

# AFTER ACTION REPORT



1st Avn Bde

17th AVIATION GROUP (CBT)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 17TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96318

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SEE DISTRIBUTION

Forwarded herewith is the after action report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) terminating 11 March 1973 upon deactivation of the unit, and forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15, 20 November 1970, and 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN J-215 dated 27 November 1972. This report includes the activities of HHC, 17th Aviation Group (Combat), Eagle Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional), 201st Aviation Company (Corps), H Troop (Air), 17th Armored Cavalry Squadron, 57th Assault Helicopter Company, 60th Assault Helicopter Company, and the 604th Transportation Company (Direct Support).



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Commanding

Incl

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## B. PERSONNEL

1. Replacements: 17th CAG received a total of 267 individual replacements during this period as compared to 1523 individual replacements during the previous reporting period. This was the result of completely shutting off the replacement stream in the middle of October when it appeared that a cease fire was near. When the cease fire did not materialize, nearly a month and a half passed before replacements again began arriving. The replacement stream again was shut-off on 20 January, following positive negotiations toward a cease fire.

2. Strength: The overall strength of 17th CAG varied during this reporting period. The general trend was decreasing strength due to a fewer number of replacements brought about by the impending cease fire, until the latter part of December when it seemed apparent that the Group would be here for some time and unit strength increased until X-day. A breakdown of Group strength by unit on X-day is included in Inclosure 3. The strength of 17th CAG on X-day was 1616 personnel.

3. Personnel management: Personnel turbulence was not as high during this period as during the last reporting period. The significant problem was having to complete assigned missions with a decreasing number of personnel. At the low point, the end of November, Group strength was 72% of authorized, and some units were as low as 65% authorized strength.

4. A&D: During this period 1 Nov 72 - 27 Jan 73 the Awards and Decorations Section of 17th CAG S-1 processed some 1700 awards of which approximately 100 were from the Republic of Vietnam to U.S. personnel. The section was responsible for processing service awards and achievement awards for all deserving personnel in the Group in preparation for deactivation. This was handled in a period of 30 days.

5. MOS Testing: MOS testing was considerably facilitated during this period because 518th PSC handled most of the necessary coordination at the Group's three primary locations, sending a representative to administer the exams. All personnel in need of testing were tested.

6. Reenlistment Program: There were 25 reenlistments in 17th CAG during this reporting period: 17 first termers and 8 career soldiers. The objective was 9 first termers. The percentage was 188% for this unit.

7. Civilian Personnel: Civilian personnel are hired from local resources of indigenous personnel. The local nationals are hired through two programs, permanent hires or direct daily hires.

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(a) Permanent hires: Each unit, after submitting its current and projected civilian personnel requirements IAW USARV Reg 570-2 through this HQ to 1st Avn Bde, is authorized to employ local nationals on a permanent basis. The permanent hires are employed in positions such as kitchen police, carpenters, secretaries, handymen, etc. A list of permanent hires by unit is provided below.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF PERSONNEL</u>
HHC, 17th CAG	24
57th AHC	8
H Troop/17th ACS	8
201st CAC	30
60th AHC	7
180th ASHC	7
129th AHC	8
H Troop/10th ACS	8
604th Trans Co	<u>65</u>

165

(b) Direct daily hires: Direct daily hires are employed on a daily as needed basis. They are primarily used for unskilled labor such as filling sandbags and general police. They are paid through ATK funds.

#### 8. Casualties:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>1-27 Jan</u>
KIA	0	0	1
MIA	0	0	0
WIA	5	3	3
Non-hostile death	0	0	0
Non-hostile injury (serious)	2	1	1

9. Drugs: The 17th CAG Drug Program had one major change in its operation during this period. The program prescribed that all individuals who came up positive on any type of urinalysis, initial or follow-up, were to be transferred to the Detoxification Center for eventual medical evacuation to CONUS. The Group Commander felt that some individuals might make deliberate attempts to come up positive on a urinalysis in an effort to leave Vietnam prior to

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these DEROS, so he modified the program for 17th CAG to allow the unit commander to determine if the individual should be returned to his unit after detoxification.

10. Human relations: The human relations program within 17th CAG had a decrease in activity after the initial announcement that a cease fire was imminent. Incidents that required investigation by the human relations officer decreased considerably. Individuals who may have been prone to lodge complaints concerning racial discrimination or unequal opportunities for promotion, duty assignment, etc., seemed to want to let the alleged conditions continue since everyone felt we would be standing down soon. As with most other activities, the human relations program did have a slight increase in activity starting in late December when most people felt we would be in Vietnam for some time longer. Throughout this period most of the units continued to have their human relations council meetings on a somewhat regular basis. LT Samuel Patterson returned from the defense Race Relations Institute at Patrick Air Force Base, Fla. on 5 Jan 73. He was assigned from ECAB TDY to USARV to begin a tour of Vietnam teaching a four hour block of instruction dealing with race relations to all E-6's in Vietnam.

11. Chaplain: Chaplain Thomas departed Camp Holloway in mid November without a replacement. Regular services continued, however, with a Protestant chaplain visiting Camp Holloway from MR II Hq. Denominational services continued to be provided each week by members of the LDS faith. ECAB was assigned a new chaplain in mid-December.

12. Headquarters Management: The Group operates a message center which is utilized for all distribution from and between units and this Hq. It also provides a UH-1H as a daily courier to transport personnel and distribution to An Son, Ninh Hoa, and Nha Trang.

13. Group Surgeon: During the current reporting period 17th Group maintained 3 medical detachments, the 94th at Camp Holloway, the 546th at An Son, and the 25th at Nha Trang. The 25th additionally provided support to the 60th AHC at Ninh Hoa. All detachments were adequately staffed during the period of this report. In preparation for deactivation, all dispensaries screened records, returning all active records to the units. Records for personnel who could not be located were boxed and shipped to the Adjutant General, Washington D.C. Numerous staff visits were made to the medical detachments to assist in inspections of installation sewage disposal, food service facilities, garbage and trash disposal, insect and rodent control, and dog control. The latter was especially important, as rabies in RVN reached epidemic proportions. Assistance was also rendered in preparation and submission of required reports. The Surgeon's office also supported several civic action projects. In the Pleiku area, MEDCAPS were made by MAJ Pollard and 94th MED personnel on a regular basis to the many Montagard villages in the area. Additionally MEDCAPS were performed at the leprosarium near An Son. The end of the reporting period found all detachments preparing to turn over equipment to ARVN medical units.

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14. HHC: During the period from 1 November 1972 to 27 January 1973, the primary problem area in Headquarters Company was that of morale. There were many contributing factors: Primary was anxiety concerning the future, of which the most important factor was news of the progress being made towards a cease fire agreement and general withdrawal of troops. The uncertainty of the situation generated much speculation as to the possibility of extended or curtailed tours. The slowdown in the replacement stream caused turbulence in many areas resulting in increased workloads and a reevaluation of personnel utilization criteria. As preliminary withdrawal plans were made and put into effect the administrative workload correspondingly increased while the flow of unit supply items, engineer support materials, and maintenance repair parts decreased. To combat the adverse impact of these factors upon the personnel of Headquarters Company, several programs were initiated. Participation in a variety of sports was encouraged, to include intra- and intermural competition in softball, volleyball, and flag football. A facilities improvement program stressed fire prevention, area clean-up, and the resandbagging of all living quarters. Finally, timely dissemination of information at all levels had a positive and stabilizing effect on personnel, combined with other steps taken to increase efficiency, improve morale, and maintain a high level of performance.

#### POST X - DAY

#### 15. Unit Strength and Strength Accountability

a. As in any deactivation, one of the most difficult tasks is strength accountability. Morning reports which had been active since 1965 had to be zeroed. A command muster was conducted on X+37 to make any necessary strength adjustments in order to enable the units to properly account for all personnel and zero their morning reports. However, because of the command emphasis that had been placed on strength accountability during the previous eight months, only one strength error was found within the entire Group. 17th CAG was able to close out all of its morning reports with no problems.

b. Group strength on X day was 1616 personnel. The following list which depicts Group strength during the post X-day period, should be viewed in conjunction with inclosure 2 which indicates unit stations during the deactivation period.

<u>STATION</u>	<u>TIME</u> X+15	<u>STRENGTH</u>
An Son		460
Pleiku		422
<u>Nha Trang</u>		<u>374</u>
Group Total		1,256

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X+30

An Son	184
Pleiku	262
<u>Nha Trang</u>	<u>237</u>
Group Total	683

X+45

Nha Trang	128
<u>Pleiku</u>	<u>28</u>
Group Total	156

Although the Group will deactivate on X+45, the 201st CAC at Nha Trang will remain active to support Operation Homecoming, and the ICCS aviation detachment will remain in Pleiku.

