



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
MILITARY REGION 2 CAVALRY TROOP 1  
APO San Francisco, 96318

19 May 1972

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL REPORT, LESSONS LEARNED, MILITARY REGION 2 CAVALRY  
TROOP 1, 1 NOVEMBER 1971 to 30 APRIL 1972.

TO: Commanding Officer  
17th Combat Aviation Group  
APO San Francisco, 96318

(C)

1. OPERATIONS: Significant Activities

A. General: During the period covered by this report Troop B transitioned from relatively low intensity operations conducted during a phased down conflict to full scale combat operations intended to deter/defeat the enemy initiated offensive in the northwestern portion of Military Region 2. Additionally the Troop underwent redesignation and reorganization while experiencing considerable personnel turbulence due to the abrupt change in situation. Although the basic mission of intelligence gathering remains the same emphasis has shifted from the use of ARVN assets to develop the intelligence information and enemy contacts to the use of organic weapons and air power to destroy the enemy forces. This shift in objectives provides a portion of the military force required by an aggressive defense; however, it detracts from the ability of air cavalry to provide wide area coverage and assessment of the overall battle plans and objectives of the enemy force since considerable time is spent developing individual targets.

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B. NARRATIVE: 1 November to 15 November 71

The beginning of November found Troop B supporting Pleiku Province west of the City. The Aero Scouts found a large bunker complex and came under fire. The Aero Rifle Platoon (ARP) was inserted and made contact on the LZ, airstrikes and gunships were used to suppress, one OH6A was destroyed, 2 US injured and 6 ARP's wounded. Enemy casualties were 5 KIA, 8 KBA, numerous documents captured which identifying the unit as a reinforced company, medical supplies, and miscellaneous equipment including several weapons were captured. On 4 November the troop found and destroyed 19 structures and 48 bunkers, and captured a quantity of medical and military(NVA) supplies. ON 6 November north of Kontum the troop destroyed 104 structures, killed 3 enemy and detained 10 suspects. The Air Cavalry supported the 47th regiment on 13 November capturing enough medical supplies to support a company size unit for 6 months to one year. In addition repair parts for weapons, 4500 lbs of rice, 500 lbs of corn and meal and other military equipment was captured.

15 November to 30 November 71

The Troops supported Kontum Province in the Plei Trap Valley area making contact with a company size element resulting in one enemy KBA, 2 M 16's, 1 carbine, medical supplies (USSR), and miscellaneous military equipment and food captured. Supporting Kontum Province on 18 November the Scouts discovered a battalion size base camp the reaction company was inserted and made contact. The enemy suffered 9 KIA, 9 KBA and two POW's were taken. Equipment captured included 3 AK 47's, medical hand books, transfusion kits and ammunition, 50 structures and 25 bunkers were destroyed. Two Pallbearers and two attached M model gunships

received hits. Working in the Dak To area on the 27th of November one OH6A Scalphunter was shot down. The crew was rescued and contact with the estimated battalion sized force maintained resulting in 9 KBA's. The following day the troop again worked the Plei Trap Valley area reestablishing contact with the enemy force, 2 aero scouts were shot down and four US were slightly wounded. One enemy KBA was confirmed and 20 KBA estimated. The lack of OH6A helicopters and crews forced the troop to conduct Phantom missions utilizing one UH1H for low level reconnaissance for the next few days.

#### 1 December to 15 December 71

The troop made very little contact during the first few days of December but on the 4th contact was made with an estimated 20 to 30 man enemy force. The ARP's were inserted and final results were ~~made with~~ an estimated 4 enemy KIA, 1 B40 rocket launcher, 2 AK 47 rifles, documents radio equipment and miscellaneous military supplies captured with negative friendly casualties. On the 7th, working in the Kontum area again one enemy was KBA and a quantity of military equipment and documents captured. On the 12th the troop supported the Ranger Command west of Pleiku. Contact was made with a estimated company resulting in the loss of 2 OH6A's to enemy fire and 2 US WIA. One AK47 and 1 French weapon were captured but no further enemy losses were confirmed.

