


OR-CC  
34 GSG APR 72



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 34TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP (AM&S)  
APO 96309

AVRAY-BR

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters 34th General Support Group (AM&S) for period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65

THRU: Commanding General  
1st Aviation Brigade  
ATTN: AVBAGC-O  
APO 96384

Commanding General  
United States Army Vietnam, MACV Sup Com  
ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO 96375

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington D.C. 20310

1. Section 1 Operations: Significant Activities

a. (U) MISSION: Provide Army aircraft maintenance and supply support (aircraft repair parts, avionics, and aircraft armament) to United States and other Free World Military Assistance Forces within Southeast Asia.

b. (U) OPERATIONS:

(1) During the 182 day period of this report, the 34th General Support Group (Aircraft Maintenance and Supply) continued to provide combat service support to over 2,000 U.S., Vietnamese, and other Free World Military Assistance Forces aircraft in Vietnam. This is a decrease of approximately 1,000 aircraft since the last reporting period. Since the last reporting period the monthly average flying hours for the theater fleet has decreased from 170,161 to 77,647 hours or approximately 54%.

(2) During this reporting period increment XI had a considerable impact on the 34th General Support Group (AM&S) in that the following units were phased out:

Protective Markings

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*

AVBAY-BR

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters 34th General Support Group (AM&S) for period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65

(a) The entire 520th Transportation Bn (AM&S)(GS) including Headquarters and Headquarters Company  
56th Transportation Company  
165th Transportation Company  
605th Transportation Company  
AVEL CENTRAL  
Army Aviation Refresher Training School

(b) Most units of the 58th Transportation Bn (AM&S)(DS/GS) including:  
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment  
610th Transportation Company  
344th Transportation Company  
263rd Light Equipment Maintenance Company

(c) Most units of the 14th Transportation Bn (AM&S) (GS) including:  
Headquarters and Headquarters Company  
79th Transportation Company  
608th Transportation Company  
614th Light Equipment Maintenance Company

(d) Most units of the 765th Transportation Bn (AM&S) including:  
Headquarters and Headquarters Company  
330th Transportation Company  
317th Light Equipment Maintenance Company

(e) Two units of the Aviation Material Management Center, including:

110th Transportation Company  
166th Aviation Maintenance Detachment (SA)

(f) Also during this period the 1st Transportation Bn (Seaborne) departed from waters off the Vietnamese Coast aboard the USNS Corpus Christi Bay.

(3) Enemy activity during this period against 34th GSG (AM&S) units was relatively light except during the month of April when increased enemy activity, especially in MR I resulted in several rocket attacks on units of the 58th Transportation Bn (AM&S). Overall, enemy activity had little adverse effect on the operational mission with the exception that many productive military man-hours had to be diverted to the security of installations from late January through the end of April.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVBAY-BR

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters 34TH General Support Group (AM&S) for period 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65

c. (U) TRAINING:

(1) A total of 456 students graduated from the Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS) during this reporting period. This number included 97 VNAF CH-47 crew chiefs. A summary of the graduates from the various courses held during this period prior to the school's closing follows:

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>LENGTH</u>	<u>Nov 71 - April 72</u>
T53L13 Engine	2 weeks	40
Armament (enlisted)	1 week	17
Armament (officer)	1 week	13
UH-1 Hel Rep	2 weeks	79
OH-6 Hel Rep	2 weeks	19
OH-58 Hel Rep	2 weeks	14
Tech Supply	1 week	56
T-63 Engine	1 week	26
Tech Inspector	2 weeks	46
AH-1G Hel Rep	2 weeks	43
Honeycomb Repair	1 week	26
CH-47 Crew Chief (VNAF)		<u>97</u> <u>456</u>

(2) This total number represents a decrease of 41% from the last reporting period.

d. (U) ORGANIZATION:

(1) During this reporting period the 34th GSG was reorganized as a result of the stand-down of the units outlined in b(2) above. After increment XI, the 34th GSG was left with four DS companies which have been reorganized to give them each an additional GS capability. Also remaining is the Group Headquarters, the Aviation Material Management Center, and two aviation detachments (D) which have been assigned to the 34th GSG for airfield operations at Saigon and Vung Tau.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVBAY-BR

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters 34th General Support Group (AM&S) for period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65

(2) The four companies are deployed as follows to provide aircraft direct and general support to their respective MR's.

