

# VIETNAM

**the view  
beyond  
the battle**





*Vietnamese Popular Forces militiamen here build a school in a Vinh Long province hamlet. Materials for construction and food for workers were furnished by U.S.AID to support this self-help project. Three hundred new classrooms were constructed in Revolutionary Development projects in this Mekong River delta province during 1966.*



## A NATION OF GROWTH

The Republic of Vietnam has considerable natural wealth to be developed when the war ends. There is much development during war.

The delta in the south, where the Mekong and other rivers meander through miles of incredibly green fields, is one of Asia's great rice bowls. Government programs are increasing yields. With peace, improved farming and new land can provide an enormous surplus for export to neighboring countries — someday, perhaps, rice-short North Vietnam.


South Vietnam can grow more than enough cotton and sugar to meet its needs. Present crops, mainly rubber and tea, can be expanded. The country has the capability to become a major supplier of pork to the rest of Asia.

Coastal waters teem with fish and shrimp, already being exported. The government is helping fishermen to motorize their boats and buy modern nets; it is building fishing port facilities.

Low-grade anthracite deposits are known. The Republic shares geography in which tin and zinc are mined, but the country has never been explored thoroughly for minerals. There are few known raw materials for heavy industry.

But resources for light industry — particularly those based on agriculture and forestry — exist or can be developed in quantity. Textiles, plastic, paper and other products already are produced. And production is increasing, new factories are being built, even as the war goes on.


—Map from Fortune Magazine, reprinted by permission. © 1966, Time, Inc.



0 25 50 100 150 200  
MILES

105° 106° 107° 108° 109° 110° 111°

17°  
16°  
15°  
14°  
13°  
12°  
11°  
10°  
9°



# **VIETNAM**

**the view  
beyond  
the battle**

## **CONTENTS**

<b>CHAPTER 1: THE ROAD TO NATIONHOOD .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2: REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>CHAPTER 3: DISRUPTING THE VIET CONG .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>CHAPTER 4: THE ECONOMY IN WARTIME .....</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>CHAPTER 5: A TIME FOR COMPASSION .....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>CHAPTER 6: THE NEW GENERATION .....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>CHAPTER 7: AS VIETNAM BUILDS .....</b>	<b>59</b>

Faces of Today's Developing Vietnam



# THE ROAD TO NATIONHOOD

1

## **The Land, the People**

The Republic of Vietnam is a green, fertile, tropical country about half the size of Norway, with four times as many people—and a surprising potential for national growth and economic prosperity.

A warm ocean, abounding in food, washes the long coastline. Beaches are broad and white; some of the harbors rival Rio de Janeiro or San Francisco.

Around, and south and east of Saigon, the capital, lies one of the world's great deltas, the flat, wet rice bowl formed by the nine meandering mouths of the 2,600-mile long Mekong River. From Saigon north, lush valleys, in plantation country, break the peninsular mountains, or funnel out to a narrow coastal plain.

The area of the Republic is about 65,000 square miles. The land is peopled—densest in the delta—by one of mankind's most attractive races. Population is about 17 million souls, of whom 85 per cent are farmers or village dwellers.

The peopling of Vietnam was a north to south movement. It was a movement of a definite ethnic group, and it began some fifteen centuries before the first Europeans reached America.

From their homeland in China, the Viets migrated down the coast in large groups, made up of clans. The people they displaced took to the hills, to become today's mountain tribesmen. Themselves divided into sometimes hostile clans, tribal peoples number less than 4 per cent of the Republic's population.

The Vietnamese, making up nearly 96 per cent, are small-boned but tough—an intelligent, resilient folk. Their culture stems from old China, with a flavoring of France. They speak a tonal language related to Chinese.

Growing out of Confucianism, their religion has become a mixture, predominately Buddhist, but with many other sects, Taoist, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, animism, as well as Christianity.

But the Vietnamese, over the centuries, preserved an ethnic identity of their own, characterized by customs and an independence of spirit which set them apart from all their neighbors.

Often, in the old days, they paid no more than lip service to the overlord in the north. Sometimes, led by their own rulers, they revolted. And sometimes, too, they quarreled with each other, clan against clan, north against south.

The system of hereditary feudal aristocracy under which they lived, based on family—a system whose vestiges remain a national problem—contained some of the roots of democratic practices. The Vietnamese, for example, are no strangers to voting. The concept of popular election lies deep in their tradition, since for 2,000 years the clans voted to choose their ruling councils.

## **Toward Independence**

Ancient Vietnamese ways, old political structures, began to change when the French came to Southeast Asia in the second half of the Nineteenth Century. In the course of their occupa-

tion, the new rulers found it convenient to divide Vietnam into three parts:

- Tonkin, embracing the Red River delta in the north. (Tonkin now constitutes the greater part of communist North Vietnam.)

- Annam, along the narrow coastal waist, which the French permitted Vietnamese emperors to rule from their capital at Hue. (What was Annam is divided at the 17th Parallel between the two Vietnams.)

- Cochin China, in the south, including the Mekong River delta. (Now the greater part of the Republic of Vietnam.)

This arrangement helped perpetuate the historic divisiveness between Vietnamese of north and south. And it enabled the colonialists to divide and rule.

The French built schools and highways, established rubber and tea plantations and commercial enterprise, organized a colonial-style civil service (Vietnamese were confined to the lower grades), developed attractive cities, language and cultural ties.

But French rule was brief in terms of history. In Vietnam, as elsewhere, European colonialism collided with the Twentieth Century, and soon collapsed.

World War II, in which Vietnamese patriots came into conflict with both the Japanese and French, was the turning point.

When the British liberated Vietnam at the end of the war, the French attempted to restore colonial control. Forged in wartime, the Viet Minh independence forces fought the French for nearly a decade, and finally won.

The international Geneva Agreements of July 20, 1954, divided Vietnam at the 17th Parallel into two nations—a communist dictatorship in the north, and, in the south, a free Republic of Vietnam.

With partition, nearly a million Vietnamese opted for freedom and moved to the south. Many were civil servants, leaders in the professions, business, industry, education.

Resettled, they have made solid contributions as citizens of the Republic. A number, serving the country, have been killed by the Viet Cong.

The two Vietnams were to live with each other in peace. It was an agreement the communists, bargaining to gain time, never intended to keep.

Almost immediately, North Vietnam began training and organizing guerrillas.

Shortly, guided and supplied from North Vietnam, the communist Viet Cong was terrorizing rural areas of the Republic as a start toward conquering the country according to the textbook tactics of China's Mao Tse-Tung.

By 1965, units of North Vietnam's regular army had moved into the Republic, adding to terror and guerrilla warfare the threat of organized military assault. And the rulers in Hanoi and Peking were no longer bothering to disguise the foreign communist plot to enslave a free neighbor.

Peking, supporting North Vietnam's aggression with armaments, men and advice, continued to talk about "national liberation." But this hollow propaganda phrase was beginning to be understood for what it was, a device to explain away naked imperialism.

In this so-called "people's war," a very small minority of communists had been implanted by North Vietnam as an excuse to conquer and subdue the great bulk of the Republic's population.

### Nation Building

From World War II to the present—a quarter of a century—the people of the Republic of Vietnam have lived with armed conflict. A whole generation has reached adulthood without knowing the meaning of peace.

Under these circumstances, the resolve of the Vietnamese to continue to fight their assailants, while simultaneously attempting to establish and build a nation, has excited the sympathy and admiration of free men everywhere.


What progress has been made has been excruciatingly difficult. That warfare for so many years—and the brutal communist terror—have sometimes tired the Vietnamese, or led some of them down false paths, is understandable.

That the Vietnamese have remained uncowed, that they still are working and planning for their national future while fighting off a tenacious foe, is one of the phenomena of modern times.

It remains an uphill battle.

The communists fear and hate even the most modest institutions of a free nation as much as they hate freedom itself.

Thus they have directed their terror against



*Election officials in Saigon's Hoa Hung area pass out ballots to voters in September 11, 1966, election. More than 80 per cent of Vietnam's registered voters turned out in mass commitment for nationhood.*

civilians—teachers, village and hamlet chiefs, agricultural agents, even doctors and nurses—wherever they have detected signs of local leadership or progress.

Some rural Vietnamese have been “executed” for teaching neighbors to read and write. Along with numbers of women and children, the Viet Cong terrorists have killed more than 60,000 provincial, district and local government officials and workers, non-combatants all.

Other thousands have been kidnaped to unknown fates, and still others intimidated into unwilling collusion with the Viet Cong.

The terrorists have burned down whole villages and hamlets, making homeless refugees of hundreds of thousands of humble, peace-loving rural folk. They have attacked camps set up for refugees.

They have wrecked railroad trains and tracks, roads and bridges.

Schools and medical dispensaries, since they are symbols of hope and progress, have been put to the communist torch.

In answer to this tragic waste, the Republic of Vietnam—with heavy assistance from abroad—has responded with ever-increasing effort. Schools, hospitals, clinics are being built in greater numbers.

Farming is being improved, fishing fleets are being modernized, roads are being built, industries and public utilities are being established or expanded. New workers, trained in civic action, are taking the field, regardless of personal hazard, to replace the fallen.

Altered as necessary by trial and error, new strategies are being developed to rid whole areas of the enemy, and keep them free as villages re-build.

To combat the communists with force is taking great resources, much manpower and energy.

But the leaders of the Republic's government have come to recognize that military action is not enough, that military efforts alone will not win, that supreme efforts must also be made in non-military matters.

They have recognized that victory cannot be won at all unless the final battle is won in the minds of the people.

To gain the people's confidence, respect and loyalty, in a new country never given a breathing-spell from war, is a formidable task. Nationhood

for Vietnam—economic, social, political and ideological well-being—would be difficult even if there were no enemy.

One problem is to bring changes of mind and attitude among the rural people who make up 85 per cent of the population—and who, while fearing communism, have not historically identified themselves as participants in their government.

It is a problem of bringing the individual into personal involvement in the work of establishing a society in which every citizen has a role and knows he has a role.

In the month of September 1966—despite an all-out propaganda and terror campaign, directed from the north, but utilizing the Viet Cong—80.8 per cent of the people made their choice.

Of 5,288,512 registered voters in the Republic of Vietnam, 4,274,812 cast their ballots for delegates to a Constituent Assembly.

They voted for freedom and elected to draft for themselves their charter for the future.

Another is a problem of modernizing a whole economy, using that economy to fight a defensive war, simultaneously equipping it to help realize Vietnam's great future when peace finally comes.

This is the challenge which the Vietnamese government has accepted.

While still fighting a war, the government has embarked on a program of nation-building in all its aspects.

The program, if and when carried to completion, not only will help eradicate the enemy, it will transform the country.

And set a course toward social growth, economic progress, democratic institutions, eventual realization of Vietnam's place in the community of free nations of Asia and the world.

### Foreign Assistance

Vietnam's drive toward honorable peace and nation-building has the support of determined friends and allies.

In the military effort, by late 1966, some 600,000 troops of the Republic of Vietnam were in the field against the aggressors.

More than 300,000 American soldiers, Marines, airmen, sailors and Coast Guardsmen were supporting them, and more were on the way.

Six other countries had sent or were sending 30,000 additional troops, some for combat, others

for non-combatant military support such as air transport.

