

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

A. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Administration

a. Observation: Due to the type support rendered by the 17th Group, units are scattered throughout MR II. In most cases service units are not located within easy access of customer units. As a result a great deal of time is lost, and in many cases, greatly inferior service rendered.

b. Evaluation: Finance and personnel records for all group personnel were maintained in Nha Trang. The majority of units supported by 604th (Nha Trang) were at Pleiku or An Son. In both cases inferior service was rendered, time was lost in trying to communicate over an extremely poor telephone system, and needless money spent on helicopter transportation of personnel and equipment between the servicing unit and the outlying units.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That all support units be colocated with the headquarters of the units being supported, unless made totally impossible by the most stringent circumstances.

(2) If recommendation 1 is not possible, then the support unit must provide working detachments to each major area supported (An Son and Pleiku), so that essential services can be performed with minimum time and travel.

2. Personnel

a. Observation: Precipitous action was taken at DA level in stopping the flow of replacement personnel to Vietnam during the October peace negotiations.

b. Evaluation: This action created extreme hardship among operational units due to lack of personnel during the month of November. Average unit strengths during the period were 72% - 75%. Operational commitments during the period were met only as a result of great personal effort on the part of maintenance crews.

c. Recommendation: In view of the tentative nature of such negotiations, no action toward cutting off the replacement stream should be taken until a formal agreement is signed.

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

Personnel and Administration (cont'd)

POST X - DAY

3. Morale

a. Observation: Due to the length of time which personnel remained at Camp Holloway and Camp McDermott, troop morale suffered from lack of recreational facilities.

b. Evaluation: Due to the early rapid withdrawal most installations closed recreational facilities early in the deactivation period. These facilities included MARS stations, snack bars, service clubs, Officer, NCO, and EM clubs, and PX facilities. Those personnel who remained behind were left with maximum time on their hands and little to do.

c. Recommendation: While it is recognized that these facilities cannot be maintained until the last minute, it seems that arrangements could have been made to keep facilities open for a longer period, especially Camp Holloway where no activities were available on the local economy. This is especially true in view of the fact that the political situation kept many people in RVN longer than anticipated.

4. OER's

a. Observation: There was much confusion and misunderstanding created as a result of instituting a new OER system concurrent with RVN re-deployment.

b. Evaluation: Trying to institute a new OER system, and simultaneously give every officer in the command an OER, proved to be a very difficult task, and from the personnel management point of view, a very damaging event. It was obvious from the beginning that no matter how much DA expounded on the average scores in DA Circular 623-1, that no one actually believed them. As a result, the new OER became highly inflated in most cases. The unfortunate part was that some units did follow the guidance given by DA with the result that the average score for their personnel were 35-40 points lower across the board than the group average and as much as 45-50 points lower than the highest unit averages. As in any new system, some officers were hurt because of the change. It is felt that the entire new OER system has been dealt a perhaps unrecoverable blow due to the large influx of OER's in this short time frame. Minimum instructional and educational time, complicated by the fact that most raters and indorsers did not trust the new system, caused raters to rate their officers high and take the chance of receiving a letter from DA rather than to rate them according to the average and take a chance

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

on damaging the individual's career.

c. Recommendation: RVN should have been exempted from the implementation of the new OER system. Barring that, everyone in RVN should have been written an OER effective 31 December, and had an OER written under the new system for the time they remained in country.

5. Civilian Personnel Pay

a. Observation: Camp Holloway civilian employees hired through CPO did not receive pay due them upon job termination.

b. Evaluation: Terminal (advance) time sheets were handcarried to Saigon on X-23 by 1LT Wilson, Pleiku area finance officer, so that CPO employees could be paid on their release dates. 1LT Hull, Pleiku Installation, was designated the officer to handle terminal pay complaints, late payments and AIK money for the Pleiku area. This procedure did not in fact work as planned. All finance operations were relocated to Saigon and all CPO and NUNG security guard payrolls were late being paid. During the latter part of camp closure procedures the NUNG guards became apprehensive about their pay and made veiled threats to quit if no relief was rendered. Transportation arrangements for the NUNG guards had to be rearranged as a result of the late arrival of their payrolls. Further Class "A" Agents from Camp Holloway ended up paying the civilian personnel, thus delaying closure of the installation. Numerous telephone calls to the Class "B" Agent, MAJ Cannon, failed to provide relief for this unsatisfactory situation.

c. Recommendation: That Class "B" Agents insure all arrangements for terminal payment of civilian employees are confirmed at least one week in advance of their termination date.

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

1. Air Cavalry Reconnaissance Operations

a. Observation: That coordination between SRAC G-2 and the two Air Cavalry Troops of the 17th Group was often incomplete, incorrect, and untimely.

b. Evaluation: It became increasingly apparent during this reporting period that a renewed effort of coordination was needed between the Air Cavalry Troop elements and the SRAC G-2. A lack of communications, particularly evident between H Troop, 10th ACS and the SRAC G-2, often times led to a misutilization of reconnaissance assets. Lack of coordination, again particularly with regards to H/10, resulted in a considerable amount of wasted time, sometimes in excess of 50% of the total blade time, thereby reducing effective mission time. Specifically with regard to H/10, the SRAC G-2 all but gave total operational control of the Troop to the Senior Advisor, 22nd ARVN Division. No guidelines or policies were established by the SRAC G-2 as to the employment and utilization of Air Cav assets. While the SA, 22nd Division published a policy letter delineating specifics on Cav employment and utilization, it was never followed. Furthermore, the SRAC G-2 seldom monitored H/10 activities. This was particularly evidenced by the fact that the SRAC G-2 Air was never allowed to visit H/10 or the G-2/G-2 Air, 22nd Division.

Coordination between H Troop, 17th AC and the SRAC G-2 was greatly assisted by the 17th Group S-2 becoming involved in the intelligence aspect of the reconnaissance mission. Increased use of the briefing and debriefing systems by higher headquarters resulted in more timely and effective use of intelligence data, thereby allowing for more timely reaction of ARVN forces. However, the use of the SRAC G-2 Air for other requirements often delayed intelligence gathering through his unavailability at briefings of Air Cav pilots and observers. The SRAC G-2 Air's nonavailability also caused frequent coordination problems relative to the tasking of Cav assets, thereby making Cav Troop pre-mission planning extremely difficult on numerous occasions.

In addition, last minute mission changes were effected by the SRAC G-2 which more often than not, were not passed on to the requesting/using unit in the field. At all times confusion resulted, frequently causing a loss of valuable reconnaissance time. Often entire missions had to be cancelled as the necessary coordination between the US Advisors and their counterparts could not be effected.

The concept of the Air Cavalry Troop being utilized under the operational control of the SRAC G-2 offers the best results for the hours flown. However, it should be taken into consideration that intelligence gathering is a very personal type of operation and every effort should be made by all headquarters concerned to maintain a thorough and responsive communications system to insure that all phases of information gathering are coordinated and intelligence disseminated to all involved. This becomes even more important when it is recognized that the Air Cavalry Troop in a reconnaissance role can be a deciding factor in the outcome of armed conflicts such as Vietnam.

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That specific policies and guidance be disseminated by the headquarters having operational control over Air Cavalry assets relative to Air Cav operations, tactics, employment and utilization.

(2) That the responsibilities of the requesting or using unit and the operational headquarters involved should be specified in detail.

