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11 CAB

Feb 72 -

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96289

"EXEMPLA PROPONERE"

AVBAUT-AC

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 11th Combat Aviation
Battalion, for Period Ending 29 February 1972, RCS CSFOR-65
(R3) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

(U) UP AR 525-15, dated 20 November 1970, and USARV Supplement 1 to
AR 525-15, dated 8 February 1971, the Semiannual Operational Report-
Lessons Learned is submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Eldridge R. Barnes
ELDRIDGE R. BARNES
CPT, AD
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

5 Copies to CO, 12th Combat Aviation Group, ATTN: AVBAUS-C, APO 96266
2 Copies to CG, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC, APO 96384
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GROUP 4

~~DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS~~
~~DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS~~
DOD DIR 5200.10

Assified by CG, 1st Avn Bde

OBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR

INTERVALS

ASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1978

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AVBAUT-AC

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 29 February 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Awards and Decorations. The following awards and decorations were processed during this period:

<u>SUBMITTED</u>	<u>AWARDS</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>
4	Silver Star	4
1	Legion of Merit	1
31	DFC	25
1	Soldier's Medal	0
36	BSM "V"	32
33	AM "V"	24
26	ACM "V"	22
83	BSM "S"	58
376	AM	265
159	AOM	52
21	Purple Heart	13
64	RVN Cross Gallantry	7
8	RVN Civic Action	0
27	RVN Honor Medal	9
8	RVN Training Service	0
7	RVN Air Service	0
8	RVN Staff Service	0

i. (C) Intelligence and Security

Throughout the reporting period the Intelligence Section continued its mission of gathering, analyzing and disseminating timely and accurate intelligence information. It is to be noted that the primary function of any worthwhile intelligence agency or section is the dissemination of intelligence information to the user, the organizations that daily have contact

AVBAUT-AC

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 29 February 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

with the enemy. To this end the intelligence section maintains a daily file, distribution, and briefing system oriented toward keeping the units current on all enemy activity. In addition the intelligence section maintains a current situation and anti-aircraft activity map, duplicates of which are required at unit level. USARV, MACV, TRAC, 1st Aviation Brigade, 12th Aviation Group, 5th ARVN Division, ARVN Ranger Group, 7th U.S. Air Force, and subordinate elements of the 11th CAB are primary sources of information to gain complete intelligence coverage of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion area of operations. The Battalion Commander was briefed weekly and as needed. Subordinate units were briefed on a daily basis. The normal functions of classification, document storage, and clearance matters were handled daily as a matter of routine. Monthly inspections, formal and informal, were conducted in each unit in the areas of physical security and intelligence security.

j. (C) Plans, Operations and Training

(1) Plans

The Eaglefoot Sector (Phu Loi Defense) Oplan was updated 22 Jan 72. Responsibility as installation coordinator for Di An was assigned to CO, 187th AHC on 14 Jan 72.

(2) Assault Helicopter Operations

(a) 11th Combat Aviation Battalion provided direct support to ARVN III Corps during the month of November 1971, and from 1 December 1971 until 21 January 1972, the Battalion was in General Support of Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC). Primary units supported were the 5th, 18th and 25th Infantry Divisions, 3rd Ranger Group, Border Ranger Command, Capital Military District, the ARVN Airborne Division, and III Corps Headquarters. Support was in the form of Combat Assault packages for airmobile operations and single aircraft for use in general support missions used primarily for transporting personnel and equipment. In addition, the commanders of the three Infantry Divisions were furnished Command and Control helicopters equipped with Avionics Consoles. (A "Package" is the basic airmobile force, consisting of one command and control helicopter, eight troop carrying helicopters, and four armed helicopters. This is also referred to as a 1-8-4 package, and single aircraft for use in general support missions, used primarily for transporting personnel and equipment.) The Battalion continued its support of ARVN ground forces operating inside Cambodia.

