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AVGD-CC (10 August 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period Ending 21 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

c. The addition of direct distance dialing from Pleiku area has greatly increased the speed of long distance service. The reliability and speed of dial service in all cases has proved superior to the old tactical system which it replaced at Camp Holloway.

8. (U) Surgeon: Since Camp Holloway has not been under attack for over two months, a mass casualty exercise involving all personnel at the dispensary was conducted on 23 July 1968. All personnel were made aware of their duties, station and responsibilities during and following an attack. Twenty simulated casualties from Headquarters Detachment were brought to the dispensary for treatment during this exercise.

9. (U) Accident Prevention

a. The accident rate (per 100,000 flight hours) was 13.5, all of which were major accidents. The following causes are cited:

(1) May: Four Accidents; rate 28.2

(a) 9 May 1968, UH-1C: Engine failure at low level over unfavorable terrain during the conduct of an assigned mission. (Engine undergoing analysis).

(b) 6 May 1968, UH-1H:

1. Failure to perform a proper hover check.
2. Over loaded condition.
3. Improper approach to a fire base (Pinnacle).
4. Failure to initiate any corrective action.

(c) 17 May 1968, UH-1C:

1. Improper flight procedures. Pilot made improper entry to 180 degree autorotation.

2. Instructor allowed student to proceed beyond point where a safe autorotation could be accomplished.

3. Instructor Pilot failed to initiate corrective action.

4. Engine Failure.

(d) 18 May 1968, UH-1H:

1. Improper flight procedures during maximum autorotative glide.

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2. Late corrective action to reduced low rotor RPM.
- (2) June: One Accident; rate 5.9
- (a) 13 June 1963, UH-1D:
  1. Overloaded condition.
  2. Lack of proficiency.
  3. Unqualified co-pilot.
- (3) July: Accident Free

b. FOD prevention continues to be the subject of command emphasis. This headquarters is now awarding a certificate to crewmembers who find any foreign objects which would cause FOD. Foreign object damage to aircraft during the period were:

- (1) May - Six
- (2) June - Nine
- (3) July - Seven

c. The factors listed below have reduced the battalion accident rate:

- (1) Reduction in the length of the flying hour day due to early morning inclement weather and a general release time of 1700 hours has resulted in:
  - (a) Decreased aviator fatigue.
  - (b) Increased maintenance crewmember fatigue.
  - (c) Increased unscheduled maintenance.
- (2) Increased the amount of daily maintenance inspections being performed during day light hours.
- (c) Increased time for formal classroom flight crew instruction.
- (f) Increased availability of aircraft to support the standardization and training program.

d. During the last reporting period the accident rate was 29.9%, or one accident for every 3448 flying hours. During this reporting period the accident rate was one accident for each 7,466 hours. This rate was

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further improved during the last two months of the reporting period for  
which one accident would have occurred per 20,833 flying hours.

e. Flight Standardization: The Battalion Standardization Instructor  
pilot flew 88 check rides with primary emphasis to qualify instructor  
pilots at company level.

- (1) Two In-Country/Orientation Check Rides.
- (2) Eight UH-1 Qualification/Proficiency Check Rides.
- (3) Three Aircraft Commander Check Rides.
- (4) Twenty-four, ninety-day Proficiency Check Rides.
- (5) Fifty IP (Instructor Pilot) Check Rides.
- (6) One post accident (IP) Check Ride.

10. (U) Chaplain: During the reporting period, the battalion chaplain  
was responsible for all religious activities on Camp Holloway and at  
operational sites. Protestant services were conducted by the battalion  
chaplain. All other denominational services were coordinated by the  
battalion chaplain and attended frequently by men of this battalion.

11. (C) Post Headquarters: The mission of Post Headquarters is to supervise  
monitor and control activities on Camp Holloway (other than tactical opera-  
tions) and in the Camp Holloway AO. Post Headquarters provides overall  
planning administration, operations, security and maintenance of facilities  
located at Camp Holloway. These functions fall in service and logistics  
support, security and post operations and airfield operations and defense.  
Projects initiated during previous reporting and completed are.

- a. Two 80'x144' aircraft Maintenance hangers.
- b. One 75'x202' metal aircraft maintenance hangar.
- c. 14 (2,000 sq. ft.) BEQ's.
- d. Two (400 sq. ft.) Mess Halls.
- e. Two (1,000 sq. ft.) Orderly Rooms.
- f. Resurfacing of major roads.

