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HEADQUARTERS
2D BRIGADE, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIR)
APO US FORCES 96490

AVCBB-C

16 March 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
1st Air Cav Div
AMF: G3
APO US Forces 96490

1. Name and Type of Operation: Operation MASHER and WHITE WING, Search and Destroy.
2. Dates of Operation: 2 Feb 66 - 15 Feb 66
3. Location: BINH DINH Province bounded by coord BR7070, BR9990, BR7030, BS9930.
4. Controller or Command Headquarters: 2d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div
5. Reporting Officer: Col William R Lynch
6. Task Organization:

1/5 Cav

TACF

2/5 Cav

TACF

2/12 Cav

TACF

Bde Control

Tm 245 Psyops Co

10th RRU Tm

Weather Tm

2d Fwd Spt

TACF

Naval Gunfire Spt Tm Tm 13th Sig

1/77 Arty

Co B 8th Engr

2nd Plat 545 MP Co

IPW/CI Tm, 191 MI

Trp B 1/9 Cav CF CON

Ca Tm #41

7. Supporting Forces:

a. During Operation MASHER & WHITE WING 1/77 Arty provided direct arty support to the Battalions within the Bde. This fire support was augmented by 1/30 Arty (155) and 175mm gun and 8" in general support arty battalions. Extensive use of arty was used to prepare all landing zones prior to the assault landings of ground troops by helicopter. At night extensive use of H & I fires were used to suppress enemy movement. These fires were placed on trails, stream beds, and probable assembly areas. Evidence of the success of this program can be seen by blood trails, bloody bandages, and clothing found along trails, in the caves and in small isolated huts through out the area. Whenever a battalion moved to the edge of the range limit of the 105mm How a battery was placed with the battalion to provide direct support to the battalion concerned. This can be seen in 1/5 Cav's move to LION (BR740105) and 2/12 Cav's move to ROBBIE (BR835072), and SIX BITS (BR848102). It may also be noted that the batteries always stayed within mutual support of each other thus insuring massed concentrated firepower if any one battalion base area came under attack. In addition 2d Bde was also supported with a Naval gunfire support team providing 5"/38 ship to shore Naval gunfire support.

b. LHO Air support was provided by the 2d Air Div. TAC Air was used to prepare LZ's COMBAT F & S prior to the start of the arty preparation. The type ordnance used was 500 GP, naplam, 250 frag and WP. Through out the entire period of Operation MASH & WING TAC air was on AIR CAP or ground alert. Whenever a target presented itself a strike was called in on target. The reaction time varied from a few minutes for A/C already in the area to 30-45 min if they were called from strip alert. AIB's provide the best ground support due to the load they carry and the length of time they can stay on target. Smokey the Bear was on strip alert or in the air over the area each night for use by the battalions should they become engaged during the night.

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c. The 227th AHB provided the Bde with the necessary lift capability to accomplish its assigned mission. The number of a/c provided varied from day to day according to the tactical situation. The 228th AHB provided the 2d Bde with the heavy lift capability to displace arty and heavy loads of equipment. The CH47 was also used to transport troops to and from secured areas. The CH54 was used to displace the 155mm how batteries as required.

d. Civil Affairs

(1) General - During operation WHITE WING, EAGLE CLAW and BLACK HORSE extensive CA activities were accomplished by 2nd Brigade Civil Affairs Team #41. In addition, Psy War was used to a large extent to control refugee movement and during tactical operations using "Give Up" and "Safe Conduct Pass" leaflets to a great degree. A total of 3175 refugees were evacuated from combat areas to the safety of district officials during these operations. Captured civilian supply evacuation totaled 61.5 tons of rice and 13 tons of salt. Three (3) tons of rice were destroyed during all three operations.

(2) Military Civic Action/Operations

(a) During operation WHITE WING 2/5 Cav conducted Sick Call on 9 Feb at THUAT AN (BR742120), AN LOA VALLEY and treated approximately 75 persons for minor illnesses.

(b) On 6 Feb the CA Team conducted Sick Call at PHUNG DU #1 (BR 888065), treating 114 patients of which only one (1) was a shrapnel wound.

