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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96318
"FLYING DRAGONS"

AVGD-CC

10 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period
Ending 31 July 1968, PWL 6300025 (R-1) (U)

See Distribution

Section I. Operations (Significant Activities)

1. (C) Command: This report covers the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968, and is submitted in compliance with USARPAC REG 525-15, dated 22 March 1968 and USARV REG 525-25, dated 13 April 1968.

a. Mission: The mission of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion is to command all assigned and attached units and provide aviation support as directed by the 17th Combat Aviation Group to US, Republic of Vietnam, and other Free World Military Assistance Forces. Priorities are to the 4th Infantry Division, 24th Special Tactical Zone (STZ-ARVN), 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and other units under Operation Control, Headquarters, First Field Force Vietnam, located in the Second Corps Tactical Zone. In addition, the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion commands or controls all activities and functions of Camp Holloway and Holloway Army Airfield.

b. Organizational Structure: The Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion is located at Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN and is commanded by LTC William C. Chamberlain. Elements subordinate to the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion are: (See inclosure 1 for detailed organizational listing of organic and assigned units, attached units, and units under the operational control of this battalion).

- (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN.
- (2) 57th Assault Helicopter Company, Kontum RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) helicopters.
- (3) 119th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) helicopters.
- (4) 170th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) helicopters.

GROUP 14

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

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Authority NARA 27622

By LWA NARA Date 7/1/96

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Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)(5) 189th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN.
Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) helicopters.(6) 361st Aviation Company (ESCORT), Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN.
Equipped with UH-1C(A) and AH-1G helicopters.(7) 179th Assault Support Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku
RVN. Equipped with CH-47A helicopters.(8) 355th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) (-) located at Camp
Holloway, Pleiku RVN and 2nd Platoon at Phu Hiep RVN. Equipped with
CH-54 helicopters.(9) During this reporting period there were two significant changes
in organizational structure. The 155th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp
Coryell, Ban Mo Thuot was reassigned to the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion
and secondly, the 361st Aviation Company (ESCORT) was assigned to 52d
Combat Aviation Battalion from 12th Combat Aviation Group and relocated to
Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN

2. (C) Personnel

a. Awards and Decorations: During the reporting period 1,853 awards
were processed and 1,573 were awarded. This battalion received 26 Viet-
namese awards for valor or service. A decrease in elapse time from
submission to final approval of all decorations was noted.b. The increased number of assigned aviators during the reporting
period has reduced the previous reported aviator shortage to an accept-
able level. The known 45 day losses of experienced personnel in crit-
ical MOS (Maintenance field), are of particular concern to this command.
Infusion is required to preclude further shortages caused by DEROS dur-
ing the month of October and January.

c. Command and Staff Changes

(1) The following command and staff changes were made dates indicated:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>New Commander</u>	<u>Old Commander</u>	<u>Date</u>
52d Scty Det	1LT Daniel A Berry	1LT Robert L Litton	16 June 68
HHD, 52d CAB	CPT Charles R Rayl	MAJ Leon D Jackson	10 June 68
52d CAB	LTC William C Chamberlain	LTC Raymond G Lehman Jr	25 July 68
170th Avn Co	MAJ Carl R Jones	MAJ Robert W Cook	17 June 68
*361st Avn Co	MAJ Larry B Aicken	*Indicates newly assigned unit	
*665th TC Det	CPT George Michel	*Indicates newly assigned unit	
DCO, 52d CAB	LTC Thomas L Williamson	LTC Robert D Craig	25 July 68
DPC, 52d CAB	LTC James Burton	LTC Thomas L Williamson	25 July 68

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(2) Following gains and losses occurred during the period May through July 1968:

(a)	Gains	OFF	EM
	May	54	<u>219</u>
	June	41	<u>214</u>
	July	22	<u>186</u>
(b)	Losses	OFF	EM
	May	42	<u>252</u>
	June	50	<u>176</u>
	July	20	<u>208</u>

(3) The battalion is 68 enlisted men and 52 officers and warrant officers below TCE strength as of 31 July 1968. Unit authorized and present for duty strengths are:

(a) Military

Unit	Officers Auth/OH	WO Auth/OH	EM Auth/OH	Total Auth/OH
57th AHC	15/16	52/44	152/150	219/210
615th TC	1/1	1/1	70/62	74/64
822nd Sig	0/0	1/1	8/9	9/10
119th AHC	15/17	52/41	152/148	219/206
545th TC	1/1	1/1	70/61	72/63
70th Sig	1/0	0/1	9/11	10/12
170th AHC	15/16	52/41	152/140	219/197
405th TC	1/2	1/0	70/59	72/61
448th Sig	0/0	1/1	7/8	9/8
179th ASHC	13/9	25/20	132/129	170/158
402nd TC	1/1	1/2	80/71	82/74
189th AHC	15/13	52/42	152/150	219/205
604th TC	1/0	1/1	70/57	72/58
6th Sig	0/1	1/0	8/6	9/7
355th Avn Co	16/6	16/11	97/84	129/101
662nd TC	1/1	1/1	57/50	59/52
361st Avn Co	16/16	13/12	80/77	109/105
665th TC	1/1	1/1	57/54	59/56
621st Sig	0/0	0/0	6/7	6/7
HHD, 52d CAB	22/25	2/6	87/136	111/167
52d Security	1/2	0/0	151/130	152/132
68th Radar	0/0	0/0	19/16	19/16
94th Med	1/1	0/0	8/12	9/13
755th Med	1/1	0/0	8/10	9/11
52d CAB	138/130	274/227	1703/1636	2115/1993

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(b)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>DAC Auth/OH</u>	<u>VN Auth/OH</u>	<u>3rd Natt Auth/OH</u>
HHD, 52d CAB	0/0	19/21	0/0
57th AHC	0/0	14/14	0/0
170th AHC	0/0	11/9	0/0
179th ASHC	0/0	11/9	0/0
189th AHG	0/0	11/10	0/0
355th Avn Co	1/1	0/0	0/0
361st Avn Co	0/0	0/0	0/0

3. (c) Intelligence: The S-2 Section published a Daily Intelligence Report. On 29 May the S-2 was tasked to provide daily intelligence for 17th Combat Aviation Group. Submission of the first INTSUM, covering a 24 hour period from 1400 to 1500, was initiated on 1 Jun 1968.

a. Enemy Activity: Following the TET offensive, enemy activity slackened considerably. During this reporting period only a few limited attacks were conducted on 52d Combat Aviation Battalion units. On 050255 May 1968, the 155th AHC, (then assigned to 52d CAB), received 30-50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 US WIA, 1 UH-1H major damage, 2 UH-10 and 1 UH-1D minor damage. Throughout the night, installations in both Kontum City and the Pleiku Defense Sector received 122mm rockets, mortar, automatic weapons and small arms fire not affecting units of this battalion. On 150240 May 1968, the 815th Engr Bn at Connell Quarry in the Camp Holloway Area of Operation (AO) received 17 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA. On 250110 May 1968, the 155th AHC received approximately 12 rounds of 122mm rocket fire resulting in 8 friendly casualties, 1 UH-1D destroyed, 4 UH-1H (2 from the 92nd AHC) friendly damage, and damage to several buildings. On 260255 May 1968, the 155th AHC was again attacked, receiving 26 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Results were 1 US WIA, 1 UH-1H, 3x3/4 ton trucks, 4x1200 gallon tankers, 1x2½ ton truck, 2x5 ton cargo trucks, 1x5 ton tractor and 1x1½ ton trailer receiving major damage. 1 UH-1H received minor damage. On 140455 Jun 1968, the 57th AHC at Kontum received 12 rounds of 122mm rocket fire with only one round landing within the perimeter, results were 2 US WIA, 1 water tanker destroyed and major damage to 1 building. On 040212 Jun 1968, the 815th Engrs at Connell Quarry received 20-25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 3 US WIA. On 060200 Jun 1968, Camp Holloway received 14 122mm rounds resulting in minor damage to 2 CH-54, major damage to 1 CH-47 and heavy damage to 1x3/4 ton truck. On 080155 Jun 1968, Camp Holloway again received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, resulting in negative casualties, heavy damage to 1 UH-1H, moderate damage to 3 UH-1H and 1 CH-54 and light damage to 1 UH-1H, 2 CH-54 and 1x5 ton truck. On 202247 Jul 1968, the 815th Engr Bn at Connell Quarry received 45 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 3 US WIA and light damage to 1 vehicle. The last incident of the reporting period occurred on 21 Jul when an unknown number of Sapper personnel detonated a charge at Holloway OP 97 at 2120 hours, resulting in