<u>MR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
I	Marble Mountain	142d Trans Co
II	Pleiku	604th Trans Co
III	Saigon	388th Trans Co
IV	Can Tho	611th Trans Co

(3) Also during this reporting period the 34th General Support Group was reassigned from Headquarters USARV to 1st Aviation Brigade by USARV GO. 3291 effective 25 November 1971.

e. (U) Personnel: The personnel strength of the 34th General Support Group (AM&S) on 30 April 1972 was as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Warrant Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Authorized	80	45	912
Assigned	87	55	934

f. (U) Information Briefing: During this reporting period information briefings were presented to the following distinguished guests and visitors:

Mr. Hans Weichsel (VP Bell Helicopter)	1 Dec 71
LTG McCaffrey	24 Jan 72
BG Swenson	25 Jan 72
MG Kornet	5 Feb 72
LTG McCaffrey	15 Mar 72
MG Enemark	24 Mar 72

2. Section Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. PERSONNEL

(1) NHA Management

(a) Observation: (U) During this reporting period due to the rapid phasedown of the 34th GSG (AM&S) and the reorganization of remaining assets the shifting and reassessments of NHA personnel became a problem.

(b) Evaluation: (U) Due to the realignment of units remaining in the 34th GSG (AM&S) in conjunction with aircraft support requirements in each military region, the concept of assigning NHA personnel was revamped by this headquarters.

For OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVRAY-BR

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters 34th Group (AMAS) for period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65

The company commander of the 34th GSC (AMAS) unit in each MR working with the Director of Maintenance and Director of Supply based on their assessment of current requirements in that MR recommend to the Director of Plans & Operations where individuals should be assigned. Assignment instructions based on this recommendation are then given to NHA Headquarters.

(c) Recommendation: (U) That this concept of assigning NHA personnel continue to be employed as the most equitable and responsive way to make assignments.

(2) Tour Curtailment Policies:

(a) Observations: (U) There have been numerous changes in the tour curtailment policy during this reporting period and it did not always seem that consideration was given to the requirements for the various MOS's.

(b) Evaluation: (U) The various changes in curtailment policies and the rapid loss of some critical MOS's both worked to create morale problems and/or maintenance problems in some units.

(c) Recommendations: (U) That changes in tour curtailment policy be kept to an absolute minimum with MOS requirements being carefully reviewed before any changes are made.

b. INTELLIGENCE: NONE

c. OPERATIONS:

(1) Stand-down of units (Closing Installations)

(a) Observations: (U) A technical service unit designated to stand-down at an installation where all combat units have already stood-down experiences extreme difficulties in attempting to continue its mission, proceed with the stand-down and yet provide security for the installation which was formerly provided by the combat unit.

(b) Evaluation: (U) When an installation designated to be closed has as its last active tenant a technical service unit designated to stand-down, security for the installation formerly provided by combat units or other support units becomes the responsibility of the remaining unit. This spreads the assets of a technical service unit required to continue its support up until close to the time of stand-down quite thin. Also last minute preparations for the close out of the installation which the technical service unit is tasked to perform, (Such as the removal of hurricane fencing) cause an undo strain on that unit at a time when the unit is already taxed to its limit with security responsibilities, stand-down preparations, and mission fulfillment.

For OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVBAY-BR

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters 34th General Support Group (AM&S) for period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65

(c) Recommendations: (U) That the unit designated to close out an installation be a unit with a combat mission.

(2) Stand-down Units (Flow Chart)

(a) Observations: (U) A sequential plan displayed in flow chart format is an outstanding guide for unit movements and stand-down operations.

(b) Evaluation: (U) Use of a flow chart as a managerial tool greatly assists unit commanders to channel their resources to meet critical deadlines. A smooth stand-down or unit movement is attainable in the allotted time frame, if strict adherence to programmed phase out schedules is maintained.

(c) Recommendation: (U) That commanders of units designated to move or stand-down employ a flow chart as a managerial tool.