12. Civil Affairs: During the period 1 May - 31 July 1968 this battalion  
has increased its civil affairs activities. At a meeting of local major  
unit civic action officers, each village in the area was assigned to a  
specific supporting unit. The first visits were for the purpose of conduct-

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ing a survey of needs of the respective villages. Weekly visits have been made in an attempt to establish closer relations with the local people in an effort to promote their cooperation in providing information or warning of enemy activity since previous attacks on Camp Holloway were launched from areas in or near their villages. A plan has been augmented to bolster their economy by employing the villagers on a daily hire basis and providing medical assistance to the local villages on a weekly basis.

Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander's  
Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

1. Personnel (NONE)

2. Operations

a. Sling Loading Operations.

(1) OBSERVATION: Supported units continue to use improper rigging techniques, material and equipment in the preparation of external loads to be airlifted by CH-54 helicopters. Often the air items used for rigging are unserviceable and continue in use only because of the nonavailability of new items.

(2) EVALUATION: Mission accomplishment has been delayed or cancelled in many cases. Through liaison with the supported ground units it was found that units had neither applicable publications nor valid requisitions for replacement air items.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: All ground units requiring aerial delivery of combat equipment continually review requisitions in order to maintain an adequate supply of rigging materials. Air items such as cargo straps, nets and attachments should be inspected prior to and immediately after each use to insure serviceability. Items found unserviceable should be turned in or destroyed to preclude further use.

b. CH-54 Utilization.

(1) OBSERVATION: The D5 and D6B bulldozer cannot be air lifted or air landed into areas that require the CH-54 to hover out of ground effect, unless the bulldozer is broken down into 17,000 pound loads. The maximum lift capability of the aircraft preclude aerial delivery of either dozer as one component.

(2) EVALUATION: The D5 and D6B dozers are air transportable if tracks and blades are removed. The blades and tracks weigh approximately 7,000 pounds thus reducing the remaining load to 17,000 pounds. The tracks and blade can be prepositioned at the LZ by CH-47 helicopters. The dozer can then be positioned by CH-54 helicopter and reassembled with a minimum effort.

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by ground units. Limited lift during high density altitude conditions applies primarily to confined or pinnacle type landing zones during which the aircraft must hover out of ground effect to deliver the equipment.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: In those cases which preclude the aircraft developing ground effect at a hover, it is recommended that a D-3 dozer which weighs 12,000 - 13,000 pounds be used. Due to it's relatively light weight this dozer can be lifted into any Fire Support Base and other confined areas without disassembly. Missions should also be requested for early morning or late afternoon movement to take maximum advantage of low density altitude conditions.

c. Interim Manual "Air Transportability Guidance for External Sling Transport of US Army Material Using Aerial Cargo Sling, FSN 1670, by US Army Helicopters".

(1) OBSERVATION: An interim manual entitled, "Air Transportability Guidance for External Sling Transport of US Army Material Using Aerial Cargo Sling, FSN 1670, by US Army Helicopters", dated May 1968, was issued to this unit during the reporting period. (Subject manual was not received by tactical units).

(2) EVALUATION: This manual provides excellent guidance that would benefit ground units in preparing for sling loading operations.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Command attention be given to insure distribution of this manual to combat and combat support units for their use in preparing loads during sling load operations.

d. ARC/LITE Operations.

(1) OBSERVATION: ARC/LITE operations conducted in areas where aircraft are operating has proven hazardous. Ordnance employed has impacted dangerously close to aircraft. No prior warning of the intended time or impact area of the ARC/LITE was received.

(2) EVALUATION: Prior to ARC/LITE operations, warning are normally announced by air traffic control agencies on emergency radio frequencies which are monitored by all aircraft. Radios, as a means of communicating the ARC/LITE time and impact areas, has proven unreliable. All aircraft do not receive the radio warning when operating at low level in isolated areas.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: ARC/LITE operations should be published as classified NOTAM's by the major requesting unit to supporting aviation

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units to insure that airmen have prior knowledge of ARC/LITE operations. In addition, radio transmitting facilities should be expanded to insure complete area coverage to include aircraft operating at low level.

e. Warhead 2.75 Inch Rocket (Flechette, WD 4A/A).