(3) That last minute mission changes be communicated to the field units in time for the necessary coordination to be effected at that level.

(4) That coordination/tasking by the headquarters having operational control be accomplished in a timely and detailed manner so as to allow the Cav Troop Commander and his operations section to plan their portion of the mission and allow for a proper briefing of personnel who are to fly the mission.

(5) That a representative of the G-2 be present at all pilot/observer briefings to provide the latest information on enemy activity in the A/O as well as a synopsis of the friendly situation.

(6) That the G-2 Air be present at, and participate in, pilot/observer debriefings.

POST X - DAY

2. Security of Government and Personal Property

a. Observation: Once the news of the impending American withdrawal was made public, property of U.S. personnel and U.S. government property was considered fair game by local nationals.

b. Evaluation: The situation that existed with the local hires who were already on U.S. installations was bad enough. As soon as the withdrawal was announced, some of these personnel began to steal personal belongings from the troops in an effort to make a last minute income supplement. However, with the transfer of U.S. installations to RVNAF, the number of local nationals on installations increased drastically. In most cases these personnel were allowed to roam unescorted. Not only did the instance of thievery of personal property increase drastically, these personnel also looted buildings. Walls were torn down, mirrors broken, roofs removed, lighting and plumbing fixtures removed, and furniture was taken from the buildings. In some cases, Vietnamese

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

guards assigned to guard property in the 604th TC area in Nha Trang participated in these antics, and in two instances leveled loaded weapons on U.S. personnel. This problem of thievery was encountered on each of the four U.S. installations which 17th Group transferred to RVNAF.

c. Recommendation: Installations should be wholly turned over on a specific date, not in a piecemeal fashion. No local national personnel should be allowed on the installation unescorted for the purpose of property transfer until that date. If at all possible, all American personnel should be off the installation at this time with the exception of the personnel transferring property. Finally, American or American hired (NUNG) guards should be utilized for installation security until the day of transfer.

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

C. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. Splitting of Air Cavalry Assets

a. Observation: On several occasions the assets of the Air Cavalry Troops were split to enable them to cover two widely separated areas at the same time.

b. Evaluation: Splitting cav packs into two teams creates more problems and hazards than can be justified by the intelligence gathered. In order to support a split cav team, a light gun team (2 AH-1G's) and 3 UH-1H's must be secured from other sources. This creates two problems: that of coordination, and that of unfamiliarity with air cavalry operations. Therefore, the augmented pack cannot work at maximum efficiency. To attempt to have a split team work without augmentation is foolhardy. Without augmentation, there is not sufficient firepower to handle a tactical emergency such as the extraction of a downed crew from a hot area. Neither is there the capability of reinforcing a dangerous situation by inserting the Aero Rifle Platoon. Finally, since only one LOH accomplishes the reconnaissance of a split team, it takes twice as long to cover the assigned area.

c. Recommendation: Cavalry teams should never be utilized with less than 4 AH-1G's, 4 UH-1H's and 2 OH-6A's all of which come from the same unit.

2. Selection of terrain for Air Cavalry Scout missions.

a. Observation: On numerous occasions the areas selected to be scouted by the cav (sometimes as many as four separate areas), were too large and too widely separated.

b. Evaluation: Due to poor prior planning, many times the cav found it necessary to fly for as much as an hour to get from one area to another. This represents wasted hours of blade time, as well as taking away from the amount of time available for reconnaissance. Additionally, the areas to be scouted were larger than could be adequately covered in the allotted time period. This resulted in cursory inspections of the areas, rather than the detailed recons needed to develop good intelligence.

c. Recommendations:

(1) The G-2 Air for the headquarters of a non-aviation unit should be a rated aviator familiar with air cavalry operations.

(2) Aviation units must do everything possible to educate supported units to the limitations and capabilities of its aviation assets.

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

3. UH-1H Missions

a. Observations: In the role of ARVN and US Advisor support, the majority of UH-1H missions were single ship, many into insecure fire support bases in hostile areas.

b. Evaluation: Given the type mission, there is no way of avoiding the inherent hazards. If an emergency occurs, there is not another aircraft close enough to lend aid. In some cases, there is not even radio contact with flight following facilities or other aircraft. In many cases, missions are to "fly as directed", the result of which is that the pilots do not know in advance where they'll be going, and therefore make appropriate plans.

c. Recommendation: Each requestor for aviation support should submit an exact itinerary of flight. Any changes to this route once the aircraft is airborne must be cleared through the aviation unit's operations prior to execution.

POST X - DAY

4. Aircraft Utilization

a. Observation: Aviation liaison personnel at CORDS who were not rated aviators did not efficiently utilize aircraft at their disposal.

b. Evaluation: On several occasions during the reporting period aircraft were utilized in a duplicating manner as a result of staff personnel programming aircraft to go to the same general area with one or two passengers on each aircraft. By allowing the supported element to use the phrase "FLY AS DIRECTED", the operations section did not know where the aircraft were destined until the passengers arrived. By this time it was too late to attempt to combine missions since the aircraft had already departed the local area.

c. Recommendation: Supported units should provide a detailed itinerary for the supporting unit to have available not only for scheduling aircraft and aviators but also to attempt to eliminate a situation where a duplication of effort exists.

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

D. LOGISTICS

1. Supply Requisitions

a. Observation: Everyone in the support system overreacted in October by cancelling orders of all classes of supply in anticipation of a cease fire.

b. Evaluation: The lack of supplies in November and December as a result of this action caused a great loss of aircraft availability due to NOFS. Some aircraft were down in excess of 45 days awaiting parts from CONUS. Additionally, many items to include clothing was not available in unit supplies. The PX's ran short of health and welfare items. As a result, the troops suffered unnecessary discomfort.

c. Recommendation: Supply requisitions should not be cancelled until a firm deactivation date is set. Allow each unit and especially DS/GS, excess stockage of common usage items prior to shutdown of the supply system.

POST X - DAY

2. Retrograde of equipment through collection, classification, and salvage (CC&S).

a. Observation: During a time period where a large volume of items from several units are turned in to CC&S, the administrative requirements placed on them are very heavy.

b. Evaluation: The paper work required for this type of activity was the DA Form 2765-1. In addition to the CC&S having to process the required paperwork, they must also process and classify the equipment which is quite time consuming.

c. Recommendation: Each unit involved in a massive turn in of equipment similar to what has been experienced recently can save an invaluable amount of time by preparing as much of the paper work internally as possible. This relieves CC&S from being over burdened and free to process and classify the equipment which expedites the entire process.

3. Transfer of aviation equipment/items.

a. Observation: Transfer of aviation shop sets, tool sets, and ground support equipment to VNAF was not properly coordinated.

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

b. Evaluation: The letter of instruction provided by 17th Group covering the procedures for transfer of aviation shop sets, tool sets, and ground support equipment to VNAF was not detailed enough to provide the proper guidance to the units. The letters did not list the VNAF project officers who were to sign for the equipment nor did it list how to make contact with the squadrons who were going to receipt for the equipment. The paper work (DA Form 3161) required for the transfer of the equipment was excessive, e.g., for each tool box, shop set, etc., the letter of instruction required ten (10) copies of DA Form 3161 to be made by the unit. The 201st had 91 tool boxes alone which amounted to 910 pages of 3161's. This placed an excessive administrative burden on the unit. There also was a shortage of DA Form 3161's within Group; therefore, the unit was required to reproduce the forms locally. Prior to authorizing the transfer of equipment the responsible staff section should insure that sufficient quantities of all forms are in stock or on hand.

c. Recommendations: On all such future transfers of equipment, the letter of instruction should be more specific as to the procedures to be used for the transfer of equipment. The names and addresses of people designated to receive the equipment should be provided to the unit well in advance.