#### 15 December to 31 December 71

On 22 December Working for Ranger Command the scouts found a large base camp complex, several groups of enemy were engaged resulting in the destructing of 15 structures, 8 bunkers, one enemy was KBA and 4 secondary explosions were observed. Supporting the Ranger Command southwest of Poley Kleng on the 23 of December, the scouts located structures and bunkers throughout the area. Contact with the enemy resulted in one friendly WIA. Later in the day while supporting a multi-battalion lift into the Plei Trap Valley. The ground Commander reported an enemy artillery position overlooking the landing zone, the scouts marked for TAC AIR and 3 artillery pieces were destroyed and an estimated 15 enemy KBA. On 28 December the Cavalry acted as a screening force for the 47th ARVN Regiment attempting to BDA a B52 strike west of Duc Co Ranger Camp despite air support the ground force was in danger of being encircled so they were extracted and the aero scouts ~~attempted to~~ completed the BDA 2 OH6A's were shot down and 2 US were wounded.

#### 1 January to 15 January 72

On 5 January contact was made south of Pleiku resulting in the destruction of 5 structures, 4 storage bins and one enemy KBA. On 6 January while trying to investigate a bunker complex the scouts took fire and the gunships engaged. No enemy bodies were found; however, a 60 MM motor tube was destroyed. On 15 January working west of Pleiku the aero scouts came under heavy fire and one OH6A was shot down. The crew was rescued and the reaction force inserted. The reaction force made contact moving off the landing zone, indications were that a large enemy force had hurriedly left the area leaving behind a rear guard, 2 weapons were captured.

#### 16 January to 31 January 72

The beginning of this period was conspicuous due to the lack of sustained enemy contact. On the 21st of January while investigating a bunker complex, the

Scalphpunters were fired on. The ARP's were inserted making heavy contact on the LZ so the reaction force was inserted. An OH6A was hit by small arms then by a B40, he attempted to land, <sup>but crashed</sup> the observer was killed and the pilot wounded. With the gunships supporting the ground element managed to break into the complex after which contact was broken and the complex destroyed. On the 26th of January while supporting Kontum Sector the scouts spotted a bunker complex. The ARP's were inserted making no contact; however, the scouts located a basic training area with mockups of tanks and other training devices while attempting to move to the area the ground element made contact with an NVA sapper company, one of the scout observers was wounded. Air strikes were employed but negative results could be determined. The contact was broken and the ARP's extracted.1

#### 1 February to 15 February 72

The beginning of February found the troop working the area around Kontum. on the 4th a large complex was discovered. Air strikes were employed, resulting in the destruction of 30 bunkers, 10 structures, 1 aid station, and 1 mess hall. On the 6th the troop worked for the 22nd FWD around Dak To, the teams destroyed 5 structures, 6 bunkers, 1 bridge, and killed one NVA. The troop worked in support of the 22nd Forward for the rest of the period. Utilizing air strikes on the 10th of February the teams destroyed 15 structures, 30 bunkers and 3 sampans. The scouts found 80 NVA troops in the open resulting in 41 confirmed KBA's, 15 estimated wounded and 3 POW's captured. One OH6A took 2 rounds in the rotor blades.

#### 15 February to 29 February 72

Working in the Plei Trap Valley for the 22nd FWD on 17 February. The scouts located a 2 1/2 ton flat bed truck, air strikes were called in resulting in the destruction of the truck, 4 structures, 7 bunkers and 60 to 70 two hundred pound bags of rice or wheat grain. Working for the 81st ABN BDE the troop employed air strikes and artillery on an enemy force in contact with friendlies. One UH1H received 4 hits while evacating wounded. On 20 February an AH1G had an engine failure and crashed on QL14. Shortly thereafter a UH1H helicopter helping to evacuate equipment from the crash site also crashed. The troop worked for Kontum Sector for the remainder of the period destroying 19 structures, and 34 bunkers but made little contact.