(1) OBSERVATION: The WD 4A/A 2.75 inch flechette warhead was developed to fill the need for an area coverage antipersonnel weapon. The area coverage feature is valuable for use against a variety of targets, but is also important in over coming point targets. The warhead is presently in Vietnam CLASS V supply channels but current directives deny the use of this warhead.

(2) EVALUATION: The nature of several of this battalion's missions (some classified i.e. Prairie Fire/Daniel Boone) warrant the use of the WD 4A/A 2.75 inch flechette warhead for effective engagement of revetted targets under triple canopy jungle cover. On a specific mission basis the use of this warhead can be controlled to accomplish its designed effect.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Authority for the use of the WD 4A/A 2.75 inch flechette warhead should be delegated to aviation battalion level for employment on a controlled and specific mission basis.

f. Artillery Advisories.

(1) OBSERVATION: Flight safety can be improved through standardized artillery advisories to airmen for artillery fire, naval gunfire and air strikes. A published list of all radio contact frequencies and call signs that provide total coverage of Vietnam should be available to airmen.

(2) EVALUATION: Under current procedures airmen are required to contact several different artillery agencies to receive artillery advisories when flying between major unit areas of operation. Presently, no single agency publishes a document that outlines the contact station and call sign for up to date artillery warnings for all areas within the Republic of Vietnam. Consequently, it is left to the ingenuity of the individual aviator to attain up to date artillery information.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: The 58th Aviation Battalion (Flight Facility Mobile) consolidate one publication for the entire country which designates all artillery control agencies and contact frequencies. This document should be updated on a monthly basis and distributed with the current Army Flight Following System and VFR pilotage chart to all aviation units.

g. UH-1 aircraft augmentation to TOE 1-157-T (Aviation Company "ESCORT".)

(1) OBSERVATION: TOE 1-157-T, Aviation Company (ESCORT) does not

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include authorization for UH-1 type aircraft. The organic AH-1G helicopters are not capable of supporting all aviation requirements of this unit.

(2) EVALUATION: The Aviation Company (ESCORT), operating as a separate unit, has no organic aircraft with which to support command and control missions or maintenance support to disabled aircraft in forward areas of operation.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Modify the TOE to authorize UH-1 type aircraft to support unit requirements.

h. AH-1G Operations.

(1) OBSERVATION: The AH-1G helicopter is not capable of carrying non-rated members as normally carried in UH-1C(A) gunships to assist in rearming and refueling. The standard ordnance load for the AH-1G is three times that of UH-1C(A) gunships. It is essential that during operations from other than base station the supported unit provide personnel to assist in refueling and rearming AH-1G helicopters.

(2) EVALUATION: Since no crew chief or gunner are carried as crew-members, the pilot will require assistance during refuel and rearming operations. Due to the large amount of ordnance required to rearm the AH-1G, lack of assistance to the aircrews would cause an excessive turn around time and thereby reduce mission performance. Rarming and refueling takes in excess of one hour without assistance to the crew. It is not considered practical for the aviation unit to provide these ground personnel when AH-1G attack teams are operating at widespread points throughout the area of operation.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Task supported units to provide ground crews at rearm and refuel points to assist in rearming and refueling operations under the supervision of the aircraft crew and reduce turn around time thus increase AH-1G armed helicopter support.

i. Loading and Unloading Operation Involving C-124 Aircraft.

(1) OBSERVATION: Five ton trailer maintenance shop vans are airmobile in C-124 type aircraft. Loading and unloading operations requires the assistance of a heavy duty winch on this type aircraft.

(2) EVALUATION: Due to the angle formed by the aircraft cargo floor and the cargo loading ramp, the five ton tractor is not capable of positioning the five ton trailer into the cargo hole of a C-124 aircraft without the assistance of a heavy duty winch. All C-124 aircraft are not equipped with winches. The tractor can only move the trailer up the ramp until the angle described above exceeds the flex limits of the tractor-trailer attachment point. At this point the tractor is detached from the trailer to settle onto its dolly wheels and winched into the aircraft.

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(3) RECOMMENDATION: When C-124 aircraft are requested for movement of five ton trailer shop vans, the request should specify that a heavy duty winch is required for loading operations.

