

Assessment
AFTER
Cambodia
incursion

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By <u>71</u> NARA Date <u>11/6/00</u>

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ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF
CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS ON
THE ENEMY

I. COSVN/SVNLA ORGANIZATION

II. ENEMY PERSONNEL LOSSES

- A. LOSSES VS INITIAL STRENGTH
- B. DROP IN ENEMY ELIMINATED
- C. PW COMPOSITION

III. LOGISTICS

- A. TRANSPORTATION LOSSES
- B. IMPACT OF OVERLAND TRANSPORT
- C. REEVALUATION OF MUNITIONS LOSSES
- D. IMPACT OF MUNITIONS LOSSES
- E. RICE LOSSES VS 6 MONTHS' SUPPLY
- F. CREW SERVED WEAPONS

IV. QUALITATIVE FACTORS

V. ENEMY ACTIVITY IN III CTZ

IV. ASSESSMENT

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SIR, IN THIS BRIEFING I WILL ASSESS THE IMPACT OF CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS ON THE ENEMY. I WILL ATTEMPT A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL RESULTS AND TRY TO ASSESS THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS ON THE ENEMY IN A QUALITATIVE SENSE.

THIS FLIP SUMMARIZES THE BRIEFING SEQUENCE.

YOU HAVE BEEN PROVIDED A COPY OF THE OUTLINE AND BRIEFING WE HAVE PROVIDED YOU WITH A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE STRENGTH FIGURES OF COSVN HQ! IT IS STILL HARD TO VISUALIZE WHAT FUNCTIONS THESE LARGE NUMBERS OF ADMIN PERSONNEL PERFORM. WE ARE STILL SUBMERGED UNDER A PILE OF DOCUMENTS, BUT WE ARE MAKING SOME PROGRESS IN SORTING OUT THE STRUCTURE. THIS CHART SHOWS THE ORGANIZATIONAL BREAKOUT AS WE KNOW IT. NOW, THE PRG AND THE NFLSVN ARE NOT ACTUALLY SUBORDINATE TO COSVN BUT WE LIST THEM TOGETHER BECAUSE THERE APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLE MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL, ENTIRE SECTIONS, BETWEEN COSVN AND THE PRG AND DOCUMENTS LIST EACH IN THE SAME BREATH. WHERE WE HAVE A STRENGTH ESTIMATE FOR A SECTION IT IS SHOWN. THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS IS 8,037. OTHER DOCUMENTS INDICATE A GRAND TOTAL OF 10,000 FOR COSVN, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW YET WHERE THE OTHER 2,000 BELONG. WE KNOW A LITTLE ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF SOME OF THE SECTIONS. THE SECURITY SECTION HAS PRIMARILY PLATOON TO COMPANY SIZED ELEMENTS WITH AN INTERNAL SECURITY MISSION, A RATHER LARGE POLITICAL STAFF, PERHAPS TO PASS ON THE RELIABILITY OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COSVN AND AN ARMED SECURITY REGT TO HANDLE THE EXTERNAL THREAT.

THE SVNLA IS DEPICTED ON THIS CHART. ALL THE COMBAT ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN LEFT OFF. THE REAR SERVICE DEPARTMENT HAS THE RECOVERY AND REPLACEMENT REGTS SUBORDINATE TO IT AS WELL

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AS THE NUMBERED REAR SERVICE GROUPS. IN ADDITION TO THOSE SHOWN WE KNOW THAT THERE IS A 17TH RSG, BUT WE HAVE NO COLLATERAL EVIDENCE FOR IT. IT APPARENTLY MANAGED ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIA. ALSO THERE ARE A NUMBER OF BLANKS ON THIS CHART FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE THREE SEPARATE TRANS BNS DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE REAR SERVICE DEPARTMENT. WE HAVE AN ESTIMATED STRENGTH ON ONLY ONE. ALSO WE ESTIMATE THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE STAFF SECTIONS OF THE REAR SVC STAFF TO BE A THOUSAND, ALTHOUGH THAT IS PROBABLY LOW.