#### 1 March to 15 March 72

The first few days of this period the troop continued to support Kontum Sector and on the 2nd found 45 packs, helmets and a number of bunkers, airstrikes were employed and 5 bunkers were destroyed. The bunkers were so large the airstrikes had little effect. The troop captured (16) B41 rockets (6) 82 MM motor rounds, 250 lbs of explosives, (5) 20 pound mines and a section of bangalore torpedoes while accounting for 2 enemy KBA's. On a perimeter VR mission one of the scouts activated a mechanical claymore causing extensive damage to the A/C. The troop preformed reconnaissance for the 42nd Regiment on 7 March and found a dispersed bunker complex. Further investigation revealed about 10 picnic tables with food and 30 bunkers. The scouts took fire and the gunships engaged accounting for 3 KBA's in green uniforms in addition approximately 10 racksacks, 5 pith helmets and 2 bamboo mock ups of tanks were found. An airstrike was requested but not recieved. On 9 March the scouts took fire from NVA troops southwest of Fire Base 5. Construction tools including picks and a cart to haul rocks along with 5

people were spotted the ARP's refused to get off the helicopter, when they finally did the people had gotten away and all that was found was 5 pith helmets and a shovel. The Cavalry<sup>was</sup> used to preform LRRP extractions on the 10th of March for the 53rd Regiment. On 12 March the Cavalry preformed security screening missions for visiting VIPs. On the 15 the the troop worked for Kontum Sector northeast of Kontum. The scouts found a cleared area uder the trees with bunkers, structures, and clothing<sup>scattered</sup> throughout. The blues were inserted and destroyed the complex resulting in 3 enemy killed, 1 captured, 2 AK 47's, one pistol, a radio, tape recorder, documents and miscellaneous equipment, shortly thereafter another complex was discovered and the blues inserted resulting in 3 more enemy killed and 1 NVA captured, together with 1 AK47, 1 pistol and a bundle of entrenching tools.

16 March to 31 March 72

On the 17th the teams supporting Kentum Sector to the ~~East~~ of Than Chai found a bunker complex with large bunkers, numerous trails and tables which had eating utensils on them. In addition two towers constructed of bamboo were located ~~along with~~ 5 people wearing packs were found. The Undertakers engaged resulting in 5 KBA's. On 19 March working west of Kontum the Scalp-hunters took fire and the Undertakers engaged while attempting a BDA the scout took fire and the observer was wounded. An airstrike was employed resulting in 1 KBA and 1 AK47 captured. Working east of Vo Dinh on the 20th the scouts spotted two personnel in fighting positions, the gunships engaged the enemy killing 2, the ground troops were inserted, made contact and 3 more NVA<sup>was</sup> killed and an NVA doctor captured. The C & C had an engine failure pulling the crew when the troops were inserted to rig the aircraft for recovery one of the Pallbearer's had a loss of oil pressure and made a forced landing both aircraft ~~was~~ recovered by sling. Three AK47's, 1 pistol, maps, documents and plans were captured along with the wounded prisoners. Still supporting Kontum Sector the next day the scouts found fresh digging the gunships engaged and got 1 KBA. Northeast of Dak To the teams located a bunker complex and requested an airstrike resulting in 10 KBA's and 5 bunkers destroyed. On 22 March north of Kontum the troop inserted a company with a POW <sup>to</sup> attempt to capture a radio station. Numerous documents, 2M16 rifles, 1 MI carbine, clothing, food, a quantity of spare radio parts, radio repair manels and 600 rounds of M16 ammunition were captured. The ARPS also reported two KBA's from an early B52 strike. No contact was made untill the extraction when two Undertaker Cobra's took hits. In an area northeast of Vo Dinh the scouts found a bunker complex extending throughout an entire Valley. Gunships engaged but the intensity of fire precluded a BDA, a Ranger BN was inserted utilizing the Pallbearers, VNAF slicks and gunships and the Undertakers. Numerous structures, telephone wires and trails throughout the area indicated a large relatively permanent staging area, one of the Pallbearers was hit, aVNAF pilot wounded during the insertion and a VNAF gunship shot down. On the 25th the troop working for Pleiku Sector west of the City found 26 people who were detained, mostly women and children. The scouts located a bunker complex in the same general area and an airstrike was put in resulting in 18 KBA's, 3 people in green fatigues with weapons were spotted going northwest and 2 more going southwest taking about 15 montagnards with them. On 28 March working for the 53rd ARVN regiment the troop extracted 20 ARVN KIA and WIA from what had been given to the troop as a free fire area. The following day the troop supported the same unit in the general area of Kontum pass. The Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted and soon