(b) The month of November saw the accident rate of the Battalion soar to 46.6%. On 2 November 1971 a UH-1H from the 187th AHC was making a LZ insertion in a tight LZ and on departure the Main Rotor Blades struck a tree and the A/C crashed in the LZ. One crewman was

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AVBAUT-4C

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 29 February 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

slightly injured and the A/C sustained major damage. On 13 Nov 71, an O-1G from the 74th RAC had an engine failure and made a safe landing in a field with no further damage to the A/C. At approximately 0300 hours 14 Nov 71, a UH-1H from the 135th AHC was on an approach to a rice paddy PZ to extract ARVN troops, while on short final the tail rotor struck water which caused a loss of directional control. The aircraft main rotor then struck and killed three ARVN soldiers. The crew chief was slightly injured and the A/C sustained major damage. On 15 Nov 71, two UH-1H aircraft assigned to the 187th AHC were enroute to Tay Ninh after completing a combat assault at Thien Ngan. While in formation the trail aircraft moved in too close and the main rotor struck the lead aircraft causing both aircraft to crash. Both A/C were completely destroyed by fire. Four of the crewmen were killed, two seriously wounded, and two slightly wounded. On 18 Nov 71, while conducting a visual reconnaissance mission, the engine oil pressure began to drop on an O-1G. The aircraft made a forced landing in a field with 2 feet of standing water. After the main gear traveled through the water for approximately 80 feet the aircraft flipped, coming to rest inverted. No injuries were sustained but the A/C sustained major damage. At 0500, 25 Nov 71, Phu Loi Post received three 107 mm rockets. There was no damage and no casualties. All through the month of November the Battalion continued in direct support of III Corps.

(o) On 1 December 1971, the Battalion received a new mission; it was placed in general support of Third Regional Assistance Command. This was due to an increased number of VNAF aircraft available for support of ARVN III Corp. The Battalion continued to support ARVN Forces and in addition began to support other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMF). On 5 Dec 71, Phu Loi perimeter received three 82 mm mortar rounds. There were no casualties and no damage to equipment. At 2300 hours 8 Dec 71, Battalion received a mission for emergency ammunition resupply to the ARVN Airborne Division approximately 40 km inside Cambodia. The mission was assigned to the 128th AHC. Mission departed at 0500 the next day and upon reaching the LZ one aircraft was hit by enemy fire and one crewman wounded. Again the next night, 10 Dec, another emergency ammunition resupply and medivac mission consisting of a 1-6-4 package was received by Battalion and was further assigned to the 187th AHC. Upon departing the LZ at 0400, 11 Dec, one UH-1H was shot down and forced to land outside the friendly positions. The crew received only slight injuries, but due to the ground forces not responding to a request that they secure the aircraft and crew, the crew was forced to E&E for 13 hours before a massive air search was able to pin point their location. The survival radio antenna was broken and it would not transmit on UHF. It was operable on FM but no one thought to use it. (See Lessons Learned). Upon the start of the search and rescue operations,

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AVBAUT-AC

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: CMIC for Period Ending 29 February 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

the Battalion moved a forward TOC to Tay Ninh West to coordinate all operations in that area. This remained in place until 22 Dec when the ARVN's began to move back across the border. On 19 December the Battalion received a mission to support the 81st Ranger Battalion. The 187th had previously received training with this unit so they were again assigned the mission of IRRP insertions. On 27 Dec 71, the 128th AHC was conducting a combat assault when they began taking intensive enemy fire. Two aircraft were shot down and two others received hits. One medivac ship also received hits. One crewman was killed and six others from the 128th AHC were wounded. The enemy situation forced the crew to stay on the ground for five hours before they could be evacuated. On 18 Dec 71 the last VNAF pilots were returned to their units and the improvement and modernization program to train VNAF pilots ended.

(d) The New Year began with the 128th AHC entering a stand-down status in preparation for redeployment to 8th Army in Korea. The Tomahawks completed the turn in of all equipment by 20 Jan and the colors departed for Korea on 31 Jan. On 21 Jan the 135th, and 187th AHC's began standdown operations for inactivation. On 22 Jan the 74th RAC, the last O-1G airplane company in the active Army, began standdown operation for inactivation. On 7 Jan, Phu Loi Post came under attack with three 107 mm rockets. There was no damage and no casualties. Again on 20 Jan 72, Phu Loi received three 107 mm rockets. Four CH-47 aircraft received very minor damage and two personnel received minor injuries. The Battalion began an intensive program of upgrading the defense at Phu Loi in anticipation of the Tet offensive expected to begin in February. Numerous practice alerts were conducted to test the Oplan as well as insure that each individual knew what he was supposed to do.

