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2.(C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Senior NCO Assignment Policies

(a) OBSERVATION: In the battalion, a lack of experienced E7's to fill the position of Platoon Sergeant persists.

(b) EVALUATION: At present, NCOC graduates with the rank of E6 have been performing admirably, and are making ends meet in the rifle companies. However, much can be gained by having experienced E7's to help our men in battle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Senior NCO assignment policies should channel more E7's with an 11B MOS to rifle companies in Vietnam.

(2) Introduction of New Equipment

(a) OBSERVATION: Unit personnel require special training to operate and maintain new items of equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: The introduction of new items of equipment causes special training problems. In most instances, new items of equipment were received by units and placed into operation by untrained personnel. This practice has resulted in injuries and excessive equipment damage.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Mandatory training be established for select personnel in units scheduled to receive new equipment.

b. Intelligence

(1) Target Location Procedures Used in the Cambodian Operation

(a) OBSERVATION: Units with visual reconnaissance missions, such as 1-9 Cav and Brigade Scout elements, have difficulty in determining accurate grids for enemy locations they observe.

(b) EVALUATION: Inaccurate grids submitted by aerial reconnaissance elements often result in the loss of previously identified cache sites and base camps. Needless time is wasted relocating these areas. Although initially hesitant to shoot artillery into their working area, the reconnaissance elements soon found that artillery marking rounds were an excellent way to accurately determine grids of the enemy position they had located. The method developed was rapid and cut down considerably the time required to relocate targets which had previously been identified. In addition, the artillery had accurate grids to be included when desired in artillery plan fires.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: The recommended method is to give the firing unit an "at my command" mission on a grid within the recon box prior to the arrival of the helicopters. When they arrive on station, they fire in one grid (this should not take more than three minutes). The battery is also laid and ready to fire any subsequent missions. If the teams identify any enemy structures or locations, they can either shift from the previous marking mission or conduct an adjustment. The replot grid is given to the recon unit along with the target number and posted at the firing battery for later reference should the recon unit want to locate the same area at a later date.

(2) Increase in Ground to Air Fire

(a) OBSERVATION: During the last month of the reporting period, an increase in ground to air fire near villages and other populated areas has been noted.

(b) EVALUATION: In the past, ground to air fire has normally been received while flying over unpopulated areas. Air crew members are usually more relaxed and less cautious in and around populated areas. With the increase in ground to air fire around these areas, we can expect more aircraft hits unless air crew personnel are provided with this information and take appropriate action.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All air crew personnel should be notified of the fact that ~~an increase~~ of ground to air fire in the vicinity of populated areas has been noted and that they be strongly advised to continue their vigilance and caution until they are safely on the ground in a secure area.

(3) Grid Lines on Intelligence Overlays

(a) OBSERVATION: Unit commanders, supplied with intelligence overlays for use in the field with their operations, experienced difficulty in rapid assimilation of intelligence on the overlays when they only had "tick marks" as reference points.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to enhance the ease with which overlays could be used, the same grids which were on the map were drawn on the overlays. Unit commanders reported that these overlay grid lines greatly facilitated their use of the overlays.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Map grid lines should be placed on intelligence overlays intended for field use by unit commanders in order to provide greater and easier understanding of their contents.

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(4) Advance Warning of Impending Attacks

(a) OBSERVATION: Intelligence sources have been effective in providing advance warning of impending attacks on fixed installations.

(b) EVALUATION: On several occasions during this quarter, after receiving intelligence information on enemy activities, aircraft within the 11th Combat Aviation Group were dispersed to other airfields. Attacks did occur in a few instances and it is felt that losses and damages were minimized by the aircraft dispersal action taken.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis be placed upon evaluating and acting upon intelligence information by commanders at all levels.

(5) Exploitation of Ground Sensor Activations

(a) OBSERVATION: Judicious employment of ground sensors around US logistics, communications and fire support bases, together with a rapidly responsive fire-plan to support sensor activations can effectively thwart planned enemy ground attacks and attacks by fire.

(b) EVALUATION: Ground sensors were recently emplaced in the vicinity of known and suspected enemy firing positions and routes of movement around Quan Loi Base Camp. Assessment of immediate, preplanned artillery response to sensor activations on three separate occasions revealed indications of abortive attempts to attack Quan Loi by fire. First light visual reconnaissance and ground sweeps revealed scattered clothing, artillery casings, partially fuzed mortar ammunition and other equipment left by the enemy in his apparent haste to escape the incoming artillery.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That ground sensor systems be more extensively employed around logistical installations and fire support bases and that current sensor stocks be enlarged to permit employment in quantity.

c. Operations

(1) Evacuation of Enemy Caches

(a) OBSERVATION: The expeditious, efficient extraction of large enemy caches, such as those discovered in Cambodia, is an operation infrequently practiced and requires detailed planning and coordinated execution.

(b) EVALUATION: Based on the cache evacuation experience in Cambodia, the following factors must be considered in planning:

1 Type of cache material; net weight, gross cube.

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2 Location and ease of extraction.

3 Security requirements; size of cache, nature of enemy forces, type and density of vegetation, stay time for security element.

4 Labor requirements; use of local labor, use of combat forces, request CIDG or RF/PF assistance and share captured material.

5 Employment of Engineers; type, number, duration, special equipment or skills (rapelling proficiency).

6 Type of extraction and LZ construction.

a. Road

b. Helicopter, UH-1H

c. Helicopter, UH-1H with cargo hook

d. Helicopter, CH-47

7 Use of vehicles (usually miles).

8 Ground accessibility for vehicles (road construction required).

9 Disposition of materials

a. Current guidance on material to be extracted

b. Destruction and accountability

(1) Description of materials to be destroyed

(2) Photographs

(3) Demolition, rigging, extraction of forces or movement to a minimum safe distance, incorporation of automatic ambushes to preclude tampering or deactivation of charges, air warning.

10 Evacuation requirements

a. Slings, nets, doughnuts

b. Riggers

c. Blackhats and control frequencies for LZ.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That these planning factors be incorporated into an SOP to assist units in planning exploitation, extraction and destruction of cache sites.

(2) 1st ARVN Airborne Support.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the period of the Cambodian operation, this headquarters received nothing but good comments from Assault Support Helicopter Battalions concerning their support of the 1st ARVN Airborne Division. The 1st ARVN Airborne consistently had their external loads well-rigged and ready at prescribed pick-up time. Their log pads were noticed to be well policed, thus preventing the likelihood of blowing debris, which invariably causes personnel injury and equipment damage.

(b) EVALUATION: It is believed that the liaison with the 1st ARVN Airborne, when the 11th Combat Aviation Group initially started supporting them, contributed immeasurably to the ARVN outstanding performance. The training received in rigging external loads, meeting prescribed pick-up times and policing landing zones contributed much to their combat efficiency.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that in all future operations with ARVN units, the same type of initial liaison support be given. A liaison team insures the supported unit is made aware of how this group operates and has already proven to pay big dividends. It also facilitates a smooth operation and is a big step forward in the Vietnamization effort.

(3) Pathfinder support.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the Cambodian operation, the Pathfinders in some instances were not allowed to accompany the initial combat assault into new fire support bases.

(b) EVALUATION: After security has been established in the landing zone, it is common practice to immediately bring in heavy equipment using CH-47 and CH-54 aircraft. Before medium helicopters descend into a new fire support base, the aviators must be assured security and necessary air traffic control has been established. This information is normally acquired by radio communication with the Pathfinder controller in the landing zone. The absence of Pathfinders in the landing zone has caused countless delays and has been a primary factor in wasting valuable time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended all supported ground elements throughout the 1st Cavalry Division be made aware of this problem. Additionally, it is suggested each maneuver battalion include in its SOP a section concerning Pathfinder support and an implementation of the above mentioned technique. Pathfinders, when included in the initial lift of a combat assault, have proven effective, successful and efficient.

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(4) Technique in Avoiding Ground to Air Fire.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the Cambodian Operation, there was a significant increase in ground to air fire. The primary factor causing this increase was the prevalent low ceiling which forced aircraft to fly within the effective range of enemy anti-aircraft weapons.

(b) EVALUATION: This organization has found that exposure to ground fire is greatly reduced by conducting combat assaults at low level on the tree tops, utilizing the Cobra gunships at a higher altitude to vector the lift ships. This method proved effective and successful.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all assault helicopter units be made aware of this technique.

(5) Employment of the E158 CS Canister.

(a) OBSERVATION: The E158 CS Canister may be utilized to deliver both CS and PSYOPS leaflets.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of the E158 CS Canister has been effective in the delivery of CS in many tactical situations. The psychological impact can be greatly enhanced by combining the CS drops with a PSYOPS leaflet drop. The leaflets can be taped to the E158. The tape holds the leaflets in place until ignition of the canister.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That PSYOPS leaflets be taped to E158 Canisters in situations where it would be advantageous to increase the psychological effect of the CS.

(6) Ground Troops Firing their Weapons While in Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noted that ground troops utilize their organic weapons to place suppressive fire on the LZ during a hot insertion.

