

1966

HISTORY OF THE  
227TH AVIATION BATTALION

1 January 1966 - 31 December 1966

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## CHAPTER I

The base camp of the 227th Aviation Battalion remained at Camp Radcliff, An Khe, Republic of Viet Nam, throughout the year. Improvements of living areas, maintenance facilities, and aircraft parking areas progressed slowly due to the battalion's heavy operational commitments in the field. Semi-permanent buildings, showers, and latrines were erected by the individual companies whenever they were left at An Khe in support of the base defense mission. A great portion of the building materials for these projects were purchased by individuals and assembled through unit initiative.

Engineer support was very limited although a mess hall was erected in each company area. Very little lumber and cement was available through normal supply channels. Foundations for buildings were dug by hand. Sand and gravel was carried into the area by organizational vehicles. Cement was mixed with shovels and rakes, and then hand-carried in buckets. This was a slow tedious task. The heat and humidity increased the fatigue factor and further decreased the amount of work that could be accomplished.

Officers and enlisted men worked as laborers on these projects. Any individual that had previous building experience was accepted as the project director, and the rest of the personnel pitched in with a tremendous spirit to make the base camp a better place to live.

Better protective bunkers were constructed and sand-bagged. Pierced steel planking was used as a base for the bunker covers and then sand-bagged for further protection. This work also was done by hand.

A significant number of personnel still lived in tents. Many of the tents were in extremely poor condition. No relief in replacing the tentage

was realized until late summer. During the monsoon season, everything became damp and leaking tents were a normal part of everyday life. Individuals erected shelter-halves or ponchos over their cots to shed the rain that came through the tents.

The two basic seasons in Viet Nam rendered equal harrassment to everyday life. During the dry season, Camp Radcliff became a dust bowl. The development of dirt roads throughout the camp caused dust to penetrate all structures. The wind, no matter how slight, carried the dust into every conceivable spot. This condition also increased the helicopter maintenance problems. The life of hydraulic and oil seals was considerably shortened. The engine dust filters had to be cleaned daily or a noticeable reduction in engine power was experienced. During the monsoon season, the dust bowl was transformed into a mud bowl. The transition time was almost nonexistent. Soft wet mud appeared wherever people walked or vehicles drove. In heavily used areas, the mud became six to ten inches in depth. It was impossible to keep helicopters or vehicles clean. Layers of mud would build up on boots and clothing became muddy after a few hours on the job. Clothing was difficult to dry once it was washed. Uniforms hung on lines and remained wet until a break in rain showers allowed for a semi-dry condition. Many individuals donned damp clothing and permitted body heat to slowly dry their clothes.

## CHAPTER 2

The 227th Aviation Battalion continued to support brigade elements of the First Cavalry Division. The normal mission was to provide direct support to a specific brigade for a particular operation. On initial assaults of the brigade elements into an AO (area of operation), as many as sixty lift helicopters (UH-1D's) might be employed. The 229th Aviation Battalion, our sister unit, would provide support to the 227th Aviation Battalion, on these initial moves, with aircraft and crews as required.

### OPERATION MATADORE

4-20 January 1966

The 227th Aviation Battalion supported the First Brigade on OPERATION MATADORE. The AO extended along the Cambodian border from the Ia Drang River north for one hundred kilometers, and covered approximately twenty five kilometers in width. One company of the 229th Aviation Battalion was attached to the 227th Aviation Battalion for this operation. A refueling point was positioned at Katecka, eighteen kilometers southwest of Pleiku, with subsidiary points at the Duc Co and Plei Djering special forces camps.

Very little enemy contact was made during the operation and hostile ground fire was seldom encountered. The landing zones were small and covered with high barriers, stumps, and elephant grass. Landing zones were created by bombing with conventional ordnance and napalm. The conventional bombs cleared some of the elephant grass and small trees which did improve the landing zone. The napalm bombs developed a condition which was more of a hazard to the helicopters than the landing zone would have

the natural state. The napalm did burn out the elephant grass but blackened the stumps and small trees. These hazards were difficult to see since the ground was blackened in the same way. An additional hazard was created by the heat in the landing zone which raised the density altitude above the normal high level. One helicopter could not hover after making an approach and crashed on a stump. There were no casualties, but the ruptured fuel cell caused a flash fire that destroyed the helicopter. Blowing ashes and cinders picked up by rotor wash produced a near-IFR condition at a hover.

