

Dear Mr. Roush:

I trust you will be able to use the enclosed material. Both the "after action statement" and "graduation ceremony booklet" are copies of my originals and are yours to keep.

I was the assistant operations officer for the 281st AHC during the period of action stated in the after action statement. The statement does not make mention that WO1 Robin Hicks carried WO1 Donald McCoig's body from the time of being shot down in the LZ through the action of the night and the next day until being extracted from the LZ. I know the U.S. personnel on the ground were in continuous contact with the enemy and receiving small arms and mortar fire during the entire time on the ground.

Please feel free to call me if I can be of further assistance in your efforts for the VHPA.

Best Regards,


Ken Kunke

STATEMENT

The following is an account of combat aviation activities of elements of the 281st Assault Helicopter Company, Marine Air Group 36 and other specified aviation elements while in support of Project Delta in Thua Thien Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 29 and 30 March 1968. The actions described herein are characterized by repeated, conspicuous acts of gallantry by the airmen involved and were witnessed by the undersigned, the Air Mission Commander.

At 0930 hours, 29 March, Project Delta had scheduled a combat assault composed of two companies of an ARVN Airborne Ranger Battalion, one reconnaissance team and one bomb damage assessment platoon into a landing zone west of Hu Phu Bai. Participants in the lift were a Command and Control helicopter (Intruder 26), a medical recovery aircraft (Intruder 227), five UH-IH lift helicopters (Intruders 113, 127, 129, 135, and 228), and a light armed helicopter section (Wolfpack 35 and 33), of the 281st Assault Helicopter Company; four CH-46 lift helicopters (Space 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, and 1-8), and one light gun helicopter section (Scarface 81 and 82) of the Marine Air Group 36. The plan was to lift the major portion of the ground element to the landing zone in two lifts keeping the gun section on station for both lifts. The plan for entry into the landing zone was two flights of two each UH-IH's, a single UH-IH, and single CH-46 flights with 45 second separation between each flight. The Command and Control, Intruder 227 and the Wolfpack gunships were to proceed the troop lift by five minutes in order to "prep" and mark the landing zone. The Scarface section accompanied the lead flight of the first lift.

Preparatory fires on and around the landing zone consisted of a B-52 bombardment approximately three hours before the lift off and fighter bomber strikes immediately prior to landing zone time.

The first lift into the landing zone went as scheduled and without incident except that Space 1-5 and 1-7 reported light weapons fire from southeast of the landing zone during take off and the Wolfpack section reported small arms fire from southwest of the landing zone on their breaks.

While waiting for the second lift to arrive at the release point the Scarface section reported they were low on ammunition and didn't believe they would be able to remain on station for the entire lift. The lead flight of the second lift reported approximately five minutes out of the landing zone and Wolfpack 33 reported being hit and broke out of the gunship pattern. Wolfpack 35 covered his break and escorted him away from the area. After gaining altitude Wolfpack 33 reported everything appeared to be OK, that he would continue to provide suppressive fires for the lift, but that he was also very low on ammunition. The gun pattern was reestablished and the second lift began.

Intruder 113 and 127, the lead flight, entered and exited the landing zone without incident. Intruder 228 and 135 were the second flight and on final approach 228 was observed making an abort. 135 continued into the landing zone and landed. 228 after aborting reported that he had taken fire from directly below the aircraft on short final, that he had injured personnel on board and requested clearance to evacuate the casualties. The clearance was granted. Intruder 135 continued to sit in the landing zone and I observed the aircraft shutting down. Intruder 129 had arrived at the release point so I directed him

to the east of the approach path utilized by 228 and 135 and advised him to recover the crew of 135. By this time the gun sections reported all ammo expended except door guns. Intruder 129 reported exiting the landing zone with an wounded pilot but that the crewchief of 135 was not on board. Since 129 had entered and exited the landing zone without receiving fire I directed the Space flight to utilize the same approach and departure route. Space 1-5 entered and exited reporting light fire, Space 1-6 was hit on final, aborted, reported injuries on board and was cleared to return to Phu Bai. Space 1-7 was directed to alter his approach, reported receiving fire on short final but landed in the landing zone. Space 1-8 was close behind 1-7, landed, advised 1-7 that he was losing fuel from the tail pylon at which time the 1-7 crew abandoned the aircraft and boarded Space 1-8. Space 1-8 exited the landing zone and reported that the Space 1-7 crew as well as the Intruder crew chief were on board.