(c) The CA Team was airlifted into QUY THUAN (BR891136), an area secured by the ARVN Abn Bde. This area was inhabited by the VC before Abn elements moved in and had no medical attention for more than 1 1/2 years. A 400 meter section of the town had been wiped out by a B-52 strike recently. Treatment was conducted there over a three (3) day period treating a total of 301 Vietnamese. Seven (7) shrapnel wounds were recorded, one (1) of which was evacuated by chopper to BONG SON Special Forces dispensary.

(d) 1/5 Cav held Sick Call with the assistance of the CA Team in AN LOA Valley on 10, 12, 13 Feb., twice each day, at coordinates (BR742120), (BR744105), (BR738062). A total of 165 Vietnamese were treated, to include four (4) shrapnel wounds.

(e) Several Sick Calls were held at the BONG SON Refugee Camp on 22, 23 and 28 Feb by the CA Team. One Hundred fifty eight (158) refugees were treated in the absence of the Camp Dispensary Chief.

(f) Working in HOAI AN District the CA Team held Sick Call at KHOA TRUONG (BR802856, BR802856) on 24, 25 and 26 Feb 66 and in the vicinity of (BR808883) on 1 and 2 Mar 66. A total of 407 Vietnamese were treated, recording one (1) punji stake wound and one (1) shrapnel wound. Two (2) children were evacuated to BONG SON Dispensary for Malnutrition and Tuberculosis.

(g) On 4 Mar 66 the CA Team was airlifted by UH-1H into LA PAINT (BR975937) to conduct medical treatment and obtain any intelligence information for 1/8 Cav. Seventy-Six (76) persons were treated. Two (2) shrapnel wounds were recorded.

(h) The following medical supplies were expended by the CA Team during operations:

2350 Aspirin Tablets
950 Multi Vitamin tablets
63 Penicillin, Procaine (Vials)
25 1/2 Bacitracin Ointment (tubes)

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(c) C Company 1/8 Cav captured 79 ampules of injectable Vitamin B 12 (1cc), 53 Vials Salicylate Sodium Glucose (5cc) and 500 Aspirin tablets on 3 Mar 66 at coordinates BR970930. Supplies were given to BONG SON SF Dispensary.

8. Intelligence:

a. The initial intelligence information received was voluminous and complete with overlays, however, the great majority of the information was not current. Most of the intelligence that proved to be of value was gathered by the battalions and the IFW team attached to the brigade. Immediate utilization of information contained in documents and gained through interrogation often produced highly successful results.

b. Information sources from the G2 section and the BINH DINH sector advisor indicated that the AN LAO Valley area of operations was dominated by the VC and that no extensive probes had been made into the area by friendly forces in many years. The area of operations was suspected to contain numerous caches, a VC hospital, and possible regimental headquarters. Aerial photos, map study and visual reconnaissance revealed that the area of operations consisted of a rich fertile valley through which the Song An Lao River flows and which is dominated by mountain peaks and razor back ridges. Numerous valleys and draws were heavily forested, providing many areas in which concealment from aerial observation is afforded. Oblique photos were found to be best for selecting landing zones and terrain appreciation. Because of the lack of vegetation on most high ground and the valley floor, the selection of LZ's in most cases was not difficult. Infrared coverage was used throughout the area and hot spots were reported on a timely basis, however, the hot spots rarely showed a pattern or concentration.

c. Daily air reconnaissance, ground patrols and sweep operations were conducted by 1/5 Cav, 2/5 Cav and 2/12 Cav in addition to aerial screening by 1/9 Cav. Results of these operations showed that large VC forces had occupied the area a few days prior, but were no longer in the area in any large numbers. Several large rice and salt caches were discovered as was one 46 bed hospital with medical supplies. Questioning of VCS's and VCC's provided a wealth of information on past unit activities and unit morale, but often too late to be acted upon.