(3) KAPP and DSSA Missions:

(a) Observations: (U) The distinctly different missions of the KAPP (Keystone Aviation Processing Point) and the DSSA (Direct Support Supply Activity) must be recognized.

(b) Evaluation: (U) During this period some of the problems encountered by the DSSA and KAPP during the increased volume of unit stand-down/draw-down required re-evaluation and in some cases changes to established procedures. The KAPP facilities readily adapted to this sudden increase in workload. Only comparatively minor adjustments were required. However, the DSSA requirements were quite diversified. They had to continue maintaining residual customer service, process excess turn-in of aircraft repair parts/PLL's (unservicable and serviceable) and accept, process and ship all TOE avionics test equipment and aircraft special tools. To establish continuity in the system, eliminate duplication of effort and ease the burden of the DSSA, the responsibilities of handling avionics test equipment and special tools were transferred to the KAPP. The results of implementing this adjustment have been satisfactory and also brings into alignment the separate missions and operations of the DSSA and KAPP. The KAPP has been established for the purpose of processing aviation related equipment for retrograde out of country or redistribution to other units in-country. On the other hand the DSSA must continue to serve customers in the area of aircraft repair parts, both issuing and receiving.

(c) Recommendations: (U) That future operations involving KAPP's and DSSA's be evaluated on a recurring basis to determine the most efficient division of missions.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVBAY-BR

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters 34th General Support Group (AMGS) for period ending 30 April 1972, ROS CSFOR-65

(4) Retrograde of Aircraft

(a) Observations: (U) During this period retrograde of aircraft from RVN reached a peak level with certain unsatisfactory procedures requiring special investigation by the 34th Group's Directorate of Maintenance.

(b) Evaluation: (U) Probably due to the large number of aircraft being shipped during this period many were damaged during handling or actual shipment. DOM in conjunction with a project "ROSS" team from AVSCOM noted that many aircraft were found with lost or removed parts prior to loading. It was also determined that steam cleaners used in preparing aircraft for shipment were having a damaging effect on those aircraft.

(c) Recommendations: (U) That key unit personnel be required to attend a retrograde conference prior to the initiation of a unit stand-down. That they be cautioned about insuring that all parts are present on aircraft to be shipped. That they be cautioned against the use of steam cleaners in preparing aircraft for shipment.

(5) Aviator Survival Radios

(a) Observations: (U) Until recently many units have taken little or no interest in the serviceability of aviator survival radios.

(b) Evaluation: (U) During the latter part of the reporting period maintenance requests for repair of survival radios quadrupled. Many of the radios were not repairable in country and had to be evacuated to CONUS for repair. This has resulted in almost complete depletion of float stocks. At the present time there is no serviceable float stock available in MRI, II, or III. During the past two years, most aircraft were employed in multi-ship missions, and aviators could expect almost immediate rescue without having to use a survival radio. This resulted in a lack of interest in survival radios on the part of many personnel. Several radios were turned in as TOE equipment not required. Several of these radios were turned in through Keystone Points under the control of ICCV. As AMMC had few demands for survival radios, most of the radios turned in through aviation Keystone channels were shipped to CONUS instead of being repaired and re-issued. Further a lack of demands for replacement batteries has resulted in batteries being shipped to Okinawa as excess. Due to lack of maintenance requests, float stocks were reduced at the 34th GSG AVEL Units.

(c) Recommendations: (U)

1. Survival radios authorized by TOE be on hand or on order at all times and be maintained in a serviceable condition.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVBAY-BR

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters 34th General Support Group (AM&S) for period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65

2. MICB action be taken, if TOE does not authorize at least one radio per utility helicopter or observation helicopter, two per cargo helicopter or utility fixed-wing aircraft or two per OV-1.

3. Survival radios be stored at flight operations along with go-no go test set and spare batteries.

4. All survival radios on hand be recorded on the property book and reported on the 711-5 report.

5. That adequate float stocks be maintained at avionics maintenance facilities.

(6) Unauthorized Lateral Transfer of Equipment

(a) Observations: (U) Units within this command when faced with stand-down have made unauthorized lateral transfer of equipment.