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3 US WIA. Numerous attacks on other than 52d CAB installations in the Kontum, Pleiku and Ban Me Thuat areas were recorded during the reporting period.

b. Movement: There was a reported significant shift of enemy forces in the Central Highlands. In early May an entire division, the 325C, new to this area, moved into Kontum Province opposite the Dak To - Ben Het area and conducted a series of attacks on US Fire Support Bases. In Mid-June, this division was reported to have moved back into Cambodia and is believed to be in the triborder area at the present time. The 6th Bn, 32nd Regiment (previously part of NT 1 Division but now operating separately) conducted several large ambushes in May, 20-25 km north of Pleiku on Highway 14. This battalion lost over one third of its personnel in those ambushes and subsequently moved southwest of Pleiku to receive replacements, training and new arms. There were indications on 29 July 1968 that the 6th Battalion had completed its refurbishing period and is now located approximately 12-15 km NNW of Pleiku City. There was no confirmed contact with any major unit of the NT 1 Division during the entire period. Continuing agent reports, Long Range Patrol (LRP) contacts and other intelligence factors during June and July indicated the NT 1 Division was moving south through the central Plei Trap Valley. On 25 July 1968, a PW from the NT 1 Division security company indicated the Division was moving into Darlac Province to conduct operations. Further confirmation of an impending large scale attack against Ban Me Thuat in early August was received from 2 PW's captured in late July. Although still unconfirmed, it is believed a large portion of the NT 1 Division resources are currently in Darlac Province. During early June, operations conducted jointly by Special Forces and 4th Infantry Division units in the Dak Payou and Day Ayun areas southeast of Pleiku City forced redeployment of the 95B Regiment (an independent regiment), east into the Binh Dinh/Pleiku Province border area. Termination of the operation in mid July has allowed the 95B Regiment to reoccupy its former operations area 20-30 km south east of Pleiku City. In May, elements of the 2nd NT Division in Quang Tin Province forced evacuation of the Kham Duc Special Forces Camp and subsequently moved south into the II Corps Zone to conduct operations in the Dak Pek area. The 21st Regiment of the 2nd NT Division was identified in several contacts in the Dak Pek area. This Regiment evidently withdrew into LAOS in early July and a PW, captured just prior to the end of the reporting period, indicated the regiment has moved northeast, into the Quang Tin area of I Corps, removing any significant threat to the Dak Pek area.

c. New Units: New Units in the provinces of Kontum and Pleiku during the period include the 325C Division and the 21st Regiment of the NT 2 Division. The 325C Division, with the 101D and 95C Regiments, infiltrated from the Khe Sanh area, arriving in the Laos Border area between the middle and latter part of April 1968. In early May, the 325C Division crossed into Kontum and initiated activity against US Fire Bases. Interrogation of a PW captured in these engagements indicates one Battalion of the

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101D Regiment was left in I Corps and was replaced by one Battalion of the 66th Regiment of the 304th Division prior to the 325C Division leaving Khe Sanh. The 29th Regiment of the 325C Division remained in I Corps, conducting operations in the Hue City area. One complete Sapper Battalion, the D-120, was attached to the 325C Division prior to leaving Khe Sanh and sappers were employed during the May attacks on US Fire Bases. Information on the 21st Regiment, NT 2 Division is reported in paragraph b above. Several new unit designations in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces have appeared in documents late in the reporting period. Documents captured on 1 July by ARVN forces north of Kontum indicate a new Local Force Battalion, the 306th was to be or had been formed. The documents however, were dated 21 January, listing the strength of the 306th Battalion at 80 personnel. These documents also indicate the B-3 Front NVA Headquarters was to initiate an intensive recruiting program to form provincial regiments with a strength of 2200 personnel each. There have been other reports that provinces were to form regimental size units. However, at least in the highlands, there has been no firm indication of an intensive recruiting program being initiated. It should also be noted that these same documents pre-date the TET offensive, and much of the VC replacement and recruiting effort has thus far been oriented towards replacing large personnel losses suffered during the TET offensive. Other than the document reported above and several agent reports, there is no evidence to confirm the 306th Battalion as an operational unit. Documents captured by a LRP team during operations against the 95B Regiment in early June also indicate the possibility of a 2nd Local Force Battalion in Pleiku Province. The document mentions the X67 and 408th Battalions subordinate to VC Gia Lai (Pleiku) Province. Documents captured west of Pleiku City on 20 May and others captured south and southeast of Pleiku on 15 July again mention the X67 and 408th Battalion. The possibility exists that the H15 Battalion and 407th Sapper Battalion may have assumed the designations X67 and D45. However, the documents captured on 20 May and 17 June were taken in areas far outside the normal AO of either the H15 or the 407th. The possibility still exists that at least one new battalion has been formed subordinate to VC Gia Lai Province.

d. New Weapons: No new weapons were introduced during the reporting period. Use of flamethrowers, first recorded in the highlands during March 1968 by units of the 325C, has continued in attacks against 4th Infantry Division Fire Support Bases.

e. Situation:

(1) Kontum: The 325C Division is located in the tri-border area, approximately 50 km WNW of Kontum City. The 304th LF Battalion and 406th Sapper Battalion are located approximately 15 km north of Kontum City. The 24th NVA Regiment is unlocated but reported to have moved to Darlac Province with elements of the NT 1 Division. The 320th (AKA 209th) Regiment of the NT 1 is unlocated, possibly in Cambodia, 65 km due west of Kontum City. The 66th Regiment is unlocated, reportedly, in Darlac Province.

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(2) Pleiku: The 174th Regiment is unlocated, possibly in the northwest Pleiku-Kontum border area, along the Se San River approximately 35 km west of Pleiku. The 6th/32nd NVA Regiment is identified and located approximately 10-15 km north and northwest of Pleiku City. The 408th Sapper Battalion is located approximately 20 km NE of Pleiku City. The 95B Regiment is operating approximately 40 km east and southeast of Pleiku City. The X17 and X18 Engr Co's (Sapper) are unlocated and believed east of Pleiku City.

f. Capabilities:

(1) Kontum: Elements of the 325C division can conduct attacks up to regimental size in the Dak To-Ben Het area. The 304th LF and 406th Sapper Battalions are capable of conducting limited indirect fire and sapper attacks on Kontum City or interdict Highway 14N between Kontum and Dak To.

(2) Pleiku: Conduct limited sapper attacks and attacks by fire on Pleiku defense area installations employing the 408th Sapper Battalion and elements of the K-31 Artillery Battalion. To interdict Highway 14N between Pleiku and Kontum using elements of the 6th Battalion, 32nd Regiment. To conduct limited interdiction of Highway 19E between Le Trung and the Mang Yang Pass employing elements of the 95B Regiment and the X17 and X18 Engr Companies.

4. (C) Operations, Training and Unit Movement.

a. Operations: The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion supported the following operations during the reporting period; Mac Arthur, (92 days), Matthews (19 days), Prairie Fire (92 days) and Omega (92 days). The 4th Infantry Division was supported by the assets of two assault helicopter companies and one assault support helicopter company. CH-54 support was provided on a mission basis. Prairie Fire and Omega were supported by one assault helicopter company.

(1) A detailed list of units and activities supported by the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion are listed below. (A map of the operational area is included as inclosure 4).

- (a) 4th Infantry Division (Operation Mac Arthur)
 - 1. 1st Brigade - AO Spaatz (Search and Destroy)
 - 2. 2nd Brigade - AO Middleton (Search and Destroy)
 - 3. 3rd Brigade - AO Sultan (Search and Destroy)
- (b) 5th Special Forces (Omega)

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1. BAN ME THUOT - Clandestine

2. AN KHE - Clandestine

3. KONTUM - Clandestine

(c) Task Force Matthews: Operation Matthews was supported 25 May - 12 June 1968. The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion was the principal supporting aviation element during the operation. The mission was to provide responsive aviation support to the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and attached or supporting elements. This battalion's normal daily operational commitment was 36 UH-1H's, 15 UH-1C(A)'s, 10 CH-47's and one CH-54. (For a detailed operational report of significant information and events, see inclosure 3).

