

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The Department, with Joint Aviation Group
AFG San Bernardino 90045

[illegible]

10 February 1979

Subject: African American Literature

1. (U) Purpose: To report significant activities and planning involved in the standdown and the close out of the 12th Combat Aviation Group, Army Aviation Element (AAE) at the Third Regional Assistance Command, (TRAC).
2. (U) Content: During the period 1 November 1972 to 29 January 1973, plans and contingencies were formulated for the standdown and close-out of the Third Regional Assistance Command Army Aviation Element. (LMS)

ALC was composed of a Chief of AEC, two Assistant Aviation Staff Officers, and two enlisted elements. Located at 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th, and was an integral part of the 11th Staff. The AEC was a subordi-
nate of the 11th Staff, and served as the executive element for the 11th
Group. In order to his function as the 11th Aviation Officer. AEC was under
the direct supervision of the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th.

The primary mission of the wing is to serve as advisors on employment of Army Aviation assets for the 1st Air Commander and his staff and to supervise and coordinate all of the Army Aviation assets and support in the III.

Basic air aviation support for Military Region III consisted of administrative helio-bus support for the 12 provinces in the region as well as support from three division advisory teams, the Ranger Brigade advisory team, and the Army Brigade Advisory team.

The primary mission of LML, however, was mission planning and coordination for the two Air Cavalry troops and the Air 101 Detachment which were under the operational control of the Op number, LML.

This was accomplished by face to face coordination with Division and Liaison advisory teams throughout the Military Region and formulating Final Reconnaissance plans based on their recommendations. These plans were then presented to the Area Commander and staff for approval or modification. Once approved, the missions were given to the Air Cavalry by AML along with available intelligence gathered from the MAC G-2. This planning and mission coordination for the Air Cavalry was the bulk of the workload for AML and it formed a constant series of plans, operations, and updates to maintain a current picture of enemy activity along with the other intelligence gathering agencies.

During the period of this report, the enemy had been in an effort to relieve the military region in an effort to bring additional territory prior to the expected cease-fire. This created additional planning requirements because it was necessary to act in a coordinated manner all day long while at the same time being able to take a coordinated action if the enemy was in the military region. This was necessary to coordinate, close coordination with all of the elements in the military region and working to important intelligence trends.

It was also possible for coordination of OH-47 support within the III for the recovery of U.S. personnel and the recovery of downed aircraft. The III had no organic OH-47 assets and was responsible for managing OH-47 support from the IV when this support was required.

Finally, was maintained the net control station for both secure-voice and U.S. radio for all of the elements within 12th Group.

A. Section 1: Significant Organizational Activity

(1) Base-A-Day: From the period 1 November 1972 to 27 January 1973, there were four for the at address of H/L. It was realized that as a day tactical operations would occur and that the coordination of administrative matters could be handled by the G-3 section of 12th Group. As a result it was decided that H/L would be placed down on H-1 so that all remaining administrative matters would be delegated to the G-3 section.

(2) Standdown Phase: See discussion published between 12th Group 27 January 1973 and 12th Group 27 January 1973. The significant problem was coordination and personnel strength was adequate to accomplish the mission.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: N/A.

(4) Roll-Up Phase: N/A.

B. Section 2: Observations and Recommendations:

(1) Base-A-Day: No specific observations or recommendations. Plans were disseminated from both H/L and 12th Group in adequate time for establishment and no major problems were encountered.

(2) Standdown Phase: Observation: Units of the command as well as elements within the Military Region required additional OH-47 support after notification of a cease-fire because of troop-in requirements. This caused a strain on an already over-taxed support system.

Recommendation: That a OH-47 be assigned as a group asset until H/L is to be used as necessary to troop-in aircraft and equipment.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: N/A.

(4) Roll-Up Phase: N/A.

3. (6) Specific:

A. Section 1:

(1) Roll-Up Phase: During the preceding period, there was no air activity in the area of operations due to the height of the enemy activity in the military region, during this period the air cavalry ceased their activity along the river in the first and second high bridges of the bridgehead on the river. It was during this period that the air cavalry was alerted for the air cavalry strike. The air cavalry was alerted by communication between the air cavalry, the air cavalry and the air cavalry staff. Once a suitable opportunity was found the air cavalry normally conducted a high bridge operation of the target area. Approximately 50% of the air cavalry strike in the air cavalry report were either recommended by the air cavalry or suggested by the air cavalry as a result of air cavalry personnel not in conjunction with other intelligence reports.

The air cavalry detachment working in conjunction with the air cavalry avoided engaging nine targets in the air cavalry and had confirmed destruction of one tank, two APC's, and eight trucks. All controlled the disposition of the air cavalry detachment and initially assigned them to operate in the air cavalry in any area that would have a possible impact threat.

During this period, because of the intense and sustained air cavalry activity in the military region, the air cavalry was somewhat restricted. Although the air cavalry was still active, the activity of the air cavalry was somewhat restricted because of intelligence reports and maintaining reconnaissance along the river in the air cavalry.

This effort by the air cavalry, coordinated by the air cavalry, was successful in that the corridor of the air cavalry was kept abreast of the current enemy activity in the region and was better able to advise the III Corps Commander of methods of dealing with the enemy threat.

(2) Standdown Phase: Upon notification of the corridor, the air cavalry began the actual standdown procedure. All personnel assigned were briefed by the Chief of the air cavalry as to the time-table and their specific action.

tactical operations were halted and the radio nets were closed. The radio equipment was turned in to the appropriate agencies. All continuing operational functions and report functions were assumed by the 3-3 section on 11. All activities normally in contact with the air cavalry for aviation support were notified of the standdown and informed to proceed any requests through the 3-3 section. All activities at the plantation installation were closed out and all personnel and equipment moved to the 3-3 section, 12th Group on 11.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: 11/1.

(4) Roll-Up Phase: 11/1.

D. Section 2:

(1) Pre-4-Day: No significant observations were noted.

(2) At 0000Z 4-Day: All strict prohibitions were lifted and high status of coordination was noted. The entire duration of 4-Day was less than 24 hours and all of the remaining required functions of 4-Day were broken by the 4-5 Section of 1200Z Army on 11.

The only problem noted to be noted was the problem of 01-47 on 11 in 11 III. Due to the severe rules in 11 IV and of the International General Commission for Investigation and the Joint Military Commission, 01-47 on 11 was very restricted immediately after 4-Day. It is recommended that early coordination be effected through Vietnam and Air Force elements to provide 01-47 support for aircraft recovery after the situation of 01-47 on 11.

(3) Withdrawal Date: 11/1

(4) Roll-Up Date: 11/1

for [Signature] LTC
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LTC, [Signature]
Chief, [Signature]