## 16. Personnel Management and Redeployment

a. With the announcement of X day, it soon became apparent that much of the guidance contained in both SRAC and 1st Aviation Bde OPLAN's J-215 had been outdated or invalidated as a result of the rapid changes in the time frames for departure of personnel. This plan received extensive modification during a meeting with 1st Aviation Bde on X-3. This was followed at 17th Group on X-2 with a meeting of all company commanders.

b. The initial requirement of the standdown was to identify all personnel on leave or TDY in CONUS and make a determination by X+ 5 as to whether or not they were considered mission essential. If so, they would be returned to RVN. Of the 68 personnel in this category, 13 were considered to be mission essential and were returned to RVN within 14 days. Of personnel in the units on X-day, five enlisted men and six officers were declared mission essential and required to remain past their normal DEROS. Additionally, as of X-day, all routine personnel actions ceased.

c. In anticipation of X-day, the 527th PSC provided 17th CAG with machine rosters supposedly containing a listing of all personnel within Group. These rosters were approximately 60% correct because of severe personnel turbulence encountered since the last muster which the machine branch had not updated. Each unit was to update these rosters and provide release dates on all personnel within the unit by X+1. Naturally, the unit commander not knowing the date for disposition of his aircraft, property, or release from mission requirements, could in no way even closely estimate an accurate date for the release of specific personnel. Recognizing that these rosters were worthless for the purpose they were intended- the cutting of DEROS orders - necessary coordination was effected with the 518th PSC to have all DEROS orders cut with an effective date of X+45 and subsequently amend them upon



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the individual's arrival at Camp Alpha for final outprocessing. This worked extremely well and allowed the unit commander maximum flexibility to adjust to the ever changing operational requirements.

d. Upon receiving incremental quotas from 1st Avn Bde, units were assigned quotas for shipping, thus enabling the unit to determine individual DEROSes since they best knew their remaining requirements. Since all group personnel were basically located at three locations—Pleiku, An Son, and Nha Trang—generally each location was scheduled for a shipment every third day. This varied somewhat in the second increment when priority was given to closing out An Son and in the third increment to closing out Pleiku. Generally, heavy shipments were effected early in the increment in consonance with existing mission requirements in order to eliminate any foreseen problems caused by transportation. This worked extremely well as all increments were completed at least three to four days ahead of schedule. All transportation requirements were coordinated with SRAC. Except for the period when all transportation was cancelled in Vietnam, never was a flight requested that was not filled. Some intragroup reassignments had to be accomplished in the final increment in order to insure that all units were closed out as scheduled since 201st CAC was the only unit authorized personnel after X+45. This was accomplished with minimum delay by 518th, and all 17th CAG units completed their standdown well ahead of schedule. Throughout the entire deactivation period, the cooperation received from the 518th PSC and the rapidity with which they responded to the myriad requirements of 17th CAG was outstanding.

#### 17. Awards and Decorations:

All awards and decorations were required to be processed and forwarded to 1st Aviation Brigade prior to X+30 with the exception of the achievement awards for the standdown period. The problems encountered were basically that the subordinate units did not maintain appropriate files and suspense systems so as to know exactly who had been submitted for awards. This resulted in several awards being submitted after the established suspense date. This caused no major problem as the late submissions were coordinated with 1st Aviation Brigade and expeditiously processed in order to insure that all deserving personnel had been appropriately recognized for their accomplishments. Sixty-eight awards for achievement during the deactivation period were submitted on X+33. To insure that only deserving personnel received awards, all completed awards were monitored to insure that personnel whose conduct or efficiency had deteriorated during the period since the award was submitted would not receive the award. Some cases arose in which individual service awards were revoked because of drug abuse, disciplinary problems, or other unfavorable actions by the individual. As a result of using the USARV Form 197-R for service awards, preparation time was cut drastically, and the majority of personnel received their awards prior to departing their unit.

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18. Reenlistment Program: All reenlistment activities ceased as of X-day.

19. Civilian Personnel

a. As of X-day there were 165 authorized permanent hire civilian personnel employed by 17th Group. Termination requests for all spaces were handcarried to Nha Trang Civilian Personnel Office by each unit prior to X+10. The primary factor affecting release of CPO slots was the planned closure and consolidation of mess facilities and unit deactivation dates. Terminal (advance) time sheets were handcarried to Saigon on X+23 so that CPO employees could be paid on their release dates. All Domestic Hire employees were terminated on X+17 in order to avoid paying an extra month's severance pay. House maids possessing USARV passes were allowed to work on an individually arranged basis until deactivation.

b. During the deactivation period, large numbers of daily hire personnel were used for police of the installations.

20. Casualties: During the deactivation period, 17th Group sustained two casualties, both of whom were wounded by enemy fire at 1010 hours on X-day (28 January), while flying through the An Khe Pass.

21. Human Relations: All Human Relations activities ceased on X-day.

22. Drug Program: The administration of the drug program remained unchanged during the standdown period. A unit sweep was conducted for all units so that those personnel who departed after X+30, when the testing capability of Camp Alpha had departed, would have a commander's certificate stating that they had been negative in a urinalysis in the past 60 days. All drug related records were destroyed at X+30.

23. Headquarters Management: On X-day, the 1st Aviation Brigade courier was cancelled, thus placing the responsibility for distribution to and from Saigon in the hands of 17th CAG. In order to properly coordinate this and other administrative requirements, a three man liason team consisting of one lieutenant, one E-6, and one E-5 was established at the 518th PSC. The team's mission was to handle all distribution, effect necessary coordination with 1st Avn Bde and 518th PSC, handle all incoming flights of DEROS personnel from 17th CAG, and arrange for their expeditious processing through Finance and Personnel. The Group UH-1H courier continued to run on a daily basis until X+34 when it began every other day operation. The Group courier ceased operation on X+40.

24. Unit Funds: The 17th CAG S-2 was appointed to audit all unit funds. This was accomplished by X+20. Many administrative errors were found and

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corrected in the various unit funds and all money and property was properly accounted for.

25. Domestic Hire Funds: An auditor was appointed to conduct terminal audits on all DOHIF's in 17th CAG. This was completed by X+25.

26. Personal Property and Records: All personal property and records for personnel out of country on X-day who did not return to RVN were shipped to the individual's next duty station via hold baggage and registered mail. Additionally, a personal letter was written to each individual advising him of the bill of lading or registration number, and the address to which his property and records had been shipped in an effort to preclude lost items if the individual was diverted from his original assignment while on leave.

27. OERS: All OER's were required to be completed and to the 518th PSC by X+40. Many problems immediately became evident. The form to be used was the DA form 67-7, a new form that had just been implemented for use on 1 Jan 1973. Most of the rating officers were not familiar with the new form or the rating system itself. Even though the new AR 623-105 had been requisitioned, the requisitions were not filled and there were not sufficient copies of the new AR. To counteract this, a 12 page lesson plan was prepared and distributed to each officer and warrant officer within 17th CAG. The lesson plan covered in great detail the new OER and how to complete it. It proved to be a very valuable tool during this period. Still, numerous OER's had to be retyped because of administrative errors. The fact that there were in excess of 400 OER's to be prepared under this new system was complicated by the dwindling supply of clerical assets. In order to insure that all officers and warrant officers received OER's, appropriate control procedures were established at group level and cross checked with the units as well as the servicing PSC to insure that the OER's not only were completed, but also that they arrived at the PSC and were appropriately posted on the individuals 201 file and further forwarded to DA.

28. Group Surgeon: On X-day all medical detachments obtained current unit rosters from each supported unit. These rosters were used to check against immunization records. On X+5 all personnel needing immunizations were scheduled to receive them between X+6 and X+10. Between X+11 and X+16 all medical property was inventoried and turned over to ARVN medical units. Throughout the entire period, sick call and other medical services continued on a normal basis. Medical personnel were released to DEROS predicated on the population of supported units.

29. Headquarters Company: During the period from X-day to standdown, Headquarters Company experienced considerable turmoil in all areas. As unit strength continued to decrease, the workload for remaining personnel naturally increased, which created a morale problem in certain areas. This condition was aggravated by the increased frequency of guard duty. Other con-

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tributing factors were reduction of facilities such as PX, clubs, lack of a fulltime chaplain, and the fact that the city of Pleiku was placed off-limits. Difficulties were also encountered in obtaining maintenance support for building repair as curtailment of services continued. The lack of repair parts hampered vehicle support and caused excessive deadline time and premature turn-in. Strength accountability became a critical concern since the morning report reflected those on TDY to other units, as well as individuals who were working in An Son, Nha Trang, Pleiku, Phan Thiet, and Saigon. Factors which aided in countering these negative aspects included timely dissemination of information, free beer and soda, and recognition of large numbers of individuals for services rendered, to include awards and letters of appreciation. NHC morning report was zeroed on X+39, and all remaining personnel transferred to the 201st CAC.

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### C. Intelligence and Security

1. Enemy activity during this reporting period has been relatively intense in several areas of MR II. The primary areas of activity have been Kontum, Pleiku and Binh Dinh Provinces. These three provinces are the largest in ~~land~~ area and contain the largest portion of the population in the MR. Pleiku and Kontum provinces also have common borders with Cambodia and Laos which provide the enemy excellent supply routes into northern MR II. Enemy supplies have and will continue to flow unhindered across the borders of Cambodia and Laos into Pleiku and Kontum.

2. After suffering heavy losses during the last reporting period (in excess of 10,000 KIA) enemy units began concentrating on less well defended GVN positions. On 3 November the ARVN Fire Support Base at Duc Co, located 12 kilometers from the Cambodian border, came under heavy enemy attack early in the morning and was subsequently overrun and occupied in the afternoon. ABFs by 120 mm and 82 mm mortars and, reportedly, 130 mm field guns, characterized enemy preparations for the ground attack. T-54 tanks were used for the first time in Pleiku Province during the assault which took Duc Co. Two tanks were disabled by the 57th Avn Co and two others by VNAF. The enemy also employed numerous .51 caliber AA machine guns resulting in numerous shot-ats and hits to friendly aircraft.

3. On 1 November friendly forces launched an operation to recapture Duc Co and to disrupt activity by the 320th NVA Division in western Pleiku Province. The operation culminated in the recapture of Duc Co on 15 December. Enemy forces withdrew across the Cambodian border to regroup and resupply after sustaining over 1,000 KIAs in 6 weeks. Duc Co was given up by ARVN again 13 January 1973.

4. The vast majority of Kontum Province remained under the control of enemy forces during the reporting period. The only territory under the undisputed control of the GVN was the area immediately surrounding Kontum City. The GVN also continued to hold outposts at Dak Pek and Mang Buk as well as Fire Support Bases along QL 14 to the north and south of the city. The Kontum Pass was generally open although there were periods of short duration when it was closed by the enemy.

