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REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT	
AVHAV-OPT	Command Progress Report	
TO DCS Comptroller	FROM Aviation Officer	
		DATE 4 July 1972
		CMT 1 CPT Auten/jjs/5435

1. Reference: USARV memo No. 1-13, 14 June 1971.
2. Attached is the input for the fourth quarter FY 72 Command Progress Report.
3. No input is made for the Army Aviation Refresher Training School because training was terminated 25 March 1972.

FOR THE AVIATION OFFICER:

1 Incl
as*Betty L. Nemyer*
BETTY L. NEMYER
CW2, USA
Admin Officer*1st - a. 7th Report*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REFRAGED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

DA FORM 2496 1 FEB 62

REPLACES DD FORM 96, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE
ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 63 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED.

★ GPO : 1970 O - 399-410

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AVIATION OPERATIONAL DATA (U)

OBJECTIVES: (C) To present a summary of US Army aviation performances and significant changes in trend.

<u>CATEGORIES</u>	FY72			
	<u>1st QTR</u>	<u>2nd QTR</u>	<u>3rd QTR</u>	<u>4th QTR</u>
FLYING HOURS*	514,726	380,228	204,736	132,265
TOTAL SORTIES**	1,089,178	757,896	431,485	294,596
COMBAT/COMBAT SUPPORT SORTIES*	817,797	540,222	289,885	182,456
TROOPS AIRLIFTED**	1,459,047	1,024,790	650,040	427,470
CARGO LIFTED(TONS)**	176,974	89,112	102,508	37,358

ANALYSIS: (C) Army aviation operational performance during the 4th QTR FY72 showed a significant decrease in all categories. Flying time decreased 35 percent from 3rd QTR FY72, troops airlifted declined 34 percent. The total number of sorties declined 32 percent. Combat/combat support sorties, comprising 38 percent of the total sorties flown, were 37 percent less than the previous quarter. Cargo lifted decreased 64 percent.

ACTIONS/FUTURE OUTLOOK: (C) After leveling off during the early weeks of the current offensive, aviation performances began to decrease gradually in June. This decline, as well as further reductions in aircraft densities during the upcoming quarter will cause overall aviation performances to decline from their current levels during the first quarter of FY73.

*Source: Monthly OPREP-5


**Source: Monthly Summary of Aviation Losses and Performances (MSLAP)

INITIATED BY CG, 1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1978

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
GROUP 4

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200

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AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY AND AIRCREW SURVIVABILITY DATA

OBJECTIVE: (C) To provide historical data on reported US Army aircraft and aircrew survivability.

<u>CATEGORIES</u>	FY72			
	<u>1st QTR</u>	<u>2nd QTR</u>	<u>3rd QTR</u>	<u>4th QTR</u>
A/C HIT	638	485	328	445
A/C SHOT DOWN	96	87	54	79
A/C SHOT DOWN AND DESTROYED	53	34	26	49
AIRCREW MEMBERS WIA	146	123	85	100
AIRCREW MEMBERS KIA	32	10	12	41

RATES PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS

<u>CATEGORIES</u>	FY72			
	<u>1st QTR</u>	<u>2nd QTR</u>	<u>3rd QTR</u>	<u>4th QTR</u>
A/C HIT	123.9	133.9	160.2	336.4
A/C SHOT DOWN	18.7	24.0	26.4	59.7
A/C SHOT DOWN AND DESTROYED	10.3	9.4	12.7	37.0
AIRCREW MEMBERS WIA	28.4	33.9	41.5	75.6
AIRCREW MEMBERS KIA	6.2	2.8	5.9	31.0

ANALYSIS: (C) Raw figures and rates per 100,000 flying hours were significantly higher in the 4th QTR FY72 than over the previous quarter. The vulnerability rate for aircraft hit increased 110 percent per 100,000 flying hours, the shot down rate increased 126 percent per 100,000 flying hours, and the shot down and destroyed rate increased 191 percent per 100,000 flying hours. The rate for aircrew members WIA increased 82 percent per 100,000 flying hours and the rate for aircrew members KIA increased 425 percent per 100,000 flying hours. The increase in rates in all categories this quarter is attributed to the enemy invasion and generally high level

~~GROUP 4~~

~~DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.2~~
~~UPGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS~~

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of offensive activity throughout the country. The increased use of larger calibre anti-aircraft weapons and the introduction of small, but effective, surface-to-air missiles have greatly increased the aircrew attrition rates.

(C) The above tables reveal an interesting comparison between 2nd and 4th Quarter FY72. During the 2nd quarter, the figures for aircraft hits, aircraft shot down, and aircrew members wounded in action all exceeded the same figures for the 4th QTR. However, the rates per 100,000 flying hours for each category are two to three hundred percent higher during the 4th QTR. This is due to the overall decrease in aircraft flying hours by US Army aviation throughout the Republic during these time frames.

ACTIONS/FUTURE OUTLOOKS: (C) As the enemy offensive activities continue to wane, overall actual figures in the above categories should continue to decrease. However, this trend may be reversed depending upon the amount of support US Army aviation provides to the Republic of South Vietnam as they initiate offensive actions to expel the North Vietnamese from South Vietnam. Even as actual figures for the above categories decrease, the rates per 100,000 flying hours will probably show slight increases as flying hours continue to decrease in future months.