(d) In addition, the following units were supported on a special aircraft allocation basis for the periods indicated. Activities varied from direct combat support to administration/liaison support.

1. CRID - DCS (16 days)

2. WHRID - DCS (11 days)

3. Highway Coordinator - DCS (92 days)

4. 22nd, 23rd Division (ARVN) and 24th STZ (ARVN) - DCS (34 days)

5. 3/506th Infantry Battalion - DCS (3 days)

6. 299th Engineer Group - DCS (4 days)

7. VIP Flights - DCS (6 days)

(e) AMCC: The establishment of an Area Movement Control Center (AMCC) was directed in May 1968 for the purpose of improving procedures to control aviation support and reduce the UH-1 flight time. This objective was to be attained by reducing the total flight hours in support of administrative missions by eliminating "sole user" aircraft, consolidating aviation support when feasible and providing aviation support on a mission basis only. This program has met with minimum success due to the reluctance of requesting units and agencies to properly forecast requirements and provide tentative itineraries. One by one supported elements were excluded from the AMCC concept. Units currently supported by the AMCC are: 5th SEGA, IFFV Arty and DSA II Corps.

(2) The percentage of the total battalion lift capabilities which was allocated to supported units each month is as indicated:

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		<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>
(a)	4th Inf Div -	50%	50%	50%
(b)	Omega/Prairie Fire -	25%	25%	25%
(c)	Others -	25%	25%	25%
(3)	Operational Statistics (1 May - 31 July 1968)			

<u>COMBAT</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C(A)</u>	<u>CH-47</u>	<u>CH-54</u>
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
115,347	84,01	23,230	7,089	2,777	436
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>ACFT</u>	<u>ACFT</u>	
<u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>HITS</u>	<u>DAM/DEST</u>	
33,532	139,190	19.988	61/41	41/2	
<u>CREW</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>STRUCT</u>	<u>MED</u>		
<u>INJ/KIA</u>	<u>KBA</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>EVACS</u>		
15/0	313	68	640		

During the reporting period, the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion flew 1951.9 hours in support of 152 combat assaults in which 21,496 assault troops and 2274.7 tons of combat equipment and supplies were lifted in 5,255 sorties. Hostile fire was received on 13 of those assaults. Two UH-1H's received light damage without injury to crewmembers. A total of 13.5 hours of LZ pre-strikes were made by UH-1C(A) aircraft.

b. Training:

(1) Aviator Training - Maximum training emphasis and effort was devoted to standardization during the reporting period. The increased number of aircraft available resulted in this unit completing all flight training requirements which include:

- (a) 90 Day Flight Standardization Checks
- (b) Instrument Proficiency Checks
- (c) Tactical Flight Procedures
- (d) In-Country Check-Out/Orientations

(2) Ground Training - This headquarters republished training directive 350-1 which consolidates and outlines training procedures and requirements of higher headquarters. All training requirements have been completed and complied with. This unit scheduled and conducted 27 days of formal instruction.

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c. Unit Movement:

(1) The 2nd and 3rd platoons, 355th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) arrived at Nha Trang, RVN on 4 May and 18 July 1968 respectively. The six CH-54's (Sky-Crane) organic to these platoons arrived on 2 May and 31 June 1968 and the entire company was operational 27 July 1968. On 21 May the 2nd platoon with three CH-54's was relocated at PHU HIEP and was operational upon arrival. No problems were encountered pertinent to the relocation of personnel, equipment and aircraft. Warning and movement orders were received in sufficient time to allow final preparation by the sponsoring unit (268th CAB) at the new location.

(2) The 361st Aviation Company (ESCORT) equipped with 12 UH-1C(A) aircraft was relocated from DI AN, RVN to Holloway Army Airfield and was assigned to this headquarters. Movement began 22 May, was completed on 28 May 1968, and the unit became operational as of 2 June 1968. Seven of the UH-1C(A) aircraft have been replaced with the AH-1G (Cobra) and have supported convoy escort missions on route 19 between AN KHE and PLEIKU and provide armed helicopter support of US and RVN units operating in the BAO LOC area. Operational support of the latter mission proved extremely difficult and problem areas are included in, Section II "Lessons Learned".

5. (C) Logistics and Aircraft Maintenance: The 52d CAB received its Annual General Inspection during the reporting period (20 May 68 - 25 May 68) and received a satisfactory rating. All deficiencies and short comings have been corrected. Areas that have received command attention are; Conex control, aircraft revetment improvement and COLED-V reports.

a. CLASS I: Non-availability of station property mess equipment requires field mess equipment as substitution and limits food service improvements.

b. CLASS II: Repair parts supplies received have proven to be inadequate after a review of all out-standing requisitions was made to insure validity. PLLs do not contain required items in an, "on-hand", status.

c. CLASS III: Total JP-4 dispensed by the battalion for the reporting period was 4,053,750 gallons of which 1,300,000 were dispensed at the Kontum Airfield by the 57th Assault Helicopter Company.

d. CLASS V: Total ammunition expenditure for the period is as listed below:

- (1) Minigun (7.62) - 2,333,000 rounds
- (2) 2.75 Rockets - 7,571 rounds
- (3) M-5, 40mm Grenades - 9,310 rounds

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e. Aircraft Maintenance

(1) Maintenance Statistics

	AH-1G*	UH-1C	UH-1H	CH-47	CH-54	U-6A
Aircraft Authorized	12	32	93	16	9	1
Total Aircraft Assigned	12	32	82	16	9	1
Average Aircraft Per Co	12	8	20	16	9	1
Availability Rate (%)	10	83	81	52	77	48
ELM Rate (%)	81	14	14	36	8	52

*AH-1G Aircraft were assigned only at end of quarter and availability rate was reduced by weapons system installation, test firing, and acceptance inspections. (For detailed statistical data, see Incl 2)

(2) During the quarter, a maintenance stand down program was initiated which has improved the overall maintenance posture of the battalion.

(a) Under the program, each aircraft of the battalion receives one day per week of concentrated first echelon maintenance which is accomplished primarily by the flight engineer, crew chief and gunner under the supervision of the flight platoon sergeant. Some of the tasks accomplished by the crew are:

1. Complete daily inspection. (PMD)
2. Maintenance operational check. (Run-up with qualified aviator)
3. Safety of flight inspection by a Technical Inspector.
4. Overall cleaning of the aircraft.
5. Lubricate aircraft.
6. Review of all log book forms.

7. Check of current status of all requisitions and work orders listed on DA Form 2400-14.

(b) This program has increased availability, promoted crew pride in assigned aircraft and facilitated scheduled maintenance by correcting small discrepancies. Many safety of flight discrepancies have been detected and corrected during the maintenance stand down. The results of the program has been an improved safety record and better maintained aircraft.

(3) Aircraft on Hand Status as of 31 July 1968.

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>AH-1G</u> <u>Auth/OH</u>	<u>UH-1C(A)</u> <u>Auth/OH</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>Auth/OH</u>
57 AHC		8/8	
119 AHC		8/7	23/21
170 AHC		8/8	23/21
189 AHC		8/7	23/19
361 AC(E)	12/12		23/20
	<u>CH-47A</u> <u>Auth/OH</u>	<u>CH-54A</u> <u>Auth/OH</u>	<u>U-6A/UH-1D</u> <u>Auth/OH</u>
179 ASHC	16/16		
355 AC(H) HHD		9/9	

1/1

6. (U) Information Office and Special Services Activities: The Information Office continued to release both printed and pictorial news releases on personnel assigned to the battalion. During this period, 150 hometown releases were processed. This battalion has made maximum utilization of every news media that serves the military audience and the "Dragon Fire" (a bi-weekly battalion newspaper), continues to be published. The primary special services activities available to personnel of this command are:

- a. Arts and Crafts Shop
- b. Library
- c. R&R

7. (C) Signal

a. Each assault helicopter company of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion has now received a $\frac{1}{4}$ ton mounted communications facility. The AN/MRC-119 provides each assault helicopter company the capability of operating in a single side band HF radio net with the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Headquarters as well as 17th CAG. Reliable, long range communications between Dak To and 17th CAG, Nha Trang has been established demonstrating the capability of the AN/MRC-95 radio set.

b. In addition to the long range HF capability provided by the AN/MRC-95, the following radios are part of the AN/MRC-119 communications facility: AN/PRC-25, AN/PRC-41, AN/PRC-47, and AN/VRC-46. The additional radios provide each assault helicopter company the capability of operating a complete command post with radios for aircraft control as well as administrative traffic. These communications facilities can also be airlifted by CH-47 helicopters, thus increasing the deployability of this communications equipment.