Results of the MASHER, WHITE WING operations (4-15 Feb) in the AN LAO Valley are as follows:

(1) Personnel Losses		(2) Weapons and Equipment		(3) Other Materials	
KIA	47	SKA	5	RICE	84 tons
KIA (est)	122	AK	5	SALT	71 tons
WIA	12	RIFLES	1	RIS 105mm	126
WIA (est)	85	US M1 CARBINES	2	RDS 60mm	40
VCC	20	COMBAT PIONS	50	H-ND GREN DES	6
VC/NVA	1			ASSORTED AMO	2000
VCS	492			MATERIAL	34 bolts
				SANDALS	2
				LEAD	35 lbs
				MELTING POT	1
				MEDICAL SUPPLIES	
				Gross	

9. Mission: 2d Bde attacks in the N and IW zone of the Div AO (BONG SON) to find fix and destroy NVA/VC forces.

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214 Erythromycin tablets
736 Chloroquine tablets
50 Piperzinetartrate tablets
25 Deficiency tablets
30 Bentopen
40 Soap Bars
25 Cepacol Lozenges

655 Brown's Mixture tablets
185 Sodium-Salicylate tablets
113 1/2 Strptomycin (Vials)
61 Polymagma tablets
3 Averomycin Apt. Ointment
165 Gelucil tablets
150 Tetracycline
25 Sodiumbicarbonate Peppermint tablets
150 Hypodermic Needles
150 Syringes

(3) Public Welfare.

(a) On Team 4 12 distributed 2 1/2 cartons of Sweet Tart candy, 175 bars of soap and 500 vitamin pills.

(b) 1/5 Cav issued the following supplies during Sick Call activities:

4 cases of milk
1 Box of Vitamin pills (1000 tablets)
3 Cartons of Sweet Tarts
1 Carton of Clothing

(c) 2/5 Cav distributed three (3) cartons of Sweet Tarts and four (4) cases of condensed milk.

(d) 2/12 Cav distributed two (2) tons of captured rice to the Vietnamese in MY BIPH Village (BR843097).

(4) Captured Medical Supplies.

(a) On 1 March, A Co. 2/8 Cav captured the following medical supplies:

3 Bottles normal human plasma
30 Vials Dextran
23 Vials Normal Saline
11 Capsules Surgical Gut
29 ea. Hypodermic Needles
3 ea. Syringes
5 lbs of Salt
5 Vials Thiopental
2 ea. Tissue Forceps
1 ea. Sterilizer

227 Vials Ins. Penicillin
9 Vials Water
10 Vials Morphine (12cc)
25 Vials Vitamin B
24 Vials Anti-Tetanus Serum
30 Vials Campito
2 Vials Atropine (2cc)
1 ea. Tourniquet
3 ea. Hemostatic Forceps
13 Vials Water purification tablets

(b) The following list is a continuation of supplies captured by A 2/8 Cav that were turned over to 15 Med. Bn for field use:

2 ea. Rake Retractors
2 ea. Bullet Extractor Forksets
12 ea. Curled Mosquito Hemostats
1 Bone Holding Forceps
1 Yellow's Clamp
1 Curved Forceps
2 Gauze Pad Holding Forceps
1 Self Retaining Retractor
1 Stethoscope
4 Grilles Curved Forceps
2 Tongue Depressors
5 Tissue Forceps
1 Plasma (250cc)
1 Needle Holder
1 pr Army-Navy Retractors

14 Towel Clamps (Backus)
7 Grilles Forceps
1 Melzenhoun 12" Scissors
10 Str. Kelly Forceps
1 Bandage Scissors
2 Bone Curette
3 Abdominal Retractors
2 Vein Retracting Rakes
1 Rectal Spectrum
2 Intestinal Forceps
3 Adson's Forceps
2 Dressing Forceps
1 Dextran
2 ea. Jokers

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10. Concept of Operation:

a. 2d Bde with three inf battalions seizes BRASS (BR801151) and GOLD (BR856156) in order to block IVA/VC forces from escaping the coastal plains into the AN LAO VALLEY.

b. Upon establishing a base at BRASS, 2d Bde attacks with two inf bns and one in reserve to seize the high ground W of the AN LAO VALLEY and attacks B in conjunction with the US Marines attacking S to locate and destroy enemy forces within the valley.

c. Upon completion of initial objectives 2d Bde units conduct search and destroy operations in order to find and destroy the enemy, his supply bases, rice caches, and other installations, and aid the return of RVN government officials to the valley area.