3. Training (NONE)

4. Intelligence (NONE)

5. Logistics and Aircraft Maintenance

a. Ammunition for AH-1G Helicopters

(1) OBSERVATION: It has been determined through experience that Al65 miniguns ammunition (7.62) is the only type that can be used for the AH-1G armament systems. It has also been determined that only 40mm grenade ammunition of lot number 331-8 or higher, which has the double welded links, is the only ammunition suitable for use in the AH-1G weapons systems.

(2) EVALUATION: Experience has shown that when Al31 (7.62mm) ammunition in 100 round belts was used in the weapons system of the AH-1G, constant jamming and other malfunctions were experienced due to long rounds and bent links. The time required to link 100 round belts into 1,500 round belts for use in the XM-18 and XM-28 minigun pods significantly increases the rearming time to an unacceptable level for responsive mission support. Experience has further shown that when 40mm ammunition without the double welded links is used in the XM-28 turret, the high torque of the feed systems spreads the links apart and allows the rounds to twist and turn in the feed assembly causing jamming and other malfunctions to the weapons systems.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: When AH-1G aircraft are employed in operations where rearming is accomplished at other than home station, supported units stock the proper types of ammunition at the rearm points in quantities appropriate to the AH-1G armament systems.

(a) Maintenance Team Augmentation.

(1) OBSERVATION: Assault helicopter companies with ten or more aircraft, operating in forward areas 75 - 100 miles away from support maintenance facilities, experience maintenance discrepancies which required a maintenance team to evaluate and correct the deficiency.

(2) EVALUATION: Maintenance facilities are not located at forward areas. Time was lost and aircraft flying time wasted in transporting maintenance personnel to and from the forward area. Mission support was reduced due to aircraft awaiting maintenance repair. Maintenance teams consisting of a helicopter repairman and engine repairman were placed on station in forward support areas. These personnel were furnished by the

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supporting assault helicopter company and reduced the maintenance down time and increase mission support. However, this heavily taxed aircraft maintenance efforts at the rear locations, which are operating at reduced strength of experienced personnel.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Modify TOE 256-F NON-DIVISIONAL AVIATION BATTALION to authorize two maintenance contact teams with appropriate tools which could be employed at forward areas thereby relieving the overly committed assault helicopter company maintenance capabilities.

#### 6. Organization

(1) OBSERVATION: The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion is tasked to operate and maintain all Camp Holloway Installation Facilities. Major activities are, post defense, base development, operation of special services facilities, post exchange, provision of utilities (electrical power and water), maintenance and repair of installation facilities, airfield operations, discipline, law and order of all tenant units located on Camp Holloway.

(2) EVALUATION: Functions and activities described above are supported and managed by a post headquarter section. Personnel required to fill positions in post headquarters section are provided from organic assets thus increasing the battalion's overall personnel shortages.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: In December 1967 a modified table of distribution and allowance (M-TDA) was submitted and returned without action. Approval of the M-TDA upon resubmission would recognize the continuing requirement and decrease personnel shortages.

#### 7. Others (NONE)

William C. Chamberlain  
WILLIAM C. CHAMBERLAIN  
LTC, Artillery  
Commanding

#### 4 Incl

1. Organizational Structure, 52d Cbt Avn Bn
2. Recapitulation of Flying Hours and Availability
3. After Action Report, Operation Matthews
4. Map of Operational Areas

DISTRIBUTION  
See Next Page

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2 cy TO: USARPAC  
3 cy TO: USARV  
1 cy TO: 1st Avn Bde  
1 cy thru: 17th CAG  
TO: IFFCRCEV (File)  
1 cy TO: 17th CAG (File)

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C. H. COOPER

RECD: Unfinished Report of 32nd Counter-Intelligence  
Tactical Meeting 31 July 1963, REC'D 28 July 1963

PA. Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, AF. 11

P.  
P.  
E.

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25 Aug, 1968

Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion  
Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(8) Reference paragraph 2a, AH-1G Operations, page 19: Inconclusive. Second Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, task unit number 100, is responsible for AH-1G aircraft support.

(9) Reference paragraph 21, Isolating and Unloading Supplies Involving C-124 Aircraft, pages 19 and 20: Concur.

(10) Reference paragraph 2a and 2c, pages 14 and 15: Inconclusive. Higher headquarters consider possible change to C-130 aircraft TCR to include a Rigger Platoon, which would place the responsibility for rigging equipment and personnel on the aviated aircraft.