The United States had spent or committed more than U.S.\$3 billions in economic aid over a period of 11 years—and was spending at the rate of U.S.\$590 millions a year, plus shipping in food-stuffs valued at U.S.\$138 millions annually.

By late 1966, some 1,100 American civilian technicians were spread over the country to advise and support the Vietnamese in American-assisted projects.

More men were coming, and more American expenditures. During 1966, Vietnam had passed India as the foremost recipient among 82 nations receiving U.S. economic aid.

Assisting, or planning to assist the Republic of Vietnam in its economic and social or humanitarian programs were these other nations:

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Republic of China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

So were a number of international organizations, and private agencies in the United States and other countries. Many organizations and countries had people working in Vietnam.

At mid-1966, total foreign assistance—excluding American—in monetary terms was approaching U.S.\$50 millions.

Programs of reform and development had been under way for months and years. There had been solid accomplishments, many frustrations, and some failures.

These facts had become clear:

- No matter how eager the Vietnamese citizen might be to work with his government, he could not be expected to commit suicide by doing so when he was not physically protected from Viet Cong terror.

- Area pacification thus would have to precede, and continue to accompany, every effort to help the individual Vietnamese participate in government programs to promote his own well-being.

- Despite some security successes—the govern-

ment controlled the cities, the provincial capitals, the district capitals, the richest farm regions, all the ports and all the industries—there were still few areas where a citizen was safe at night unless in the actual presence of military or police protection.

This was the situation when President Lyndon B. Johnson, in January 1966, invited the leaders of the Republic of Vietnam to meet with the leaders of the United States to discuss the war and Vietnam's future.

### **The Honolulu Conference**

The meeting was convened February 6, 1966, at Honolulu, Hawaii.

To it flew virtually all the highest officers of the two governments, including the Chiefs of State.

Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman of the National Directorate, and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky stated the aims of the Republic of Vietnam, and described plans to achieve them.

Their program was discussed thoroughly. President Johnson endorsed it, and promised full American support. Both countries reaffirmed their determination that the Republic will achieve victory over the communist aggressors.

Out of the conference came solid, formal pledges:

That with military and economic assistance from the United States, the Republic of Vietnam will strive—

- To build a true democracy in which every Vietnamese can participate in development of his country.

- To reconstruct areas ravaged by the Viet Cong.

- To resettle and rehabilitate refugees.

- To eliminate social injustice and corruption.

- To wage an all-out fight against hunger, disease and ignorance.

- To return Viet Cong adherents to the national cause through the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program.

And that the two governments, working together, will achieve for the people of the Republic of Vietnam—

- Security against aggression.
- Social revolution.
- A free society.
- Genuine and lasting peace.

The agreed goal was political, economic, social and rural action designed to lead the people of Vietnam to creation of a revolutionary new democratic society.

### Manila Summit Conference

At the invitation of Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the chiefs of state of seven nations met in Manila on October 24 and 25, 1966. The nations represented—Australia, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United States, Republic of Vietnam—were united in their affirmation that:

- The freedom of South Vietnam be secured.
- They would continue united military and other efforts until aggression is ended.
- The united purpose is peace.
- They were united in their resolve for a peaceful, prosperous future for all Asia and the Pacific.
- Their actions would be in accordance with respective constitutional processes.

Particular attention was focused on the accelerating efforts of the Republic of Vietnam to force a social revolution of hope and progress.

Vietnamese leaders pledged to expand and intensify their efforts in the field of Revolutionary Development. They told of work to modernize agriculture and of giving top priority to land reform measures. They emphasized the laying of cornerstones for social justice.

The conferring nations reaffirmed their continuing support for Vietnamese efforts to achieve economic stability and progress. And they appealed to other nations and to international organizations committed to the full and free development of all nations to give further assistance to the Republic.

The Vietnamese described plans for the strengthening of the democratic process at both local and national levels. They told of their determination to open all doors to former enemies to lay down their weapons and bring their skills to the service of the people.

In their declaration of principles on which the seven nations based their hopes for future peace and progress, they stated:

- Aggression must not succeed.
- The bonds of poverty, illiteracy and disease must be broken.
- Economic, social and cultural cooperation within the Asian and Pacific region must be strengthened.
- They must seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia.



*Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu (left) and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of the Republic of Vietnam met with U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Honolulu, Hawaii, in February, 1966. Conferees reaffirmed pledges to work of social revolution and goal of free self-government.*

**A Determined People Stand Guard While Life Goes on in the Hamlet**



# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT 2

## Local Action

The Honolulu Declaration refocused national drive, put new purpose into all the many facets of Vietnam's effort toward pacification and nation-building.

Specifically, it put immediate emphasis on the government's new plan to bring rural people into the new society envisaged by Vietnam's leaders.

The plan, called Revolutionary Development, was developed during 1965. The first Revolutionary Development teams, especially trained, moved out into the countryside in mid-1966.

Ultimately, the Ministry of Revolutionary Development expects to send into the field upwards of 40,000 workers, organized into more than 600 operating teams.

In one way or another, Revolutionary Development draws on the services of nearly all the agencies of the Vietnamese government, including security forces.

It involves supplies, technical advice or training from most of the many assistance programs of U.S.AID. And it enlists the cooperation of many of the other nations which are helping Vietnam.

Revolutionary Development emphasizes the role of the individual citizen in the improvement of his hamlet and the growth of his country.

Area by area, village by village, it seeks to shatter Viet Cong interference, restore public security, enlist the people in a drive for their own progress.

One of Vietnam's inheritances is a tendency to-

ward a parochial, politically-neutral, uncommitted rural society. Revolutionary Development aims to bring to the people—men, women and children—an awareness of their heritage as Vietnamese, their role as citizens, their partnership in national life.

The idea is that when the people fully identify themselves with their nation and their government, then the Viet Cong will be faced with the alternative of joining the people, hence the government, or of fighting the government, hence the people.

## Into the Field

On May 21, 1966, within three months after the Honolulu Conference, the Revolutionary Development Cadre Training School at Vung Tau, 85 kilometers south of Saigon, graduated a class of 4,518 young Vietnamese trained under the new curriculum.

Within days most of them, formed into 59-man teams, were working in the hamlets.

Building on the foundations of rural construction efforts that had gone before, bringing new concepts with them, the Revolutionary Development groups launched the projects that will be duplicated and improved in hamlet after hamlet as new areas are liberated.

Ultimately, the program is to bring the seeds of social revolution to all 234 districts of the Republic's 43 provinces.

The Revolutionary Development teams vary

their programs to meet the special conditions of each hamlet. But they all take five basic initial actions:

- They establish local security.
- They root out remnants of Viet Cong control, arrest or drive away terrorists and "tax" collectors, move to establish democratic local self-government.
- They enable the people to defend their homes.
- They record grievances of the local people, list their hopes for themselves and the community, take steps to fulfill them.
- With technical advice, money, materials and encouragement, they help the people to develop sound economic and social well-being in the hamlet.

### Security

The Revolutionary Development group members all are armed, and trained in use of their weapons.

On establishing their headquarters in a hamlet, in an area just cleared of organized communist units, they assume responsibility for protecting the people against Viet Cong terrorists who may have been left behind.

They man, and show the people how to man, sentry posts and defensive patrols by day and night. They establish contact, and communications facilities, with military, paramilitary and police forces in the area.

Throughout the period of tutelage in civic projects, the group members prepare for the day they can turn responsibility for local security over to the hamlet's residents.

There have been early examples of success.

At Ba Canh, a hamlet of 1,650 persons in Binh Dinh province, northeast of Saigon, the Revolutionary Development group was completing its initial work. It was time for the residents to shoulder the security burden, to protect their modest new institutions, and their newly-elected hamlet officials.

As they had been taught to do, the Revolutionary Development men convinced the residents that security was a total commitment, with tasks for every man, woman and child.

A youngster minding his family's pigs could sound an alarm at the approach of strangers. A grandfather could spend some of his spare time

filling sandbags. Able-bodied villagers, given weapons, could be trained in their use.

Ba Canh's people organized their own self-defense force. They divided their armed men and women into squads, and chose squad leaders. They made plans to meet any possible terrorist assault, and practised until each person knew his or her part in each plan.

When the Revolutionary Development group moved on to a new assignment, the people of Ba Canh were confident they could handle their own security. And when the Viet Cong sent guerrillas to re-infiltrate the hamlet, the people captured them at gunpoint and turned them over to the authorities.

### Hamlet Economics

It is an objective of Revolutionary Development to accelerate economic progress by showing the country people how they themselves can work to improve their lives.

All members of the 59-man Revolutionary Development group are involved. But main responsibility lies with members of the six-man New Life Development team organized within each group.

They particularly guide the hamlet residents in self-help projects—roads, buildings, bridges—in which the government supplies the money and materials, the people the incentive and manpower.

One example of New Life Development lies in Gia Rai district of Bac Lieu province, in the delta near the southern tip of Vietnam. Here, as a starter, Vietnamese Army Captain Vo Thanh Truc, and the U.S.AID assistant province adviser, Steven Shepley, toured eight hamlets to talk with the people and the Revolutionary Development group working there.

At the end of their tour, Captain Truc and Shepley had compiled a list of 13 self-help projects the people wanted. These included cisterns to collect rainwater for Ninh Son, Tac Say and Long Tron hamlets, streamside docks for Ho Phong and Cay Gua, a maternity clinic for Xon Long, a sidewalk and bridge for Vinh My.

The government agreed to provide cash for these projects, U.S.AID to donate the cement, and the hamlet residents to do the work.

It cannot be said that the people leapt at the opportunity to thus improve their communities.

Some wanted the government to build the cis-



*A Revolutionary Development team on the march, with weapons for protection, tools for building. Each team carries a public address loudspeaker for its "town crier."*



*In a hamlet of Phuoc Tuy province, on the southern coast, Revolutionary Development team members help build a home for a woman whose husband was killed, and her home burned, by Viet Cong terrorists.*



*The government has brought pesticides to farmers. Through U.S.AID, the American people have given 34,000 sprayers like this, being used on his onion crop by a farmer in Ninh Thuan province.*

terns, docks and other projects, doing the whole job. Others feared these signs of progress, if built, would bring down the wrath of the Viet Cong. There were long debates in the hamlets.

Patiently, the district chief, the U.S.AID representative, the Revolutionary Development men explained that if the government built a cistern, the people might not feel a responsibility for maintaining it. And the Viet Cong would feel no compunction about destroying it.

But if the people built the cistern, it would belong to the people. Owning it, they would use it wisely, maintain it properly. And if the Viet Cong came, the terrorists would hesitate to destroy the property of the people.

In the end, the hamlet residents voted for the projects in community meetings. And they elected self-help project committees in each hamlet to recruit the manpower, see the construction jobs through to completion, exercise maintenance after that.

### Farming

In addition to self-help projects, the New Life Development teams within each Revolutionary Development group are engaged in a campaign to help modernize agriculture, improve yields, introduce new crops.

In much of their work, the groups conduct activities with field representatives of various government agencies, and with officials at the district and provincial level. In this case, they coordinate with extension workers of the Ministry of Agriculture.

They operate in the knowledge that South Vietnam has been a rice-exporting area, has the potential to export other food, and can achieve self-sufficiency in such presently imported necessities as sugar and cotton.