(b) EVALUATION: While the extra suppressive fire placed on the LZ by ground troops on board the aircraft can decrease the amount of fire received during insertions, it has been noted that some of the troops have exited the insertion aircraft with empty or near empty magazines in their weapons. The aircraft commander does not have immediate, positive control over their fire like he does the aircraft door gunners (by means of the aircraft intercom system) and the possibility of the ground troops accidentally shooting friendly aircraft and/or ground elements because of aircraft movements overrides the usefulness of their suppressive fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That troops on board aircraft be instructed to hold their fire until after they exit the aircraft. This will insure them the immediate use of their weapons on the ground, where they can be employed most effectively.

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(7) Utilizing ARA During Rapelling Operations.

(a) OBSERVATIONS: During rapelling operations the aircraft is in a stationary position and exposed to enemy fire for an extremely long period of time.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the extended time the aircraft used for rapelling is in a stationary position, it is exposed to an extremely heavy amount of enemy fire. Continuous suppressive fire is needed to lessen the danger of the aircraft being shot down. Normally, the suppressive fire is placed in very close proximity to the aircraft. This, of necessity, limits the types of weapons which can be employed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That two sections of ARA be included in any plan for rapelling operations. These two sections should utilize, to the fullest extent possible, 2.75 inch rockets with 10 pound warheads and 7.62mm mini-guns. Suppressive fire as close as possible to the aircraft used for rapelling is where suppressive fire is needed most.

(8) The "Air Bridge" Concept.

(a) OBSERVATION: In AO Chief the concept of the "Air Bridge" was used to enhance the mobility of ground maneuver forces in crossing impossible barriers.

(b) EVALUATION: A plan of maneuver required a river crossing by two platoons of D Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry. Bridging was not immediately available. As the platoon approached the crossing site, a PZ was established where those personnel not involved in driving the vehicles or manning the vehicular mounted weapons were organized for a combat assault to establish a bridgehead on the opposite bank of the crossing site. A brief artillery preparation was planned but not employed due to friendly troops in the vicinity of the bridgehead. An artillery smoke screen was used to obscure the area from which ground to air fire had been received the previous day. The bridgehead was secured by an aerial combat assault. Within minutes of the signal that the bridgehead was secure, CH-47's arrived at the PZ to lift the vehicles into the bridgehead. Due to the short turn around time for the helicopters, the crossing was rapidly completed. Extraction fires were planned along the air corridor during the crossing. The entire operation took less than 45 minutes. The crossing complete, the force continued on its mission. Blade time was minimal due to the short distance from the PZ to the bridgehead.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Maneuver forces should give the "air bridge" concept consideration on operations requiring the passage of barriers.

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(9) Extraction Fire Support Plans Used in Cambodia.

(a) OBSERVATION: Enemy fire encountered during early extractions in Cambodia brought about the need for extensive fire support planning in extraction operations. The extraction fire plan developed by Division Artillery proved to be very effective in the suppression of enemy fires during the vulnerable stages of extraction operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Used extensively by units of the Division Artillery and by the ARVN Airborne, the extraction fire plan prescribes defensive fires by Artillery and ARA around the closing FSB and for an anti-aircraft suppressive fire along the assigned flight corridor. Aviation lift ships participating in the extraction were well briefed as to the corridor restriction and the area. AASWCC warned other aircraft in the area. In this way, extraction fires were able to continue without check fire. The plan was so successful that significant enemy fire was not encountered by personnel or aircraft involved in extraction operations protected by this fire plan.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Fire support planners should consider the use of this plan during extraction operations.

(10) Use of Artillery "Cache Denial" Fires in the Cambodian Operation.

(a) OBSERVATION: During operations in Cambodia, numerous cache sites were located by air and could not be immediately exploited by ground forces.

(b) EVALUATION: A method had to be developed to restrict enemy movement around the cache site until friendly troops arrived to exploit the cache. The artillery developed a plan for "cache denial" fires which was particularly effective. Artillery was placed in cache sites and along avenues of approach and withdrawal from the site. This fire was placed at irregular times on an around the clock basis prior to the arrival of friendly troops.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The cache denial fire plan should be considered when interdiction of enemy forces from a known cache is desired.

(11) Marking Positions for ARA

(a) OBSERVATION: Aerial identification of friendly positions during monsoon flying weather continues to be difficult. Smoke is frequently masked by the low hanging clouds and strobe lights are confused with muzzle flashes.

(b) EVALUATION: Railroad flares continue to provide a brilliant, easily observed light even during reduced visibility. Friendly locations are easily soptted by ARA aircraft when marked by railroad flares.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: FO parties should carry additional railroad flares during the monsoon season.

(12) Cover and Deception for Combat Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Operations conducted in work areas of local civilian wood cutters, farmers, etc., pose a problem in cover and deception. Too often the answer has been either to warn the civilians to stay out of the area and possibly lose the advantage of surprise or to conduct the operation unannounced without the support of artillery CAP's and blocking fires.

(b) EVALUATION: In AO Chief, this problem has been successfully solved by clearing an operating AO through GVN channels much larger than required. Personnel not directly involved in the operation are briefed on an operation completely away from the actual target site. GVN officials and military leaders are asked to keep all civilians out of the entire area and for artillery clearances. Extensive air reconnaissance and artillery fires are used in the false area of operation. If a fire base is established, the guns are laid and registered in the direction of the false operation. The advantages of using deception plans of this type are as follows:

1 Simple and easy to employ.

2 Civilians are warned to stay out of the area, thus allowing artillery CAP's and blocking fires to support the operation from the beginning.

3 Political clearance for all artillery throughout the operation becomes a simple matter.

4 Possibility of early warning to the enemy is lessened.

5 Fire bases and artillery can be employed prior to the day of the operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That cover and deception plans of this type be used when operations are in an area where large numbers of civilians are found.

(13) Use of Flak Jackets.

(a) OBSERVATION: Four flak jackets were issued to each company in the 2-12 Cav and worn by point men. This procedure has proven very effective and prevented numerous serious injuries.

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(b) EVALUATION: Because of the excessive weight of the flak jackets, four less packs were taken to the field and the log and personal items of the point men were divided and carried by other platoon members. The reduced weight enables the point men to move and react faster to the combat situation, in addition to affording the maximum protection possible.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That resupply and personal items of the point men be distributed among members of the platoon to permit more effective utilization of the flak jacket on point.

(14) Defensive Wire.

(a) OBSERVATION: When installing wire in the barrier plan for a fire support base, the installation should be such that it can stop a sapper attack as well as a ground attack.

(b) EVALUATION: The concertina wire should be laid in three rows consisting of at least three belts for each row with all three belts on the forward slope, not on the top of the berm or at ground level. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to tie the concertina to engineer stakes with barbed wire. The second and third rows of defensive wire also consist of three belts of concertina and a two-strand barbed wire fence on the friendly side of the wire. The barbed wire serves as an "anti-ladder" fence, prohibiting the enemy from placing a ladder or pole across the wire and moving directly across. Stretching concertina wire to its maximum length and securing it to the ground is an extremely effective means of establishing hasty tangle foot. Three rows of hasty tangle foot can be installed rapidly and easily between each row of concertina with a 1½ foot separation between each row.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders consider employing defensive wire as outlined above.

(15) Use of .50-caliber HB Machinegun and 81mm Mortar.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of the .50-caliber machinegun and 81mm mortar at a unit's log site and/or PZ contributes to the overall security of the area.

(b) EVALUATION: The .50-caliber machinegun and 81mm mortar inserted into resupply sites and pick-up zones can be utilized in the H&I suppressive fire role. The mortar can fire periodic fires 360 degrees around the area, while the .50-caliber machinegun can be fired periodically in the "red splash" manner or as suppressive fires. These weapons can be delivered prior to final extraction or on the first log bird and removed either prior to the final extraction or during extraction. In the case of normal resupply, the weapons can be extracted anytime. The use of these weapons, however, requires considerable coordination between aviation support elements and the commander on the ground.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders consider employment of these weapons during unit resupply and on extractions from pick-up zones.

(16) Assistance in Locating Cache Sites

(a) OBSERVATION: Assistance in locating cache sites may be obtained by careful evaluation and analysis of their physical lay-out.

(b) EVALUATION: Units were assisted in their search for cache sites by dissemination of information as to the location, manner of storage and camouflage, contents, etc. in their area of operation. This information assisted in the employment of mine detectors, aerial reconnaissance and general search patterns.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units be required to submit sketches of all bunker and cache systems to include sketches of an actual storage site.

(17) Use of Off-Leash Dogs.

(a) OBSERVATION: Observation of Scout Dog Teams on missions indicates that off-leash dogs are more effective than when on leash.

(b) EVALUATION: When using Scout Dog Teams with infantry units, increased effectiveness is gained by using off-leash trained dogs. The off-leash dog may be worked to the front of the point man or to the unit's flanks while the handler remains in position in the unit. This freedom of movement permits a large area to be checked by the dog in advance of the unit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That off-leash dog teams be utilized and additional teams acquired above the three currently available.