At this time Wolfpack 33 reported taking hits but would attempt to fly the helicopter to the Forward Operating Base. Wolfpack 35 reported that he had expended all ammunition and would accompany 33 to that location. Since the second lift had been completed all remaining aircraft were directed to return to the Forward Operating Base to assess damages, regroup, rearm and plan the third lift to coincide with recovering the two downed helicopters.

Approval for utilization of recovery helicopters delayed the station time for the third lift until 1530 hours. When we were advised that the recovery helicopters were enroute and would rendezvous in the area of the landing zone the third lift was launched.

The organization and plan for this lift was as follows:

a. The Command and Control Helicopter (Intruder 26) and the medical recovery helicopter (Intruder 227) would carry, in addition to the regular crew and passengers, sufficient M4A2 smoke pots to blanket the western side of the landing zone and the planned approach/departure route. A heavy gun helicopter section (Wolfpack 35, Scarface 81 and 82) would accompany this flight to the landing zone, establish a South - North orbit and suppress on the south, east and north sides of the landing zone.

b. Following this flight was to be Intruder 228 carrying the USMC maintenance and recovery team and Intruder 127 carrying the Intruder maintenance and recovery crew.

c. To follow the insertion of the maintenance/recovery crews would be the third lift consisting of 2 UH-1H lift ships (Intruders 113 and 129) and two single aircraft CH-46 flights (Space 1-5 and 1-6).

d. Following the third troop lift an extraction of the downed helicopters would be attempted, then the maintenance/recovery crews would be extracted.

e. Preparatory fires around the landing zone had been in progress in the form of TAC Air Fighter Bomber sorties since the second lift had been completed.

Upon arriving at the landing zone the heavy gun section established the desired orbit which necessitated making their outbound breaks directly over the landing zone. On the first pass over the landing zone Wolfpack 35 reported heavy automatic weapons fire coming from the west side of the landing zone. Six smoke pots had

been deposited along the western side of the landing zone and the desired "blanket" was beginning to form.

I cleared Intruder 228 and 127 into the landing zone with instructions to off load their maintenance teams load wounded members of the ground element aboard and exit to the south. After sitting on the landing zone for some time 228 reported that no wounded were being loaded but 127 reported that he had several wounded on board. I advised both aircraft to depart immediately. 228 lifted, started north, then broke right and exited the landing zone on a southerly heading. 127 continued straight out to the north - northeast.

Immediately after observing these two aircraft depart the landing zone the ground commander reported they were receiving B-40 rocket fire from the north - northwest at a range of 175 - 250 meters. This information was monitored by Wolfpack 35 and he immediately adjusted the gun orbit to engage this position.

Realizing the landing zone was not sufficiently secured to warrant a recovery attempt of the two downed helicopters I cleared Intruder 113 and 129 into the landing zone with instructions to retrieve the two maintenance and recovery teams. Intruder 113 responded immediately advising he was turning final. At this time I observed a single UH-1H on short final and believed it to be 113. This helicopter landed and shut down. I queried 113 about his problems and he responded by stating that he and 129 were still inbound on final approach. I established visual contact with 113 and flight, then realized that another helicopter had been downed. I cleared 113 into the landing zone with instructions to bring the downed crew out along with whatever recovery personnel he could carry and directed Intruder 129 to break out and return to the south.