4. Transfer of aviation equipment/items

a. Observation: VNAF was not prepared to receive title transferred tools and shop sets.

b. Evaluation: No prior coordination was effected with VNAF to determine how their supply system functioned. As it turned out, all equipment had to be inventoried, logged, and the lists sent to the VNAF computer facility at Bien Hoa. It required two men several days to inventory all items of equipment by FSN and prepare the paperwork to send to Bien Hoa.

c. Recommendation: Coordination must be made with receiving units prior to attempting transfer of equipment.

5. Lack of Liaison Personnel

a. Observation: All U.S. Air Force liaison personnel were withdrawn on X+15.

b. Evaluation: Dealing with VNAF on transfer of equipment was hindered because the channels for liaison (U.S. Advisors) which had been open previously were no longer open. Dealing directly with VNAF created problems because of unfamiliarity with the personnel and their procedures.

c. Recommendation: In future operations of this nature, U.S. Advisors in areas where complicated transactions are to take place should be among the last personnel to depart.

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

E. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Adverse Effects of the Vietnamization Program on Land Line Communications.

a. Observations: The Vietnamese Armed Forces are not adequately trained or equipped to effectively manage the area communications system of which the dial telephone system is a part. In addition, ARVN signal elements were not responsive to the needs of the U.S. subscribers. Generally, VNAF signal personnel were more cooperative than ARVN signal personnel, however, it takes cooperation from both parties to maintain telephone service.

b. Evaluation: Prior to December, the communications support provided to Camp Holloway subscribers by the Vietnamese Armed Forces was minimal, however, the support did exist. After December, the possibility of a cease fire became imminent and all communications support from ARVN personnel came to a complete halt.

c. Recommendations: U.S. forces should never be placed in the position where they are entirely dependent on their allies for long distance communications. If this cannot be avoided, an alternate means of communications must be established that is independent of allied control.

2. Inadequate Signal Repair Support

a. Observations: Throughout the reporting period, elements of 17th CAG located at Pleiku and An Son received very poor signal repair support from the Logistics Support Activities at Pleiku or Qui Nhon. It usually took two to four weeks before ISA could return a serviceable item to the user. In addition, many items were returned still inoperative.

b. Evaluation: The long down time for signal items was due partially to the fact that the ISAs at Pleiku and Qui Nhon reduced themselves to only a direct exchange capability. All equipment had to be evacuated to Nha Trang from Pleiku and Qui Nhon for repair. The quality control was marginal in that many items that were returned to the users were still inoperative.

c. Recommendations: An Aviation Group should have its own organic direct support capability for tactical communications equipment. By virtue of command and control, this support would be more responsive to the needs of the Group. The addition of two signal repairmen and supporting PTL to each avionics facility could accomplish this task.

3. Inadequate Communications

a. Observation: Overall availability of quality communications between units is poor.

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

b. Evaluation: As a result of this unfavorable situation, necessary coordination between units, reports, and requirements tasked by higher headquarters were often delayed or misinterpreted.

c. Recommendation: Establish a high frequency radio capability between headquarters and the separate location of each subordinate unit.

POST X - DAY

4. Disposition of Avionics Assets

a. Observation: Prior to X+10, there existed some confusion between 604th AVEL and Brigade Avionics as to disposition of avionics assets. This resulted in a delay in shipping. After X+10, the confusion was eliminated and shipping progressed smoothly.

b. Evaluation: LOIs from Brigade concerning the retrograde of avionics assets were frequently changed. Often, these changes arrived late and this resulted in confusion. Also, it appeared that coordination between various agencies, such as ECOM and NICP, was initially inadequate.

c. Recommendation: That finalized disposition instructions be established prior to deactivation.

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

F. Aircraft Maintenance

1. Transportation of repair parts:

a. Observation: Although the 604th FSP at Pleiku was functioning well, lack of timely receipt of NORS and PLL parts from the Central DSSA (Saigon) caused a serious NORS problem after the Brigade dedicated SMAR flight was discontinued.

b. Evaluation: Discontinuance of dedicated SMAR flights by USAF upon their operational move to Thailand lengthened the requisition-receipt time for Pleiku from 4 days to 11 days. Since USAF would accept only full pallets of cargo, a delay was experienced in waiting for a pallet to fill up for a particular location. Secondly, once TMA accepted the load it waited on space available basis for on-shipment whenever a flight was scheduled. Because of the delay, units were found going NORS for many items normally stocked in PLL.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That every effort be made to establish a dedicated SMAR flight for shipment of repair parts to in country locations (with retrograde of unserviceable repairables on backhaul).

(2) That TMA/USAF be persuaded to accept less than full pallets for on-shipment in order to expedite receipt of NORS items.

(3) As an alternative, utilize Air America or Brigade Courier missions to transport small NORS items.

POST X - DAY

2. Transfer of Air Combatant Assets

a. Observation: There was a decided lack of coordination concerning the transfer to VNAF and the operation of the 16 UH-1H's belonging to the ICCS and the RJMC aviation units.

b. Evaluation: The first problem which occurred was over the KM-23 gun mounts. Before Brigade policy was announced, the mounts had been removed from the aircraft. Then Brigade announced that all aircraft would retain their gun mounts. A controversy subsequently developed over whether ICCS and RJMC aircraft should retain gun mounts. Before all was said and done, the mounts had been removed and remounted several times. The second problem

AVBAV-C

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

occured when an attempt was made to transfer the aircraft to VNAF shortly after X-day. VNAF refused to sign for the aircraft because they would be used to carry members of opposing armed forces. As a result the aircraft remained on the property book of the 604th TC until X+44 when the detachment commanders signed for the aircraft. The final disposition will be to turn the aircraft over to VNAF as the aviation teams leave country.

c. Recommendation: Prior coordination must be sufficient to cover all possible eventualities when massive equipment transfers are made.

14 March 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

G. SAFETY

1. Aviation Hazards on Allied Installations

a. Observation: During this reporting period one U.S. helicopter was destroyed by fire at a P.O.L. point operated by an allied country. The P.O.L. point in question was lacking proper aircraft grounding equipment, sufficient fire extinguishers, and had fuel nozzles which locked in the open or fuel flow position.

b. Evaluation: U.S. Army aircraft often operate from aviation facilities operated by an allied country. However, these facilities may or may not have the same emphasis placed on safety procedures and equipment that we place on our own airfields. This increases the hazards to our own aircraft and crews.

c. Recommendation: When a facility is known to be deficient in safety standards, either our own or that of an allied country, all efforts must be made to rectify the situation. Within our own commands this is relatively simple, however, difficulty may be encountered with an allied country. If the safety standards of that facility are not brought up to our standards further operation of U.S. aircraft from that facility should cease. If this is not possible, and further use of the facility is required despite the deficient safety standards, aircrews must be notified of the hazard and warned to take extra precautions to prevent accidents.