(18) Use of Automatic Ambushes.

(a) OBSERVATION: Experience during the Cambodian Campaign indicates the enemy has increased movement along trails during daylight hours.

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(b) EVALUATION: Automatic ambushes have greatly enhanced the effectiveness of maneuver elements in the field. They have denied the enemy freedom of movement at night. Consequently, he has been forced to increase movement during the day. On 14 June 1970, at approximately 0830 hours, Co C and Co D, 1-12 Cav had meeting engagements with enemy troops at separate locations while moving to disarm automatic ambushes. Had the two companies waited for 30 minutes, the battalion would have had approximately six additional kills for the campaign.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Maneuver elements should consider leaving automatic ambushes in place until approximately 0900 hours and increase use of daylight ambushes to take maximum advantage of the enemy's recent propensity for daylight movement.

(21) Detonation of Fougasse and Husch Flares upon Closure of a FSB

(a) OBSERVATION: On move day, bulldozers normally begin leveling the berm as early as possible. During the last two moves made by one battalion, the dozers severed and/or buried the wire and Claymore detonators connected to the Fougasse and Husch flares.

(b) EVALUATION: The flame/heat emitted by these chemical munitions serve as an effective means of destroying/burning anything left on the FSB after it has been cleared of all personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Shortly after first light on move day, the Chemical NCO should personally insure all Claymore wires and detonators are rolled and secured with their respective Fougasse and Husch flares. This will permit all Fougasse munitions to be realigned to face the interior of the FSB. The Husch flares should be ignited first, since they are closer to the interior, followed by the Fougasse detonations. This will saturate the FSB with fire as the final extraction takes place.

(22) Use of "Daisy-Cutters"

(a) OBSERVATION: The nature of the terrain in Brigade and Battalion AO's during the past 90 days has been generally rugged and devoid of natural LZ's. As a result, location of sit-down log pads and assault LZ's has been difficult.

(b) EVALUATION: Daisy-Cutters are excellent for LZ construct missions in bamboo; however, they are ineffective in heavily forrested areas with double canopy. A Daisy-Cutter does not have the force necessary to uproot and push away hardwood trees. It has been noted that 2,000 pound hard bombs and Commando Vaults are effective LZ construct weapons in forested areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Maximum emphasis should be given to use of Daisy-Cutters in bamboo-infested areas and hard 2,000 pound bombs or Commando vaults in forested areas.

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(23) Radar Tower Construction

(a) OBSERVATION: Construction of radar towers in the field is partially effective.

(b) EVALUATION: The construction of radar towers in the field using natural timber is time-consuming and utilizes manpower necessary for other firebase construction.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Tower should be constructed prior to moving into the new firebase. The tower can be easily transported by an UH-1 helicopter and therefore could be moved from one firebase to another if necessary.

(24) Clearing of Hasty LZ's

(a) OBSERVATION: Location of cache sites in dense jungle requires the clearing of a hasty LZ.

(b) EVALUATION: To effectively clear the LZ, an efficient and highly organized engineer team with a rappelling capability is required.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A typical rappel team consists of 1 NCO and 4 EM. This team is large enough to clear a UH-1B pad in 2-4 hours and small enough to be inserted in two lifts; one for the men and one for the equipment. The equipment carried consists of 3 chainsaws, 300 lbs of C-4, 1000 ft of detonating cord and demolition accessories. The mission starts as early in the morning as possible as it will give a longer work day and also allows the hovering helicopter a lower density altitude in which to work. If a larger LZ is required, additional men and equipment can be delivered once the UH-1B LZ is established.

(25) Use of M-757 Kit

(a) OBSERVATION: Demolition operations have shown that the use of the standard 30 block case of C-4 is bulky to handle and time consuming to use.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of the 30 block case requires valuable time to disassemble and the case is difficult to handle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Experience during recent operations has shown the M-757 kit to be superior to the standard 30 block case of C-4. The M-757 kit consists of 8 canvas bags, each containing 16 blocks of C-4 and 8 lengths of detonation cord with boosters. Individual loads can be broken down and carried with greater ease and charges can be assembled at the work site quickly with less chance of malfunction.

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(26) Rappelling with a Chainsaw

(a) OBSERVATION: Members of an engineer team rappelling into the jungle should not rappell with chainsaws attached to their body.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience in rappelling operations has shown that a man rappelling with a chainsaw attached to his belt may cause injury to himself and damage to the chainsaw.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The best method of getting the chainsaw down to the ground is to tie it to the end of the rappel rope and lower it to the ground first. The advantage of this method is that it prevents injury to the operator and damage to the chainsaw, and also permits the chainsaw to serve as an anchor for the end of the rappel rope and aids in keeping the rope from becoming tangled in the trees and bush.

(27) POL Requirements in Initial Construction of a Firebase

(a) OBSERVATION: In firebase construction, the engineer equipment arrives shortly after the initial combat assault.

(b) EVALUATION: Maximum efficiency from the equipment is not attained on the first day because of the lack of POL products.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An engineer kit containing a minimum one day POL requirement should be shipped to the LZ after the combat assault or with the initial lifts of engineer equipment. The kit should consist of one barrel each of OE-10, OE-30, OE-50, two barrels of diesel, and one barrel of gasoline. If required for clearing fields of fire, a pallet of C-4 should be included.

(28) Cutting of Aircraft Tires by M8A1 Matting on Forward Airfields

(a) OBSERVATION: The M8A1 matting used on forward airstrips can cut the airplane tires.

(b) EVALUATION: If the matting is layed with the male end in the opposite direction of the landing aircraft, the cutting edge of the male end is exposed and could cut the tires. This is especially true during the wet season. When the matting is wet, the airplane will skid across the cutting edges.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: According to TM 5-337, M8A1 matting is layed with the female end in the direction of laying. Therefore in laying matting on airfields, placement should start in the middle of the airstrip. This procedure is recommended in matting the entire strip, or just the ends and overruns. The application of non-skid paint to the matting is important to prevent skidding during the wet season.

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(29) Rice Destruction Operations

(a) OBSERVATION: The destruction of rice is a problem for units in the field due to a lack of resources and time in the area.

(b) EVALUATION: The dumping of rice in running water is the most desirable of all disposal methods. This, of course, is contingent on the proximity to streams. The next most practical method is to slit the sacks and scatter the loose rice over the ground. This method is dependent on the monsoon rains for wetting of the scattered rice. Once the rice has been wet, it begins to spoil in 12 hours. By 24 hours, mold growth on the surface of the rice was obvious and the odor had become very strong. By 72 hours, the rice had deteriorated to such a point that it would be difficult to eat, and even if it were it would have little food value. If the situation allows, the use of BURBS to contaminate the surface of the rice is an effective adjunct to this method of disposal. CS use in this manner would be effective for about two to three days.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: These methods of rice destruction should be utilized whenever the situation permits.

(30) Hazards of Thickened Fuel Drops and Thickened Fuel Log Missions

(a) OBSERVATION: Whenever thickened fuel is sling loaded, for log missions or thickened fuel drops, there is a possibility of small arms tracers igniting the fuel.

(b) EVALUATION: Drums of thickened fuel were taken to the range and fired at with an M16 rifle utilizing tracer ammunition. Approximately sixty (60) rounds of ammunition were fired from 300 meters into each drum tested and none of the drums ignited. Tracers were also fired into the thickened fuel on the ground in an attempt to light the fuel, but this also failed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That thickened fuel continue to be carried as now prescribed, following all established safety procedures.

d. Organization.

(1) Colocation of US and ARVN Fire Support Coordination Centers During the Cambodian Operation

(a) OBSERVATION: Colocation of US and ARVN Fire Support Coordination Centers was instrumental to the success achieved by the fire support coordinators during the joint ARVN-US operation into the Fishhook area of Cambodia.

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(b) EVALUATION: Variations of fire support techniques and the risk of imprecise understanding between US and ARVN Fire Support Coordinator Centers caused US and ARVN Artillerymen to colocate their FSCC's and conduct joint fire support planning and operations. The joint fire coordinating infrastructure was further enhanced by attaching US forward observer parties to maneuver battalions to allow for maximum ARVN utilization of US artillery assets. The result was a thoroughly integrated fire support effort. The coordinating effect of face to face, side operation of US and ARVN artillerymen during the planning phase and day by day fire control cannot be too highly stated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Colocation of ARVN and US fire support agencies should be a strong consideration in the planning of future joint US-ARVN operations.

e. Training.

(1) Training of Ground and Aircrew Personnel on the Capabilities and Restrictions of the 2.75 inch Rocket

(a) OBSERVATION: During this reporting period, one (1) incident of friendly troops being wounded by aerial rocket fire occurred when rockets were fired too close to the friendly element.