came under motor and rifle fire a company minus reaction force was inserted to reinforce however; they would not move toward the objective after all efforts to move them failed the commander decided to extract them. The troop returned to Kontum to support Kontum Sector by conducting a reconnaissance of a road to the southwest of Kontum. Scheduled B52 strikes were diverted from the area. The team started to work to the west of the planned area employing the gunships and airstrikes in a column of troops using the road then returned to the original target. Scalphunter Lead was shot down in a middle of a bunker complex, his observer was extracted but he could not be found, a ground force attempted to reach his location was ambushed losing one US KIA and 17 ARVN KIA/WIA. The second element in the reaction force fought their way to the element ambushed and the two units returned to the LZ so that casualties could be extracted. A Ranger BN was inserted to the nearest LZ; however it was too late to move up the valley. On 31 March the troop acted as a screening force ahead of the advancing Ranger BN and confirmed that Blues body was in the contact site they then were diverted to BDA a B52 strike they found 10 structures and 15 bunkers destroyed and 8 bodies. Returning to the site of the crash which the Ranger BN had reached another Scalphunter was shot down and the observer seriously wounded.

1 April to 15 April 72

On 2 April working for Kontum Sector the scouts located a bunker complex. One gunship had hydraulic failure while another encountered electrical failure so no BDA <sup>or airstrikes put on the complex</sup> was performed. On the 3rd three gunships were hit by friendly motor fire. Working for Kontum Sector on the 4th <sup>produced little results</sup> ~~was not successful~~ due to maintenance problems, one LOH parked at Kontum City was struck by rocket fragments from a 122 MM motor. The Pallbearers inserted the Aero Rifle Platoon near a village just east of Kontum which had been assaulted and destroyed the previous night by NVA troops. Working north of Dak To for the 22nd ~~Forward~~ the scouts found 4 people by a camp fire and took fire. In the same general area the teams found numerous bunker complexes and took fire resulting in one hit. On the 11th the teams supported the 22nd Forward again finding numerous large bunker complexes ranging from old to under construction and a road being built in the area. Scouts were fired upon several times; however airstrikes could not be put in. Teams moved south of Dak To to find positions firing upon Dak To and Tanh Chan, located many people and put in airstrikes; however, still received fire. A motor and 3 personnel were discovered just southwest of Dak To; however airstrikes could not be put in on the position because clearance could not be obtained to shoot. The following day the teams continued working the same general area and continued to find evidence of heavy activity including wheeled vehicles. On the 14th of April working east of Kontum airfield the teams supported a friendly element which came in contact with an estimated enemy platoon the gunships engaged and airstrikes were employed on the retreating enemy force which resulted in 8 enemy KRA's and 5 weapons captured. The scouts resupplied the friendly force with ammunition. On April 15 the troop responded to a TAC E, a covey aircraft had 37 WIA ARVNs and one US WIA. Two Undertakers were dispatched to shoot for the people while a mission release was obtained both guns were hit, one had a hydraulic failure the other complete electrical failure the crews landed safely at

Kontum, returned to base camp to get new aircraft and returned to the mission. One UH1H received fire in the pick up zone and the crew chief was killed. A 3rd gunship was hit during the final extraction.