POST X-DAY

2. Vehicle Safety

a. Observation: During this reporting period there was a sharp increase in the vehicular accident rate.

b. Evaluation: Excessive speed and/or inattentive driving was the primary cause of these accidents. Vehicular accidents are, in most cases, easily preventable. Most military personnel drive their own automobile and feel fully capable of driving military vehicles. However, some of the military vehicles, notably the M-151 $\frac{1}{4}$ ton Jeep, have characteristics which do not allow them to be driven carelessly with the same margin for error found in most civilian vehicles. The primary cause for most military vehicular accidents, however, is the driver. Defensive driving techniques and observance of all traffic regulations must be practiced in military vehicles as well as civilian vehicles.

c. Recommendations: Extensive command emphasis on safe driving at all levels of command and supervision is required to reduce the vehicular accident rate. Any person observing an unsafe act must take action to correct the driver. In addition, ground safety should be the topic of regular meetings with all personnel and should be given the same emphasis as aviation safety. Also, strict control of vehicle dispatches and drivers licenses should be implemented.



ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

STATION LIST PRE X - DAY

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
HQS, 17TH CAG	PLEIKU
HHC, 17TH CAG	PLEIKU
H TRP 17TH CAV	PLEIKU
57TH AHC	PLEIKU
344TH AD (D)	PLEIKU
94TH MED DET	PLEIKU
201ST CAG	NHA TRANG
25TH MED DET	NHA TRANG
339TH AD (D)	NHA TRANG
604TH TRANS CO	NHA TRANG
60TH AHC	NINH HOA
HQS, EAGLE BN (PROV)	AN SON
H TRP 10TH CAV	AN SON
129TH AHC	AN SON
180TH ASHC	AN SON
318TH AD (D)	AN SON
546TH MED DET	AN SON

STATION LIST POST X - DAY

The following station changes occurred during the deactivation period due to base closures.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STATION DEPARTED</u>	<u>STATION ARRIVED</u>	<u>DATE</u>
60TH AHC	NINH HOA	NHA TRANG	X+8
180TH ASHC	AN SON	NHA TRANG	X+ 31
129TH AHC	AN SON	PLEIKU	X+31
HQS, 17TH CAG	PLEIKU	NHA TRANG	X+40

STRENGTH

UNIT	ASSIGNED			AUTHORIZED		
	OFF	WO	ENL	OFF	WO	ENL
HHC 17TH CAG *	37	6	108	30	2	41
57TH AHC	23	20	140	18	48	214
H TRP 17TH CAV	17	22	175	16	34	216
129TH AHC	24	23	132	18	48	214
180TH ASHC	15	13	157	15	26	227
60TH AHC	25	14	128	18	48	214
H TRP 10TH CAV	21	17	155	16	34	216
201ST CAC	20	20	144	20	33	161
318TH AD (D)	2	0	16	1	0	16
339TH AD (D)	1	0	15	1	0	16
344TH AD (D)	1	0	18	1	0	16
25TH MED DET	1	0	5	1	0	7
94TH MED DET	1	0	7	1	0	8
546TH MED DET	1	0	5	1	0	8
604TH TC	8	7	86	8	7	79

* Includes personnel assigned to provisional headquarters at ECAB.

OPERATIONAL RESULTS - PRE X DAY

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA</u>	<u>STRUCTURES DESTROYED</u>
<u>NOV</u>						
HHC 17TH CAG	110.8	214	64	2.8	0	0
57TH AHC	1172.9	2632	5277	43.5	25	0
H TRP 17TH CAV	1421.1	1776	558	0.0	0	1
129TH AHC	2168.0	9951	21935	595.2	0	13
180TH ASHC	651.0	2564	5416	3258.0	0	0
60TH AHC	1065.4	3984	11263	161.2	0	0
H TRP 10TH CAV	1016.8	1967	910	18.0	17	66
201ST CAC	1123.0	2140	3902	25.7	0	0
604TH TC	11.2	8	25	0.9	0	0

DEC

HHC 17TH CAG	86.9	165	183	3.0	0	0
57TH AHC	1113.3	2349	4925	48.7	20	8
H TRP 17TH CAV	1300.8	1561	466	0.0	19	3
129TH AHC	1986.0	9020	17745	527.8	0	0
180TH ASHC	660.0	2658	3988	3403.0	0	0
60TH AHC	1161.1	4510	11980	144.3	0	3
H TRP 10TH CAV	935.1	1694	934	19.6	5	55
201ST CAC	1014.3	2028	3836	30.6	0	0
604TH TC	44.4	79	114	0.8	0	0

JAN 1-27

HHC 17TH CAG	13.4	148	107	0.0	0	0
57TH AHC	916.0	1793	3773	37.2	0	0
H TRP 17TH CAV	1286.0	1438	410	0.0	3	5
129TH AHC	1798.0	8509	21258	442.2	6	2
180TH ASHC	623.0	2780	3424	3836.0	0	0
60TH AHC	1185.7	4926	13386	217.7	0	0
H TRP 10TH CAV	1027.7	2008	1182	8.1	59	146
201ST CAC	987.0	1854	3679	43.1	0	0
604TH TC	29.5	35	84	0.0	0	0

OPERATIONAL RESULTS - POST X - DAY

X-DAY THROUGH X + 40

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>
HHC, 17th CAG	47.8	71	77	.3
57th AHC	648.2	1005	2665	28.0
H Troop, 17th CAV	39.0	34	59	0.0
129th AHC	754.2	3400	7966	216.2
180th ASHC	417.0	1359	7050	1367.5
60th AHC	574.6	1883	4450	142.6

Operational Results - Post X - Day (cont'd)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>
H Troop, 10th CAV	108.0	90	44	13.0
201st CAC	721.7	1154	1969	18.1
604th TC	17.5	7	25	2.8
IGCS	248.9	202	378	15.1
RJMC III	462.6	833	1032	18.7
RJMC IV	463.0	583	1180	38.3

SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS - PRE X - DAY

1. During the reporting period 1 November 1972 to X-day, the 17th Aviation Group continued to provide aviation support for combat operations of FWMAF in MR II. The period was characterized by a lack of major operations by either FWMAF or the enemy. As had been the case during previous reporting periods, the majority of enemy activity occurred in Kontum, Pleiku and Binh Dinh Provinces. Significantly, as the cease fire approached, enemy activity greatly increased in Binh Thuan Province, particularly in the Phan Thiet area. The Group was committed on a daily basis for 38 UH-1Hs, 8 AH-1Gs and 6 CH-47s to support MR II. These commitments do not include 8 UH-1Hs, 8 AH-1Gs and 4 OH-6As drawn from the two Cav Troops and organized into two Air Cavalry packages which were committed on a daily basis to gather intelligence. Mission requirements continued to decrease as further withdrawals of FWMAF were made.

2. 57th AHC was normally tasked on a daily basis for 10 UH-1Hs and 2 to 4 AH-1Gs to support II CORPS Headquarters, Ranger Command, 23rd ARVN Division, and Pleiku, Kontum, Darlac and Phu Bon Province advisers. Additionally, the unit flew the daily courier mission for the Group Headquarters. Other units which received support included the ARVN 2nd Armored Brigade and 42nd Regiment, and H Troop, 17th ACS. 57th nightly provided two AH-1Gs and a UH-1H mounting two mini-guns and a ~~Xenon~~ searchlight for the defense of the Camp Holloway-Pleiku area. On several occasions during the reporting period, Cougar guns from the 57th aided the ARVN defenders of firebases under enemy ground attack. Most notable were the results achieved at Duc Co on 1 November 1972 and at Firebase 41 On QL 14 north of Kontum on 26 January 1973. On 1 November, a heavy Cougar gun team engaged 4 tanks of an enemy combined arms assault against Duc Co and disabled two using 17 pound HE rockets. On 26 January 1973, the Cougar guns were instrumental in stopping a determined enemy ground attack against Firebase 41 by destroying several enemy crew-served weapons which were providing devastating fire support for the attackers.