→ (11) Reference paragraph 5a, Ammunition for AH-1G Helicopters, page 20: Concur. The unit providing armed aircraft is responsible for stocking, maintaining, and loading ammunition. Sound logistic preparation for all operations is essential for mission accomplishment. The DEAS system is not restricted to 40MM ammunition. It is the opinion that extra care is necessary to insure proper linkage of all 7.62 belts for loading, including A-105, A-131, A-137, or other 7.62 configuration. The 100 round linked belt is only one 7.62 configuration; another is the 200 round linked belt. This does not affect the rearming time for AH-1G aircraft, provided the correct ammunition section is properly used. The fact that the 40MM 40mm ammunition does not function in the DEAS system will affect the ability to all AH-1G units in the 34th General Support Group Headquarters, dated 10 June 1968, and in the 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters dated 10 June 1968.

→ (12) Reference paragraph 5b, Maintenance Team Augmentation, pages 20 and 21: Inconclusive. Assigned direct support maintenance teams are capable of performing required maintenance in forward areas. Aircraft planning and personnel assignment will prevent the problems outlined in basic letter. Augmenting the TCR of all non-distributed units in the division with sufficient personnel to provide maintenance units for all potential forward sites is not feasible. The current air wing plan of four technical inspectors in the direct support divisional command will enable contact teams to conduct inspection aircraft maintenance and to be anticipated and aircraft replaced on a progressive basis.

(13) Reference paragraph 6, Organization, page 21: Concur. This should result in better.

b. Section 1, Significant Activities.

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25 August 1968

1. Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCG CS/PR-65 (RL) (U)

(1) Reference paragraph 5a, CLACI I, page 10: Station property and equipment is available in depots. RCG has allocated some of this equipment only to units at designated "entitlement areas." The units of our units are not located at these designated areas. Therefore, RCG has dispatched a letter to 1st Aviation Brigade on this problem.

(2) Reference paragraph 5b, CLACI II, page 10: The comment in the basic letter appears to refer to EDP items, and not PEL items available by demand. Units must submit demand requisitions to establish the line and conduct constant review to insure the requisitions are filled or else submit follow-up requisitions. The basic PEL listed in the Reference manuals is not usually valid in RVN. Because of adverse operating conditions and continuous overflying of the flying hour program, the basic PEL must be expanded in number and quantities of line items to provide a PEL adequate to support sustained operations.

c. Enclosure 3, After Action Report, Operation Mather.

(1) Reference paragraph 5a, Mission Planning, pages 6 and 7: Command Headquarters is finalizing an orientation program for support ground commanders.

(2) Reference paragraph 5b, Establishing Priorities, page 7: Command.

(3) Reference paragraph 5c, B-52 Air Strike, page 7: Command.

(4) Reference paragraph 5d, Policy of Landing Zones and Load Out Areas, pages 7 and 8: Command.

(5) Reference paragraph 5e, Preparation of Commanders, page 8: Command. See paragraph 2c(5), above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. Cook  
cc

JERALD M. COOK  
LTC, AAC  
Adjutant

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Authority NARA 27622

By WJD NARA Date 7/1/96

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AVBA-C (10 Aug 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period  
Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 SEP 29 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,  
APO 96375  
Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OP  
APO 96558TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 203101. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be  
adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed except for the following:a. Section 2, paragraph 2e, page 18. Nonconcur. The NDU 4 1/2.75  
inch flechette warhead was a test item which, after testing, was declared  
unacceptable for tactical use. This headquarters instructed 17th Combat  
Aviation Group to turn in these warheads as unserviceable. It is recom-  
mended that these warheads be removed from Class V supply channels by  
1st Logistical Command. An improved flechette warhead is being introduced  
in RVN at this time by the New Equipment Training Team. Upon acceptance  
of the warhead, authority to use it will be delegated to aviation bat-  
talion level.b. Section 2, paragraph 2h, page 19 and paragraph 2a(8), 1st Indorse-  
ment. Nonconcur. Paragraph b, 2d Indorsement. Concur except for re-  
taining door gunners. The standardized MTCE for Aviation Aerial Weapons  
Companies, which is currently being staffed for approval at DA, will trade  
off the currently authorized door gunner spaces for critically needed  
aircraft armament mechanics and ammunition handlers. Supported units  
do not have personnel qualified to service and arm the AH-1G. The com-  
plexity of the AH-1G armament system and the necessity for proper ammu-  
nition handling and refueling procedures makes it essential that qualified  
personnel perform aircraft rearm and servicing tasks. It is unlikely that  
supported units would have qualified personnel for this duty. A UH-1D  
helicopter has been issued to the Aviation Company (Escort) assigned to  
the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion and could be used to transport personnel  
from their unit to man rearm/refuel points when required.c. Paragraph 2a(10), 1st Indorsement. Nonconcur. TM 55-450-11,  
Helicopter External Loads Rigged with Air Delivery Equipment, dated 21  
June 1968, states that it is the responsibility of the transported unit  
to furnish sling, straps, cord, clevises, padding, tape, etc., used in

