used for nerve-racking target practice. Repeatedly, Dengler was beaten with fists and sticks, being rendered unconscious on one occasion. As further persuasion to sign a statement condemning the United States and apparently to heighten the enjoyment of his captors, Dengler was bound and dragged through the bush behind a water buffalo. At the time of his rescue this formerly 180-pound pilot weighed 98 pounds.⁷⁵

The stories of maltreatment from escaped prisoners, and even from those released for propaganda purposes, have a common thread. Admittedly, the documented evidence available at this time is limited. Yet the evidence available is overwhelmingly uniform in reflecting callous and inhumane treatment of our prisoners in the hands of the Communists in Southeast Asia. A pattern has emerged which includes jungle camps operated by the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao and the larger permanent camps operated by the North Vietnamese. The most notorious of these North Vietnamese camps is known already as the "Hanoi Hilton." It appears

likely that this facility will join "Pak's Palace" of the Korean war on the list of infamous prisoner-of-war camps.

These limited glimpses of the treatment of prisoners of war in Vietnam give cause for grave concern for the treatment of the estimated 1,400 American prisoners still in the hands of the Communists in Vietnam.⁷⁶ As of February 1970, the Department of Defense listed 422 Americans known to have been in the hands of the Communists in Vietnam. These figures have been compiled from eyewitness battle accounts, information from released prisoners, as well as from Hanoi press and radio announcements.⁷⁷ The Communists have to date refused to comply with the Geneva Conventions and provide lists of prisoners they hold. In March 1970 North Vietnam did acknowledge to an Associated Press newsman (Daniel De Luce) that they held 320 American prisoners of war and "were considering" releasing their names, not to ICRC representatives, but to "friendly" news media.⁷⁸

Repeated attempts by the American Government and relatives to obtain information on American prisoners held by the Communists have failed.⁷⁹ Response to these groups would not materially benefit or support the political objectives of the Communists and, therefore, seem doomed to failure. Massive direct pressure by American citizens, appeals by "dovish" U.S. Congressmen and other vehement American antiwar groups, and concentrated efforts by the Government through the United Nations would appear to offer the best opportunity for determining the status of American prisoners in Vietnam and insuring their welfare and ultimate freedom. Since the North Vietnamese consider their own captured personnel as expendable and since they know we value highly the lives and welfare of our soldiers in captivity, they are using their control of our prisoners of war as a bargaining tool for propa-

ganda and leverage for a settlement of the war favorable to them.

Legacy and Lessons. The development of meaningful and essential international law relative to prisoners of war has been extremely slow, yet ever more precisely defined. Up to World War II this development had significant impact on improving the humanitarian treatment of prisoners. From World War II came the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which materially strengthened the law in this area, more clearly defined its application, and provided for humane treatment agreed upon by some 117 nations as of 1968.⁸⁰ From World War II also came distinct evidence that, regardless of the law and weight of world opinion, the Communists did not intend to abide by international law to which they and others had committed themselves. As the history of World War II unfolded with the passing of time, more precise proof became available. The extent and enormity of some of the evidence strains humanitarian understanding, and even today many ignore or refuse to assess the record.

In the aftermath of the Korean war it became clear once again that the Communists had shown an utter disregard for international law and contempt for humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war, which other peoples and nations sought to uphold. Though smaller in scale, the barbaric and cruel treatment of prisoners of war by the Communists established a record in modern times for the high rate of death among captives. Again the rules for conduct of affairs among nations were severely set back. This demonstrated contempt for the precepts of human dignity and compassion for fellowmen is appalling. This, coupled with the hypocrisy of claiming adherence to international law, while resolutely and consistently failing to do so, invites more grave questions. Although only shreds of evidence are available from the current war in Viet-

nam, these shreds point to the Communists adding to the legacy passed on from World War II and Korea.

A review of history supports the contention that prisoners of war have been used as instruments of foreign policy. Concurrent with the evolution of international law, mounting concern for the humane treatment of prisoners of war has resulted in increasing well-defined international agreements to protect the victims of war, thus tending to reduce the effectiveness of prisoners of war as instruments of foreign policy for those nations adhering to the law. Starting in World War II and continuing through to the current Vietnam war, the Communists have demonstrated a complete reluctance to be inhibited in their use of prisoners of war to achieve national and international political objectives. This remains so, whether or not they profess adherence to international conventions.

Based on the record of treatment accorded their own people when recovered from captivity, the Communists are not receptive to bargaining for the exchange or treatment of prisoners predicated on humanitarian principles. Accordingly, it appears that even when assured of our propriety in the treatment of their prisoners, the Communists are unwilling to reciprocate and guarantee humane treatment for U.S. prisoners of war. This, coupled with the fundamental principle of the dignity and rights of man upon which the Government of the United States is based, rules out any consideration of reprisal against Communist prisoners as ineffective and repugnant.

Thus, to obtain humane treatment and release of prisoners from Communist control, it appears that the most realistic alternative is to marshal American opinion unifying the country on the issue. To affirm our resolve to deny the Communists their political objectives through use of our prisoners of war is the most positive way to insure their

fair treatment and release. In this regard the text of President Nixon's First Annual Foreign Affairs Message to Congress of February 1970 concerning the treatment and release of prisoners of war merits comment and is quoted in part below:

This [prisoners of war in Vietnam] is not a political or military issue, but a matter of basic humanity. There may be disagreement about other aspects of this conflict, but there can be no disagreement on humane treatment for prisoners of war. I state again our readiness to proceed at once to arrangements for the release of prisoners of war on both sides.⁸¹

This statement is a true reflection of previously stated American policy and most likely was heartily supported by the majority of people of the United States. However, considering that it is a part of a 40,000-word address designed for foreign as well as domestic consumption, the reaction of the Communists would seem of paramount importance. The Communists would not agree with the first portion of the pronouncement which states that the prisoner-of-war question in Vietnam "... is not a political or military issue, but a matter of basic humanity." The history of Communist actions disputes that portion of the address which states "... there can be no disagreement on humane treatment for prisoners of war." Finally, in advising the Communists of "our readiness to proceed at once with arrangements for the release of prisoners of war on both sides," they are being advised of a fact with which they have been fully cognizant. In summary, the statement of the President appears to have contributed little toward obtaining humane treatment and release of American prisoners of war.

Needed are positive statements by

our national leaders recognizing that prisoners of war are used as "political instruments" by the Communists, but affirming U.S. rejection of this practice. Identification and clarification of the fact that there is "disagreement on humane treatment of prisoners of war" between the Communists and ourselves is also required. Lastly, a positive declaration should be made that any peace negotiations must first obtain agreements on the accounting for and release of prisoners of war.

The Communist practice of releasing small groups of our prisoners of war to American pacifist groups should be denounced for the degrading and inhumane practice it is. As stated by the *Washington Evening Star* the practice is "a little like the Oriental water torture—and just as humanitarian." To put this release ploy in perspective, consider that at the current rate of release it would take over 400 years to obtain the release of our captured men.⁸²

Ho Chi Minh recanted in July 1966 on his threat to try American prisoners as war criminals due to the weight of world public opinion, especially the statements of some U.S. Senators. Again in August 1969, at the instigation of

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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prisoners' next of kin, 42 U.S. Senators signed a strong statement condemning North Vietnam for its record of violation of international law and for its "cruel and inhuman treatment of prisoners of war." This statement also condemned the callous treatment of the families of prisoners who traveled to Paris seeking information about the prisoners from the North Vietnamese delegates to the peace talks. On 21 August the North Vietnamese rejected the protest. It is significant to note that some of the leading antiwar Senators, including the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, had not signed the statement of protest. The full impact of a similar statement signed by all 100 Senators or of a joint resolution by Congress is a matter of conjecture.

The question that presents itself is "Why should this critical matter be left to conjecture?"

The need to focus attention on the current plight of American prisoners in the hands of the Communists is evident. Previous limited success in combating the Communists' use of prisoners of war as instruments of foreign policy has been attained only when antiwar factions in the United States, particularly members of Congress, have repudiated these inhuman practices. It appears that these factors must drive concerted American efforts to deny the Communists their political objectives. The continued maltreatment of American prisoners of war in direct violation of international law is totally unacceptable.

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All soldiers taken must be cared for with magnanimity and sincerity so that they may be used by us.

Chang Yu, fl. 1000

The mass media have presented the SDS as an organization primarily interested in domestic issues and concerned with foreign policy only to the extent that it competes with domestic programs for limited financial resources. In fact, however, the main thrust of the SDS program relates to U.S. foreign policy. The goal of the movement is the isolation of the United States from the world arena and a political revolution that brings to power an elite group of radicals.

SDS TACTICS AS AN INDICATOR OF AIMS

DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

A research paper prepared

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Origin of the Students for a Democratic Society. The social unrest and demand for change which have swept the country during the 1960's have been considered by many as phenomena of the times. The rebelliousness and dissident behavior on our college campuses have brought a new and distinct character to student movements. Different from historically recorded student movements, the new movement is national in scope and complex in nature. It is different because it endorses and engages in direct political activism. The communications media of the 1960's have shown the movement in its militant and revolutionary form; however, to understand the student movement it is necessary to delve into tactics and aims.

The SDS began in 1960 as the youth affiliate of the League for Industrial

Democracy.¹ The league is the successor to the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, a group organized in 1905 to mobilize the country's intelligentsia to teach socialism and collective ownership throughout the Nation.² In June of 1962, 59 people attended what is considered to be the SDS founding convention at the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Labor Center in Port Huron, Mich.³

It was at this convention that the SDS manifesto, which has become known as the "Port Huron Statement," was first presented. This document called for massive public pressure to make the Government and the economy responsive to popular control and declared the bankruptcy of America's cold war policies. It further pledged SDS to work for the creation of a New Left and placed special emphasis on the potential of the university as a radical center. The

preamble in the original text stated that the SDS program was "counterposed to authoritarian movements both of communism and the Domestic right." The "Port Huron Statement" also coined the phrase "Participatory Democracy" which called for a "town meeting" type government.⁴ This gave further impetus to the type of organization that the SDS desired.

It was during 1962 that the SDS began to emerge as a potent force for campus activism. The movement, made up mostly of students, was initially felt to be liberally oriented but radically disposed. This radical predilection was evident in its distrust of compromise and its proclivity for direct action. The original SDS organization has grown from 59 students at 11 colleges to a present membership claim of 70,000 students at over 350 colleges and universities.⁵

In June of 1969 the SDS split into three factions: the Weathermen (also referred to as Revolutionary Youth Movement I), Revolutionary Youth Movement II, and the Progressive Labor Party (pro-Mao Tse-tung) group.⁶ The Weatherman faction is militant in nature, while the other two factions advocate nonviolent, educational forms of protest—at least until the people's consciousness has been developed.⁷ For the purpose of this paper, all factions will be considered as part of SDS.

An Analysis of SDS Tactics. The scenario of the SDS confrontation tactics has been widely reported in the mass media. Therefore it is not necessary to point out what has occurred at this or that university or meeting, but rather to bring about some understanding of the tactics used by SDS in its confrontations with the "establishment."

The SDS has attempted to develop a radical political consciousness among students by focusing their attention on the ties between the university as an

instrument to "channel" students by "pressurized guidance" into particular fields for the good of the "establishment."⁸ In focusing attention on these relationships, the SDS has opened the way for their confrontations with the "system." In their view the "system" includes these targets: the university, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, the Selective Service System, campus recruiting, and the Nation's industrial base.

In analyzing the SDS tactics with regard to the aforementioned targets, four techniques of confrontation keep recurring. These techniques include issues, coordination, propaganda, and "moral absolutism." Taken together they form a pattern which might be labeled a "template for analysis." Through a discussion of specific incidents and statements, the reader will gain the facility to analyze other areas of student confrontation with which he is more familiar.

The SDS in its confrontations with the selected targets has made great use of the "issues." The attempt is made in each case to connect campus issues, no matter how academic, to off-campus questions which are political. Carl Davidson, a former national SDS officer, has stated the necessity of tying the university ranking system to the Selective Service System and the ROTC issues to the "fighting of Aggressive [sic] wars of oppression abroad."⁹ The University placement office has become the focus of their political action aimed at the national industrial base. The "immorality of napalm" is bound to Dow Chemical Corporation, and the students are urged to "run them off campus . . . because of their complicity in war crimes."¹⁰ One other linking of issues was presented in the 1966 SDS Anti-Draft Resolution which tied the draft to the economic and foreign policy objectives of the United States.¹¹ The use of issues has been further crystallized in a statement by Philip A.

Luce, a former leader of the Progressive Labor Party.