SEVERAL SECTIONS HERE CANNOT BE DESCRIBED IN DETAIL. WHAT THE ADJUTANT SECTIONS WOULD DO WITH 4000 PERSONNEL WE CANNOT SAY RIGHT NOW. THIS CHART BREAKS OUT THE SIGNAL SECTION WHICH HAS AN OVERALL STRENGTH OF 1690, BASED ON ONE SOURCE AND A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT COMPOSITE STRENGTHS GIVEN BY OTHER SOURCES. IT IS EASY TO SEE HOW MANY OF THESE PEOPLE ARE EMPLOYED. HE HAS THREE SUBORDINATE SIGNAL BNS, ONE TO COMMUNICATE WITH NVN, ONE FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS AND ONE FOR INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS. THE STAFF SECTION HAD ITS OWN TRAINING SCHOOL, SIGNAL SUPPORT COMPANIES, DISPENSARY AND, SURPRISINGLY, ITS OWN INFANTRY BN THE D190.

NEXT IS A LOOK AT PERSONNEL LOSSES BY OPERATIONAL AREA, SHOWN ON THIS FLIP. WE COMPARE THE ESTIMATED INITIAL STRENGTH IN EACH MAJOR AREA WITH THE LOSSES. SIGNIFICANT IS THE HEAVY LOSS SUFFERED BY UNITS IN THE PARROT'S BEAK AREA, 44% OF THEIR INITIAL STRENGTH. I HAVE NOT INCLUDED ANY OF THE ENEMY UNITS TARGETED AGAINST THE DELTA IN THIS INITIAL STRENGTH ESTIMATE, NOR ARE ANY LOSSES INFILCTED BY IV CTZ COUNTED AGAINST THE ENEMY. THIS IS PROBABLY NOT A BAD APPROXIMATION SINCE ONLY 4 OF THE 700 PW TAKEN BY THE III CTZ UNITS WERE FROM MR-2/MR-3 FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE THE HOI CHANH THAT LEFT THE AREA TO RALLY AT POINTS INSIDE THE CORPS. MANY OF THESE HOI CHAN WERE NOT ON THE ENEMY ROLLS.

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
EXPLANATION FOR THE DECLINE IN ENEMY ELIMINATED. THIS FLIP SHOWS THE ENEMY ELIMINATED FIGURES FOR CAMBODIA FOR MAY AND A PROJECTED FIGURE FOR JUNE BASED ON THE FIRST 20 DAYS OF THE MONTH, THERE HAS BEEN A CONSIDERABLE DROP IN ENEMY ELIMINATED. THIS DROP WAS NOTICEABLE TOWARD THE END OF MAY, BUT AT THAT TIME I ATTRIBUTED IT TO AN ADEPTNESS AT AVOIDING CONTACT IN TERRAIN THAT ALLIED FORCES WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH. HOWEVER, ON THIS FLIP I LISTED THE ENEMY STRENGTH FIGURES BY COMPOSITION, SINCE THERE ARE SO MANY DIVERSE UNITS TO DEAL WITH. READING DOWN THE FIRST COLUMN GIVES THE TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH IN CAMBODIA AT THE START OF OPERATIONS. THE NEXT COLUMN GIVES AN ESTIMATE FOR THE NUMBER WITHDRAWN FROM THE OPERATIONAL AREA. THIS IS MOSTLY A GUESS, SINCE WE CANNOT REALLY SAY WHAT PORTION OF COSVN HQ AND SVNLA HAVE WITHDRAWN. FOR REAR SERVICE PERSONNEL I ~~ESTIMATED~~ THAT THE RECOVERY AND REPLACEMENT REGTS LEFT THE AREA BUT PERSONNEL IN THE NUMBERED REAR SERVICE GROUPS REMAINED.

THE NEXT COLUMN PROVIDES AN ESTIMATE OF ENEMY ELIMINATED IN EACH CATEGORY, BASED LARGELY ON PROPORTIONS IN THE PW COUNT IN THE DISTINCT OPERATIONAL AREAS. THE FINAL COLUMN JUST LISTS THOSE REMAINING IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA. THE RATIO OF INITIAL STRENGTH TO THOSE REMAINING IS ROUGHLY THE SAME AS THE ELIMINATION RATIO FOR MAY COMPARED TO JUNE. THIS EXPLAINS THE DECREASE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, ALTHOUGH OTHER FACTORS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN MENTIONED ARE CERTAINLY RELEVANT TO A LESSER DEGREE.