5. One enemy division, the 10th Infantry Division, and other regimental sized B-3 Front subordinate units operated exclusively in Kontum Province during the reporting period. Surveillance of the Kontum area by H Troop, (AIR) 17th Armored Cavalry Squadron confirmed preparations for an attack upon Kontum City by the NVA. Enemy activity increased sharply in the Province, particularly in areas to the west and southwest of the city. It appeared that the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment, a B-3 Front subordinate, moved south from the Ben Het-Dak To area to a location directly west of Kontum City. The city itself sustained only a few minor ABFs, suffering little damage

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and few casualties. However, the GVN Fire Support Base November, located approximately 5 kilometers to the northwest of the city on QL 14, was the target of almost continuous heavy ABFs and light ground probes from late November until the afternoon of 23 December when it was overrun by NVA elements. The base was not retaken by ARVN forces until eight days later, although some 80 ARVN troops were trapped in the base and were able to maintain themselves throughout the period the enemy held the base. An attack upon the city may have been forestalled by massive B-52 strikes upon areas to the north and west of the city, but more probably by the advent of the cease fire on 28 January.

6. In Binh Dinh Province during the early portion of the reporting period, enemy uncertainty with regard to the cease fire led them to concentrate their efforts upon political indoctrination operations while open acts of hostility remained minimal. ABFs constituted the most serious enemy activity in November although an attempt was made to close QL-19. December saw a substantial increase in ABFs, particularly in the northern part of the province where the majority of the 3rd NVA Division was located. Late December saw a substantial increase in enemy movement throughout the province. This activity continued into January when major elements of the 2nd NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division moved from Quang Ngai Province into the An Lao Valley in northern Binh Dinh. Mid-January saw the only major enemy attack in the province during the reporting period. On 12 January two NVA battalions mounted an attack against the Tam Quan District Headquarters. The attack was repulsed and enemy activity subsided into less spectacular efforts to gain control of territory prior to the cease fire. ARVN convoys were ambushed infrequently along QL-19 and the Mang Yang and An Khe Passes were closed briefly on at least two occasions during the reporting period. Again, as in the case of Kontum Province, the enemy controls the largest percentage of the land area of Binh Dinh. GVN forces have been able to keep QL-19 open from Qui Nhon to Pleiku and maintain a series of bases along QL-1 north and south of Qui Nhon.

7. Late January saw the deployment of half of an Air Cavalry team from H Troop, 10th Armored Cavalry to Binh Thuan Province where an enemy attack upon Phan Thiet City was considered imminent. The attack, however, was not made. One light observation helicopter was shot down and the US observer killed two days before the cease fire went into effect.

8. Most of northern MR II remained in the control of the enemy during the reporting period. ARVN forces were spread rather thinly trying to keep the major road networks open and defend the cities. While the GVN controlled less land area, it did maintain control over the vast majority of the population. Aside from the three northern provinces in the MR, enemy activity in the remainder of the MR consisted chiefly of an occasional ABF against RF/PF outposts and an unsuccessful attack against the southwest suburbs of Dalat City.

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9. During the reporting period Pleiku Airbase was the target of numerous ABFs by 122 mm rockets. Although several aircraft were damaged and a few were destroyed by these attacks, damage in the main was minimal and personnel losses were insignificant. MR II headquarters was rocketed on 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 January. The MR II Inspector General was killed during the 27 January attack. On 28 January the headquarters received two rocket attacks, one just prior to 0800 hrs and one after the beginning of the cease fire. Little damage was sustained during any of these attacks which came generally from positions in the northwest and southwest-rocket boxes. Local Force VC units were responsible for the attacks.

10. Enemy strength and order of battle changes have been significant since the end of the last reporting period. There are now 102 NVA maneuver battalions estimated to be operating in MR II, an increase of 22 since 1 November 1972. Their total strength at the end of the reporting period was put at approximately 18,400 as compared to 9,000 late in October of last year. The increase is due in large part to the inclusion of the 2nd NVA Division into the order of battle holdings and to the introduction of several new units into the MR since mid-November. The 2nd NVA Division was added to the order of battle lists primarily because it utilizes base camps in northern Binh Dinh from which to stage operations into Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces. Also, the 24th NVA Regiment moved back into MR II from MR III in early December to reinforce the 320th NVA Division which operated in Pleiku Province and the 7th and 83rd Engineer Regiments operating in Kontum Province were added to the order of battle in January. These latter two regiments were primarily engaged in the movement of supplies into the northern portion of the MR and improving and maintaining the enemy's extensive road network in Kontum, Pleiku and Binh Dinh Provinces. The 10th Infantry Division was formed in Kontum Province out of assets that were already available to the B-3 Front. The division was apparently formed to provide better command and control of B-3 Front subordinates operating in the province which would have been the main forces used in an attack upon Kontum City.

11. Local Force VC units remained relatively quiescent during the reporting period. VC strength was put at approximately 3,800 to 4,100, with units operating in most provinces of the MR.

#### POST X - DAY

12. On X-day, 28 January 1973, the S-2, 17th Group and S-2 Eagle Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional) began the standdown phase of operations. On X-day, organic intelligence operations and other intelligence sources rapidly diminished their output. During the standdown phase, security control guidance and assistance was furnished the units and staff sections by both the

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Group S-2 and Eagle Battalion S-2 and included the following:

- a. Instructions for the final base closure security measures were furnished to all units and tenant organizations.
- b. Effected coordination with the 525 MI Detachment at Pleiku for the base closure inspections.
- c. Security debriefings were given to personnel who had access to classified information.
- d. War trophy registrations were authenticated by the S-2, Eagle Bn, Group S-2, and local Provost Marshal offices.

13. The following is a chronological list of the significant activities of the standdown phase:

- a. X-day-Organic intelligence operations ceased.
- b. X+1 - X+4 - Classified files were reduced to bare operational minimums.
- c. X+8 - Ninh Hoa Installation was cleared. The Group S-2 met with Major Young, DCOPS MACV, with reference to the final base security checks. Initial guidance was given to commanders of units at Camp Holloway on base closure security checks.
- d. X+10 - Reduced map stockage at group. Eagle Bn turned all maps over to the Vietnamese National Police.
- e. X+12 - Published a letter to all commanders giving guidance relative to base closure security checks and providing for individual unit base closure inspection teams.
- f. X+15 - Eagle Bn burned remaining secret documents and closed out the classified documents register, forwarding it to Group Headquarters with the destruction certificate file. Eagle Bn retired the S-2 filing system.
- g. X+19 - Two E-5's and one E-4 were assigned to Group S-2 to conduct base closure inspections of units at Camp Holloway.
- h. X+23 - Eagle Battalion commenced final security check of all 17th CAG units at Lane-An Son Installation.
- i. X+24 - Final security check by 525 MI Group made of H/17, 604th Trans Det, and the old D/17th Infantry areas. H/17th & 604th cleared Camp



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Holloway.

j. X+36 - Group S-2 classified files were further reduced. The only secret documents remaining were those which pertained to the installation mine field. 201st CAC closed its classified document register and forwarded it to Group S-2.

k. X+37 - Camp Holloway mine field was turned over to the ARVN. A copy of the letter of transmittal was sent to 1st Aviation Brigade by registered mail.

l. X+38 - Last secret documents were destroyed. Classified documents register was closed out.

m. X+40 - Final security checks of Camp Holloway were completed. Installation was turned over to the ARVN.

n. X+41 - Classified document register was turned over to 1st Aviation Brigade.

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#### D. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. Flight Operations: Flying hours and performance figures for the 17th CAG are listed in Inclosure 4.

2. Installation Defense procedures for the four bases under the control of the 17th CAG are as follows:

a. Camp Holloway: (17th CAG HQ's)

(1) The Camp Holloway perimeter is 3.5 miles in length. Thirty observation towers are situated around the perimeter which is illuminated by flood-lights during the hours of darkness. There are 3-4 fighting positions between each tower and these are manned during periods of 100% alert.

(2) Each tower has land line communication to the Installation Defense Coordination Center. Six command towers, equally spaced around the perimeter have radio contact with IDCC. Interpreters are present in IDCC to facilitate control and the roving commander of the relief in  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicle is accompanied by an interpreter.

(3) All towers are manned with a minimum of three personnel during the hours of darkness. This number is increased to four during other than normal alert status. Presently twenty-six towers are manned with ~~MCNG~~ guards, and six by US personnel. Local Nationals are not permitted to fire upon or otherwise engage penetrators except as authorized by regulation.

(4) Triple concertina and double apron wire are the nucleus of the perimeter defense. Trip flares are located throughout the perimeter and selected sectors have antipersonnel mines. Claymore mines are installed throughout the entire perimeter. One third of the perimeter has pressure sensitive detectors installed outside the wire and these are monitored (aurally and visually) in one of the U.S. manned towers. This sensor field is gradually being expanded in width and depth. In addition two AN/PPS-5 radars are installed on towers and used to detect movement within the area of coverage. A U.S. manned mortar position is located at the eastern end of the compound. Infantry personnel assigned to the Air Cavalry Troop man this position and have 3 - 81mm and 2 - 60mm mortars. Defensive concentrations have been registered around the perimeter. The mortar section responds with observed fire against suspected or known enemy attempts to penetrate the defensive wire after ARVN clearance to fire is obtained by IDCC personnel.

(5) Each day at first light a low-level sweep is made by helicopter of the wire and of the terrain extending 3000 meters from the perimeter. During the hours darkness a UH-1H equipped with a XENON searchlight and two miniguns is launched on a random basis to provide aerial surveillance of Camp Holloway, Pleiku Air Base, and the rocket boxes. Average hours flown by

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this aircraft each night is two to three. Two AH-1G's are maintained on a 5 minute standby status and respond as required by tactical developments in the Pleiku area.

