


"The war America never lost, but wasn't allowed to win."

—L. Brent Bozell III



The Politically Incorrect Guide™ to

THE VIETNAM WAR

From the bestselling P.I.G. series

*You think you know the Vietnam War.
But did you know:*

When we left South Vietnam we had
won the war (congressional liberals
later ensured that South Vietnam lost)
Enemy body counts were actually
underreported

The United States never carpet-bombed
urban areas

Soviet and Chinese support for North
Vietnam was even more extensive than
we realized (and Ho Chi Minh was a
hard core Communist, not a mere
nationalist)

Philip Jennings



- The black people should have been no different when the long list of years community development activities and benefits
- Drug abuse was a problem years ago, not just in the States, it was a problem that was brought to our attention by the Army
- John F. Kennedy, "I have said and done something wrong, but I don't know the form of an official waiving order, so I led to a state of confusion by the chairman and myself," which makes me a great person
- "I think it is a mistake to be too self-critical. It is better to be a little more self-critical and a little more self-critical than to be too self-critical."

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Laos or Cambodia. Nixon and Kissinger found themselves not only fighting the enemy abroad but confronting a hostile Congress at home that was intent on handcuffing the commander in chief. In October 1970, Nixon proposed a cease-fire until a formal peace agreement could be reached. But Hanoi viewed this only as another sign of weakening American will and did not respond. Moreover, time appeared on Hanoi's side, as American troops continued their steady withdrawal. By the end 1970, Nixon had cut America's troop levels in Vietnam by roughly one half since his inauguration in January 1969.

Despite all the political forces working against him, Nixon believed that Vietnamization was working, that "peace with honor" would soon be achieved. On January 4, 1971, he assured the American people that "The end [of the war] is in sight."³⁰ Lest the North Vietnamese take any comfort in that announcement, the United States launched heavy airstrikes against NVA supply camps in Laos and Cambodia. It was obvious that the Nixon administration believed that a key to securing peace in Vietnam was denying the enemy sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia.

Nixon delivers

A test of Vietnamization was launched on January 30, 1971, with an all-Vietnamese ground offensive into Laos. Seventeen thousand ARVN attacked 22,000 NVA inside Laos in an attempt to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail. The Operation, Lam Son 719, was supported by U.S. artillery, air strikes, and helicopter support that ferried ARVN troops into combat. The fighting did not go well. Tough terrain and bad weather kept the ARVN from reaching their objectives on schedule, and the delay allowed the NVA to bring 20,000 troops to the battle. The ARVN suffered more than 7,500 casualties—almost half of the invasion force. The press was on hand to witness the scrambling, panicked retreat of the ARVN. They proclaimed it as proof that Nixon's Vietnamization program was failure. The

ARVN had certainly performed poorly. But it was also true that as many as 20,000 North Vietnamese had been killed or wounded (thanks to American air support). So the battle was not exactly a disaster for the Americans and South Vietnamese (the United States had lost 200 killed, along with 100 helicopters downed and another 600 damaged). The lesson Nixon took away from the battle was not that Vietnamization was a failure, but that American air power, much maligned because of its failure to bomb Hanoi into submission earlier in the war, could ensure its success. Whenever the NVA concentrated their forces for a decisive attack, they would be vulnerable to American air strikes. In short, the United States could ensure South Vietnam's independence without having to keep any significant number of troops on the ground.

Indeed, on the field of battle, the North Vietnamese continued to take a beating—so much so that on March 10, 1971, Communist China thought



You Say Invasion and I Say Incursion

The anti-war protesters who were so furious over the Cambodian “invasion,” which was a legal incursion into an enemy sanctuary in a neutral country lasting a few weeks, ignored the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, which was an illegal invasion—a war—that lasted more than a decade. Go figure. “Expanding the war” was another one of the Left’s headline-grabbing rallying cries, but it did not reflect the truth of the Cambodian incursion. The fact was the United States was not “expanding” the war—it was striking the same enemy, for the same reasons, and doing so to end the war in a way that would preserve the independence of the internationally recognized sovereign state of South Vietnam.

it needed to make a public announcement of its full support for North Vietnam. Nixon was proving a tenacious foe. At home, he continued to face down a hostile Congress, an even more hostile media, and the biggest anti-war demonstrations since the Civil War; in Southeast Asia, he was deftly withdrawing American troops while hammering the enemy to agree to a negotiated peace.

In June 1971, the *New York Times* published what it thought might be a devastating blow to Nixon—the “Pentagon Papers.” These were a compilation (which McNamara had ordered to be assembled in 1967) of classified documents about why the United States had entered the war and how the war had been conducted. The Nixon administration went to the courts to try to halt further publication of classified documents, but less than a week later, the *Washington Post* began publishing the Pentagon Papers, in what was seen as a battle to preserve the First Amendment—though Nixon rightly assumed that real motivation was to provide ammunition to the anti-war cause. The newspaper spin was that the papers presented the lies, deceptions, mistakes, and misjudgments that had led America into Indochina, and that this was why the Nixon administration had tried to block their publication. In fact, if you actually read the papers, you find that far from revealing lies and deception, they show how the United States had entered the Vietnam War full of (old-style) liberal idealism. Apparently, in their frenzy to discredit the war, the media didn’t seem bothered by this. It was President Nixon, the man defeated by Kennedy in the 1960 presidential election, who, de facto, was fighting to preserve the reputations of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations—indeed, he was at that very moment trying to pull their chestnuts out of the fire with his program of Vietnamization. Of course, to him, the real issue about the Pentagon Papers was that secret information, such as the papers contained, should not be leaked to the enemy—and certainly not in a time of war.