Classified by CG, 1st Avn Bde

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF MAINTENANCE ORDER 11652

ALLOWED TO DOWNGRADING AT TWO YEAR

PERIODS

RECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC

1978

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DOWNGRADING AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5206

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
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
AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY AND AIRCREW SURVIVABILITY DATA

336.4

RATES PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS-FY 72



AIRCRAFT AND AIRCREW COMBAT LOSSES - FY 72



AIRCRAFT HIT

AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN

AIRCRAFT DOWN & DESTROYED

AIRCREW MEMBERS KIA / MIA

AIRCREW MEMBERS KIA / MIA

1st Avn Bde

GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

DECLASSIFIED AND DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR

ON 31 DEC

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
AVIATION SAFETY FY 72

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OBJECTIVE: To provide a summary of Aviation Safety Data and significant changes in Trends.

ANALYSIS: The USARV accident rate showed a slight increase during the 4th Qtr, FY 72 and the causitive trend reversed from 3d. Qtr, in that operationally caused accidents have increased considerably.

ACTIONS/FUTURE OUTLOOK: Closer supervision of all pilots by supervisory personnel must be greatly enforced. Standardization personnel and instructor pilots must place greater emphasis on all maneuvers, especially emergency procedures. These procedures must be stressed to the utmost on the 90 day standardization rides. The USARV accident rate for the Fiscal Year 1972 was 17.1, the lowest rate in the last six years of operation in Vietnam.



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INPUT FOR AVIATION SUPPLY PERFORMANCE FY 72

DEMAND ACCOMODATION - 89%


DEMAND SATISFACTION - 68%

OBJECTIVE: To maintain demand accommodation and demand satisfaction within the USARV goals.


ANALYSIS: While demand accommodation declined 2% from the previous quarter it is still well above the USARV objective, demand satisfaction dropped drastically to a point well below the USARV objective. The dramatic change from the previous three quarters is mainly attributable to the transfer of AMMC operating stocks to the Central DSSA. The stock transfer and customer transfer were scheduled to occur within the same time frame, but due to unforeseeable difficulties this was not accomplished. AMMC continued to receive requests from those customers not yet converted to DLOGS after the stock had been transferred. As a result of this the demand satisfaction decreased. The demands that could not be filled were held in a back order status until such time as the customer was converted to DLOGS. At this time the Central DSSA filled the back orders. This action took place in the last few days of the quarter and the DSSA is not in a position at this time to furnish information concerning their demand satisfaction. Their input would undoubtedly raise the demand satisfaction rate above the USARV objective.

ACTION/FUTURE OUTLOOK: Demand accommodation is expected to remain relatively constant during the next quarter and possibly rise to a higher rate than this quarter. Demand satisfaction is expected to rise to its previous highly acceptable rate well above USARV objectives.

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2.75 ROCKET EXPENDITURES FY 72



OBJECTIVE: To remain below the established DA USARV Budget Levels and the supplemental USARV Aviation Expenditure Goal.

ANALYSIS: Rocket expenditures in the 4th Qtr FY 72 were .3 million dollars above the 3d Qtr FY 72. This was 62% below the USARV Aviation Goal and 39% below the DA/USARV Budget and can be attributed primarily to decreased US involvement.

ACTIONS/FUTURE OUTLOOK: Expenditures will decline commensurate with the continued reduction in force.

(DCSOPS) (MIDA)

AVN GOAL = MOR x Tubes x 90 days x Cost of Rnd
 AVN GOAL = .224 x 17,308 x 90 x 43.38
 AVN GOAL = 3,876,992 x 90 x 43.38
 AVN GOAL = 348,929.280 x 43.38
 AVN GOAL = 15,136,552.16640
 AVN GOAL = 15.1 million

DA/USARV Budget obtained from DCSLOG (AMMO)

Rocket Expenditure x Price/Rnd

56,445	49,424	29,632	2.4
x 43.38	x 43.38	x 43.38	2.1
2,448,584.10	2,144,013.12	1,285,436.16	1.3
(2.4)	(2.1)	(1.3)	5.8
APR	MAY	JUN	

INPUT FOR ACFT READINESS
4TH QUARTER FY 72

F/W OR RATE 75%
NORS RATE 4%
NORM RATE 21%

R/W OR RATE 76%
NORS RATE 6%
NORM RATE 18%

OBJECTIVE - Same


ANALYSIS - The decline in fixed and rotary wing operational readiness rates resulted primarily from a decrease in aircraft density coupled with increased mission commitments due to the current enemy offensive.

ACTIONS/FUTURE OUTLOOK - Availability rates can be expected to remain about the same unless there is an appreciable decline in combat damage. The installation of IRCM Kits will also have a slight effect on rotary wing availability until mid August.

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AVBAGC (1 Feb 72) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation, Period Ending 30 Jan 72, (Redeployment) RCS: CSFOR-6

LA, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, AFN San Francisco 96371 1972

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVN AFN San Francisco 96375

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Leaded, 10th CAB for the period ending 30 Jan 72.