3. H Troop (AIR), 17th ACS operated principally in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces, opcon to SRAC G-2 or the ARVN 23rd Division. On a few occasions, H/17 moved to Binh Dinh Province to support the ARVN 22nd Division. Working closely with Group S-3 and S-2, efforts were made to improve mission effectiveness and instill in supported units and SRAC G-2 a greater understanding of Cavalry capabilities and limitations. This was achieved by the use of accurate files and reports of problem areas. An Air Mission Commander report was initiated and maintained.

daily. The AMC logged any significant problem areas of each day. Another report contrasted the blade time expended while actually working a mission with the blade time enroute to the AO. The latter report was kept in the event supported units requested more "on station" time without appreciating the total time required to fly a VR mission. Other problem areas concerned the size of boxes chosen for VR missions. At the time of standdown, a lengthy report was in the initial stages of preparation which cited these and other problems. The report was not completed due to standdown. However, significant progress was made during the reporting period toward bringing those who utilize the Air Cavalry Troop to a better appreciation of the Cav's mission and capabilities. The SRAC G-2 became more aware of the maintenance requirements and flight time limitations of the helicopter. As a result, the daily mission requirements were reduced to four periods and these were never divided among more than two supported units. Consequently, the blade time spent moving between supported unit locations was reduced considerably. The Fleiku last light VR was continued but instead of an entire team only one aircraft was utilized. Efforts were made to require backseaters to increase the familiarity with friendly locations in the Fleiku area, but this proved futile due to the substantial number of small unit locations throughout the area. The weakness of these flights was demonstrated when on 23 January 1973 at 1700 hours Fleiku Airbase sustained a severe rocket attack. The evening VR helicopter was already airborne with the backseater at the onset of the attack. A gun team was launched but due to the congestion of VNAF aircraft at the suspected rocket site, all three helicopters had to remain clear and return to base without firing a single round. An additional first light VR was initiated in January. During the month of January a problem began to arise between SRAC G-2 and the Troop. G-2 based its Arc Light placement as much as 80% on Cav spot reports. Air Force bombers reported secondary explosions during many of these Arc Lights. ARVN ground forces in the area sometimes reported heavy damages as a result of the Arc Lights. On the other hand, Cav Scouts, during bomb damage assessment missions, rarely found any evidence of damage, 90% of the time reporting negative BDAs. Whether the problem was with the accuracy of the original spot report, the accuracy of plotting the Arc Light location, or the inaccurate reporting of the Air Force, the ARVN ground forces or the Cav cannot be determined. In January the Troop uncovered a resupply road network extending from the Flei Trap area to enemy positions in the Kontum area. Good BDAs were obtained and it is felt that this discovery assisted immeasurably in the interdiction of supplies that would have otherwise been valuable in the impending attack on Kontum and prevented enemy exploitation of the already precarious situation there. Normal daily commitment for the Troop was 4 UH-1H's, 4 AH-1G's, and 2 OH-6A's.

4. 201st CAC which is located in Nha Trang continued to provide UH-1H support to the Province Senior Advisors of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Quang Duc and Tuyen Duc. In addition, aircraft were provided on a daily basis to CORDS Advisors in MR II, and classified missions were flown supporting PSCG. The majority of the missions flown by 201st CAC are C&C and VIP in nature, rather than the daily combat missions flown by other units. Normal daily mission commitment was 11 UH-1Hs.

5. Eagle Combat Aviation Battalion (Prov) area of operations consisted of the eastern portion of MR II and covered the area from southern MR I to the northern MR III border. Several times during the reporting period units from the Battalion were re-located to Fleiku Province and Binh Thuan Province (Phan Thiet) in support of activities in the western and southern portion of MR II. The Battalion was employed in the support of the 22nd and 23rd ARVN Divisions, Capitol ROK Infantry Division and the White Horse ROK Infantry Division and Binh Thuan Province.

a. H Troop/ 10th Cavalry daily provided a Cav package of 4 UH-1Hs, 4 AH-1Gs and 2 OH-6As for Cavalry operations in eastern MR II. During the first two weeks of November, the Troop was conducting daily reconnaissance missions for the 22nd ARVN Division in Binh Dinh Province. No significant enemy activity was reported during the month of November and flying was kept to minimum due to adverse weather conditions throughout the AO. On 5 December the Troop assets were divided, with half the team being sent to Fleiku while the other half continued its mission in Binh Dinh Province. On 11 December the Troop returned to Lane and supported the 22nd ARVN Division. Once again on 15 December the Troop was relocated to Fleiku to locate and engage enemy forces west of Fleiku. The Troop made two LRRP insertions west of Duc Co and completed several BDAs of Arc Lights. However, no significant large scale enemy movement was noted. The entire team returned to Lane on 20 December and continued working for the 22nd ARVN Division. In early January the Troop operations were hampered by continued poor weather. On 5 January, a LRRP team was inserted 50 miles west of LZ English in search of an American POW. Though the search was unsuccessful, the team did note increased enemy build-up to the north and west of LZ English. On January 18 1973 the Troop was directed to furnish one Cav team to Binh Thuan Province to counter a suspected enemy threat in that area. Several large local force enemy units were found during the first week and successfully engaged by the Troop, naval gunfire and TAC air. On 27 January the team found several large enemy forces west of Phan Thiet and killed over 50 during several encounters. Friendly casualties at Phan Thiet included 1 aerial observer KIA and 1 pilot WIA on 26 January 1973. Meanwhile the team at Lane found the 18th NVA Regiment-Headquarters two miles southwest of Tam Quan, which was destroyed by Tac air. All tactical operations ceased on 27 January at

1800 hours and preparations for standdown were begun. Throughout the entire reporting period H Troop/ 10th Cav inserted and extracted PSCG (LRRP) teams throughout MR II. Because of this mission, valuable intelligence was gathered for higher headquarters.

b. 129th AHC continued its assigned mission of providing logistical and tactical combat support to the Capitol ROK Infantry Division and the 22nd ARVN Division. Several small scale combat assaults were conducted in the An Khe Pass area but no contact was encountered. Insignificant operations occurred during the period largely due to the pending ceasefire. The unit also provided support for Binh Dinh Province, Qui Nhon Support Command, 17th CAG and various other units throughout the reporting period. Normal daily mission requirements were 12 UH-1Hs and 2 AH-1Gs.

c. 180th ASHC provided medium helicopter support for the entire MR II. The unit normally provided 3 CH-47s at Camp Holloway to support the western half of the MR. The majority of support provided by the unit was logistics support with approximately 65% for ROK forces, 35% for ARVN and U.S. forces and 5% for units located at Lane AHP.

d. 60th AHC located at Ninh Hoa regularly supported the White Horse (9th) ROK Infantry Division also located at Ninh Hoa. The unit normally provided 6 UH-1Hs and 2 AH-1Gs daily. The majority of missions flown were C&C, resupply, and troop transport. On a limited number of occasions, the unit supported combat assaults by the 9th. There were no major combat actions in the 60th's AO during this reporting period.