Confrontation as a revolutionary tactic works like this: Manipulate people into a posture wherein they are in direct conflict with some power source and violence can be created. The first key is to broaden support for the apparent cause *through the rising [sic] of false issues*. Second, demand from the power source concessions that they can not or will not accept. Then claim that the student will have been thwarted and the only answer is peaceful but extra legal measures to gain the demanded changes.¹²

This creation of issues was to be seen even prior to the statement by Luce. At Columbia University in April of 1968, the Institute for Defense Analysis and the construction of a Columbia-owned gymnasium in Harlem became the great issues of confrontation.¹³ However, Mark Rudd, the leader of the Columbia SDS, speaking of these issues at a lecture at Harvard, stated: "We manufactured the issues, the Institute for Defense Analysis is nothing at Columbia. Just three professors. And the gym issue is bull. It doesn't mean anything to anybody. I had never been to the gym site before the demonstration began. I didn't even know how to get there."¹⁴

The SDS has considered the "issues" as matters around which larger masses of students may be "radicalized" or "politicized" toward the eventual reform of other social institutions.¹⁵ The purpose of these "issues" is not the solving of the Nation's problems, but rather to gain support for the organization's programs. The issues that are considered viable are those that will cause a reaction by the masses against the established order. The purpose is to show that incidents such as Vietnam are caused by the system and are not just an

aberration of it. In keeping with this, a leading member of the Stanford University SDS attempted as early as 1967 to close Vietnam as a "viable issue" because now even the university trustees desired a withdrawal.¹⁶ The issues that gain support and sympathy from the masses but not the "establishment" are considered viable, and the coordination that is used to highlight these issues, through confrontation, is then planned.

One of the mysteries of SDS has been its ability to disseminate information and coordinate its complex activities on a national basis. It has been intimated by some that the mass media's devotion of time and space to SDS activities has given the movement a means of coordinating the use of similar tactics.¹⁷ This may be true for specific tactics, such as threatening to burn a dog as a symbolic gesture.¹⁸ However, it still does not explain the coordination of the large "single-shot" event nor does it reflect the spontaneous character attributed to the movement by the media.

The SDS ability and use of effective coordinating techniques can be seen by the timeliness of their planning and the commonly known results of the following specific actions:

A. The first large-scale march (15,000) on Washington, D.C., in April of 1965 was planned by the National Council of SDS in December of 1964.¹⁹

B. The Columbia University demonstration was planned in detail in October of 1967 while the actual confrontation took place in April of 1968.²⁰

C. The confrontations which took place at the Democratic Convention in June of 1968 were announced to the author of this paper approximately 7 months prior to the event.²¹

As with all revolutionary movements, SDS coordination techniques include the use of locally produced literature. One example of this close coordination is the linking of the 1966 Anti-Draft

Resolution at Berkeley with Carl Davidson's "Praxis Makes Perfect," which sets forth the tactics to be adopted.²² Another example of the SDS capability to project the same view on different campuses simultaneously was significantly shown in April of 1969 when identical editorials demanding the abolition of ROTC appeared in 29 independent college newspapers.²³

The importance of the media as a means of influencing campus activities has been fully recognized by the SDS. The organization feels that the student movement must: "(1) Try to gain control of as much of the *established* campus cultural apparatus as possible, (2) if control is not possible, they should try to influence and/or resist it when necessary and (3) develop a new counter apparatus of their own."²⁴ By having their own people on the staff of the campus media the SDS has attempted to gain, through the media, student body support for its programs.

The need of media control by the SDS can be viewed also from one other direction. Holsti has written that propaganda is most effective against youth and that it is most successful if it is the major source of information for a particular target group.²⁵ After gaining control of the local media or establishing counteroutlets for the dissemination of information, the SDS is able to bring to bear all the techniques and methodology of propaganda. The techniques employed are name calling (Marine Killers, Chicago Pigs), glittering generalities (the university exists to provide the military-industrial complex with trained manpower), transfer (capitalism is decadent; education in the United States is in its historically most irrational and decadent state), testimonial (the use of politicians and generals to criticize the Nation's policies), selection (the collection and promulgation of just those facts that support predetermined objectives)²⁶ and finally the bandwagon (all power to the people; all peace-loving

people recognize that . . .). The use of these techniques by SDS-sponsored media and the success of these methods are demonstrated by the rapid rise shown in the SDS influence and membership.

The SDS has attempted to gain support through the use of what Ellul terms "agitation propaganda." This is a type of propaganda used by most revolutionary movements, and it is aimed at gaining support for issues. The effect of "agitation propaganda" may be of a relatively short duration. Through propaganda of this nature, SDS has been able to use its "issues" for great short-term advantages. The use of its controlled media lends itself well to this form of tactic which is often used to disrupt established order.²⁷ Once the confrontation has been gained through the issues and coordination, propaganda is the tool which moves the participants to action. The SDS then addresses the confrontation from a position of "moral absolutism."

The final technique which completes the "template for analysis" is the use of "moral absolutism" by the SDS. Moral absolutism is defined as a circumstance where the pursuit of ends regarded as supremely good and desirable legitimates the use of all means, including coercion and violation of the rights and freedom of others, which are believed to be necessary to accomplish the goals.

Although the faculty and students at Columbia endorsed the principle of an "open campus," the awards ceremony of the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps was disrupted because the SDS did not feel that the NROTC had a right to be on the campus.²⁸ The "open campus" policy was further ignored when campus recruiting by the Armed Forces and industrial firms was disrupted, because the SDS stated these institutions were inherently evil.

The feeling of those within the movement is that SDS represents all that is good, and, therefore, this legitimates

any action that fosters "goodness." Feuer points out that this tactic is not new and was used by the Nazi Studentenschaft in 1933 and the French Student Movement (1932-1941), which supported Mussolini's imperialism and eventually sided with the Vichy regime. German students entered classrooms insulting liberal professors while justifying their disruption by arguing that only those with whom they agreed had the right to teach.²⁹ The Fascists felt, as the SDS of today, that the students should stop bearing the "burdens" of the old. Feuer also points to the irony of the French student movement's moral position in that it was credited with helping the French prepare for capitulation to the Germans. The SDS tactic of not allowing all to have freedom of expression has been vividly covered by the mass media during the 1968 presidential elections and during the visits of many guest lecturers to the college campuses.

The innovation of combining the four techniques of confrontation into a successful tactical mode has given the SDS a dramatic *modus operandi* which added to its own membership and gained for the SDS many temporary allies. The success SDS has enjoyed, using these techniques of confrontation, has exerted an influence toward a change in basic orientation, i.e., from protest to resistance. This program of resistance is best described by former SDS national secretary Greg Calvert who has stated, "No matter what America demands, it does not possess us. Whenever that demand comes, we resist."³⁰ The change from protest to resistance is framed by Carl Davidson in the following statement: "Do we work within the system? Of course we do. The question is not one of working 'inside' or 'outside' rather, the question is do we play by the established rules? Here the answer is an emphatic No."³¹

The SDS has exhibited the competence to direct the "movement" down

the path of participation through confrontation activism. The path of resistance, though incongruous to middle-class America, is the path that SDS has chosen to follow. The course of that resistance has been set by the leaders of SDS, and termination of this direction will come only through realistic approaches by the "establishment" to the problems of the society as visualized in the idealistic thought of the young. Society's problems must be solved to prevent the radicalization of the truly concerned youth. The template serves as a way to understand the actions that are taking place; it does not explain the SDS mystique.

Core Influences on the SDS Movement. A close examination of SDS and its activities reveals that the movement offers not a program, but a choice—a choice between "the revolution" and American democracy. Unfortunately, and possibly by design, the answers to what happens "the day after the revolution" are not laid out, and therefore this information must be derived from the movement's empirical design.

Some useful insights into the SDS as a sociopolitical group can be gained by examining the influences that have given the movement impetus. The movement has been greatly influenced by the writings of C. Wright Mills, Paul Goodman, Herbert Marcuse, Regis Debray, Robert Nisbert,³² Staughton Lynd, Che Guevara, Carl Davidson, Thomas Hayden, and Carl Oglesby. The last three listed could be classified as the movements tacticians while the remaining are better identified as theoreticians.

C. Wright Mills turned to the intellectuals as the agents for social change. He observed that it was a handful of student intellectuals that moved the Cuban Revolution to fruition and that this made the Cuban movement different from previously known revolutions.³³ The revolutionary fervor was forged by bourgeois intellectuals who considered

themselves the base of a new order because their revolution was not economically determined or inspired.³⁴ Through the middle-class intellectual character that the SDS brings to revolution, a parallel can be drawn between the SDS and the Cuban movement. Similar to their emulated movement, the SDS views its revolution as founded on morality and its strength resting with the young intellectuals rather than with labor.

Paul Goodman, who has been labeled a freewheeling anarchistic spirit, has influenced the SDS into placing all of society in the political arena. In this way no phase of life is left untouched by political thought. There is a rejection on the part of SDS and Goodman to the separation of morality and politics. Jonathan Eisen and David Steinberg have credited Goodman's theories of behavior and social control with giving the movement its revolutionary impact.³⁵ If the political aims of the writers mentioned could be meshed, the synthesis would be an endorsement for a complete social revolution leading to a new world order controlled by a small elite group.

The ideal and term that has initially constituted a core influence on the movement is "Participatory Democracy." This is a decentralized system without real leadership which gives equal voice to all. The ideal is an attractive one; it places every individual in a position where he has a voice in the forces that shape his own life. Though it presents the individual a voice, it strongly rejects the contention that reform can be achieved through established parliamentary procedures.³⁶

The SDS believes that its meetings should produce a unanimity of viewpoint; yet it still prizes a rebellious, strong-willed individualism and independence of mind.³⁷ Policies are set and action is determined by those who, in the maelstrom of discussion and debate, exert the most influence through

courage, articulateness, reasonableness, and sensitivity to the feelings of the group.³⁸ This method appears best suited to an action movement which mobilizes and focuses the moral energies of young people in brief, one-event actions. Nevertheless, the SDS defend the wider utility of this form of government by citing the successful control by workers of cooperative factories and citizen participation in classic town meetings.³⁹

Critics of "Participatory Democracy" have argued that it is a vague, utopian notion that could never provide a workable system of government on a mass scale.⁴⁰ Initially students associated themselves with the rhetoric and ideology of the phrase Thomas Hayden had coined and have pushed it to reform society.⁴¹ Staughton Lynd, who has compared "Participatory Democracy" with "Soviet Democracy," has since stated it may have been the product of a naive early stage of protest.⁴² This same view of a revolutionary movement is attributed to Lenin by Feuer. Lenin felt that it was not possible for the working class to acquire the outlook to enable them to vote intelligently, therefore the minority must seize the state power. Then, holding the real power, they would "convince" the majority to accept its policies.⁴³ The "Participatory Democrat" likewise has shown no inclination to abide by elections or parliamentary procedures. The basic argument purports that, since the masses are nonparticipant, the elite activists must act on their behalf.⁴⁴ Critics of this method of government have termed "Participatory Democracy" as "Democratic Anarchy" fulfilled.

The use of the word "Communist" when dealing with any movement usually exposes the user to the wrath and label of "Red baiting" or "McCarthyism," but in the case of SDS the influence is too blatant and unequivocally present to be passed over in the cause of timidity. When the movement

was initiated in the early sixties, it appeared to be quite free of any subversive influence, but as the movement grew and gained support the statements and verbiage of the leaders tended to take on the language and fervor of Marxism. The movement's leanings were fairly well established in the midsixties with the many trips made by SDS members to Hanoi and Cuba. The leadership statements at the 1968 SDS Convention left little room for doubt. Bernadine Dohrn, the interorganizational secretary, stated that she is a "revolutionary Communist,"⁴⁵ and Michael Klonsky, the national secretary, has stated that their primary task "is to build a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement."⁴⁶ The distinction that they have made for themselves is that they are communists with a little "c" to distinguish them from the card-carrying Communists of the past.⁴⁷ The direction the movement has taken could be traced to the change in the preamble of the SDS Constitution in 1965. It was this change that allowed Communists to obtain membership in the organization. The preamble was changed because the leadership felt the section which stated that the movement was "counterposed to authoritarian movements both of communism and the domestic right" was negative, exclusionary, and smacked of "Red baiting."⁴⁸ Gus Hall, Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, stated that because of organizations like SDS, fronts were things of the past. As far back as 1961 Hall told his National Committee that they must give higher priority to the youth movement.⁴⁹

During one visit to Budapest, SDS members met with North Vietnamese representatives. Upon their return to America they promulgated to the SDS membership the proper methods of organizing demonstrations in this country and provided information on the methods North Vietnamese employed to set up their youth cells in both Vietnams.⁵⁰ In 1968, during a trip to

Cuba, several SDS members were instructed by Huynh Van Ba, a representative of the Viet Cong, in the areas of effective demonstrations and the collecting of funds for the support of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.⁵¹ The travel to Communist countries is not significant in itself, but the actions and writings of the travelers are. The writings and actions of Bruce Dancis, David Dellinger, and Carl Davidson upon their return give testimony that the ideology of SDS has more and more taken on a Marxist-Leninist coloration. Staughton Lynd has even mused that SDS meetings now seem indistinguishable from those of the Old Left sects of his youth.⁵²

The influences and the direction of the SDS movement seem inalterable. They have manifestly made their objectives clear. By declaration and action, the crux of SDS ideology is to change the society by any method necessary. The SDS has charted a course for the future. The pattern appears not as a program of reform of the present foundations of democracy, but rather as a revolution to "smash" the American political system.⁵³ The discourse in confrontation is not reasoned and logical but rather a totalitarian philosophy which will not tolerate opposing positions.