(e) During the month of February, maximum effort was concentrated on Phu Loi perimeter defense improvements. The Phu Loi perimeter was improved considerably by Tet, but the Tet offensive that was expected did not materialize. On 6 Feb 72 the Battalion conducted small arms familiarization firing on the Vietnamese Marine range at Di An. On 14 February all U.S. assets were removed from Di An, personnel and equipment still remaining from 135th AHC and 187th AHC were moved to Phu Loi for completion of standdown. On 15 February the 11th Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company commenced standdown operations. On 16 February the Battalion was released from responsibility for the Eagle-foot sector of the Phu Loi perimeter. On 19 February a Battalion awards and decorations and redeployment ceremony was held on the Battalion parade field. The Battalion Colors and AHC Guidon were cased for redeployment to Europe. The 74th RAC completed standdown operations on 29 Feb 72. The 135th and 187th AHC's completed standdown operations on 29 Feb 72. Battalion Colors departed Phu Loi on 29 Feb 72 enroute to Europe.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVBAUT-AC

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: OMLL for Period Ending 29 February 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) Fixed Wing Operations

The 74th RAC was under the operational control of TRAC until 21 Jan 72, at which time they entered a standdown status in preparation for inactivation. One platoon continued to be based at Cu Chi and one at Benson, with the remainder of the company located at Phu Loi. The O-10's supported TRAC G-2 AIR for intelligence gathering missions, 23rd Army Group, and 3/1 Cav division, for Arty registration and VR missions. In addition, classified missions were flown across the border. On one such mission an aircraft was shot down by enemy ground fire, killing the pilot and observer.

(4) Pathfinder Operations

The Battalion Pathfinder detachment continued to provide support in PZ's for airborne operations. Proficiency training was conducted in rappelling techniques. The detachment continued to provide a team on 30 minute standby on a 24 hour basis for recovery of crew and rigging the aircraft for extraction. They continued to provide air traffic advisory service for Di An until 1 February 1972. The detachment stood down with MHC on 29 Feb 72.

(5) Security

(a) Security at Di An is a responsibility of the Installation Coordinator, who is the senior of the two MHC commanders. During this period the flight line was completely enclosed by chain link fence and a lighting system was installed. Additional barrier materials and fighting positions were also installed. Upon standdown the wire and chain link fence were removed and transferred to other installations.

(b) 11th CAB continued to have responsibility for approximately 2400 meter of Phu Loi perimeter until 16 Feb 72. During this period approximately 1000 meters of this line was moved back and a new berm with three new bunkers and one new tower incorporated into the berm line. An additional four new bunkers were built in February and another 500 rolls of concertina wire was installed. Three balance pressure type ground sensors were also installed in February. Practice Red Alerts were conducted by 1st Bde, TRAC, Post Headquarters, and 11th CAB to insure the alert Oplan was understood by all personnel.

(6) Training

(a) Since the requirements for mandatory training and maintaining of individual training records has been rescinded by Department of the Army, periodic inspections of the companies' flight and training records have been conducted by Battalion.

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AVIATION

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: 9th Cav Bn for Battalions 22 February 1972, RAR 63102-65 (R2) (U)

(b) The 82nd Cavalry security-stabilizing conducted by 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry has been discontinued. The Battalion used the Vietnamese 82nd Cavalry rifle range at 17 Km for the purpose of conducting small arms familiarization training.

(c) The operating criteria to develop and fill quotas for the classes at the Army Aviation Leadership Training School (AALS). However, due to standdown security the Battalion quotas can no longer be filled.

(d) Aircraft used to be placed on aviation stability, seniority and proficiency flying. Care is taken in the selection and coordination of the aircraft, pilot and aircraft commanders. Each mission is required to fly two hours of dead time and to execute two instrument approaches over month.

(e) The 1st Battalion mission of training Vietnamese pilots to fly operational aircraft, and were discontinued 10 December 1971. During the period of 1970-71, 30 December 1971, fifty seven (57) UH-1H's were used by the 1st Battalion as assault helicopter operations. Much of which was attributed to one of the sergeants for a period of 90 days, flew minimum of 100 hours and returned to his squadron with tremendous skill for command, armament, pilot, or cockpit duty. When the Vietnamese 1st Team (V1AT) strengthened the 1st RAR forces, no standdown, it was no longer necessary to continue this mission.

(f) The Battalion continued to be used with the major aircraft and security objectives. The crews assigned the completed the mechanized duty position. Four of these pilots were assigned day in night, standdowns. All aircraft wing, only pilots were qualified in the 82nd Cavalry and subsequently every other flight semi-annual evaluations. Additionally, all aircraft were drawn from units regarding to be converted to additional training responsibilities placed on the 1st Battalion.