16 April to 30 April 72

Working for Kontum Sector the teams found a bunker complex from which a estimated enemy company was engaging a friendly column on the road the friendlies would not move off the road so airstrikes were employed along with the gunships resulting in 15 KBA's. On the 18th the teams spotted sampans moving south on the river west of Kontum, back packs, baskets and what appeared to be motor tubes were in the boats. The teams were not allowed to shoot, instead a ground unit further down the river was assigned to intercept the sampans. The troop supported the BOK forces attempting to open the Anh Khe Pass with gunships on the 20th and the 21st. While supporting Kontum Sector on 22 April the scouts found what appeared to be a tank, covey was called to put in airstrikes after the scouts took fire. In the same area a little further north of Kontum the team spotted a 2 1/2 ton vehicle, airstrikes were not obtained, the gunships engaged but BDA was prevented by ground fire and when finally conducted the vehicles could not be found. While engaging the vehicle one of the gunships were forced to land due to oil pressure lost, the crew was extracted and the aircraft recovered. Enroute to Pleiku a Scalphunter was hit by 50 caliber automatic weapons fire, crashed and was destroyed the wing scout picked up the crew despite heavy fire being placed on the area. The Air Cavalry supported Kontum Sector on 23 April but was diverted to 22nd Forward to locate and destroy motor and artillery positions firing on Dak To and Than Chan. The Pallbearers extracted wounded from Than Chan taking one hit. A Scalphunter extracted Typhoon 3 from Dak To when a sister unit's UH1H was motored off the runway. One of the Undertakers took a round which caused extensive damage. On 24 April Dak To and Than Chan fell and the troop was diverted to extract the American's attempting to evade the enemy. Enroute to Dak To one Cobra took 50 fire and was forced to land, his wing ship and a Pallbearer were detached to cover him and extract the crew which they did despite heavy fire. The remaining Cobra's joined by the wing after the extraction attempted to engage the tanks despite direct hits on the tanks the Cobra's were ineffective. Scalphunters lead extracted Rogues Gallery whose OH58 had been pulled to the ground by ARVN's when he attempted to extract a US advisor, the AH1G's supported 2 friendly forces in contact, Undertaker 25 was hit by 50 caliber and 37 MM anti-aircraft fire and forced to land. The ship recieved fire attempting to land and the Pallbearer who extracted the crew took fire departing. An attempt to recover the aircraft resulted in the loss of the Pallbearer aircraft that inserted the rigging crew he took heavy fire departing and his transmission siezed resulting in a hard landing. The rigging crew was extracted; however, the AH1G's were not extracted because a CH47 was not available and weather closed in. Meanwhile one of the Undertakers covering a scout who extracted an A1E pilot who had been shot down was hit in the tail rotor. On the 25th the teams escorted refugees on QL14 to Kontum. On the 26th the troop preformed rescue missions searching for and extracting American's. Numerous mirrors, smokes and other signaling devices together with lack of communications made this extremely difficult. Farewell Poppa was extracted from the area just northwest of Dak To strip. VNAF took fire and aborted the attempt the Pall-

bearer

bearers extracted despite heavy fire and mortars on the landing zone. Ships received anti-aircraft 37MM and 50 caliber fire from the vicinity of Dak To. One Pallbearer was hit having his plexi-glass window knocked out. The following day the troop participated in the extraction of 300 more ARVN's located to the northeast of Than Chan the Cavalry teams screened and the UH1H's aided in the extraction one slick was hit on the LZ by mortar rounds and destroyed, the crew evaded with the aid of the Scalphunters who extracted them after they had moved to a site which allowed the LOH's to hover low enough. One of the scouts received one round of 76.2 which guaged his tail rotor. The Scalphunters spotted two trucks driving down the road with 105's attached and an airstrike was utilized to knock them out. The Cavalry was employed to support friendly units in contact throughout the area. On the 30th of April a Ford the enemy was using was located west of Kontum with fresh tank tracks. A BDA of a B52 strike showed numerous bodies and people still alive in the area, scouts took fire and the gunships engaged, approximately 40 people, airstrikes were put in but darkness prohibited further damage assessment.



