

NOTES.

Item 17

May 72

Police Klong is a small border camp located at _____ West of Wontun. It had a ranger battalion some dependents and two U.S. advisors. On about the _____ of May the camp started receiving intensive attacks by fire. The enemy employed artillery, rocket and R.R. fire. He had moved to within 200 meters of the camp and placed 51 cal machine guns around it. There was also a 23 mm AA gun located North of the camp. On the _____ of May after _____ days of shelling tanks were spotted in the early morning approaching from the north. Tac air was called in. At first there were 3 tanks sighted and engaged by TAC air. US jets and VNAF A1E's engaged the tanks. Hawk's claw was launched out of HAAK. The package consisted of one CTC with G. Roy Sudar, two panther gunships, the B model Tow bird and Hawk 5 (Col Todd) in his aircraft. The claw could not get a shot at any of the tanks although one was spotted. It seems the only way to see the tank was directly overhead but it was lost.

once the aircraft went out on the run. On this day B Troop put a U.S. Army Lt into the camp for the purpose of directing U.S. air. They did this by bringing him in a LOH low and fast. The guns attempted suppressing the ground fire. The LOH pilot kept taking heavy fire to include 51 cal firing from a small knoll over looking the camp. The insertion was successful. (LOH pilot WO-1 Brassel) This pilot was shot down two days before and to say the least he was a bit shaky going in. He did not expect to encounter the intensity of fire that he did. The attack on Polie Klong was stopped and although they still had Heavy ABF there was no immediate danger of losing the camp. Many of the bunkers had been destroyed and most of the Troops were in foxholes. That night it was decided to resupply Polie Klong with water & ammo. This was decided on about 2000 at night. The plan called for a drop from three CH-47 from about 2000.

This method was questioned by all since it was intended to have the supplies free fall. This whole situation seemed hilarious at the time. The CH-47 drivers couldn't believe it. The mission quickly got dubbed The great banking mission. It was believed that the dropping supplies would on impact be destroyed on impact with ground and thus present a serious hazard to the survivors below should they land anywhere in their vicinity. The plan was set and the decision to go was made by higher H.Q.s. Col Todd would go out to act as C+C for the mission. The CH-47's started loading at about 2300 hrs and did not complete until about 2345. The package was to be 3 CH-47's one C+C one chow and four gunships. By the time everything was ready to go the weather was so bad the mission had to be cancelled. ~~The~~

The next morning early the situation at the camp had worsened. Numerous casualties

Jan 11
were reported and the U.S. advisors
waited out. It was decided to
pull them out with LOH's from
B troop. The whole operation was
well supervised in that the SA
Mr. Vann his assistant Gen Hill.
and the Reg SA. LT. Col Rose were
all over the camp in their own
helicopters. There was considerable
discussion between Mr. Vann. and
the U.S. and Gen. Byun
and the V.N. camp commander.

Tempers flared and threats were
made. Apparently the V.N. wanted
to abandon the camp but Mr. Vann
and the Gen. would not hear of
it. This discussion went on
for some time amidst the
continual incoming enemy fire.
Finally it was decided that the
U.S. would come out but
the V.N. would hold. One of the
V.N. could speak English
and he directed air strikes the
rest of the day. The U.S.
people were extracted successfully
by LOH. While this was going
on another rather dramatic episode
was taking place with the rescue
of some survivors of #175.

Another attempt was going to be made to resupply the camp by CH-47 at night. This time it was planned to very early in the AM about 0400 hours.

Again the weather forced abandonment of the mission. The next day the VN abandoned the camp.

It was reported that they left some of their dependents in the camp. At the height of the heated discussions on whether or not the VN would abandon the camp it was feared that they would

bolt over the wire and leave the two U.S. alone. The loss of Polie Hlang was a blow in that it was one more defeat for ARVN. There were agent and PW reports that the NVA wanted to take Polie Hlang because they intended to attack out of the Polie Trap with infantry and Tanks past Polie Hlang to Kontum.