(b) EVALUATION: This incident was caused by the lack of the ground commander to fully realize the capabilities and restrictions of the 2.75 inch rocket. An additional factor was the AH-1G aircraft commander placing several pairs of rockets on a target extremely close to the friendly position without first firing one pair for target identification and confirmation. Although the aircraft commander had informed the ground commander of the dangers involved in firing that close to friendly elements, the ground commander insisted upon the rockets being placed there. After the target was marked with a white phosphorous grenade by the scout ship, the gunship placed several pairs of rockets on the target. He did not shoot one pair for target identification confirmation and to ensure the safety of the friendly ground element.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: During in-country training, both ground personnel and weapons aircraft pilots should be fully informed of the capabilities and restrictions of the 2.75 inch rocket in different types of terrain. In the incident noted, there would have been little danger to the friendly personnel if they had been in open terrain, since the wounds were caused by the rockets hitting the trees and sending shrapnel down and outwards instead of up and outwards when hitting the ground.

(2) Requirement for Instrument Examiners

(a) OBSERVATION: Monsoon weather and late evening operations continue to demand that assigned pilots exercise a high level of instrument proficiency.

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(b) EVALUATION: In an area where instrument conditions prevail during a lengthy monsoon season, it is imperative each organization has a sufficient number of instrument examiners to maintain a high level of instrument proficiency. This organization has a present assigned strength of 577 aviators and consists of three separate aviation battalions and one aviation company. To support this organization's instrument program, there are only two qualified instrument examiners assigned. Qualified instrument pilots must maintain proficiency through training, and that training must be monitored and evaluated by rated instrument examiners.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that a minimum of one instrument examiner be assigned to each company size-unit.

f. Logistics

(1) Logistical Procedures for Support of Operations in Cambodia

(a) OBSERVATION: The logistical system established to support tactical operations in Vietnam can be extended to support operations in Cambodia without alterations.

(b) EVALUATION: Routine logistical matters are normally passed through Division directly to USARV. During the period 1 May to 30 June 1970, while the Division was engaged in operations in Cambodia, routine logistical matters were required to be routed through II Field Forces, Vietnam. This exception caused a degradation in the responsiveness of the logistical system. Major logistical problems that have a bearing on the tactical situation should be brought to the attention of the tactical commander. However, a tactical headquarters should not be burdened with routine logistical matters. The established supply system was not changed to support operations in Cambodia. Therefore, a change in the routing of routine matters was not necessary.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Routine logistical matters continue to be handled through established channels. Only significant logistical problems that have an adverse effect on the tactical situation be brought to the attention of the Field Force Commander.

(2) Ammunition Resupply in Cambodia

(a) OBSERVATION: The aerial resupply of artillery ammunition became, at times, critical during operations in Cambodia.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the large number of targets and enemy contacts during the Cambodian operations, the rate of artillery fire was quite heavy. The resupply requirements were therefore quite high. Ammunition supply points were established at the airfields at Bu Dop, Bu Gia Map, and later to a limited extent at O'Rang.

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Ammunition was brought in by fixed wing to those airfields and then by helicopter from there to the fire support bases in Cambodia and along the border. Bad weather and strip conditions often closed the airfield at Bu Gia Map. In addition, expected ammunition often failed to arrive. Only by hourly ammunition status reporting and an extremely flexible logistics response were the artillery battalions able to continually maintain sufficient ammunition stocks in their batteries. Priority of air assets given by the Division G-3 proved to be vital in the effort. The key to the operation, however, was the early identification of pending shortages and then decisive logistics action to get the ammunition to the FSB's before the onset of darkness or bad weather.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: During the monsoon season, commanders must develop systems which will give early warning of impending supply failure of critical items. In addition, logistics contingency plans to counteract these failures must be formulated.

g. Communications.

(1) Ground Element Commander Utilizing a Headset for Communication During LZ Insertion

(a) OBSERVATION: A headset connected to the aircraft communications system and worn by the ground element commander during combat assaults has proven to be very successful for coordination with low and high birds.

(b) EVALUATION: Utilizing the aircraft communications system enables the ground element commander to have excellent communications with the aviation element and keeps him informed of all friendly and known enemy activity concerned with the assault. He can locate the enemy weapons emplacements and determine the type and intensity of fire. Therefore, the ground commander is kept better informed as to the enemy resistance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the ground element commander utilize a headset connected to the aircraft communications system during combat assaults to keep better informed of the friendly and enemy activity on insertions into LZ's.

(2) RC-292 Antenna Failures Because of Water

(a) OBSERVATION: The RC-292 antenna may become ineffective after exposure to the weather, especially during the monsoon season.

(b) EVALUATION: Water will enter the coaxial adaptor on the antenna base after prolonged (about one month) exposure to inclement weather. Eventually the water will seep into the coaxial cable itself, causing a short circuit.

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Water will also enter the ceramic insulators where the antenna is attached and at the interfaces of the insulators and the base. Splices or coaxial connectors along the coaxial lead-in cable are also susceptible to moisture penetration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The coaxial cable connectors on the antenna base should be well-taped in order to make the connection waterproof. Splices in the coaxial lead-in cable should be avoided and coaxial cable connectors should be utilized instead. These connections must also be taped to keep water from entering the cable. The rubber gaskets between the base plate and upper and lower insulators should be inspected and if found faulty or missing, an even layer of grease should be applied to the insulators to form a seal where the gaskets would normally be positioned. It is further recommended that a light coat of grease be applied to the threads on the ground plane extensions to eliminate rusting.

(3) Non-Utilization of AM Communication Capabilities

(a) OBSERVATION: AM communication capabilities are not being utilized.

(b) EVALUATION: The AN/VSC-2, organic to maneuver battalions, is seldom used. As a result, operators are not proficient in the use of this equipment. The AN/VSC-2 is mounted in a $\frac{1}{4}$ ton vehicle and has an AM single sideband transmitter which may be used for voice communication (non-secure) as well as a radio teletype capability. The teletype is secure when used separately and non-secure when used simultaneously with voice. The transmitter has a range in excess of 100 miles when the doublet antenna is used. The whip antenna provides a range of approximately 50 miles. In several instances, the receiver-transmitter has been dismounted from the vehicle. It may be used separately, but requires a power source of 28 VDC.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The 13th Signal Battalion should send an AM training team to the brigades and conduct classes on the operation and maintenance of the AN/VSC-2 for brigade and battalion operators.

(4) Transmitter Output Measurement

(a) OBSERVATION: No determination is being made whether radio transmitters are operating properly.

(b) EVALUATION: Radio transmitters, especially the RT-524, are being utilized without determining if they are operating at peak efficiency. Transmitters operating at only a fraction of their rated power output are being utilized without operators being aware of this deficiency.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Wattmeter TS-2609, presently on order by all maneuver battalions, should be utilized to test the forward and reflected power of all their transmitters. This test should be made as frequently as possible, and the result should be compared to standards set forth in appropriate technical manuals. Transmitters not meeting these standards should be forwarded to the proper maintenance facility for necessary repairs.

(5) Use of Tactical Antennas on the FSB

(a) OBSERVATION: Units are constantly endeavoring to achieve maximum height on their tactical radio antennas; particularly on the FSB. This increases the range of organic radios, permitting greater flexibility in deployment of maneuver units.

(b) EVALUATION: The AB-577 launchers are generally used with two or three antennas to achieve greater height. 1-12 Cav has constructed a mast-head composed of cross arms 15 feet long and a 7½ foot vertical mast which is capable of mounting five antennas. The antennas are placed in a star shape 10 feet apart. The upper mast consists of RC-292 mast sections. This technique has proven successful through two complete SOI changes with frequencies as close as two megahertz apart. There has been no over-ride or interference thus far.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Maneuver units having FM communications problems should consider this system.

(6) Use of a Jump Rig When Moving a FSB

(a) OBSERVATION: It is imperative that fast and reliable radio communications be established at the new FSB.

(b) EVALUATION: The 1-12 Cav has developed a mule-mounted comno rig consisting of a wooden frame, four RT-524's, two AN/PRC-77's, one KY-38, and two long whip antennas. This rig is coupled with four RC-292 antennas and one 3 kw generator at the new FSB and is operated by three RTO's. The rig can be moved by UH-1H or CH-47 and can be operational on the battalion command and B2 nets within 10 minutes of set down. Within 45 minutes, five high-quality FM systems can be operational.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A comno rig should be adopted during FSB moves to provide command and control as quickly as possible at the new location. These rigs may be mounted on a jeep or mule.

(7) Use of Short Whip Antennas

(a) OBSERVATION: Short whip antennas for AN/PRC-25/-77 radios are constantly breaking down as a result of the rugged terrain which maneuver elements negotiate daily.

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(b) EVALUATION: Without exception, all breaks occur at one of the three flex-rivet points. By taping the handle of a plastic C-ration spoon securely at each of these points, the antenna will last much longer and retain its flexibility and effectiveness.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This field expedient method of care and maintenance of communications equipment has proven very effective and is submitted for consideration by other units.

(8) Radio Frequency Interference During the Cambodian Operation

(a) OBSERVATION: Concentration of radio antennas in a small area can cause an unacoeptable amount of override with the result that some nets may not satisfy the purposes for which they were established.