MASHER-WHITE WING-EAGLES CLAW-BLACK HORSE-JIM BOWIE

25 January-21 March 1966

These operations were conducted in sequence in an AO sixty kilometers west of a north-south line running between Phu Cat and Bong Son. Company B, 227th Aviation Battalion was attached to the 229th Aviation Battalion and moved with that unit to the vicinity of Phu Cat. The mission was to support the 3rd Brigade on 25 January 1966. As the tempo of the action increased, the 2nd Brigade was also committed in the AO. The 227th Aviation Battalion (-) was placed in support of the 2nd Brigade. Company A, 227th Aviation Battalion, remained at Camp Radcliff, An Khe, in support of the base defense mission.

Hostile ground fire was very heavy on all assaults into the valleys and low ground. This resulted in a change of tactics as operations progressed. Assaults were made to the high ground to support a ground tactical plan of sweeping down to the valleys. Very little hostile ground fire was encountered with helicopter assaults to the hill tops but aircraft accidents increased. Landings were made to the mountain peaks or ridge lines which required a greater amount of pilot skill to overcome

~~surveillance and density~~ altitude problems. One helicopter, which attempted to land on a high pinnacle, rolled over and killed two infantry passengers. Two night missions were successfully performed during these operations. One was a medical evacuation and the other was an extraction of an infantry platoon. Both missions were supported by flares to illuminate the landing zones.

During Operation JIM BOWIE, 13-21 March 1966, two more UH-1D helicopters were destroyed. One fatality occurred. These two accidents involved pinnacle landings. Very little enemy contact was made during the search and destroy operations; consequently, JIM BOWIE was terminated earlier than initially planned. Lift helicopters landed at an artillery position to wait to extract one security company of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, after the CH-47 helicopters completed the extraction of the artillery tubes. It was dark when the last tube was finally lifted out. No prior planning for loading the security company had been made during daylight hours. This resulted in confusion and excessive delay before the extraction could be effected. The infantry company commander had a difficult time getting his troops loaded because he couldn't see which helicopters were loaded or not loaded.

#### LINCOLN-MOSBY I

25 March-17 April 1966

These two operations were basically reconnaissance-in-force missions near the Cambodian border. The initial assault was made from Camp Radcliff to a landing zone south of Duc Co. The flight covered a distance of one hundred thirty five kilometers and carried the entire assault elements of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry.

On 30 March, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, could not disengage from numerically superior Viet Cong force. The 227th Aviation Battalion lifted one company from the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, into a landing zone to reinforce the outnumbered troops on the ground. Eighteen UH-1D helicopters were utilized to make the lift and encountered no hostile fire. The plan was to reinforce elements and effect the extraction of the American dead and wounded. Once this was accomplished, all of the ground elements of the American force were to be extracted prior to darkness. The ground commander radioed that he was ready for extraction at dusk. A CH-47 was scheduled into the landing zone first to extract while the area was relatively secure. On approach to the landing zone, the CH-47 received heavy automatic weapons fire. The CH-47 landed but could not be flown out. This prevented the extraction of the troops until the CH-47 could be repaired or extracted. A decision was then made to secure a position for establishing a fire base to support the stranded troops with artillery. Since it was now dark and a visual reconnaissance could not be made, a landing zone eight kilometers west was selected from an aerial photographic map. At 2330 the decision was made to air assault one company of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, into the selected fire base point to secure the area. At 0100 the first three UH-1D helicopters landed without benefit of illumination and discharged a pathfinder and engineer team. The pathfinder team set up lights and established radio contact for the remaining lift. At 0105 the first platoon of infantry was airlifted into the fire base. By 0230 hours, twenty-four UH-1D loads of troops and two cargo sling loads were on the ground.