In the hamlets, the New Life Development team members examine each farm and advise the owner how he can better utilize his land. They distribute fertilizer and seed.

They inspire, and help to organize and guide, projects to improve animal husbandry in the hamlet, build or enlarge fish-growing ponds. They show farmers how to join or organize cooperatives, how to qualify for agricultural credit.

They help such farmers as 43-year-old Dang Vien Bien, of Vinh Trach village, also in Bac Lieu

province, show his model farm.

Bien's two-hectare plot of land lies on a main road, where travelers can see the results of his modern technology.

His rice cultivation demonstration consists of two plots, one fertilized and the other unfertilized. His recent crop from the fertilized plot was half again as large as the other.

Using 50 bags of cement contributed by U.S. AID, Bien is building modern stys to house two improved-breed Yorkshire pigs loaned to him by the government. He plans to sell high-quality breeding stock to his neighbors.

Bien, pleased and proud, is not content merely to show his farm to passers-by or people brought to him by government workers. He has become something of a missionary, going out on his own to invite farmers to come see with their own eyes what can be done.

### Land Reform

One of the first tasks of the Revolutionary Development group members, on moving into a hamlet, is to survey the available land, helping to pave the way for land reform.

This is an active program of the Vietnamese government. Already it has changed the lives of 166,000 refugee and tenant-farmer families, holding farm totaling 327,000 hectares, expropriated from big landowners or government-owned.

The government sells the land at low cost, in farms running 3 to 10 hectares or more. The farmer gets immediate title, pays for his land in 12 annual installments from his income. - If he is a refugee, his first installment is postponed a year.

A total of 1.2 million hectares has been expropriated from French and Vietnamese owners of extensive tracts, or taken from former communal lands. Provincial and district officials, government surveyors, village committees act to enforce the land reform regulations, settle eligible families on their own farms.

The Vietnamese love the land as much as farming peoples anywhere.

Huynh Ngoc Xuong, 58, had spent most of his life as a small merchant.

But the war brought him a series of misfortunes which by 1957 had cast him in the role of

an unlanded tenant farmer in a hamlet of the delta province of An Giang. His productive life, he thought, had all but ended.

Then the government's land reform program reached his hamlet, and Xuong found he was entitled to purchase 14 hectares.

Once he began working the land for himself, ex-merchant Xuong developed into a first-class farmer. Unlike the conservative former owner, he was not afraid to try new methods, or to listen to the government technicians.

He worked hard, and planned skillfully. He rotated crops, utilized marginal areas, used fertilizer as recommended, planted a proportion of cash crops.

Now he has two full time employees to help him work his 14 hectares, pays a tractor-driver to do the plowing, and hires five extra workers at harvest time.

Huynh Ngoc Xuong is a prosperous man.

Another farmer, who lived with his wife and five children in a one-room hut near Hue, was standing in front of his home when a member of the Chinese Technical Mission passed by.

Leonard Chang, the mission member, stopped. Invited inside, Mr. Chang was surprised when the farmer began talking to a pile of straw in the corner.

A voice came back. It was the farmer's wife, who had covered herself with straw to keep warm. They asked Mr. Chang if the Chinese technicians could help them bid for some communal land.

Under Mr. Chang's guidance the farmer bid on a single hectare of land—and won. The Chinese supplied the man with cauliflower and eggplant seeds, as well as insecticide and advice.

Later, Leonard Chang revisited the village to see the farmer's harvest. The man told him, "My family has not seen 1,000 piasters in its hands for three generations. If I could just have 1,000 piasters for my crop I would be happy."

A technician surveyed the crop to estimate its value. And told the farmer its worth—45,000 piasters. The man was stunned; he could not comprehend that wealth.

Mr. Chang asked him what he was going to do with his money. The farmer turned, and tears were in his eyes. He said he was going to buy his wife a kilo of pork. She had not eaten meat for a year.

"What else?" Leonard Chang asked.

But the farmer did not respond for some time. He looked at the ragged clothing on his children. And he looked at his house.

And said, "Many things."

### Toward Democracy

When they go to work in a hamlet, Revolutionary Development group members—particularly those of the New Life Development team—cooperate with the people in building, equipping and maintaining schools, dispensaries, community centers.

They give the people guidance in preventive medicine and public sanitation. They participate in relief operations for homeless refugees, widows and orphans, the poverty-stricken.

An underlying theme of Revolutionary Development is group action, group involvement of individuals in community activities and projects. Organization of democratic groups within the hamlet is one of Revolutionary Development's most important, most time-consuming missions.

The teams assist farmers to establish joint-action organizations. Each community self-help project involves establishment of a hamlet management board.

Specialized organizations are encouraged—an association for the men, one for the women, one for old men, one for old women, one for young men, one for young women, one for male teen-agers, one for female teen-agers, even one for the hamlet's children.

And because the people organize themselves and elect their own leaders, the once muted voice of the individual gains volume, strength and importance. The organizations acquire a certain political power in the community, their leaders acquire something akin to constituencies.

One of the busiest of the Revolutionary Development sub-groups is the Census and Grievance team.

The six team members talk in turn to each of the hamlet's residents, in the course of conducting a detailed census in cooperation with the police. They question each individual about his complaints, his idea of community needs.

Perhaps an underground Viet Cong "tax" collector is still at work, bleeding the hamlet of its spare piasters. Perhaps a local farmer is not paying just wages to his workers, or is not shar-

ing the produce equitably with a tenant.

Perhaps the hamlet's surplus products cannot be taken to market readily for lack of a road, a canal, a bridge. Perhaps the water supply is polluted, or there are no medical facilities for a sick child.

The teams record grievances and desires, investigating where necessary.

Where outside help can be provided, they initiate government action at the appropriate district or provincial office. If a self-help project is indicated, they guide the residents toward this solution.

Larger community aspirations—a school, a road, a dock, a well—are written down. And, at a ceremony, a People's Agreement is drawn and signed.

The agreement constitutes a master plan for the hamlet and becomes the source of many self-help projects, the basis for larger, government-sponsored programs.

Hamlet master plans gradually are becoming a reality over much of Vietnam.

### Local Government

On the local level, Vietnamese have been electing their leaders for centuries. But under Revolutionary Development, the system is being shorn of its remnants of patriarchy and the ancient "dynasties" of local mandarins.

Government at the hamlet and village level used to be by "consensus." This was usually established by the few articulate and influential farmers, land-owners in the village or hamlet.

Now the Revolutionary Development groups have introduced the secret ballot into village and hamlet council elections.

When the Revolutionary Development group moves into a liberated hamlet, all 59 members begin helping the residents prepare for modern self-government, and the election of leaders from among the best qualified, most dedicated people.

Primary responsibility for this mission rests with the Civil Affairs sub-team. Members of this team begin by reinforcing the existing hamlet administration, or temporarily assuming its functions.

Often they must identify and arrest Viet Cong adherents before they begin.

The hamlet's voters have a choice among can-

didates when election day comes. And since their ballots are secret, they choose the leaders they want without fear of reprisal from an employer or a local feudal "lord."

Binh Tay is a small hamlet south of Saigon, in Long An province. Its voters turned out on election day despite threats of retaliation from the nearby Viet Cong.

Soon after the Revolutionary Development team came to Binh Tay, at community meetings and in private conversations, its members began to speak of the theory and practice of democratic elections in the new Vietnam.

The speeches of the team leader, Lam Quang Nha, went something like this:

"When you elect a hamlet council, you will be giving yourself a voice which will be listened to with respect by the authorities in the district government.

"And through the links of the district to the provincial and the national authorities, your opinions will help to shape our country's policies.

"For no statesman, in any country, can long afford to turn a deaf ear to the voice of the people."

Five candidates announced they were running for the three council posts. Each chose a symbol to emblazon on his campaign posters, and on his ballots, to make voting easier for the illiterate.

By election day, posters with their symbols had been fastened to every tree in the courtyard that had been selected as the polling place.

As the voters lined up, and the Revolutionary Development men began to check their registration cards, the buzz of voices almost drowned out the familiar sound of a battle with the Viet Cong across the river.

Each voter moved into a curtained booth, selected three of the five ballots, placed them in an envelope, then left the booth to deposit the envelope in a ballot box in the courtyard.

When the polls had closed, the ballots were counted by the village chief (a Vietnamese village is made up of several hamlets), the Revolutionary Development team leader, and a hamlet elder.

Of the three elected council members, Phan Van Doc polled 85 votes, Vo Van Ton 84, and Vo Van Loi 65. All are farmers, active in hamlet organizations.

But that was not the end of the election. It was now necessary to choose a council chairman from among the three winners.



*In the Binh Tay hamlet election, a Revolutionary Development team member checks voter registration cards. Men and women over 18 can vote in Vietnam.*



*The Binh Tay winners organize the hamlet council. From left Secretary Vo Van Ton, Chairman Vo Van Loi, Deputy Chairman Phan Van Doc.*

Vietnamese custom took charge here.

Over tea, it was unanimously decided by the three that the oldest, Vo Van Loi, 68—a man who for years had handled Binh Tay's relationships with the outer world, who had kept the hamlet's books and saved the hamlet's money when there was any—would bear the title of chairman, even though he polled the fewest votes.

The next oldest, Phan Van Doc, was named deputy chairman. The post of secretary went to the youngest, Vo Van Ton.

News of the election was spread through the hamlet and there was general satisfaction.

Vo Van Loi sat in natural dignity as his son and two daughters poured tea for all.

"I am happy to have been elected," he said. "Now I will be able to continue to do what I can for the people of my hamlet."

### **A Matter of Nation-Building**

The objective of Revolutionary Development is to spread a sense of national unity among a people whose social divisions have been based on birthplace, religion, ethnic derivation and class—who have thought of themselves traditionally not as Vietnamese but as Buddhists or Cao Dai or Catholic or Hoa Hao, as northerners, or southerners, mountain tribesmen or Chinese or Annamites or Tonkinese.

The great goal is to forge a nation from the hamlet level up. It is to bring about more and more self-help projects so that the people—seeing each time that the government is working with them—will begin to understand that the government is the people and the people are the government.

Revolutionary Development is new. And it is dangerous.

For example, on September 6, 1966 in Phu Yen province, on the central coast, the Viet Cong ambushed and mined a government car carrying six Revolutionary Development team members. Four of them were killed.

Officials of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, the team members themselves, Amer-

ican advisers offering their support, are aware that imperfections will develop in the program, that changes will have to be made to meet new situations and new conditions.

But the approach is sound. It comprehends the fundamental needs without being elaborate. It will remain. And early in the effort, reports from the provinces indicated that Revolutionary Development was beginning to take hold.

By the middle of 1966:

- In Long An province, the people and government built nine kilometers of new roads, repaired 20 kilometers of old roads, erected 27 schools. A thousand farmers had undertaken self-help projects.

- In Binh Dinh province, the count included 10 schools, a five-kilometer canal, 11 self-help community projects, two bridges and 633 farmers trained in modern agriculture.

- In Phu Yen province, 12 schools, 5,600 meters of new road, 19 self-help projects, 443 farmers trained.