Intruder 113 landed on the landing zone in close proximity to the downed helicopter, reported that it was 228 and stated he was waiting for the crews to board before departing the landing zone. Realizing that 113 could not possibly retrieve all aviation personnel then on the landing zone I cleared 129 inbound to extract all remaining crewmembers and maintenance personnel. Intruder 113 reported departing the landing zone with all crewmembers of 228 plus the Intruder maintenance team. He further reported heavy fire upon exiting the landing zone but had not been hit.

Intruder 129 landed in the landing zone, waited for some time, reported that he had no USMC recovery team in sight but that a wounded man had been loaded. I cleared him to depart the landing zone and proceed with the medivac. Upon departure 129 reported receiving fire from west of the landing zone.

Wolfpack 35 had altered the gunship pattern in order to place maximum suppression on the western side of the landing zone so I cleared Space 1-5 inbound with instructions to retrieve the USMC maintenance team. I further advised him to maintain continual suppression on the high ground west of the landing zone with his .50 caliber door guns. 1-5 landed and reported the maintenance team was boarding. At this time I observed Space 1-6 approaching very fast on short final. I directed 1-5 to depart immediately, that 1-6 was almost on top of him, and to give me a count of the number of recovery personnel he had picked up. I observed Space 1-5 departing to the northeast, then my attention was diverted to the landing zone where I observed Space 1-6 land extremely hard, bounce back into the air and

come to rest 90 degrees opposite his original heading. The helicopter remained upright but was resting on its belly.

I had never received a reply from my query to Space 1-5 and had not been able to reestablish visual contact with this helicopter after observing him approximately 100 meters northeast of the landing zone. I made another transmission to Space 1-5, received no answer and realized that he had probably gone down somewhere in the jungle growth northeast of the landing zone.

The smoke screen had begun to dissipate on the western side of the landing zone by this time and the Delta Forward Air Controller was preparing a flight of fighter bombers to engage targets west of the landing zone. Feeling that an even chance existed to recover the crew of Space 1-6 I directed Intruder 227, the medical recovery helicopter, into the landing zone to recover this crew. Intruder 227 landed in the landing zone, reported three crew members on board and exited to the north. I observed 227 on take off, received a call saying "We're hit, hit bad!" I immediately queried "Who's hit and where are you?" The reply was "This is 227, McCoig is on the controls, I can't get him off and Don't know whether I can control it or not!" I had been maintaining visual contact with 227, observed him in an extremely nose high right turn approximately 300 meters north of the landing zone. I advised 227 to have a crewmember get the Aircraft Commander off the controls, to continue his turn and try to make it back to the landing zone. 227 reported that he would try to make it but that the engine oil pressure had dropped to zero. I observed the helicopter return to the landing zone, land and shut down. The gunsection reported completely expended of ammunition so I directed them to return to the Forward Operating Base and to conduct a search for Space 1-5 on the return route.

I remained on station for approximately 10 minutes longer with the Command and Control helicopter while awaiting a report on the status of the 227 and Space 1-6 crewmembers. While on station Intruders 113 and 129 rejoined me in the event further recovery attempts were to be made. While on station a visual search was conducted for Space 1-5 in the area immediately north - northeast of the landing zone but to no avail. Utilization of the TAC air had by this time relieved some pressure on the ground elements.

Just prior to departing the area to regroup and organize another extraction attempt of the downed crews and ground force casualties I received word that Warrant Officer McCoig had been killed, the other Intruder crewmembers were OK and that one Space 1-6 crewmember was seriously wounded.

We returned to the Hu Phu Bai Forward Operation Base under deteriorating weather conditions. Ceiling and visibility in the Phu Bai area was 500 feet and 1 mile by the time the Command and Control landed.

The Intruders had lost two more UH-1H helicopters with one crew remaining on the ground. MAG-36 was known to have lost one additional CH-46 with the crew still on the landing zone. Space 1-5 was listed as missing.

A recovery flight was organized to attempt extraction of the wounded and dead, however before it could be launched the Delta FAC reported that low ceilings had sealed off the area. He stated that it would be impossible to maintain visual flight into the area. The decision was rendered to delay further recovery attempts until the weather improved.