(6) During this time period 6 bunkers were re-built, over 500 claymore pits were built IAW USAF standards and 40 new fighting positions were constructed. In addition to this, much of the tall grass, both inside and outside of the perimeter, has been burned. Due to the lack of personnel, much of this was accomplished by daily laborers under US supervision.

b. An Son (Eagle Bn):

(1) The perimeter security for Lane Army Helibort is provided by 9th Company, 3rd Bn., 26th Regt., Capitol ROK Infantry Division. The 9th Company mans 28 towers and as many bunkers as possible depending on the number of troops they are required to provide in support of combat operations.

(2) LAH has an inner circumference of 2.4 statute miles. Defensive positions located around the perimeter include 29 guard towers, 53 bunkers, and 72 fighting positions. The perimeter is illuminated by flood lights during the hours of darkness. A flare ship is on fifteen minute strip standby during normal conditions and is on a five minute standby during alert conditions.

(3) There are between two and four belts of triple concertina and double-apron wire surrounding the perimeter of LAH. Numerous trip flares are located throughout the perimeter barrier. There are presently 762 M18A1 claymore mines around the perimeter. There are 18 operational sensor units. The sensor bunker on the perimeter is manned by US personnel. These individuals are equipped with starlight scopes and have land-line communications with ECAB TOC.

(4) Fire support for LAH is obtained through the use of organic aircraft, 9th ROK Company 81mm mortars, and 105mm and 155mm artillery support from the 628th ROK Artillery Bn. The 129th AHC provides one light fire team on 15 minute strip standby during normal conditions.

(5) Each night a last light low-level VR is made of the immediate area out to 4,000 meters in certain directions. During the hours of darkness, a UH-1H equipped with a XENON searchlight and two M-60's is launched on a random basis to provide perimeter aerial surveillance.

c. Camp Worthington Ninh Hoa (60th AHC):

(1) Security is provided by personnel from the 9th ROK Division. ROK forces utilize 24 towers, 88 crew served weapons positions, 527 one-man positions, and 6 observation posts to conduct their defense.

(2) The perimeter is 6.2 miles in circumference, and is illu-

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minated by 505 floodlights. Artillery support is provided by 2 batteries located within the confines of Camp Worthington. Fire power is provided by 4 105mm howitzers, and 4 155mm howitzers. Additional artillery is located outside the perimeter, and consists of 6 105mm howitzers.

(3) A ready reaction force consisting of one rifle company with APC's for mobility is available for perimeter defense, if required, ARVN forces available consist of one infantry battalion, 3 infantry companies, and 44 RF/PF platoons dispersed throughout the local 15 KM area.

d. Nha Trang Airbase/Camp McDermott (201st and 604th):

(1) The 201st Avn Co. flight line is not separated by any barriers from the remainder of the Air Base. A fence approximately ten (10) feet high, topped with concertina wire, surrounds the 604th Trans Co. work area with the exception of the ramp on the north side.

(2) During daylight hours, security for the 201st Avn Co work area is provided by approximately one hundred (100) US personnel working in the area. Security during daylight hours for the 604th Trans. Co. working area is provided by four (4) NUNG guards and approximately fifty (50) US military personnel.

(3) Security for the 201st Avn Co. area between 1800 and 0600 is provided by twelve (12) US guards, a three man roving patrol (two US personnel and one Vietnamese QC) and an NCOIC. Four walking guards and the roving patrol observe the entire area. At the beginning of November, 15 NUNG guards were hired to supplement existing security measures.

(4) Security for the 604th Trans Co. area between 1800 and 0600 is provided by six (6) US guards, thirteen (13) personnel working in the area and twenty-one (21) NUNG guards. Two (2) US personnel and two (2) NUNG guards control access through the two gates to the 604th area during the hours of darkness. The remainder of the US personnel and NUNG guards are stationed at various positions throughout the area.

(5) As discussed in the report of the previous period, neither the 201st Avn Co. ramp or the 604th Trans Co. ramp has sufficient lighting. Some light is provided in the 201st area by four (4) lamps near the hangar and residual light from the sheds. The majority of the light in the 604th area is a result of the open sheds. Additional lighting for both units was requested, but due to pending deactivation no action was ever taken.

3. Unit Movement: NONE

4. Unit Mission Changes: NONE

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5. Unit Gains: NONE

6. Unit Losses: NONE

7. Significant Operations: During this reporting period the 17th CAG was not involved in any major operations. Inclosure 5 outlines a summary of individual unit operations.

8. Training:

a. With the decrease in enemy activity in the MR during the reporting period, the Group was able to once again devote an appropriate amount of time to training, to include instrument training as well as normal standardization rides. The 30 day extension of required standardization rides which was noted during the last reporting period was rescinded in view of the increased availability of aircraft.

b. In an effort to continually upgrade IP/SIP standards, frequent visits of 1st Aviation Brigade SIP's were solicited. Additionally, a USARV standardization board meeting was held in mid-January, continuing a practice started in October 1972. 17 IP's and SIP's attended.

c. Training in nap of the earth techniques, initiated during the previous reporting period, were continued with favorable results. Classes were given at the unit level on techniques of nap of the earth flying and low level navigation. Additionally, each 90 day standardization ride included a check of these skills.

d. Each unit was required to hold an orientation briefing for each newly arrived aviator. The briefing covered a wide range of subjects including the unit missions, unit operations, maintenance, safety, standardization, enemy situation, and any other subject which would enable the aviator to function safely and effectively in his new environment.

e. Unit training was conducted in arms familiarization. Each unit familiarized with all weapons organic to the unit on a 90 day basis.

POST X - DAY

9. Flight Operations: Flying hours and performance figures for the deactivation period are listed in Inclosure 4.

10. Installation Defense Procedures during this period were as follows:

a. Camp Holloway:

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(1) The installation defenses remained unchanged until X+10 with the exception that the first and last light VR of the perimeter was discontinued on X-day. Additionally, operational control of the UH-1H gun/light ship (Nighthawk), and the AH-1G light fire team was shifted from the Installation Defense Coordination Center (IDCC), to the Group Operations Center (GOC).

(2) On X+10, the pressure sensitive detectors installed in one third of the perimeter were no longer manned due to personnel shortages. These were turned over to ARVN in place and operational on X+13. Additionally on X+13, the radio link sensors were retrieved from the field by an air lifted patrol from the sensor section, and turned in to H/17th ACS supply.

(3) On X+11, all AH-1G's which had provided aerial fire support were turned in for retrograde.

(4) At X+20 the two AN/PPS-5 radars located in bunkers 13 and 17 were turned in to H Troop 17th ACS. Also, on X+20, the mortar section of H Troop, 17th ACS was stooddown and the equipment turned in. This left Camp Holloway without organic indirect support fire power although artillery was still available through ARVN.

(5) At X+22 all bunkers were manned with NUNG guards. This was due to the reduction in forces of U.S. units at Holloway. To help in the security of the perimeter, two  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks with two US sergeants and one NUNG interpreter each patrolled the bunker line continuously at night. These two vehicles, as well as the OG's, had radio contact with IDCC at all times. Along with bunker guards, the security police guarded the main gate 24 hours a day. During the standdown, the SP's increased their searching of vehicles and individuals for stolen property and contraband items.

(6) On X+24 those personnel from H Troop, 17th ACS needed to maintain IDCC were transferred to HHC, 17th CAG. These included twelve security police, three radio operators, six sergeants of the guard, two NUNG supervisory personnel, one E-7 platoon sergeant, and two E-6 section leaders. These personnel, under the supervision of three officers, stooddown the security operations of Camp Holloway on X+40.

(7) On X+25, all crewserved weapons, and M-79 grenade launchers were turned in. Perimeter guards were armed with M-16's only after this date.

(8) On X+34, all tactical (field) telephones were removed and turned in. This removed the land line communication link between the perimeter and the IDCC. The six command towers, equally spaced around the perimeter, were provided with radios for contact with the IDCC. Interpreters were present in the IDCC 24 hours a day to help facilitate command and control.

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(9) The Camp Holloway minefields were turned over to the ARVN on X+39. It was found that incomplete and inadequate records had been kept and that four areas suspected of containing mines were located on Camp Holloway. These areas were recorded and marked according to regulation and were turned over to ARVN as suspected mine fields. The claymore mines which were installed along the perimeter and numbered over 500 were turned over to ARVN in place and operational.

(10) Camp Holloway was turned over to ARVN on X+40, and all US personnel evacuated.

b. Lane-An Son Installation: Installation defense at An Son changed very little during the post X-day period. The 9th Co., 3rd BN., 26th Regt., Capitol ROK Infantry Division continued to man the perimeter during the entire period until closeout of An Son. On X+1, the flare ship was no longer on stand by during the hours of darkness. Fire support for Lane after X+2 was provided by the organic mortars of the 9th ROK Company. The 129th AHC provided one light fire team on 15 minutes stand by from X-day through X+11. There were no low level VR's of the perimeter made after X-day. The 18 sensor units were turned over in place to the ARVN on X+31. The 9th ROK Co. was relieved of perimeter defense on X+31 when the installation closed.

c. Camp Worthington: All defenses remained the same with the exception that the unit's AH-1G's were turned in on X+2 and were replaced with two UH-1H's armed with mini-gun systems. These aircraft were on 5 minute strip alert during the hours of darkness. All American personnel were removed from Camp Worthington on X+9.

d. Camp McDermott: Defenses at Camp McDermott were not changed except that as the number of American personnel decreased, additional NUNG guards were hired to replace them. On X+8, the two armed UH-1H's moved from Ninh Hoa to Nha Trang for base defense. These aircraft were maintained on strip alert through X+11. 60th AHC, upon its move to Nha Trang, occupied the Tish Compound on Camp McDermott. This posed no increased requirement for base security. On X+43, the 604th TC and 201st CAC were relocated to a compound within Camp McDermott to provide increased security. By this date all guard posts were manned by NUNGS.