6. 604th Trans Co began preparations for the retrograde of all OH-58 helicopters in MR I and MR II on 1 November 1972. Problems encountered during retrograde operations included difficulty in obtaining 1010 preservative oil, tailboom attaching brackets, and cargo tie-down straps. Tailboom attaching brackets were obtained by coordinating with the 388th Transportation Company in Saigon and local manufacture. During retrograde operations of the OH-58s, night crews were established to aid in the retrograde operation. During this period, military and civilians worked overtime, including Sundays, to complete the retrograde project. The non-availability of cargo tie-down straps for securing OH-58s inside SEA-LAND vans was resolved when it was decided that Air Force C-141 aircraft would be used for the shipment of 18 of 24 OH-58 aircraft. During this period, shipment of repair parts was greatly interrupted due to the transfer of all Air Force C-130 aircraft in Saigon to Thailand. Preparations were made on 20 November 1972 to establish a Keystone Aircraft Processing Point (KAPP) in the 604th Maintenance area.

The plans included KAPPING the CH-47 special tools from the 201st Aviation Company as a trial run. Increased retrograde processing plus decreased Air Force SMAR flights during November 1972 led to a backlog of retrograded material awaiting shipment at the aerial port in Nha Trang plus no repair parts being delivered. Also, a courier was not available from Nha Trang to Saigon during much of this period, creating a problem with distribution. During the pre X-day period, huge quantities of avionics maintenance flight equipment and other avionics related items were received from supported units as turn-in equipment. From 20 November 1972 to 8 December 1972, over \$226,000 of excess avionics equipment was turned in. By the end of November the KAPP yard was well established and awaiting disposition instructions from Saigon. A U-21 courier from Saigon was established on 6 December 1972, with flights on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. Also during December, night crews were utilized to accomplish the special paint project in which selected aircraft in MR II were painted with infra-red suppressant paint. Planning for this operation began on 7 December, and painting went on from 26 December 1972 to 24 January 1973, when the project was stopped due to the impending peace treaty. A total of 12 UH-1H, 4 AH-1G and 1 OH-6A helicopters were painted during this special operation. During January, as a peace agreement seemed imminent, units began turning in their excess parts on hand. On 25 January, 16 UH-1Hs descended on Production Control with little prior notice to be painted and transferred to RJMC 4, RJMC 3 and the ICCS immediately. By 27 January, all aircraft had been painted with white crosses and stripes and transferred. There was some confusion from 25 to 27 January as to who was to receipt for the aircraft and what UIC Code to use on the issue of the aircraft. As of X-day this problem had not been solved.

POST X-DAY

7. During the deactivation period, 17th Group continued to provide support to the various RVNAF and FVMAF throughout MR II, although on a continuously declining basis. There were no major operations during this period. Both Air Cavalry Troops ceased operations on X-day. All armed helicopter flights ceased as of X-day. By X+41 support to ROK forces had ceased completely, and support to U.S. forces in MR II had dwindled to two aircraft per day, plus whatever miscellaneous missions came about. 201st CAC was not deactivated on X+45 as planned, but was instead retained until X+55 for possible support of Operation Homecoming prisoner releases in South Vietnam. The most significant event of the post X-day period was the formation of three aviation detachments from the assets of 17th Group. These detachments, although formed from 17th Group assets, belonged to, and flew in

Incl 5

support of, the International Commission for Control and Supervision and the Regional Joint Military Command.

8. 57th AHC continued to support SRAC and other units on a daily basis with aviation assets through X+52. However, on X+40, the 57th was officially deactivated and all remaining personnel and equipment transferred to the 201st CAC. These personnel continued to operate as an autonomous unit within the 201st. Missions were gradually reduced from an average of 14 per day prior to X-day to 4 missions on X+30 and 2 missions by X+40. All files were transferred to the records holding area on X+16, and all material no longer needed for reference was burned. The 57th deactivated on X+40.

9. 201st CAC continued to support province advisors on a diminishing basis through X+30 at which time province support ceased. On X+40 all remaining 17th CAG assets were assigned to the 201st. On this date, daily aircraft commitment averaged three aircraft. However, 201st had to have available 12 mission ready UH-1H aircraft and crews with which to support Operation Homecoming, if required. The unit will deactivate on X+55.

10. 60th AHC continued to provide support to the Whitehorse ROK Infantry Division during the phasedown. By X+30 missions were reduced to two per day, and by X+36 to one per day. Also during this period, the 60th closed its installation at Ninh Hoa and redeployed to Nha Trang. This occurred on X+8. As a result of this move, 60th AHC, was removed from the command and control of ECAB, and placed directly under 17th Group. The unit deactivated on X+37.

11. ECAB continued its support to both the Koreans and the ARVN 22nd Division during this period. CH-47 support to the ARVN ceased on X-day, as did any type of direct combat mission. Further C&C missions in support of combat operations were halted. All air cavalry missions ceased on X-1. ECAB was deactivated on X+31.

a. 129th AHC continued to provide needed support to the ARVN 22nd Division and the Capitol ROK Infantry Division. The 129th had the dubious distinction of being the only unit to sustain casualties during the cease fire period. On the morning of the cease fire, two hours after it had gone into effect, a 129th aircraft sustained small arms fire and 2 WIA's while flying through An Khe pass. A five hour per day blade time restriction was placed on all aircraft in order to conserve blade time. The unit continued to support 10 missions per day until X+8, when the mission load dropped to 7. On X+12 missions were reduced to six. By X+25 missions were down to 3 per day. On X+31 129th deployed to Pleiku due to the base closure at An Son. The unit deactivated on X+37.

b. 180th ASHC continued medium helicopter support for Free World Forces in MR II. The White Horse Infantry Division required two aircraft daily until X+5, one aircraft daily until X+10 and no aircraft after that date.

The Capitol ROK Infantry Division required two aircraft daily until X+13, and one as required thereafter. During the period until X+10 the aircraft that supported the White Horse Infantry Division also supported Lane AHP by withdrawal of retrograde equipment and PLL to the 604th DSU at Nha Trang. After X+10 the aircraft were missioned to support Lane AHP as needed. CH-47's were also used to support Lane AHP for transportation of DEROS personnel to Qui Nhon and Phu Cat as needed. Also, the 180th detachment at Pleiku supported the US Forces in the Pleiku area by withdrawal of retrograde equipment and PLL to 604th DSU at Nha Trang and also by transportation of supplies from Nha Trang and Qui Nhon to Pleiku. On X+31, the 180th was transferred to Nha Trang upon closure of Lane Installation. The unit was deactivated on X+35.

12. 604th Transportation Co. continued to provide normal direct support maintenance during the reporting period. The majority of their activity was concentrated in retrograde of equipment and turn-over of air combatant assets which will be covered in other sections of this report. Operations continued without any major changes through X+45. On X+45 a civilian contractor representative replaced the military COR. Central DSSA continued to operate a Forward Supply Point (FSP) at 604th with one warehouse to support RJMC and ICCS up to X+59. At that time, Air America will be supported through the FSP. After X+44, 91 NHA personnel remained in the Nha Trang area. This was 49 in excess of the number needed.