The volume of hostile fire on helicopters during this operation

indicated that the Viet Cong had moved in close to friendly locations. Most of the hostile fire commenced at dusk or after dark, and when the aircraft were on short final to a landing zone. Most of the aircraft were hit while at an altitude of 200 feet or less, while within three to four hundred meters of the landing zone.

The earlier decision to commit helicopters in no less than flights of two was reaffirmed several times during this period of time. On one occasion one aircraft flight of two had to land on the beach south of Qui Nhon due to mechanical difficulties. The aircraft was immediately taken under fire by Viet Cong in a village approximately two hundred meters away. The accompanying aircraft landed and picked up the crew, weapons, and radios of the downed aircraft. Tac Air was called in to neutralize the hostile fire. The aircraft was then repaired and flown out.

DAVY CROCKETT

4-16 May 1966

The 227th Aviation Battalion supported the 3rd Brigade on Operation DAVY CROCKETT in the Bong Son AO. The 3rd Brigade was supported with twenty-four UH-1D's daily. Eight UH-1D's were laagered at LZ Dog (6 kilometers NNE of Bong Son) each night with the remaining sixteen returning to base camp after the day's operations. This arrangement was not satisfactory. The poor weather conditions seriously hampered the flight of aircraft between Camp Radcliff and the AO each day, and unproductive flight time resulted.

On 3 May 1966, 37 sorties of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, were lifted to Phu Cat. The aircraft and troops were laagered overnight as

as ready reaction force in the event the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, moving by convoy at night was attacked enroute to LZ Dog. On 4 May the thirty-seven helicopters at Phu Cat and twenty-seven helicopters at Camp Radcliff were scheduled to air-assault elements of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, into pre-selected landing zones in the Bong Son AO at first light. After completion of these assaults, the elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, were to be picked up at LZ Dog and air-assaulted into their respective landing zones. Poor weather conditions in the morning of 4 May prevented the departure of the twenty-seven UH-1D's from Camp Radcliff. The thirty-seven UH-1D's took off from Phu Cat as scheduled. After lifting the thirty-seven troop loads of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, into their assigned landing zones, two lifts out of LZ Dog completed the assaults of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, which had arrived at LZ Dog during the night. The thirty-seven aircraft completed the move of one and a half battalion into their assigned positions before the twenty-seven UH-1D's could depart Camp Radcliff.

On the night of 11 May, a decision was made to laager forty-eight UH-1D's at a forward landing zone to be prepared for a first-light assault on 12 May. The landing zone was a series of rice paddies surrounded by palm trees. The perimeter was positioned within the palm tree line. During the night an enemy force attacked the position with small arms and automatic weapons fire. Twelve UH-1D's were damaged and one crew member was killed.

Enemy sniper fire against helicopters increased as the operation progressed. Most of the hostile fire was experienced approaching and departing friendly positions. Twenty-nine helicopters were hit during the

operation. The 227th Aviation Battalion returned to An Khe on 15 May.

CRAZY HORSE

16 May-2 June 1966

The 227th Aviation Battalion provided support for this operation on 16 May only. Three companies of assault troops were lifted into the AO. One helicopter was lost on the last lift. Contributing factors were darkness, poor weather conditions, and relatively inexperienced pilots. The 227th Aviation Battalion remained at An Khe supporting the base defense until 2 June 1966.

PAUL REVERE I

2-9 June 1966

The 227th Aviation (-) moved to "Turkey Farm", approximately two kilometers northwest of Pleiku, to support the 2nd Brigade. Company A, 227th Aviation Battalion remained at An Khe in support of the base defense effort. The southwest monsoon season curtailed aviation activity until approximately 0900 each morning. No significant activity occurred during the operation.

HOOKER I

10-23 June 1966

On 10 June 1966, the 227th Aviation Battalion moved by wheeled vehicle and organic air from "Turkey Farm" to Kontum. The battalion continued to support the 2nd Brigade although additional commitments were assigned. Daily aviation support was provided to the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, in the Dak To area and to the First Field Forces-Vietnam ready reaction force. These added commitments required the use of 100% of the mission ready aircraft each day. No significant activity developed

uring this operation, and the 227th Aviation Battalion returned to An  
Khe on 23 June.