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K8

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AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 68) 4th Ind (C) MAJ Klingman/ds/LBN 4433
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 27 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT, APO
96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning interim manual, page 17, paragraph 2c; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2a(3). TM 55-450-11, Helicopter External Load, Rigged with Air Delivery Equipment, has been distributed to all major subordinate commands in sufficient copies for redistribution to all subordinate units.

b. Reference item concerning ANCLITE operations, page 17, paragraph 2d; 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a(4); 2d Indorsement, paragraph a; and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2b: Concur with the 3d Indorsement.

c. Reference item concerning warhead, 2.75 inch rocket (flechette, WD 4A/A), page 18, paragraph 2e; and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 1a: Concur with the 3d Indorsement.

d. Reference item concerning AH-1G operations, page 19, paragraph 2h; and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 1b: Concur with the 3d Indorsement.

e. Reference item concerning artillery advisories, page 18, paragraph 2f, and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2c: Concur. Effective 1 October 1968 the artillery warning frequencies and call signs in the I and II CTZ were being published by the 56th Aviation Group (Prov). This headquarters is presently studying the feasibility of including the stations in the IV CTZ in this publication. These frequencies, call signs, and locations are presently available over the air from the IV CTZ flight following stations.

f. Reference item concerning mess equipment, page 10, paragraph 5a; and paragraph 2a, 3d Indorsement: Nonconcur. In order to be issued station property mess equipment in RVN, the locations must be major bases, have

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AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 68) 4th Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

adequate power resources to operate the equipment, and have adequate facilities available in which to install the equipment. Recent consideration has been given to authorizing the Pleiku area station property mess equipment but the location does not satisfy the present criteria.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl
nc

W. C. ARNTZ

CPT AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:

HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 52 CAR

YFR: ORII was staffed through:

Avn: MAJ Scoggins/4322

Ch: LTC Cline/4379

G3 Tng: MAJ Nowak/1982

ACTION OFFICER: MAJOR KLINGMAN/4433

31

CH DST DIV	✓
CH MS BR	
CH DOC BR	✓
CH TNG BR	✓
A/C	✓

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By	MSD
NARA Date 7/9/76	

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INCL 1

SUBJECT: Organizational Structure of 52d Cbt Avn Bn (U)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>
52d Cbt Avn Bn - "FLYING DRAGONS"	LTC Raymond G. Lehman Jr.
52d Security Platoon	1/Lt Robert L. Litton
57th Aslt Hel Co - "GLADIATORS" "COUGARS"	M.J William D. Gess
615th Trans Det	M.J Niles C. Clark
822nd Signal Det	WO1 Harvey Baker Jr.
119th Aslt Hel Co - "ALLIGATORS" "CROCS"	M.J Warren R. Porter
545th Trans Det	M.J Hugh H. Rhodes
94th Medical Det	CPT Fred C. Margolin
70th Signal Det	2/Lt Larry T. Beck
155th Aslt Hel Co - "STALWARTS" "FVLCS FS"	M.J Walter Urbach
165th Trans Det	M.J Eugene P. Malkoff
8th Medical Det	CPT Merrill J. Newman
208th Signal Det	CPT Albert E. Fisch
170th Aslt Hel Co - "BIRDS"	M.J Robert W. Cook
"BUCCANEERS"	
405th Trans Det	M.J Edward D. King
755th Medical Det	CPT David L. Lucas
448th Signal Det	WO1 Harold S. Sunday

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INFO

SUBJECT: Organizational Structure of 52d Cbt Avn Bn (U)

179th Aslt Spt Hel Co - "SHARKBITE" MAJ Robert F. Wetherbie

402nd Trans Det MAJ Billy W. Cocks

189th Aslt Hel Co - "GHOSTRIDERS"
"AVENGEAS" MAJ William W. Fraker

604th Trans Det MAJ David C. Whitworth


6th Signal Det 1/Lt James E. Conley

344th Avn Det LTC Robert D. Craig Jr.

355th Aslt Spt Hel Feavr MAJ Glen E. Longan

662nd Trans Det MAJ William R. Wimbs

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OBJ CT: Recomputation of Flying Hours (U)
 REM RPT: Average number of aircraft is based on those actually on-hand with the following provisions:
 (1). Aircraft destroyed are dropped from accountability the day following destruction.
 (2). Replacement aircraft are picked up on accountability on the first day that they become "mission ready" or within 72 hours following receipt, whichever occurs first.

UNIT	MONTH	Avg Nr UE-IC on Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hours Guns	Avail- ability	Avg Nr UE-IC on Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hours Flown	Avail- ability	Total Hours	Combined Avg Hours	Percent of Program
57th	Feb	7.5	367	46.9	45.7	16.7	1622	97.4	67.0	2189	63.5	139%
	Mar	8.0	546	66.2	70.4	20.5	1931	94.2	87.4	2477	89.9	149%
	Apr	8.0	676	84.5	82.0	16.6	2503	150.8	80.0	3179	129.2	217%
119th	Feb	5.5	342	62.2	75.3	20.0	1686	84.4	79.9	2030	79.6	132%
	Mar	7.0	345	49.2	79.6	16.4	1645	83.9	59.3	1990	78.3	131%
	Apr	8.0	206	35.8	66.7	19.0	1479	77.8	75.6	1765	65.4	109%
155th	Feb	6.3	382	60.6	85.7	15.0	1221	81.1	83.0	1603	75.2	125%
	Mar	7.4	346	46.7	63.5	19.4	1781	91.6	80.5	2127	80.9	134%
	Apr	7.0	435	62.1	84.3	17.7	1582	89.4	74.1	2017	65.7	113%
170th	Feb	7.0	390	55.7	88.5	19.2	1471	76.6	76.9	1861	71.0	112%
	Mar	6.3	472	74.8	80.6	17.9	2133	113.3	80.0	2605	107.6	176%
	Apr	6.0	687	65.9	78.6	16.0	2023	112.3	81.9	2710	104.2	174%
187th	Feb	7.9	555	70.3	67.1	18.6	1522	90.0	60.8	2077	77.8	133%
	Mar	6.4	531	82.9	82.7	16.7	2004	120.0	75.4	2535	109.7	133%
	Apr	5.8	330	56.9	82.0	16.0	1975	109.9	75.0	2302	95.6	162%

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 By b6 b7D NARA Date 7/1/26

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INCL

SUBJECT: Decapitulation of Flying Hours (U)

REMARKS: Average number of aircraft is based on those actually on-hand with the following provisions:

- (1). Aircraft destroyed are dropped from accountability the day following destruction.
- (2). Replacement aircraft are picked up on accountability on the first day that they become "mission ready" or within 72 hours following receipt, whichever occurs first.