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A. STATISTICAL SUMMARY:

1. Units Supported

- a. Kontum Province
- b. Kontum Sector
- c. Fleiku Province
- d. Fleiku Sector
- e. 22nd Forward
- f. 2nd Airborne Brigade

- g. Ranger Group
- h. Ranger Command
- i. 45th Regiment
- j. 42nd Regiment
- k. 53rd Regiment
- l. 23rd Division

2. Flight Statistics

a. OH6A	#3133 HRS
b. AH1G	2785 HRS
c. UH1H	2739 HRS
d. TOTAL	8675 HRS
e. SORTIES	11,488
f. PASSENGERS	9743

3. Aircraft

	<u>OH6A</u>		<u>UH1H</u>		<u>AH1G</u>	
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asg</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asg</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asg</u>
	9	10	8	6	10	9
MR	7		5		3	
DS	0		0		5	
OM	1		1		1	
NORS	<u>2</u>		<u>0</u>		<u>0</u>	
TOTAL	10		6		9	

4. Aircraft Losses

Hit	51
Downed	21
Not Recovered	13

5. Personnel Losses

WIA	17
KIA	3
MIA	1

6. Expenditures

762 MM	412,700
20 MM	40,367
40 MM	31,341
2.75 FFAR	10,080

B. AUTHORIZED/ASSIGNED STRENGTH:

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASG</u>
Commissioned Officers	16	25
Warrent Officers	34	23
Enlisted Men	208	225

These strength authorization and assignment figures are taken from the

27 APRIL 1972 morning reports. As of 28 APRIL this unit no longer maintains a morning report. Personnel are presently assigned to HHC, 17 CAG and attached to Military Region 2 Cavalry Troop 1.

C. PERSONNEL:

1. Key Personnel Changes:

a. CO

1. MAJ Cassity, Robert C.
2. MAJ Gibbs, James M.

DATE DEPARTED

~~1 April 1972~~

Present

b. XO

1. CPT Hartley, Charles R.
2. CPT Sanders, Alfred A.
3. CPT Slaughter, Samuel R.

1 Dec 1971

7 Feb 1972

Present

c. OPNS

1. CPT Nichols, Robert L.
2. CPT Hess, Robert W.
3. CPT Dell, Raymond C.

1 Dec 1971

29 Mar 1972

Present

d. WPNS PLT CMD

1. CPT Wagner, Floyd E.
2. CPT Delgado, Richard
3. CPT Bristow, Robert

26 Dec 1971

11 Apr 1972

Present

e. SCOUT PLT CMD

1. CPT Trees, Paul M.
2. CPT Norton, William W.
3. CPT Matthews, Johnny
4. CPT Finch, Melvin W.
5. CPT Stein, James E.

24 Dec 1971

21 Jan 1972

26 Jan 1972

30 Mar 1972

Present

f. AERO RIFLE PLT CMD

1. CPT Hess, Robert W.
2. CPT Massaglia, Victor D.

1 Dec 1971

Present

g. MAINT PLT CMD

1. 1LT Heilmann, Richard W.
2. CPT Gimbert, Richard

Feb 1972

Present

D. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Personnel:

a. OBSERVATION: The personnel curtailments and change over during this period created many difficulties which adversely affected the units capability to perform its mission.

b. EVACUATION: The uncertain policies and frequent changes made planning extremely difficult. Personnel were assigned to this unit one day only to be reassigned somewhere else a few days later. After the initial turbulence subsided it was difficult to find qualified personnel to fill key positions. During February and March 1972 curtailments were given to virtually every experienced aircraft mechanic and vehicle mechanic in the unit without providing replacements. By the middle of March only 2 AH1G mechanics out of 26 authorized and 16 of 28 ~~authorized~~ authorized mechanics remained. The unit was excess in non-aviation personnel so an OJT program was started utilizing these people. After approximately a month all excess non-aviator personnel were given curtailments negating the effort spent on training and leaving the unit in the same condition before the OJT period began.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Prior to implementation of curtailments and MOS and TO & E evaluation should be made. This evaluation should be the guideline for curtailments and personnel required to perform the units mission should be released only when a replacement is available.