- In Vinh Long province, in the delta, 300 new classrooms (including two destroyed by the Viet Cong and immediately rebuilt by the people). Also five village water purification plants, six village electrification projects, a 146-meter steel and concrete bridge, 12 maternity dispensaries.

One Vinh Long project was construction of a river boat, the size of a four-auto ferry, for transport of goods and people along the waterways.

By mid-1966, more than a half-million people in hamlets recently subject to the Viet Cong, had been brought under government control.

In general, it could be said that Revolutionary Development was showing signs of success in areas where the people felt secure against communist attack.

And as more and better-trained teams move into freed hamlets with an improving program, it appeared that Revolutionary Development can indeed help change the face of the countryside.

Its full consummation could usher rural Vietnam into an era of modern agricultural productivity and social progress.

To Prevent Subversion,  
To Maintain Law and Order,  
Missions for War and for Peace



# DISRUPTING THE VIET CONG

3

## The Third War

The big war is being fought by the military forces of the Republic of Vietnam and its allies.

The smaller war to guard hamlets against infiltrators is being fought by the militia-like Popular Forces, and by such armed civilians as Revolutionary Development workers and the people's own village guards.

A third war, its operations backstopping and sometimes intermingling with the others, is being fought by the Vietnamese police.

It is a police function to flush out and battle the Viet Cong in cities, and where its members can be found in government-held or disputed countryside with or without military assistance. And also:

- To guard public buildings, streets, crossroads, market places against terrorist bombs, grenades and bullets.
- To collect information on the Viet Cong, its organization and plans.
- To identify and arrest Viet Cong adherents hiding among the people.
- To break up the movement from one place to another of the Viet Cong, and their arms and supplies.

These responsibilities aside, the government of the Republic has set out to organize a force capable now and in peacetime of performing all the normal functions of police in a modern society:

- To combat ordinary and extraordinary crime.
- To detect and suppress criminal conspiracies.

- To control traffic in the cities and on roads and waterways.

- In general, to protect the lives and property of citizens, and to maintain law and order.

And also to perform such diverse duties as guarding harbors and airports, serving the courts, controlling passports and immigration.

About 56,000 men, and some women, constituted the Vietnamese National Police Force at mid-1966; the goal is a force of 130,000. This is a reasonable ratio of policemen to population where the national force handles the police job down to the hamlet level.

Working with the police, in Saigon headquarters but mainly in the provinces, were 120 U.S. AID advisers, others from Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines and the United Kingdom.

Public safety—against present subversion and as a permanent function of a society—has an important place in Vietnam's requests for foreign assistance. The U.S.AID program includes not only advisers but also Jeeps, trucks, buses, assault and patrol boats, communications, police equipment and weapons.

The American and other foreign advisers are men who have learned their professions as municipal or state police officers, as members of constabularies, or of such organizations as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, customs and narcotics control services.

With their advice, the Vietnamese government is building a police force designed to be one of the most efficient in Asia.

The force operates three training schools, one of them for supervisory officers and administrators.

It maintains a small Civil Disturbance Control Force for special action against terrorists, to subdue riots and to hold demonstrations within legal bounds.

It is building a new Field Force, highly mobile, armed with automatic weapons—a strike force to fill the gap between regular police and the army.

### **Police Field Force**

A major function of the Police Field Force is to mop up behind the military in areas which have been cleared of organized hostile forces.

The Field Force men break up Viet Cong units moving into and out of newly pacified areas. They patrol trails and waterways, collect intelligence and interrogate hamlet dwellers and passersby.

They provide the muscle in the task of rooting out the secret network of Viet Cong spies, "tax" collectors and assassins which may remain in hiding after the main Viet Cong forces have been smashed or driven away.

By the end of 1967, a total of 15,000 men, most of them Vietnamese military veterans, are to be organized into 89 Field Force companies to do this dangerous work.

### **Communications Network**

The National Police Force helps maintain and operate the radio-teletype, radio-telegraph, radio-telephone systems which link police and security forces, and agencies of the government, over the country down to village and hamlet.

The force patrols rivers and waterways as well as roads, operates from boats as well as trucks, Jeeps, cycles and on foot.

On a May night in Binh Thuan province, east of Saigon, two companies of Viet Cong infiltrated into the hamlet of Phu Long, threatening the inhabitants and their homes. A village leader slipped away, sent for help.

The alarm reached the provincial capital in the early morning over the radio communications system. Two platoons of police headed for the hamlet by truck and Jeep, along with a unit of militia, the provincial police chief, and Roger Robinson, U.S.AID public safety supervisor for the province

(on leave from the Alameda County Sheriff's Department at Oakland, California).

The small force surrounded the village and commenced shooting to hold the Viet Cong in place. During the action, the police chief and Robinson went from position to position, directing operations, talking with the men to keep up their spirits, helping bandage the wounded under fire.

The force kept the Viet Cong pinned down until the military arrived to clean up the guerrillas.

It was a typical police response, the kind that occurs in some part of Vietnam nearly every night. And will occur until the country begins to achieve peace.

### **Blocking Supply Lines**

The National Police Force has responsibility for disrupting the movement of Viet Cong terrorists and recruits and for blocking supply lines used by the enemy in government-controlled and contested territory.

The campaign is against enemies who seek to melt into the population until they are ready to strike—who try to feed, clothe, heal, and, if possible, arm themselves with commodities and equipment bought, stolen or extorted from the South Vietnamese economy.

Police intelligence seeks to locate Viet Cong and their caches and arsenals. Systematically, the police hit the terrorists where they are most vulnerable—along their clandestine communications lines within the country.

The police issue the identity card each Vietnamese must carry. The card is made of safety paper, laminated with a distinctive plastic, embossed and bonded. Along with his name and description, it carries the citizen's picture, and prints of his two forefingers.

From its inception, the Viet Cong recognized the threat of the identity card program, tried to break it up. Terrorists ambushed mobile registry teams in the countryside, threw grenades into registration centers in the cities.

But the police frustrated these efforts. In 1966, nearly 7.5 million men and women—everyone 18 or over in government-controlled Vietnam—was carrying an identity card.

As others reach 18, as names change by marriage, as old identity cards are brought up to



*Combat police examine credentials of a man during family census operations in Phan Thiet, capital of Binh Thuan province. He turned out to be a Viet Cong agent and was arrested.*

date, the police issue new cards at the rate of 15,000 a month. When the citizen obtains his card, he leaves with the police a full set of fingerprint impressions.

These go to the Central Identification Bureau at National Police Headquarters in Saigon; when properly classified, they will constitute a powerful weapon in control of terror and crime.

In a parallel program—assisted in the hamlets by Revolutionary Development teams—the police conduct a family census and identification scheme.

In a registration booklet, they list the legal members of each household, their buildings, tools and other possessions.

A brief family history is included. The police also take a group photograph which is pasted into the booklet.

Two copies of each booklet are made. The police keep one.

The other goes to the family, which usually regards it as a cherished possession. It is the duty of the head of the household to report births, deaths and other changes.

These programs involve a photographic project of major proportions. Cameras, film and other materials are provided by U.S.AID.

The cards and booklets give the police a useful weapon for flushing out Viet Cong.

Regularly, police task forces cordon off neighborhoods in cities, or whole hamlets in the countryside. They inspect identification papers, check every household.

If they find a man or woman without identification, or with a forged card, they hold the person for investigation.

They look for army deserters, draft evaders and wanted criminals as well as Viet Cong.

If a household harbors more people than there should be, they want to know why. If a family member is away, they want to know where and what for.

At approaches and within cities, at hamlets and along roads and waterways, the police set up fixed or mobile check points.

They inspect the credentials of everyone who passes.

They search vehicles and boats for contraband which may be en route to Viet Cong hideouts.

They look for undocumented shipments of food and medicines, search for arms and explosives.

These are wartime measures which are dis-

liked by everybody, especially the Viet Cong. But stern measures are necessary in Vietnam today if the day is to come when they can be happily abandoned.

Vietnam is a land of jungle trails and obscure canals and streams. All routes cannot be plugged on any one day.

Nevertheless, the police make many catches.

In one recent period of six months, they arrested nearly 7,000 suspected Viet Cong, seized more than 2.7 million kilograms of contraband foodstuffs and quantities of fuel and pharmaceuticals.

There is evidence that police measures have significantly reduced the flow of Viet Cong supplies. The communists have begun to seize family food supplies where they used to buy or "tax" surpluses—thus alienating people they are attempting to win over.

They will now attack a village just to seize its supply of medicines.

Identity checks, roadchecks, searches, seizures are necessary measures against an enemy which practices deceit, disguise any infiltration as weapons of war against the Republic.

Along with many wartime measures, they will lose their usefulness in a peaceful Vietnam.

But when the war is over, the people will be secure in their hard-won freedom because the government will have built a force trained, equipped and organized to maintain law and order and the full police function in tomorrow's new society.

## Open Arms

To conquer a nation, according to Chinese communist dogma, you seize control of the countryside and choke off the cities.

You start with terror, escalate to guerrilla attack, and, finally, throw organized armies against the demoralized defenses of your victim.

By 1966, battalions of the Viet Cong, and North Vietnamese troops at regiment and division strength, were seeking to enter the final stage of their proposed conquest of the Republic.

But it appeared there was something amiss with the dogma.

Troops of the Republic of Vietnam, and their American and other allies, were breaking up communist concentrations before battle plans could be carried out.

They were sweeping whole areas, forcing the

*Former Viet Cong at a Chieu Hoi reception center. A government official (standing) answers their questions.*



organized invaders to surrender or flee.

Police pressure on Viet Cong supply routes was beginning to tell. Revolutionary Development and other civic action programs were taking hold in parts of the country.

The peasantry, once a source of strength to the communists, was turning unfriendly even in areas controlled by the Viet Cong.

The tide had been stopped, was beginning to turn.

No one was talking of early victory.

But the combination of efforts, wearing the enemy down with many weapons, was beginning to shake the communist aggressor, defeat his propaganda, push him off balance.

One effort creating particular dissension and distrust in communist ranks is called "Chieu Hoi" (Open Arms)—a program to woo and win defectors from the enemy, bring them into the community of free Vietnamese and help them become useful citizens.

It also is a program to deplete the supply of Viet Cong weapons, gain military and political intelligence, sap the will to fight of enemy soldiers and guerrillas.

Similar efforts helped defeat communist aggression in Malaya and the Philippines. In Vietnam, Chieu Hoi shows increasing results.

By mid-1966, more than 40,000 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers had crossed over—or, as the Vietnamese say, "rallied"—to the side of freedom.

Singly, or in small groups, communists were seeking asylum at the rate of 50 a day. Projected annual defections were running at double the 1965 rate, and 1965 defections were double those of 1964. In the 8-month period ending August, 1966, more than 12,000 voluntarily left the jungles and swamps from the ranks of the Viet Cong.

Chieu Hoi is operated by a sub-ministry within Vietnam's Ministry of Information. It is directed from Saigon, and extends into all 43 provinces.

The U.S. contributes supplies and funds. U.S. AID coordinates the supporting efforts of some 15 American advisers, and others from the Philippines and Australia. Many agencies of Vietnam's government play contributing roles.

The program involves physical installations:

- A national center at Saigon, especially for

rehabilitation of higher-ranking defectors.