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By WJD NARA Date 7/14/96

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Ending 31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (HL) (U)

rigging the equipment and to prepare, rig, and hook up the loads. An assault support helicopter company normally supports separate units at one time from multiple locations. Having rigger personnel organic to the combat aviation battalion would require transporting these rigger personnel to each separate location in order to prepare the loads for the transported unit. This procedure is impractical when compared to the present system of personnel trained in rigging assigned to the transported unit. Technical assistance on the preparation of external sling loads is provided by the aviation unit when required.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Section 1, paragraph 5a, page 10 and paragraph 2b(1), 1st Indorsement. This headquarters forwarded to Headquarters USARV ATIN: AVHHD a letter request, subject: Restricted Issue of Cantonment Mess Equipment and Personnel Quarters Furniture, dated 23 August 1968. This letter requested the Fleiku area be added to the current list of cantonment areas authorized to be issued mess equipment.

b. Section 2, paragraph 2d, page 17. Action has been taken by USARV Aviation Officer with appropriate USAF agencies to improve ARC/Lite warnings to aircraft operating at low levels in remote areas. An airborne radio relay of such warnings is being studied at this time.

c. Section 2, paragraph 2f, page 18 and paragraph 2a(6), 1st Indorsement. Artillery advisory frequencies for the III Corps Tactical Zone are unclassified and published in a monthly frequency sheet by the 58th Aviation Group (FFM) (Prov). The artillery frequencies in the I, II and IV Corps Tactical Zones are classified and therefore are not published in this manner but rather are found in respective SOIs. This headquarters will request that USARV consider action which will provide unclassified artillery advisory frequencies. Action could then be taken by this headquarters to have artillery advisory frequencies published in DOD Flight Information Publication (FLIP). Artillery advisories can presently be obtained by pilots en route from the Army Flight Following Stations and Air Force Radar Control Agencies spotted throughout RVN.

d. Section 2, paragraph 2g, page 18, and paragraph 2a(7), 1st Indorsement. The Aviation Company (Escort) assigned to the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion was issued a UH-1D helicopter on 12 September 1968. The unit was directed to submit MTOE action to authorize this additional aircraft.

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Authority NWD 27622

By WAD NARA Date 7/1/86

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AVBA-C (10 Aug 68) 3d Ind

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period  
Ending 31 July 1968 RCS GSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

e. Section 2, paragraph 6, page 21 and paragraph 2a(13) ~~not~~ Indorsement. Base camp TDAs are not planned for installations other than divisional or separate brigade. The current personnel space limitations within USARV precludes the possibility of additional personnel being authorized. Approval of the MDTA cannot be granted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CPT. Frank C. Norcross

1st Battalion Adjutant

Major William D. Segal

**J. D. SEGAL** CPT.  
CPT. AGC, USAF, Jr.  
Assistant Adjutant General

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Authority NMAI 27622  
By WAD NARA Date 7/1/96

SUBJECT: Organizational Structure, 52d Cbt Avn Bn (U)

UNIT

52d Cbt Avn Bn - "FLYING DRAGONS"  
Headquarters & Headquarter Detachment  
52d Security Platoon  
Pathfinder Detachment  
344th AOD  
755th Medical Detachment  
94th Medical Detachment  
68th Radar Detachment

57th Aslt Hel Co - "GLADIATORS"  
"COUGARS"  
615th Transportation Detachment  
822nd Signal Detachment

119th Aslt Hel Co - "ALLIGATORS"  
"CROCS"  
545th Transportation Detachment  
70th Signal Detachment