NEXT WE LOOK AT THE COMPOSITION OF ENEMY PW. THE UPPER LEFT BREAKS THEM OUT BY TYPE. CLASSIFICATION IS SOMETIMES DIFFICULT SINCE DIVIDING LINES ARE NOT ALWAYS CLEAR. THE BOTTOM LISTS PW BY AREA. OF THOSE TAKEN FROM THE REAR SERVICE GROUPS, MOST CAME FROM THE 50 AND 82 RSG, MOST OF THESE EITHER LABORERS

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OR PATIENTS. NOTABLE IS THE LARGE PERCENT OF VC PW. WHILE THE OVERALL TOTAL IS 80% VC AND 20% NVA, THE PW TAKEN ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER ARE COMPOSED JUST THE OPPOSITE. 80% NVA AND 20% VC. THE OVERALL TOTAL REFLECTS PRIMARILY THE ENEMY COMPOSITION IN SR-2 AND SR-3 AND ALSO ONE OF HIS DILEMMAS. IN OPEN AND POPULOUS AREAS LIKE LONG AN AND HAU NGHIA THE ENEMY MUST HAVE LOCAL SUPPORT SIMPLY TO SURVIVE. TO GAIN THIS LOCAL SUPPORT HE NEEDS A MAJOR PORTION OF HIS FORCE TO BE VC. IN THE SPARSELTY POPULATED OR UNPOPULATED NORTHERN JUNGLES THE PROPORTION OF VC DOES NOT REALLY MATTER. NVA CAN DO AS WELL AS VC. THE COMMITMENT OF A DIVISION TO THE DELTA WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND THE APPARENT FAILURE OF THE 2642 BN IN A LF ROLE IN DUC HOA (D) SERVE TO EMPHASIZE THIS POINT. THE ONLY WAY THE ENEMY CAN AGAIN POSE A SERIOUS THREAT IN SR-2 AND SR-3 IS THROUGH LOCAL RECRUITMENT AND THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE CAN SUCCEED IN HOLDING THE POPULATION, MUCH LESS EXPANDING THESE LOSSES IN SR-2 AND SR-3 MEAN THE ONLY AREAS THAT THE ENEMY CAN EFFECTIVELY REINFORCE ARE IN THE NORTHERN TIER AND IN THE SOUTHEASTERN AREA OF THE CORPS.

TO TURN TO THE MORE IMPORTANT LOGISTICS ASPECT, ONE OF THE RESULTS OF THE CAMBODIAN OPERATION WAS TO DEPRIVE THE ENEMY OF SIGNIFICANT TRANSPORTATION RESOURCES. THIS MAP SHOWS THE LOCATIONS OF THESE TRANSPORTATION ASSETS THAT WERE DESTROYED. THE GREY MARKERS SIGNIFY ENEMY TRUCKS, SOMETIMES LARGE NUMBERS, WITH THE DOTS 1-5 TRUCKS, TRIANGLES 6-10 AND SQUARES MORE THAN 10. THE RED DOTS AND SQUARES ARE AT THE LOCATIONS WHERE 25 BICYCLES OR MORE WERE CAPTURED. THE MORE THAN 300 TRUCKS DESTROYED HAD A LOAD CARRYING CAPACITY OF MORE THAN 400 TONS. THE 1300 BICYCLES COULD CARRY 260 TONS. THE YELLOW DOTS INDICATE MAJOR VEHICLE REPAIR SHOPS, CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING 2-3 TRUCKS AT A TIME. ONE SUCH REPAIR SHOP HAD 3 DRIVE SHAFTS, 11 AXLES,