Reports received during the night revealed that the enemy maintained continual pressure on the ground elements; engaged in frequent probing attacks around their perimeter and gradually reduced their combat effectiveness as reflected by the mounting casualty figures. Also it was reported that elements of MAG-36 had managed to break through the weather barrier and locate the survivors of Space 1-5. However in the process a Scarface gunship had gone down. Additionally a Space 1-6 crewmember died during the night and another crewman was injured.

The morning of 30 March arrived with low ceilings and low visibility prevailing. Extraction of the ground force with its mounting casualties could not be attempted until the weather broke. Throughout the morning and early afternoon the enemy force maintained continual pressure on the ground elements. An NVA prisoner was captured by the ground force during the day and his interrogation revealed that an NVA Battalion was moving toward the friendly position from the northeast. It appeared as though total annihilation of the ground forces was a possibility to be considered.

Marine Air Group 36 had advised that they would conduct the SAR attempt for the Space 1-5 and Scarface crew and passengers.

At approximately mid-afternoon the weather broke sufficiently for TAC air to strike around the perimeter of the friendly elements. In addition artillery pieces had been moved into a position where they could provide supporting fire for the ground force. Under cover of the TAC air and artillery fire the unit was able to start movement toward the south to another landing zone from which an extraction could be attempted.

All available aviation support was requested to extract the unit, however by 1700 that afternoon all that had arrived on station were 3 Dust OFF helicopters from the 571st Medical Co (Air Amb), and two MAG-36 CH-46 helicopters. We were assured that a Scarface gun section would be available to team up with the remaining Wolfpack gunship so with this meager augmentation an extraction plan was formulated. The plan was as follows:

a. The entire western ridge line, north and south of the landing zone, was to be blanketed by a TAC air delivered smoke screen. In addition fighter bomber sorties would be on "air cap" to suppress enemy resistance in that area.

b. Artillery fire from FSB Bastogne would be utilized to suppress enemy resistance on the N-NE side of the landing zone. Helicopter gunships would provide suppression on the southern and eastern sectors.

c. The lift helicopters were to make a contour approach from south to north into the landing zone utilizing vectors from the Command and Control helicopter when necessary. They were to exit the landing zone along the same flight path.

It was decided that complete extraction of all elements would be attempted with resources then available. Priority of extraction would be casualties, aircrew-members then remaining ground forces. If heavy resistance was encountered during the initial phase an ammunition and medical resupply would be effected and the extraction attempt would be cancelled.

The flight was organized as follows: Intruder 126 (C&C) accompanied by Intruder 129, Dust Off 505, 62, 60, Space 1-5 & 1-6. All lift ships except the Dust Off would off load at FSB Bastogne and return to the landing zone for additional lifts. The Dust Off flight would take their casualties to Phu Bai and return to Bastogne to evacuate casualties from that location. Intruder 113 was prepared for the resupply mission.

At lift off of the C&C flight the aircraft enumerated above were all that was available to attempt this extremely difficult and hazardous operation. Even the Scarface gun section had not arrived and only Wolfpack 38 was available to accompany the lead flight to the area.

With this limited support the lift began at 1820 hours: An hour and three minutes later the landing zone was cleared. The intervening period has become a blur in my memory, although if there is such a condition, it is a "magnificent blur." During the course of the extraction elements from four different units arrived on station to assist. The Scarface gun section arrived on station approximately five minutes after the beginning of the lift and Wolfpack 38 worked them right into a suppressive fire pattern. As the Space flight lifted off the FOB Space 1-5 reported that he now had Space 1-7, 1-8 with him also. Additionally Space 1-1 and 1-2 reported in to assist during the initial phase of the first lift. Added lift support arrived on station during the second phase of the lift, in the form of two UH-1H helicopters, Typhoon 1 and 2. Gun helicopter support, Black Widow 1 and 2, 2 AH-1G Cobras, arrived to assume the suppressive fire role when Wolfpack 38 and the Scarface section had expended. An "Eagle Claw" gun section also arrived while the "Black Widows" were on station but were held over FSB Bastogne until a time could be found to work them into the area. Intruders 113 and 127 and Wolfpack 38 assisted me in conducting air to air briefings of the crews and escorting them into the area of activity.

