

Prepared	NAME	DATE	LOCKHEED CORP. STRESS SHEET	Page	TEMP.	PERM.
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<p>FORM</p> <p>THE TAPE IS SET ON SIDE TO START DON DAVIS DESCRIPTION OF NELSON RESCUE.</p> <p>3 WENT WITH DOAN WHO GOT SHOT UP COMING OUT OF RANGER SOUTH + MADE EMER LANDING ON FB 31/PL 30?</p> <p>DAVIS GOT NELSON OFF RANGER SOUTH.</p> <p>TAPE MENTIONS MOH ON HICKORY. IT IS IN THE ATTACHED XEROX COPY. BUTLER THINGS DON WANN + MATERS GOT KILLED BY .51 - THIS PIECE SAYS IT WAS ANI RPG.</p> <p>SIDE 2 HAS DAVE FERRELL'S TAPE FROM 9/7-17 CAU SNAKE. HE HAD EARPIECE FOR TAPE RECORDER IN HIS EAR, OBVIOUSLY THIS WEST VA RIDGERUNNER DIDN'T KNOW HOW TO ADJUST HIS HELMET TO KEEP THE SOUND DOWN.</p> <p>GOOD SHIT ON THIS TAPE.</p> <p>Muh</p>						



### Tape Transcript

On 21 June 1972 I was working on a mission in support of an Arvn airborne brigade in the vicinity of the village of Tan Khai on highway 13 approximately 6 miles south of An Loc. We were escorting a US slick unit that was tasked with extracting the ARVN airborne brigade from Tan Khai for redeployment.

In support of this, we had a heavy fire team, 3 AH-1G's Cobras. I was the AC of chalk 3. The method of support was to put one ship low with the lift flight and two ships high to provide overall area coverage. Chalk 2 and 3 in the heavy team were the high birds. I was chalk 3

On my second gun run into the area, in which I was providing suppressive fires, I broke to the right and made a pass from SE to NW breaking right over Highway 13 and was in the process of rejoining chalk 2 and taking his wing position, when I was struck by a SA 7 missile.

So far as I know, no one else has survived in a helicopter, anyway, this type of anti aircraft fire. I think there was a combination of things that accounts for the fact that I am alive and my pilot are alive. And I don't want to underestimate the importance of luck which was the most significant contributor to our good fortune was luck. I do feel, however, there are some things that we did, that we had not done, the luck we had would not have been able to save us. In describing the impact of the SA-7, but first let me back track a little bit, I think the single most important thing that happened was the fact that other personnel in the area, other aircraft in the area, were able to observe the missile being fired.

As they observed it, they yelled, "missile, missile, missile!", over the VHF radio. I think the fact that I knew what I was hit by, and what the aircraft should do was the single most important contributing factor, outside of luck, in my survival.

I feel every unit, or every task force, that is operating in an area where SA 7's are known to be, should have an SOP on alerting aircraft when a missile is fired. They should also have posted in such position as to advise or observe 360 degrees around the flight as possible, so that these can be seen.

After hearing the words, "missile, missile!", I looked over my left shoulder, I saw the signature of the missile, I thought it was heading for my aircraft. Just as I saw the missile, I saw it hit the aircraft. Probably at the same time as it was hitting my aircraft, I was rolling off my throttle, and bottoming my collective pitch.

The impact of the missile on my aircraft did not seem to be that



severe. There was concussion, but there was not as much as one might expect. I would say judging on the way it felt to me, as far as concussion was concerned, there was probably not more HE charge in the warhead of the SA 7 than there was in a 40MM grenade.

What happened to the aircraft as it hit, is the tailboom was total severed, completely severed in the vicinity of the battery compartment, which on the Cobra is directly below the exhaust stack. The aircraft, as soon as it was hit, jostled slightly, it seemed to pitch up and pitch down and from side to side. This was followed by, during the autorotation, the aircraft began to spin about its mast to the right at a nose low attitude. As the aircraft descended, it spiraled, making a spiraling descent, continuing to spin slowly about the mast. The speed of the spin was, I would say, about the same angular velocity as one would experience in a normal rate pedal turn.