#### 11. Unit Movement:

- a. X+8 - 60th AHC moved from Ninh Hoa to Nha Trang.
- b. X+31 - 129th AHC moved from An Son to Pleiku. 180th ASHC moved from An Son to Nha Trang.
- c. X+40 - HQs, 17th CAG moved from Pleiku to Nha Trang.

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12. Unit Mission Changes: None

13. Unit Gains: None

14. Unit Deactivations:

- a. X+28 - H Troop, 17th ACS and H Troop, 10th ACS.
- b. X+35 - 180th ASHC.
- c. X+37 - 129th AHC, and 60th AHC.
- d. X+40 - HHC, 17th CAG, 57th AHC, 604th Trans Co.
- e. X+56 - 201st CAC.

15. Significant Operations: There were no significant aviation operations during the post X-day period. Inclosure 5 outlines individual unit operations.

16. Training: As of X-day all training ceased. All 90 - day standardization rides were waived, and waivers for semi-annual minimums were granted to key personnel who could not fly as a result of standdown activities. Also, waivers were granted to personnel who did not have a current standard instrument ticket.



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## E. LOGISTICS

### 1. General

a. During the reporting period great difficulty was experienced in receiving and maintaining adequate supply stock in all classes of supply. This in turn greatly hampered the units in the performance of their mission. This shortage was due to supply procedures which had been implemented in October in anticipation of a cease fire agreement. All existing stock in excess of a 45 day supply were turned in for retrograde. Further, no demands were submitted in anticipation of early unit deactivations. The result was a general lack of all classes of supply with a delay of 90-120 days between requisition and receipt of 02, 05, 06, and 12 priority orders.

b. ECAB at An Son faced an additional problem. Due to the fact ECAB is a Provisional Battalion, the S-4 has no authority to requisition parts and supplies. Therefore each unit must requisition replenishment of supplies directly from Group. This method does not provide a supply "cushion" or stockpile at the local level, and adds additional time to the time between requisition and receipt.

### 2. Class III and V

a. During this reporting period ARVN was tasked to supply Class III and V products through letter agreement for specific quantities. An inadequate supply of Class V and some items of Class III existed from 1 Nov 72, through approximately 15 Jan 73. Subject letters of agreement were not recognized at VNAF/ARVN ASP's and depots until shortly before the end of this reporting period. Subject letters of agreement were approved by VNAF higher headquarters approximately 5 Jan 73.

b. During this reporting period approximately 620,000 gallons of fuel (JP4) were issued to aircraft from Camp Holloway POL Point.

c. Ammunition expenditures are listed at Inclosure 7.

### POST X - DAY

### 3. Supply

a. Due to the rapid phase down, there was no real need for continued logistical support. Existing supplies were more than sufficient to sustain operations during the standdown period. Class I support was adequate in all areas.

b. Some confusion was caused in some units within the Group as a result of new supply personnel. Due to the numerous DEROSes in December and January, there were several new property book officers. As a result, some units were not prepared to begin necessary post X-day operations.

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c. Ammunition turn in was executed in a smooth manner with no apparent problems. 17th Group turned in more than 2, 200, 000 rounds of various caliber ammunition.

4. Mess activities were closed out as indicated below. The use of "C" rations was held to a minimum, with only the 129th mess serving four meals of "C" rations prior to closeout of Lane Installation. This was necessitated by the one day extension of the closeout date. HHC mess supported Camp Holloway until base closure. The 201st mess was closed on X+29 and operation of a consolidated mess was assumed by Nha Trang Installation.

<u>CLOSURE DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT CONSOLIDATED WITH</u>
X+8	60th AHC	Moved to Nha Trang
X+8	H/10th CAV	129th AHC
X+17	H/17th CAV	HHC, 17th Gp
X+21	180th ASHC	129th AHC
X+29	201st CAC	Nha Trang Installation
X+30	129th AHC	Closed
X+30	57th AHC	HHC, 17th Gp
X+40	HHC, 17th Gp	Closed

NOTE - 604th Trans had consolidated with 201st prior to X-day.

5. Aircraft refueling points operated by the 17th GAG were phased out as noted below. The Ninh Hoa refueling point was terminated 3 days early due to fuel shortage. Aircraft operating in that area refueled at Nha Trang Air Base. An Son POL point was closed and turned over to PA&E who became responsible for the recovery of fuel prior to U.S. evacuation. Refueling in the An Son area was diverted to Phu Cat or Qui Nhon. The POL point at Camp Holloway closed on X+31 and all refueling was accomplished at the VNAH mini-port on Pleiku Air Base.

<u>CLOSURE DATE</u>	<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
X+8	Ninh Hoa	Transferred to ARVN who physically removed the facility.
X+29	An Son	Transferred to PA&E.
X+31	Holloway	Transferred to ARVN.

6. On X+37 one stake and platform trailer full of helicopter rotor blades, rocket tubes, skids and other aircraft wreckage was shipped to the Qui Nhon Property Disposal Yard.

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## 7. Equipment Retrograde/Turnover

a. On X-day all units were alerted and began their pre-planned standdown operation in the areas of PC&S and TOE property. Transportation became an immediate problem. H/17th CAV, H/10th CAV, and the 60th AHC started immediate turn in of ammunition, retrograde of U.S. titled equipment, and physical turnover of ARVN titled equipment. The retrograde and turnover of equipment was eased by the already reduced amount of equipment on hand due to approved droppage of non-mission essential equipment. All other units turned in weapons and ammunition commensurate to unit strength. Due to aviation commitments to the ROK Army, the 60th AHC was informed to move to Nha Trang by X+9 and remain operational instead of standing down as planned by X+15. Transportation requirements were received from H/17th CAV for retrograde shopsets, the Group Signal Officer for retrograde of avionics shelters (oversized, air evacuation required), and the 604th FSP for oversized parts pallets, and other items needing to be sent to Nha Trang from Pleiku. H/17th CAV and H/10th CAV transferred their remaining UH-1H's to 57th AHC and 129th AHC respectively for the purpose of clearing their property books. Sealand vans were requested for land shipment of retrograde items to Nha Trang from Pleiku. ECAB S4 made all requests for transportation of retrograde material to Nha Trang from An Son. All units prepared for the turnover of PC&S property "as is/where is". Contact was made with each area VNAF/ARVN liason officer to coordinate equipment transfer. CTA50-901 turn in was also started. On X-day the Group's property books reflected that only 30% of the total authorized TOE items were on hand. Operations in the Keystone Aircraft Processing Point were greatly increased after X-day. An SOP giving complete instructions on proper disposition of equipment to KAPP was distributed to all units in 17th CAG. Problems arose when units failed to follow this SOP. Some units continually attempted to turn in dirty, un-tagged equipment, and shortage lists were often missing or incomplete. One unit attempted to get 604th to sign for shop sets that had not arrived at the KAPP yard.

b. X+1 thru X+15. On X+1 Sealand van transportation for retrograde items was not available at Pleiku due to enemy activity having closed the roads. Therefore An Son (ECAB) received Sealand vans for retrograde cargo to Nha Trang which were to be sent to Pleiku. A conex consolidation yard was established for Camp Holloway, and a yard for conex consolidation was established at An Son also. A free turn in point for aviation and non-aviation related equipment was established, excluding PC&S property. Also, on X+1, word was received that all armament and related equipment must be sent via air to Saigon. Wooden boxes the size of Air Force pallets were constructed for the shipment of rocket pods. On X-day seventy-five 17th CAG aircraft were slotted for transfer to VNAF with XM-23 armament systems. Word was received on X+3 not to retrograde XM-23 system ammunition boxes but to demilitarize and PDO them. On X+3 H/17th Cav was informed to prepare their shopsets for organic CH-47 airlift to Nha Trang due to Sealand shortage.

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ISA dining facility was closed and approximately 25 military and 10 civilian personnel subsisted with HHC, 17th Gp mess. 10 CPO kitchen police were transferred to HHC, 17th Gp mess. An audit schedule was issued for the property books of the 17th Gp, to coincide with the issued Bde audit schedule. On X+5, 5th ALC was requested to contact the 60th AHC to coordinate PC&S property inventory and EOD of ammo at Ninh Hoa. At that time a problem arose. The ARVN, contrary to previous agreement, decided that all property at Ninh Hoa would be turned in at ARVN depots rather than on station "as is/where is". This was accomplished, but not without extra effort on the part of the unit. At the FSP in Pleiku, it was decided to open a "free turn-in" point to prevent the necessity of retrieving aircraft peculiar items from the dump. A requirement to clean, tag and preserve the items was established at first, but proved to defeat the purpose of the free turn-in point, so this requirement was later dropped. Problems were later encountered as units would come around after duty hours and drop off their junk next to the warehouse of the FSP. As the 247th Med Det turned in their PLL on X+7, it was shipped to Phan Thiet to support the RJMC there. Later, shelves, lumber, plywood, and nails were also sent to aid in construction of support facilities there. The outshipment of all OH-6A's in MR II via Sea Land vans was delayed due to non-availability of cargo tie-down straps. The straps had been on requisition since October 1972, and they finally arrived in Saigon on X+4. Shipments began as soon as the tie-down straps arrived at the unit, and by X+9 all 16 OH-6A's were loaded and ready for shipment. Also during this period, air shipment was requested for retrograde of all oversized loads. Property records reflected 11% of authorized TOE equipment on hand at X+15.

c. X+16 thru X+30. Units continued their drawdown during this period. Disposition instructions from Saigon on KAPP equipment was very late in arriving, causing a backlog of equipment and loaded vans in the 604th maintenance area. Disposition instructions were finally received on X+24 and X+25.

d. X+31 thru X+45: The last mess hall was closed (HHC) and all final mess hall quarterly audits were turned in to Brigade. The 201st property books were also sent to Brigade. These were the last property books remaining in Group. All KAPP equipment was shipped by X+39 and the KAPP yard closed on the same day. All shipments of ASL lines through Tech Supply were finished by X+40. An ASL of 600 UH-1 lines will be retained for the NHA maintenance team that will remain at the 604th maintenance area to X+59, in support of ICCS and RJMC aviation detachments.

e. The retrograde and turn-in of avionics equipment from MR II after X-day was a huge accomplishment. To assist in the inspecting and shipment of avionics equipment, a TI from the AVEL section was sent to Pleiku for a ten day period. He was particularly valuable in the handling of storage shelters and air traffic control towers. Problems were encountered in determining whether or not some of the electronic equipment was complete, and de-

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termining the expendability of missing components. These problems could have been avoided had the units obtained the proper manuals for the equipment. Non-availability of tie-down straps, cargo nets, and retrograde material created some problems in shipping avionics equipment from Pleiku. From X-day to X+38, a total of \$2,357,430.00 in avionics equipment was processed and shipped to Sacramento Army Depot through the AVEL section. Five boxes of float and end items plus one box of test equipment remain to be sent to SAD as of X+39, and shipments were completed by X+41.