There are those who feel the faction split of 21 June 1969⁵⁴ will bring about new and distinct positions, but it should be realized that this inner debate is not one of substance, but rather of form. The FBI has stated that the organization has drifted into the orbit of revolutionary thought and direction as laid down by Marx, Engels, and Lenin.⁵⁵ Therefore, the internal struggle may be viewed as a struggle over which form of Marxist revolutionary action will be followed. The SDS still appears to desire control over the destiny of their organization without Old Left or foreign domination; however, the direction of the movement augers against it.

Foreign Policy Attacks Through Use of Domestic Issues. The foreign policy of the United States has come under varied attacks by the SDS which project it as imperialistic in nature and spawned by the "military-industrial complex." The term "military-industrial complex," first uttered in President Eisenhower's "farewell address" of 1960, has given the movement a phrase by which they can claim legitimacy for their antagonism.⁵⁶ Through this oft-repeated statement the SDS has attempted to represent both the military and the Nation's industrial base as the cause for the world's ills.

As a consequence of this reasoning, the defensive posture of U.S. forces in Europe is distorted into the cause for the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the claim that the invasion proves the validity of the original defensive posture is dismissed as circular reasoning.⁵⁷ In essence, the criticism of foreign policy gives no thought to post-World War II developments. It simply denigrates as imperialistic any U.S. participation in overseas defensive arrangements. It does not accept Russian power as an external threat to all of Europe but equates the Czechoslovakia takeover by Russian military force to the United Fruit Corporation's pursuit of economic interests in Guatemala.⁵⁸ In this discourse the U.S. "military-industrial complex" is placed in the floodlight, while aggressive action of other powers, though decried, is placed in the background. The moral conscience of these young people appears to be attuned only to American actions, while other nations are free to operate in a galaxy of freedom from criticism of their policies.⁵⁹

The term "foreign policy" has never specifically become a "watchword" for the SDS in its movement toward revolution; however, it has always been visible in its writings and discussions. In an examination of SDS targets and ac-

complishments, it would appear that an extension of views on all other fronts would disclose the influence they seek to exert on U.S. foreign policy. The amount of influence already subsumed by SDS successes in other areas can be used as an indicator of direction. This can be accomplished by an analysis of the domestic programs espoused and pushed by SDS which impinge on foreign policy.

There will be some who will state that these changes were inevitable or that the problems leading to change already existed. However, it is worth remarking that all past revolutions have seized existing problems as a vehicle, and the revolution has been furthered by repression of people who are attempting to follow understandable instincts in meeting legitimate needs.

The confrontations at Yale, Harvard, Cornell, and Dartmouth, among many institutions, have succeeded in highlighting the demand for the abolition of Reserve Officers' Training Corps on the campuses of America. The ROTC itself is in little danger of disintegration. However, the problem of student pressure is real when capitulation to the demands of a student minority is obtained from some of the oldest universities in the Nation.⁶⁰ The *Cornell University Chronicle* of 13 November 1969 ran a headline story that stated, "Student Survey Says 67% Support ROTC in Some Form."⁶¹ This, like most polls, favored retention.

The exact purpose for abolition is brought out best by a young dedicated SDS leader from Trinity College in Hartford, Conn.:

By destroying ROTC, a strong student movement would contribute to stopping this war and wars like it; hence no one would have to go . . . The position of the College should be to refuse to cooperate with the Armed Forces

as long as counter revolution remains the objective of American foreign policy.⁶²

The argument against ROTC is that the military's longstanding policy is one of securing worldwide markets which will be open to exploitation by American business and trade. Their case for abolishing ROTC rests on their contention that ROTC is essential to the smooth functioning of the "American military" in pursuit of its policies.⁶³ These demands for a change in the Nation's foreign policy by the SDS are not well known by the American public as the exposure given to the SDS by the media has distorted the actual parameters of the movement. The SDS has been represented as a campus movement with a heavy interest in domestic affairs, with the Vietnam issue depicted as an extension of the evils of the capitalist system. However, the SDS pamphlets and articles have actually little to do with solely domestic issues. What the SDS media demand is a change in foreign policy. The call is for "pressurized guidance" exerted on politicians who, they feel, are susceptible to pressure.

The recent change in the conscription laws of the Nation can be classified as a partial success for the SDS and fellow organizations. The agitation for the passing of this draft reform in 1969 can be traced in part to the 1966 SDS Anti-Draft Resolution. The change did not parallel the resolution; however, the demand for change was met during a period when the United States was heavily engaged in conflict abroad. The proposal for an "all volunteer force" will meet with the increasing demands to halt all forms of conscription. However, this still does not meet the basic objectives of SDS. In personal discussions with many SDS dissidents demanding such a change they have alluded to the "channeling" of the underprivileged into the military as a

byproduct of this "all volunteer force." Now SDS concern is on a different level. They ponder the fairness of a system that directs the choice of an individual who has limited opportunity in the job market. The foreign policy implications that SDS relates to the draft can be found in the following paragraphs of the 1966 Anti-Draft Resolution:

(2) . . . We maintain that all conscription is coercive and Anti-Democratic and that it is used by the U.S. Government to oppress people in the U.S. and around the world.

(3) SDS recognizes that the draft is connected with the requirements of the economic system and the foreign policy of the U.S.

(4B) National SDS will assist all efforts to organize within the armed forces, resistance to the U.S. foreign policy.⁶⁴

The overtone of this domestic issue appears to have its actual base in the commitments of the United States abroad. Just as they previously tied "on-campus activities" to "off-campus questions," it is apparent that domestic issues are tied to foreign policy decisions.

The SDS has gained some success in its constant attacks on U.S. corporate industry. The purpose of these attacks has been to show the worker that the corporation is exploiting the people not only in the United States, but also abroad. The tactic has been to point out existing domestic inequities and to bring the worker's attention to concomitant wrongs in the world. SDS has depicted to the worker what they label an "imperialist pattern." The pattern in Vietnam is presented as the blueprint for the U.S. foreign policy of giving massive aid to oppressors of people all over the world. The Vietnam conflict is por-

trayed as rooted in the imperialistic nature of capitalism, where the great corporations of America exploit the cheap labor and raw materials of "third world countries."⁶⁵ The symbol of the corporate giant crushing and exploiting the worker domestically is thereby projected as the true image of U.S. activities abroad.

There are other substantial SDS accomplishments which may have subtle and far-reaching effects on the foreign policy of America. These successes include changes in college curricula, student control of the hiring and firing of professors, and student control of university funds. The curriculum of the university may, in the future, be taught in a structure where professors are granted tenure not by merit, but by emotion. This can be compared to post-World II Germany, where the students, by force, controlled the university and were responsible for the firing of almost 1,600 professors with whom they disagreed.⁶⁶ The result of such demands is a regenerative effect which reinforces the ideology approved by the militants. The foreign policy ramifications of these actions are apparent.

In every case the SDS has pushed for a change in the principles and policies of the Nation. They have shown their ability to mobilize mass action by concentrating on carefully chosen issues.⁶⁷ The movement disdains the democratic process and political liberty. It also disdains the process of continually balancing and rebalancing liberty and order, authority and independence, rights and obligations. Its foreign policy is in line with the Marxist dogma. To SDS it is not the results but the commitment that counts; T.R. Brooks in the article "Metamorphosis in SDS—the New Left Is Showing Its Age" states "SDSers couldn't care less that the Marxism-Leninism of Stalin murdered millions; that morally wrong 'means' wreak havoc with 'the noblest of ends,'

that violence only breeds violence."⁶⁸ A similar position on commitment was stated by Ted Gold, a former member of the Columbia University SDS. When confronted with the accusation by a fellow member that his views were those of a "rightwing extremist," he stated "Well, if it takes fascism, we'll have to take fascism."⁶⁹ Ted Gold was killed in New York City when a bomb exploded in a building suspected of housing "Weatherman" demolitions.

The program for "the day after the revolution" does not appear to have been written as yet, but the verbiage, influence, and direction of the movement have been spawned. Carl Davidson has stated that the decision will be made after the revolution as to what program they will follow. Che Guevara wrote that the revolution educates a man; first act, and out of action will come enlightenment.⁷⁰ The actions against basic institutions such as the military can only raise doubts in the eyes of U.S. allies as to this Nation's will to meet treaty commitments. This brings to foreign policy a problem of dimensions that cannot be easily measured. Grave harm may also result if our enemies are led to question the Nation's resolve and test its abilities. This view has already been expressed by some of our allies, who, because of our internal problems, have questioned our viability as a strong nation.⁷¹

Conclusions. The cynicism that prevails in the SDS for American political and social institutions has brought to the organization a high political consciousness and activism. The activism which has cried for "change now" has not concerned itself with the solutions to the problems it deplores. This lack of a coherent strategy for social reform continues to be the great criticism of the movement. The randomness of the movement's issues, though well planned in confrontation, indicates a degree of opportunism rather than a coherent

program. The evidence points to the continuance of this lack of concern for "the day after the revolution." The guiding light will continue to be disruption of all with which they disagree and a pattern of "revolution for the hell of it."

This movement, thought to be transitory by many, has completed a decade where it has proven its ability to foster change. The change accomplished radically or peacefully has given to the SDS the image as a catalyst for activism.

In keeping with this image and the protective benefits of the "student" label, the campus will remain the base of the movement, and the demands for change of all institutional apparatus that interferes with total freedom, as espoused by SDS, will be the goal. In the specter of militancy for change, the university will find once more that it is faced with legitimate, as well as illegitimate, requests for review of its present policies. The classrooms of the universities and high schools, like those of post-World War II Germany, are to be the scenes of over-growing confrontations dealing with all the issues of the day.

Personal experience in the realm of academia has left the author of this paper with the conception that the influence of SDS will be felt in educational circles for many decades to come. The reason for this prediction is the knowledge that many of the dissident young have been turning to teaching as a profession. This lends to the SDS a regenerative quality of influencing those who are most susceptible to propaganda relating to a cause. America's classrooms will provide that audience.

In these disrupting circumstances the classroom may very well become a forum, and the will of the students is going to be the deciding factor. If the educational structure is going to survive in this setting of disruption, the agitator's position will have to be put to the test of logical discourse. The other

students will have to be consulted as to what they think of the information being expounded by the SDS. The Students for a Democratic Society demand, under the guise of educational freedom, that everyone be open to questioning on the position that he represents. It will be up to the non-SDS students to demand the same right in the questioning of the SDS platform. If the student feeling for responsible discourse or their desire for learning is colored by apathetic unconcern, there is little that the non-SDS influenced professor will be able to do short of notifying the authorities.

Clearly the university will have to change. These changes must not be guided by emotional slogans, pressure, or preconceptions supplied by the SDS, but rather through reasoned approaches to existing problems. The key to success in managing the change without destroying the institution is the mature student. The student body must take on the responsibility for maintaining a free academic structure.

When faced with militant disruption, the university should present its position on issues to the students by fully explaining the problem and the possible consequences of acquiescence to the demands of the dissidents. The University must not take a "passive" role but an "active" one. This role should be one of soliciting opinion on significant issues from all major organizations, including the SDS, in an attempt to involve all segments of the academic community in the university workings. The responses and recommendations from these active procedures should be made known to the students and faculty through the use of the established campus apparatus. In involving the entire intellectual community in the affairs that affect them all equally, it would acquaint them with the seriousness of problems of the institution, financial and academic, and generate a feeling of mutual responsibility for solutions. This is not to

intimate that the wholly irrational demands of the SDS on issues that are irresponsible, and for which they show a marked ignorance, should be open for litigation. However, even in these circumstances, answers to SDS charges and the consequences of acquiescence to the SDS position could be presented.

The SDSers' wider goal is clearly one of radical change, not of constitutional reform. The movement, though factionalized, will continue to make its presence felt by supporting sympathetic political figures and by instigating violence in the street. The only counter to these actions will be to give to the people of the Nation viable alternatives to those offered by the radical minority. This minority has cloaked its demands in legitimacy so that it now draws support on specific issues across the broad spectrum of our society. Though there is little general support for the many confrontations and the attendant destruction engineered by SDS, the people who support or accept the other precepts feel—presumably like Pontius Pilate—that by washing their hands they are absolved from the consequences of a specific act. The failure in perception is that all movements perform acts that most people will agree with; however, the danger lies in the dastardly act with which most disagree, but which few will act to prevent. Mao Tse-tung states that, "All power comes from the barrel of a gun," and SDS has shown that it will bring the fight to the streets if necessary.