(b) EVALUATION: At the Task Force Shoemaker Headquarters at Quan Loi, radio frequency interference and override caused many radio transmissions to be ineffective. Normally, clear frequencies assigned to major commands became unsatisfactory. The interference was caused basically from too many antennas located on one 200 foot antenna tower. All Task Force Headquarters units utilized the same tower and with the volume of traffic on all of the nets, it became quite difficult to communicate via FM radio. Once the source of the problem was recognized, some units removed their antennas from the 200 foot antenna tower and noticed an appreciable improvement in the quality of their FM radio communications. It was also clear that a total FM radio communications outage could result if the enemy attacked the tower and caused it to collapse. There were too many critical nets operating from a single supporting tower, thus leaving the Task Force Headquarters in a precarious disposition.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. Antennas should be sufficiently dispersed to avoid serious interference problems.

2. If large numbers of radio antennas are required to support a task force operation, consideration should be given to locating the antennas and radios at diverse locations and remoting into the headquarters. This will eliminate seriuos radio interference problems.

3. Enemy strength and capability should be considered when positioning communications assets to preclude serious communications outages due to enemy attacks.

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(9) UHF Radio Set

(a) OBSERVATION: Rotary and small fixed-wing aircraft usually have an FM radio channel for communication with ground elements. All of these aircraft flying in support of infantry maneuver elements have a UHF radio which is normally used for air communications. Each infantry battalion TOE includes the authorization for one (1) UHF Radio Set (AN/VRC-24). Operation of this radio set in the infantry battalion TOE provides the infantry commander with an additional radio channel for aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION: A UHF Radio Set, AN/VRC-24 has been operating in the battalion TOE with gratifying results.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The UHF set should be a standard component of the TOC radio system.

(10) Communications at Extended Ranges

(a) OBSERVATION: The AN/PRC-25 with RC-292 is not adequate for communications at ranges beyond 6 kilometers and in dense jungle.

(b) EVALUATION: It was observed that the RC-292 antenna cable is too short to permit sufficient antenna height for communications at extended ranges in triple canopy jungle. Therefore, the range at which a company could operate from the fire base with reliable communications was limited. Communications were improved by connecting two antenna cables together and utilizing pole climbers to permit the placement of the antenna heads approximately 100 feet above the ground. The additional weight of these items was, however, excessive.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a light weight set of pole climbers and a lighter, longer antenna cable be developed for erecting the RC-292 antenna head when operating in dense jungle terrain.

(11) Airborne Communications Relay

(a) OBSERVATION: The airmobile concept often requires units to operate at extended ranges from their parent headquarters and beyond the capabilities of their communications equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: On several occasions during the Cambodian operation, companies over-extended their communications capabilities because of the dense jungle terrain. In most cases, the AN/PRC-25 with RC-292 was only reliable to a range of 6 kilometers from the fire support base. Communications between battalion and company stations was often unreliable to non-existent. During daylight it became necessary to utilize Air Force FAC's, Brigade Scouts, Command and Control aircraft, and Pink Teams to reestablish communications between companies and their parent battalion. At night there was little assistance to be rendered if night-flyable aircraft (Flareships and Nighthawk) were not available, or if weather conditions prohibited rotary wing operations.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Division maintain an organic, on-call, fixed wing, all-weather communications relay capability for use by brigades and their subordinate battalions; thus eliminating reliance on Air Force assets.

h. Material

(1) Securing Small Arms Ammunition During the Monsoon Season

(a) OBSERVATION: During numerous contacts at the outset of the monsoon season, an unusually high number of machineguns malfunctioned. The basic reason was later established as dirty ammunition. When a firefight is initiated, everyone hits the ground. The machinegun crews traditionally wrap the ammunition around themselves (Poncho-Villa fashion). This results in ammunition which becomes covered with mud and dirt.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to keep all small arms ammunition clean during the monsoon season, it must be maintained inside containers. Under no circumstances should it be exposed to the elements for the reasons cited above. Units have carried M-60 ammunition successfully in M-60 boxes. The rounds stay dry and clean.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Small arms ammunition should be carried in waterproof, mud-proof, containers to preclude weapons malfunctions from dirty ammunition.

(2) ARA Close Fire Support With New Delay Fuze

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the extensive canopy coverage in many areas of Vietnam, ARA close fire support is severely restricted as a result of the increased size of the fragmentation pattern caused by tree bursts.

(b) EVALUATION: At the present time, the 2.75 " rocket does not have the firing capability for canopy penetration. There have been occasions where friendly troops have received shrapnel up to 200 meters from the point of rocket detonation. The ARA Battalion has just completed a test of the XM-433 fuze. The test was highly successful and the fuze would give the aviator the capability of selecting a delay action to prevent treetop detonation. With this capability, ARA support could be provided in closer proximity to friendly troops.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The XM-433 fuze be approved for production and every effort be made to obtain quantities of subject fuze at the earliest date for use in Vietnam.

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(3) Loading Tray Modification

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the tremendous amount of wear and tear incurred through the heavy firing of the medium artillery battalion, the existing ammunition loading trays (FSN 1025-557-3641) are splitting at two particular points of stress: immediately behind the front legs and just forward of the rear legs. Continued welding may repair the break, but this gives no strength to the body of the tray and the tray quickly breaks again.

(b) EVALUATION: The existing loading tray (FSN 1025-557-3641) is neither sturdy enough nor strong enough to withstand the heavy amount of wear and tear that is imposed on it.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a new type of loading tray be designed which has a base at least $\frac{1}{4}$ inch thick with reinforcement bars of steel running lengthwise beneath the center part of the tray.

i. Other

(1) Combat Test of Ammunition Bunker Blast Wall Protection During the Cambodian Operation

(a) OBSERVATION: On two occasions during the Cambodian operation, 120mm rounds impacted inside 155mm howitzer parapets without causing significant damage to material or ammunition.

(b) EVALUATION: The PSP lined ammunition bunker blast wall, which has been used by medium artillery batteries, has successfully passed its test by fire. The blast wall consists of an earth-filled revetment one foot thick placed in front of all ammunition bunkers. In one instance, a 120mm mortar round burst no more than six inches from the blast wall protecting a powder bunker. The fragments from the round failed to penetrate into the powder storage area, thus precluding a possible fire problem.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units required to store ready ammunition consider the use of blast walls to further reinforce their ammunition revetments.

(2) Fire Support Base Construction

(a) OBSERVATION: With the advent of the rainy season, it has been found that depressions left by bulldozing artillery parapets generate great drainage problems.

(b) EVALUATION: In construction of wet weather fire support bases, success has been obtained by utilizing engineer support to haul dirt in for the parapets from fill areas outside the base. The increased engineer effort required pays later dividends by increasing the health and operational standards.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the additional engineer support be made available to hauling parapet fill when severe drainage problems would result from bulldozer constructed parapets.

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. C. BUTLER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

20 Incl
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1- CO: 1 Bn; 7th Cav
1- CO: 2 Bn; 7th Cav
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TAB D: Weather and Terrain

1. Terrain:

a. The Cambodian AO extended from the generally flat plains adjacent to Mimot, northeast through roughly rolling plains, and east to the roughly dissected hills and low mountains near O Rang. The low mountains in the east rise to heights of 650 to 700 meters. Hills between and at the southwestern edges of these mountains have an average elevation of approximately 350 meters, with slopes of 15 to 60 percent. The central area of the AO is generally an undulating plain with an average elevation of 100 meters. The relatively flat western plain has an average elevation of 70 meters and slopes of 0 to 5 percent. The southwestern portion of this area is rougher and more heavily dissected with numerous small hills. These hills have an average elevation of approximately 120 meters and slopes ranging from 10 to 30 percent.

b. The AO in South Vietnam, occupied in July, extended from the rugged hills north of Bu Gia Map; south to the low mountains of central Long Khanh Province; west to the low foothills of eastern Binh Long Province, and east to the heavily mountainous region of western Quang Duc and Lam Dong Provinces. The entire area can be characterized as a transitional area between the delta and the highlands of MR II. In this AO the most prominent mountain is Nui Ba Ra.

2. Weather:

a. May's ~~outstanding feature was the failure of the southwest~~ monsoon to become established until about the last three days of the month; much later than usual. Despite the absence of prevailing southwest winds, rainfall totals for the month were almost exactly equal to the monthly average, although ceiling and visibility conditions for flying were generally better than average. Overall rainfall, although heavy in spots, never blanketed the entire AO at any time. The official onset date of the southwest monsoon was decided as 28 May. The usual monsoon indicators were not clear cut this year and a typical monsoon wind pattern was not firmly established until the first two days of June.

b. June was the first full month of the southwest monsoon and the increase in rainfall and cloud cover was very noticable. Moreover, both the amount of rainfall and the number of days with rain were higher than for this month in previous years. As was expected, the section of the Division's AO most frequently having unfavorable weather for military operations was the area of high terrain in northern Phuoc Long Province extending northward into Cambodia. Moist westerly winds formed low ceilings, lasting often into the afternoon, which interfered with TAC air strikes. However, the last one-third of the month was not as bad as the first two-thirds, both in terms of rainfall and prolonged low ceilings. This better weather can be attributed in part to a reduction in the speed of westerly monsoonal winds.