2. Reference paragraph 2d, logistics. The failure of the Key to receive timely disposition of aircraft was due to the short notice to be stood down and not receiving firm stand down dates. This in inadequate time for necessary staff actions prior to issuance of disposition instructions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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
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REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT		
AVBAGD-AS	Comments on OR-LL		
TO G-3	FROM G-4	DATE 9 Feb 72	CMT 1

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1. Reference: OR-LL 10th CAB:

Paragraph 2d, page 6 and 7, discussed the failure of Keystone units within the 10th CAB to receive timely instructions. These delays were due to this office receiving short notice on units to be stood down and firm stand down dates. This has resulted in inadequate time for necessary staff action prior to issuance of aircraft disposition instructions.



JAMES M. LESLIE
LTC (P), GS
ACofS, G-4

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 10TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96377

AVEAVA-C

1 February 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCS: CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) Historical Events

(1) On 1 November 1971, the 183rd Reconnaissance Airplane Company began inactivation proceedings and completed stand down on 1 December 1971. No significant problems were encountered during the 183rd Reconnaissance Airplane Company's Keystone operations.

(2) On 4 November 1971, an RF/PF force of 256 troops from Binh Thuan Province was airlifted by elements of the 192nd Assualt Helicopter Company from two (2) pick-up zones (PZ) BN 045095, BN 017297; into two (2) Landing Zones (LZ) BN 052230, BN 072092.

(3) On 7 November 1971, ten UH1H and four Gunships from A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion linked up with VNAF elements to aid in the insertion of the 45th Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division, ARVN, from two (2) PZ's, Phu Nhon and My Thach, into three (3) LZ's YV 957855, YV 915796, ZV 015780, moving 1207 troops. On 17 November 1971, 12 Vagabond aircraft assisted in the extraction of the 45th Regiment.

(4) On 8 November 1971, A Troop 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, OPCON to 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, moved 19 Officers, 6 Warrant Officers and 52 EM plus five (5) UH1H, five (5) OH-6A and five (5) AH-1G aircraft to Pleiku in support of 45th Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division, ARVN. During the two weeks A Troop was OPCON to the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, the troop uncovered several enemy locations during scout operations. A Troop began its move back to Phan Rang on 22 November.

(5) On 14 November 1971 the Sidekick Guns, from the 92nd Assualt Helicopter Company had 50 confirmed KBA's at YV 915687 while in support of the 45th Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division, ARVN near Phu Nhon.

(6) On 19 November 1971, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion (-) and elements of the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion, in support of the 29th Regiment, 9th Whitehorse ROK Infantry Division, inserted 361 troops and

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Declassified after 12 years.

AVDAVA-C

1 February 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCS:
CSFOR-35 (R2) (U)

5 tons of cargo into two (2) LZ's CQ 156296, CQ 167286 from a PZ at
CQ 270336 flying 104 sorties and 56 hours.

(7) On 21 November 1971, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion (-) inserted the 30th Regiment, 9th Whitehorse ROK Infantry Division into three (3) LZ's BP 851555, 878388, 851725, from one (1) PZ BP 902561, lifting 777 troops and 5 tons of cargo while flying 130 sorties and 51.3 hours.

(8) On 29 November 1971, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry relieved Company A, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry and assumed the mission of perimeter defense at the Dong Ba Thin installation.

(9) On 1 December 1971, the 92nd Assualt Helicopter Company began Keystone Operations and completed stand down on 31 December 1971.

(10) On 5 December 1971, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion(-), supporting the 29th Regiment, 9th Whitehorse ROK Infantry Division, transported 671 troops and 5.3 tons of cargo from PZ BP995855 into two (2) LZ's, DQ 902044 and DQ 975005, flying 171 sorties and 60.3 hours. On 22 December 1971, an extraction was made transporting 326 troops and 2.5 tons of cargo flying 65 sorties and 27 hours.

(11) On 20 December 1971, the 192nd Assualt Helicopter Company began inactivation proceedings and completed Keystone on 20 January 1972. As a result of the 192nd and 92nd Assualt Helicopter Companies stand down, the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion assumed responsibility for flying the Darlac Province mission while the 60th Assualt Helicopter Company continued to fly the Khanh Hoa Province mission. The 201st Aviation Company (CORPS) assumed the remaining five (5) Province missions previously flown by the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(12) On 21 December 1971, A Troop was tasked with the mission of providing a package of two (2) UH-1H (Nighthawk) light ships, and two (2) AH-1G (Cobra) aircraft for the Cam Ranh Bay/Dong Ba Thin defense. On 4 January 1972, two (2) UH-1H's were added to the package and the detachment moved to Cam Ranh Bay on 15 January 1972.

(13) On 23 December 1971, while in support of Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, and providing convoy cover from Cam Ranh Bay to Ben Me Thout, a 50th Assualt Helicopter Company AH-1G Cobra Gunship came under light enemy fire at BP 703897. The aircraft expended 2.75 in rockets and 40mm in the area resulting in one (1) V.C. confirmed KIA.

(14) On 26 December 1971, A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, in support of 53rd Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division, ARVN at YT 992575 inserted 170 troops, flying 20 sorties and 5.6 hours.

(15) On 1 January 1972, A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was

AVBAY-C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1 February 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCS: CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

detached, and the 60th Assault Helicopter Company was reassigned to the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry. The 130th and 193rd Medical Detachments were reassigned to the 14th Transportation Battalion, 34th General Support Group.

(16) On 7 January 1972, B Company, 2nd Battalion, 327 Infantry, 101st Airborne (AM) Division assumed perimeter security of Dong Ba Thin from 'B' Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry.