It must be remembered that revolutions only succeed if the established authority fails to use the means at its disposal to counter it. The means available do not have to be force, but in specific instances it may have to be. Legislative and judicial means of handling the problems of our times may head off a revolutionary confrontation. However, the SDS revolution will continue to project morality into politics and justice. There can be no quarrel

with a moral stand—but whose concept of morality is to prevail? In view of the polemical nature of the SDS "moral absolutism," there is adequate reason to be suspicious of their motives in this respect. This Nation was built on a precept of "justice for all." Although in reality perfect justice cannot be achieved by man, the country in conscience can do little else than to strive toward this goal—especially since it may mean its survival.

Nonpolemical justice, constructive change, and a sympathetic understanding of the problems of all segments of society would help to produce a Nation where the citizens realize that, "freedom begins only with the humble acceptance of membership in, and subordination to, a natural order of things, and it grows only with struggle, self discipline, and faith."⁷²

The SDS demand for "change now" shows no inclination to self-discipline and faith. They have pointed to problems that are known to exist but have not offered any solutions or viable alternatives. The SDS message, which is fraught with disruption, is one of anarchy.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY




Maj. Robert V. Brennan, U.S. Marine Corps, graduated from American International College in 1958 with a degree in economics. Since 1959 he has served as an artillery officer in the Marine Corps, and

his assignments have included tours of duty in Okinawa and Vietnam. He holds a master's degree in international affairs from The George Washington University and is a graduate of the Naval War College's School of Naval Command and Staff. Major Brennan is presently assigned to Force Troops, FMFLANT, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

FOOTNOTES

1. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Students for a Democratic Society," Unpublished Report, Washington, D.C.: 1969, p. 22.
2. Richard E. Peterson, "The Student Left in American Higher Education," *Daedalus*, Winter 1968, p. 296.
3. James O'Brien, *A History of the New Left 1960-1968* (Boston: New England Free Press, 1969), p. 6.
4. Staughton Lynd, "The New Left," *The Annals*, March 1969, p. 69.
5. Barnard L. Collier, "SDS Scores Big Gains but Faces Many Problems," *The New York Times*, 5 May 1969, p. 1:3.
6. "Crime Outlook Bleak Not Hopeless," *Boston Sunday Advertiser*, 28 December 1969, p. 36:1.
7. James K. Glassman, "Came the Revolution—and Only 400 Marched," *Boston Sunday Herald Traveler*, 12 October 1969, sec. 1, p. 31:3.
8. Peter Henig, "On the Manpower Channelers," *Essays on Draft Resistance, Our Fight Is Here*, SDS Pamphlet (Chicago: SDS, n.d., circa 1965-1969).
9. Carl Davidson, *The Multiversity: Crucible of the New Working Class*, Pamphlet (n.p.: n.d., circa 1967-1969), p. 11.
10. *Ibid.*
11. "SDS Anti-Draft Resolution," National Council Position Paper (Berkeley, Calif.: 1966).
12. Philip A. Luce, "How SDS Hopes to Disrupt America," *Human Events*, 15 June 1968, p. 9:4.
13. Jerry L. Avorn, et al., *Up against the Ivy Wall* (New York: Atheneum Press, 1969, c. 1968), p. 77.
14. Clarence Doucet, "Shapes of Protest," *Reprinted Series by The New Orleans Times-Picayune*, 23 May 1969-1 June 1969, p. 26.
15. Peterson, p. 313.
16. Collier, p. 30:6.
17. The author spent two school years recruiting for the U.S. Marine Corps at New England college campuses. The use of the media was told to him by members of the Students for a Democratic Society at Trinity College, Hartford, Conn., during the spring visit, 1968.
18. This was a tactic used to gather a crowd. The tactic was first employed on the campuses on the west coast. In the fall of 1968 it was used in conjunction with the visit by the Marine recruiters to the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass. It was threatened to be used again at the University of Rhode Island, Kingston, R.I., during the 15 October 1969 moratorium. There is never any real intention of actually burning a dog, but the purpose was to draw a crowd and then chastise the audience for getting upset about a dog while allowing the war in Vietnam to continue.
19. O'Brien, p. 12.
20. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, p. 13.
21. Conversations with members of the Students for a Democratic Society at Bridgeport University, Bridgeport, Conn., and Trinity College, Hartford, Conn., during the fall term, 1967.
22. Carl Davidson, "Praxis Makes Perfect," *Essays on Draft Resistance, Our Fight Is Here*. p. 2-4.
23. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, p. 9.
24. Davidson, *The Multiversity*, p. 12.
25. Kalevi J. Holsti, *International Politics: a Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 254-255.
26. *Vietnam Fact Sheet*, SDS Pamphlet (Ithaca, N.Y.: Glad Day Press, n.d.).
27. Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda—the Formation of Men's Attitudes* (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 70-72.
28. Avorn, p. 287-288.
29. Lewis S. Feuer, *The Conflict of Generations* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 285.
30. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, p. 14.
31. Davidson, *The Multiversity*, p. 13.
32. Jonathan Eisen and David Steinberg, "The Student Revolt against Liberalism," *The Annals*, March 1969, p. 83.
33. Feuer, p. 249.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Eisen and Steinberg, p. 85.
36. Richard Blumenthal, "SDS—Protest Is Not Enough," *The Nation*, 22 May 1967, p. 657.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 660.
38. Bradford Lytle, *After Washington—Three Views*, Committee for Non-Violent Action Pamphlet No. 5 (n.p.: n.p., 27 August 1968), p. 1-2.
39. Blumenthal, p. 660.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Eisen and Steinberg, p. 85.
42. Lynd, p. 71.
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DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was not only a successful military officer, but was also one of his generation's most talented orators. One of his most eloquent speeches was "Duty, Honor, Country"—an impassioned patriotic appeal to the values of the officer corps—delivered at West Point in 1962 on the occasion of his acceptance of the Sylvanus Thayer Award. In the following article the author analyzes and evaluates this address in the light of contemporary standards of rhetorical excellence.

A research paper prepared

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MacARTHUR OF WEST POINT

Duty, honor, country: those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be.

On 28 February 1962 the U.S. Military Academy announced that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur had been selected to receive the Sylvanus Thayer Award.

The award, first presented in 1958, is named for Sylvanus Thayer, known to generations of cadets as "The Father of the Military Academy." As Academy Superintendent from 1817 to 1833, Thayer instituted academic and military principles "based upon integration of character and knowledge" that remain today virtually unchanged.¹ The award

is presented annually to a distinguished U.S. citizen "whose record of service to his country, accomplishments in the national interest, and manner of achievement exemplify outstanding devotion to the principles expressed in the motto of West Point—Duty, Honor, Country."²

On 12 May 1962, General MacArthur made his final journey to West Point. On that day he was to be presented with the award—"a handsome gold medal, a beautiful hand-painted scroll, and a citation."³ It was a perfect day for a parade. A brilliant sunshine highlighted the spring beauty of the Hudson Valley as the Corps formed on "The Plain" in honor of the general. The ancient parade field was surrounded by more than 30,000 spectators who broke into spontaneous applause as the Old Soldier trooped the line once again.⁴

Following the parade, the award presentation was made in the cadet messhall. Maj. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the Academy Superintendent, opened the program with a few brief remarks. Next, Lt. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, President of the Association of Graduates, recalled some of the highlights of General MacArthur's career. Following these momentary reminiscences, General Groves then read the award citation. At the conclusion of this reading, the audience, which consisted of 70 distinguished military and civilian guests, more than 300 Academy graduates and the entire 2,400 man Corps of Cadets, rose in a standing ovation as the award was presented. Then, speaking from his heart "without reference to notes or script," General MacArthur "delivered the inspiring address which will occupy forever a prominent niche in the history of West Point."⁵ (See appendix I.)

This "moving and inspirational farewell speech"⁶ would come to be called "Duty, Honor, Country" and would take its place alongside of "Old Soldiers Never Die" as the most famous public addresses of General MacArthur.

The purpose of this paper is to conduct a rhetorical critique of "Duty, Honor, Country." This criticism will include investigation in the following areas: a brief sketch of the background of General MacArthur and his methods of speech preparation; an examination of the organizational structure of the speech and of the means of proof employed within the speech; an analysis of the style and delivery of the speech; and, finally, an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of "Duty, Honor, Country" as well as an interpretation of its communicative situation.

No attempt will be made to recount in detail the many and varied highlights of the career of Douglas MacArthur. Called "the greatest front line general of the war,"⁷ his daring exploits with the famous Rainbow Division during World

War I are included in even the most basic history texts. Equally as familiar is his rapid rise within Army ranks to Chief of Staff. His subsequent records as Special Military Advisor to the Philippines, Commander in Chief U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers for the occupation of Japan, and Commander in Chief, United Nations Forces in Korea are, again, both well known and well documented. Yet, because a speaker's "background may well contribute to his ultimate product,"⁸ certain facets of General MacArthur's life and career merit reinvestigation.

Douglas MacArthur was born in his father's Army headquarters at Arsenal Barracks, Little Rock, Ark., on 26 January 1880.⁹ If, indeed, "the military officer raised in such a milieu since childhood might be influenced on a particular issue in a very positive way,"¹⁰ then most certainly Douglas MacArthur would have been so influenced. Though he would not officially join the Army until his entrance to West Point in 1899, he "was in and of the Regular United States Army from the day of his birth."¹¹ He was fond of saying "the first recollection I have is the sound of Army bugles."¹² "His first books had to do with soldiering; his playmates were the children of other soldiers on the post, and like young Douglas their first playground was an Army square."¹³

Douglas' father, Arthur MacArthur, a professional soldier of considerable renown,¹⁴ conducted an early education of his son. In addition to the three R's, he instilled in him "a stern sense of obligation." Douglas learned that he must "always do what was right and just" and that his country "was to come first" in his heart.¹⁵ A frequent topic of conversation between father and son during these early years was "the glories of West Point." As far back as he could remember, his father had expounded on the virtues of the Academy. He fre-

quently brought to his home "some recently graduated young shavetail to tell his son of the customs and regulations of the Academy."¹⁶ Many years later his father would say that "he started Douglas towards West Point the day he was born."¹⁷ General MacArthur likewise recorded in his memoirs "always before me was the goal of West Point, the greatest military academy in the world."¹⁸

Douglas MacArthur achieved "the fulfillment of all my boyish dreams"¹⁹ when he entered West Point on 13 June 1899. As the son of a famous soldier, he was singled out in advance as a target for hazing. He quickly gained the respect of both his classmates and the upperclassmen by meeting a very rough summer camp hazing "like a man, with fortitude and dignity." In fact he emerged from the camp "with flying colors" and "showed himself a true soldier, easily mastering the military training."²⁰

With the rigors of summer camp behind him, MacArthur began to pursue "with direct, unwavering purpose his self-set goal of surpassing his classmates." Militarily he progressed from corporal in his 2d year to company first sergeant in his 3d year. In his final year he achieved the peak of West Point military aptitude—First Captain of the Corps of Cadets. Academically he ranked number one his first 2 years, dropped to fourth in his 3d year, but returned to the top his senior year. His final 4 year average of 98.14 was the highest in the history of West Point.²¹ Although not an outstanding athlete, he was proficient enough to win a starting position in the outfield of the Army baseball team and twice earned his "A." (He would wear it on his cadet bathrobe until his death in 1964.)²² He was particularly proud of scoring the winning run against Navy in 1901 by "stretching" a base on balls into a homerun as a result of shoddy fielding by the midshipmen.²³

Douglas MacArthur, "a tall, slender, handsome cadet, glitteringly immaculate with maroon silk sash, plumed dress hat, glinting sword, and four gold stripes of chevrons"²⁴ was graduated from West Point on 11 June 1903 as a second lieutenant of Engineers "prepared to live—or to die—in upholding the oath. Duty, Honor, Country."²⁵ Sixteen years later he would return, as the youngest Superintendent in its history, with the mission to revitalize an Academy that was "forty years behind the times."²⁶

"West Point in 1919 was sorely in need of a leader of energy and vision."²⁷ Due to wartime demands for Army officers, the normal 4-year curriculum had been shortened to 1 year, leaving the institution in a state of disorder and confusion. In Congress and across the Nation the popular opinion seemed to be "Why have a West Point at all?" Critics of the Academy argued if World War I "was the war to end wars, the war to save democracy for all time, why go on training, at great expense, officers who would never have to fight?"²⁸ As MacArthur noted in his memoirs, "Even the proud spirit of the Academy had flagged."²⁹

The new Superintendent lost no time in beginning his "fight for the very life of the Academy."³⁰ He immediately went to Washington to plead the Academy's case before Congress. He reminded the legislators that "West Point, together with the United States Naval Academy, represents the apotheosis of the public school system" and called for "that spirit of generous foresight that has marked the educational system of the nation for the past century." Much to his relief, Congress supported his views and the Academy was returned to a 4-year curriculum.³¹

General MacArthur then turned his attention to the internal problems that were plaguing the Academy. He bluntly asked the Old Guard of traditionalists, "How long are we going on preparing

for the war of 1812?"³² Although frequently opposed by many academic members of this Old Guard, MacArthur was relentless in his purpose—"to change the objective of the United States Military Academy from its hide-bound and traditional lines to the specialized preparation needed for modern soldiering."³³ In 3 short years he completely rehabilitated the Academy's administrative procedures; revitalized its academic, tactical, and physical training; and laid the long-range plans for the expansion of its physical plant and facilities.