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TAB D: Weather and Terrain (cont)

c. July's distinguishing feature was a period of unusually good weather from 17 through 29 July. Because of this dry period, rainfall during the month was less than average, particularly in the southern half of the AO. This weather was the result of a shift in winds above 5000 feet from the normal southwesterly direction to an easterly direction. Although rainfall was less than normal, the number of days with rain was very close to the average. Temperatures averaged slightly higher than normal.

d. Maximum Temperatures: May - 103
June- 99
July- 99

e. Minimum Temperatures: May - 73
June- 73
July- 73

f. Relative Humidity: May 94% morning
55% afternoon

June 95% morning
65% afternoon

July 92% morning
55% afternoon

g. Rainfall: May 8.5 inches
June 16.56 inches
July 7.5 inches

h. Maximum Density Altitude: May 3641 feet
June 3410 feet
July 3280 feet

i. Minimum Density Altitude: May 1232 feet
June 1582 feet
July 1530 feet

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TAB E: Surveillance Information

1. Aerial Surveillance:

a. Mission statistics for the period 1 May to 31 July 1970

MISSION TYPE	SCHD/COMP	RESULTS
IR	199/163	548 Emissions
SLAR	211/178	337 Movers
PHOTO (Mohawk)	172/172	—
PHOTO (Air Force)	117/117	--

The weather during the three-month reporting period was average for the southeastern monsoon season. Amount of rainfall generally conformed to the climatological averages. Weather adversely affected aerial surveillance missions, especially during the latter half of the reporting period.

(1) IR: During the quarter 81.9% of the missions were completed. 36 missions were cancelled; 31 because of weather and 5 because of sensor malfunctions.

(2) SLAR: During the quarter 84.3% of the missions were completed, 33 were cancelled; 29 because of weather, 4 because of sensor malfunctions.

(3) PHOTO ~~(Mohawk): During the~~ quarter, 100% of the Mohawk Photo missions were completed.

(4) PHOTO (Air Force): During the quarter, 100% of the US Air Force Photo missions were completed.

2. Ground Sensor Surveillance: Mission statistics for the period of 1 May to 31 July 1970:

a. Mission Sche/Comp: 26/24 (8 air/16 grnd)

b. New Sensors Emplaced: 372

c. Average Number Emplaced per Mission: 15

d. Air Employed: 241 (64.5%)

e. Hand Emplaced: 131 (35.5%)

f. Maximum Sensor Density: 504

g. Number of Targets Detected: 356

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TAB F: Intelligence Activities

191st Military Intelligence Company Operations

1. Background Investigations:

a. Cases on hand at beginning of reporting period:	11
b. Cases received during reporting period:	377
c. Cases closed during reporting period:	112
d. Cases on hand at end of reporting period:	276
e. Cases processed past suspense date:	48
f. Leads completed:	357

2. Security Services:

a. Announced security inspection:	8
b. Courtesy inspections and checks:	41
c. Unannounced inspections and checks:	6
d. Unannounced sanitary fill checks:	103
e. Fingerprintings:	219
f. Tech services (Locks, combination changes, etc):	140

3. Liaison Contacts:

a. Local GVN Officials:	352
b. Military Officials:	913
c. Other Intelligence Units:	842

4. Intelligence files checked: 173

5. Interrogations: 272

a. NVA:	8
b. VC:	17
c. VCI:	0
d. Detainees:	247

6. Brightlight Reports: 32

7. Collections:

a. Overt:	
(1) Spot Reports	30
(2) Translations	12
b. Covert	9
c. ICAPS	89

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TAB F: Intelligence Activities (Cont)

8. Personnel Security Actions:

a. Number of Validations:	1401
(1) Top Secret	137
(2) Secret	1264
b. Interim Clearances Granted:	148
(1) Interim Top Secret	140
(2) Interim Secret	8
c. Cryptographic Access Granted:	0
d. Requests for USAIRR Checks Submitted:	293
e. Local Files Checks Completed:	5160
f. Requests for BI Submitted:	5
g. Requests for NAC Submitted:	59

9. Detainees:	696
a. PW:	36
(1) NVA:	35
(2) VC:	1
b. Returnees:	4
(1) NVA:	4
(2) VC:	0
10. Documents:	431 (3995 inches)

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TAB G: Training/Combat Developments

1. DIVISION TRAINING:

a. The FIRST TEAM Acamedy at Bien Hoa conducted individual replacement training for all incoming replacement personnel during the reporting period. A total of 564 officers and 4837 enlisted men received the four day course of instruction.

b. The Combat Leaders Course (CLC) graduated 226 personnel during the quarter. The 10-day course of instruction provides training for selected personnel (E3 thru E5) who have demonstrated leadership potential in the field and are programmed to become team leaders and squad leaders. The subjects stressed are small unit tactics, air assualt techniques, map reading, communications procedures, first aid, and leadership.

c. The Kit Carson Scout training program graduated 35 personnel during the reporting period. The objectiveof the program is to provide maneuver units within the Division with well-trained former VC/NVA soldiers who perform as scouts with American units during operations. Training includes basic airmobile tactics and techniques, care and operation of U.S. equipment, the English language and the mission of the Kit Carson Scout.

d. The Division Sniper School graduated 20 personnel during the quarter. The program is designed to train selected personnel in advanced marksmanship and sniper techniques. The course of instruction also includes communications procedures, map reading, adjustment of indirect fire and night firing techniques. Upon graduation the trained snipers are returned to their units to be employed as a battalion asset. Sniper training is conducted at Bien Hoa by a nine man Sniper Committee. This Sniper Committee is a specially-trained unit from the Army Marksmanship Training Unit, Fort Benning, Georgia.

2. NON-DIVISIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHOOLS:

The Division made extensive use of the USARV school system during the reporting period. The following figures indicate the utilization rate for the quarter:

		OFF	EM
a.	Army Aviation Refresher Training School	15	77
b.	AH-1G Transition	17	
c.	UH-1H IP/SIP	7	
d.	OH-6A Transition	8	
e.	OH-6A IP/SIP	2	
f.	US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Bde.		58
g.	MACV Recondo School		17

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TAB G: Training/ Combat Developments (Cont)

3. US/RVNAF TRAINING:

a. In keeping with the spirit of Vietnamization the FIRST TEAM has participated in an on-the-job training program with the graduates of the 5th ARVN Division's Platoon Leader Refresher Course, Company Commander Refresher Course and NCO Academy. The graduating ARVN officers and NCO's are attached to 1st Cav Div (AM) units in OJT positions commensurate with their rank and MOS for a period of one week. During the last quarter 44 ARVN officers and 177 ARVN NCO's participated in the program. The program provided an exchange of ideas between US and ARVN personnel on concepts and techniques. This resulted in a greater respect for and appreciation of one another.

b. A four-hour class was given to 108 students of the RVN advanced course C& SC on 8 July 1970. Given at Dalat, RVN in the RVNAF C&SC the class provided instruction on airmobile operations and techniques through a class study of the 1st Cavalry Division's " Operation Pegasus ".

c. RF/PF/PSDF received OJT instruction from division units in numerous areas. A summary of training follows:

Subject	No. of Students	Man-Hours of Instruction
Airmobile Operations	40	120
Artillery	199	4644
Tactics	276	598
Weapons	281	7853

4. COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS:

a. The 90-day evaluation of the Del Mar Non-Directional Ground Fire Detector was concluded on 23 May 1970. Seven systems installed on AH-1G aircraft of C/1-9 Air Cav Troop were evaluated. A total of 21 GAF incidents involving equipped aircraft occurred during the evaluation period. The system detected enemy fire on 19 of these occasions; however, many false alarms were also registered. The system has great potential and is particularly well-adapted for the Airmobile division. Continued R&D effort is requested to improve the system's signal selectivity and to develop a directional capability.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB G: Training/Combat Developments (Cont)

b. Evaluation of the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) for UH-1 series helicopters was completed on 1 June 1970. The unit performs the function for which it was designed (i.e. operation of radios on C&C aircraft when the engine is shut down) satisfactorily. However, this usage is minimal as commander's normally use ground station radios from unit TOC's when C&C aircraft are on the ground. Further, the range of C&C radios on the ground is limited. The APU's were used extensively, however, for providing auxiliary power during maintenance operations.

c. Evaluation of the Laser Target Designation System (LTDS) (ENSURE 170) terminated on 25 May 1970. The 1st Cav Div (AM) will retain the existing devices mounted on the aircraft of the 229th Aviation Battalion. There are eight laser devices in the 229th: three seekers in AH-1G helicopters, three designators in UH-1H helicopters, and two hand-held seekers.

d. Evaluation of the Tunnel Detector (Portable Differential Magnetometer) was completed on 30 May 1970. The device is capable of detecting tunnels as designed. The device is fragile, too heavy, and too bulky for employment with foot troops. The eight foot staff is cumbersome and not easily maneuvered in thickly vegetated areas. One detector is being retained by the 8th Engineer Battalion. It will be used for tracing operations when tunnels are found or when operating in highly suspect areas.

e. Evaluation of the XM433 Rocket Fuze was completed on 24 May 1970 and all fuzes have been expended. The fuzes provide flexibility in mission assignment by allowing attack options with airborne aircraft. Present missions must be preplanned with conventional munitions. The fuze was successfully utilized against troops in multiple canopy jungle and bunkers. This is the only rotary aircraft system with the capability of defeating bunkers. The fuzes and support system are reliable and presented no maintenance problems.

f. Use of the Canopy Marking Round (ENSURE 3) has been favorable. The M-79 fired smoke device provides a quick, efficent method of position marking in heavy canopy vegetation. All rounds have been expended and the next shipment is expected in January 1971.

g. As of 31 July 1970, the following equipment was under evaluation:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB G: Training/Combat Developments (Cont)

(1) The Naval Airborne Munitions Detector has been in operation since 8 June 1970. It has acquired 204 readings - 84 of which were investigated with significant caches found in five areas. Using search boxes established by G2 Air the system makes parallel search sweeps in these boxes escorted by Cobra/LOH Pink Teams. The Pink Team provides security as well as the capability for immediate visual reconnaissance of significant readings.