(17) On 30 January 1972, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion was redeployed to Fort Lewis, Washington with seven (7) Officers and ten (10) enlisted men. The detachment departed from Cam Ranh Bay, RVN.

(18) Under the provisions of VNAF/AFGP USARV Improvement and Modernization Augmentation Plan 70-51, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion continued to provide airmobile experience to VNAF Aviator Graduates of the U.S. Army Aviation School (USAAMVNS) and training upgrading to first pilot. Ten (10) pilots were graduated on 24 November 1971 with five (5) pilots trained by the 60th Assault Helicopter Company, bringing the total to forty-nine (49) pilots graduated since the I&M program was initiated. The pilots have averaged 225 hours per man during a 90 day cycle. No major problems were encountered during the training and it was considered to have been highly successful.

(19) The enemy continued to make his presence felt in the 10th Combat Aviation Battalions' area of operation. During the reporting period 10 aircraft were hit by enemy fire, 9 were hit by small arms fire and 1 by anti-aircraft weapons. 35 other aircraft were shot at, but did not sustain hits.

b. (U) Changes in Unit Mission: The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion was reduced to cadre status for redeployment to Fort Lewis, Washington.

c. (U) Organizational Changes: On 1 December 1971, the 133rd Reconnaissance Airplane Company was inactivated. On 31 December 1971, the 92nd Assault Helicopter Company was inactivated. On 1 January 1972, A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was detached, and the 60th Assault Helicopter Company was reassigned to the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry. On 30 January 1972, the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company was inactivated.

d. (U) Key Personnel Changes:

(1) On 14 November 1971, Major David E. Hill, IN, 574-10-2846, assumed command of the 60th Assault Helicopter Company from Major Rudolph Ostovich III, IN, 339-38-2589.

(2) On 3 December 1971, 1Lt Harold Hashizume, OB, 575-74-5927, assumed duties as 10th Combat Aviation Battalion S-2 from Captain El Cartio Burnes, MP, 555-60-0362.

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AMM M-1-C

1 February 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCS: CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

(3) On 15 December 1971, Captain James H. Elder, IN, 466-70-6561, assumed interim duties as 10th Combat Aviation Battalion Executive Officer from Major Frank T. Peterlin, FA, 335-24-8648.

(4) On 15 December 1971, Captain Darrell W. Katz, IN, 507-42-5442, assumed interim duties as 10th Combat Aviation Battalion S-3 from Captain James H. Elder, IN, 466-70-6561.

e. (U) Unit Strength: Authorization and present for duty as of 30 January 1972:

UNIT	OFF AUTH/ASGD	WO AUTH/ASGD	EM AUTH/ASGD	TOTAL AUTH/ASGD
HHC	20/7	370	87/10	110/17

NOTE: On 30 January 1972, seven (7) officers and ten (10) EM were redeployed with HHC, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, to Fort Lewis, Washington.

f. (U) Aircraft Status as of 30 January 1972 is shown in inclosure 2.

g. (U) Operational Statistics are shown in inclosure 3.

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel

(1) Observation: The present system of receiving reassignment instructions for personnel returning to CONUS early due to Keystone activities is slow and inefficient.

(2) Evaluation: Personnel have not been receiving their assignments in a timely and orderly fashion. This has created a backlog of people awaiting reassignment plus a serious morale problem.

(3) Recommendation: Advance Oversea Returnee (AOR) and Officer Overseas Returnee (OOR) lists are submitted to DA on a monthly basis. A man's name should appear on this roster five (5) months and eight (8) months respectively before his DEROS. The assignments must be handled expeditiously at all levels of higher command which would alleviate the problems presently encountered when an individual has an adjusted DEROS and no assignment.

(4) Observation: Current officer aviator utilization and incountry reassignment procedures in conjunction with Keystone activities are not very selective and have created a tremendous percentage of over strength in most aviation units.

(5) Evaluation: The current policy of arbitrarily reassigning

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1 February 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCS: CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

officers by percentage and not by name or needs to other units in RVN has created low morale, personnel overstrength, and poor utilization of highly trained assets.

(5) Recommendation: When a unit starts stand down, a final personnel strength roster should be submitted through channels to USARV. All units are currently submitting a personnel strength roster to USARV on a monthly basis. A careful check of current and expected needs of other units would determine their actual need for additional personnel. All others should be reassigned in other overseas commands to complete the required short tour requirements or to CONUS.

b. (C) Intelligence

(1) Observations:

(a) The enemy continues to employ his force in small unit operations in the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion's area of operations. Many of the offenses are directed against the Vietnamization and Pacification program with others directed against U.S. and allied installations.

(b) Capabilities: The enemy is capable of using small units to employ and direct sapper attacks and indirect fire against allied installations in the Dong Ba Thin and Cam Ranh Bay area.

(c) There has been no change in enemy tactics, and it is believed that the enemy uses highway QL-1 as a supply route to transport supplies and materiel to enemy locations in the Dong Bo Woods (coordinates CP0045) and the Ba Cum Secret Zone (coordinates BP7630).

(2) Evaluation: The enemy has the ability to move undetected throughout the area and possesses the ability to successfully attack allied installations with both indirect fire and Sapper attacks.

(3) Recommendations: The continuous use of sentry dogs, sensors, searchlights, Nighthawk, H&I fire and an aggressive and alert policy in employing Visual Reconnaissance and interior patrols.