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2 RADIATORS, 6 ACETELYNE SETS WITH OXYGEN TANKS AND 15 GREASE GUNS. THE SUPPORT FOR THE TRUCKS WAS EXTENSIVE. IN ADDITION TO THESE MAINTENANCE SHOPS ENOUGH FUEL WAS DESTROYED TO ALLOW THESE 300 TRUCKS TO TRAVEL 400 MILES EACH AT 10 MI/GAL. THE ENEMY ISSUED HIS OWN LICENSE PLATES, WITH TWO LETTERS AND FOUR DIGITS. THE THREAT OF CONTINUED ARVN INCURSIONS INTO CAMBODIA WILL FORCE THE ENEMY TO DEVELOP OTHER MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION EVEN THOUGH HE MAY CONTINUE TO USE TRUCKS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT WHERE THE RISKS ARE NOT GREAT. THESE TRUCKS THAT WERE DESTROYED WERE PROBABLY NOT THE LONG HAUL TRUCKS PROVIDED BY THE HAC LY TRUCKING COMPANY. THESE TRUCKS AND THE BICYCLES WERE USED FOR MOVING GOODS WITHIN THE BASE AREAS AND BETWEEN THE BASE AREAS. THE LOSS OF THESE TRANSPORTATION ASSETS IS NOT THE IMPORTANT POINT. THE POINT IS THAT THE ENEMY IS UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO USE THIS EFFICIENT MEANS TO MOVE GOODS. I SAY THIS BECAUSE THE ELABORATE SECURITY MEASURES HE TOOK TO CONCEAL HIS DEPOTS AND BASE CAMPS IN CAMBODIA WHEN THEY WERE NOT SERIOUSLY THREATENED SUGGESTS THAT HE WILL NOT RISK EXPOSING HIS ACTIVITY THROUGH HEAVY TRUCK TRAFFIC NOW THAT ALLIED COMBAT OPERATIONS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE. ALSO, ARVN OPERATIONS WILL PERIODICALLY DENY ROUTES. THE ENEMY CANNOT STAKE HIS FUTURE SUPPLY OPERATIONS TO ANY AREAS ON THE PREMISE THAT THE ARVN WILL NOT BLOCK A ROAD NETWORK. HE MUST DEVELOP AN ALTERNATIVE, EXPENSIVE OVERLAND ROUTE. WHILE THE ESTIMATE OF COSTS INVOLVED TO REPLACE THE STRATEGIC NETWORK THAT WAS LOST WHEN THE ENEMY LOST SIHANOUKVILLE IS A STRATEGIC CONSIDERATION IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT WE CONSIDER THE COSTS INVOLVED IN ESTABLISHING A NETWORK TO SUPPORT HIS OPERATIONS IN III CTZ. THESE COSTS CAN BE ESTIMATED, ALTHOUGH THE

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
CALCULATION PRODUCES FIGURES THE ENEMY CANNOT HOPE TO RAISE.

TO MAKE THE ESTIMATE WE USE A THEORETICAL MODEL DIAGRAM-
MATICALLY PORTRAYED ON THIS OVERLAY.

HERE I HAVE ASSUMED A LOGISTICS TERMINAL DEEP ENOUGH IN CAMBODIA TO NOT BE THREATENED SERIOUSLY BY ALLIED OPERATIONS. HERE HE COULD EXPECT TO OPERATE WITH SOME EFFICIENCY IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO HIS EARLIER CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, TO BE ASSURED OF SUPPLYING HIS UNITS IN III CTZ HE WOULD NEED TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN OVERLAND SUPPLY ROUTES. CONSIDER THAT THE 81, 84 AND 86 RSG USED 6,000 PERSONNEL TO TRANSPORT MUNITIONS FROM BA 351 TO WZ "D". GRANTED THESE PERSONNEL PERFORMED A GREAT MANY RELATED TASKS, BUT THEIR ONLY USEFUL END PRODUCT WAS THE TRANSPORTATION FUNCTION. ONCE THE GOODS WERE IN WZ "D" THE COMBAT UNITS HAD TO PICK THEM UP. APPROXIMATELY 5000 COMBAT SOLDIERS WERE SUPPORTED BY THIS EFFORT. ADDITIONALLY, A REGT WAS NORMALLY TASKED TO SECURE THESE ROUTES. THE 174 ALONG THE JOLLEY ROAD AND THE 165 ALONG THE SAIGON RIVER CORRIDOR. A SIMILAR EFFORT FROM KRATIE, IN TERMS OF COMBAT POWER SUPPORTED, WOULD REQUIRE 4 LINES SIMILAR TO THE BA 351-WZ "D" ROUTE, ONE TO THE BA 351, ONE TO THE FISHHOOK AND TWO TO REACH SOUTHERN SR-1, SR-2 AND SR-3. ADD ANOTHER LINE TO SUPPORT THE THREE REGTS THAT WILL BE SECURING THESE LINES IN AREAS WHERE THEY MAY BE CONTESTED. THIS EQUALS 30,000 PERSONNEL. NOW, IF HE WANTS TO HAVE ONE DIVISION CONDUCT MOBILE OPERATIONS IN THE CORPS WE MUST ADD 1 TO 2 MORE SEGMENTS TO THIS LINE. HE CAN USE INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL TO SOME EXTENT. HOWEVER, PAST PRACTICES SUGGEST THAT HE WILL LIMIT THEIR ROLE TO NO MORE THAN A QUARTER OF THE EFFORT. THIS SAVINGS IS BALANCED BY ADDITIONAL OVERHEAD ALONG THE LINES OR NEAR KRATIE TO OPERATE HOSPITALS, ADMINISTER FUNDS AND SUPERVISE THE