(7) Logistics

(a) The short of "no-go" for the 12th ARB continued during the inspection period, carrying a staggered maintenance program. This shortage was reflected in high demand items during November and December. By January the problem had been solved, all repair parts became available. The mission safety standards of 12th ARB were not compromised.

(b) In mid December, the 12th ARB received an alert for standdown. Tasking availability in preparing for standdown was initiated at this time. 1 January 1972 was the official date for standdown and by this time all excess had been trimmed from the company. Due to this early alert, trimming of excess, and concentration of effort, the 12th ARB was able to standdown completely by 20 Jan 72.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVBAUT-AC

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 29 February 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(e) In mid December, the 11th CAB intensified efforts to trim Battalion excess and responsibilities. Negotiations began in December and were successfully completed in early January to transfer possession and responsibility of the POL point in Tinh Ngen, the rear station in Tay Ninh, and POL properties in Quan Loi to ARVN and VNAF control. The 74th RAC, 187th AHC, 135th AHC, and HHC were ordered to take inventory, separate and identify properties and to turn-in non-mission essential property in early preparation for Keystone activities. As the 128th AHC completed standdown, all officer personnel were absorbed by other companies in the Battalion. With this large influx the 135th, 187th and HHC became greatly overstrengthed, further complicating the efforts to turn-in excess property.

(d) On 20 January 1972, the 74th RAC, 135th AHC, and 187th AHC officially entered a standdown status in preparation for inactivation. At this time higher headquarters ordered the initiation of paperwork to laterally transfer vehicles from these three units to other units. The vehicles were to remain with the standdown units on hand-receipt to reduce transportation support requirements. However, the maintenance strain placed upon the vehicles all but nullified expected results, as most vehicles became deadlined during the standdown.

(e) The standdown operations of the 135th AHC and 187th AHC was further complicated by a lack of personnel assignments. Unable to move people, both units were eventually forced into an operation stoppage.

(f) Further complicating the standdown activity was Tet of 1972. Both units were scheduled for completion no later than 14 February 1972, the day before Tet. Because of the personnel problem, this date could not be met and both AHC's from Di An were forced, for security reasons, into redeployment to Phu Loi on 10 February 1972. Because of these difficulties the AHC's were a week late inactivating.

(g) On 15 February 1972, HHC received official notification to begin preparation for redeployment to USAREUR on 29 Feb 72. As standdown activities began just prior to and continued through Tet, increased security became an additional problem. Personnel movement in HHC was also a problem. HHC, 11th CAB, officially completed standdown on 29 Feb 72, and was redeployed to USAREUR on 2 March 1972.

(8) Signal

(a) The perimeter telephone system was a continuous problem with loss of communication between bunkers and command post. Because of this it was decided to install a new circuit to improve the reliability of communications. This was completed on 15 Dec and communication failures have been significantly reduced.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVBAUT-4C

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 29 February 1972, RCS,CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) The combined avionics shop continued to have problems due to a lack of AC power. A generator was assigned from HHC, 11 CAB and this solved the problem.

(9) Aircraft Maintenance

(a) The average aircraft density for the Battalion was 58 UH-1H, operating an average of 56 flying hours per month. The average aircraft density for the UH-1M, was 16, each operating an average of 32 flying hours per month. The average density of the AH-1G, was 8 each operating an average of 35 flying hours per month.

(b) During this reporting period the 11th Battalion retrograded 2 UH-1H, 13 UH-1H, 0 AH-1G and 1 O-1G. Thirteen UH-1H's were transferred to the I & M program during this reporting period. All UH-1C model aircraft were converted to UH-1M configuration.

(c) The 128th AHC received standdown orders 1 January 1972 and completed transfer of all assigned aircraft on 7 January 1972. No significant problems were encountered. On 20 January 1972, the 74th RAC, 135th AHC, and 187th AHC received their standdown orders. The 74th RAC completed transfer of all assigned aircraft on 27 January 1972 to the 56th Transportation Company located at Long Thanh. The 187th AHC completed transfer of all assigned aircraft on 31 January 1972 to the 388th Transportation Company, located at Vung Tau, for retrograde to CONUS. The 135th AHC completed all turn-in 2 Feb 72 to 388th Transportation Company at Vung Tau. The 187th transferred two AH-1G aircraft to F Troop 3/17th Cav and received two high time AH-1G's in return which were transferred to the 388th Transportation Company at Vung Tau on 31 January 1972.