NATHAN HALE

26 June-2 July 1966

The 227th Aviation Battalion (-) moved by organic and Air Force  
C-130 aircraft to Tuy Hoa to support the 1st Brigade. Company B, 227th  
Aviation Battalion, remained at Camp Radcliff to support the base defense  
plan. The AO included the range of mountains to the northwest of Tuy Hoa.  
Very little enemy contact was made although the 227th Aviation Battalion  
committed all mission ready aircraft each day. The battalion's field  
position was located on the beach approximately three kilometers south-  
east of the north-south airstrip at Tuy Hoa.

Weather was excellent during the days and nights. The days were  
extremely hot although the steady sea breeze relieved the intensity. Sand  
ingestion caused maintenance problems for both helicopters and wheeled  
vehicles. The easy access to the South China Sea provided all personnel  
with a refreshing swim each day. However, the beach was restricted from  
1000 hours until 1600 hours daily as a preventive measure against  
sunburn.

HENRY CLAY

3-28 July 1966

The 227th Aviation Battalion continued to support the 1st Brigade.  
The AO extended along the river west of Tuy Hoa and included the special  
forces camp. The area along this line and fifteen kilometers south was  
thoroughly searched by the 1st Brigade.

Due to an intelligence report on 7 July 1966, the 227th Aviation Battalion

given the mission of air assaulting a battalion size CIDG force into a position approximately fifteen kilometers north of the Chung Son special forces camp. The mission was received at dusk. A daylight reconnaissance was impossible. The aviation battalion utilized organic aircraft to drop illumination flares to light the landing zone. The landing zone could accomodate only one ship at a time. Approximately one half of the CIDG force was on the ground when the supply of flares was exhausted. The Air Force flare ship was not available so the mission could not be completed until the next morning.

The 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry was given the mission to search and clear an area of two hundred square kilometers within the AO. Fifty one helicopters supported the mission and lifted the assault troops into a total of forty-nine landing zones throughout the area.

On 13 July the 227th Aviation Battalion moved to Ban Bleck by organic and Air Force C-130 aircraft. Company B, 227th Aviation Battalion moved to rejoin the battalion from An Khe by wheeled vehicle and organic aircraft. The next morning, the battalion moved to the abandoned airstrip at Ban Breing due to the congestion at Ban Bleck.

Weather conditions deteriorated after the battalion arrived at Ban Bleck, and missions were postponed or delayed continuously throughout the remaining portion of HENRY CLAY.

On 20 July 1966, a flying hour program was established to reduce the number of hours flown each day. The objective of this program was to insure better utilization of aircraft by supported units, and allow time for the required daylight maintenance on aircraft.

The 227th Aviation Battalion returned to An Khe on 27 and 28 July 1966.

PAUL REVERE II

2 - 25 August 1966

The 227th Aviation Battalion scrambled twenty-four UH-1D's to airlift an infantry company to Pleiku at 1130 hours on 1 August, because of a mortar attack against an element of the 25th Infantry Division south west of Pleiku. The following day, Operation PAUL REVERE II commenced. The 227th Aviation Battalion (-) returned to the "Turkey Farm", to support the operation. Company C, 227th Aviation Battalion, remained at Camp Radcliff in support of the base defense. On 8 August, the battalion was placed in direct support of the 2nd Brigade. The initial mission was to combat assault troops of one infantry battalion into landing zones approximately sixty-five kilometers southwest of Pleiku. First elements of the infantry battalion were air assaulted into landing zones at the eastern base of the Chu Pong hill mass. The first lift went without incident. During the second lift of the remaining battalion elements, the flight of forty-eight UH-1D's were diverted in flight to a landing zone in the vicinity of LZ Oasis, twenty-five kilometers southwest of Pleiku. Elements of the 3rd Brigade were heavily engaged with NVA forces and required reinforcements. The flight leader was directed to pick up troops at the original landing zone and deliver them to the 3rd Brigade area as additional reinforcements. A reserve battalion at Pleiku was then airlifted by the same forty-eight aircraft into the 3rd Brigade zone. The last lift was completed at 2045 hours in darkness and deteriorating weather conditions.