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LOGISTICS CHAIN. THE TOTAL BILL IS SOMEWHERE NEAR 40,000 NVA AND 10,000 CAMBODIANS AND HE NEEDS TO PICK UP THE TAB EARLY IN THE DRY SEASON OR FACE A FURTHER SERIOUS DEGRADATION OF CAPABILITY INSIDE III CTZ. HE CAN'T DO THIS, AT LEAST NOT IN TIME. THE MOST EXPENSIVE AREA TO MAINTAIN IN THIS PICTURE IS SR-2/SR-3, IF I WERE THE CHIEF LOGISTICIAN FOR THE ENEMY I WOULD ASK THE G3 IF SUPPORT TO THIS AREA IS REALLY WORTH THE EFFORT. A RECOMMENDATION TO REVERT TO GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THESE AREAS MAKES SENSE ON BALANCE. I WOULD ALSO OPPOSE THE COMMITMENT OF MAJOR ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS TO MR-7 EVEN THOUGH US TROOP WITHDRAWAL MIGHT CREATE FAVORABLE TACTICAL CONDITIONS IN THIS AREA.

NEXT I WILL DISCUSS, OR REEVALUATE, OUR ESTIMATE OF MUNITIONS LOSSES. YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE ASSUMPTION OF A YEAR'S STRATEGIC STOCK'S AT 1ST QUARTER 69 USAGE LEVELS. SINCE WE TRACK THE INDIRECT FIRE AMMUNITION THE ENEMY USES THIS IS THE GAUGE THAT WAS USED TO MEASURE OUR SUCCESS. THE IMPLIED ASSUMPTION IS THAT, GIVEN THE LARGE NUMBER OF CACHES CAPTURED, THE INDIRECT FIRE AMMUNITION CAPTURED IS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MUNITIONS STOCKED. I BELIEVE THIS LATTER ASSUMPTION IS INVALID. THE FLIP PROVIDES A BASIS FOR DISCUSSING THIS POINT. IT SHOWS THE TONNAGES OF VARIOUS TYPES OF AMMO CAPTURED IN EACH OPERATIONAL AREA AND THE PERCENTAGE THAT EACH TYPE CONTRIBUTES TO THE TOTAL. YOU DON'T NEED A LOGISTICS FACT BOOK TO PICK OUT THE FIRST ANOMALY. TIME MAGAZINE PICKED IT UP, ALTHOUGH THEIR EXPLANATION WAS NOT THE POINT AND WAS BASED ON A MISCOUNT. THAT POINT IS THE DISTORTION PROVIDED BY THE LARGE AMOUNTS OF AA AMMO. IF YOU LOOK AT WHAT THE ENEMY SHOULD USE FOR HIS TYPE DIVISIONS AND REGTS AND COMPARE IT TO THE COMPOSITION OF HIS FORCES IN III CTZ THERE IS NO WAY TO RECONCILE THIS ANOMALY.

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
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INITIALLY WE ATTRIBUTED THE HEAVY AA TONNAGES TO HIS LOGISTIC TAIL CATCHING UP WITH A DECISION TO INSTITUTE AN AA EMULATION CAMPAIGN, BUT THE DIFFERENCE IS DEEPER THAN THAT. SMALL ARMS AMMO SHOULD PROVIDE A LARGER FRACTION BY WEIGHT THAN EITHER MORTAR OR DIRECT FIRE MUNITIONS. THE NUMBER OF ROCKETS ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY GREATER THAN THE MORTAR ROUNDS. THE RELATIONSHIP OF MORTAR TONNAGES TO DIRECT FIRE MUNITIONS IS OK FOR AN ENEMY DIVISION OR REGT, BUT WE HAVE THE EQUIVALENT OF 4 ARTY REGTS IN THE CORPS WHOSE NEEDS FOR HEAVY WEAPONS AMMO ARE EACH EQUIVALENT TO A DIVISION. NOW I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT AN ANALYSIS BASED ON THEORETICAL USAGE FIGURES BE SWALLOWED. CONSIDER, HOWEVER, A COMPARISON OF THE RANG RANG CACHE, 150 TONS OF MUNITIONS AND 20 TONS OF OTHER GOODS. WE DESTROYED ALMOST 4 MILLION RDS OF SA AMMO THERE. THE TOTAL FOR CAMBODIA, ALMOST TEN TIMES THE TONNAGE, IS ONLY SLIGHTLY OVER 8 MILLION. IT SHOULD BE 20 MILLION. OVER 35 TONS OF MORTAR AMMO WAS CAPTURED AT RANG RANG. THE 150 TONS IN CAMBODIA SHOULD BE ALMOST 300 TONS.

THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS. FIRST, IN THE TIME AVAILABLE TO THE ENEMY AFTER ALLIED OPERATIONS BEGAN, HE PUT EMPHASIS ON EVACUATING SMALL ARMS AND MORTAR AMMO FROM HIS DEPOTS. HE COULD MOVE MORE FIRE POWER WITH LESS TRANSPORTATION THAT WAY. SECOND, IT WAS MOST USEFUL TO HAVE THESE TYPES OF MUNITIONS FOR HIS OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CAMBODIAN ENEMY. THE COMMUNISTS DURING APRIL PROBABLY SAW LITTLE NEED FOR RELATIVELY HEAVY AA AMMO AGAINST THE SMALL CAMBODIAN AF. HE WOULD NOT EXPECT TO RUN INTO THE INTENSIVE PATROLLING AROUND CAMBODIAN CITIES THAT WOULD MAKE GREATER RANGE BY RKT'S WORTH THEIR WEIGHT.

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
WIN A SETTLEMENT FROM THE RVN, AT LEAST IN III CTZ IN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE, THE IMPLICATION IS THAT HE MUST REPLACE A MAJOR PART OF THE MUNITIONS LOST.

THE NEXT FLIP TAKES US FROM MUNITIONS TO THE RICE LOSSES. I HAVE GIVEN UP TRYING TO EXPLAIN HOW HE COULD HAVE HAD SO MUCH. THIS FLIP COMPARES THE RICE CAPTURED IN EACH AREA TO THE ESTIMATED 6 MOS. NEEDS FOR ALL THE PERSONNEL IN THE AREA. TO HAVE HAD MORE THAN THAT ON HAND WOULD HAVE BEEN UNCHARACTERISTIC WASTE FOR HIM, SINCE THE AGRICULTURE MAN AT CORDS SAYS THAT BAGGED POLISHED RICE IN FIELD TYPE STORAGE SHOULD LAST 6 MOS TO A YEAR. QUITE A BIT OF A 6 MOS SUPPLY MIGHT BE LOST BEFORE IT COULD BE CONSUMED. ADD TO HIS LOSSES THE FACT THAT THE ENEMY IS STILL EATING IN THE REMOTE AREAS, ALTHOUGH UNDOUBTEDLY THERE ARE MANY FEWER PERSONNEL THERE NOW.

HE SHOULD BE STARVING IN SEVERAL OF THE REMOTE AREAS. HE STILL FACES A PROBLEM AFTER WE WITHDRAW IN TRANSPORTING RICE TO PERSONNEL SECURING HIS REMAINING DEPOTS AND OPERATING IN FORWARD AREAS.

TO CONTINUE THE SURVEY OF HIS LOGISTICS LOSSES, THE NEXT FLIP SHOWS HIS CREW SERVED WEAPONS LOST. THE NUMBERS ARE COMPARED TO A TYPE VC DIVISION. WE HAVE CAPTURED A COMPARATIVELY GREATER NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. I SUSPECT THAT THE REPLACEMENT RATE FOR SMALL ARMS MUST RUN HIGHER THAN IT DOES FOR CREW SERVED.

THIS NEXT FLIP IS A LAUNDRY LIST OF QUALITATIVE FACTORS THAT ARE BOUND TO RESULT IN DEGRADATION OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO PROSECUTE THE WAR. A PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT IS BOUND TO RESULT FROM ALL THE FACTORS MENTIONED EARLIER AND THOSE MENTIONED HERE. I HAVE TRIED TO GROUP THE FACTORS TO HIS GOALS IN A SEPARATE CATEGORY. THE ENEMY HAS SCALED DOWN HIS GOALS