I did not look at any of my instruments after being hit. Shortly after I was hit, as soon as I was hit, I lost all radio communication. I had no radio communication what so ever. I did however have intercom with my front seat. Using the intercom, I instructed my pilot, CPT Cordoan, to empty the his turret weapons system, fire it out. He attempted to do so, but was unable to do it. My control movements, during the descent, were very few. Having been aware, for some time, that this could happen, I had thought, pretty well thought it through, what I would do, if I were hit by a SA-7, and my tailboom were severed. It seems to be characteristic of the missile that it does severe the tailboom, if it strikes you from the side. I felt the biggest problem that I would have with no tailboom would be the CG shift. That it would be most difficult to prevent the nose from becoming extremely low particularly in a loaded helicopter. And this would have to be the biggest problem I would have to cope with. As it worked out, that was exactly the case. I told my self, that if this were case, and prior to the crash, I told my self, that my action would be to pull complete aft cyclic and attempt to correct for the CG shift. This I did, it did not prevent a nose low attitude. Those who observed my descent said I appeared to be descending a skids level attitude, however I felt that I was nose low. I attempted to experiment with the cyclic enroute to the ground. I tried slight left and right cyclic movements which did little for me, and as far as I am concerned, were a waste of time. I feel that anybody that has the same misfortune, that I had in flight, should attempt to only pull aft cyclic. Their only concern should be CG. As far as cyclic movement should be, I bottomed the pitch and I left it that way. I made no attempt to control RPM. I made not attempt whatsoever to select a forced landing area. There was no way I could have controlled the aircraft to bring it to a forced landing area. Probably if I had selected a forced landing area, I probably would have not made anyway, even if I could have guided the aircraft to it. I'll explain the reasons for this later on.



During the descent, RPM built, as it built, I felt feedback forces in the cyclic and the collective. The cyclic tried to pull itself forward, I pulled it back and I was able to keep it against the rear stop during the entire descent. The collective attempted to push it self up, I was able to keep it on the bottom, until my pitch pull.

Also during the descent, a couple things I tried to do, were trying to fire out my turret, I was able to see that I was not able to adjust my CG. I attempted to jettison my wing stores, my wing store jettison did not function. I suspected, as I thought about this prior to my accident that it would not, since the wing store jettison circuit breakers and your electrical power is largely located in the forward portion of the tailboom.

So my wing store jettison capability was lost, having determined this, I attempted to fire out the remainder of my ordnance. I was 50% expended at the time. My ordnance, my 2.75 inch rockets, could not be fired. With these three unsuccessful attempts, the turret, the wing store jettison, the rocket firing, all these failing, I abandoned all further hope of slowing my rate of descent, by getting rid of extra weight or by shifting my CG by getting rid of extra weight in the wrong places.

As I said before, the only control movement that I made, cyclic-wise, was to pull complete aft cyclic and held it there and bottomed my collective pitch and held it there.

At about 30 feet above the trees, was where I pulled my pitch. I pulled pitch at about the same rate that I would in a normal autorotation, except I pulled every bit of pitch that I had. The collective was full up. As I reached the ground. This significantly slowed my descent also assisted in my CG problems. I wouldn't say that I recovered from the nose low attitude, but it recovered somewhat. It also begun a violent spin. At this point, I can't remember if the spin went to the right or the left. I do know it was violent, I do know that it was stopped by my landing in the trees.

The second most significant thing that saved me, was the fact that I did land in trees. I had no choice over I was going to land in trees or land in an open area. It was something that fate alone could determine. As I said, there was no directional control, there was no selecting a forced landing area. But luck was with me and I did land in trees, which helped me in two ways. One, they stopped the spin of the aircraft, two they assisted in cushioning my fall.

On impact there was no fire, the engine had continued to run. I had rolled of the throttle to the flight idle position initially, however I did not attempt to make further attempts to shut the engine down. If I had it to do over again, I would probably do that. I would probably attempt to shut the engine down, if I would have had time to do so.



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As far as what I did on the ground, I was on the ground for approximately 10 or 15 minutes. And I don't believe what I did on the ground is of that much assistance to anyone else. Suffice it to say, that I did land in a bunker complex; my front seat and I both made attempts to conceal ourselves until friendly aircraft got in the area, my survival radio would not operate, so we moved into a clear area and waved until we were spotted by friendly aircraft. At this point we concealed ourselves again to await pickup.