8. Transfer of Bases, Installed Property and Equipment, and Real Property.

a. An Son - All transfer of real property was delayed until X+31 due to the reluctance of the incoming ARVN unit to sign for property until they could physically take possession. The joint inventory was conducted on X+29 and X+31. The installation was physically transferred on X+31. The actual transfer was conducted relatively efficiently with elements of the 22nd ARVN Division occupying vacated portions of the installation commencing on X+29.

b. Ninh Hoa

(1) On X-day, the decision was made to redeploy the unit from Ninh Hoa to Tish Compound, Nha Trang. This necessitated the requirements to rapidly turn-in all excess TO&E property and to transport all mission-essential TO&E property to the new location at Nha Trang. Simultaneous coordination was effected on X-day to allow the 5th ALC (ARVN) to sign for post, camp, and station property located at Ninh Hoa, since this property would not accompany the unit on its impending move. Arrangements were made for this property to be transferred on X+8. The 5th ALC stated they would bring necessary personnel and vehicles to Ninh Hoa to load PCS property and remove it as fast as it was signed for.

(2) On X+8, the 5th ALC arrived at Ninh Hoa with 25-26 ton vehicles, and began the task of counting, signing for, and on-loading the PCS property. At this time, the personnel of the 5th ALC began to move from room to room, loading the property, and commenced stripping the walls and ceilings of plywood, light fixtures, fans, and anything else they apparently desired. When this was discovered and brought to the attention of their superiors, very little corrective action was taken by the OIC, 5th ALC, to prevent further occurrences as the vandalism and destruction continued. The 60th AHC provided a security force to remain at Ninh Hoa to try to prevent further destruction, but it met with little success.

(3) Real property transferred included approximately 50 wooden structures. They were turned over and signed for by PA&E on X+11. Despite

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the fact that the installed property had been stolen from many of the structures, the turn over to PA&E went without incident. The unit was officially cleared of the responsibility for Camp Worthington (Ninh Hoa) on X+11.

c. Camp Holloway

(1) A 100% inventory of real property was conducted at Camp Holloway and was finished on 4 December 1972. The ARVN signed for all properties in the Pleiku area except Camp Holloway since it was considered a major installation. This refusal to sign the joint inventory necessitated a repeat inventory at the time Camp Holloway was transferred to ARVN.

(2) Post police and pickup of over ten years residue of war materials cannot be described in terms to fully explain the task. An average of 250 daily hire Montagnard personnel and seven trucks were used over a three week period. Approximately 500 acres of eight foot high elephant grass was burned exposing materials and scrap which had been obscured for many years. All of the military property was turned into a "free" turn in point. EOD was taken to the ARVN EOD point. Trash was burned in the sanitary fill and scrap metal was hauled off post by scrap dealers. Based on an average of 30 truckloads at 2 tons each for 20 days it is estimated that somewhere between 1000 and 1500 tons of trash were picked up and cleaned from the compound. Approximately 300 CONEX containers were picked up and turned into a central collection point.

(3) As units cleared their areas, the PC&S property was turned over to the various ARVN gaining units. However, since the ARVN units did not trust one another, as this property was signed over, it was removed from the installation. As a result, there were numerous ARVN personnel on the compound from X+30 on. These personnel did much damage to buildings by stripping them of light fixtures, plywood walls, and plumbing.

(4) Permission had been received early in the deactivation period to sign over facilities to the local PA&E real property section as these areas were cleared. During the period that elapsed before signing the installation over to the ARVN, PA&E local national personnel stripped many of the buildings of PC&S property, as well as dismantling the buildings for materials. Actual sign over of the installation on X+40 was a very drawn out affair, as the ARVN's who signed for the installation were very upset by the looting which had occurred. However, the sign over finally took place late in the afternoon of X+40.

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#### F. SIGNAL

1. During this reporting period, as during the previous period, Camp Holloway was plagued with not having an adequate dial telephone system. On 31 October 1972, the reconstruction of the cable system leading to Camp Holloway was declared completed by ARVN signal personnel. It was hoped that this would greatly enhance the possibility that Camp Holloway would have reliable and complete access to the dial telephone system.

To insure that the VNAF were aware of our telephone requirements, complete Telephone Service Requests (TSR's) were submitted on 10 July, 7 August and 28 September. Because the old cable system was at its maximum capacity, the VNAF did not produce any work orders on the additional telephone requests. It was anticipated that once the new cable system was completed that the VNAF would complete the work orders in order that additional phones at Camp Holloway could be installed. However, the VNAF professed no knowledge of the previous requests so an additional request was submitted to SRAC on 31 October. By 2 November, no work orders for the ARVN had been produced by the VNAF. SRAC was contacted and the Group Signal Officer was informed that SRAC had not yet delivered the TSR to the VNAF but that it would be done that same afternoon. By 9 November, the ARVN had still not received any work orders from the VNAF. In response to several telephone conversations and a personal visit, the US VNAF advisor said that he would use his influence to get the VNAF to write up the work orders. On 16 November, the Group Signal Officer received a call from a VNAF Warrant Officer. He stated that he was personally typing up the work orders but that all additional phones would have to be Class C phones, in that Camp Holloway had exceeded its limit of 15 percent Class A telephones. On 20 November, the ARVN picked up the work orders from the VNAF for the additional dial telephones and began to locate good cable pairs on the O3 Cable. On 21 November the ARVN and FEC personnel began installing new phones. By 4 December, 15 additional phones were installed on Camp Holloway. Although the ARVN had completed only 50 percent of the work request, no additional phones have been installed by the ARVN since that date. Because the ARVN appeared to have no intentions of completing the work orders, the 17th CAG Signal Section personally installed three critical phones. This was accomplished through the cooperation of the VNAF who operate the DTE. At this time, the revamped cable system appeared to be more reliable than the old system. Camp Holloway was experiencing a daily outage rate of only three percent and the ARVN were responsive in repairing the outages. By 5 January the outage rate began to gradually increase. This was due primarily to the fact that the ARVN ceased to repair the phones as they became inoperative. On 12 January, a letter was sent to SRAC requesting that they assist the Camp Holloway subscribers in restoring telephone outages. This request was forwarded to Pleiku DCO (VNAF) and work orders were written up on the outages. The ARVN picked up the work orders and returned them to DCO as "repaired", however, the phones were still inoperative. By 21 January, the outage rate was 22 percent.

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On 22 January, ARVN Signal personnel arrived at Camp Holloway to work on the outages. They refused to show their ID Cards to the gate guards and were not permitted to enter the compound. Since that day, they have not returned to Camp Holloway to work.

2. In addition to local telephone problems, availability of long distance lines was reduced during this reporting period. Without prior notification, the trunks between Pleiku and Saigon were reduced from 20 lines to 9 lines. To confuse matters even more, The prefixes for Pleiku and Qui Nhon were changed without first notifying anyone. Consequently, 1st Aviation Brigade had difficulty in communicating with 17th CAG until the change had been discovered. Because of the extreme difficulty in obtaining a long distance line between Pleiku and Saigon, the HF Admin radio net between 17th CAG headquarters and Brigade headquarters was utilized by all staff sections. This was the only fast and reliable means of communications between the two headquarters.

3. Although the elements of 17th CAG at Lane AHP do not have direct access to the dial system, FEC personnel at that location have done an outstanding job. At Lane, FEC operates and maintains a very reliable common battery telephone system utilizing an AN/MTC-1. Lane AHP did encounter considerable problems with the operators of the Qui Nhon DTE. Lane is totally dependent on Qui Nhon DTE for its long distance lines. For no apparent reason, the Qui Nhon operators would intermittently refuse to accept calls from Lane. This problem was usually solved by forwarding this information to the SRAC G-6 who, in turn, would inform his Vietnamese counterpart.

4. On 17 December, the Group Signal Section began revamping the tactical telephone system on Camp Holloway, particularly in the headquarters area. Where ever possible, wires were replaced with cable and excess wires and cable were removed. The result has been a more reliable tactical phone system. The tactical phone system at Camp Holloway is an absolute necessity because of the inadequate and unreliable dial system. During the month of January, the wiremen were particularly busy replacing wires and cables that had been inadvertently burned by personnel trying to burn off the grassy areas of the compound. The Signal Section fared well on the pre-AGI conducted by Brigade. No shortcomings were found in either COMSEC or Signal.

5. Communications Security improved somewhat during the reporting period. To enhance security awareness by all telephone subscribers in MR II, SRAC directed that all individuals answering a telephone must state "This is not a secure line". In addition, a secure voice capability was established between SRAC, CTC, and 17th GOC.