11. Operation MASHUR commenced with the movement of 2/5 Cav from the Div base camp near KHE to psn GOLD (BR856156) N of BONG SON. On 3 Feb 2/5 Cav was relieved by 1/5 Cav on the Barrier line and moved to DOG (BR875010) utilizing 29 CV2 sorties. Once elements began to arrive at DOG they were further moved to GOLD by helicopter. The bn closed into GOLD at 1730 hrs. 2d Bde CP moved to TWO BITE (BR848955) from AN KHE utilizing 3 CV2 sorties and truck convoy.

a. On 4 Feb at 0800 hrs 2d Bde assumed control of 1/5 and 2/12 Cav. 2d Bde CP moved to BRASS using 13 CH47 sorties. 1/5 and 2/5 Cav conducted active patrols in the vic of BRASS & GOLD. C Co 1/5 attacked cross country to seize TOP KICK (BR800171). Once TOP KICK was secure B 1/77 Arty placed 4 tubes on the position using CH47. 2/12 Cav attacked S from SUE (BR840230) to AN HO (BR861182). 2/12 Cav captured and evacuated 15 tons of rice and 15 tons of salt found vic BS864172 and BS862186.

b. Due to marginal flying weather on the 5th of Feb the Bde's attack plan into the AN LAO VALLEY was postponed until the following day. 2/12 Cav moved by CH47 to BRASS as the weather allowed single ships to slip through the haze and land at BRASS. On 6 Feb once again due to marginal flying weather the Bde's attack to AN LAO VALLEY was postponed. B Co 2/12 Cav attacked overland from BRASS to seize and secure an LZ vic DIME (BS793135).

c. On 7 Feb at 0715 TAC Air attacked the LZ's COPPER S & N to start the preparation for the assault landings. After the air strike, arty fired a twenty minute preparation using 105mm and 155mm. At 0804 hrs Co B 1/5 lifted off from BRASS and landed on COPPER (BS706097) S at 0810 hrs. Thirty-two air craft were used in flights of four spaced a minute apart in the assault. By 0916 hrs 1/5 Cav completed their movement to the LZ. No enemy contact was made and B & C Co attacked down the valley toward objective LEAD (BS745115). After refueling at DOG the same 32 air craft began to lift 2/5 Cav into COPPER N (BS699109). At 0944 hrs to 0951 hrs arty fired preparation on the LZ and the first A/C of A Co 2/5 landed at 0955. 2/5 Cav closed the LZ at 1040 hrs. No enemy resistance was encountered on the LZ. 2/5 Cav attacked E down from the high ground to seize Obj 1. A & C Co seized Obj 1 and once secured, B and the remainder of the Bn were air lifted into Obj 1. In conjunction with the attack, the 2d Bde and 2/9 Marine Bn attacked S from the high ground down into the valley to catch the enemy between two closing forces. At 1700 hrs 2/5 Cav was ordered to place a rifle company in the valley at BS728150 to prevent any enemy from slipping out of the valley. The first lift touched down in the objective area at 1830 hrs after a five minute arty preparation and the company closed at 1930 hrs. 2/12 Cav continued to defend the Bde CP and arty at BRASS and conducted a company sweep and destroy operation vic DIME.

d. On 8 Feb 1/5 Cav continued to attack toward Obj LEAD. At 1030 hrs A Co made contact with 7 VC at BS700096. VC broke contact. A & C Co were air lifted to BS740047 to conduct a sweep into the town complex. 2/5 Cav attacked to seize Obj TIF. Once Obj 2 was secure and 2/5 Cav had linked up with 2/9 Marine at the top of the valley, A Co attacked MEDAL (BS742143) after an A/C dropped 300 CS

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grenades on the Obj. Attack netted 22 VCS. Once MEDAL was secure the remainder of the Bn attacked and secured Obj TIN (BS743134). 2/12 Cav continued to defend position BRASS while B Co conducted a sweep from DIME to vic BS761139.