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PERIODICALLY, IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL SENSE HIS OBJECTIVES HAVE BECOME PROGRESSING LESS AMBITIOUS, FROM SAIGON TO BIEN HOA TO TAY NINH AND FINALLY LOC NINH, HIS ANNOUNCED HOPES FOR VICTORY HAVE HINGED FIRST IN MILITARY ACTION, THEN ANTI WAR SENTIMENT IN THE US AND MOST RECENTLY, IN COSVN 9, WITH A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT FORCED ON RVN FOLLOWING A US TROOP WITHDRAWAL. NUMEROUS INDICATORS EXIST THAT ILLUSTRATE THE ENEMY'S FEAR OF A PROTRACTED WAR. THIS FEAR POSSIBLY EMANATES FROM THE FACT THAT, TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, THIS IS NOT A TRUE INSURGENCY. HE HAS KEPT A CONVENTIONAL COMBAT CAPABILITY DESPITE CHICOM SUGGESTIONS TO DROP THIS. ONE DOCUMENT CONSIDERS THE POSSIBILITY OF A RETURN TO GUERRILLA WARFARE AND REJECTS IT AS UNTHINKABLE.

NOW, HOWEVER, THE ARVN HAVE CONDUCTED SEMI-INDEPENDENT, LONG RANGE MOBILE OPERATIONS SUCCESSFULLY. THE US SUPPORT WAS INDIRECT, THIS DEMONSTRATION PUTS THE LIE TO THE BELIEF THAT VC/NVA FORCES CAN PUNISH THE ARVN AT WILL AFTER US WITHDRAWAL. A CHANGE IN GOALS OR PREDICTED VEHICLE THAT WILL LEAD TO VICTORY BY THE COMMUNIST HIGH COMMAND WILL RESULT IN FURTHER LOSSES OF CONFIDENCE BY VC/NVA TROOPS. THE BELIEF THAT THEY ARE CONTINUING TO PROSECUTE THE WAR BECAUSE THAY ARE ON THE TIGER'S BACK AND CAN NOT GET OFF IS STRENGTHENED. THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT CAN HAVE A VERY REAL EFFECT ON THE ENEMY'S COMBAT CAPABILITY. WE HAVE TWO RECENT INDICATORS THAT THE ENEMY SOLDIER WHO DOES NOT WANT TO FIGHT DOES NOT HAVE TO FIGHT. ONE IS THE DEP CO SR-2 INTERROGATION CONCERNING MASS RESIGNATIONS AND THE OTHER WAS A DOCUMENT FROM THE 92D RECOVERY AND REPLACEMENT REGT THAT SUGGESTED THAT CADRE FROM COMBAT UNITS VISIT THE RECOVERED CONVALESCENTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THEM TO RETURN TO THEIR UNITS.

DOCUMENTS - OVER 6 TONS. THIS IS A BLOW TO A SECURITY



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
CONSCIOUS ENEMY. THE HIGH LEVEL ASSESSMENT CAPTURED NEAR HQ, SVNLA, BEMOANS THE CAPTURE OF COSVN 9. THE ENEMY ALSO HAS A FETISH FOR RECORDS KEEPING. IT IS NOT UNUSUAL TO REMOVE RICE RECEIPTS THAT ARE MONTHS OR EVEN YEARS OLD FROM ENEMY BODIES. HE FACES A TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE IF HE TRIES TO PIECE THESE LOST DOCUMENTS BACK TOGETHER.

HE HAS HAD OLD COMMO-LIAISON ROUTES DISRUPTED. WORSE YET ARE THE LARGE NUMBERS OF NEW ROUTES HE NOW NEEDS THAT HAVE PROBABLY NEVER BEEN ESTABLISHED. HOW, FOR EXAMPLE DOES THE 86 RSG TRANSMIT THEIR EXTENSIVE REPORTS, RECEIPTS AND MONEY'S TO SVNLA WHEN, IF A ROUTE DID EXIST BEFORE IT WAS TO THE FISHHOOK.

ALSO, AT THE TIME WHEN HE MOST NEEDS IMAGINATIVE AND FLEXIBLE COMMAND AND CONTROL THIS CAPABILITY HAS BEEN DISRUPTED AT A NUMBER OF LEVELS, MOST PARTICULARLY IN SR-2 AND SR-3. THE PROBLEM THAT IS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS BUT DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE IS MONEY. ENEMY UNITS MUST HAVE MONEY TO BUY RICE AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES EVEN FROM HIS OWN REAR SERVICE GROUPS. THIS IS NO MINOR PROBLEM. THE 90 RECOVERY AND REPLACEMENT REGT HAD 86 MEN STARVE FOR LACK OF FUNDS. WHETHER THE DISRUPTION IN THEIR HQ FUNCTIONS WILL RESULT IN A SHORTAGE OF FUNDS FOR SAY SR-2 AND SR-3 OR TO UNITS THAT ONCE OPERATED IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO COSVN, THE SOURCE OF FUNDS, IS SPECULATIVE. BUT EVEN ONE UNIT THAT HAS A SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF MONEY BECAUSE OF THE CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS IS IN SERIOUS TROUBLE INDEED.