Under General MacArthur's leadership the academic departments, formerly "isolated, tight little islands," were drawn together. Instructors were sent to colleges and universities throughout the land to take courses and observe their educational procedures. At West Point, military courses were adapted to modern needs; scientific courses were brought up to date; classical courses were instituted to be used as cultural foundations; and liberal arts courses received new and greater emphasis.³⁴

As Superintendent, MacArthur was also responsible for reviving forgotten or ignored Academy traditions. Under his hand the fourth class system was re-established, but without the brutality of physical hazing. The old customs of the Corps were not changed, instead, "Plebes would learn them in a decent soldierly way, without arrogance or abuse."³⁵

MacArthur also eliminated the frivolous world of the cadet summer camp. In its place he substituted a rigorous military training system. Included in the new system was a program of sending cadets to Regular Army posts as a part of their summer training. In this way he insured that the prospective officers would receive training in the handling of modern weapons and would also encounter realistic field experiences.³⁶

Cadet physical training was completely revamped during MacArthur's

tour as Superintendent. The old program of optional athletic participation by interested cadets was discarded. He directed that every cadet would engage in an active athletic program and thus established West Point's now famous program of intramural athletics.³⁷

Douglas MacArthur gave to and demanded from the Corps the highest standards of honor. He felt such standards were "the only solid foundation for a military career." "A code of individual conduct" was established to maintain "the reputation and well-being of the whole." To Douglas MacArthur this code was a West Pointer's "personal responsibility to his mates, to his community, and above all to his country." It was MacArthur's professed view that "In many businesses and professions the welfare of the individual is the chief object, but in the military profession the safety and the honor of the state become paramount."³⁸

Douglas MacArthur's aims as Superintendent of West Point are best described in the Academy code which he wrote. This code begins "To hold fast to those policies typified in the motto of the Academy—DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY."³⁹ It is not possible to cite here all of his accomplishments and triumphs as Superintendent in support of these aims. It is significant to note, however, that when he departed the banks of the Hudson in 1922 "the new objective of West Point had been firmly established. A new spirit had been instilled that was to grow and thrive—a new spirit that can be positively identified with MacArthur."⁴⁰ No graduate of the U.S. Military Academy would challenge William Ganoe's appraisal, "If Sylvanus Thayer was the Father of the Military Academy then MacArthur was its Savior."⁴¹

Douglas MacArthur did not like to talk extemporaneously. On those few occasions when someone pushed a microphone in front of him, he most likely had already "carefully rehearsed

in his own mind just what he would say." MacArthur was most articulate in carefully prepared speeches. His normal working habit was to write out his speeches in longhand on lined legal-sized yellow paper. While writing he would edit and reedit until satisfied that his finished product would contain the message he wished to convey to his listeners.⁴² In a foreword to *A Soldier Speaks*, a textbook prepared for use at the Military Academy, Vorin E. Whan noted, "He often wrote his speeches in longhand in order to collect his thoughts, and then delivered them almost verbatim without using his text."⁴³

The general seldom introduced his speeches or attempted to embellish them with any "that reminds me" stories. Normally, his speeches were devoid of any humor. On those occasions when he spoke, his speeches were serious.⁴⁴

General MacArthur's speeches were his own. He never used a ghostwriter.⁴⁵ His close friend Carl Mydans observed, "No one ever wrote a line for him . . . and no one ever added a word to or deleted one from anything he had written for the public record." Mydans also recalled observing MacArthur "preparing the communiques, a steady, unhesitant flow of words written in pencil on a pad of lined legal-sized paper, as though it had all been written before and was now only being copied."⁴⁶

In preparation for his famous "Old Soldiers Never Die" address to Congress in 1951, General MacArthur followed his normal habits of speech preparation. He worked "through the long day and into the night" honing the speech.⁴⁷ Yet, incredibly, "Duty, Honor, Country" does not fit this pattern. It appears to be a remarkable, extemporaneous speech spoken from the heart without any formal preparation. In commenting on the occasion, MacArthur stated simply, "I had no prepared address."⁴⁸ Dignitaries who were seated at the head

table that day unanimously concur that the speech was delivered "without reference to notes or script."⁴⁹ The professional opinion of the editors of the text, *A Soldier Speaks*, that "Duty, Honor, Country" "was delivered extemporaneously and had not been written out by General MacArthur prior to its delivery at West Point"⁵⁰ remains unchallenged.

THE SETTING

The long, gray line has never failed us. Were you to do so, a million ghosts in olive drab, in brown khaki, in blue and gray, would rise from their white crosses, thundering those magic words: duty, honor, country.

West Point is awe inspiring. "It is situated between the lofty Crow's Nest of New York's Bear Mountain and the venerable Storm King Mountain of the Highlands." Flowing below its "noble heights" is the majestic Hudson River, guarded since Revolutionary days by historic Fort Putnam, a familiar haunt of generations of cadets and their ladies.⁵¹

But the inspiration of West Point is not derived just from its magnificent physical setting or its genuine ascetic beauty. In time, the cadet, exposed to these on a daily basis, comes to regard them more with pride than awe. It is, instead, the incessant, never heard yet never silent, footsteps of the Long Gray Line which stir the heart and quicken the pulse of the cadet. "For West Point is not battlements; not ivy and cloistered halls; not parades; those things are stage-setting."⁵² West Point is the joy and despair, the triumph and defeat of that ever-lengthening Long Gray Line.

Cadet parades on "The Plain" seem to be joined by those ubiquitous spirits from another day. The cadet, passing under the long, mournful shadow of Battle Monument which commemorates the Civil War, hears again the rollicall,

"Grant, Lee, Jackson, Early, Sheridan, Sherman . . . all present and accounted for, sir!" There is no escape from tradition at West Point. The Long Gray Line is that tradition. The West Point cadet cats in a messhall faithfully guarded by Sylvanus Thayer. He sleeps in the same room, organized in the same manner, as did "Black Jack" Pershing. He studies under the watchful eye of George Patton—who guards the library as a lone sentry, binoculars draped jauntily around his neck, pearl-handled pistols at his side. On those few occasions when the rigors of West Point are momentarily forgotten, the cadet enjoys a limited social life within the confines of staid old Cullum Hall—on whose walls are inscribed the names of every single graduate who has ever given his life in defense of his country.

Although every graduate of the Military Academy is considered a member of the Long Gray Line, few, if any, ever truly join its ranks until their death. Douglas MacArthur was one of those few. Returning to West Point on that lovely spring day, he was not just a graduate, albeit a distinguished one. He was one of "them." Douglas MacArthur was a living part of the tradition of West Point which is so zealously passed to each succeeding fourth class. His portrait stood guard over the stone portals of the gymnasium, saluting each cadet as they passed through or paused to read the maxim he had had carved in the stone:

Upon the fields of friendly strife,
Are sown the seeds that,
Upon other fields, on other days,
Will bear the fruits of victory.

If a cadet stopped to view the long line of official portraits of former Academy Superintendents, one striking figure of a soldier, wearing a crushed cap and proudly displaying the Rainbow Division shoulder patch, seemed to tower above all others. Much of the modern-day lore of West Point is cen-

tered about Douglas MacArthur. His deeds and words are legend at West Point and in many cases a part of the "required" tradition. Even the newest cadet knows verbatim the text of his "Beat Navy" telegram of 1949: "From the Far East I send you one single thought, one sole idea—written in red on every beachhead from Australia to Tokyo—there is no substitute for victory."

A ripple of laughter must have passed along the Long Gray Line that day when he began his speech: "As I was leaving the hotel this morning, a doorman asked me, 'Where are you headed for General?' And when I replied 'West Point,' he remarked 'Beautiful place. Have you ever been there before?'"

In analyzing a speech "to unearth the nature of the occasion is also a task of the critic."⁵³ Correct identification of the occasion can lead to "influences on the subject, the speaker, and the speaker's purpose."⁵⁴ Occasions can be categorized into such types as ceremonial, required, routine, or perhaps spontaneous. But "whatever the occasion it is significant in rhetorical analysis and evaluation."⁵⁵

Although the presentation of the Thayer Award was made to Douglas MacArthur at the end of a day of ceremonies, the occasion was not truly ceremonial. It was more than that; it was parochial. The award, named for "The Father of the Military Academy," was presented to an individual commonly called "The Savior of the Military Academy." The selection of the awardee had been made by a committee of seven distinguished Academy graduates.⁵⁶ The actual presentation was made in the historic cadet messhall before an audience of 2,800 cadets and graduates of the Academy. Finally, the award presentation, normally made in early March, was postponed until May in order to include a traditional Corps review in the occasion. (The first time this had ever been done.)⁵⁷ It would

have been heresy for General MacArthur to have selected any topic other than West Point for his acceptance speech.

The occasion does not alone "mold the speaker's ideas," so too does the audience. There are four simple categories of audience reaction: completely favorable, completely opposed, apathetic, and uncommitted. "Very seldom, however, can the critic find a pure reaction in any one audience."⁵⁸ Audiences neither come from a vacuum nor assemble in one. They come with pre-established systems of values, conditioning their perceptions.⁵⁹

These learned opinions are probably true in the large majority of rhetorical analyses, but they seem somehow out of tune with the audience that was assembled at West Point on 12 May 1962. This was an entirely homogeneous audience, tightly packed in the artfully conceived vacuum that is West Point. Together with the speaker, they formed an integral part of the day's activities. They stood tall and proud as the old general passed by their ranks to the tune of "those treasured chants of World War I . . . 'Tipperary,' 'Smile Awhile,' 'K-K-K-Katy,' and 'My Buddy.'"⁶⁰ Then, as the nostalgic sounds of "The Official West Point March" flooded The Plain, General MacArthur stood tall as the cadets passed in review. Later, as the Corps gathered in the messhall for the noon meal, they knew that that withered old man in the dark business suit had once been "the handsomest cadet that ever came into the Academy."⁶¹

The values which were dominant in that group were obvious. They were the values of "duty, honor, country"—the motto of West Point. Both General MacArthur and his audience shared these same values. Douglas MacArthur's farewell speech was not designed to introduce any new values. It was intended to reinforce the cadets' preestablished values of "duty, honor, country."⁶² The effectiveness of "Duty, Honor, Country" in accomplishing this

task was significantly increased as a result of the cadet identification with MacArthur.

ORGANIZATION AND MEANS OF PROOF— "DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY"

Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be duty, honor, country.

A well-organized speech should be divided into three distinct parts: introduction, discussion, and conclusion. Each of these parts should fulfill certain specific requirements.⁶³

The introduction of the speech should serve to (1) gain attention; (2) present a clear statement of the speaker's purpose; and (3) provide a thesis which suggests the main point of the speech. These three points may be usefully summarized by the terms: attention-getter, orientation, and thesis statement.⁶⁴

The empathy between General MacArthur and his West Point audience was so strong that an attention-getter, as such, probably was not necessary in "Duty, Honor, Country." However, as a speech perfectionist, General MacArthur did choose to use an attention-getting step. The technique he employed was "reference to the occasion." Following his opening anecdote, the general began, "No human being could fail to be deeply moved by such a tribute as this. . . ." He continued by interpreting the award as "not intended primarily to honor a personality but to symbolize a great moral code." MacArthur then characterized the code as "an expression of the ethics of the American soldier" while expressing his pride and humility at being thus integrated into such a noble ideal.

The orientation and thesis statement are frequently confused. The orientation should tell the audience what a speaker is going to do while the thesis statement does it. The thesis statement "is the assertion of an idea or an opinion. It is in effect a one-sentence summary, the one statement in your speech which all others support, either directly or indirectly."⁶⁵ In "Duty, Honor, Country," General MacArthur reversed the normal speech procedure, by first stating his thesis and then explaining his purpose (orientation).

After completing his reference to the occasion, MacArthur stated his thesis, "Duty, honor, country: those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be." Following the statement of his thesis, the general explained the purpose of "Duty, Honor, Country." This orientation was extremely effective, because, despite the general's well-known speech talents, he chose to explain his purpose in a negative manner. "Unhappily, I possess neither that eloquence of diction, that poetry of imagination, nor that brilliance of metaphor to tell you all that they mean." In this manner MacArthur completed his rhetorically sound introduction and proceeded on to the discussion portion of "Duty, Honor, Country."