VULNERABILITY CHART

UNIT	TYPE A/C	NOV		DEC		JAN 1-27		TOTAL	
		HIT	DEST	HIT	DEST	HIT	DEST	HIT	DEST
HHC 17TH CAG	UH1H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
57TH AHC	UH1H	0	0	2	0	1	0	3	0
	AH1G	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0
H TRP 17TH CAV	UH1H	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
	AH1G	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	OH6A	3	0	0	0	2	0	5	0
129TH AHC	UH1H	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0
	AH1G	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
H TRP 10TH CAV	UH1H	0	0	1	1	1	0	2	1
	AH1G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	OF6A	2	0	2	0	4	1	8	1
60TH AHC	UH1H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	AH1G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
180TH ASHC	CH47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
201ST CAC	UH1H	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
604TH TC	UH1H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		6	0	8	1	12	1	26	2

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES PRE X - DAY

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>7.62</u>	<u>2.75</u>	<u>20MM</u>	<u>40MM</u>
NOV	84,898	5464	800	8460
DEC	123,004	5536	4356	10979
1-27 JAN	149,048	6405	2117	14026

AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF 27 JAN 1973

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>TOE/MTOE</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>
HHC 17TH CAV	UH1H	2	2
57TH AHC	UH1H	23	20
	AH1G	6	6
H TRP 17TH CAV	UH1H	8	8
	AH1G	9	8
	OH6A	10	8
EAGLE BN (PROV)	UH1H	54	50
	AH1G	21	18
	OH6A	10	7
	CH47	16	15
129TH AHC	UH1H	23	22
	AH1G	6	6
60TH AHC	UH1H	23	21
	AH1G	6	4
H TRP 10TH CAV	UH1H	8	7
	AH1G	9	8
	OH6A	10	8
180TH ASHC	CH47	16	15
201ST CAC	UH1H	20	20
604TH TC	UH1H	2	2
17TH CAG.TOTALS	UH1H	109	102
	AH1G	36	32
	OH6A	20	16
	CH47	16	15

AVERAGE FLYING HOURS AND CR RATE

UNIT	TYPE	NOV		DEC		JAN		21-27 JAN	
		AVG HRS/AC	CR%	AVG HRS/AC	CR%	AVG HRS/AC	CR%	AVG HRS/AC	CR%
HHC 17TH CAG	UHLH	60	89%	43	86%	35	98%	7	100%
57TH AHC	UHLH	58	84%	53	83%	49	74%	19	81%
	AH1G	46	77%	30	63%	30	67%	8	83%
H TRP 17TH CAV	UHLH	81	86%	56	87%	74	92%	15	83%
	AH1G	71	76%	56	73%	64	74%	10	77%
	CH6A	56	86%	35	88%	42	86%	9	96%
129TH AHC	UHLH	73	80%	73	78%	69	76%	14	78%
	AH1G	21	72%	26	72%	29	75%	12	71%
H TRP 10TH CAV	UHLH	65	80%	43	87%	50	82%	28	84%
	AH1G	38	56%	43	66%	43	71%	9	75%
	CH6A	26	67%	21	79%	37	65%	8	66%
60TH AHC	UHLH	51	91%	46	88%	59	88%	19	83%
	AH1G	22	85%	20	85%	24	92%	6	97%
180TH ASHC	CH47	45	68%	48	71%	50	72%	11	68%
201ST CAG	UHLH	51	85%	59	89%	57	88%	17	87%
604TH TC	UHLH	22	86%	25	89	27	84%	4	98%

Transfer and Retrograde of Aircraft (TOE)

<u>DAY</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>RECEIVING UNITS</u>	<u>BALANCE</u>
X-day	UH-1H			102
X-day	CH-47C			15
X-day	AH-1G			32
X-day	OH-6A			15
X+2	OH-6A	15	604th TC (Retro)	0
X+2	UH-1H	2	17th CAG	104
X+3	CH-47C	2	388th TC (Retro)	13
X+3	AH-1G	20	388th TC (Retro)	12
X+4	UH-1H	16	RJMC III, IV and ICCS	88
X+6	CH-47C	1	388th TC (Retro)	12
X+7	AH-1G	8	388th TC (Retro)	4
X+11	UH-1H	1	604th TC (S5)	87
X+12	AH-1G	4	388th TC (Retro)	0
X+14	CH-47C	3	388th TC (Retro)	9
X+14	UH-1H	16	RVNAF	71
X+15	UH-1H	3	RVNAF	68
X+16	UH-1H	4	RVNAF	64
X+17	UH-1H	5	RVNAF	59
X+19	UH-1H	9	RVNAF	50
X+22	CH-47C	2	388th TC (Retro)	7
X+26	UH-1H	3	Air America	47
X+27	UH-1H	10	RVNAF	37
X+27	CH-47C	2	388th TC (Retro)	5
X+30	UH-1H	1	Air America	36
X+31	CH-47C	1	388th TC (Retro)	4
X+35	CH-47C	4	388th TC (Retro)	0
X+37	UH-1H	6	ICCS, Pleiku	30 (1)
X+37	UH-1H	9	12th CAG	21
X+37	UH-1H	5	RVNAF	16 (2)

TOTAL (as of X+37)

148

NOTES: (1) Six UH-1H transferred to ICCS on X-day were subsequently transferred to Air America on X+37. Six additional aircraft were painted and transferred to ICCS from the 60th AHC.

(2) At X+37 16 each UH-1H remain in 17th CAG. It is expected that 11 of these will be RVNAF transferred by X+45. The remaining 5 UH-1H will be transferred to RVNAF by X+60.

RVNAF Transfer from 604th TC Accounts

<u>DAY</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ACCOUNT</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
X+14	UH-1H	S3, 5	15
	UH-1H	S2	7
X+16	UH-1H	S2	3
X+22	UH-1H	S2	2
X+26	UH-1H	S2	2
X+27	UH-1H	S2	2
X+31	UH-1H	S2	3
X+36	UH-1H	S2	3
TOTAL (as of X+37)			37

Incl 9b

ACCIDENT STATISTICS

ACCIDENTS

Operational

Maintenance

TOTAL

3
1
4 *

INCIDENTS

Operational

FOD

TOTAL

1
1
2

FORCED LANDINGS

Fuel Control Malfunction

TOTAL

1
1

PRECAUTIONARY LANDING

Hydraulic Failure

Chip Detector

Master Caution and/or Warning Lights

Compressor Stall

High Frequency Vibration in Engine

Engine Compressor Stall

Contamination in Fuel Control filter

Transmission oil pressure loss

Fuel Control malfunction

Hydraulic servo failure

Oil cooler fan failure

TOTAL

7
5
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
26

Aviation Ground Accidents

TOTAL

2
2

* REMARK: One accident during this reporting period had both operational and maintenance causes.

POST X - DAY

ACCIDENTS -- None

INCIDENTS -- None

FORCED LANDINGS -- None

PRE-CAUTIONARY LANDINGS

Transmission Oil Loss

Hydraulic Failure

Engine Overspeed Due to Governor Failure

TOTAL

1
3
1
5

Aviation Ground Accidents

TOTAL

1**
1

Incl 10

GROUND ACCIDENTS

1/2 Ton Vehicles

3

3/4 Ton Vehicles

1

TOTAL

4

** REMARK: One aircraft on being shut down from a pre-flight run-up, spun in the revetment striking the synch elevator and tail stinger against the revetment. There was no intent to fly.