WE HAVE CAPTURED ENOUGH MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO OPERATE A 300 BED US HOSPITAL FOR A MONTH AND WE ARE NOTORIOUSLY WASTEFUL. A PW CLAIMS THAT PERHAPS 100% OF THE STOCKS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN CAPTURED. AT LEAST AS SIGNIFICANT IS THE EFFECT LOSSES TO MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND LENGTHENED OR DISRUPTED EVACUATION ROUTES WILL HAVE. A WOUNDED VC/NVA SOLDIER WOULD PROBABLY

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HAVE DIFFICULTY PARTICIPATING IN ANY OBJECTIVE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT.

THE REMAINING POINTS ARE MORE OR LESS MINOR IRRITANTS COMPARED TO THOSE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED.


BEFORE SUMMARIZING HOW THE CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS HAVE HURT THE ENEMY, WE SHOULD LOOK AT WHAT HE HAS DONE IN III CTZ.

THESE LEVEL OF ACTIVITY CHARTS COMPARE HIS DAILY ACTIVITY TO THE AVERAGE FOR THE PREVIOUS MONTH. ALSO SHOWN IS THE ACTIVITY IN III CTZ. THESE CHARTS SIMPLY SHOW THAT THE ENEMY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF REDUCED ALLIED PRESENCE IN THE CORPS.

THIS CHART SHOWS THE LEVEL OF ACTIVITY IN SEVERAL AREAS FOR APRIL, MAY AND JUNE. THE AREAS ARE THE SE, N, CENTRAL AND SW SECTIONS OF III CTZ. THE NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS BY FIRE FOR JUNE ARE EXTRAPOLATED TO THE END OF THE MONTH. THIS INDICATES A VERY LIKELY INCREASE IN SR-1/SR-5 DUE TO THE RETURN THE 101 REGT TO SR-1 AND A MORE ACTIVE DONG NAI REGT UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT. NOTABLE ALSO IS THE LACK OF ACTIVITY IN THE SE. THE ENEMY CERTAINLY HAS MORE PERSONNEL RESOURCES HERE THAN THIS REFLECTS. PERHAPS THE LOSS OF THE RANG RANG CACHE IS BEING EVIDENCED.

FINALLY SIR, THE SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE ENEMY INSIDE III CTZ WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNDER HIS LATEST GUIDANCE. CAMPAIGN "X" WAS SCHEDULED TO RVN TO JULY AND WILL BE PROSECUTED BY THE UNITS ON III CTZ TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. HIS CAPABILITY TO CAUSE TROUBLE HAS RECENTLY BEEN HIGHEST IN SR-1/SR-5. IN THE LONG TERM THE ENEMY MUST MAKE MAJOR EFFORTS TO PREVENT A MORE RAPID DETERIORATION OF HIS POSITION. IT APPEARS THAT HE HAS THREE ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO HIM. THEY ARE LISTED ON THIS FLIP. THE FIRST IS TO SECURE A CAMBODIAN VICTORY. THE MAJOR IMMEDIATE IMPACT

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OF THIS WOULD BE PROVIDE A PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFT TO HIS TROOPS. THE SHORT TERM TACTICAL SITUATION IN III CTZ WOULD BE AFFECTED LITTLE BY SUCH A VICTORY, SINCE THE ENEMY'S BASE AREAS WOULD STILL BE SUBJECT TO INTERDICTION. IN THE LONG RUN SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE WOULD NOT BE A HAPPY RESULT FOR RVN. HOWEVER, THE ENEMY'S DRIVE IN CAMBODIA SEEMS TO BE LOSING MOMENTUM. MASSIVE OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE COULD SALVAGE HIS LOSSES. FINALLY, HE COULD MAKE THE BEST OF HIS SITUATION AND CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE THE WAR IN III CTZ ACCEPTING THE PROBABILITY THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REVERT TO GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE POPULATED AREAS. THE ONLY COURSE THAT COSVN CAN INFLUENCE WITH ITS OWN RESOURCES AND THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IS TO SECURE A CAMBODIAN VICTORY. HE WILL CONTINUE TO DIVERT HIS MAJOR DIVISIONAL EFFORT TO THIS END.

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