(d) During the month of November and December 1971 the 11th Battalion lost two UH-1H helicopters and one O-1G Birddog due to hostile actions and four UH-1H's and one O-1G Birddogs were lost due to accidents. These aircraft were replaced by aircraft from units standing down.

(e) Problem areas encountered during the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Excessive down time was experienced due to the critical shortage of main rotor heads within the command.

(2) Tail booms for the AH-1G's modified for the tractor tail rotor system were also in short supply and accounted for considerable down time for the AH-1G's, also the silent chain for the AH-1G tail rotor pitch change system was hard to acquire.

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AVBAUT-AC

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: GRL for Period Ending 29 February 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(10) Aviation Safety

(a) At the end of the reporting period, the Battalion accident rate per 100,000 flying hours was 18.2. The Battalion experienced four accidents, seven incidents, twenty-five precautionary landings and two forced landings during the period. Breakdown by individual unit is as follows:

UNIT	ACCIDENTS	INCIDENTS	P/L	F/L
74th RAC	1	2	3	2
128th AHC	0	0	1	0
187th AHC	1	3	5	0
135th AHC	2	2	16	0
HHC, 11th CAB	0	0	0	0

(b) Of the four accidents that occurred, three were attributed to operational error and one to faulty preflight procedures.

(c) A synopsis of each accident follows:

(1) While conducting operations in a single ship pickup zone, the main rotor blades of a UH-1H that was on short take-off contacted a tree to the left front of the aircraft. The main rotor blades and transmission separated from the aircraft with the aircraft coming to rest in a slightly nose low attitude. The copilot was flying the aircraft while the L/C was monitoring the instruments. Both crew-members felt they had cleared the obstacle.

(2) During an approach into a pickup zone, a UH-1H aircraft was placed in a tail low attitude in an attempt to land to pickup waiting troops. The tail rotor blades contacted water in the pickup zone resulting in a complete loss of the tail rotor and ninety degree gear box. The aircraft began a nose right spin in a tail high attitude. The main rotor blades then flexed downward killing three ARVN soldiers waiting pickup. The aircraft came to rest after completing a 180 degree turn with extensive damage to the main rotor blades and transmission.

(3) Two UH-1H aircraft were flying in a staggered trail right formation enroute to a refueling point. While flying at a distance that varied, according to one crew member, from $\frac{1}{2}$ a rotor disc to several feet, the main rotor blades meshed. The main rotor blades and transmission of the lead aircraft separated resulting in an uncontrolled fall from an altitude of 1500 feet. All four crewmembers were killed on impact. The wing aircraft suffered damage to one main rotor blade and subsequent loss of the vertical fin as a main rotor

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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AVBAUT-AC

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: ORLI for Period Ending 29 February 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

blade flexed downward through the tail boom. The aircraft impacted in a level attitude with all four crewmembers suffering back and burn injuries.

(4) An O-1G aircraft was being flown on a visual reconnaissance mission when a drop in the engine oil pressure was noticed. As the aircraft was enroute to an airfield, the engine seized. The aircraft was landed in a large field with approximately two feet of standing water in it. During the landing roll, the aircraft flipped along its longitudinal axis coming to rest inverted. Neither crewmember was injured. Investigation disclosed that the engine oil cap probably had not been secured after oil was added during the preflight. It is felt the oil cap vibrated loose and came off during flight allowing the oil to be lost from the engine.

(11) Medical.

(a) During the period of 1 Nov 71 to 29 Feb 72, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion dispensaries had a total of 6050 outpatient visits, including 150 Vietnamese civilians, 167 flight physicals, performed completely within the Battalion dispensaries, 3500 laboratory tests and 165 admissions.

(b) In general, the health of the command was satisfactory. No serious epidemics or infectious diseases, including malaria, occurred in the Battalion. Overall environmental sanitation has steadily improved. All Vietnamese civilians continued to undergo periodic examinations for tuberculosis, syphilis, and parasites. The major unsolved problem of the period proved to be the high rate of venereal disease.

(c) The major changes in the Battalion medical sections were the standdown of the 341st Medical Detachment at Di An in late January 1972. The 32nd was transferred to 34th GSG on 15 Feb 72.