UNIT	MONTH	Avg Nr. of UHIC on Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hours Guns	Avail- ability	Avg Nr. of UHIC on Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hours Flown	Avail- ability	Combined Total Hours	Combined Avg Hours	Percent DA Program
		34.2	2036	59.5	72.7	91.7	7724	84.2	76.6	9760	77.5	129%
52d	Feb	34.2	2036	59.5	72.7	91.7	7724	84.2	76.6	9760	77.5	129%
	Mar	35.1	2240	64.4	79.4	92.9	9494	100.6	77.3	11734	91.7	153%
	Apr	36.8	2414	65.3	78.9	89.3	9566	107.1	77.2	11980	95.0	159%
UNIT	MONTH	Avg CH-47 On Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hours Per CH-47	Percent of DA Program							Availability
179th	Feb	13.3	904	67.8	136%							67.0
	Mar	14.8	1259	83.7	168%							68.0
	Apr	15.6	1246	79.2	159%							25.4
UNIT	MONTH	Avg CH-54 On Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hours Per CH-54	Percent of DA Program							Availability
355th	Feb	3.0	53	17.7	59%							60.9
	Mar	3.0	79	26.3	79%							67.9
	Apr	3.0	93	31.0	100.3%							25.4

GROUP 1
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By MSD NARA Date 7/9/26

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INCL 2

SUBJECT: Recapitulation of Availability, Mission ready, EDP and
EDM percentage taken from DA Form 1352 and Daily Aircraft
Status. (U)

	STD	FEB	MAR	APR
UH-1C				
Availability	75	72.7	79.5	78.9
Mission Ready	80	53.7	50.8	58.7
EDM	17	20.5	16.0	16.9
EDP	8	6.8	4.5	4.2
UH-1H	STD	FEB	MAR	APR
Availability	78	76.6	79.5	78.5
Mission Ready	80	52.8	63.3	61.6
EDM	17	18.7	15.0	17.6
EDP	5	4.7	5.5	3.9
UH-1 COMBINED	STD	FEB	MAR	APR
Availability	80	74.6	79.5	78.7
Mission Ready	80	53.3	57.1	61.7
EDM	17	19.6	15.5	17.2
EDP	5	5.8	5.0	4.1
CH-47	STD	FEB	MAR	APR
Availability	65	67.0	68.0	68.0
Mission Ready	50	46.1	41.3	47.4
EDM	23	22.0	22.0	22.0
EDP	12	11.0	10.0	12.0
CH-54	STD	FEB	MAR	APR
Availability	67	60.9	68.0	55.0
Mission Ready	30	25.9	66.2	25.4
EDM	23	17.2	5.6	9.0
EDP	10	21.9	26.4	36.0

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The following personnel received treatment at the Camp Holloway Dispensary and were released:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
PFC LEONARD, Terrie L.	355th ASHC
SP4 ERNEST, Lewis W. Jr.	
SP4 WILLIAMS, Johnny L.	189th AHC
SGT RUMSEY, James D.	
SP6 QUEEN, Harold	HHD
CWO MAVIS, Charles O.	
LTC FORD, Eddie L.	
SE4 GROHSCHNER, William H. Jr.	170th AHC
WO SLAYDEN, Dan J.	
WO BARTHEMES, Robert F.	
SP4 WATTS, Luther J.	
SP4 FIDGETT, William P.	119th AHC
SP4 PERRY, Ralph B.	
SP4 STARKEY, William L.	
SP5 MADDY, Stephan A. III	
1LT WHETSTONE, Charles B.	
SP4 CORNETT, Orrel B.	
PFC HYLTON, Norman C.	355th ASHC
ST4 LEE, George A.	662th Maint Det

b. Major items of equipment damage or destroyed

1. The following damage was sustained by aircraft at Camp Holloway:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>A/C#</u>	<u>TYPE DAMAGE</u>
UH-1H	170th	170	Extensive Sheetmetal
UH-1H	170th	110	Extensive Sheetmetal
UH-1H	170th	142	Minor Sheetmetal
UN-1H	170th	995	Minor Sheetmetal
UH-1H	170th	358	Minor Sheetmetal
UH-1H	170th	210	Minor Sheetmetal
UH-1H	170th	616	Minor Sheetmetal
UH-1C	170th	144	Major Sheetmetal Damage
UH-1C	170th	136	Minor Sheetmetal
UH-1C	119th	588	Major Sheetmetal Damage
UH-1C	119th	560	Minor Sheetmetal (Two holes)
UH-1H	189th	158	Minor Sheetmetal

4. (C) Planned Actions and Recommendations.

a. Defense plans are constantly being reviewed and revised as deemed necessary.

b. Planned actions are the same as those proposed in the after action report of 30 Jan 68.

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By <u>MSD</u> NARA Date <u>7/9/76</u>

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INCL 3

SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Holloway Army airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked by a supporting element of the 41st NVA Artillery Regiment on 020400 February 68. Twenty five (25) rounds were fired into the aircraft revetment, runway, and motor park areas from four (4) 82mm mortar tubes, located in the vicinity of AR 815475 (See inclosure 1). The attack lasted 10-15 minutes.

2. (C) Sequence of Events and Significant Intelligence Information,

a. The enemy mortar section an estimated 20-25 man force, approached the prepared firing positions from vicinity of AR824752, undected. After firing 25 rounds in rapid succession, the enemy element moved immediately to the vicinity of AR825477 and dispersed.

b. Following the incoming enemy rounds, friendly artillery, mortar, and gunships were employed to engage the suspected enemy firing positions. The 52d Security Detachment located the enemy firing positions 020900 Feb 68 and ground assessment indicated that the enemy element suffered no damage from the aerial rocket attack made on the suspected positions immediately following the attack.

c. The attack was well planned and executed with precision. The enemy probably selected this course of engagement because:

(1) All movement had to be made during the hours of darkness to avoid detection by increased aerial observation of the area of operation during daylight hours, thus possibly explaining the unusually late engagement at 0400 hours due to approximately six (6) hours of night movement required to reach the firing positions from the staging area vicinity of coordinated AR824752.

(2) Previously, extended enemy engagements were made from the same location which allowed sufficient time for the gunships to engage the suspected enemy mortar positions while they were occupied. The enemy may have shortened his engagement time to avoid being counter-engaged by gunships.

(3) The enemy may have chosen a later engagement to avoid a pattern set in three (3) previous attacks on Camp Holloway.

3. (C) Damage Information.

a. Personnel losses by unit

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INCL 3

SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Holloway Army Airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked with at least six (6) 120mm rockets by unknown sized element of the NVN 40th Artillery Regiment at 0125 Hours on 3 February 1968. The duration of the attack was approximately ten (10) minutes, during which six (6) rounds fell within the confines of Camp Holloway; four (4) were duds, two (2) detonated.

2. (C) Sequence of Events:

a. The enemy rocket crew moved into position vicinity ARVN 2 (approximately 9,500 meters from target center of mass), using the surrounding wooded area for concealment. At 0125 hours the first round was fired. This hit between the TOL tanks causing no damage. Approximately 5-7 minutes later, the second round fell fifteen (15) feet from a JP-4 pipeline. Shrapnel from the rocket punctured the line, causing a fuel fire. Approximately ten thousand (10,000) gal of JP-4 burned before the fire was brought under control. The third round exploded in the 604th DS platoon billet, causing extensive damage to the building. The fourth round apparently had a delayed fuze. It landed five (5) meters from the DS billets, resulting in a hole in the ground six (6) inches in diameter and approximately ten (10) feet deep. The last two rounds were duds. Rounds Two (2) through six (6) landed almost simultaneously.

b. The general direction and distance of the enemy position was visually confirmed by 52d CAB Security Forces by the first flash of round number one leaving the tube. The gunships were alerted and airborne in under fifteen (15) minutes. An Air Force C-47 (Spooky) was airborne at the time. He spotted the approximate source of enemy fire and began engaging the target as the last rounds were fired. Gunships arrived on station and also engaged the suspected area with aerial rocket and mini-gun fire. Incoming rounds ceased immediately upon being engaged by aerial fire.

c. During the attack the post was on 50% alert. Individual companies to include the 604th, was on 100% alert in bunkers/defensive positions. This resulted in the DS platoon billets, 604th Trans Co, containing only one individual, a civilian. He was shaken up but received negative injuries. Throughout the night gunships and mortars continued H & I fires with unknown results. There were no indications that the Camp Holloway perimeter was penetrated during the attack.

d. The rocket attack again indicates that the enemy has used his detailed knowledge of the Camp Holloway facilities. Intended targets were the support facilities. Factors that may influenced the enemy course of action are:

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Downey, 1968

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- (1) Passive defense measures provide more protection to personnel than IOL and maintenance areas.
- (2) Destruction of support/supply facilities denies combat elements the prime movers of supplies, equipment and troops into forward areas, seriously affecting combat operations.
- (3) Armed aircraft located at this installation constitute a major deterrent to ground assaults of installations in the Pleiku area.
- (4) Due to the time-on-station capability of the C-47 (Spooky) and its relatively slow scramble time, this aircraft should be airborne in the Pleiku area during the hours of darkness.

3. (C) Significant Intelligence Information:

- a. The reaction of Spooky and the gunships probably caused the enemy to cease fire early. Also, since the last rockets fired failed to detonate, it is possible that pressure from aerial attack caused the VC to fire these rockets without arming them.
- b. No reaction force was sent into the area from which the rocket attack was made. Therefore, it is impossible to accurately determine the personnel/material destruction due to aerial attack.