The following is the best account I have been able to reconstruct concerning the events at the landing zone during the hectic hour plus of this extraction. During the initial phase of the lift heavy fire was observed along the approach/ departure route and from the eastern sector of the landing zone. This fire was quickly suppressed when the Scarface section arrived to team up with Wolfpack 38 which was coincidental with Dust Off 62 and 60 beginning their approaches. Sporadic fire was received throughout the extraction, however quick target identification and rapid engagement exercised by the aforementioned gun section and the "Black Widows" effectively nullified enemy resistance. The smoke blanket effectively contained enemy elements along the western sector and no fire was observed from the N-NE where artillery fire was being placed. To the best of my recollection all lift ships made two trips into the landing zone with the exception of the Dust Off's, the last Space aircraft (Space 1-2), and the Typhoon flight which arrived during the latter stages of the extraction. In addition all lift ships carried an ACL far in excess of that which was recommended.

The last three lifts of the extraction, performed by the Typhoon element and Space 1-1, was made more hazardous due to the smoke screen moving over the landing zone and the approach/departure route. As the Typhoon flight exited the landing zone the Black Widow section reported ammo expended and were released from the area. The Eagle Claw guns who had been holding over Bastogne had reported extremely low on fuel therefore could not be utilized in the suppressive role.

At this time the ground element reported on 21 personnel left on the landing zone. The next lift ship in line Space 1-1 with full knowledge that gunship support was no longer available, reported he would attempt to extract all remaining personnel if I could vector him through the smoke to the landing zone. This was successfully accomplished and the extraction from this area was completed.

A further note of irony was added as we cleared the area to return to the Forward Operating Base. Before clearing the Typhoon flight into the landing zone I had directed Intruder 113 to off-load his supplies at Bastogne and proceed to the landing zone for a load of troops. 113 was not able to arrive on station prior to Space 1-1 extracting the remaining element so I reversed 113 and instructed him to begin ferrying troops from Bastogne to the Forward Operating Base. While awaiting a load at Bastogne, 113 reported the enemy had launched a mortar and ground attack against the fire support base. This, coupled with darkness, necessitated discontinuance of further flights into Bastogne that day and approximately 60 of the personnel extracted stood another enemy assault at FSB Bastogne. These troops were returned to the Forward Operating Base the following day.

As heretofore stated this action of 29 and 30 March is characterized by numerous acts of forthright heroism by the aircrewmembers involved. I was not an eyewitness to ground force actions however reports indicate that the same degree of professionalism, courage, and complete disregard for personal safety and survival was exhibited again and again by ground force personnel during their operations.

As air mission commander of the activities related above I cannot possibly express with mere words my appreciation and admiration for the displays of forthright bravery, and complete devotion to successful mission accomplishment exhibited by the aircrewmens involved in this action. Surely their performance ranks high in the annals of combat aviation operations. Statistically it was an extremely costly operation in terms of equipment and personnel lost. Only time will tell whether the cost was justified.

I strongly feel that every crewmember involved in this action performed far above and beyond the call of duty. I request that each commander review the detailed actions of his crewmembers and submit recommendations for the highest possible award deemed justified. I personally feel that every crewman deserves an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross or equivalent recognition.

Although it is difficult to distinguish and separate the degrees of heroism displayed by personnel involved in this action I feel four aviators deserve consideration for award of the Distinguished Service Cross or its equivalency. These being first of all Warrant Officer Donald B. McCoig, as Aircraft Commander of Intruder 227, when he, at complete disregard for his own safety, piloted his aircraft back into a landing zone in which he had previously been downed in an attempt to recover fellow aircrew members. With full knowledge that at least four additional helicopters had met a similar fate, he landed, loaded the crew on board and received fatal wounds while exiting the landing zone.