(4) Command Action:

(a) During the last reporting period, B/1/22nd Infantry (OPCON) provided security for the Dong Ba Thin installation. In addition, Sentry Dogs were employed on the flight lines and perimeter. A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was tasked to provide two (2) Nighthawks and two (2) Cobra gunships which provide Visual Reconnaissance and immediate strike capability for the Dong Ba Thin and Cam Ranh Bay area. In addition, Cam Ranh Bay Support Command and the 272nd Field Artillery Detachment provide

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ANCAVA-C

1 February 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCS:
CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

a TPS- 58 Surveillance Radar Site located in the northern portion of
Cam Ranh Peninsula.

c. (C) Operations:

(1) Observations: The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion has conducted
five (5) Battalion size combat assaults for the 9th ROK Infantry Division
during the reporting period. In all cases only light enemy fire was
encountered.

(2) Evaluations: The enemy has learned that after an insertion air-
craft will be used to resupply friendly positions. Being limited in his
offensive capability, rather than resist when aviation assets are readily
available during the insertion, the enemy has found it more economical to
attack resupply aircraft.

(3) Recommendations: That gunships continue to be committed for
standby missions during the resupply phase of operations. Gunships
should be on standby at the closest point possible to the area of operations.
That crews be briefed on the likelihood of receiving anti-aircraft fire and
and the necessity of being alert at all times for enemy activity.

(4) Command Actions: When resupplying units in landing zones that
have been recently used for insertions, aircraft crews are briefed on
expected enemy actions. Gunships are provided for armed escort of resupply
missions which are close to known or suspected enemy positions. Resupply
missions are executed on an irregular schedule to avoid establishing a
fixed pattern.

(5) Observation: This unit was not authorized to send an advance
party to the gaining command for the purpose of coordinating the arrival
of personnel and equipment at Fort Lewis.

(6) Evaluation: The lack of coordination between redeploying units
and gaining commands may cause numerous problems in arranging for trans-
portation, billeting and the filling of requisitions for personnel short-
ages.

(7) Recommendations: A small advance party of one (1) officer and
two (2) NCO's should be authorized to proceed ahead of the main body to
coordinate a unit's arrival. It would greatly alleviate the problems that
might arise when the unit arrives at its CONUS destination.

d. (U) Logistics

(1) Observations: Upon notification of Keystone, the units are not
receiving timely instructions for the disposition of aircraft.

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AVBAVA-C

1 February 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RSC
CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Evaluation: Before aircraft may be transferred they are thoroughly inspected, and all deficiencies must be corrected prior to transfer. This requires the use of the unit's maintenance equipment and personnel. The delay in aircraft disposition delays the turn-in of maintenance equipment and reassignment of personnel. This further delays the turn-in of wheeled vehicles necessary to use and transport the equipment, causing an excessively long delay in the processing of maintenance equipment.

(3) Recommendations: A list of aircraft disposition should immediately follow an aviation unit's Keystone instructions. This would allow a reasonable amount of time for technical inspections, deficiency corrections, and to coordinate the turn-in of PLL and tools.

- e. (U) Communications. None
- f. (U) Material. None
- g. (U) Other. None

James O. Hegdahl

JAMES O. HEGDAHL
✓ LTC, IN
Commanding

3 Incl

- 1. Organizational
Information Chart
- 2. Aircraft Status
- 3. Operational Statistics

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - CINCUSARPAC
- 3 - CG, USARV
- 2 - CG, 1st Avn Bde
- 10 - CO, 17th Cbt Avn Gp
- 3 - Unit File

Classified by CCO, 1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULED FOR DECLASSIFICATION 31 DEC 1982
AUTOMATICALLY UPGRADING AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION CHART (U)
30 JANUARY 1972

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APO</u>
HQ & HQ Co, 10th CAB	Dong Da Thin, RVN	96377

Reduced to cadre status on 24 Jan 1972.

Inclosure 1

Classified by CG, 1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULED IN INTELLIGENCE ORDER 11652.
AUTOMATICALLY UPGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIRCRAFT STATUS (U)
30 JANUARY 1972

The three (3) OH-58A helicopters assigned to Headquarters Company were redeployed with the company to Fort Lewis, Washington. All other aircraft were reassigned or retrograded prior to 30 January 1972.

Classified by CG, 1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULED FOR AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADE 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1978

Inclosure 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPERATIONAL STATISTICS (U)
30 JANUARY 1972

	HHC	50	22	193	1/7/72
Sorties Flown	563	6,463	2,257	5,329	3,724
Hours Flown	312	2,855	1,225	3,202	1,868
Troops Lifted	0	14,311	4,023	8,462	1,630
Cargo Lifted (TONS)	0	551	64	151	0
Enemy KIA (Susp/Conf)	0/0	1/1	50/50	0/0	0/0
Surpans (Dest/Dmgd)	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Structures (Dest/Dmgd)	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	14/10
Aircraft Destroyed	0	0	0	0	0
Aircraft Damaged	1	0	2	9	2
Aircraft Recovered	0	0	0	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 3

1/7/72 1st Avn Bde
DECLASSIFICATION
FIVE YEARS 11652
INGRAVATION TWO YEARS
1978
CLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 10TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96377

AVEAVAC-C

1 February 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCS:
CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) Historical Events

(1) On 1 November 1971, the 183rd Reconnaissance Airplane Company began inactivation proceedings and completed stand down on 1 December 1971. No significant problems were encountered during the 183rd Reconnaissance Airplane Company's Keystone operations.