4. (C) Damage Information:

- a. There were no friendly KIA or WIA.
- b. The only item destroyed consisted of approximately 10,000 gal of JP-4. The 604th DS platoon billet sustained heavy damage.

5. (C) Planned Actions and Recommendations:

a. Planned Actions:

- (1) When an attack is eminent and we have an excess of flyable aircraft beyond those required for flare/medical evacuation missions, they will be evacuated from Camp Holloway.
- (2) Aircraft will continue to be dispersed as much as possible.
- (3) Bunkers will continue to be improved.
- (4) When intelligence information indicated an attack is eminent, alert status will be maintained at 100%.
- (5) When aircraft requirements permit, the frequency of local area visual reconnaissance missions by 52d CAB aircraft will be increased.

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By <u>WSD</u> NARA Date <u>7/9/76</u>

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b. Recommendations:

- (1) Increase the manning level of the assigned security detachment so that it may better patrol, secure and interdict the local area.
- (2) Bring the 52d CAB up to TO&E aircraft strength or reduce commitments to enable us to increase our VR capability.
- (3) When enemy activity in the Fleiku area increases, maximum use of available ground troops be made to close with and capture or destroy the enemy before he gains the initiative.

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By <u>MSD</u> NARA Date <u>7/9/26</u>	

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INCL 2

SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Holloway Army Airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, VN, was attacked by a supporting element of the 40th NVA Artillery regiment on 060245 Feb 68. Eighteen (18) rockets (122mm) were fired and impacted within the confines of Camp Holloway. The barrage lasted until 000315 Feb 68, approximately 30 minutes.

2. (C) Sequence of Events and Significant Intelligence Information:

a. The enemy rocket element of unknown size fired from positions in the vicinity of AR840510 and AR842568. There is no information pertaining to the infiltration or exfiltration of this element to the firing position.

b. Following the incoming rockets friendly artillery and gunships were employed to engage the suspected enemy positions. There was no ground assessment made to determine the extent of damage or losses to the enemy element. Incoming rockets had ceased before the gunships engaged the suspected positions.

c. The attack was well planned and executed. The impact area was the same as the attack of 02 Feb 68. Damage to friendly facilities was not serious because the rockets didn't explode in the general proximity of equipment and facilities, even though it was the same impact area. The rocket attack did not saturate the impact area to the extent of the 02 Feb 68 mortar attack.

3. (C) Damage report:

a. The damage incurred during the attack is negligible. Two (2) UH-1H's received damage but were repaired and mission ready the same day.

b. There were no friendly WIA or KIA.

4. (C) Planned Action and Recommendation: Actions and recommendations are the same as those submitted in preceding after action reports of recent attacks on Camp Holloway.

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 By MSD NARA Date 7/9/26

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INCL 1

SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Holloway Army Airfield (52d CAS) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN was attacked by a estimated twenty (20) to twenty five (25) man mortar section on 100205 February 1968. This section was thought to be part of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment. A total of eighty (80) 82mm mortar rounds, counted by a tape recorder turned on as the attack began, were fired into the compound. The majority of these landed in the billets area. The attack lasted fifteen (15) minutes utilizing a total of three (3) tubes.

2. (C) Sequence of Events:

a. The enemy mortar section moved into their firing position (AR820477) from the foothills vicinity AR8652. The movement, attack, and subsequent withdrawal were all conducted during the hours of darkness.

b. The general direction and distance of the enemy position was visually confirmed by 52d CAB Security Forces via flashes from the tubes. Mortar concentrations eight (8) and eleven (11), both layed in old VC mortar positions in proximity to the flashes, were immediately fired. The standby gunships and a C-47 (Spooky) were scrambled. Counter battery fire from the 52d Artillery Group was called as the attack began. Twenty three (23) minutes later the first volley was fired; fire continued for about five (5) minutes. The gunships were airborne and in a position to attack before the artillery was prepared to respond but were held off the target area until termination of artillery fire.

c. During the attack the post was on 100% alert. However, not all personnel were in bunkers; the one (1) friendly KIA and most of the PIA were in billets or in the open. Primary target was personnel in the billets area. Factors that may have influenced the enemy course of action are:

(1) During previous attacks, prime targets have been aircraft and aircraft maintenance areas. Enemy follow-up reports have probable indicated little change in our support capabilities following these attacks. Consequently, it can be surmised that, lacking noticeable effect from material target attacks, the enemy elected to try for personnel.

(2) Immediate mortar and aerial retaliation forced the enemy to limit his attack to one of short but violent duration.

3. (C) Significant intelligence information:

a. A ground reconnaissance conducted the morning of the attack located the imprints of three mortar baseplated at AR820477. A blood trail was picked up and followed N-NE to the vicinity of AR8248. At this point, the blood trail seemed to cut off toward the village of Plei Thien.

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By <u>MSD</u> NARA Date <u>7/9/26</u>	

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(AR6351) while the main body proceeded towards the foothills. At 0652, a cursory interrogation of indigenous personnel in the vicinity of Plei Thung indicated the VC had passed south of their village for both ingress and egress to the firing positions. The gunships also has a fleeting glance under the flares of approximately fifteen (15) people in a rice paddy moving north between the firing position and the village.

b. With the exception of one (1) blood trail, no indication of personnel/material destruction was found.

** (C) Damage Information:

a. Personnel:

The following named person was KIA:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
SGT BUNNELL, Eugene V.	119th AHC

The following named personnel were WIA (Med Evac):

<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
SGT CLAYTON, Larry W.	119th AHC
SGT COOK, Robert E.	52d Scty Det
SGT FATHING, Stanley E. III	170th AHC
SGT GALLAGHER, Edward L.	189th AHC
SGT GILDED, Lenard P.	119th AHC
SGT GOFSON, Edward L.	170th AHC
SGT GILMORE, Gilmore C.	52d Scty Det
SGT HARRIS, Lawrence S. Jr.	189th AHC
SP4 HOGG, Paul A.	170th AHC

The following personnel were treated and released:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
SP4 HETHEA, Lee D.	52d Scty Det
SP4 BOIRIM, David L.	HHD, 52d CAB
SP4 MINK, Thomas L.	170th AHC
SP4 SMITH, Otha L.	HHD, 52d CAB
SP5 CLARK, Siomie (HHD)	52d Scty Det
SP4 O'KALVO, Joseph M.	52d Scty Det
SP4 COOKSON, Jerry J.	52d Scty Det
SP4 COTTEDWELL, Terry L.	170th AHC
SP4 DICARISTO, James J.	52d Scty Det
SGT DILLMORE, Dale A.	189th AHC
SP4 JONES, Calvin B.	189th AHC
SP4 GARCIA, Chris J.	52d Scty Det

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REF ID:

UNIT

SP4 RICHARD, Homer J.	HM, 52d CAB
WOLKED, John B.	119th ANC
WOLKIRK, Mack L.	119th ANC
WOLKOWSKI, Harold E. Jr.	119th ANC
WOLKOWSKI, Willford D.	119th ANC
WOLKOWSKI, John W.	119th ANC
WFO TOIGHT, Dallas (MI)	119th ANC
SP4 WILLIAMS, Jonie S. Jr.	HMD, 52d CAB
WOLKOWSKI, Joseph W.	170th ANC
SP4 WINICK, John L.	52d Det
SP4 ZIN, John A. III	662 TC Det
SP4 ZWISCHER, John L.	HMD, 52d CAB

b. The following damage was sustained by aircraft at Camp Holloway:

TYPE	UNIT	A/C#	DAMAGE
UH-1H	119th	527	Light: N/R blade
UH-1H	119th	524	Light: N/B blade

c. The following damage was sustained by equipment other than aircraft:

TYPE	UNIT	DAM. GP
1/4t trk	119th	Moderate damage
1/4t trk	119th	Light damage
3/4t trk	119th	Moderate damage
3/4t trk	119th	Light damage
1/4t trk	18th	Light damage
1/4t trk	344th	Moderate damage
3/4t trk	448t	Moderate damage

5. (C) Planned Actions and Accommodations:

a. Planned actions:

(1) When an attack is eminent all personnel except those necessary for command/control/communications functions will be in bunkers or revetted areas.