e. On 9 Feb 1/5 Cav conducted a two company sweep up through the town of AN LAO with A Co on the left and C Co on the right. The sweep of the town netted 127 VCS which were evacuated to the VCC compound for interrogation. The recon plat conducted a patrol vic of NUOC CAN while B Co patrolled the high ground in the vic of BR730100. 2/5 Cav conducted a two company search and destroy operation in the vic of Obj TIN while one Co remained at TIN as a rapid reaction force. At 1255 hrs A Co 2/5 found a 20 ton rice cache in the vic BS725118. Rice was evacuated to the BONG SON District Hq to be used at refugee camps in the area. 2/12 Cav conducted 7 squad size air assaults into the area around BRASS to conduct search and destroy and to recon likely enemy hideouts and caches. At 1015 hrs a patrol found four well camouflaged store houses with approx 50 tons of rice and 126x105mm rds. Rice and How rds were evacuated and the buildings were destroyed. Cache was found in the vic of BS813128.

f. On 10 Feb 2/5 Cav conducted local patrolling vic of TIM and then at 1252 hrs began movement from TIN to DOG closing DOG at 1630 hrs. A combination of CH47 and UH1D's were used in the move. 2d Bde Hq moved from BRASS to TWO BITS using 18 CH47 sorties. 1/5 Cav conducted local patrolling and then moved to position LION. 4 1/77 Arty was moved from BRASS by CH47 to LION to provide 1/5 Cav effective fire support. C Co conducted an air assault into a suspected hospital area to conduct search and destroy operations vic BS765032. 2/12 Cav conducted six platoon size patrols in the vic of BRASS. Patrols made sporadic contact with VC trying to escape from the coastal plains area in small groups. Also found was a cave with about 500 lbs of salt and rice, all was destroyed in place.

g. On 11 Feb 2/5 Cav continued to secure DOG and TWO BITS. 2/12 Cav conducted six patrols in zone around BRASS. At 1500 hrs 2/12 Cav began movement from BRASS to ROBBIE (BS838086) to be more centrally located in zone for the conduct of operations. 1/5 Cav remained at LION while C Co remained in the vic of a suspected hospital area coord BR764035. After receiving SA and AW fire from BS752026 B Co was lifted into area to clear it. The company came under heavy AW fire and mortar fire. TAC Air and ARA were called in. Secondary explosions resulted from the TAC Air strike. At 1815 the enemy had broken contact. Sporadic contact was made through the night. Smokey the Bear provided illumination.

h. On 12 Feb 2/5 Cav continued to secure the log bases at DOG and TWO BITS, A Co 2/5 Cav was attached to 3d Bde to secure arty at BIRD (BR730810). A Co 1/5 Cav lifted off from LION and assaulted into an LZ vic BS750020. A Co moved N along the river to link up with B Co moving S. Sporadic SA fire was received through out the day by both elements. A Co found a cave with three weapons and some webb gear while C Co found a cave with 24x60mm mtr rds. 2/12 Cav conducted local patrol action around ROBBIE (BS835072). C Co found and destroyed a two ton rice cache at BS837099. B Co while on patrol found approx 25 tons of salt vic BS829060.

j. During 13 Feb 2/5 Cav remained at TWO BITS and DOG. 1/5 Cav helped evac some 3175 personnel from the AN LAO VALLEY by CH47 by securing an LZ for the 41st CA Tn vic BINH HOA & HNUG LUNG. The remainder of 1/5 Cav conducted local patrols in the vic of the valley to keep the enemy off balance. 2/12 Cav conducted local patrol action vic ROBBIE. At 1400 hrs 2/12 Cav began to move to SIX BITS along with C Btry 1/77 Arty. At 1430 hrs elements of 1/9 Cav observed approx 25 armed VC vic BS865105. Target was engaged with ARA and Arty. 2/12 Cav operating in the vic of LZ SIX BITS (BS849099) were notified to provide a rifle company as a blocking force, on LZ JIM (BS875134). All available aircraft were committed within the Bde, which were logistics ships from the attached Bns. A total of 8 aircraft were utilized. The recon plat and Co B, 2/12 Cav were utilized as a blocking force. At 1748 hrs the recon plat lifted off for LZ JIM while ARA fire was used to prepare the LZ. By 1910 hrs B Co closed the LZ and began to move out to make contact with the VC. At 1905 hrs the 1/9 Cav team took under fire 15 VC about 400 meters south of the LZ killing 4, while B Co captured 11 VCS and killed 4. VC were observed in