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6. The present avionics configuration within 17th CAG consists of direct support consolidated facilities at An Son and Camp Holloway, a direct support shop at Ninh Hoa, and a general support activity at Nha Trang. Under this configuration, responsive and timely avionics support was provided to all elements of 17th CAG.

7. The 17th Aviation Group continued to maintain aviation communications facilities at Camp Holloway (344th ADD), An Son-Qui Nhon (318th ADD), and Ninh Hoa-Nha Trang-Phan Thiet (339th ADD). These units maintained airfield and enroute flight following facilities.

#### POST X -DAY

8. During the deactivation period, the dial telephone system on Camp Holloway continued to be unreliable. Initially, the number of common trunk circuits between Pleiku and Saigon was reduced from nine to two. RJMC/ICCS teams in the Pleiku area received the other seven. This made communications between Brigade and 17th CAG Headquarters extremely difficult. On X+22, Camp Holloway experienced a major dial telephone outage. Of the 62 phones on Camp Holloway, only twelve remained operational. Within 17th CAG Headquarters, only six were operational. Consequently, the tactical phone system on Camp Holloway with Eagle Switch provided the only means of reliable local communications. The only means of reliable long distance communications was the Brigade HF voice radio net. The cause of the telephone outage at Camp Holloway was attributed to a 180 foot length of the 03 Cable that was burned on Pleiku Air Base. Since the source of the outage was on the air base, it became VNAF responsibility to repair it with the ARVN furnishing the material. On X+26 the VNAF began to replace the burned section of cable. Initially, this resulted in a 100 percent outage on Camp Holloway, however, six phones were operational within four hours. On X+27, the splicing had been completed and there were 25 working telephones on Camp Holloway. Since many of the lines had been shorted out by the burning, their modules had been pulled at DCO to keep from burning up the equipment. After the splicing was completed, VNAF began to reinsert the modules. By X+29, 30 phones were operational. DCO stated that the strap wires for the other phones had been lost. In order that Eagle Switch could cease operation and the equipment be turned in, the Signal Section installed five new phones and restored five phones so that all activities on Camp Holloway would have access to the dial system. On X+30 at 2300 hours, Eagle Switch closed down. On X+34 all bunker line tactical phones were collected and turned in to LSA Pleiku. This action was necessary because the LSA Pleiku retrograde facility closed on X+35. Radios were placed on the bunker line for communications. All radios were transferred to the ARVN and all dial phones were returned to the VNAF upon closure of Camp Holloway.

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9. By X+10, all COMSEC equipment held by 17th CAG was consolidated for turn in. 17th Group no longer had a secure voice capability, however, it was determined that this capability was no longer required. On X+13, the COMSEC equipment was transported to Saigon where it entered the Armed Forces Courier System. ARFCOS is responsible for transporting this equipment to Lexington COMSEC Depot. Because of the time delay involved in this process, the COMSEC Custodian will not receive his clearance until after he reaches his next duty station.

10. The MARS Station at Camp Holloway ceased operation on X+12. On that same day, the equipment was shipped to Saigon for turn in. On X+3, the MARS Station at An Son closed and the equipment was turned in to Saigon by X+12.

#### 11. Avionics

a. Brigade Avionics directed that all avionics assets be retrograded to Sacramento Army Depot or Lexington Army Depot. None of these items could be transferred to VNAF or ARVN. In addition, strict property accountability was in force at all times. 604th Avionics Maintenance Facility (AVEL) in Nha Trang was responsible for conducting a technical inspection, packing and shipping of all avionics assets held by 17th CAG. Many of these avionics items were bulky, such as Avionics Shop Shelters and the various Air Traffic Control Facilities. It was anticipated that the transportation of these items from Camp Holloway and An Son to Nha Trang would be a major problem. However, this was not the case. Smaller avionics items, such as float, repair parts and test equipment, could be transported to Nha Trang utilizing aircraft organic to the 17th CAG.

At An Son, the transportation problem was solved by utilizing Sea Land vans. Because the roads to Pleiku were not open, the Sea Land vans originally designated for Pleiku were diverted and utilized by elements of the 17th CAG at An Son. The only method of transporting the bulky avionics items out of Camp Holloway was by utilizing Air Force transportation assets, such as C-130s. To avoid the time delay involved in packing and shipping these items from Camp Holloway, and unpacking, inspecting, repacking and shipping those same items out of Nha Trang, 604th AVEL sent a Technical Inspector to Camp Holloway. Under his supervision, all bulky items received a technical inspection and were packed and shipped directly to Sacramento Army Depot from the Pleiku Air Base. This operation was highly successful. Over a six day period, X+4 to X+10, eleven Avionics Shop Shelters, a TSQ-71A, a TSC-61 and an FSQ-75 were shipped directly from Pleiku and the owning units received immediate turn in credit. This operation greatly eased the congestion at 604th AVEL and facilitated the flow of avionics assets out of country. Units located at Ninh Hoa and Nha Trang experienced no transportation problems because of their close proximity to 604th AVEL. An Avionics Shop Shelter located at Phan Thiet was slung to the 388th TC in Saigon by a CH-47 that was being retrograded.

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b. By X+15, the following avionics assets at each 17th CAG locations were being processed by 604th AVEL in Nha Trang or all actions had been completed.

PLEIKU (H/17, 57th, 344th)

1. 6 ea ASM-146 Avionics Shop Shelters
2. 5 ea ASM-147 Avionics Shop Shelters
3. 1 ea TSC-63 Pleiku Radio
4. 1 ea TSQ-71A Holloway GCA
5. 1 ea FSQ-75 Holloway Tower
6. 2 ea TRN-25 NDB
7. All avionics test equipment

AN SON (129th, 180th, 318th)

1. 2 ea ASM-147 Avionics Shop Shelters
2. 3 ea ASM-146 Avionics Shop Shelters
3. 1 ea TSC-61 Qui Nhon Radio
4. 1 ea FSQ-75 Lane Tower
5. All avionics test equipment (minus three pieces)

NHA TRANG (60th, 201st, 339th)

1. 1 ea ASM-147 Avionics Shop Shelters
2. 2 ea ASM-146 Avionics Shop Shelters
3. 1 ea TSQ-70A Ninh Hoa Tower
4. 1 ea TRN-25 NDB
5. All avionics test equipment

By X+15, the following items had not been processed through 604th AVEL for retrograde.

PLEIKU (H/17, 57th, 344th)

1. 1 ea TSQ-70A Holloway Tower
2. Avionics float

AN SON (129th, 180th, 318th)

1. 3 ea pieces of test equipment
2. Avionics float

NHA TRANG (60th, 201st, 339th)

1. 1 ea TSQ-70A Nha Trang Radio

On X+19, the TSQ-70A, Holloway Tower, was deactivated and was turned in to 388th AVEL. On X+22, avionics support at An Son ceased and the remaining equipment was turned in to 604th AVEL. On X+31, TSQ-70A, Nha Trang Radio, was deactivated and turned in to 604th. On X+38, all avionics support at Camp Holloway terminated and the float was turned in to 604th AVEL.

c. USARV Avionics directed that all aircraft being transferred to the VNAF had to have the following avionics configuration:

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- (1) KY-28 mount and control head removed.
- (2) AN/ARC-131 FM radio installed in lieu of AN/ARC-54 FM radio
- (3) AN/ARN-82 VHF receiver removed if the aircraft also had an AN/ARC-134 installed.
- (4) Aircraft with an AN/ASC-15, Command and Control Console had to be transferred to the VNAF with the aircraft.

This was readily accomplished by the servicing avionics facilities at Pleiku, An Son and Nha Trang.

d. During the period of stand-down, avionics property accountability was outstanding. As expected, a great quantity of excess avionics equipment was turned in to 604th AVEL. The following is a breakdown on avionics assets processed through 604th AVEL as of X+34.

	AGGREGATE	FREE	TOTAL	444	
	ACCOUNTABLE+TURN-IN	TURN-IN	PROCESSED	ACTIONS	NET GAIN*
Number Items	3,157	103	3,260	28	
Dollar Value	\$3,372,885.	\$132,115	\$3,505,000	\$5,265	\$126,850

\*NOTE: Net Gain = Free Turn in - 444 Actions. It is anticipated that the total processed figure will approach \$5,000,000 by X+45.

## 12. Air Traffic Control (ATC)

a. Prior to X Day, 17th CAG had the following ATC configuration:

TYPE EQUIPMENT	FUNCTION	LOCATION
FSQ-75	Holloway Tower	Camp Holloway
TSQ-70A	Holloway Tower (Mob)	Camp Holloway
TSQ-71A	Holloway GCA	Camp Holloway
TRN-25	Holloway NDB	Camp Holloway
FSQ-75	Lane Tower	Lane AHP
TRN-25	Lane NDB	Lane AHP
TSC-61	Qui Nhon Radio	Qui Nhon
TSQ-70A	Ninh Hoa Tower	Ninh Hoa
TRN-25	Ninh Hoa NDB	Ninh Hoa
TSQ-70A	Nha Trang Radio	Nha Trang
ASM-146	Phan Thiet Radio	Phan Thiet

b. By X Day, all ATC equipment that was not mission essential or was not being utilized was prepared for turn in. This included the Holloway GCA as well as all NDBs. On X+1, the FSQ-75, Holloway Tower, was deactivated and replaced by the TSQ-70A. Because of its questionable reliability, the TSC-61, Qui Nhon Radio, was deactivated on X+2. Since the 60th AHC was relocated from Ninh Hoa to Nha Trang, the TSQ-70A, Ninh Hoa Tower, was deactivated on X+7. On X+10, the FSQ-75, Lane Tower, was deactivated and replaced

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by a PRC-25. On X+13, the ASM-146 that housed Phan Thiet Radio was transported to the 388th TC in Saigon for turn in. Phan Thiet radio retained FM capability and was relocated inside of the hotel. On X+19, the TSQ-70A, Holloway Tower, was deactivated and replaced by two PRC-25 FM radios. One of the PRC-25s served as Holloway Tower and the other was utilized as Pleiku Radio. Nha Trang Radio was admitted to the HF voice radio net between 17th CAG Headquarters and Brigade Headquarters. This net was utilized to pass flight following between Nha Trang and Pleiku. On X+31, the TSQ-70A, Nha Trang Radio, was deactivated. A VRC-46 FM radio was colocated with 201st Operations in Nha Trang for flight following purposes. Eagle Control in 17th CAG GOC assumed the flight following function for Pleiku.