(2) When an attack is eminent, a flareship will be airborne. It is interesting to note that the attack initiated immediately after a flareship had landed and before another one had been launched.

(3) A 106mm recoilless rifle has been put on emergency requisition. It will be mounted near the tower for instantaneous reaction to line-of-sight enemy fire.

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(4) Since gunships seem to react faster than artillery, their strikes will not be delayed while waiting for artillery counter-battery fire.

b. Recommendations:

(1) Increase the manning level of the assigned security Detachment so that it may better patrol, secure and interdict the local area. The security Detachment set up an ambush position the night following this attack: One PVA with numerous satchel charges and one pair of Russian binoculars was killed.

(2) Maximum use is to be made of available ground troops in the Pleiku area to harass, ambush, and destroy these small enemy groups before they gain the initiative.

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INCL 3

SUBJECT: After action report of Enemy Attacks on Holloway Army Airfield
(52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Plei K, RV, was attacked by an unknown sized mortar element on 27/2/55 Feb 62. This force is believed to be the 408th Sapper Battalion Element. The attack lasted ten minutes and a total of 65 (sixty-five) 82mm mortar rounds were fired into the billets and equipment areas.

2. (C) Sequence of events:

a. The enemy mortar section moved into firing positions vicinity of Al823477. The movement to firing positions, the attack, and subsequent withdrawal were conducted during the hours of darkness.

b. The general direction and distance of the enemy positions were not confirmed. Friendly mortar concentrations, a portion of the counter mortar defense plan, were fired immediately after the attack began. Gunships were scrambled but no visual confirmation of the enemy positions could be made. The enemy had stopped firing and was probably displacing once the gunships became airborne.

c. During the attack the post was on 50% alert. Primary targets of the attack were the equipment and billets areas. Factors that may have influenced the enemy choice of time and duration of the attack and target areas are:

(1) Previous enemy attacks have failed to significantly change our support capabilities through destruction of aircraft and support facilities as primary targets.

(2) Personnel are extremely vulnerable during short violent mortar attacks when the post is not on 100% alert.

(3) The attack started when the flare-ship landed to re-fuel, and the relief ship could not be started due to maintenance difficulty. During previous attacks within the Pleiku area, reports indicated the enemy has waited to commence firing until there were no aircraft airborne to detect through aerial observation the enemy's firing positions.

3. (C) Significant Intelligence Information:

a. A sweep of the area at first light by the 52d Security Detachment resulted in no visible evidence of VC casualties. No equipment was found. Villagers in Plei Monu state that two platoons of VC had arrived outside their village at 0200 hours that morning from the north-east. At the time of the attack, the flare-ship was refueling and there was no aircraft over Camp Holloway. There have been several instances where an attack has occurred in this area during the absence of flare-ship

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coverage. The possibility exists that the "C" will be on the way for several hours in the hope that they may be able to intercept and immediate detection by flare-ships.

4. (C) Damage information:

a. The following personnel received treatment at the Camp Holloway Dispensary and were released:

NAME	UNIT
1LT CONLEY, James R	6th Sig Det
SSG J. PAUL, Duane L.	170th AIC
SP4 LUMTAUEN, Lawrence A.	604th Trans Det
PFC CUVA, David W.	755th Med Det
CPT HOWE, Michael B.	189th AHC
CFT OWLING, Ernest R.	189th AHC
PVT MC CANN, Kenneth W.	179th AHC
PVT KEEL MC, JOHN L.	179th ASHC
PFC BURRILL, James E.	179th AHC
1LT LINDSEY, Jerald C.	189th AHC

b. Major items of equipment damaged or destroyed:

(1) The following damage was sustained by aircraft at Camp Holloway:

TYPE	UNIT	A/C#	TYPE DAMAGE
UH-1H	119th	609	Minor: Tail boom, two holes
UH-1H	119th	535	Minor: Fuselage & tail boom
UH-1H	119th	520	Minor: Tail boom
UH-1H	119th	522	Minor: Hole in A/C windshield
UH-1H	119th	525	Minor: Main rotor blade

(2) The following damage was sustained by equipment other than aircraft:

TYPE	UNIT	DAMAGE
3/4T M37 (1)	119th AIC	Light damage
1/4T M151 (1)	119th AHC	Moderate damage
1/4T M151 (1)	119th AHC	Heavy damage
2-1/2T M35A2 (1)	5 t. AHC	Light damage
1-1/2T Trailer (1)	57th AHC	Light damage
2-1/2T Tanker M49A2C (1)	344th AOD	Light damage
3/4T Trailer (1)	344th AOD	Light damage

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INCL 3

SUBJECT: After Action Report of Enemy Attacks on Holloway Army Airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Plei Me, RVN, was attacked on 050310 March 68 by a mortar section of the 408th Sapper Battalion. Fifty (50) rounds fired from two (2) 82mm mortars fell within the billets and equipment complex at Camp Holloway.

2. (C) Sequence of Events:

a. The enemy moved to and established their firing position at AR823477. They launched their attack at 0310 hours. The attack lasted approximately fifteen (15) minutes.

b. Immediately after the attack was initiated, friendly counter-mortar fire was employed. Gunships were scrambled, and supporting artillery was called.

c. Within minutes after the initiation of friendly fire, the enemy incoming rounds reduced in intensity. Within fifteen minutes, enemy fire had ceased.

d. Artillery H and I fires were utilized on suspected exfiltration routes. A mobile reaction force was employed to interdict the enemy's withdrawal. This force did not make contact.

3. (C) An agent report on 1 March 68 stated that elements of the 408th Sapper Battalion were located in the vicinity AR843537. The agent further stated that a cache built for the purpose of storing mortar tubes and equipment was located approximately one (1) kilometre north of Camp Holloway. This information corresponds to a previous PW report on 18 Feb 68, describing the general location of the 80th Co, 40th Sapper Battalion. This company appears to move from day to day in a 10-15 square kilometre area north-east of Camp Holloway. No other V.C. units have been known to operate in this area since the V.C. 3d District Local Forces Company was decimated on 30-31 January 1968.

4. (C) Damage Information:

a. Personnel:

(1) The following named personnel received treatment at Camp Holloway Dispensary and were released:

MIE

CW2 ST JOHN, Larry W.
PFC THOMAS, Clarence E.
WO1 DONEGAN, Michael J.

UNIT

119th AHC
170th AHC
170th AHC

GROUP 1
Downgraded at 60 day intervals
Declassified after 20 years

INCL 3

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CW3 BARNES, Thomas W. Jr.
 CW4 MATTIE, Vernon C.
 PFC CREWS, Charlie S.
 SFC REEVES, Ualmond C.

179th AHC
 179th AHC
 Trans Det
 Trans Det

(2) Equipment other than aircraft which received damage:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
1/4T H151 (1)	189th AHC	Light Damage
3/4T M37B1 (1)	189th AHC	Light Damage
3/4T H37B1 (1)	189th AHC	Heavy Damage
2-1/2T H35A2 Cgo (2)	189th AHC	Moderate Damage
2-1/2T M49A2C Tanker(1)	189th AHC	Moderate Damage
2-1/2T M49A2C Tanker(1)	189th AHC	Light Damage
5T M52A2 Tractor	189th AHC	Moderate Damage
3/4T M37B1 (1)	170th AHC	Moderate Damage
2-1/2T H109A2 (1)	170th AHC	Moderate Damage
3/4T M37B1 (1)	179th AHC	Light Damage
2-1/2T H35A2 Cgo (1)	355th Avn Co (HH)	Moderate Damage
3/4T M37B1 (1)	57th AHC	Light Damage

NOTE: No aircraft Damaged.

5. (C) Planned Actions and Recommendations:

a. Due to the number of similar attacks directed against this installation, planned actions and recommendations remain the same as those presented in previous After Action Reports. All previous planned actions have been completed.

b. Recommendations that require action by higher headquarters have not been completed and should be reviewed for further action. The following recommendations pertinent to passive and active defense that remain outstanding are listed below:

(1) Additional personnel to augment the 52d Security Det.

(2) Additional fire support weapons, i.e., recoilless rifles and heavy mortars.

c. Consideration should be given to augment the 52d Security Detachment and increase its capability. The detachment can not secure the assigned area of operations to preclude the employment of enemy mortars which have constituted a major portion of damage to the aviation assets on Camp Holloway.