- Four regional and 39 provincial centers for the reception and rehabilitation of the rank-and-file.

- Eighteen special hamlets for the resettlement of homeless "ralliers," or those who cannot return to Viet Cong-controlled hamlets or North Vietnam.

Chieu Hoi starts with propaganda.

Within the Republic, the Vietnamese citizenry are told that any member of the Viet Cong is to be welcomed if he wishes to give himself up. Military and police are instructed to take him to the nearest reception center.

To propagate defection within Viet Cong and disputed areas:

- Leaflets, including safe-conduct passes, are dropped from airplanes. On the ground, security forces leave them at hamlets to be read by Viet Cong infiltrators.

- Low-flying airplanes, equipped with powerful loudspeakers, broadcast Chieu Hoi messages over enemy-held areas. Sound trucks do the job by day.

- Government radio stations, provincial newspapers, carry explanations of Chieu Hoi into the hamlets, with instructions how to defect.

- Posters, banners, slogans are nailed on trees, pasted or painted on hamlet walls.

Communist officers and political commissars attempt to prevent exposure of their men to Chieu Hoi inducements. There are severe penalties for Viet Cong caught with leaflets, or found listening to interdicted radio.

But evidence is ample that the word is getting through.

Most effectively, it is spread by word of mouth, or in letters sent into communist-held areas—often by rehabilitated Viet Cong who have volunteered to join government service as Chieu Hoi propagandists.

### The Process of Surrender

When a Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldier turns himself in peaceably, he is given two sets of clothing, a temporary home at the reception center, food, and 200 piasters for his incidental needs.

If he has brought Viet Cong weapons with him,

or significant Viet Cong documents, he is given a reward—800 piasters for a pistol up, to 20,000 for a recoilless rifle.

He is carefully interviewed:

- To determine his degree of sincerity in coming over to the Republic.
- To develop information about Viet Cong, its organization and plans in his area.

Once he has settled in, the defector begins his indoctrination in what the Republic stands for, and his own place among the people.

He is kept busy. Aside from classes, he takes part in self-help projects—maybe a new building for the rehabilitation center, or cultivation of food for himself and his comrades.

After a few days, he may join classes for training in carpentry, tailoring, metal-working, machinery repair.

After 45 days, he is encouraged to start making decisions about his future.

He may elect to move to a city, to enter a trade if he has one.

He may want to return to his home hamlet, if it is secure, to resume his former life as a farmer. If so, the government helps him resettle, sees him through the early months with food and supplies.

If his own hamlet is still unsafe, if he has defected from North Vietnamese forces or is otherwise homeless, he may decide to join a permanent Chieu Hoi hamlet.

Here he will be given land, a house, and six months of subsistence while he begins to establish his new life. Probably, if he has left them behind, he will get word to his wife and children to slip away from the communists to join him.

If he has come actively to hate the Viet Cong—and many defectors have—he may be motivated to volunteer for the Republic's armed forces, or to turn directly against his former communist associates.

Some former Viet Cong volunteer for Chieu Hoi Armed Propaganda units. Carefully screened, then trained and armed with light weapons for self-defense, they are formed into five-man squads, which are organized into 36-man platoons.

Fifty-four platoons thus far have been formed.

The men go into Viet Cong or contested areas at great risk to themselves. They talk to the people, compare their experiences on both sides

of the war, discuss the policies and aims of the Republic of Vietnam.

They talk about Chieu Hoi in the easily comprehended terms of what they themselves have seen and experienced as individuals.

Known as men who have seen both systems, they are able to persuade former friends it is the communist cause which is unjust, it is the Republic which is fighting the people's war and making the Vietnamese revolution.

This, in turn, brings in more defectors.

Armed Propaganda squads regularly accompany troops on military operations. They assist in locating Viet Cong trails, camps, caches. They help interrogate prisoners.

Sometimes they join in active battle. In a recent three months, in Hau Nghia province, northwest of Saigon, an Armed Propaganda platoon killed and captured more Viet Cong, and seized more weapons, than any equivalent force in the province.

In parts of Vietnam, the Viet Cong have begun to avoid populated places entirely. Infiltrators stay away from streets and marketplaces, for fear of being spotted by Armed Propaganda units watching for people they used to know.

### **What Chieu Hoi Says**

Every Vietnamese soldier or policeman, every civil officer, is instructed to give the Chieu Hoi defector humane treatment, sympathetic care.

But hard-core communists in the higher ranks have not begun to defect in appreciable numbers. They appear either to doubt they will qualify for rehabilitation, to continue to believe communism ultimately will win, or to prefer present status to the uncertainties of defection.

The large majority of "ralliers" thus comes from the ranks, especially from Viet Cong conscripts and recruits.

The changing character of defectors is clear indication that attrition is taking a heavy toll within the Viet Cong.

In the first years, defectors were largely South Vietnamese in origin. Many were among the pre-independence communists who moved north at partition, trained there and were infiltrated into the south as guerrillas.

Now the "ralliers" in many cases are North Vietnamese.



*Three Viet Cong used this safe-conduct pass—picked up from a government air leaflet drop—to reach a Chieu Hoi center.*



*North Vietnamese Army Sergeant Vu Tuan Anh brought his Communist Chinese-made AK-10 automatic rifle along when he defected to the government. His reward: 2,000 piasters.*

When they were conscripted for Viet Cong service, or sent south with their military units, they were led to believe that the communists were winning the war.

They were told the trip south would be easy and safe, that an oppressed and poverty-stricken peasantry would welcome them as liberators.

Chieu Hoi propaganda is designed to help their disillusionment.

It contrasts the two Vietnams, compares performance in the Republic with empty promises in the north for land reform and a happy rural proletariat.

It calls attention to the Republic's drive toward democratic institutions, the opportunities it provides for the people. It compares this to the dictatorial, oppressive character of North Vietnamese rule.

It encourages the potential defector to think for himself about the difference between Viet Cong propaganda promises and real communist aims.

It demonstrates that while he was promised victory, he is being harassed and defeated.

It emphasizes the distrust and hatred of the Vietnamese villager for Viet Cong terrorists, "tax" collectors and other communist strangers.

It shows the Viet Cong guerrilla that he has been sold out by leaders actually using him to extend Chinese communist colonialism.

It demonstrates that the Republic of Vietnam represents the true resistance to imperialism, that the Republic is conducting the true social revolution.

It makes clear that the United States and other free nations are assisting the Republic because the legitimate government has asked them to do so, because free peoples are determined to

put an end to communist aggression. It stresses that foreign forces will leave Vietnam when the communists have been driven out of his country.

And it describes the Republic's progress for the people—increasing security, medical services, schools, wells, seeds, fertilizers, democratic political development and hope for the future.

### **Troubles of the Viet Cong**

Military, police, Chieu Hoi and other pressures have reduced Viet Cong morale to a low ebb compared to the heady confidence of a year or two ago.

"Sometimes there is not enough food. We are losing many men," was the lament in one recently-captured Viet Cong diary.

The movement has lost the identification it once enjoyed with the Vietnamese peasantry.

Instead of victory in 1965, as he was promised in the original communist timetable, the Viet Cong finds himself harried through the jungles, driven from his tunnels, constantly under fire from ever-growing forces which can move over the difficult terrain faster than he can move through it.

Chieu Hoi is taking increasing hold. Defectors are expected in growing numbers.

Said one of them, Nguyen Van Nhac, 35, who "rallied" to the Republic in Dinh Tuong province, southwest of Saigon:

"I returned here because I realized that I could not go on being the slave of the Viet Cong all my life, having little food to eat and being used constantly.

"Our lives were considered by the Viet Cong as a soft drink merchant using a lemon. Once the lemon has been squeezed, it is thrown away.

"Thus I came back to the national right cause."

**Massive Free World Support  
Puts No Price Tag on Freedom**



# THE ECONOMY IN WARTIME

4

## Backstopping the Republic

The United States has committed massive military force to help the Republic of Vietnam defend itself from aggressors who seek to make the country a communist colony.

It has committed massive, continuing economic support as well. The free American people put no price tag on freedom.

At the request of Vietnam's government, the U.S. backstops the Republic with supplies and money in almost every phase of the war effort. And with men to advise and help—educators, engineers, technicians, managers, economic experts, farm leaders enlisted from American civilian life.

Elsewhere in the world, the United States has helped war-ravaged nations rebuild their economies, is helping new nations develop.

In Vietnam, non-combatants of the United States Agency for International Development are serving the people and the government in the front lines of war.

In provinces, districts, hamlets, they offer their services to help and advise in government programs, work alongside Vietnamese officials and ordinary citizens in the field as well as in offices.

At mid-1966, they numbered 1,100 men and a few women. Joining them to bring advice and support were 450 civilians from other countries giving humanitarian or economic assistance to the Republic.

Several thousand Vietnamese men and women work for U.S.AID and the other foreign missions. They, too, risk their safety in rural projects, share the special rewards of contributing to success and well-being for their country.

The Americans include young people, some of them college students, who have accepted minimum salaries to live and work among the Vietnamese for the International Voluntary Services—an organization which also has programs in Laos and several countries of the Middle East.

In Vietnam, I.V.S. operates under a contractual arrangement with U.S.AID.

Its volunteers—furthering the organization's goal of creating understanding between the Vietnamese and American peoples—work in agriculture, education and health. Many return to Vietnam as U.S.AID advisers.

Eight foreign non-combatants engaged in helping Vietnam had been ambushed, assassinated or otherwise killed by the Viet Cong at mid-1966. Three had been kidnaped into communist activity, 11 wounded by Viet Cong bullets or grenades.

Peter Hunting, 24, was an International Voluntary Services volunteer. He taught Vietnamese children, helped the people organize schools over a period of three years.

He also tinkered with windmills. He developed an easily-made windmill which could raise water to high-lying paddies. The farmers in the area he served, and their youngsters, looked on him as a friend.

Peter Hunting was ambushed by the Viet Cong. They caught him in the open, shot him through the head. After he died, as if to express their hatred for a man of peace and helpfulness, they fired many bullets into his body.

Such tragedies do not deter assistance to Vietnam.

Dedicated new civilians replace the fallen.

Terror against men, women and children has

not sapped Vietnamese morale; it will not sap American determination to see the Republic through.

American assistance to Vietnam began in 1950. Four successive Presidents, of both political parties, with the backing of the Congress and the American people, have acknowledged and kept the U.S. pledge to Vietnam.

"We are prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence," President John F. Kennedy said.

"We combine unlimited patience with unlimited resources in pursuit of an unwavering purpose," said President Lyndon B. Johnson. "We will not abandon our commitment to South Vietnam."

### Supplies and Raw Material

The greatest single American financial effort to support Vietnam's wartime economy is offered under what the Vietnamese government and U.S. AID call the Commercial Import Program.

Since the program was begun in 1955, US\$1.8 billions worth of commodities have been shipped into Vietnam through this method of U.S. economic assistance.

By providing hard currency, the U.S. makes it possible for Vietnamese business, industry and the people to buy, with their own piasters, essential materials in seven categories: white cement, fertilizer, galvanized iron sheeting, tinplate, jute bags, newsprint, and rice.

The purpose is to stem a wartime inflation which in itself could help defeat the Republic.

It also is to thwart a communist effort to disrupt and bring down Vietnam by economic sabotage.