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### G. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

1. During the reporting period, the Group consistently met all mission requirements. The backlog of deferred maintenance from the previous reporting period affected OR rates of assigned AHIG aircraft during this period. Performance of deferred maintenance during PMP's resulted in aircraft spending an abnormally long time in scheduled maintenance overall; however, OR rates were consistently above USARV standards, except as mentioned, while the fleet was within the USARV flying hour program. Many of the problem areas encountered during the previous period were resolved only to be replaced by others having an impact on maintenance operations:

a. Lack of scheduled transportation of repair parts from Central DSSA (Saigon) to field locations (Fleiku, An Son, and Nha Trang).

b. Prepackage POL products support discontinued.

2. On the positive side, 604th TC operations continued to improve with a greater output of aircraft and better utilization of float (S-2) considering the requirements to perform extensive scheduled and unscheduled DS maintenance. Although peak workloads were quite heavy in terms of manhours expended, the "smoothing out" process of 604th maintenance operations enabled the unit to meet its commitment with relative ease. During the month of January, maintenance requirements noticeably decreased. This was due mainly to a sharp decrease in Group flying hours, in expectation of the cease fire.

3. Unit aircraft status, OR rates and average flying hours for the Pre X-Day reporting period are listed at inclosures 8 and 9.

### POST X-DAY

4. From X-day onward, 17th CAG operational ready (OR) rates never dropped below 88%. With curtailment of missions and transfer of aircraft, OR rates steadily increased and were an average 95% after X+12. Aircraft transfers to RVNAF kept the performance of PMP's and unscheduled minor maintenance at a minimum during the period. NORS rates were minimized by the timely receipt of parts from other units and locations in MR II as well as from Central DSSA in Saigon. Due to a lack of regular air transportation, excessive down time was experienced beginning at X-day. The use of organic CH-47 aircraft, however, solved this problem. On a weekly basis an aircraft was dispatched to Saigon to pick up accumulated repair parts and current NORS on hand. This system yielded outstanding results as an almost zero NORS rate was experienced (X-day to X+37). The assistance and cooperation of ASA was complete

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and parts and supplies were processed and loaded in a matter of hours after arrival of the CH-47. On several occasions it was necessary to remove serviceable parts from a retrograde aircraft. Again, the assistance and cooperation of the 388th TC (ADS) at Newport Dock was complete.

5. Minor problems were experienced with proper execution of DA Form 444, 2765-1 and 2408-17 early in the standdown phase. Increased command emphasis at the unit level and additional clarifying instructions brought a quick resolution to these problems.

6. Beginning X-day, NHA Inc was committed to provide organizational and direct support maintenance and supply to special aviation detachments formed as a result of the cease fire provisions as follows:

<u>DETACHMENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NO OF UH-1H</u>	<u>AUTH NHA STRENGTH</u>
RJMC III	Pleiku	6	23
ICCS	Pleiku	6	23
RJMC IV	Phan Thiet	4	23

Preparations to send a team of NHA contract personnel to Phan Thiet to support RJMC aircraft began on X+1. Much confusion evolved during this period as to who was to provide support for the RJMC team. The 17th CAG said 388th Transportation Company in Saigon would support the team at Phan Thiet, but 1st Aviation Brigade said that 604th was to support the team. The 604th supported RJMC at Phan Thiet with NHA Maintenance Personnel. Central DSSA picked up the supply support on X+4. At Pleiku, the NHA teams were combined as a single maintenance location at Camp Holloway and provided priority support to JMC and ICCS. Additional support was provided to 57th AHC, an element of 129th AHC (from X+28 until X+36), and HHC 17th CAG. Elsewhere, NHA assumed the entire aircraft maintenance task including PMD's. At the 604th TC (ADS) by X+30, NHA had assumed the entire maintenance role, organized as a reinforced KD team.

#### 7. Transfer of Control of Air Combatant Assets:

a. Transfer of aircraft to RVNAF: Transfer of UH-1H helicopters was accomplished at three sites to RVNAF units: Pleiku Air Base, Phu Cat Air Base and Nha Trang Air Base. With the exception of S3 and S5 account (retrograde and crash damage) aircraft, 95% were operational ready at the time of transfer. For schedule of RVNAF transfers during Project Enhance Plus (+), see Inclosure 2 (X+37):

Pleiku AB (60th M&S Wing):	21
Phu Cat AB (61st M&S Wing):	16
Nha Trang AB (62nd Wing, 2nd Air Div):	15
604th TC (ADS) Nha Trang AB:	37
(S2, S3 and S5 Account, 62nd Wing, 2nd Air Div)	
<u>TOTAL (AS OF X+37)</u>	89

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b. Retrograde of Aircraft to CONUS: All OH-6A aircraft were retrograded through 604th TC (ADS) at Nha Trang on X+2 (15 each) and subsequently departed for CONUS on X+11. Starting at X+3, 32 each AH-1G plus 2 float aircraft were retrograded through the 388th TC (ADS) at Newport Dock in Saigon. By X+14 all had been retrograded. At X+3, CH-47C aircraft were retrograded from Newport. Starting with 15 aircraft, CH-47's were sent in weekly increments until this type was reduced to 0 on X+35. For schedule of retrograde actions see Inclosure 9.

c. Intra-Group Aircraft Transfers: On X-day, all UH-1H aircraft were transferred from H/10 Cav and H/17 Cav to the 129th AHC and 57th AHC respectively. Sixteen aircraft meeting rigid predetermined criteria, mostly 1971 UH-1H, were transferred from all units of the 17th Group to 604th TC (ADS), S2 account for painting, reconfiguration and issue as follows;

6 UH-1H to RJMC III, Pleiku.  
4 UH-1H to RJMC IV, Phan Thiet.  
6 UH-1H to ICCS, Pleiku.

d. Eagle Battalion (Provisional): Aircraft transfers/retrogrades were coordinated through AMO, ECAB with superlative results. PLL and AIMI assets were retrograded to 604th TC by X+24. RVNAF transfers at Phu Cat were accomplished with no problems encountered. Most armament subsystems were retrograded through 604th TC facilities. All necessary actions were accomplished prior to the standdown and base closure at X+31. At standdown 8 UH-1H remained in the 129th AHC and 5 CH-47C remained in the 180th ASHC.

e. Transfer/Retrograde of Armament Subsystems: Most armament subsystems were retrograded to the 604th TC (ADS) at Nha Trang. A limited number of XM-23 subsystems were transferred with UH-1H aircraft directly to RVNAF, the remainder to RVNAF from 604th. A total of 91, XM-23 subsystems were transferred to RVNAF. Analysis:

SUBSYSTEM	TOTAL SYSTEMS	RECEIVING UNIT	ULTIMATE USE	COMPLETION DATE
XM-19	2	604th TC	KAPP	X+13
XM-23	17	604th TC	KAPP	X+26
XM-23	91	RVNAF	RVNAF	X+23
XM-24	17	604th TC	RVNAF	X+13
XM-28	32	388th TC	KAPP	X+13
XM-35	6	604th TC	KAPP	X+1
XM-59	4	604th TC	KAPP	X+26
XM-158	63	604th TC	KAPP	X+13
XM-159	6	604th TC	KAPP	X+1
XM-200	79	604th TC	KAPP	X+13
TOTAL	317			



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f. Retrograde of Aviation Repair Parts (PLL): All aviation repair parts including unit PLL's and AIMI assets at Forward Supply Points (Pleiku and An Son) were retrograded to the Forward Supply Point at 604th TC (ADS). Tailored 30 day level PLL's were established from assets on hand for RJMC III, IV and ICCS at their respective sites. Evacuation of repair parts was accomplished utilizing organic CH-47 aircraft and Sea-Land transportation (available at An Son). Disposition instructions for CH-6A, CH-47C and AH-1G repair parts were received and parts subsequently shipped from Nha Trang. UH-1H repair parts will be shipped upon termination of all activities in MR II requiring U.S. UH-1H support. The 604th TC, Nha Trang FSP is scheduled for standdown at X+50.

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#### H. AVIATION SAFETY

1. The aircraft accident rate has shown a considerable decrease for the second straight reporting period. There were a total of three accidents during this reporting period for an accident rate of 11.4 compared with 15 accidents for the previous period and an accident rate of 23.3.

2. Personnel turbulence greatly complicated maintaining the continuity of the safety program. Due again to no incoming replacements, the safety officer and his assistant both left without replacement, and the safety position was taken over by the Installation Security Officer. Through safety qualified, he was limited in the amount of time which he could devote to safety duties.

3. Accident, incident, forced landing and precautionary landing statistics appear as Inclosure 10.

#### POST X-DAY

4. During this period the aircraft safety record was extremely good. There were no accidents, only five precautionary landings, and one aircraft ground accident resulting in minor damage.

5. The ground safety record, however, showed a sharp increase in vehicle accidents with four vehicle accidents during this period. All these accidents were primarily the result of operator error. Two of the accidents resulted in  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles being rolled over, with excessive speed being the primary cause of the accident. The other two accidents involved elements of inattention. Defensive driving practices could have prevented all these accidents.

6. Statistic appear at Inclosure 10.