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Of course also during this period, there were several attempts by the VC to interdict our MSR from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh and also from Tay Ninh to Dau Tieng. They made very good use of the large trees that their own plows had knocked down around the area for the construction of bunkers that were really something to see. They made them out of these trees that were three feet in diameter or more, one hundred feet tall, and they made some really tough bunkers. I saw some that had almost taken a direct hit from a 500 pound bomb and with negligible damage. From the 20th of August on, I'd say the operation was somewhat hampered by the fact that since there is very little activity anywhere else in Vietnam, the 1st Brigade of the 25th Division AO was swamped with beaucoup reporters and all kinds of brass. We had two or three generals in the area, it seemed like every day, and they even had President Thieu up one day. The whole thing I think rapidly became overly controlled and this was one of the things that led to our Brigade Commander, at that time Colonel Wolf, being relieved. It was pretty evident that was relieved because he got highly agitated over the amount of guidance that he was being given and I can only say that I know that in so many words he told the assistant Division Commander to either let him run his damn brigade or relieve him. Not wanting to let him run his brigade, they relieved him. I would say that I couldn't really blame the Brigade Commander. He probably should have exercised some restraint and he might have been able to keep his job. Unfortunately, I'd have to say from my observation, that this is one of the main problems that we have in the Vietnamese Conflict over here, is control of everything, right down to squad, because I've seen a case where a lieutenant colonel who's a battalion commander, and a full colonel who's a brigade commander, and a brigadier general who's an assistant division commander were all trying to direct the movements of an infantry squad. Of course on the 20th, a point was brought up to us by the Brigade S5, Major Seabrooke, who is now Lieutenant Colonel Seabrooke, there was estimated upwards of 2,000 refugees in the Long Hoa area downtown and they were getting worried about the sanitary conditions. However the problem pretty well took over itself about as soon as it materialized because as soon as the VC moved out of the area the people just filtered right on back into the area and started rebuilding their homes so it was only a problem for a couple or three days at the most. The action slowed down a little after the 21st and the 22d. On the 23d of August, our CRIP found three base camps which the VC had used apparently for a staging area for their attack on Fire Support Base Buell earlier in the week. In the same area, they found 100 bodies in hasty graves north of the Tay Ninh Base Camp and 40 more at a location a few hundred meters east of that, which brought the Brigade body count up to 907 confirmed for the five day period up until the 23d. There was a contact with a small local force VC unit right south of our base camp early on the morning of the 23d at about 0200 hours. That was an ARVN contract

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