US Army Aviation Support Element, Regional Joint Military Commission III

The following is a summary of the formation and operations of the detachment.

1. Organization - The Aviation Detachment in support of the Joint Military Commission for supervision of the Viet Nam cease fire was formed on 26 January 1973. The unit under command of Major Alan R. Todd, former executive officer of Eagle Battalion, is comprised of twelve officers and eight enlisted personnel. All personnel were drawn from H Troop (Air), 10th ACS and were chosen on the basis of highest qualification. Since the Unit furnishes UH-1H helicopter support, six aircraft commanders and six pilots were selected. An NCOIC, Technical Inspector, and six crew chiefs completed the team. With 24 hour notice, the team on the 27th of January picked up specially marked aircraft in Nha Trang and relocated from their home stations at Lane AHP, An Son, to Camp Holloway, Pleiku. During the stay at Camp Holloway, the unit was furnished quarters, mess facilities, given administrative and logistical support by the 17th CAG staff and by Headquarters and Headquarters Company. On March 3, 1973 the unit relocated to Team 21, II Corps Headquarters, Pleiku, where they will remain until completion of operations and withdrawal on or about 1 April.

2. Operations - The aviation element's principal support is to six Joint Military Commission Teams located at Phu Cat, Tuy An, Ninh Hoa, Ban Me Thuot, Hau Bon, and Kontum. On 29 January a courier flight was established to travel a circuit visiting every team site on a daily basis. Three other aircraft are prepared as standby everyday and frequently pull miscellaneous missions. The average number of aircraft flown per day is 2. An average of 12 aircraft hours is flown daily. Operational totals are listed as Inclosure 4. These figures are applicable to the first 40 days operation in a forecasted 60 day time of operation.

3. Maintenance - Maintenance has been quite satisfactorily performed by NHA civilians contract personnel. Six periodic inspections, one per aircraft, were performed usually lasting 3 to 4 days per aircraft. All intermediate inspections were performed in minimum time and did in no way detract from the mission ready status. A truly commendable performance beyond normal duty expectations was rendered by NHA personnel when the initial color scheme of three white stripes for the fuselage and tailboom was deemed ineffective for identification, and therefore protection. Changing colors from white to international orange and adding a stripe was the decision that came from higher echelons. Paint was brought in from Saigon at 1700 hours one evening, and the NHA personnel worked through the night to have sufficient aircraft available for mission requirements the following day. Their hard work and efficiency has contributed greatly to the success of this mission.

US Army Aviation Support Element, Regional Joint Military Commission IV

The following summarizes the establishment and operation of the aviation element.

1. Organization - The advance party for the aviation element in support of RJMC IV arrived at Phan Thiet on X-1. The remainder of the party arrived on X-Day. The detachment is commander by CPT Hary Davis, former executive officer of the 201st CAC, and is composed of 9 officers and 7 enlisted men, all drawn from the 201st CAC. The detachment has 4 aircraft. Additionally, a team of 12 NHA civilian maintenance personnel were attached on X+2 in support of the team. The mission of the aviation element is to provide aviation support to RJMC IV throughout Tuyen Duc, Quang Duc, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy, and Lam Dong Provinces.

2. Operations - On X+2, the flight detachment took over Phan Thiet radio and assumed flight following responsibilities for the southern one-third of MR II. Between X-Day and X+9 the detachment made various improvements on the Phan Thiet Airfield. One hanger was renovated to provide a maintenance area, the Phan Thiet tower was put into operation, and the PSP on the runway was renovated so that the airfield was once again usable by fixed wing aircraft. On X+12 contact was made by a helicopter team with PRG Elements in Binh Thuan Province at coordinates AN904358 without incident. On X+13, 36 PRG delegates were transported from AN768182 in Binh Thuan Province to Phan Thiet. On X+25 the various delegations were flown to the outlying sites of Bao Loc, Dalat, and Phan Rang. As of this date, support to RJMC IV is expected to continue until X+60. Operational performance figures through X+40 are contained in Inclosure 4. The aircraft have been utilized as follows; logistical missions - 30% of total time, liaison - 55% of total time, cease fire violation inspections - 5% of total time, DRV/PRG support - 10% of total time.

3. Maintenance - Aircraft availability from X-Day through X+40 was 97.8%. The detachment had completed 4 PE's by X+40. Reasons for the high availability are as follows; all aircraft are relatively new, both civilian and military maintenance personnel were carefully chosen for the assignment, maintenance personnel have no extra duties, repair parts for the detachment have been given a high priority resulting in no NORS time, and normally only three aircraft are flown per day allowing a maintenance down day for each aircraft every fourth day.

ICCS REGION III FLIGHT DETACHMENT

The following outlines the activities of the ICCS Flight Detachment from formation through X+40.

1. Organization - Prior to the announcement of a cease fire, a contingency plan had provided for the formation of this detachment. All personnel had been alerted prior to X-day and all aircraft chosen. On X+2, the detachment picked up its six aircraft and became operational. The detachment was commanded by MAJ William W. Holston, 17th Group's former liason officer with SRAC Headquarters, and was composed of 13 officers and warrant officers, and 8 enlisted men. The 8 enlisted men included 1 NCOIC, 1 Technical Inspector, and 6 crew chiefs. All personnel were drawn from H Troop (AIR), 17th ACS.

2. Operations - From X-day through X+24 there was little of an operational nature for the detachment to do, due to the fact that the ICCS was slow in deploying to the various field sites. This period was used by the detachment to fly to the various outlying locations which would be utilized by the ICCS in order to familiarize the pilots with their area of operations. It also allowed time for the pilots to get proficiency flying time. As the ICCS teams began to arrive in Pleiku, the aviation detachment gave orientation rides to acquaint the members with the capabilities of the vehicle they would be using. From X+25 through X+31 ICCS teams were inserted into the following locations: Kontum, Cheo Reo, Phu Cat, Ban Me Thuot, Tuy An, Qui Nhon, Ninh Hoa, Nha Trang, Duc Co, and Ben Het. The actual insertions were completed without incident; However, an ICCS aircraft received a hit from small caliber ground fire while on a coordination visit prior to inserting the team into Ben Het. As a result of this and similar incidents throughout Vietnam on X+30, beginning on X+31 no further flying of ICCS aircraft was allowed without prior approval by ICCS Headquarters in Saigon. The irony of this situation is that ICCS Hqs granted permission for flights into contested areas such as Ben Het and Duc Co, but refused permission for flights into uncontested areas. Overall, the total hours flown in support of ICCS Region III was well below operational capability. The limiting factors on hours flown were the late arrival of ICCS personnel and the restrictions on all ICCS personnel and the restrictions on all ICCS flights which went into effect on X+31. A summary of ICCS operational performance through X+40 is contained at Inclosure 4.

3. Maintenance - Maintenance presented no problems. OR rates remained high, and maintenance support from NHA was excellent.

4. Lessons Learned

a. Observation: It was necessary to replace two enlisted personnel in the detachment for disciplinary reasons.

b. Evaluation: The NCOIC and the OIC of the detachment were not consulted on the selection of personnel. The two individuals in question were apathetic toward the mission of the unit, and their conduct was not in keeping with the high standards required for this duty.

c. Recommendation: All personnel be interviewed by the OIC and/or the NCOIC before selection. Particular attention should be paid to proven ability in the MOS, a desire to accomplish the mission under rigorous conditions, and a proper temperament to work with VIP's.