(b) Evaluation: (U) Lateral transfer of equipment between subordinate units of a Headquarters without prior approval of that Headquarters or USARV causes undo confusion in records keeping and is in fact unauthorized. If a unit becomes Keystone then only USARV can authorize lateral transfers.

(c) Recommendations: (U) That higher Headquarters monitor subordinate units to insure that proper procedures are followed in making lateral transfers of equipment where authorized and that lateral transfers are not made when not authorized.

(7) Inventory

(a) Observation: (U) Difficulties in improving availability balance file (ABF) accuracy at USAMIC through an effective cyclic inventory program are compounded by rapid turn-over of personnel in RVN, by ADP hardware and soft-ware changes and by satisfaction of high customer requirements.

(b) Evaluation: (U) Turn-over of supervisory personnel with little "overlap" resulted in the recurrence of previously corrected procedural problems (e.g. failure to manually compare first and second count cards prior to final reconciliation). After USAMIC changed to new computer hardware and soft-ware during the reporting period, three inventories were conducted before it was noticed that second count cards were not being utilized in the final reconciliation due to a deficiency in USARPAC supplied soft-ware. Because of high priority customer requirements, issues and receipts must be expeditiously processed for lines undergoing inventory; this increases the opportunity for errors in the final reconciliation and in the resulting adjustments posted to the ABF.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AVBAY-BR

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters 34th General Support Group (AM&S) for period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65

(c) Recommendations: (U) That supervisory personnel at all levels place special emphasis on maintaining correct inventory procedures during personnel changes. That detailed checks of inventory ADP outputs be made the first time they are produced after a hardware or software change.

(8) Completed Customer Requisition History Purge File.

(a) Observation: (U) All requisitions that have been closed for thirty days are purged from the active history tape files and are now maintained in a printed purge file. Follow-ups and cancellation requests for these requisitions are rejected from the daily supply cycle as unmatched inquiries. By manual research of the purge file, AMMC is capable of supplying the customer accurate updated status for these requisitions. If research based on a follow-up for a requisition less than 30 days old shows that the requisition was never received, AMMC enters a new requisition into the daily supply cycle.

(b) Evaluation: (U) Full utilization of the purge file insures that complete and accurate status is disseminated for customer inquiries and cancellation requests. Automatic reinstatements of lost requisitions by the supply source eliminates further delay to the customer.

(c) Recommendation: (U) That maximum use of the printed purge file be continued at AMMC.

(9) VNAF Improvement and Modernization (I & M).

(a) Observation: (U) In accordance with the Interservice Support Agreement between USAEPAC and Air Force Logistic Command (AFLC), requisitions other than NORS (not operationally ready, supply), requisitions are submitted by VNAF through AFLC to Warner Robbins Air Material Area (WRAMA). WRAMA forwards the requisitions to AFLC and stock is issued to VNAF or back ordered. VNAF phones NORS requisitions direct to a VNAF liaison man at AMMC. After a NORS requisition is satisfied, VNAF submits a duplicate requisition to WRAMA so that AFLC supply and financial records can be updated. Special manual sorting of computer produced status cards at AMMC is required to avoid transceiving status cards to WRAMA before the appropriate requisition is recorded in the WRAMA computer. Discrepancies between NORS requisitions phoned to AMMC and supposed duplicates transceiving to WRAMA result in unnecessary follow-up actions and extensive manual research. Differences in Army and Air Force implementations of MILSTRIP further necessitate special off line processing.

(b) Evaluation: (U) Intensive management by all parties involved in the VNAF I and M Program and special monthly reconciliations of AMMC and WRAMA requisition files enabled AMMC to continue to provide high quality support to VNAF.

~~For official use only~~

AVBAY-BR

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters 34th General Support Group (AM&S) for period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65

(a) Recommendations: (U) That planners and implementers of unorthodox supply systems involving other services, other countries and high priorities be alert to the potential difficulties in such systems. That further effort be expended for standardizing the MILSTRIP implementations of the services.