(2) On 4 November 1971, an RF/PF force of 256 troops from Binh Thuan Province was airlifted by elements of the 192nd Assualt Helicopter Company from two (2) pick-up zones (PZ) BN 045095, BN 017297; into two (2) Landing Zones (LZ) BN 052230, BN 072092.

(3) On 7 November 1971, ten UH1H and four Gunships from A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion linked up with VNAF elements to aid in the insertion of the 45th Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division, ARVN, from two (2) PZ's, Phu Nhon and My Thach, into three (3) LZ's YV 957855, YV 915796, ZV 015780, moving 1207 troops. On 17 November 1971, 12 Vagabond aircraft assisted in the extraction of the 45th Regiment.

(4) On 8 November 1971, A Troop 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, OPCON to 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, moved 19 Officers, 6 Warrant Officers and 52 EM plus five (5) UH1H, five (5) OH-6A and five (5) AH-1G aircraft to Pleiku in support of 45th Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division, ARVN. During the two weeks A Troop was OPCON to the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, the troop uncovered several enemy locations during scout operations. A Troop began its move back to Phan Rang on 22 November.

(5) On 14 November 1971 the Sidekick Guns, from the 92nd Assualt Helicopter Company had 50 confirmed KBA's at YV 915887 while in support of the 45th Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division, ARVN near Phu Nhon.

(6) On 19 November 1971, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion (-) and elements of the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion, in support of the 29th Regiment, 9th Whitehorse ROK Infantry Division, inserted 361 troops and

~~GROUP 4~~

~~Downgraded at 3 years in a
Reclassified after 12 years.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDAVA-C

1 February 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCS:
CSFOR-35 (R2) (U)

5 tons of cargo into two (?) LZ's CQ 156295, CQ 137285 from a PZ at
CQ 270336 flying 104 sorties and 56 hours.

(7) On 21 November 1971, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion (-) inserted the 30th Regiment, 9th Whitehorse ROK Infantry Division into three (3) LZ's BP 851355, 878308, 851725, from one (1) PZ BP 902561, lifting 777 troops and 5 tons of cargo while flying 130 sorties and 51.3 hours.

(8) On 29 November 1971, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry relieved Company A, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry and assumed the mission of perimeter defense at the Dong Ba Thin installation.

(9) On 1 December 1971, the 92nd Assualt Helicopter Company began Keystone Operations and completed stand down on 31 December 1971.

(10) On 5 December 1971, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion(-), supporting the 29th Regiment, 9th Whitehorse ROK Infantry Division, transported 671 troops and 5.3 tons of cargo from PZ BP995855 into two (2) LZ's, BQ 902044 and BQ 975005, flying 171 sorties and 50.3 hours. On 22 December 1971, an extraction was made transporting 326 troops and 2.5 tons of cargo flying 65 sorties and 27 hours.

(11) On 20 December 1971, the 192nd Assualt Helicopter Company began inactivation proceedings and completed Keystone on 20 January 1972. As a result of the 192nd and 92nd Assualt Helicopter Companies stand down, the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion assumed responsibility for flying the Darlac Province mission while the 60th Assault Helicopter Company continued to fly the Khanh Hoa Province mission. The 201st Aviation Company (CORPS) assumed the remaining five (5) Province missions previously flown by the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(12) On 21 December 1971, A Troop was tasked with the mission of providing a package of two (?) UH-1H (Nighthawk) light ships, and two (?) AH-1G (Cobra) aircraft for the Cam Ranh Bay/Dong Ba Thin defense. On 4 January 1972, two (2) UH-1H's were added to the package and the detachment moved to Cam Ranh Bay on 15 January 1972.

(13) On 23 December 1971, while in support of Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, and providing convoy cover from Cam Ranh Bay to Ban Me Thout, a 50th Assault Helicopter Company AH-1G Cobra Gunship came under light enemy fire at BP 708397. The aircraft expended 2.75 in rockets and 40mm in the area resulting in one (1) V.C. confirmed KIA.

(14) On 26 December 1971, A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, in support of 53rd Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division, ARVN at YT 992576 inserted 170 troops, flying 20 sorties and 5.6 hours.

(15) On 1 January 1972, A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was

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AVBAV-C

1 February 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCS:
CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

detached, and the 60th Assault Helicopter Company was reassigned to the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry. The 130th and 193th Medical Detachments were reassigned to the 14th Transportation Battalion, 34th General Support Group.

(16) On 7 January 1972, B Company, 2nd Battalion, 327 Infantry, 101st Airborne (A/M) Division assumed perimeter security of Dong Be Thin from 'D' Company, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry.

(17) On 30 January 1972, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion was redeployed to Fort Lewis, Washington with seven (7) Officers and ten (10) enlisted men. The detachment departed from Cam Ranh Bay, RVN.