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the open fields in a state of confusion while ARA and arty fire was called in on target. As darkness fell B Co and the recon plat pulled back into the LZ forming a defensive perimeter while at the same time sending out combat patrols of plat size to keep up pressure on the enemy. At 2350 hrs CO 2/12 was notified to move C Co N to B Co at LZ JIM while B Co and recon plat moved south so as to trap any VC between the two closing elem and to drive toward the block established by B Co and the recon plat. 2304 hrs the 2d plat of C Co moved from SIX BITS to gain contact with the VC from the south. Smokey the Bear and arty illumination was used through out the area to help spot enemy trying to slip out between the two closing forces. At 0410 hrs C Co (-) left LZ SIX BITS moving NE to link up with their 2d plat, Co B and the recon plat moving SW from LZ JIM. Units were still moving at first light. At first light a scout element from 1/9 Cav began to recon the area for bypassed and escaping VC. At 0830 hrs 2/12 Cav was notified to withdraw from the area so ARVN forces could move into the area. 2/12 Cav elements began to move back to LZ SIX BITS.

The results of the operation netted 16 VC killed (BC) with 40 est killed. 2/12 Cav captured 63 VCS and 3 VCC and 4 wpns. Friendly losses were 1 killed and 1 slightly wounded.

In the space of 30-45 min a reinf rifle company was placed in a blocking psn in front of a known VC unit and arty and heavy fire power brought to bear in a matter of min which confused and scattered the enemy force. The mobility of the aircraft and the reaction time of all units involved helped make a successful mission against a target of opportunity.

The remainder of the day 2/5 Cav (-) became attached to the 3d Bde and moved to BIRD (BR730810). 1/5 Cav still operating in the AN LAO VALLEY conducted an air assault to a suspected hospital area. Immediately after landing two platoons of A Co came under heavy AW fire from the high ground. Arty and ARA fired on area. The enemy broke contact after about an hour and the Co moved forward to clear the small valley. A Co did find evidence of a hospital being in the area but no personnel or equipment were found. A Co moved back to LION to secure A 1/77 Arty while the remainder of the Bn closed on TWO BITS.

k. On 15 Feb A Co and A 1/77 Arty closed TWO BITS while the remainder of the Bn prepared for operations in the "CROWS FOOT" area. 2/12 Cav continued to patrol vic BILL. A Co found a 60 bed hospital with a mess hall, operating room, one stretcher and a small amount of medical supplies. Structures were destroyed. C Co patrolled S from SIX BITS capturing and destroying 5 tons of rice. 2d Bde Hq moved from TWO BITS to PONY for future operations.

12. Results:

a. The results of Operation WHITE WING in regards to enemy losses are:

KIA	WIA	VCC	VC(NVA)	VCS
47 (DC)	12	20	19	492
122 (EST)	85 (EST)			

Equipment captured: 84 tons of rice, 71 tons of salt, 126x105mm rds, 40x60mm rds, 1x82mm rd, 5xAKA-47, 5xSKA, 2xM-1 Carbines, 2xRPB LMG, 1 Mauser rifle, 6 grenades, 35 lbs of lead, 5500 rds SA ammo, medical supplies, 50 ruk sacks.

b. Friendly losses for the period were:

KIA	WIA
7	49

13. Administrative Matters:

a. General: During the period 3 Feb 1966 through 6 March 1966, Operations

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MASHER & WHITE WING were logistically supported from psn TWO BITS (BR855975). The Bde trains and 2d Fwd Spt Elem were located at psn TWO BITS. This optimum location resulted in the following: supply and resupply within 10 minutes or less; a ground LOC from QUI NHON to BONG SON (TWO BITS); an airfield adjacent to TWO BITS.

b. Supply:

(1) Containers, Food, Insulated: Although 33 insulated food containers were issued to brigade units during the period 3 Feb through 6 Mar 66, a shortage of 42 containers existed at the conclusion of the operation. The constant use of containers, food insulated is rapidly rendering these items unserviceable. Moreover, several containers are consistently lost, damaged, or destroyed during each combat operation. It is envisioned that this problem will become more acute in the forth coming months.