Other significant things, I think that contributed to the success here were, number one I had only had 600 pounds of fuel on board the aircraft at the time of the crash, and I was 50% expended. I had fired all of my outboard pod, and I believe, a few of my inboard rounds.

As far as feelings, I think the psychology is as important as anything else, as how you survive this thing. There was no question, having been around SA 7 environment, for the last two months, there was no question in my mind, that I was dead on the way down. However, I never gave up. I had enough control over the aircraft to do something for myself. I still had a good rotor, I still had two controls, my aft cyclic and my pitch control, and in the end, the things I was able to do, assisted in saving my life.

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Cobra experience without Tailboom  
similar to 58,  
must follow spiral

229AnLoc

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5 Apr 1972 CW2 Windeler/CPT Spengler 2W130/2W129  
Shot down by heavy automatic weapons fire in AH-1G #67-15594, 1030 hours, near Loc Ninh at XU 746 054

11 May 1972 CPT Strobridge/CPT Williams 1W24/1W24  
Shot down by an SA-7 missile in AH-1G #68-15009, 1233 hours, over An Loc at XT 755 872

24 May 1972 CW2 Hosaka/CW2 Henn 1W30/1W30  
Shot down by an SA-7 missile in AH-1G #67-15836, 1425 hours, south of An Loc near the village of Tan Khai at XT 768 786



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Shot down by heavy anti-aircraft fire in AH-1G #67-15718, 0955  
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Breuer/CW2 Townsend on board was hit by an SA-7 missile and lost at  
XT 776 768.

they were part of ready section. never sent less than 3 CW2  
White/MAJ Funk AC wouldn't start no igniters clicking they went  
off with the section White/Funk  
"Oh, Shit" broadcast by high bird high bird 21st ARVN north of  
Chon Thanh Ross Franklin called one of the pilots a coward the  
day before  
24 June 68-15206 YS 048 915  
F/79 AFA CW2 Dilallo  
Parents couldn't understand how

Finally, I made you a copy of the 362d ASHC yearbook made in 1971.  
This is the unit that lost the CH-47A, "United 157" with CPT Tomlin  
and 1LT Hamblin at the controls. On January 10, 1992, I got the  
following information from MAJ Richard Hatch, who was a Flight  
Engineer on United 994 that was in the flight of 4 CH-47A's from  
the 362d that were flying 1st Cav troops from the Sandy Pad at Bien  
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157 was the lead aircraft in a very loose formation. The  
rotor blade spar split in the forward rotor blade and to Hatch it  
looked like the aircraft shattered like a glass bulb. Because the  
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from that flight path. I showed up with the Battalion safety  
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I told Hatch to join VHPA as an associate member. He has had  
a very distinguished career. In 1972 he was the Army Aviation  
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768.

24 June 1972 CW2 Dilallo 1W48  
AH-1G #68-15206 developed flight control problems during a night  
maintenance flight, 2340 hours, and crashed into a river west of  
Long Binh at YS 048 915

This is a very strange loss. F/79th had been alerted to move  
north to DaNang; the unit was having one last party before they  
left. Dilallo had been working on the aircraft all day long. The  
unit shied from doing night maintenance test flights, especially



with a single pilot, as he was. Dilallo was romantically linked to a Vietnamese lady, who was not pleased that the unit was leaving III Corps. There was speculation that Dilallo crashed the Cobra into the Dong Ngai river to give the appearance that he was dead, then go to Saigon with the lady. This is not substantiated, however, when the survival officer went to inventory Dillalo's effects, there was nothing there. Additionally, when his body was recovered, a few days later, it was nude, and again it was part of speculation that he intended to crash the aircraft, swim ashore, and vanish.