2. INTELLIGENCE:

a. OBSERVATION: This unit does not receive adequate, timely intelligence.

b. EVALUATION: Timely intelligence is vital to successful Air Cavalry operations. Liaison with battalion and group S-2 Staffs indicated that the problem originates above those echelons.

c. RECOMMENDATION: ~~Recommendation~~ Tactical intelligence requires a more effective dissemination system. This type of intelligence (aircrafts fire incidents, red haze, MTI etc.) should be provided simultaneously to all levels rather than through each intermediate headquarters.

3. Operations:

a. OBSERVATION: The troop is being used to respond to individual intelligence reports rather than in planned search operations.

b. EVALUATION: The use of limited Air Cavalry assets in this manner increases dead blade time utilized to move from one point target to another and creates large gaps in the overall intelligence picture.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Since the majority of the reports are located

within a very small area they should be programmed into normal area search patterns and the search patterns adjusted to respond to the reports rather than attempting to move the teams to specific points particularly since in many cases the Air Cavalry is not able to positively verify or refute the validity of information. This will allow the development of search patterns insuring complete coverage of the area.

a. OBSERVATION: The Air Cavalry is being utilized to pinpoint the location of targets for immediate destruction.

EVALUATION: The current tactical situation and the lack of an aggressive defense makes the use of cavalry as a combat force imperative. The response lag of supporting fires results in considerable waste of troop assets in attempting to fix the target position and undue risk to scouts who are required to remark the targets because of the accuracy required to destroy them (ie. armored vehicles, large bunkers).

RECOMMENDATION: During the current situation enough targets exist to justify a pair of slow movers with relatively long station time being kept on station in a high orbit to be utilized as targets are uncovered. An alternative solution would be to place an artillery battery upon the troop and register them prior to engaging in search operations.

#### 4. Organization:

a. OBSERVATION: The troop was redesignated during this period from TROOP B 7th SQUADRON 17th AIR CAVALRY TO Military Region 2 Cavalry Troop 1.

EVALUATION: The redesignation was made when the 7th SQD 17th CAV was stood down and the colors returned to the United States. The troop personnel and operations remained the same; however, a good deal of time and manpower was expended in related efforts such as converting the property book.

RECOMMENDATION: The redesignation was a paper work drill and placed an unnecessary burden on the unit, these type changes should be eliminated.

b. OBSERVATION: The troop assumed responsibility for the personnel and equipment utilized for base defense.

EVALUATION: The unit was not prepared for the major problems encountered by this change. The equipment was in a very poor state of repair for instance 80% of the radios were inoperative, none of the radars were functioning, and the vehicles were almost to the point of retrograde. The personnel had just been turned over in the personnel shuffle and lacked experience. An officer from the unit was ~~supported~~<sup>appointed</sup> to organize and train the platoon sized unit, a radar repairman from another base was located and brought to this location to repair the radar sets, many hours of maintenance time was expended on the vehicles and the signal equipment was checked and turned in for repairs.

RECOMMENDATION: The function of the defense platoon indicates that it should be assigned to the unit responsible for base defense in this case the 17th CAG. A platoon leader should be provided by TO&E. A repairman should be provided for the signal equipment.

5. Training:

a. OBSERVATION: This unit has not received school trained observers.

EVALUATION: The use of untrained observers results in a loss of intelligence information for a period of approximately 25 hours. It also exposes the scout to personnel and weapons which would probably be avoided with a trained observer.

~~Keep~~ RECOMMENDATION: That school trained observers be provided this

6. Logistic:

a. OBSERVATION: DASSA (604th) has been experiencing increased delay of vital parts resulting in decreased aircraft availability.

EVALUATION: DASSA (604th) has not been able to keep up with reordering their ASL resulting in an excessive amount of requisitions being forwarded to AMMC. In the best of circumstances a 3 to 4 day delay is encountered when this

RECOMMENDATION: Despite the phase down in strength levels units remaining are still expected to support full time combat operations therefor renewed emphasis should be placed to modernize (ie. computerize all supporting DASSA's) to expedite the flow of supply parts.

RAYMOND C. DELL  
CPT, SC  
Operations Officer



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