(2) Clothing: The non-availability of medium sized jungle fatigues and boots presented a major problem. In several instances due to non-availability troops were forced to wear fatigues that were ill fitting or do without. Other sizes were received in adequate quantities.

(3) Water Containers: The shortage of 250 gallon collapsible water containers continues to hamper water resupply to troops in forward operational areas. With the ensuing spring and summer months this will develop into a serious problem. Five serviceable containers are on hand. The brigade has a minimum requirement for eleven 250 gallon collapsible water containers.

c. Services:

(1) Water Purification: Initially the water point established by Div produced insufficient potable water to meet the needs of div elements operation in the BONG SON area. Units were required to wait up to six hours to obtain water. However, on 6 Feb 66, 1st Log Command obtained a truck mounted erdlator (3000 gallons per hour) which produced adequate quantities of water.

(2) Laundry Facilities: The establishment of a QM laundry point on 14 Feb 66, at BONG SON provided a needed service. However, maximum utilization could not be made of the laundry since the brigade had not made provisions for maintaining extra clothing for the troops in the trains locations.

d. Medical Evacuation: This operation revealed the need for a medical evac helicopter with a hoist capability. On three occasions CH47's with hoist were utilized for the evacuation of critically wounded personnel. If medical evacuation helicopter (UH1D) had had this capability the reaction time could have been significantly reduced. In addition the CH47's could have been more effectively utilized.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

During Operation WHITE WING a 155mm How btry was moved from DOG to BRASS and back again using a CH54. Spt Cnd had to fashion a special sling with which to sling the weapon under the A/C but once the sling was made it proved a fast and effective way for moving heavy arty into extremely remote areas of operation to provide fire support. Depending on the distance involved a 4 gun battery can be moved in two to 4 hours.

15. Commanders Analysis:

a. Operation WHITE WING was a successful operation as far as destroying the enemy installations and helping the return of RVN government control of the AN LAO VALLEY. Information acquired about enemy trails, his movement and pattern of supply bases will help in future operations. The capture of 126x105mm rds will limit his use of two 105mm How captured earlier from ARVN forces. The loss of 84 tons of rice and 71 tons of salt will further limit his ability to conduct large

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scale operations in the area for some time to come. US Forces operated in an area never before penetrated by friendly forces. A total of 3320 personnel were evacuated from the AN LAO VALLEY which will hinder the enemys ability to control the population.

b. Weather must be taken into account when operating in areas which are subject to early morning ground fog. Operations should be planned taking into account the effect of fog obscuring the target areas, LZ locations, and enemy movements. Alternate plans for ground attack should be made for an air mobile operation in case weather precludes the use of A/C to make the assault.

c. The use of Psy War teams during the operations greatly contributed to the effectiveness of the entire operation. The teams were used to aide in control of civilian personnel in populated areas, they helped persuade some VC to give themselves up, and they helped the units gain local information about the VC. The one major fault is there were never enough teams to go around to each battalion.

d. The Civil Affairs team attached to Bde was very effective in helping to treat civilians through out the area of operation, however the full extent of their work can not be utilized due to the short term stay in any one area by the brigade.

16. Recommendations:

a. Due to the success of night operations, that more night patrols be conducted in areas of operations.

b. That enough Psy War teams be made available to the Brigade to provide at least one team per battalion.

c. That alternate plans be made to attack objectives in case weather precludes air assault operations.

d. That necessary action be initiated to alleviate the shortage of insulated food containers.

e. That action be initiated to obtain sufficient quantities of jungle fatigues and boots in the medium size range.

f. That renewed emphasis be initiated to obtain six 250 gallon collapsible water containers for use within the unit.

g. That an erdlator be placed in support of all brigade sized operations to insure an adequate, timely supply of potable water.

h. That Quartermaster laundry facility be adjacent to brigade size units during extended operations.

i. That medical evacuation helicopters be equipped with a hoist to perform medical evacuation missions in areas where LZ's are non-existant.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for *Allen C. Smith*
VINCENT A. PACELLI
Maj, Inf
Adjutant
1st Inf
Assistant Adjutant

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DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, AND PROJECT NUMBER *947573*, BY *EB/USW*, DATE *12/27/94*