Secondly, Warrant Officer Robin K. Hicks who regained control of the mortally stricken helicopter after Warrant Officer McCoig had been hit and returned it to the landing zone through a withering hail of gunfire. This action allowed the crewmen on board to link up with friendly elements.

Third, Captain Montague Aircraft Commander of Space 1-5, who remained on the hot landing zone long enough to load a maintenance and recovery crew aboard and in order to preclude imminent collision with the trailing helicopter flew through heavy automatic weapons fire in an unsuccessful attempt to save his aircraft, crew, and passengers.

Lastly, Major Sayes Aircraft Commander of Space T-1 who, under conditions of almost zero visibility, without suppressive fire support piloted his helicopter into and out of the extraction landing zone recovering the remaining 21 members of the beleaguered force. By successfully extracting these personnel, a number which approximated twice the allowable cargo load for his helicopter, he precluded the necessity of subjecting further aircraft to such hazardous conditions.

Attached as inclosures to this eyewitness statement/after action report is listing of participating crewmembers.



BOBBY SINCLAIR
Major, Infantry
Executive Officer

INCLOSURE # 1 - 281st Assault Helicopter Company

Crewmembers

1. 29 March 1968 - 1st and 2d Lifts

a. Intruder 26

AC - Maj Bobby Sinclair

P - WO1 Thomas Miller

CE - SP5 James Leveille

G - SP4 Lonnie Hannah

b. Intruder 227

AC - WO1 Robin Hicks

P - WO1 Wendell Allen

CE - SP5 Kenneth Embrey

G - SP4 Lionel Wesley

c. Intruder 113

AC - 1LT John Wehr

P - WO1 Kenneth Smith

CE - SP5 Warren Hays

G - SP4 Ronald DeLeon

d. Intruder 127

AC - WO1 Carl Reitz

P - WO1 John Galkiewicz

CE - SP5 Roy Bewley

G - SP4 James Gillette

e. Intruder 129

AC - CW2 Calvin McDougal

P - 1LT Lyle Belta

CE - SP5 Johnny Hughes

G - SP4 Michael VanDyke

f. Intruder 135

AC - WO1 Donald McCraig

P - WO1 Norman Kaufman

CE - SP4 Lovie Robb

G - SP4 Richard Schleher

g. Intruder 228

AC - WO1 Edgar Young

P - WO1 Frederick Shanhart

CE - SP4 Larry Loudin

G - SP4 Gary Naumczik

h. Wolfpack 35

AC - WO1 Lance Ham

P - WO1 John Fayer

CE - SP5 Corbin Humphries

G - SP4 Donald Creed

i. Wolfpack 33

AC - WO1 Joseph Anderson

P - WO1 Charles O'Daniel

CE - SP5 Daniel Digenova

G - SP4 Donald Creed

2. 29 March 1968 - 3rd Lift

a. Intruder 26

AC - Maj Bobby Sinclair

P - WO1 Thomas Miller

CE - SP5 James Leveille

G - SP4 Lonnie Hannah

b. Intruder 227

AC - WO1 Donald McCraig

P - WO1 Robin Hicks

CE - SP5 Kenneth Embrey

G - SP4 Lionel Wesley

c. Intruder 228

AC - WO1 Edgar Young

P - WO1 Frederick Sharhart

CE - SP4 Larry Loudin

G - SP4 Gary Naumczik

d. Intruder 127

AC - WO1 Carl Reitz

P - WO1 John Galkiewicz

CE - SP5 Roy Bewley

G - SP4 James Gillette

e. Intruder 113

AC - 1LT John Wehr

P - WO1 Kenneth Smith

CE - SP5 Warren Hays

G - SP4 Ronald DeLeon

f. Intruder 129

AC - CW2 Calvin McDougal

P - 1LT Lyle Beltsch

CE - SP5 Johnny Hughes

G - SP4 Michael VanDyke

g. Wolfpack 35

AC - WO1 Lance Ham

P - WO1 John Fayer

CE - SP5 Corbin Humphries

G - SP4 Donald Creed

3. 30 March 1968 - Extraction

a. Intruder 26

AC - Maj Bobby Sinclair

P - Maj Donald Ruskauff

CE - SP5 James Leveille

G - SP4 Lonnie Hannah

b. Intruder 127 (Recovery)