(2) 20 Sandbag Bunker Kits have been deployed with the 2-19th and 1-77th Artillery Battalions. Field reports are highly favorable. The kits provide adequate protection from fragments and waterproof housing for the artillery gun crews. The lightness of the kits represents a significant saving in air sortie requirements during the movement of firebases.

(3) On 24 July 1970 a 60-day evaluation of Water-Resistent Writing Pads commenced. Ther are three types of paper to be evaluated in 20-day increments. The evaluation unit is the 1st Bn., 12th Cav. They are currently utilizing 40 pads of paper, type A. The first period of evaluation will be completed on 6 August 1970.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1970
TAB H: Key Personnel Roster (1 May - 31 July)

POSITION	RANK AND NAME	DATE ASGD DUTY
CG	MG E. B. ROBERTS	5 May 69
CG	MG GEORGE W. CASEY	12 May 70
CG	MG GEORGE W. PUTNAM	21 Jul 70
ADC-A	BG GEORGE W. CASEY	12 May 70
ADC-A	BG EUGENE P. FORNEY[illegible]	4 May 70
ADC-B	BG ROBERT M. SHOEMAKER	22 Nov 69
ADC-B	BG JONATHAN R. BURTON	15 Jun 70
Chief of Staff	COL(P) EDWARD C. MEYER	15 Apr 70
G1	LTC HAROLD E. IVERSON	16 Apr 70
G2	LTC MICHAEL J. CONRAD	27 Apr 70
G2	LTC JOHN KIZIRIAN	30 Jun 70
G3	LTC RODERIC E. ORDWAY	20 Apr 70
G4	LTC LEWIS A. WILLIAMS	16 Oct 69
G5	MAJ DOUGLAS S. DETLIE	16 Apr 70
G5	MAJ JOE P. HAGAN	18 Jul 70
CO 1st Bde	COL WILLIAM V. OCHS, JR.	
CO 1st Bde	COL ROBERT C. KINGSTON	8 May 70
CO 2nd Bde	COL CARTER W. CLARKE, JR.	15 Apr 70
CO 2nd Bde	COL WILLIAM J. BUCHANAN	6 Jul 70
CO 3rd Bde	COL ROBERT C. KINGSTON	5 Dec 69
CO 3rd Bde	COL JOSEPH R. FRANKLIN	4 Jun 70
CO 1/8th	LTC WILLIAM J. McCLOSKEY	
CO 1/8th	LTC JOHN R. GALVIN	5 May 70
CO 2/8th	LTC WILLIAM C. GLISSON	18 Apr 70
CO 1/12th	LTC NORMAN A. MOFFETT	10 Apr 70
CO 1/5th	LTC JAMES L. ANDERSON	
CO 1/5th	LTC WILLIAM A. BURKHARDT	3 Jul 70
CO 2/5th	LTC ELDON R. CARR	21 Mar 70
CO 2/12th	LTC FRANCIS A. IANNI	10 Mar 70
CO 1/7th	LTC EVERETT M. YON, JR.	25 Feb 70
CO 1/7th	LTC ANTHONY LABROZZI	25 Jun 70
CO 2/7th	LTC EDWARD L. TROBAUGH	3 Apr 70
CO 5/7th	LTC MAURICE O. EDMONDS	17 Apr 70
CO 1/9th	LTC CLARK A. BURNETT	13 [illegible]c 69
CO DIV ARTY	COL MORRIS J. BRADY	1[illegible]t 69
CO 2/19th	LTC THOMAS E. FITZGERALD	7 Feb 70
CO 2/20th	LTC HUBERT MORRIS	9 Jan 70
CO 1/21st	LTC GERALD E. MONTEITH	20 Feb 70
CO 1/30th	LTC HOWARD R. CUFFEY	15 Jan 70
CO 1/30th	LTC ROBERT J. GREENE	22 Jun 70
CO 1/77th	LTC THOMAS J. P. JONES	
CO 1/77th	LTC WALLACE G. HUNT	15 Jun 70
CO 11th Avn Gp	COL KENNETH D. MERTEL	11 Jun 70
CO 11th Avn Gp	COL JAMES F. HAMLET	21 Jul 70

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1970
TAB H: Key Personnel Roster (1 May - 31 July) (Cont)

POSITION	RANK AND NAME	DATE ASGD DUTY
CO 227th Avn Bn	LTC DAVID L. JOHNSON	
CO 227th Avn Bn	LTC JOHN A. ISLIN	8 May 70
CO 228th Avn Bn	LTC FRANCIS J. TONER	
CO 228th Avn Bn	LTC EDWARD E. WALDRON II	11 Jun 70
CO 229th Avn Bn	LTC ROBERT S. PATTON	
CO 229th Avn Bn	LTC DAVID L. MOSHER	15 Jul 70
CO SPT CMD	COL(P) TOM M. NICHOLSON	
CO 15th TC	LTC BENTLEY J. HERBERT	
CO 15th TC	LTC FRANCIS J. TONER	22 Jun 70
CO 15th S&S	LTC JAMES C. MORGAN	
CO 27th Maint	MAJ(P) NEIL S. WILLIAMSON	19 Mar 70
CO 15th Med	LTC JOSEPH W. McNANEY	25 Jun 70
CO 15th Med	LTC QUINN H. BECKER	5 Jun 70
CO 13th Sig	LTC NORMAN E. ARCHIBALD	
CO 13th Sig	LTC ROBERT G. LYNN	23 Jul 70
CO 8th Engr Bn	LTC SCOTT B. SMITH	7 Sep 69
CO 8th Engr Bn	LTC HOMER JOHNSTONE	5 Jul 70

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 70
TAB I: G1 Activities

1. DIVISION QUARTERLY STRENGTH REPORT

OFFICER	31 May 70	30 Jun 70	31 July 70
Auth:	1379	1379	1370
Asgd:	1393	1300	1257
WARRANT OFFICERS			
Auth:	697	697	696
Asgd:	667	641	644
ENLISTED			
Auth:	18078	18105	18060
Asgd:	18151	17679	17304

2. CASUALTY STATISTICS

	HOSTILE			NON-HOSTILE	
	KIA	MIA	WIA	DEATH	INJURY
MAY 70	107	4	596	16	135
JUN 70	50	5	528	16	112
JUL 70	28	0	186	25	84

a. The following problem areas exist in the area of casualty reporting:

(1) Incomplete casualty reports continue to be received.

(2) Delay in compliance with follow-up proceedures after casualties are sustained.

(3) Delayed casualty reports due to lack of communications.

b. These problem areas have been reduced through issuance of instructions to units on correct procedures and better communications with units by field phone and couriers.

3. REPLACEMENT REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 MAY 1970 - 31 JULY 1970

	OFF	WO	NCO	EM	TOTAL
MAY	86	44	326	1306	1762
JUNE	133	47	377	1398	1955
JULY	204	94	348	1455	2101
TOTAL	423	185	1051	4159	5818

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB I: G1 Activities (Cont)

4. REENLISTMENTS AND EXTENSIONS

a. 1-31 May 1970

DIVISION OBJECTIVE	REENLISTMENTS	%
* 93	101	108%

b. 1-30 June 1970

DIVISION OBJECTIVE	REENLISTMENTS	%
* 93	101	108%

c. 1-31 July 1970

DIVISION OBJECTIVE	REENLISTMENTS	%
** 182	79	43.4%

* Objective for May and June was at .5% of Division Strength, counting only the RA 1st Termer, AUS, ER & NG.

** Objective for July is 1% of Division Strength, counting all enlistments, RA ~~1st Termer~~, ~~AUS~~, ~~ER~~ & ~~NG~~ ~~and Career~~ RA.