(18) Under the provisions of VNAF/AFGP USARV Improvement and Modernization Augmentation Plan 70-51, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion continued to provide airmobile experience to VNAF Aviator Graduates of the U.S. Army Aviation School (USAIVNS) and training upgrading to first pilot. Ten (10) pilots were graduated on 24 November 1971 with five (5) pilots trained by the 60th Assault Helicopter Company, bringing the total to forty-nine (49) pilots graduated since the I&M program was initiated. The pilots have averaged 225 hours per man during a 90 day cycle. No major problems were encountered during the training and it was considered to have been highly successful.

(19) The enemy continued to make his presence felt in the 10th Combat Aviation Battalions' area of operation. During the reporting period 10 aircraft were hit by enemy fire, 9 were hit by small arms fire and 1 by anti-aircraft weapons. 35 other aircraft were shot at, but did not sustain hits.

b. (U) Changes in Unit Mission: The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion was reduced to cadre status for redeployment to Fort Lewis, Washington.

c. (U) Organizational Changes: On 1 December 1971, the 183rd Reconnaissance Airplane Company was inactivated. On 31 December 1971, the 92nd Assault Helicopter Company was inactivated. On 1 January 1972, A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was detached, and the 60th Assault Helicopter Company was reassigned to the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry. On 20 January 1972, the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company was inactivated.

d. (U) Key Personnel Changes:

(1) On 14 November 1971, Major David E. Hill, IN, 574-10-2846, assumed command of the 60th Assault Helicopter Company from Major Rudolph Ostovich III, IN, 339-38-2589.

(2) On 3 December 1971, 1Lt Harold Hashizume, CB, 575-14-5927, assumed duties as 10th Combat Aviation Battalion S-2 from Captain El Cartio Barnes, MP, 555-60-0362.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMM-1-C

1 February 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCS: CSFOR-65 (22) (U)

(3) On 15 December 1971, Captain James H. Elder, IN, 436-70-5581, assumed interim duties as 10th Combat Aviation Battalion Executive Officer from Major Frank T. Peterlin, FA, 335-24-3648.

(4) On 15 December 1971, Captain Darrell W. Kutz, IN, 507-40-5442, assumed interim duties as 10th Combat Aviation Battalion S-3 from Captain James H. Elder, IN, 436-70-5581.

e. (U) Unit Strength: Authorization and present for duty as of 30 January 1972:

UNIT	OFF AUTH/ASGD 20/7	NO AUTH/ASGD 370	EM AUTH/ASGD 87/10	TOTAL AUTH/ASGD 110/17
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NOTE: On 30 January 1972, seven (7) officers and ten (10) EM were redeployed with HHC, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, to Fort Lewis, Washington.

f. (U) Aircraft Status as of 30 January 1972 is shown in inclosure 2.

g. (U) Operational Statistics are shown in inclosure 3.

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel

(1) Observation: The present system of receiving reassignment instructions for personnel returning to CONUS early due to Keystone activities is slow and inefficient.

(2) Evaluation: Personnel have not been receiving their assignments in a timely and orderly fashion. This has created a backlog of people awaiting reassignment plus a serious morale problem.

(3) Recommendation: Advance Oversea Returnee (AOR) and Officer Overseas Returnee (OOR) lists are submitted to DA on a monthly basis. A man's name should appear on this roster five (5) months and eight (8) months respectively before his DEROS. The assignments must be handled expeditiously at all levels of higher command which would alleviate the problems presently encountered when an individual has an adjusted DEROS and no assignment.

(4) Observation: Current officer aviator utilization and incountry reassignment procedures in conjunction with Keystone activities are not very selective and have created a tremendous percentage of over strength in most aviation units.

(5) Evaluation: The current policy of arbitrarily reassigning

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WDAVA-C

1 February 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCS: CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

officers by percentage and not by name or needs to other units in RVN has created low morale, personnel overstrength, and poor utilization of highly trained assets.

(3) Recommendation: When a unit starts stand down, a final personnel strength roster should be submitted through channels to USARV. All units are currently submitting a personnel strength roster to USARV on a monthly basis. A careful check of current and expected needs of other units would determine their actual need for additional personnel. All others should be reassigned in other overseas commands to complete the required short tour requirements or to CONUS.

b. (C) Intelligence

(1) Observations:

(a) The enemy continues to employ his force in small unit operations in the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion's area of operations. Many of the offenses are directed against the Vietnamization and Pacification program with others directed against U.S. and allied installations.

(b) Capabilities: The enemy is capable of using small units to employ and direct sapper attacks and indirect fire against allied installations in the Dong Ba Thin and Cam Ranh Bay area.

(c) There has been no change in enemy tactics, and it is believed that the enemy uses highway QL-1 as a supply route to transport supplies and materiel to enemy locations in the Dong Do Woods (coordinates CPO045) and the Ba Cum Secret Zone (coordinates BP7630).

(2) Evaluation: The enemy has the ability to move undetected throughout the area and possesses the ability to successfully attack allied installations with both indirect fire and Sapper attacks.

(3) Recommendations: The continuous use of sentry dogs, sensors, searchlights, Nighthawks, H&I fire and an aggressive and alert policy in employing Visual Reconnaissance and interior patrols.