THEY WILL ALWAYS BE REMEMBERED BY THE FLIGHT CREWS

FROM A/229TH AHB WHO WERE

"PROTECTED BY BLUE MAX"



**5 Apr**

AH-1G, 1530 67-15594 XU 746054

F/79 AFA CW2 Windeler/CPT Spengler KIA

Wing ship was flown by Cpt Leach. Section was launched from Song Be. NVA wire team was seen in the open laying wire. On climbout the AH-1G was hit by ground fire and caught fire. Windeler asked Leech to check where the aircraft was hit. Leech told him he was on fire and to land immediately. On approach to the ground, the AH-1G took fire again, Windeler extended his approach as the fire got worse. As the aircraft descended to 100', Leech encouraged Windeler to expedite; by then the fire was in the cockpit behind Windeler. Spengler had his radio selector on UHF, intended to be on intercom, and could be heard by Leech to be hollering at Windeler to get the aircraft down. The aircraft exploded at 50'; the crew was lost. The crash site was in NVA control and could not be searched to recover the bodies. The crew was designated KIA-bodies not returned (BNR) The remains were returned to US control in 1989, and funeral services were done in Aug 1989, with Spengler being buried at Arlington Cemetery and Windeler in NY state.

**8 April 1972**

CPT Joseph Richard Harris F/9 CAV OH-6A

Harris was killed just east of the Bu Dop Special Forces camp by NVA automatic weapons fire. Harr

/9 was flying reconnaissance missions around Bu Dop so that the ARVN could be evacuated by the Chinooks from 362 ASHC "Fly United", 229th AHB, 1st CAV. One CH-47A took a load of 108 Vietnamese out and was hit in the main rotor blades on departure. Since Bu Dop was not secure, and surrounded by NVA, the CH-47 lumbered to Song Be and passengers offloaded. An immediate postflight inspection revealed that the blades had to be changed before the aircraft could be flown. Blades were flown up and the flight crews, maintenance personnel and anybody else standing around helped the crews manually change the blades. The task took about 5 hours and was completed in time to return to homebase at Long Thanh North in the dark.

Got his blue freckles as the result of an accident as a teenager when he was loading shotgun shells. He had not put the pellets in the shell, when the powder went off and inbedded in his face.

He was 6'2'' and weighed 220. Sloniker was over his crash site at Bu Dop on Apr 8, 1972, but did not know who he was until the 1992 directory came out.

Data from Paul Murtha

**10 May 1972**

CH-47A 64-13157 YT 168 032

362 ASHC CPT Tomlin/1LT Harrell

United 157 was a flight of four Chinooks that picked up infantry troops at the Sandy Pad at Bien Hoa Army Base. The troops were being taken to Vung Tau. As 157 neared Long Thanh North airfield, other Chinooks in the flight described 157 as exploding like a lightbulb flash. Since there had been an increase in NVA activity at An Loc, the aircraft was thought to have been shot down. The remaining CH-47's sped from the area. It was learned later that the Chinook had a material failure of a blade retaining pin. 5 crewmen and 27 soldiers were lost.

**11 May, 1205 hours**

AH-1G 68-15009 XT 755 872

F/79 AFA CPT Strobbridge/CPT Williams

Might have been a survivable tail boom loss, several thought they may have gotten out landed upright, didn't burn wasn't there when ARVNs

**22 May, 1040 hours** 67-15836 XT 768 786

F/79 AFA CW2 Hosaka/CW2 Henn

Missile hit and blew up BNR.

**13 June, 0905 hours** 69-15095 XT 763 790

A/229 AHB WO1 Dunigan/CPT Bowers

Dunigan was "White 2" in a flight of 5 UH-1H's. Flight was inserting troops in the vicinity of Tan Khai and took fire in and out of the LZ. White 1 WO1Nuess/CPT Orahoad flared hard into the LZ because of the speed needed to outwit the NVA gunners. After dropping the ARVNs the flight made a left turn out of the LZ for a southerly departure. The aircraft were in a loose 120 knot treetop gaggle when White 2 was hit. With the aircraft losing power, the cockpit filling with smoke, Josh Dunigan initiated a high speed low level autorotation, which was successful to a point 3 feet above the ground. Because Josh could not tell the depth of the elephant grass he had pulled all available pitch at an altitude of 3 feet. 095 slammed hard vertically and spread the skids, with the only injury being the door gunner's back. Josh immediately informed lead that "White 2's down in the LZ." Dunigan and his crew were immediately rescued by "White 5," CW2 Vickery. Within minutes Comet 67, the OPS officer for F troop was in the vicinity of the crash site with a pink team, and the "Browns,"\* ready to initiate aircraft recovery. However, the intensity of the ground fire and the condition of 095, made recovery too dangerous for the slow lumbering procedure required when the Chinook hovers over the downed aircraft for recovery. 095 was abandoned, but her crew survived.