170th Aslt Hel Co - "BIKINIS"  
"BUCCANEERS"  
405th Transportation Detachment  
448th Signal Detachment

189th Aslt Hel Co - "GHOSTRIDERS"  
"AVENGERS"  
604th Transportation Detachment  
6th Signal Detachment

179th Aslt Spt Hel Co - "SHKMPCBOATS"  
402nd Transportation Detachment

355th Aslt Spt Hel Heavy - "WORKHORSE"  
662nd Transportation Detachment

361st Avn Co (ESCORT) - "PINKPANTHERS"  
665th Transportation Detachment  
621st Signal Detachment

COMMANDER

LTC William C Chamberlain  
CPT Charles R Rayl  
1LT Daniel A Berry  
1LT Joseph C Parsons III  
MAJ Leon D Jackson  
CPT James H Peterson  
CPT Fred G Margolin  
No Commander Authorized

MAJ William D Gess

CPT Hubert G Smith  
CW2 Harry Baker Jr.

MAJ Warren R Porter

MAJ Hugh H Rhodes  
CW2 Floyd V Garrison

MAJ Carl R Jones

MAJ Edward D King  
WOL Harold B Munday

MAJ William W Fraker


CPT Robert R Stratiff  
1LT Larry T Beck

MAJ Robert F Wetherbie  
MAJ Billy W Cocks

MAJ Glen E Morgan  
MAJ William H Hinds

MAJ Larry B Aicken  
CPT George Michel  
No Commander Authorized

(U) معلومات انتظامية - انتظامیاتی معلومات - انتظامیاتی معلومات - انتظامیاتی معلومات



SUBJECT: Recapitulation of Flying Hours (U): Average number of aircraft is based on those actually on-hand with the following provisions: Aircraft destroyed are dropped from accountability the day following destruction. Replacement aircraft are picked up on accountability on the first day that they become "mission ready" or within 72 hours following receipt, whichever occurs first.

UNIT	MONTH	AVG. NO. UH-1C(A) ON HAND	HOURS FLOWN	AVG. HOURS UH-1C(A)	AVAIL- ABILITY	PERCENT
						DA PROGRAM "C"
57TH	MAY	7.3	540	74.0	18.0	128%
	JUN	6.3	433	68.7	75.5	128%
	JUL	7.3	560	76.7	88.7	153%
119TH	MAY	7.4	454	61.4	56.7	105%
	JUN	7.0	425	60.7	66.1	105%
	JUL	6.4	546	80.8	77.0	139%
170TH	MAY	7.3	652	89.7	77.0	155%
	JUN	6.5	493	75.9	75.0	131%
	JUL	6.6	588	80.9	77.1	138%
189TH	MAY	5.7	374	65.6	82.9	116%
	JUN	7.0	586	83.7	65.7	144%
	JUL	6.8	598	80.8	79.0	140%
361ST	MAY	12.0	598	49.8	85.0	85%
	JUN	12.0	710	59.2	72.0	102%
	JUL	11.4	670	58.1	58.7	100%
52ND (OVER ALL)	MAY	46.5	3036	65.3	75.8	113%
	JUN	38.8	2647	68.2	74.3	117%
	JUL	38.5	2962	74.1	76.1	128%
				UH-1H		
57TH	MAY	18.6	2393	128.1	77.9	173%
	JUN	19.4	2426	125.0	77.3	170%
	JUL	21.0	1788	85.1	82.5	107%
119TH	MAY	19.3	1821	94.4	63.4	127%
	JUN	19.2	1957	101.9	63.7	137%
	JUL	20.7	1923	90.6	73.7	126%
170TH	MAY	18.0	1780	98.1	79.9	132%
	JUN	18.3	1835	100.0	82.4	135%
	JUL	19.8	1910	90.6	82.1	127%
189TH	MAY	18.6	1875	100.3	74.1	135%
	JUN	18.9	1505	79.0	72.0	108%
	JUL	20.0	1161	58.0	83.0	79%
52ND	MAY	92.4	9655	104.5	73.1	141%
	JUN	75.8	7723	101.8	74.4	137%
	JUL	81.5	6852	81.8	80.3	109%

\* Percent DA Program on flying hours is bases on the following Flying Hour Program per aircraft: UH-1C(A) 58 Hours, UH-1H 74 Hours.