(10) Aircraft Normal Modification Work Order (MWO) Compliance

(a) Observation: (U) It has been the USARV Command Policy that aircraft normal MWO's will be applied insofar as the unit commander is capable, dependent upon the availability of manpower and kits. First priority has been given to maintaining operational readiness. As a result a great number of normal MWO's have not been applied to USARV aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: (U)

(1) Normal MWO compliance is mandatory in accordance with Army Regulation 750-5. The kits of component parts for these MWO's are normally PEMA funded and are purchased on a one-for-one basis against the serial numbers of aircraft requiring modification. Within 12 months of publication of the MWO the compliance is required. The tactical considerations in RVN have delayed a sense of urgency towards applying normal MWO's.

(2) After the 12 months compliance period, it is normal for the TM 55-Series-P manuals to be changed to show the parts now required to support the modified fleet world-wide. Procurement of repair parts and components for the unmodified configuration is stopped and depot stocks of the old parts become difficult or impossible to obtain. It is possible that eventually all unmodified airframes could be grounded for parts no longer available, thus forcing the command involved to modify these airframes to get them operational again.

(3) If, as has apparently happened in some cases, the PEMA funded kits have been issued and have been lost due to non-application, the individual components of the MWO kit must be requisitioned through normal supply channels. These requisitions result in stock fund expenditure of assets against the theater budget. Since more than one requisition is involved, a good deal of time and energy will be required to assemble all of the parts required to accomplish the modification.

(c) Recommendations: (U)

(1) That the command policy be reviewed to determine whether the tactical situation justifies the continuation of past policies.

~~For official use only~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AVBAY-BR

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters 34th General Support Group (AM&S) for period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65

(2) That the economic impacts be evaluated and emphasis be placed on determining which MWO's have not been applied and the availability of MWO Kits.

(11) Percentage Change Factor (PCF)

(a) Observations: (U) The retrograde of aircraft and the Vietnamization program have caused unique management problems at USAMC in maintaining the TASL.

(b) Evaluation: (U) As a result of the problems caused by the retrograde of aircraft and the Vietnamization Program, USAMMC continues to use the PCF (percentage Change Factor) in forecasting future requirements. The PCF, a unique program developed by USAMMC is a valuable method of reducing historical demand data by forecasted reductions in aircraft density by system of aircraft. By using the PCF factor combined with several other unique programs, USAMMC continues to:

(1) Provide timely and efficient retrograde of aircraft repair parts excess to theater requirements.

(2) Keep pace with the large quantities of stocks required to support Vietnamization; both demand accomodations and satisfaction exceeded USARV goals by 8% and 10% respectively.

(c) Recommendation: (U) That the PCF continue to be used as a management tool in support of aircraft retrograde and Vietnamization programs.

(d) ORGANIZATION: NONE

(e) TRAINING: NONE

(f) LOGISTICS: NONE

(g) COMMUNICATIONS: NONE

(h) MATERIAL: NONE

(i) OTHER: NONE

1 Incl  
Organization Chart

DONALD H. JERSEY  
Colonel, TC  
Commanding

## THE HISTORY OF THE VILLAGE.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVBAGC (15 May 72). 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Reports Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 34th General Support Group for Period Ending 30 April 72, RCS CS FOR-65.

4 July 1972

DA Headquarters, 1st Avn Bde, APO San Francisco 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam/MACV Support Command, ATTN: AVHCG-DST, APO San Francisco 96375

1. After review of the OR-LL for the 34th General Support Group the following comment is submitted.

2. Reference: OR-LL, 34th General Support Group:

Paragraph 2C (10), page 10, discusses the USARV Normal Modification Work Order (MWO) Compliance Policy. The command policy is currently in the process of a thorough review. This policy will most assuredly be changed in the near future. However, more research is required to determine the most feasible way of accomplishing this enormous task without imposing an unbearable workload on the already heavily tasked operational units. The observations, evaluations, and recommendations, in this paragraph are valid and are in full awareness of this command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*blw*  
BETTY L. NEMYER  
CW2, USA  
Assistant AG

G-3 FILE COPY CPT ALLEN / LTC SMITH / MAJ TER/RTT/MS  
11 MAY 1972

Protective Markings  
REMOVED 31 DEC 1974

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

*blw*