\* The "Blues" from the Air Cav Troops normally provided security for aircraft recovery. Other than the aircrews and the advisors, no other Americans were allowed to be on the ground during this battle, so ARVN were used in place of the "Blues" and were called



the "Browns."

**20 June, 0825** 67-15718 XT 769 770

F/79 AFA 1LT Shields/CPT Northrup

LTC Lew McConnell, Bn Cdr-229th, went to extract the pathfinders south of a creek bed. Pink team was covering McConnell, when a puff of white smoke went off under his aircraft. Three Blue Max aircraft were in the area; Causey and Funk were lead, Shields and Northrup were in the second aircraft, and Leach was in three. All Cobras were flying low level at high speed, when Shields and Northrup were hit by .51 cal fire. They went straight in with such impact that their bodies were thrown out of the aircraft. Causey/Funk were also in the area and took 12.7 hits aft of the cockpit. Also an RPG went through all rocket pads and damaged primary hydraulic and nitrogen accumulator. Crew successfully landed the aircraft.

**20 June, 0820 hours** 67-15670 XT 776 768

F/9 CAV 1LT Breuer/CW2 Townsend

Hit by SA-7 missile. First combat loss by F/9 to SA-7. Crew lost.

**21 June** 67-15725 XT 761 769

F/79 AFA CPT Brown/CPT Cordonne

Hit by SA-7 missile at 4000 feet, tailboom separated, aircraft crashed into trees. This was the first Cobra crew to survive a SA-7 missile hit and survive.

**ON MAY 10, 1972, THE CREW OF UNITED 157, A CH-47A FROM THE 362D ASSAULT SUPPORT HELICOPTER COMPANY, 229TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION, 3D BDE (SEP) 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION PICKED UP SOME OF THE BRIGADE INFANTRYMEN AT THE SANDY PAD AT BIEN HOA TO TAKE THEM FOR A WELL DESERVED BREAK AT THE SEASIDE CITY OF VUNG TAU. ENROUTE, ONE OF THE BLADE RETAINING PINS FAILED, THROWING A BLADE, CAUSING UNITED 157 TO FALL FROM THE SKY. ALL WERE LOST, FOREVER GONE, NEVER FORGOTTEN.**

**THE FLIGHT CREW OF UNITED 157**

**CPT BARRY C. TOMLIN  
1LT SAMUEL HARRELL  
SPR ALVIN R. ELENBURG  
SP5 LARRY S. MUSTIN  
SP4 TERRY D. NEISS**

**THE INFANTRYMEN**

**SGT MIKE J. AGUILAR  
SP4 OSCAR AGUILAR  
SGT WILLIAM A. BOATRIGHT  
PFC STEVEN E. BOWERSOCK  
PFC CLINT E. CARR  
SP4 DENNIS G. DUNNING  
SP4 DAVID CRUZ FLORES  
SGT DIETER K FREITAG  
PV2 JAMES D. GROVES  
PFC DALE L. HAYES  
SP4 WILLIAM F. HENAGHAN  
SP4 FRANK T. HENSON  
SP4 DONALD E. HOWELL  
SP4 FREDDIE JACKSON  
SGT JAMES C. JENSEN  
SP4 THOMAS A. LYDIC  
SP4 GARY R. MONTELONE  
PFC DEAN A. PHILLIPS  
PV2 JACKIE RAY  
SP4 RICHARD RIDGEWAY  
PV2 AGOSTO E. RIVERA  
CPT KENNETH ROSENBERG  
PFC JOHN T. SABLAN  
SP4 CLARENCE L. SAULSBERRY  
SP4 RAYMOND J. SHIKO  
SP4 DAVID W. SULSER  
PFC THOMAS E. WOOD**

**THEIR NAMES ARE NEAR 01W20**

*United 157*