SUBJECT: Recapitulation of Flying Hours (U): Continued

UNIT	MONTH	AVG. MO. ACFT ON HAND	HOURS FLOWN	AVG. HOURS PER ACFT	AVAIL- ABILITY	PERCENT*	
						DA PROGRAM	
361ST	JUL	4.5	62	13.7	10.0	19%	
	MAY	15.1	1140	75.0	51.0	126%	
	JUN	14.3	913	63.8	42.0	106%	
	JUL	16.0	941	58.8	52.0	98%	
355TH	MAY	4.1	112	27.3	65.2	91%	
	JUN	6.0	159	26.5	62.0	61%	
	JUL	7.6	207	27.2	77.6	68%	
	TYPE	HOURS FLOWN		AVAILABILITY			
	ACFT	MAY	JUN	JUL	MAY	JUN	JUL
HHD	UH-1D	60	27	28	100%	N/A	51.7
HHD	U-6A	58	10	29	77.4%	29.7%	48.3%
Recapitulation Availability, Mission Ready, EDP and EDM percentage taken from DA Form 1352 and Daily Aircraft Status.							
<u>UH-1C</u>	STD	MAY		JUN		JUL	
AVAILABILITY	80	76.3		74.3		83.0	
MISSION READY	75	61.0		61.4		67.3	
EDM	17	13.2		15.9		13.9	
EDP	8	10.5		9.8		3.1	
<u>UH-1H</u>	STD	MAY		JUN		JUL	
AVAILABILITY	80	74.1		74.2		80.8	
MISSION READY	78	62.6		64.3		70.1	
EDM	17	18.5		18.9		14.0	
EDP	3	7.4		6.9		5.2	
<u>AH-1G</u>	STD	MAY		JUN		JUL	
AVAILABILITY	70	0		0		10.0	
MISSION READY	UNK	0		0		11.3	
EDM	UNK	0		0		81.3	
EDP	UNK	0		0		9.0	
<u>CH-47</u>	STD	MAY		JUN		JUL	
AVAILABILITY	65	51.0		42.0		52.0	
MISSION READY	50	40.7		39.5		40.8	
EDM	23	33.0		13.0		36.0	
EDP	12	16.0		4.5		12.0	
<u>CH-54</u>	STD	MAY		JUN		JUL	
AVAILABILITY	67	62.5		62.0		77.6	
MISSION READY	30	42.9		33.3		50.3	
EDM	23	10.2		6.0		7.3	
EDP	10	27.3		37.0		15.1	

\* Percent of DA Program is based on a DA Flying Hour Program per aircraft as follows: AH-1G 70 Hours, CH-47 60 Hours, CH-54 40 Hours.

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AVGD-CC (20 June 68)

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Matthews (AO MATTHEWS), 25 May - 12 June 1968. (U)

1. (C) GENERAL: This report covers Operation Matthews (AO Matthews) conducted in the vicinity of Dak To, Kontum Province, Republic of Vietnam, during the period of 25 May - 12 June 1968.

a. Command Headquarters.

(1) The aviation command headquarters was the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

(2) Task Force Matthews (Division Forward) was the overall command element for this operation.

b. Mission.

(1) The mission of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion was to provide responsive Aviation Support to the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and attached and supporting elements within the confines of AO Matthews (See Incl 1). 52d Combat Aviation Battalion also continued to support 4th Division in Operation Mac Arthur (AO Mac Arthur).

c. Participating Units.

(1) Units organic to the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion, commanded by LTC Raymond G. Lehman Jr, which participated in Operation Matthews, are as follows:

Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion  
57th Assault Helicopter Company  
119th Assault Helicopter Company  
155th Assault Helicopter Company (not committed to Op. Matthews)  
170th Assault Helicopter Company (-)  
189th Assault Helicopter Company (-)  
179th Assault Support Helicopter Company  
355th Aviation Company Heavy Helicopter (-)  
361st Aviation Company (Escort)

(2) Supporting detachments organic to units in paragraph 1c (1), which supported the operation were:

545th Transportation Detachment  
70th Signal Detachment  
94th Medical Detachment  
405th Transportation Detachment  
448th Signal Detachment  
755th Medical Detachment  
402nd Transportation Detachment  
604th Transportation Detachment

Incl

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GROUP - 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;  
Declassified after 12 years.