A standard communist tactic is to deny goods and materials to a country under attack—halt industry, create unemployment, cause shortages, higher prices and hoarding. It was inflation which helped the communists conquer a demoralized China in 1949.

In Vietnam, the Viet Cong seeks to use the same weapon.

The Commercial Import Program cost the U.S. \$150 millions in 1965. In 1966, with military build-up putting new strains on the economy, it cost more than two and a half times as much—US\$398 millions.

The figure will grow as the war intensifies. It will decrease with peace, as Vietnam moves toward stability and a normal budget, and the Americans go home.

Beyond making essential commodities available, the program has a second deflationary effect.

Over and above Vietnam's regular tax revenue, it provides piasters to help the Republic fight its war and simultaneously carry forward its social revolution.

In late October 1966, the Government of Vietnam and U.S.AID agreed to a change in the method of purchasing bulk commodities under the Commercial Import Program. Under this new system, the U.S. General Services Administration, acting as purchasing agent for AID, makes consolidated purchases in large lots of bulk items in the seven categories needed for Vietnam's economy.

AID then transfers the commodities to the Government of Vietnam, which in turn makes them available to Vietnamese importers for sale on the market.

Previously, most transactions in these commodities were handled in small lots directly by Vietnamese importers. They placed orders through normal commercial channels with American or foreign suppliers.

Nearly half of all Commercial Import Program commodities for Vietnam in 1965 were purchased outside the United States from a selected list of developing countries. The new method of central purchasing raises the U.S. share of this procurement, offsetting potential dollar drain from offshore buying. Now, AID makes payment to foreign suppliers in letters of credit which can be used only for purchases in the United States.

One base of a successful economy is a developed system for handling international commerce. The Commercial Import Program preserves, and utilizes, normal channels of Vietnamese trade to bring in bulk goods.

The procedure, using newsprint for the printing industry as an example, goes like this:

- The Vietnamese government and U.S.AID agree that the import of newsprint is essential; they establish specifications, determine how much is needed.

- The U.S. General Services Administration, acting as purchasing agent, finds suppliers of newsprint at advantageous prices. (The supplier usually is American; most Commercial Import dollars are spent in the U.S.; this helps protect the American economy against dollar drain.)

- A purchase is made, and U.S.AID pays in dollars.

- U.S.AID transfers the newsprint to the



OPEN STORAGE AREA AT CAM RANH BAY PORT.

Government of Vietnam.

- At Saigon, the Government of Vietnam makes the newsprint available to local printing firms.

- The printing firm pays for the newsprint in piasters, into a counterpart fund maintained jointly by the Vietnamese and American governments.

The fund of counterpart piasters—which is subject to U.S. audit—is spent, with U.S.AID

concurrence, by the Vietnamese government. It goes to pay troops, to buy military supplies within the country, to finance military construction.

It also supports the expenses of social services to the people, economic development and rural improvement programs.

In effect, the fund replaces tax revenue which Vietnam could expect to collect locally under peacetime conditions. And it helps the Republic control inflation while fighting an expensive war.



*Aboard the US Lieutenant Colonel John Page, 150 refugee families await the end of their nine-hour trip from Tuy Hoa to Cam Ranh Bay. The 832 men, women and children were forced to flee from their homes in Phu Yen province by marauding Viet Cong. They are being resettled at the new industrial center at Cam Ranh Bay.*

## Food for Peace

As late as 1964, the Republic of Vietnam fed itself, and exported rice—to Japan, Indonesia, Africa, even to far-away France.

Tragically, communist aggression has brought a wartime food deficit to this agriculturally rich nation.

Viet Cong terrorists have driven farmers from the paddies, disrupted movement of fertilizers and farm supplies, seized harvests when and where they could. A toll of combat is the dispersal of farm families from the land.

Vietnam still produces rich crops. Paddy for paddy, production is rising as government workers bring improved methods and better seeds to secure areas.

With peace, Vietnam can become one of Asia's prime suppliers of food and other foodstuffs. But while the war continues, there will be a deficit the Republic cannot meet on its own.

To fill the gap, to make sure no Vietnamese goes hungry, the United States supplies heavy shipments of food.

Under U.S.AID, at mid-1966, Vietnam was importing rice, beans, cooking oils, corn, cornmeal, flour, wheat, milk, American tobacco and cotton at the rate of 650,000 metric tons a year.

Through their government, Americans were spending at the rate of U.S.\$138 millions to keep the foodstuffs moving to Vietnam.

About 80 per cent of the food is handled—like commodities under Vietnam's Commercial Import Program—through normal channels of trade.

U.S.AID, working with the Vietnamese government, pays in dollars at the source of supply. The importer, usually a Vietnamese food processing firm or a licensed trader selling to processing firms, pays in piasters.

U.S.AID retains 15 per cent of the piasters to pay its local costs, including wages of its Vietnamese employees. The rest of the money goes into the Republic's treasury to help meet the costs of war and government.

The remaining 20 per cent of U.S.AID food involves no payments.

Supplies go gratis as American support for Vietnamese programs—and those of charitable organizations—to alleviate the miseries of victims of war, care for orphans and old people, help fight poverty.

And for some programs to advance social revolution, or help feed militiamen guarding rural people against Viet Cong violence.

These foodstuffs provide all or part of their sustenance to more than 3.3 million Vietnamese. They are used:

- To provide basic rations at war refugee settlements.

- To help resettling refugees live while they re-establish their lives.

- To help feed widows and orphans of men killed while serving in the Vietnamese armed forces.

- To supplement the rations of men of the Popular Forces and their dependents.

- To hamlet dwellers, as part of their wages while employed on community building projects or public works.

- To feed tribal peoples in special camps established for these minority-group victims of Viet Cong depredation.

- To supply such private American and international organizations as C.A.R.E., Roman Catholic and Protestant social welfare services and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund with food for school lunch programs, orphanages, hospitals.

Other nations have made contributions of food, mainly for refugees. Flour from Canada, wheat from Argentina, milk from Australia, coffee from Brazil, rice, meat and fish from the Federal Republic of Germany, rice from Thailand, Venezuela and the Republic of China are examples.

In the 1960's, the world faces new food problems.

Expanding populations, large-scale agricultural failures such as those of the Soviet Union and Communist China, have made inroads on supplies, used up surpluses, disrupted former patterns of distribution.

Excess foods provided by America's productive farm revolution are now in tight supply.

Most of Vietnam's AID-financed imports continue to come from the United States. But already, U.S.AID has had to turn to Thailand for rice. And, where possible, to improvise, using foodstuffs which are available.

A food twice as nutritious as rice, and not dissimilar in texture, is bulgur wheat. Partly



*Peter Hunting and one of his windmills. The Viet Cong killed this man of peace.*

pre-cooked, then dried and cracked, bulgur wheat resists moisture and disease, handles easily, ships well.

It has been a staple in the Middle East since the days of ancient Egypt.

It is, however, a new and foreign food to the Vietnamese. Getting them to eat it, when rice is unavailable, has sometimes added salesmanship to the duties of Vietnamese-American teams working in the countryside.

William Pye, of Leominster, Massachusetts, a U.S.AID representative in Binh Long province north of Saigon, did this job so well he became known as "Bulgur Bill."

Pye and his Vietnamese government colleagues often cooked and ate bulgur wheat publicly in the hamlets—to disprove what the Viet Cong was telling the villagers, that it was a substance developed by the Americans to poison the people.

Bulgur wheat is cooked in the same manner as rice, and, like rice, can be eaten boiled, or with meat, vegetables, sweetenings. Pye developed recipes, like wheat with coconut, or green beans, or fish.

Almost like an old-fashioned medicine man in rural America, he conducted carnival-like shows in the hamlets, demonstrating the new food to an initially cautious people.

"There isn't any place I have been where people can't be shown," Pye said. "When they learn how to use bulgur wheat, they begin to want it."

### **Moving Mountains**

Rice, wheat, milk, foodstuffs to the extent of 650,000 tons and more per year constitute a lot of cargo. But this is only a small percentage of all the many things Vietnam must import to fight its unwanted war and build its promising society.

Industrial machinery, trucks, baled cotton, fertilizer, cement, steel—finished goods and raw materials in hundreds of categories—move in by sea, in ships which come from halfway around the world and further.

The incoming vessel heads for Vung Tao (which the French called Cap Saint Jacques) on the South China Sea. At Vung Tao, it picks up a pilot and steams upriver to Saigon, a distance of 85 kilometers.

Saigon's river port was built to meet the needs of a sleepy French colony. Imports of a wartime

economy overwhelmed it a year or two ago. By the end of 1965, it had become a clogged confusion of ships, mountains of goods, and men trying to sort out the chaos by hand.

At one time, with a full quota of ships unloading at Saigon, 166 vessels were waiting downriver around Vung Tao, and still others were holding as far away as Bangkok and Manila, waiting to get in line.

Not only commercial goods, but vital military supplies were slowed to the extent that defense was beginning to suffer. Shortages of commodities, tantalizingly nearby but not available on the market, were contributing to a dangerous inflation.

The answer was a crash program which has substantially dented the mountains of cargo, and which is expected to remove final bottlenecks during 1967.

The end result envisaged by Vietnam's National Port Authority is an expanded, modern system of deepwater ocean and river ports to handle international and some internal trade in a prospering peacetime Republic.

The American military, in a massive program, is improving facilities for handling military cargo as well as assisting in the civilian effort in the port. In this endeavor, U.S.AID also is providing significant assistance, providing machinery and equipment, initiating modern techniques.

Saigon will remain the nation's principal port. Its development includes new docks, new warehouses, a mammoth new lighterage area. It includes new tugboats to replace the 40-year-old "teakettles," as sailors call them, which have been trying to do the job.

And not only modern, self-loading lighters, but steel for construction of additional lighters by Saigon shipbuilders.

It includes more than 200 pieces of port machinery such as cranes and forklifts to do work formerly handled by hands and backs.

Pallets used with the forklifts—wooden skids on which goods are stacked—are pre-cut in the highlands, where the timber is, a small industry for the tribal people.

The program is in full swing. There are problems.

Viet Cong terrorists attack workers in remote areas of the sprawling port.

They plant explosives in the river between Saigon and the sea. Minesweepers and patrol

boats protect the channel. Occasionally, however, a ship is damaged, has to be beached and towed away.

A second river route to the ocean is being developed.

Port management has been tightened. New customs procedures speed clearance of consignments.

Saigon—in company with many of the world's seaports—has had its serious problem of pilferage. Major attempts on the part of customs, police, and military have reduced these substantially. These groups are continuing their programs, even expanding them, so there will be an uninterrupted program of moving goods through the port and into the nation's economy.

With port facilities being expanded, cargo already moves more rapidly from ship to dock to consignee.

In early 1965, the port of Saigon was able to handle only 150,000 tons of cargo a month. By mid-1966, the figure was up to 380,000 tons.

And by the end of 1967, when more new facilities come into use, capacity is expected to balance off at perhaps a 650,000 metric tons a month.

### Along the Coast

To help relieve the load on Saigon, to take delivery of their own supplies nearer point of use, American military forces are developing four ports spaced along the Vietnamese coast. In addition, U.S.AID is assisting in expanding and improving civilian facilities in these ports.