(d) Major improvements to the medical facility were refurbishing and reconstructing the medical bunker adjacent to the dispensary. Most of the work was completed by the medical personnel.

(12) Religious.

During this period religious services have continued to be provided for personnel assigned to this unit. Three memorial services were conducted for persons killed during this period. The Chaplin was reassigned to 71st Transportation Battalion on 3 Feb 72.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVBAUT-AC

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 29 February 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(13) Civil Affairs (U)

(a) During the reporting period the 74th AAC and members of the 11th CAB supported Lai Thieu Deaf Mute School. The children of the school have been entertained with refreshments and movies. Various small gifts of school supplies and food have been provided. A monthly MEDCAP program was conducted. Battalion PIO has released several news stories concerning the support activities. This particular effort has aided the pacification program of the local area. A noted improvement of U.S.-Vietnamese relationships has been evident in the school.

(b) The 135th AAC continues to support three school aged children from the Di An area. Members of the company willingly contributed clothing, food, and school supplies, hygiene articles, toys and entertainment.

(c) The 187th AAC continues with their support of providing English lessons to approximately 20 Vietnamese a week at the Tho Due Catholic Church.

(d) AAC, 11th Cbt Avn Bn has provided the Phu Cuong Hospital with medical supplies, and bi-monthly MEDCAPS. The 11th CAB has been recommended for the Vietnamese Civic Actions Unit Citation 1st Class for outstanding work in this area.

2. (C) Lesson Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

None

b. Intelligence:

None

c. Operations:

(1) Use of Survival Radio

(a) Observation: On 10 December 1971 when a UH-1H from the 187th AAC was shot down in Cambodia, the crew was not immediately rescued because the search aircraft could not pin point their location. It was known that a survival radio was on the aircraft prior to departure but no contact was ever established between the crew and the search aircraft.

AVIAUT-AC

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: ORUJ for Period Ending 29 February 1972 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Radiations: Control could not be established because the antenna mount was broken by the crew when the antenna was extended. The radio appeared to be sending out a broken signal on UHF but in fact was not transmitting. The radio was checked in the FM mode, and found to be operable. Whether the crew had search party considered using the FM mode.

(c) Recommendations: That any time a crew is on the ground that at least two aircraft monitor the FM Guard frequency and that an EIR be submitted on the antenna mounts, as it was found that a number of them have been broken.

(d) Command Actions: The above recommendations were carried out.

d. Training:

(1) During the month of November three major accidents occurred as a result of pilot error. In each case the aircraft was flown by a low time aviator. In 2 cases the aircraft was flown by a pilot rather than an aircraft commander.

(2) As a result of the accident investigation report it was determined that no standard policy of selecting first pilots was in effect throughout the Battalion. The newly assigned aviators were not accumulating hours as fast as experienced aviators were lost. This was due in part to the VMF pilot training program and the large number of aviator losses in September and October.

(3) Recommendations: That a uniform policy be established to insure all first pilots were properly selected and trained before being placed in command of an aircraft.

(4) Command Action: An SOP was established which required each person considered for first pilot to first be selected by his platoon leader, fly at least five hours in the left seat with a qualified A/C, make a minimum of 94% on the -10 written examination and pass a check ride with an IP consisting of a minimum of two hours. During the check ride he must demonstrate proficiency of all emergency procedures.

e. Logistics

None

f. Medical

None

AVBAUT-AC

1 March 1972

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 29 February 1972 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

g. Safety

(1) Observation: The Battalion has experienced a dramatic increase in the accident rate during this period.

(2) Evaluation: All accidents occurred as a result of pilot error. Since pilot error is a direct result of supervisor failure it was felt that additional command emphasis was needed in all areas of aviation safety.

(3) Recommendation: That all commanders institute a program to educate all assigned personnel in aviation safety practices.

(4) Command Action: All commanders were briefed by the Battalion Commander and instructed to implement the above recommendations since that time no accidents have occurred in this unit.

11TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
OPERATIONAL/MISSION RESULTS
FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER 1971 THROUGH 20 JANUARY 1972

a. Operational Results

UNIT	SORTIES FLOWN	TROOPS LIFTED	CARGO TON LIFTED	HOURS FLOWN
128th AHC	9280	18722	3	3970
135th AHC	10279	25638	16	5129
187th AHC	8706	21544	40	3797
74th RAC	1328	-	-	6822
HHC	300	205	-	766

b. Mission Results

UNIT	AIRCRAFT LOSS		ENEMY KIA	STRUCTURES DEST	
	DAM	LOSS		DAM	DEST
128th AHC	3	1			
135th AHC	3		3		
187th AHC	5	3			
74th RAC	4	1			

Incl 1

11TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATISTICAL SUMMARY FOR THE
 PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER 1971 THROUGH 20 JANUARY 1972

<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
		<u>HOURS FLOWN</u>	
U-6A	28	28	42
UH-1H	4704	3250	3049
AH-1G	342	236	272
OH-58A	203	100	125
UH-1M	554	549	391
O-1G	2781	2051	2275

	<u>AVAILABLE</u>	
U-6A	46%	85%
UH-1H	76%	80%
AH-1G	71%	74%
OH-58A	100%	74%
UH-1M	72%	63%
O-1G	97%	95%

	<u>NORM</u>	
U-6A	23%	15%
UH-1H	23%	16%
AH-1G	21%	16%
OH-58A	00%	26%
UH-1M	26%	34%
O-1G	2%	5%

	<u>NORS</u>	
U-6A	30.0%	0.0%
UH-1H	1.6%	4.0%
AH-1G	1.8%	10.0%
OH-58A	0.0%	0.0%
UH-1M	1.5%	3.0%
O-1G	1.0%	0.0%

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SUBJECT: After Action Report

who had been med-evac'd in the past or confined were the most difficult to get orders on. All funds were closed out by the 7th day of standdown without problem. O&R's were not a problem as most of them were handled by the 1-1.

B. Vehicles: When we were notified of standdown we immediately went to work evaluating our vehicle status. A roster was made of the vehicles and projected dates of turn-in. This was variable as it was determined by equipment, personnel remaining, and the need for vehicles. Paperwork was perfect on all turn-ins primarily because of prior experience gained by other companies standing down. All deadlined vehicles were turned-in first and all non-mission essential equipment followed close behind. Coordination with keystone is a prime factor in turning in vehicles. You must know what keystone requires, when they require it and how they require it. Prior planning ensured that all vehicles went through the keystone points the first time they were taken down.

C. Supply: The unit supply was the focal point for the unit during the entire standdown. The property book officer had 2765-1's made up on all equipment prior to standdown. He ordered a 100% inventory on hand receipt holders. All shortages were corrected immediately. Excess equipment was turned in prior to standdown. Unit supply was assigned enough personnel that they could effectively work in teams, loading, unloading and escorting equipment to Keystone. At the end of each day the Company Commander was notified of the accomplishments made and a percentage of turn-in was computed daily.

D. Personnel: A plan for the release and transfer of personnel was developed, whereby the percentage of personnel released was equal with the percentage of equipment turned-in. This worked well.

E. Liaison: Liaison Officers and NCO's were appointed to coordinate between the company and the respective keystone turn-in points. Liaison personnel were always present at the turn-in point when unit equipment was being processed in. Each liaison officer and or NCO must be familiar with all Keystone SOP's as well as having diplomatic personal traits. If the liaison personnel really extend themselves to co-operate with Keystone, the daily turn-in will be much smoother. Our liaison Officers and NCO's developed the rapport needed for a smooth continuous turn-in.

F. Facilities: We asked for and received a pre-inspection of the company area by P&W. During this inspection we learned of their requirements and what was needed to meet them. As we processed and lost personnel, we inspected the vacated rooms, removed all trash and ensured that all fixtures were present. Once we were satisfied with its condition we closed up the room. As more and more rooms became vacant, we began to consolidate personnel in certain buildings and thereby was able to completely vacate other

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SUBJECT: After Action Report

buildings. This consolidation process greatly enhanced the police of the company area as well as control of remaining personnel.

G. Detachments: The 390th and 432nd Detachments were transferred as soon as possible since they were not standing down. Approval was given to transfer property to them which aided us in our property turn-in.

III. Summary: Our standdown was efficient, well planned and organized. The plan we used allowed for day to day changes and was flexible enough to allow for problem areas. All personnel within the company must be kept informed at all times of the changing requirements that take place. As the final date of standdown neared, numerous problems came, vehicles were not available, orders for personnel were slow in arriving and equipment remained to turn-in. Keeping a cool head and using the best people to the limit of their capabilities will result in a successful finish.

William H. Miller

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Commanding

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