(4) Command Action:

(a) During the last reporting period, B/1/22nd Infantry (OPCON) provided security for the Dong Ba Thin installation. In addition, Sentry Dogs were employed on the flight lines and perimeter. A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was tasked to provide two (2) Nighthawks and two (?) Cobra gunships which provide Visual Reconnaissance and immediate strike capability for the Dong Ba Thin and Cam Ranh Bay area. In addition, Cam Ranh Bay Support Command and the 272nd Field Artillery Detachment provide

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AVCBVAL-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Rodeployment) RCS:
CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1 February 1972

a TPS- 58 Surveillance Radar Site located in the northern portion of
Cam Ranh Peninsula.

c. (C) Operations:

(1) Observations: The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion has conducted
five (5) Battalion size combat assaults for the 9th ROK Infantry Division
during the reporting period. In all cases only light enemy fire was
encountered.

(2) Evaluations: The enemy has learned that after an insertion air-
craft will be used to resupply friendly positions. Being limited in his
offensive capability, rather than resist when aviation assets are readily
available during the insertion, the enemy has found it more economical to
attack resupply aircraft.

(3) Recommendations: That gunships continue to be committed for
standby missions during the resupply phase of operations. Gunships
should be on standby at the closest point possible to the area of operations.
That crews be briefed on the likelihood of receiving anti-aircraft fire and
and the necessity of being alert at all times for enemy activity.

(4) Command Actions: When resupplying units in landing zones that
have been recently used for insertions, aircraft crews are briefed on
expected enemy actions. Gunships are provided for armed escort of resupply
missions which are close to known or suspected enemy positions. Resupply
missions are executed on an irregular schedule to avoid establishing a
fixed pattern.

(5) Observation: This unit was not authorized to send an advance
party to the gaining command for the purpose of coordinating the arrival
of personnel and equipment at Fort Lewis.

(6) Evaluation: The lack of coordination between redeploying units
and gaining commands may cause numerous problems in arranging for trans-
portation, billeting and the filling of requisitions for personnel short-
ages.

(7) Recommendations: A small advance party of one (1) officer and
two (2) NCO's should be authorized to proceed ahead of the main body to
coordinate a unit's arrival. It would greatly alleviate the problems that
might arise when the unit arrives at its CONUS destination.

d. (U) Logistics

(1) Observations: Upon notification of Keystone, the units are not
receiving timely instructions for the disposition of aircraft.

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AVB/AVIA-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period Ending 30 January 1972, (Redeployment) RCR,
CSFOR-35 (R2) (U)

1 February 1972

(2) Evaluation: Before aircraft may be transferred they are thoroughly inspected, and all deficiencies must be corrected prior to transfer. This requires the use of the unit's maintenance equipment and personnel. The delay in aircraft disposition delays the turn-in of maintenance equipment and reassignment of personnel. This further delays the turn-in of wheeled vehicles necessary to use and transport the equipment, causing an excessively long delay in the processing of maintenance equipment.

(3) Recommendations: A list of aircraft disposition should immediately follow an aviation unit's Keystone instructions. This would allow a reasonable amount of time for technical inspections, deficiency corrections, and to coordinate the turn-in of PLL and tools.

- e. (U) Communications. None
- f. (U) Material. None
- g. (U) Other. None

- 3 Incl
- 1. Organizational Information Chart
 - 2. Aircraft Status
 - 3. Operational Statistics

James O. Hegdahl
JAMES O. HEGDAHL
✓ LTC, IN
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - CINCUSARPAC
- 3 - CG, USARV
- 2 - CG, 1st Avn Bde
- 10 - CO, 17th Cbt Avn Gp
- 3 - Unit File

Classified by CG, 1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE 4 - AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION ORDER 1147
AUTOMATICALLY UPGRADED AT TWO
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION CHART (U)
30 JANUARY 1972

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APO</u>
HQ & HQ Co, 10th CAB	Dong Ba Thin, RVN	96377

Reduced to cadre status on 24 Jan 1972.

Classified by CG, 1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT: ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION CHART (U)
SCHEDULE: AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
AUTOMATIC UPGRADING: 11652
INTERVALS: INGRAVITY OF TWO YEARS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1978

Inclosure 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIRCRAFT STATUS (U)
30 JANUARY 1972

The three (3) OH-58A helicopters assigned to Headquarters Company were redeployed with the company to Fort Lewis, Washington. All other aircraft were reassigned or retrograded prior to 30 January 1972.

Classified by CG, 1st Avn Bde
SCHEDULED FOR AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULED FOR AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION TWO YEAR
INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 518

Inclosure 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPERATIONAL STATISTICS (U)
30 JANUARY 1972

	HHC	60	92	192	3/7/72
Sorties Flown	563	6,463	2,257	5,329	3,724
Hours Flown	312	2,855	1,225	3,202	1,868
Troops Lifted	0	14,311	4,023	8,462	1,630
Cargo Lifted (TONS)	0	551	64	161	0
Enemy KIA (Susp/Conf)	0/0	1/1	50/50	0/0	0/0
Suppans (Dest/Dmgd)	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Structures (Dest/Dmgd)	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	14/10
Aircraft Destroyed	0	0	0	0	0
Aircraft Damaged	1	0	2	9	2
Aircraft Recovered	0	0	0	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 3

Classified by: CAG, 1st Avn Bde
Date: 15 JAN 72
EXPIRES: 15 JAN 78
REF ID: A11652
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
PERIOD: 15 JAN 72 - 15 JAN 78
DETERMINED BY: 15 JAN 78
REASON: EXPIRED
APPROVED BY: 15 JAN 78