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INCL 3

SUBJECT: After Action Report of Enemy Attacks on Holloway Army Airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked by an enemy mortar section utilizing two (2) 82mm mortar tubes at 0250 hours on 6 March 1968. The attack lasted approximately four (4) minutes.

2. (C) Sequence of Events:

a. The unit, an estimated fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, approached their firing position at AR827484 from the foothills vicinity AR8550 through the village of Plei Thung (AR8351).

b. As the enemy launched their attack, the flashes of their tubes were observed by personnel in the tower and the gunner on a .50 cal. machinegun located on the NE side of our perimeter. The enemy position was immediately taken under fire by the .50 cal., friendly mortars were called in on the position and gun-ships were launched.

c. Almost immediately after friendly fire was brought to bear on the enemy, the in-coming mortar rounds ceased. At first light, the Security Platoon swept the area. One (1) 82mm mortar round which had been damaged by shrapnel was found. A blood trail led from the firing position north approximately fifty (50) meters and stopped (men probably treated at this point).

d. The Security Platoon proceeded to the village of Plei Thung (AR8351). The village chief told them the enemy had entered the village from the NE at 2400 hours, pushing bicycles with two (2) mortar tubes attached. After the attack, the enemy again passed through the village and proceeded to the NE, probably returning to a base area in the foothills vicinity AR8752. The Security Platoon did not attempt to follow.

3. (C) Damage Report:

a. The following personnel were WIA, treated at Camp Holloway Dispensary and released:

WIA

UNIT

PVT FULLER, James L.
SFC WHITFIELD, Marvin R.

179th ASHC
170th AHC

INCL 3

GROUP A
Documented at least 10 years
from original date of release.

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b. Damage to equipment sustained by aircraft at Camp

(1) The following damage was sustained by equipment at Camp

TYPE	UNIT	NUMBER	DAMAGE
175-4E	119th	66-16520	Major Damage-(Turn-In)
175-4E	119th	66-16523	Minor Damage
175-4E	119th	66-16527	Minor Damage
175-4E	170th	66-16616	Minor Damage

(2) The following damage was sustained by equipment other than aircraft.

TYPE	UNIT	DAMAGE
3/4T 137E1 (1)	119th	Light Damage
3/4T 137E1 (1)	57th	Heavy Damage
2-1/2T 145L2 (1)	57th	Moderate Damage
1/4T M151 (1)	175th	Moderate Damage
2-1/2T 145L2C (1)	110th	Moderate Damage
2-1/2T 145L2C (1)	170th	Moderate Damage

b. (C) Planned Actions and Recommendations:

a. Planned actions: No change from previous report.

b. Recommendations: One of the indigenous personnel of Plei Thung to be hired as a friendly agent and given an FM radio. This individual could then relay current information concerning Viet Cong activities to us via 1st Corps HQ.

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JNCL 7

SUBJECT: After Action Report of Enemy Attacks on HOLLOWAY Army Airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 31 April (7)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked by two (2) 82mm mortar tubes of an enemy element in support of the 408th NVN Sapper Battalion at 0100 hours on 10 March 1968. The mortar attack lasted approximately ten (10) minutes and was concentrated against the 88th S&S Bn and the 52d CAB billets areas.

2. (C) Sequence of Events:

a. The mortar element, an estimated 15-20 man force, approached their firing position from the east. The two mortars located in the vicinity of AR827484 opened fire on the Camp Holloway Complex, and between 0100 and 0110 hours forty rounds were fired into the billets area. The heaviest concentration fell into the 88th S&S Bn billets area.

b. The enemy mortar locations were not confirmed but immediately following the incoming rounds, friendly counter mortar, artillery, and gunships fire were brought to bear on the suspected positions. Within minutes incoming fire ceased.

c. The subsequent enemy withdrawal was undetected. Artillery fire was called into interdict.

3. (C) Significant Intelligence:

a. Mortar positions for the attack were located approximately 50 meters from the mortar positions used for the 6 March attack against Camp Holloway. Trails leading north from the mortar positions to the river crossing point again indicate the VC used Plei Thung village as a thoroughfare into the area. Only one intelligence report indicating an attack was received prior to the attack, a radio reading on 7 March north of the river line, assumed to be recon personnel. Although it is assumed that the 408th is the responsible unit for the attack, the fact that the attack was coordinated, with mortars against Holloway and New Pleiku, and a sapper attack against the rock quarry, leads to the conclusion that the 408th, understrength at the present, was supported by another unit. There was one agent report of a K-2G Sapper Bn, although currently unacceptable in order of battle, has been reported by three PVN's, two from the 408th and in one document. The K-2G supported the 408th Sapper Bn on the 30th and 31st of January in the attack on Pleiku.

4. (C) Damage Information:

GROUP - 4

Downloaded at 3 year intervals

JNCL 7

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a. The following personnel were WIA, treated at Camp Holloway Dispensary and released:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
WO1 HAWKINS, Dan A.	170th AHC

The 88th S&S Bn had ten WIA's names omitted.

b. The following damage was sustained by equipment other than aircraft:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
1/4T veh	189th	Light Damage
Bldg #6134	189th	Light Damage
2 Bldgs	119th	Light Damage
2 Bldgs	170th	Light Damage
1 chair, office type	88th	
2 desks	88th	
2 file cabinets	88th	
4 tents	88th	
Freezer Cabinets	88th	
Telephone T. 312	88th	
1 chair special service	88th	
Dispenser, water	88th	
Tank, Liquid, 600 gal.	88th	

5. (C) Planned actions and recommendations:

a. Due to the number of similar attacks on this complex, planned actions and recommendations have been omitted.

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INCL 3

SUBJECT: After action Report of Flying Accidents on Holloway Army Airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb thru 10 Mar 68

1. (C) 29020 Mar 68
2. (C) Fifty-second Combat Aviation Battalion
3. (C) AR801470
4. (C) Mortar, 20 VC, 33 rounds, 82mm.
5. (C) a. 57th AHC

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AS/CH#</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
UH-1H	66-17116	Moderate: holes in fuselage, windscreen M/R blades scissors levers, T/R blades
UH-1H	66-16174	Light: holes in tail-boom and fuselage, in one M/R
	b. 119th AHC	
UH-1H	66-16180	Light: holes in tail-boom
UH-1H	66-16535	Light: holes in tail-boom and fuselage
UH-1H	66-16609	Light: holes in fuselage
	c. 170th AHC	
UH-1H	66-995	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, fuselage, M/R T/R blades, engine and deck areas
UH-1H	67-17246	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, fuselage, M/R T/R blades
UH-1H	67-17273	Light: holes in tail-boom, T/R blades, fuselage
UH-1H	66-16394	Heavy: Direct hit to mast head. Extensive sheet metal and components replacement necessary
	d. 189th AHC	
UH-1C	66-15213	Light: holes in 1 M/R blade, 1 T/R blade, drive shaft and fuselage
UH-1C	66-690	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, fuselage, M/R T/R blades
UH-1C	66-696	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, fuselage
UH-1C	66-694	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, fuselage, M/R blades
UH-1C	66-15037	Light: holes in tail-boom and T/R blades

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e. 219th Recon Apln Co

0-1D 57-2966 Heavy: holes in engine, fuselage.

6. (C) Following personnel were WIA, treated at Camp Holloway Dispensary and released:

<u>NME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
L.SCH, Roger N. WO1	179th ASHC
BOIVIN, David L. MAJ	52d CAB
LEW, Neil I. MAJ	189th AHC
BOWENS, Charlie Jr. PVT	405th Trans Det
CONNORS, Jerald T. SP5	179th AHC

An additional nine personnel were wounded from the 88th S&S Bn and 85th E.O.D. names have been omitted.

7. (C) One of the OP's spotted flashes from the enemy tubes and called in counter mortar fire. Gunships were deployed from WMAF

8. (C) VC ceased fire and withdrew.

9. (C) Bn went on 100% alert ten minutes prior to mortar attack, due to explosion in ARVN ASP. Personnel were on way to bunkers or already covered positions. Counter mortar fire engaged target. Personnel moved in calm and efficient manner.

10. (C) LTC Lehman, Commanding Officer 52d CAB.

11. (C) 52d CAB