In examining the discussion or body of a speech, a first consideration is whether or not the speaker supported the idea suggested in the introduction.⁶⁶ In "Duty, Honor, Country," General MacArthur never wavered from his initial thesis statement. Four different times within the body of the speech he made specific reference to his thesis. Each time the technique of repetition and restatement was used:⁶⁷ "Always for them: duty, honor country... the very obsession of your public service must be duty, honor, country... Your guideposts stand out like a tenfold beacon in the night: duty, honor, country... thundering those

magic words: duty, honor, country."

Although restatement was his primary rhetorical tool in supporting the thesis of "Duty, Honor, Country," MacArthur also effectively employed other means of verbal support. The general was "a conscious speech stylist" who sprinkled his speeches with liberal use of imagery and metaphor.⁶⁸ In "Duty, Honor, Country" he made frequent use of both and in one stirring passage combined the two:

From one end of the world to the other, he has drained deep the chalice of courage. As I listened to those songs, in memory's eye I could see those staggering columns of the First World War, bending under soggy packs on many a weary march, from dripping dusk to drizzling dawn, slogging ankle-deep through the mire of shell-packed roads; to form grimly for the attack, blue-lipped, covered with sludge, and mud, chilled by the wind and rain, driving home to their objective, and, for many, to the judgment seat of God.

The powerful effect of MacArthur's use of metaphor and imagery to create and recreate is unmistakable in that passage and throughout the speech.

An additional technique of verbal support used by General MacArthur in "Duty, Honor, Country" was comparison. Using this technique he explained to the cadets what the words "duty, honor, country" could do for them, "... they teach you to be proud and unbending in honest failure, but humble and gentle in success. . . ."

To complement his very skillful use of verbal support, MacArthur employed one additional principle of rhetoric within the body of the speech. He began his discussion by immediately refuting any opposing points of view of his thesis. To do this he resorted to parallel-

ism⁶⁹ to dispense with "the unbelievers" who might say that duty, honor, country "are but words, but a slogan, but a flamboyant phrase." He further warned, "Every pedant, every demagogue, every cynic, every hypocrite, every troublemaker, and, I am sorry to say, some others of an entirely different character, will try to downgrade them, even to the extent of mockery and ridicule." This identification of a very different view of duty, honor, country was used by MacArthur to begin his discussion. Having thus admitted that some persons might challenge his concept of duty, honor, country, he pushed the thought aside and began his impassioned defense of that concept. Throughout the remainder of his discussion, the general artfully applied a variety of verbal support in reinforcing his thesis statement. As with the introduction, the discussion was a model of rhetorical organization.

"An effective conclusion generally consists of two parts: a summary and a direct indication of how the speech may be used."⁷⁰ The conclusion of "Duty, Honor, Country" does not fit the classical mold of "telling them what you told them," but it is effective nonetheless. The start of the conclusion was unmistakable as the general spoke, "The shadows are lengthening for me:" as with the discussion, the conclusion is rich in imagery and metaphor. "I listen vainly, but with thirsty ear, for the witching melody of faint bugles blowing reveille, of far drums beating the long roll. In my dreams I hear again the crash of guns, the rattle of musketry, the strange mournful mutter of the battlefield." As the speech neared its denouement, MacArthur injected a very brief summary by the use of restatement—"... always I come back to West Point. Always there echoes and re-echoes: duty, honor, country." The aged general then ended with an emotional personal intention, "I want you to know that when I cross the river, my last conscious

thoughts will be of the Corps, and the Corps, and the Corps."

It was not necessary for General MacArthur to include in his conclusion how "Duty, Honor, Country" could be put to use by the assembled audience. Throughout the discourse, its usefulness was unmistakable. It would stand, from that moment on, as an eloquent defense of the West Point motto—duty, honor, country.⁷¹

"Duty, Honor, Country" proved to be an excellent example of how a good speech should be organized. It follows the established pattern of introduction, discussion, and conclusion. Both the introduction and the discussion are models of textbook accuracy in their application of rhetorical principles of organization. While the conclusion deviates somewhat from this type accuracy, it is still superb in its impact and adds to rather than detracts from the overall effectiveness of the speech.

"Whatever end the speaker has in mind, his specific purpose is to speak with persuasive effect toward that end."⁷² There are three methods available to a speaker to achieve his specific purpose. These methods are usually referred to as means of proof and are categorized as ethical, logical, and emotional.

"Ethical proof refers to the observable references in a speech that tend to indicate the character and the integrity of the speaker."⁷³ In employing the techniques of ethical proof, or ethos, the speaker is simply saying "listen to me because of who I am."⁷⁴

Unquestionably MacArthur "enjoyed high ethos with the cadets."⁷⁵ To those young men who accepted the rigors of West Point for the sole purpose of embarking on a military career, Douglas MacArthur was the epitome of the military profession.

It would be impossible to say whether West Point or the Army was closer to General MacArthur's heart. "He lived in and for the Army" and

"for the abstractions in the West Point motto—Duty, Honor, Country."⁷⁶ Most likely he himself could not truly have made such a judgment. He spoke eloquently of both. "No West Pointer had more loudly acclaimed or more forcefully demonstrated his love for his Alma Mater than did Douglas MacArthur."⁷⁷ MacArthur was also always lavish in his praise of the soldier, "the noblest development of mankind."⁷⁸ In his autobiography he would describe his "faithful men-at-arms" as "the driving soul of Americanism."⁷⁹ Such a judgment is not necessary. A cadet is a soldier. A West Pointer's first oath of allegiance is to the Army and his country. When MacArthur spoke of "the soldier" in "Duty, Honor, Country" he was speaking of those in the messhall, those they would lead and those they would follow.

The dominant ethical proof in "Duty, Honor, Country" is credibility of source.⁸⁰ The general, whose personal integrity and sincerity were unchallenged by the audience, "was fully aware of ethos factors."⁸¹ He used his credibility throughout the speech, and in this passage it is classic: "In 20 campaigns on a hundred battlefields, around a thousand campfires, I have witnessed that enduring fortitude, that patriotic self-abnegation and that invincible determination which has carved his statue in the hearts of his people."

General MacArthur further strengthened his ethos with the audience by using the ethical appeal of reference to the Deity. He reminded the cadets that in war many drive home not only "to their objective" but "to the judgment seat of God." Later, in describing "the soldier" he spoke these words, "In battle and in the face of danger and death he discloses those divine attributes which his Maker gave when he created man in his own image. No physical courage and no brute instinct can take the place of the divine help, which alone can sustain him."

Emotional proof, "to convince and

stimulate through appeals to emotion"⁸² is a second means of proof. Here the speaker is saying "listen to me because, as a human being, I share certain motives, certain emotions, certain ambitions, with you."⁸³ A speech needs emotional appeal if it is to stir its audience. The speaker is able to develop this proof "by using words which refer the hearers to specific emotion or by describing and/or suggesting the emotions, moods, and feelings he wishes his audience to feel."⁸⁴

In "Duty, Honor, Country" both types of emotional proofs are evident. In the introduction MacArthur admitted, "no human being could fail to be deeply moved by such a tribute." Again he struck an early emotional chord with the declaration, "it fills me with an emotion I cannot express." As he described the values of duty, honor, country, MacArthur included the phrase, "a vigor of the emotions." The general also clearly spelled out those emotions he wanted the audience to feel, "they create in your heart the sense of wonder, the unfailing hope of what next, and the joy and inspiration of life."

As discussed earlier, the conclusion of "Duty, Honor, Country" is overwhelming in its emotional impact. When the legendary Old Soldier soliloquized, "My days of old have vanished tone and tint. They have gone glimmering through the dreams of things that were. Their memory is one of wondrous beauty watered by tears and coaxed and caressed by the smiles of yesterday" both he and his audience reached the emotional breaking point. Many in the audience were moved to tears.⁸⁵

"Duty, Honor, Country" was delivered in an emotion-packed atmosphere. It was spoken from the heart and with unabashed sentiment. It would not be a mistake to conclude that every single word of the speech was touched by emotion.

Even though a speech is strong in

ethical and emotional proofs, a speaker should not neglect "the logical presentation of facts, using sound modes of support." Such logical support "gives credence to the thesis of the speech" as well as adding to audience acceptance.⁸⁶ When a speaker employs logical proof he is telling an audience "listen to me because of what I know."⁸⁷ Common types of logical support include events, statistics, examples, comparisons and contrasts, definitions, and testimony.⁸⁸

"Duty, Honor, Country" contains several good examples of logical proof. The general used comparison in defining what duty, honor, country can do, "They teach you . . . to learn to laugh, yet never forget how to weep. . . ." Metaphors, short, compressed comparisons, were used throughout the speech by MacArthur. "You are the heaven which binds together the entire fabric of our national system of defense." Also used frequently by General MacArthur were imagery or hypothetical examples. In "Duty, Honor, Country" it is sometimes difficult to determine where imagery ends and empirical evidence begins. Both, however, are examples of logical proof. A final example of MacArthur's use of logical support is his continual definition and redefinition of the concept of duty, honor, country during the speech.

"Duty, Honor, Country" is replete with correct examples of rhetorical means of proof. The speech is primarily ethical and emotional in its appeal, but General MacArthur also effectively interspersed logical proof. The worth and validity of these proofs are exceptional in "Duty, Honor, Country."

STYLE AND EVALUATION

—always victory, always through the bloody haze of their last reverberating shot, the vision of gaunt, ghastly men, reverently following your password of duty, honor, country.

Two additional rhetorical aspects remain to be examined before determining the final evaluation of "Duty, Honor, Country." They are style and delivery.

"Delivery is concerned with two areas of evaluation: voice and bodily action."⁸⁹ "Duty, Honor, Country" was delivered in 39 minutes. During a large majority of this time, General MacArthur spoke from behind a lectern making only an infrequent hand gesture.⁹⁰ This was his normal speaking pattern. "His voice is never loud but there is a pulse in it that holds the listener far more effectively than heavily accented perorations or gestures. MacArthur never gestures."⁹¹ It should be pointed out that MacArthur did not need to resort to gestures to make his speeches effective for he possessed that great quality of charisma. Although "he grew, eventually, physically weak, his powers were undiminished, his august presence unmistakable."⁹² Even at age 82 he was still capable of producing a "throat-catching sense of excitement."⁹³

General MacArthur spoke slowly and deliberately without an accent to mark him as a native of any particular part of the country.⁹⁴ His voice had a "low, compelling resonance."⁹⁵ The general was twice gassed during World War I. His larynx never recovered from these gassings, and, as a consequence, although its tone was sonorous, his voice had a "curious tremolo, a manner of delivery which those who did not understand the background would wrongly attribute to affectation."⁹⁶

MacArthur's voice was clear and distinct as he began "Duty, Honor, Country." He related the doorman anecdote with a tone of levity. (Such use of humor was extremely uncharacteristic of MacArthur's normal speech pattern.) When the laughter had subsided, however, his voice turned serious. The general now spoke slowly and deliberately without inflection. As he spoke his

thesis statement he emphasized the words, "duty-honor-country" pausing slightly between each as if for strength.

MacArthur then continued in a slow and deliberate manner. He departed from his monotone when he warned with rising inflection that some "unbelievers will say they are but words." As he continued "pedant," "demagogue," "cynic," "hypocrite," and "troublemaker" all received speaker emphasis. His voice then trailed off, becoming somewhat hoarse and faint with the words "officer and gentleman."

The general's voice took on renewed vigor as he told the cadets of the troops they would one day command. The phrases, "American man-at-arms," and "that invincible determination" both received powerful emphasis in a resonant, rich voice. Listening to this portion of the speech is like hearing the Douglas MacArthur of an earlier, more glorious day.

When MacArthur began to paint his vivid imagery of "those staggering columns," his voice wavered almost as if he himself was "bending under soggy packs." At this point he appeared to be saving his emphasis for the words, "duty, honor, country." Each time he spoke them his voice was resonant, his enunciation clear. Once, midway through his address he paused, an inexplicable 12-second pause, apparently grouping for the phrase, "the Divine help." As the general neared the end of the discussion, his voice became strong again and his enunciation particularly clear. Once more, the words, "duty, honor, country" were heavily emphasized and then suddenly in dramatic, whispered tones "Only the dead have seen the end of war."

Pausing once more, "General MacArthur stepped to the side of the lectern, his hand resting on it."⁹⁷ After 18 seconds of unearthly silence, he began the emotional conclusion in a low, almost hushed, voice. As Douglas

MacArthur uttered the words, "duty, honor, country," for the last time, it was as if he had lovingly caressed each with his voice. Then having pledged his "last conscious thoughts" to "the Corps, and the Corps, and the Corps," General of the Army Douglas MacArthur whispered softly, but with an unmistakable tone of finality, "I bid you farewell."