Some of the new facilities, such as floating docks, are temporary. But there is permanent construction.

And it is planned with a view toward providing new coastal seaports for peacetime, to supplement the big river port at Saigon.

At Cam Ranh Bay, midway along the coast, Vietnam will have the makings of an outstanding deep-water port, with a major airport adjacent, served by the north-south railway and National Highway 1.

Cam Ranh Bay is the big, attractive natural harbor which briefly sheltered the disaster-bound Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese war. The Japanese used it as a shipping haven during World War II.

After that, the bay became a silent place of sand dunes and deserted beaches, marked by a

tiny fishing village and a Cistercine monastery.

Cam Ranh Bay now buzzes with activity.

Civilian contractors for the armed forces are building docks, warehouses, fuel storage areas, runways for big jet airplanes.

At mid-1966, incoming cargo already was being handled at Cam Ranh Bay at the rate of 112,000 tons a month.

These supplies were for Vietnamese and American forces combatting the communists in central Vietnam. While the war lasts, Cam Ranh Bay will handle military cargo.

But with peace, the bay could become the site for a model industrial city, a commercial center and resort with a major role to play in Vietnam's future.

A plan for such a city is being developed, utilizing, for example, water and sewage systems being installed to handle a sizable population.

Americans are fighting in Vietnam, President Johnson said in September, 1966, "because aggression is there.

"Those troops will go home. Their bases will be turned over for constructive peacetime purposes—as soon as the aggression stops."

### In the Air

Heavy cargoes travel to Vietnam by sea. Airplanes bring perishables, urgent shipments, people from other parts of the world.

And within a country in which mine-the-railway or wreck or seize or "tax" the passing truck, are standard guerrilla tactics, air transport plays much more than a usual role.


Not many airfields in the world carry as much traffic as Saigon's Tan Son Nhut, in the north-eastern outskirts of the capital. At peak hours, there is a landing or takeoff every 22 seconds.

Danang Airport, in the north, serving Vietnam's second largest city, is another major terminal.

Modern airports, complete with beacons, runway lights, traffic control, have been built to serve a dozen smaller cities.

And every populated place of significance has its landing strip, often paved.

Expansion from an almost primitive minimum to today's sophisticated air transport complex has been guided by Vietnam's Directorates of Civil Aviation and Air Bases—with American military



support, and assistance (since 1962) from U.S.AID.

A U.S.AID team, recruited from the Federal Aviation Agency, continues to offer technical assistance and advice. Vietnamese run the show.

Among other things, Vietnamese aviation authorities:

- See to training of commercial pilots.
- Train air controllers (the instructors are Vietnamese who have learned the craft in the United States).
- Operate a countrywide communications network, linking all airports. In the busy Vietnamese sky, an integrated control center at Saigon

identifies every plane in the air, with its speed, altitude and mission.

- Using radar, control the safe entry of international civilian airliners from 60 miles out.
- Operate an aviation meteorological service.

Air Vietnam, the country's commercial airline, serves airports within the country, flies regular schedules to such Asian cities as Singapore and Bangkok. Its equipment ranges from DC-3's and DC-4's to Caravelle jets.

Airways equipment, skilled technicians and managers, and the demanding experience of war will leave peacetime Vietnam with a going, modern air transport industry, capable of meeting any foreseeable needs.

*It is milk, and it is good. Schoolgirls enjoy nourishing drink under a Food for Peace lunch program.*

**From Out of the Hills, People Flee the Viet Cong**



# A TIME FOR COMPASSION

5

## Victims of War

Despite the years of conflict, still in the presence of an unrelenting enemy, the Republic of Vietnam is making progress in social change. Revolutionary programs of development and growth, intertwined necessarily with military and police action, are beginning to take hold.

Some of the new confidence stems from the people's knowledge that the war no longer is being lost.

Slowly, Viet Cong units are being smashed, terrorists being driven out of the hamlets. More and more Viet Cong adherents are surrendering for repatriation.

Successful elections, local and national, look toward democratic institutions of government.

The Vietnamese are making strides in education, public health, youth activities, social welfare, economic growth.

But bright and eager children in the schools, prospering farmers, men and women engaged in community improvement, are only one part of the picture.

Another is orphaned boys and girls, widows, human beings maimed or blinded, families driven from their homes.

At partition in 1954, nearly a million Vietnamese, hating or fearing communism, moved from North to independent South.

By 1957, they had been substantially resettled,

merged into the Republic's population, in one of the most successful migrations of history. Many are among today's leaders in government, business, education, the professions.

But the million was only a beginning. When Viet Cong terror started, a new refugee problem began to develop.

By late 1966—because they prefer life under the legal government, because of Viet Cong "executions" and "taxation," to escape forced labor or conscription into Viet Cong units, or simply to escape the crossfire of war—more than a million and a quarter Vietnamese men, women and children have fled to the relative safety of secure areas.

This is 7 per cent of the population.

The government has established camps to house them.

Initially, the camps were simply clusters of temporary housing. Families would stay there only briefly, it was thought, until their hamlets were made secure and they could return home.

At mid-1966, more than 140,000 refugees had indeed gone back to resume their lives, and others are returning as new areas are pacified. New jobs have been found, or new homes and farms, in the resettlement program for more than 360,000.

Many have crowded into the cities, especially the suburbs, finding what employment or shelter they can. Some of the more successful are sav-

ing money against the time of return to their hamlets.

But families and individuals to the number of a half-million persons still are homeless—more than 150,000 women, more than 250,000 children, more than 100,000 old, incapacitated or beaten men.

The Vietnamese government now maintains semi-permanent camps to house these refugees. The government helps them return home, or resettles them, as fast as conditions permit.

But more refugees seek haven as military operations enable them to escape the Viet Cong. They often come faster than they can be rehabilitated with present resources. Many will remain public charges until peace has been restored.

It is one of the most demanding problems faced by the Republic.

And even here, security is an everyday consideration.

When the people flee a Viet Cong-controlled or a contested area, it deprives communists of labor—men and women to draft for digging underground hideouts. It takes away young people to be conscripted for war.

Indicative of their shortage of manpower, the Viet Cong have begun to draft boys as young as 14 into guerrilla units.

Presumably to discourage others from seeking haven with the government, the Viet Cong retaliates against the refugees themselves. As examples:

- In Vinh Binh province, north of Saigon, the Viet Cong attacked and burned much of the Can Thanh district refugee shelter, killed a man, destroyed the meager possessions of the refugees.

- In Quang Tri province, at the northern tip of the country, Cua Viet refugee camp houses a number of fishing families. The Viet Cong has mortared the camp, wounding some of the occupants, on three separate occasions.

- In Pleiku province, in the central highlands, terrorists have attacked the tribal families in Tra Ba II resettlement center with grenades and rifle fire.

- In Quang Tin province, in the north, Viet Cong invaded An Than camp, killed 11 refugees, wounded 13, kidnaped 11, destroyed 249 houses.

Militia, police or military protection thus must be provided for camps in exposed locations.

When it became apparent that large numbers of refugees were going to be more than temporary residents, that morale was sagging with idleness, the Vietnamese government took steps to remedy conditions.

In February, 1966, within the Prime Minister's office, the government organized a Special Commissariat for Refugees, gave it new funds and dynamic new leadership.

New camps are being built, with schools, dispensaries, wells, some with permanent construction in recognition that housing will be needed for a long time.

Teachers have been assigned to educate the refugee children.

Doctors of government agencies, the army, American and allied military forces, of private organizations, make regular visits. Nurses are being assigned to the dispensaries, or trained from among refugee women.

Health and sanitary conditions are being improved; new wells, or purification units, provide potable water.

Training programs have been started to teach useful, productive cottage industries. The refugees are encouraged to form cooperatives to market what they make—fabrics, hammocks, ceramics, hats, wooden screens, grass mats and many other products.

Sometimes in the camps, more often at nearby technical schools, apt boys and girls, women and men are being trained in carpentry, sewing, automobile mechanics, basic electricity, welding, sheet metal work, clerical trades.

And also in modern farming, for those who will stay with the old vocation.

In Quang Ngai province in the north, for example, 19 hectares of land were leased by the government from private owners near Cao Dai camp.

Taking over the tract, refugee men and women dug wells for irrigation, built stys for 200 pigs, ponds to grow fish for food. They raise rice, watercress, peanuts, beans and other vegetables for themselves and the others in the camp.

Some refugees, although farmers, are strangers in new farm surroundings.

A highlander, for example, may know nothing about rice, may never have seen a water buffalo. If he is to be resettled in the lowlands, he must be trained all over again.



*Dr. Martin Funk, a volunteer from Park Ridge, Illinois, treats children in the out-patient clinic he established in Kontum province.*



*Much-needed medical help comes from many free nations. These doctors and nurses, preparing a Vietnamese lad for surgery, are from the Philippines.*

The refugee problem is a big one. Much remains to be done.

Some camps still lack occupation for adults, schools or even play areas for children. Apathy takes hold when there is nothing to do but sit, or wander aimlessly in the compound.

But the program is moving. And the government of Vietnam is not alone in the work of mercy, the effort to restore usefulness, dignity, security to shattered lives.

Australia, the Republic of China, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand, Venezuela are among countries which have contributed food, money, supplies.

Eighteen international and national organizations of private citizens, supported by contributions of compassionate individuals in the United States and around the world, have sent people to Vietnam to work with the refugees.

A Knights of Malta team consists of 25 West German youths. The British Save the Children Fund and the American Friends Service Committee are developing child care centers. The International Voluntary Services is sending 40 workers in agriculture, education, community development. The Asian Christian Councils, Red Cross, C.A.R.E., Vietnam Christian Services are some of the others.

Working with Vietnam's Commissariat for Refugees, U.S.AID coordinates foreign and private assistance with its own extensive support. Some three dozen American advisors—civilians trained in refugee relief—take part, most of them in the field.

Camps range from primitive emergency shelters to clean, fenced compounds, with neat homes and community buildings.

Some are situated within a few kilometers of hamlets not yet considered safe. Here, pathetically, refugees can look across the fields to the homes they have had to abandon, and their ancestral tombs.

There are more than 300 refugee camps in Vietnam.

They substantially cover the country.

Moving food to them is a sizeable task in itself. Close coordination is required between civilians and the security forces to keep supplies safely in transit.

A typical city camp is situated at Danang, the

northern metropolis. Thousands of refugees have flocked to Danang as to other cities; not all have been able to find jobs, or homes with friends or relatives.

To establish the Danang camp, the Vietnamese authorities found a site on the river, and 4,000 homeless people moved in.

U.S.AID brought them food, bedding, roofing material, and the refugees went to work to build their own houses. They added a dispensary, to which the government assigned three Vietnamese nurses and a midwife.

U.S. Navy doctors began to hold regular sick calls at the camp. Government public health officials and U.S.AID advisors guided well-digging, and provisions for sanitation.

The first refugees barely were settled when they began to clamor for a school. They built one themselves with U.S.AID materials, found teachers from within their own ranks.

On their own initiative, they built stalls and began to operate a market. Some grew vegetables to be sold there.

Others enrolled in vocational training classes set up for them at Danang Polytechnic School.

Ultimately the refugees developed their own Camp Council. When recognized by the municipal government, it took over responsibility for law and order within the camp, and public services.

