

HEADQUARTERS
1ST SQUADRON 9TH CAVALRY
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO 96490

AVR-3

18 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry for Period Ending
30 April, RCS CSFOR - 65 (AL)

TO: Commanding General
1st Cavalry Division (AM)
ATTN: AVTRACT-DT
APO 3. F. 96490

SECTION II LESSONS LEARNED

I Personnel: None

II Operations:

A. Night Hawk Operations:

(1) Observation: Occasionally helicopters are utilized in conjunction with night observation devices for the purpose of reconnaissance and interdicting enemy movement along trails.

(2) Evaluation: This technique of reconnaissance is of limited value and also costly. It is difficult to observe from air to ground during the hours of darkness even with illumination. Optical devices are relatively ineffective at night unless they are provided with an image stabilization device. Further, other than on high speed trails, the enemy will seek cover upon hearing helicopters at night.

(3) Recommendations: That helicopters not be utilized for night reconnaissance unless the aircraft is equipped with image stabilized night observation devices and then only along high speed routes where there would be little likelihood of the enemy detecting the aircraft.

B. Aviation Support

(1) Observation: Frequently Air Cavalry Units are called on to provide close in support to ground units engaged in contact with the enemy.

(2) Evaluation: Air Cavalry is not designed to provide close in support. Close in support from reconnaissance units frequently results in friendly casualties due to the urgency of the required fires to support the combat action. Air Cavalry personnel are not provided the necessary training to be proficient in close support operations.

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(3) Recommendations: That Air Cavalry operations be limited to reconnaissance missions. For close in support Air Cavalry should be utilized to screen the flanks, rear, and front of the action. Close in weapon support should be provided by trained personnel, the AAA and Air Force.

C. Deception

(1) Observation: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols are inserted into varying types of terrain.

(2) Evaluation: On occasion this insertion is observed by the enemy, defeating the purpose of the mission. False insertions have proven to deceive the enemy in open terrain and to be of little importance in dense jungle terrain.

(3) Recommendations: That false insertions either prior to the actual insertion or following it, or both, be performed when inserting the LRRPS into open terrain false insertions can be quite deceptive but set patterns for deception should be avoided.

D. Utilization of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol

(1) Observation: LRRPS are utilized in close proximity of maneuvering rifle companies which has the ultimate result of their being reduced to combat patrols.

(2) Evaluation: The primary function of the LRRPS is to gather intelligence concerning the enemy where his operations are continuing on a normal basis.

(3) Recommendations: That the LRRPS maintain twice the range of an 81mm mortar in separation from the nearest friendly unit. At that distance the enemy should continue to operate on a normal routine. Basis and will not change his status because of the proximity of troops.

III Training: None

IV Intelligence: None

V Logistics: None

VI Organization: None

VII Other: None

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LTC, ARJCR
Commanding