AC - WO1 Carl Reitz

P - WO1 John Galkiewicz

CE - SP5 Roy Bewley

G - SP4 James Gillette

c. Intruder 123

AC - 1LT John Wehr

P - WO1 Kenneth Smith

CE - SP5 Warren Hays

G - SP4 Ronald DeLeon

d. Intruder 129

AC - WO1 Thomas Miller

P - CW2 Calvin McDougal

CE - SP5 Johnny Hughes

G - SP4 Michael VanDyke

e. Wolfpack 38

AC - CW2 Kenneth Donald

P - Cpt Daniel Wall

CE - SP5 Corbin Humphries

G - SP4 Donald Creed

INCLOSURE # 2 - Marine Air Group 36

Flight Crews

1. 29 March 1968

a. 1st and 2nd Lifts

Space 1-5

Cpt Montague

LLT Archer

Cpl Bimat

Cpl Sands

Space 1-6

Cpt Romero

LLT Barstein

Cpl Anderlowis

L/Cpl Galo

Space 1-7

Cpt Morgan

Cpt Weaver

Cpl Donnelly

L/Cpl Barr

Space 1-8

Cpt Jones

2LT Turok

Cpl McMillon

5

Cpl Brank

Scarface 8-1

Cpt McDonald

Cpt Coon

Sgt Boshear

Cpl West

Scarface 8-2

Cpt Hoffman

Cpt Mitchell

Cpl Geiger

Sgt Jackson

b. 3rd Lift

Space 1-5

Cpt Montague

1LT Archer

Cpl Bimat

Cpl Sands

Space 1-6

Cpt Romero

1LT Barstein

Cpl Burson

L/Cpl Barr

Scarface 8-1

Cpt McDonald

Cpt Coon

Sgt Boshear

Cpl West

Scarface 8-2

Cpt Hoffman

Cpt Mitchell

Cpl Geiger

Sgt Jackson

2. 30 March 1968

Space 1-5

Maj Prather

2LT Turek

Cpl Van Houten

Cpl Palmer

Space 1-6

1LT Gennaro

1LT Ford

Cpl Myers

Cpl Huntley

Space 1-7

Cpt Pomkamp

1LT Bucceri

Cpl Brown

Cpl Davis

Space 1-8

Cpt Anderson

1LT McKinney

Cpl Deimel

Cpl Jarvis

Space 1-1

Maj Sayes

2LT Fischer

Cpl Swabb

SSG Muckley

Space 1-2

1LT Merrill

Cpt Smith

Cpl Wallach

SGT Walker

Scarface 8-1

1LT Kenyon

Cpt Pinson

Cpl Schiefbauer

Sgt S. Djak

Scarface 8-2

Cpt Mummery

Cpt Owens

Cpl Gustafson

L/Cpl Gicking

INCLOSURE # 3 - Other Crews Participating in 30 March 1968 Extraction

1. Dust-Off Aircraft

a. Dust-Off 505 - 571st Medical Co (Air Amb)

AC - Cpt Mark S. Carr

P - 1LT Robert Peneguy

CE - SP4 Michael V. Peters

Medic - SP5 Roger Yost

b. Dust-Off 62 - 498th Medical Co (Air Amb)

AC - WO1 D. Griffith

P - 1LT G. Miller

CE - SP4 D. Aronson

Medic - SP5 L. Hammonds

c. Dust-Off 60 - 498th Medical Co (Air Amb)

AC - CWO Samuel L. DeLoach

P - 1LT Aubrey Lange

CE - SP5 Stanley E. Baker

Medic - SP5 James O. Woods