The delivery of "Duty, Honor, Country" was masterful. It was a perfect complement to a well-organized, emotion-packed speech. To have expected anything less than an extremely effective delivery would have been foolish for "MacArthur understood the uses of theater: as he once put it, it is sometimes good to be 'a bit of a ham' in order to convince large audiences."⁹⁸

"Style is intrinsically woven to the effect the speaker desires."⁹⁹ Definitions of style run the gauntlet from Jonathan Swift's "proper words in proper places" to Buffon's "Style is the man himself." For the purpose of this discourse, style will be defined as an individual's "unique way of using the resources of the English language."¹⁰⁰ However, regardless of its definition, to be effective, a speaker's style must be clear, appropriate, and vivid.¹⁰¹

It has been said of Douglas MacArthur that "fancy language came to him as readily as Cherokee to a Cherokee."¹⁰² MacArthur possessed an extraordinary vocabulary. He also had a gift for making impressive phrases into slogans that would be remembered. The MacArthur speeches had "a touch of poetic phraseology and rhythm."¹⁰³ In "Duty, Honor, Country" such language and phrases are abundant. "They give you a temper of the will . . . a freshness of the deep springs of life, a temperamental predominance of courage over timidity. . . ."

When the general spoke "there were no 'uhs' or 'ohs' to halt or clog his almost classical sentences, which flowed steadily like a smooth river without the

splash or splatter of rapids."¹⁰⁴ Douglas MacArthur enjoyed talking to the degree that he monopolized most conversations. John Gunther referred to him as "an old-fashioned monologist, *par excellence*." Gunther admitted, however, "I have seldom met anybody who gives such a sense of the richness and flexibility of the English language; he draws out of it—like Winston Churchill—as out of some inexhaustible reservoir."¹⁰⁵

The MacArthur style, as with the man himself, was not without its critics. Charles Marshall believes "Words often got out of hand." He also writes that MacArthur "was prodigal with such terms as insurmountable, unsurpassed, eternal and supreme—where strong, good, long-lasting and high would have served better." It is Marshall's judgment that "the Byronic streak needed curbing."¹⁰⁶ It should be noted, however, that a style that uses such words as divine, eternal, supreme, etcetera, adds to the ethical appeal of the speech.

Unlike Marshall, most critics of the MacArthur style fail to realize the fact that his style never varied. Whether he was delivering a prepared address or simply engaging in polite conversation it was "always an experience to hear MacArthur talk." Even in his private talks the general was "a spellbinder" who "used archaic words and terms as one might a rare spice—for extraordinary flavor."¹⁰⁷ Tommy Davis, aide and confidant to MacArthur for over a decade, remembers numerous instances of the general's "spontaneous grandiloquence." Once, surprising an unauthorized dalliance, MacArthur ordered, "Eject that strumpet forthwith." Davis recalls on another occasion the general sent a bewildered subordinate scurrying to the dictionary by informing him, "You have given me umbrage."¹⁰⁸ The MacArthur style was very apparent when he "faded away" in his speech to Congress. His critics accused him of "hamming," "but in truth he was

simply using the legitimate postures of oratory to express what he himself felt."¹⁰⁹

The text of "Duty, Honor, Country" illustrates the fact that, indeed, "MacArthur was a conscious speech stylist." Throughout the speech, "imagery, metaphor and elegance of language are pronounced."¹¹⁰ For many speakers, "the eloquence of a Churchill may not be appropriate."¹¹¹ For MacArthur such speech eloquence was both in character and fitting for the occasion. Douglas MacArthur would never have said, "I can still remember the noise of the battlefield." The MacArthur description would be, "In my dreams I hear again the crash of guns, the rattle of musketry, the strange, mournful mutter of the battlefield." That was the MacArthur style. Without it, "Duty, Honor, Country" would have long since been deposited in some forgotten repository of forgettable speeches.

In a critique of "Old Soldiers Never Die," Craig Baird, a noted evaluator of rhetoric, observed that "General Douglas MacArthur will be ranked as one of America's outstanding military orators. . . . He is an orator by temperament, by habit, and by long exercise." Baird also concluded that despite its logical texture, "Old Soldiers Never Die" was primarily personal and ethical.¹¹² That same comment is entirely applicable to "Duty, Honor, Country." The general's limitations were also essentially the same in both speeches. MacArthur's delivery was sometimes too sonorous. On occasion, his phrasing was more volatile than meaningful.¹¹³ But these few shortcomings did not detract from the manifold skills Douglas MacArthur brought to the lectern on 12 May 1962. Such minor defects could not penetrate the empathy that existed between the general and his audience nor could they break the spell that his manner and eloquence created. "In manner and bearing he went back to principles symbolized by aspiring young

men, flashing swords, and the shiver of bugles in the air." "A man of eloquence he spoke words like Honor, Courage, and Country without embarrassment."¹¹⁴

Many of the thoughts and much of the same verbiage of "Duty, Honor, Country" can be found in earlier MacArthur speeches and communiques. In a 1936 speech in Manila, General MacArthur eulogized "the soldier" in much the same manner and with similar words as he did in "Duty, Honor, Country." At one point the general used the exact same phrase, "I do not know the dignity of his birth, but I do know the glory of his death."¹¹⁵ This phrase had first appeared in his lexicon during a speech given to the 1935 reunion of the Rainbow Division. It would be used again in posthumously decorating Capt. Colin Kelly in 1941¹¹⁶ and at Punchbowl National Memorial Cemetery, Honolulu, in 1951 while delivering an address en route to Washington. (Most likely General MacArthur first came upon the words in his wife's hometown of Murfreesboro, Tenn., where they are engraved on a battle memorial.)¹¹⁷

MacArthur liked to tug at the strings of emotion by announcing he was in "the twilight" of his life. As early as 1941 he wrote to a friend that he was fortunate to have had a son "in the twilight period of my life." Ten years later the general informed Congress, "I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of my life."¹¹⁸ In "Duty, Honor, Country" he spoke simply, "the twilight is here."

It would be fallacious to expect Douglas MacArthur not to repeat or paraphrase old familiar thoughts and utterances on an occasion so fraught with emotion as was the presentation of the Thayer Award. MacArthur's love and devotion for West Point never wavered. In a 1951 Academy Sesquicentennial message he stated, "And as I near the end of the road, what I felt when I was sworn in on the Plain so

long ago, I can still feel and say—that is my greatest honor." Again, in a 1953 address commemorating Founder's Day, MacArthur said, "This anniversary stirs many poignant memories in me—memories which in many respects are common to all graduates of the Military Academy. They take each one back to that ceremony on The Plain at West Point when he entered the military service and dedicated himself to duty, honor, country."¹¹⁹ His mind must have been flooded with these and many more memories when he accepted the Thayer Award, the highest accolade of his beloved alma mater.

"Duty, Honor, Country" had a profound effect on those who were privileged to hear it. The speech was intended to reenforce cadet values which occasionally become hazy as a result of the strain placed on the cadet by the normal rigors of the military Academy. The organization, style, and delivery of the address were all exceptional. Each in its own way contributed mightily to the extraordinary effectiveness of "Duty, Honor, Country." Douglas MacArthur was eminently successful in imbuing the cadets with renewed and positive determination to devote their lives to the motto of West Point—Duty, Honor, Country.

On 15 October 1969, a Boston television channel simultaneously broadcast a recording of "Duty, Honor, Country" against a backdrop of the day's Moratorium events. To the casual viewer this may have seemed a rather quixotic gesture done, perhaps, solely for artistic merit. Such is not the case. In evaluating "Duty, Honor, Country" it becomes apparent that Douglas MacArthur was speaking not just to his West Point audience but to all.

In 1962 the United States had not yet become mired in the quagmire of Vietnam, but, as in any peacetime situation, critics of the military were numerous.¹²⁰ Answering the old charge of warmonger, General MacArthur sound-

ed "the ominous words of Plato... 'Only the dead have seen the end of war.'" Three decades earlier MacArthur had performed his duties as Chief of Staff in a similar climate of public opinion. In 1933 he warned the graduating seniors of West Point, "Pacifist habits do not insure peace nor immunity from national insult or aggression." The general also decried the "unabashed and unsound propaganda" produced by the "muddled thinking" of "peace cranks."¹²¹

It is not possible to evaluate the effect that "Duty, Honor, Country" had on the 1969 viewing audience. However, its potentially significant effect on an audience of an entirely different bent than the cadets of West Point should not be discounted. This potentially powerful impact has already been demonstrated. Less than one month after his impassioned defense of duty, honor, and country, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was honored as the "outstanding American military leader" of the 20th century. The selection was made as a result of a vote of 8,000 college students across the nation.¹²² The meaningfulness of "Duty, Honor, Country" was not limited solely to West Pointers or even the Army; its effect was felt by all Americans. As such, it stands as a model of rhetorical excellence.

CONCLUSIONS

But in the evening of my memory always I come back to West Point. Always there echoes and re-echoes: duty, honor, country,

Abraham Lincoln, Douglas MacArthur, John Brown, Joseph McCarthy, Mark Anthony, Norman Thomas, Frederick Douglass, Thomas Jefferson—we know these men for their different political, social, and military roles. But... they share a similar role,

that of the advocate, the man who has a point to make and a desire to persuade his fellow man and hence turns to rhetoric to discover the means of persuasion available to him.¹²³

During the course of his distinguished career, "General MacArthur proved to be one of the Army's most articulate spokesmen and one of his generation's most talented orators."¹²⁴ "Duty, Honor, Country" did not receive the immediate nationwide publicity or subsequent critical investigations of "Old Soldiers Never Die." This is understandable since one was delivered to the Congress and the Nation, while the other was spoken in the closed atmosphere of the Military Academy. Yet, in retrospect, "Duty, Honor, Country" seems to tower far above "Old Soldiers Never Die."

The hurt was too great when the Old Soldier mounted the congressional rostrum. On that day Douglas MacArthur was a practitioner of the rhetoric of self-defense.¹²⁵ The center of his speech was himself. "Rarely indeed have the American people heard a speech so strong in the tone of personal authority."¹²⁶ This uncharacteristic devotion to self was not the true Douglas MacArthur. To him devotion to duty was always "of the highest importance."¹²⁷ Throughout his lifetime he placed duty, honor, and country above self. "He was required to reach further than one man can reach, to bear the strain of decision, to accept the isolation of command, to undergo the rigors of living a moral code and personifying the spirit of dedication."¹²⁸ His abrupt departure from this creed tempers the worth of "Old Soldiers Never Die."

The converse is true in "Duty, Honor, Country." It too was emotional and ethical. Its tone of personal authority was strong. Yet, that day the center of Douglas MacArthur's speech was not Douglas MacArthur, it was the

country he fought for and loved so well. In his eloquent farewell speech, Douglas MacArthur was reminding us all, private citizen or soldier, that it is every man's birthright and obligation to dedicate himself to this Nation, to defend its honor, and to perpetuate its greatness.

Douglas MacArthur was, above all, a patriot. To him, "the highest encomium you can still receive is to be called a patriot, if it means you love your country."¹²⁹ Today, when "strange voices are heard across the land, decrying this old and proven concept of patriotism"¹³⁰ the true meaning of "Duty, Honor, Country" is more significant than ever before.

In an envoi to the career of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, William F. Buckley, Jr., wrote:

MacArthur was the last of the great Americans. It isn't at all certain that America is capable of producing another man of MacArthur's cast. Such men spring from the loins of nations in whose blood courage runs: and we are grown anemic. That is why so many have spoken of an age that would die with MacArthur. An age when occasionally, heroes arose, acknowledging as their imperatives the Duty, Honor and Country which MacArthur cherished, but which the nation that rejected him has no stomach for, preferring the adulterated substitutes of the Age of Modulation, approved by the Pure Food

and Drug Act, and adorned by the seal of *Good Housekeeping Magazine*.¹³¹

It was not the purpose of this paper to examine or even comment on the social and political pressures at work in the Nation today. But such is the greatness of "Duty, Honor, Country" that one cannot help but reflect on it as each day's events unfold in this troubled land. From a rhetorical standpoint, "Duty, Honor, Country" will withstand even the most "searching analysis and interpretive acumen,"¹³² and emerge as greatness. It exceeds every rhetorical criteria demanded for excellence in speech. But it is more than just an academically superb speech, it is indeed a "credo for all Americans"¹³³ and in this role may one day achieve its ultimate greatness.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Maj. Richard A. Behrenhausen, U.S. Army, graduated from West Point in 1961. Since then he has served in a variety of armored and infantry assignments, including a tour of duty with the 101st Airborne Division in Vietnam. A graduate of the 1970 Class of the School of Naval Command and Staff at the Naval War College, Major Behrenhausen is presently assigned to the Armor Branch, Officer Personnel Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.

FOOTNOTES

MacARTHUR OF WEST POINT

1. "General MacArthur Honored," *The New York Times*, 1 March 1962, p. 13:1.