5. ENLISTED PROMOTION STATISTICS (Number of Promotions)

GRADE	MAY	JUNE	JULY	TOTAL
E9	1	1	0	2
E8	1	2	0	3
E7	5	0	0	5
E6	48	12	7	67
E5	478	217	445	1140
E4	873	362	685	1920
TOTAL	1406	594	1137	3137

6. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

The following is a report of awards put on General Orders by this office from 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970. This report does not include those awards processed by this headquarters requiring approval from higher headquarters.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB I: G1 Activities (Cont)

AWARDS	MAY	JUNE	JULY	TOTAL
SILVER STAR	94	40	123	257
DSC	95	32	210	337
SOLDIERS MEDAL	16	14	46	76
BRONZE STAR MEDAL "V"	65	666	281	1012
AIR MEDAL WITH "V"	42	126	164	332
ARCOM WITH "V"	45	1094	720	1859
PURPLE HEART	323	389	171	883
BRONZE STAR MEDAL	1413	1052	1114	3579
ARCOM	1270	749	1616	3635
AIR MEDAL	3013	1734	1556	6303

7. SPECIAL SERVICES ACTIVITIES
   a. Entertainment
      (1) Statistical Breakdown

SHOW	DATES	FWD PERF	REAR PERF	TOTAL
Electric Grunts	May 1-2	4	0	4
Lillian Lehman	May 4	2	0	2
Free World Military Forces	May 5	1	1	2
Airmobile Rhythm	May 10 - Jun 14	14	17	31
George Jessel	May 13	2	0	2
Phyliss Thompson	May 28	2	0	2
Public Eye	Jun 1	1	1	2
Ann B. Davis	Jun 3 & 10	5	0	5
Cats & Dogs	Jun 9	0	1	1
Melbourne Concert Party	Jun 14-15	3	1	4
Sunshine Delegation	Jun 16	1	0	1
Cav Touring Show #6	Jun 23 - Jul 27	12	19	31
Bombbusters	Jul 4	0	1	1
Kitchen Cinque	Jul 9	2	0	2
George Peppard	Jul 15	3	0	3
Ron Ely	Jul 19	5	0	5
Page Six	Jul 26-27	3	1	4
TOTAL		60	42	102
PERCENTAGE		59%	41%	100%

*62 performances for CTS #5 & #6 - 61% of the performances

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB I: G1 Activities (Cont)

(2) Narrative: During the period 1 May - 31 July 1970, this division has received 17 shows of all types, giving 102 performances in the Cav area of operations. These figures are substantially lower than for the preceding three months period due to the Cav's involvement in Cambodia and the inability to schedule shows for the units in that area. USO continues to send a larger portion of "Handshake" Tours than the more popular "Performing Musicians" shows. Cav Touring Show #5 and #6 accounted for 61% of all performances put on for the entire Division. All types of shows for the reported period were well-received by the troops.

b. On 8 July 1970, Special Services conducted a "Ditty-Bag" Drop, leaving plastic bags of troop need items (pens, stationery, soap, wash n' dry, etc.) as well as 50 recreation and game kits at FSB's Quan Loi, Granite, Snuffy, Buttons, Thomas, Mo, Barry, Exodus, and Eleven-Bravo. It has been determined that the game kits are extremely popular with the troops in the field.

c. The Tay Ninh Free World Service Club was closed on 27 June 1970. The equipment and supplies were trucked to Bien Hoa and stored until such time as the proposed Bien Hoa Service Club is completed. The Commanding General of USARV has approved an expenditure of $11,000.00 for construction of the Bien Hoa Club. A building priority must be determined before construction can begin.

d. On 28 July 1970, a new Service Club Director, Miss Caroll Heisit, assumed duties as director of the Phuoc Vinh Service Club.

e. The Phuoc Vinh swimming pool was completed on 8 July 1970 and is currently in operation.

f. At present, Special Services maintains 81-16mm motion picture accounts. The number of accounts has been increasing since the pull-outs from Cambodia, with the result that one new film point has been established in Song Be and two complete film circuits have been added to the previous ten.

g. Tape Center: The following number of tapes were prepared for Skytroopers in the field during the period indicated:

(1)	May 1-31:	203
(2)	Jun 1-30:	189
(3)	Jul 1-31:	122
	TOTAL:	514

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB I: G1 Activities (Cont)

8. QUARTERLY R&R UTILIZATION:

	MAY			JUNE			JULY		
R&R SITE	ALLOCATED	USED	PCT	ALLOCATED	USED	PCT	ALLOCATED	USED	PCT
Hawaii	451	554	117.2	450	506	112.0	550	592	106.5
Sydney	230	392	170.4	215	375	174.4	330	449	136.1
Hong Kong	220	261	118.6	210	268	126.6	115	138	120.0
Bangkok	250	352	140.8	250	381	152.6	173	241	130.9
Tokyo	101	115	113.8	104	102	98.1	105	106	100.9
Taipei	175	247	141.1	151	226	149.6	110	124	112.7
Manila	24	16	66.6	30	19	63.3	-	-	-
Totals	1451	1937	133.4	1410	1877	133.1	1383	1650	119.1

9. POSTAL ACTIVITIES:

a. A comparison of the business conducted by the Division APO, by month, is indicated below:

TYPE OF BUSINESS	MAY	JUNE	JULY
Money Order Sales:	$865,603.51	$912,151.90	$772,760.52
Stamp Stock Sales:	$ 20,915.00	$ 25,187.00	$ 21,780.00
Postage Meter Funds:	0	0	0
Total Pieces of Incoming Mail:	9,223	10,113	18,774
Weight of Outgoing Mail:	76,887	84,017	87,309
Number of Days Mail was Received:	31	30	31
Number of Days Mail was Dispatched:	31	30	31
Total Pieces of Mail Receiving Directory Service	37,277	40,142	32,684

b. Total business conducted during entire period.

TYPE OF BUSINESS	TOTAL
Money Order Sales	$2,550,515.93
Stamp Sales	$ 67,882.00
Postage Meter Funds	NONE
Incoming Pieces	38,110
Incoming Weight	1,339,768
Outgoing Pieces	10,702
Outgoing Weight	248,213
Number of Days Mail Dispatched	92
Number of Days Mail Received	92
Pieces of Mail receiving Directory Service	110,103

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB I: G1 Activities (Cont)

10. QUARTERLY AER REPORT:

May

Grants Approved	0	0
Loans Approved	12	$2,650.00
Total Assistance		$2,650.00

June

Grants Approved	0	0
Loans Approved	6	$1,075.00
Total Assistance		$1,075.00

July

Grants Approved	0	0
Loans Approved	4	$810.00
Total Assistance		$810.00

Total Assistance for Quarter	$4,535.00
Total Contributions Received During Quarter	$10,575.80

11. Staff Judge Advocate Activities:

a. During the subject reporting period, LTC Ronald M. Holdaway occupied the position of Division Staff Judge Advocate.

b. Significantly, in accomplishing the mission of the Staff Judge Advocate during the subject reporting period, 5 general courts-martial were convened; 54 special courts-martial reviewed from the 7 special courts-martial jurisdictions within this Division; 8 summary courts-martial were processed; 966 Article 15 actions reviewed, to include action and/or advice upon 40 appeals from such actions. A total of 1484 legal assistance cases were handled by this office during the cited period, a good portion of which required preparation of various documents for the clients concerned. This office also processed a total of 24 foreign claims as well as 142 other type claims.

12. Finance Activities:

a. Statistical Summary

(1)	Regular month payments	47,407
(2)	Partial and advance payments	27,180
(3)	Travel payments	6,169
(4)	Piaster sales	5,865
(5)	Sale of Government checks	8,279
(6)	Processed in personnel	5,630
(7)	Total cash and check payments value	$9,750,000.00

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB I: G1 Activities (Cont)

b. The Command Savings Program participation

Total participation	72.0%
Bonds only	62.5%
Bonds and Savings Deposits	6.0%
Savings Deposits only	3.5%

13. CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES

a. Chaplain Averages: The Division chaplains averaged 7.6 services per chaplain per week during this operational period - 1 May 1970 through 31 July 1970. An average of 22 chaplains was on duty each week within the operational period. Due to normal rotation this number decreased to 21 by the end of the period.

b. Services Conducted: Total number of services and attendance for the operational period is as follows:

Sunday Services:	805	Attendance:	18,006
Weekday Services:	1,379	Attendance:	25,458
Memorial Services:	69	Attendance:	8,904
Total Services	2,271	Total Attendance:	52,368
Pastoral Visits:	34,515	Sacraments:	22,008
Lectures/Briefings:	78	Attendance:	4,165

c. Chaplain Coverage: Chaplain coverage has been provided by assigning chaplains to brigade and attaching them to battalion sized units. The most effective religious coverage has been achieved when a Protestant and a Catholic chaplain, traveling as a team, provide both Protestant and Catholic services to the two battalions to which the chaplains are attached. Religious services are conducted on Sunday at Division, brigade, and battalion rear areas, and on weekdays at the forward fire support bases and field positions.

14. INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

Complaints/Requests for Assistance	109
Annual General Inspections	24
Investigations	5

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