Some of the refugees have found themselves absorbed into Danang's population, have left the camp for jobs and homes in the city. Some have returned to their hamlets; others wait to go home.

But, from the contested countryside, new refugees continue to arrive. And like the others, the camp at Danang remains full.

### **Orphans and the Old**

War or peacetime, civilized societies take care of their own. Vietnam's Ministry of Social Welfare:

- Operates or supports 28 homes for old people, is building 10 more.
- Supports 73 orphanages, which care for more than 10,000 children.
- Builds, supports or works with Vietnamese and foreign organizations in operation of day nurseries for the children of working mothers, community and social centers in the countryside, dormitories for students away from home, school

lunch counters, centers to rehabilitate prostitutes and beggars.

More than 3 million Vietnamese regularly take their meals at low-cost restaurants established by the government. A school lunch program serves 200,000 children.

U.S.AID supports most of the Ministry's projects, helps coordinate those of the many religious and charitable agencies working in Vietnam; also the assistance contributed by other governments.

The Ministry of Social Welfare has a substantial budget. But the funds are not nearly enough to meet the entire need in a developing country at war.

The Ministry, therefore, attacks priority situations. In them, it has made strides in easing the burdens of the unfortunate, contributing to the growth of those who can become useful citizens.

As problems are controlled, as conditions of peace begin to return, Vietnam will have the organization, and a nucleus of trained people, to take on the whole spectrum of social welfare.

### **The Sick, the Halt, the Wounded**

The Republic of Vietnam is a country which ought to have at least 5,000 doctors.

It has 1,000.

The ratio of physicians to population is not as discouraging as it might seem, however. A few years ago there were only 200 doctors to treat 15 million people.

More doctors are being trained.

Medical schools at Saigon and at Hue, in the north, are graduating physicians at the rate of 150 a year.

Other Vietnamese are training in medicine in the United States, Australia, Japan, the Netherlands and elsewhere abroad, usually at the expense of the host government.

Meanwhile, physicians and surgeons, medical technicians and nurses from a dozen free nations help fill the gap with care for sick and wounded in city hospitals and in the remotest provinces.

One nation, the Federal Republic of Germany, has sent a fully equipped hospital ship, the *Helgoland*.

Doctors, nurses and medical corpsmen of the armed forces—Vietnamese, Americans and their allies—do their share among civilians. They spend some or most of their time in refugee

camp, villages, populated places of all descriptions.

The military doctors find themselves not only treating disease and mending wounds but, often, delivering babies.

Vietnamese with special ailments often are sent abroad for treatment, at the expense of one or another government or humanitarian organization. *Terre des Hommes* sends children, 30 at a time, to be treated in Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands for polio and heart defects.

U.S.AID coordinates outside medical help for Vietnam's government, including much of the military help. It furnishes supplies and equipment to hospitals, clinics and dispensaries over the full range of modern medical needs.

In a typical month, U.S.AID distributes throughout Vietnam medicines, bandages, anaesthetics sufficient for more than a half-million treatments.

U.S.AID also works with the American Medical Association, in a program which brings volunteer doctors to Vietnam for tours of duty in hospitals and the field. And with the American Dental Association, in a program to improve dental health.

All told, besides treating illnesses, doctors working with the support of U.S.AID perform more than 2,000 major and minor operations on Vietnamese patients each month.

The hospital at Kontum, a province in the highlands, is one of 63 in Vietnam's cities and provincial capitals. It serves an area with 74,000 people, and it has 66 beds.

When Dr. Martin Funk took leave from his practice at Park Ridge, Illinois to serve a volunteer tour at Kontum, he found in the province one Vietnamese physician, and a six-man surgical team from the Philippines.

There were no facilities at the hospital to treat out-patients. Dr. Funk decided the first need was a clinic.

"I started with nothing," he recalled later. "No technicians, no nurses, no medications, no equipment."

Dr. Funk pre-empted a room, painted it himself, installed fluorescent lights and running water. A U.S. Army doctor, stationed nearby, offered to help. They enlisted their staff, including interpreters, from among their early patients.

Dr. Funk worked at the clinic in the mornings, at the hospital in the afternoons, held sick-call in

outlying hamlets on week-ends.

In less than two months, he was treating 120 patients a day. They ranged from babies to sick farmers, from civilian amputees to wounded and captured Viet Cong.

### **Warding Off Disease**

Tropical Vietnam is a land of cholera, typhoid, malaria, dysentery, plague, polio, tuberculosis and some leprosy.

Part of the country's drive toward a modern society thus is a sizeable program of public health.

Not only of sewage systems and water purification for the cities, not only wells and safe latrines in the hamlets. Also government programs providing:

- Hospital construction, expansion, renovation, including temporary facilities where needed, and institutions to treat specific diseases.

- Immunization and vaccination on a mass scale.

- Distribution in the thousands of pamphlets and leaflets telling the people, in easy language, how to avoid getting sick.

- A laboratory service for diagnosis of disease and detection of incipient epidemics.

- Anti-malaria campaigns, including spraying against mosquitoes (more than 1.6 million homes have been sprayed since 1965).

- Public health centers in 234 district capitals and more than 4,000 villages.

- Training for public health workers, nurses and technicians.

The government is supported by U.S.AID in these projects, sometimes in a coordinating, sometimes in a direct role. In the first half of 1966, working alongside Vietnamese government technicians, U.S.AID doctors and nurses immunized nearly 50,000 children and adults in cholera-stricken areas, 70,000 persons against plague, 10,000 against typhoid.

U.S.AID has financed a basic science building for the government's Saigon Medical School. With the World Rehabilitation Service, it has installed a center for the manufacture of artificial limbs, to help return to society the amputees of a continuing war, many of them civilian casualties of Viet Cong terrorism.

Even prevention of disease meets attempted sabotage from the aggressors attacking Vietnam.

In 1965, Vietnamese-American teams were immunizing Saigon orphans and other children

against plague and smallpox. Radio Hanoi leapt into the fray with a charge that the nurses and medics really were using their syringes to draw blood from the children for use by Vietnam's armed forces.

Viet Cong propagandists in the Saigon area spread the same tale by word of mouth.

A government information program among the people rapidly exposed the truth. And the resulting publicity paid dividends.

It brought in thousands of people wishing to be immunized themselves.

The U.S.AID Director, on a tour of the stricken area, visited a village in which only the roofs of houses were out of water. Families were living in sampans tied to the roofs. When he asked why they had not been evacuated, a village elder told him:

"Oh, we will stay here. Our government is coming to help us."

### **The Nine Dragons**

Each year, the five great branches and four principal tributaries of the Mekong River rise in summer and autumn, bringing life and food to Vietnam.

In a normal year, this means a gentle and orderly flooding of the thousands of rice paddies which stretch, wet and green, to the horizon.

But in a bad year, when the "Cuu Long" (Nine Dragons), as the Vietnamese term the Mekong system, swells and spills over its banks, the usually life-giving waters can bring death, misery, destruction, economic distress.

The Mekong breached its banks in 1961, 1964 and again in 1966. But the 1966 flood story had a new ending. In 1966, the Republic, with powerful assistance from U.S.AID, met the challenge of rising waters with swift, co-ordinated action to relieve suffering, to prevent food shortages and disease, to replant crops in the immediate wake of the receding waters.

In August 1966, as reports of mounting water levels were received, Republic ministries in Saigon and operating divisions of U.S.AID began stockpiling emergency supplies at key points throughout the threatened western delta.

Helicopters and transport aircraft airlifted rice, bulgur wheat, cooking oil, tents, boats, blankets, medical supplies to strategic locations to await further distribution.

In the ministries in Saigon, officials eyed future and current project plans, rearranged prior-

ities, recalculated national income and budget figures. The government braced itself to meet the immediate threat as well as its long-range consequences.

Farmers looked at their doomed crops and waited. They knew the cycle of destruction.

First, the young rice shoots, waiting for transplantation, would be overtopped by the quietly rising waters. Not in a swirling torrent, but gently, insidiously, as in a rising lake.

Then, their homes—built on rises across the table-flat lowlands—would begin to wash away. Livestock would be without food. Humans—perched on tables, or atop roofs, or floating in sampans tied to the central roof-beam—would be threatened.

Finally, the long dry season would come, the waiting for nature's next cycle, the food shortages, the damages to be repaired, the absence of livestock and cash-crop provender. And the empty family purse.

The waters rose relentlessly—to within a few centimeters of the 1961 deluge in many places.

In each of four provinces the story was much the same. Moc Hoa, capital of Kien Phong province in the Plain of Reeds, was entirely inundated; a boat was seen sailing down the town airstrip. Kien Tuong—a province of poor soils and marshy ground which is a rice deficit area even in normal years—had its entire crop washed away. Chau Doc and An Giang provinces felt the wrath of the Nine Dragons.

More than 70,000 evacuees from the lowest-lying areas flowed into refugee centers on the slopes on the few isolated mountains which dot the vast river plain. Assistance in the form of food, clothing, shelter was rendered to more than 209,000.

*Victims of delta floods obtain relief supplies from Ministry of Social Welfare worker. More than 125,000 received assistance from the Republic during September-October 1966 disaster.*

Spreading waters posed another threat—the possibility of epidemic disease. Vietnamese mobile medical teams immunized thousands against typhoid and cholera. U.S. Military Provincial Health Assistance Teams traveled to refugee centers and hamlets, using high-speed hypospray injectors to administer more than 200,000 doses of vaccine. A Korean health team visited villages boats to immunize and treat isolated inhabitants in Kien Tuong province.

U.S.AID, U.S. military, and Catholic Relief Services supplied more than 1,225 tons of relief goods in a three-week period. Actual distribution was carried out by the Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare, which contributed more than 500 additional tons of supplies from its own sources.

Vietnamese voluntary groups helped, too. The Vietnam Red Cross and Junior Chamber of Commerce organized campaigns to collect money and goods for flood victims. The Saigon City Council organized relief activities.

Civil servants in Kien Hoa, a province close to the flooded region, donated US\$1,500 from their meager salaries to aid two stricken villages. And in the flooded villages themselves, merchants donated lumber—a scarce and costly commodity in the delta—to build refugee shelters.

Help came from other nations. Venezuela donated 150 tons of rice. From the Republic of China came 6.6 tons of precious seeds for replanting.

Vietnam's Ministry of Agriculture purchased 573 tons of seed for the same operation. U.S.-AID provided funds to buy 15 tons of soybean seed, 510 tons of mung bean seed, 73 tons of corn seed, 38 million sweet potato cuttings.

Seed from China and the Vietnamese government was distributed to 110,000 farmers in late October. They were for fast-growing, high-income cash crops such as water spinach and yard-long beans. Each of the 6 kilogram packets of seeds were enough for one-third of a hectare—and a cash yield of some 25,000 piasters, actually more than many delta farmers usually realize from their rice crops.

The new plantings, though, only offset in part the huge total losses. With the best of effort and planning, 1966 was a bad year for the Nine Dragons. But in years to come, the aftermath of the 1966 flood may actually bring an increase in productivity to the delta. If it does, it will be due to the plans and programs developed during the very heat of the crisis.



When Today's Children Grow Up  
There Will Be an Educated Population