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3. "Sylvanus Thayer Award Presented to General MacArthur," *Assembly*, Summer 1962,

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8. Albert E. Grzebien, "Research in Communicative Arts," *Naval War College Review*, February 1969, p. 51.
9. Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 14.
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11. Robert P. Knapp, Jr., "Of War, Time, and Generals," *The Reporter*, 13 January 1966, p. 50.
12. Clark Lee and Richard Henschel, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Holt, 1952), p. 9.
13. Frank Kelley and Cornelius Ryan, *MacArthur: Man of Action* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1950), p. 41.
14. Arthur MacArthur, known as the "Boy Colonel of the West," was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his heroism at Missionary Ridge on 25 November 1863. Later, as a lieutenant general, he became the senior officer in the Army. MacArthur, p. 1-37.
15. Frazier Hunt, *The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1954), p. 11.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
17. Peyton C. March, quoted in Hunt, p. 18.
18. MacArthur, p. 18.
19. Vorin E. Whan, Jr., ed., *A Soldier Speaks* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 253.
20. Robert E. Wood, "An Upperclassman's View," *Assembly*, Spring 1964, p. 4.
21. Lee and Henschel, p. 29-31.
22. "Although the ribbons and decorations of his war days are without parallel, he never wears them. His uniform is unadorned but that plain black "A" never leaves its place over his heart on his lounging-robe—because from it he gains the inner spiritual strength needed to guide him over difficult times." Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History* (New York: Knopf, 1956), p. 316. (Note: The last photograph ever made of General MacArthur shows President Johnson visiting him in his hospital suite. The general is wearing his familiar cadet bathrobe with varsity "A.")
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24. William A. Ganoe, *MacArthur Close-up* (New York: Vantage Press, 1962), p. 22.
25. Lee and Henschel, p. 31.
26. Newlon, p. 96.
27. Gavin Long, *MacArthur as Military Commander* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1969), p. 34.
28. MacArthur, p. 77.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Douglas MacArthur, quoted in Earl Blaik, "A Cadet under MacArthur," *Assembly*, Spring 1964, p. 8.
31. MacArthur, p. 78.
32. Douglas MacArthur, quoted in Robert B. Considine, *General Douglas MacArthur* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1964), p. 29.
33. Jacob L. Devers, "The Mark of the Man on USMA," *Assembly*, Spring 1964, p. 18.
34. Robert M. Danford, "USMA's 31st Superintendent," *Assembly*, Spring 1964, p. 14.
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55. Hillbruner, p. 32.
56. "Sylvanus Thayer Award Presented to General MacArthur," p. 12.
57. *Ibid.*
58. Hillbruner, p. 29.
59. Jane Blankenship and Robert Wilhoit, *Selected Readings in Public Speaking* (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson, 1966), p. 238.
60. Considine, p. 123.
61. Wood, p. 4.
62. Linkugel, et al., eds., p. 151.
63. Jane Blankenship, *Public Speaking: a Rhetorical Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 76.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 76-78.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
66. Grzebien, p. 51.
67. Linkugel, et al., eds., p. 299.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
70. Blankenship, *Public Speaking*, p. 90.
71. Linkugel, et al., eds., p. 151.
72. Blankenship, *Public Speaking*, p. 51.
73. Grzebien, p. 52.
74. Blankenship, *Public Speaking*, p. 51.
75. Linkugel, et al., eds., p. 151.
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84. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
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101. Blankenship, *Public Speaking*, p. 122.
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110. Linkugel, et al., eds., p. 151.
111. Grzebien, p. 53.
112. Haig A. Bosmajian, *The Rhetoric of the Speaker* (Boston: Heath, 1967), p. 43.
113. *Ibid.*
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116. Included in the West Point audience of 12 May 1962 was Cadet Colin Kelly, III, the son of the famous wartime hero.
117. Lee and Henschel, p. 94.
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123. Bosmajian, p. vii.
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126. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
127. George W. Cocheu, "Cadet Days, 1899-1903," *Assembly*, Spring 1964, p. 6.
128. "MacArthur Memorial Dedicated," *Assembly*, Fall 1969, p. 43.
129. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 415.
130. *Ibid.*, p. 414.
131. Buckley, p. 310.
132. Grzebien, p. 53.
133. "Duty, Honor, Country," *U.S. News & World Report*, 4 June 1962, p. 78.

APPENDIX I

ACCEPTANCE OF SYLVANUS THAYER AWARD MEDAL SPEECH

By General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

Washington Hall, West Point, New York, 12 May 1962

General Westmoreland, General Groves, distinguished guests, and gentlemen of the Corps:

As I was leaving the hotel this morning, a doorman asked me, "Where are you bound for, General?" and when I replied, "West Point," he remarked, "Beautiful place, have you ever been there before?"

No human being could fail to be deeply moved by such a tribute as this. [Thayer Award] Coming from a profession I have served so long, and a people I have loved so well, it fills me with an emotion I cannot express. But this Award is not intended primarily to honor a personality, but to symbolize a great moral code—the code of conduct and chivalry of those who guard this beloved land of culture and ancient descent. That is the meaning of this medallion. For all eyes and for all time, it is an expression of the ethics of the American soldier. That I should be integrated in this way with so noble an ideal arouses a sense of pride and yet of humility which will be with me always.

DUTY—HONOR—COUNTRY. Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. They are your rallying points: to build courage when courage seems to fail; to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith; to create hope when hope becomes forlorn. Unhappily, I possess neither that eloquence of diction, that poetry of imagination, nor that brilliance of metaphor to tell you all that they mean. The unbelievers will say they are but words, but a slogan, but a flamboyant phrase. Every pedant, every demagogue, every cynic, every hypocrite, every troublemaker, and, I am sorry to say, some others of an entirely different character, will try to downgrade them even to the extent of mockery and ridicule. But these are some of the things they do. They build your basic character, they mold you for your future roles as the custodians of the Nation's defense, they make you strong enough to know when you are weak, and brave enough to face yourself when you are afraid. They teach you to be proud and unbending in honest failure, but humble and gentle in success; not to substitute words for actions, nor to seek the path of comfort, but to face the stress and spur of difficulty and challenge; to learn to stand up in the storm but to have compassion on those who fall; to master yourself before you seek to master others; to have a heart that is clean, a goal that is high; to learn to laugh yet never forget how to weep; to reach into the future yet never neglect the past; to be serious yet never to take yourself too seriously; to be modest so that you will remember the simplicity of true greatness, the open mind of true wisdom, the meekness of true strength. They give you a temper of the will, a quality of the imagination, a vigor of the emotions, a freshness of the deep springs of life, a temperamental predominance of courage over timidity, an appetite for adventure over love of ease. They create in you heart the sense of wonder, the unfailing hope of what next, and the joy and inspiration of life. They teach you in this way to be an officer and a gentleman.

And what sort of soldiers are those you are to lead? Are they reliable, are they brave, are they capable of victory? Their story is known to all of you; it is the story of the American man-at-arms. My estimate of him was formed on the battlefield

many, many years ago, and has never changed. I regarded him then as I regard him now—as one of the world's noblest figures, not only as one of the finest military characters but also as one of the most stainless. His name and fame are the birthright of every American citizen. In his youth and strength, his love and loyalty he gave—all that mortality can give. He needs no eulogy from me or from any other man. He has written his own history and written it in red on his enemy's breast. But when I think of his patience under adversity, of his courage under fire, and of his modesty in victory, I am filled with an emotion of admiration I cannot put into words. He belongs to history as furnishing one of the greatest examples of successful patriotism; he belongs to posterity as the instructor of future generations in the principles of liberty and freedom; he belongs to the present, to us, by his virtues and by his achievements. In 20 campaigns, on a hundred battlefields, around a thousand campfires, I have witnessed that enduring fortitude, that patriotic self-abnegation, and that invincible determination which have carved his statue in the hearts of his people. From one end of the world to the other he has drained deep the chalice of courage.

As I listened to those songs of the glee club, in memory's eye I could see those staggering columns of the First World War, bending under soggy packs, on many a weary march from dripping dusk to drizzling dawn, slogging ankle-deep through the mire of shell-shocked roads, to form grimly for the attack, blue-lipped, covered with sludge and mud, chilled by the wind and rain; driving home to their objective, and, for many, to the judgment seat of God. I do not know the dignity of their birth but I do know the glory of their death. They died unquestioning, uncomplaining, with faith in their hearts, and on their lips the hope that we would go on to victory. Always for them—DUTY—HONOR—COUNTRY; always their blood and sweat and tears as we sought the way and the light and the truth.

And 20 years after, on the other side of the globe, again the filth of murky foxholes, the stench of ghostly trenches, the slime of dripping dugouts; those boiling suns of relentless heat, those torrential rains of devastating storms; the loneliness and utter desolation of jungle trails, the bitterness of long separation from those they loved and cherished, the deadly pestilence of tropical disease, the horror of stricken areas of war; their resolute and determined defense, their swift and sure attack, their indomitable purpose, their complete and decisive victory—always victory. Always through the bloody haze of their last reverberating shot, the vision of gaunt, ghostly men reverently following your password of DUTY—HONOR—COUNTRY.

The code which those words perpetuate embraces the highest moral laws and will stand the test of any ethics or philosophies ever promulgated for the uplift of mankind. Its requirements are for the things that are right, and its restraints are from the things that are wrong. The soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training—sacrifice. In battle and in the face of danger and death, he discloses those divine attributes which his Maker gave when he created man in his own image. No physical courage and no brute instinct can take the place of the Divine help which alone can sustain him. However horrible the incidents of war may be, the soldier who is called upon to offer and to give his life for his country, is the noblest development of mankind.

You now face a new world—a world of change. The thrust into outer space of the satellite, spheres and missiles marked the beginning of another epoch in the long story of mankind—the chapter of the space age. In the five or more billions of years the scientists tell us it has taken to form the earth, in the three or more billion years of development of the human race, there has never been a greater, a more abrupt or staggering evolution. We deal now not with things of this world alone, but with the

illimitable distances and as yet unfathomed mysteries of the universe. We are reaching out for a new and boundless frontier. We speak in strange terms: of harnessing the cosmic energy; of making winds and tides work for us; of creating unheard of synthetic materials to supplement or even replace our old standard basics; of purifying sea water for our drink; of mining ocean floors for new fields of wealth and food; of disease preventatives to expand life into the hundreds of years; of controlling weather for a more equitable distribution of heat and cold, of rain and shine; of space ships to the moon; of the primary target in war, no longer limited to the armed forces of an enemy, but instead to include his civil populations; of ultimate conflict between a united human race and the sinister forces of some other planetary galaxy; of such dreams and fantasies as to make life the most exciting of all time.

And through all this welter of change and development, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable—it is to win our wars. Everything else in your professional career is but corollary to this vital dedication. All other public purposes, all other public projects, all other public needs, great or small, will find others for their accomplishment; but you are the ones who are trained to fight; yours is the profession of arms—the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory; that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed; that the very obsession of your public services must be DUTY—HONOR—COUNTRY. Others will debate the controversial issues, national and international, which divide men's minds; but serene, calm, aloof, you stand as the nation's war-guardian, as its lifeguard from the raging tides of international conflict, as its gladiator in the arena of battle. For a century and a half you have defended, guarded, and protected its hallowed traditions of liberty and freedom, of right and justice. Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our processes of government; whether our strength is being sapped by deficit financing, indulged in too long, by Federal paternalism grown too mighty, by power groups grown too arrogant, by politics grown too corrupt, by crime grown too rampant, by morals grown too low, by taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent; whether our personal liberties are as thorough and complete as they should be. These great national problems are not for your professional participation or military solution. Your guidepost stands out like a tenfold beacon in the night—DUTY—HONOR—COUNTRY.

You are the leaven which binds together the entire fabric of our national system of defense. From your ranks come the great captains who hold the nation's destiny in their hands the moment the war tocsin sounds. The Long Gray Line has never failed us. Were you to do so, a million ghosts in olive drab, in brown khaki, in blue and gray, would rise from their white crosses thundering those magic words—DUTY—HONOR—COUNTRY.

This does not mean that you are warmongers. On the contrary, the soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war. But always in our ears ring the ominous words of Plato that wisest of all philosophers, "Only the dead have seen the end of war."

The shadows are lengthening for me. The twilight is here. My days of old have vanished tone and tint; they have gone glimmering through the dreams of things that were. Their memory is one of wondrous beauty, watered by tears, and coaxed and caressed by the smiles of yesterday. I listen vainly for the witching melody of faint bugles blowing reveille, of far drums beating the long roll. In my dreams I hear again the crash of guns, the rattle of musketry, the strange, mournful mutter of the battlefield.

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But in the evening of my memory, always I come back to West Point. Always there echoes and re-echoes DUTY—HONOR—COUNTRY.


Today marks my final roll call with you, but I want you to know that when I cross the river my last conscious thoughts will be of The Corps, and The Corps, and The Corps.

I bid you farewell.



It is Time We should establish an American Character—Let that Character be a Love of Country and Jealousy of its honor—This Idea comprehends every Thing that ought to be impressed upon the Minds of all our Citizens, but more especially of those Citizens who are also Seamen and Soldiers.

*Benjamin Stoddert: Letter to
Captain John Barry, USN, 11 July 1798*



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War and economy are things not easily reconciled, and the attempt of leaning towards parsimony in such a state may be the worst economy in the world.

Edmund Burke, 1729-1797