The 2nd Brigade operations resumed in the Chu Pong mountain area on 11 August 1966. Light enemy contact was experienced during the operation.

The 227th Aviation Battalion was credited with the capture of four NVA soldiers, complete with weapons. The four men signaled their intentions to surrender and were picked up by two lift ships with armed UH-1B's providing cover.

During this operation a large number of new personnel arrived in aviation battalion. Through inexperience of these individuals numerous main rotor strikes, tail rotor strikes, and stump damage to helicopters occurred. The tempo of the operation was not interrupted, and the new arrivals acquired an acceptable level of proficiency prior to the completion of the operation.

Poor weather conditions existed throughout the operation. Reduced visibility, low clouds, and terrain with few landmarks combined to make it difficult to locate LZ's and check points.

Paul Revere II terminated on 25 August and the 227th Aviation Battalion returned to Camp Radcliff.

The 227th Aviation Battalion refitted at Camp Radcliff from 12 August until 13 September 1966. At 2155 hours, 3 September 1966, the enemy attacked Camp Radcliff with mortar fire. The "Golf Course", (helicopter parking area) was the primary target. The battalion suffered no personnel casualties. Eleven UH-1D's and eight UH-1B's were hit by mortar fragments. Two helicopters were damaged beyond repair. As a result of this attack, aircraft were dispersed throughout Camp Radcliff each evening at 1800 hours until first light the following day.

THAYER I

13 Sep to 10 Oct 1966

The 227th supported by the 229th Aviation Battalion, airlifted five battalions of the 1st and 2nd Brigades into the ring of mountains around the "eagle claw" area approximately 15 kilometers southwest of Bong Son.

The 227th Aviation Battalion had mission responsibility for air lifting 1st Brigade elements. Thirteen UH-1D's and four UH-1B's of the 14th Aviation Battalion were attached to the 227th Aviation Battalion. Company C, 227th Aviation Battalion (-) supported the 1st Brigade from Camp Radcliff. The value of this procedure was proven on 23 September when the enemy attacked Hammond Airfield with mortars. Company C, 227th Aviation Battalion, suffered no casualties or damaged aircraft.

This operation was characterized by light enemy contact within the AO, heavy aircraft committments, and a large number of aircraft hit by hostile ground fire. Most of the hostile ground fire directed at helicopters occurred from the plains area near and north of Hammond. On successive nights, commencing 18 September, three aircraft were shot down within ten kilometers of Hammond. The 227th Aviation Battalion transported security forces to the downed aircraft. Once the aircraft were rigged and lifted out, security forces were extracted by helicopter. On the first night, no hostile ground fire was experienced by the lift helicopters. On the succeeding two nights, intense hostile ground fire was encountered upon entering and leaving the area of the downed aircraft. The UH-1B gunships proved their value on both nights. These armed helicopters returned such a volume of suppressive fire into the enemy positions that no lift ship was damaged. On both nights, a gunship was hit with several rounds that damaged the aircraft and wounded several crew members. The three downed aircraft were retrieved and both gunships made successful landings at Hammond. The door gunners of the lift helicopters also returned the enemy fire, and contributed to the success of the missions.

**INVINC**

**2 - 31 October 1966**

The 227th Aviation Battalion air-assaulted three infantry battalions into the Nui Micu mountain range northeast of Hammond. Armed CH-47 helicopters were utilized for prepping the landing zones for the first time during these assaults, and proved to be a valuable asset on the battle field. The three infantry battalions were lifted into the mountains without incident. The 227th Aviation Battalion reached a low of twenty-two mission ready aircraft on 3 October due to the heavy commitments over the preceding month. The maintenance stand down program was implemented whereby 25% of mission ready aircraft were not committed except under tactical emergency situations. These aircraft were grounded for maintenance with the stipulation that they could be made flyable within four hours. This program also made it possible to more efficiently schedule aircraft into required maintenance inspections.

Light enemy contact was made and ground fire against helicopters decreased from moderate to light during this operation.

**LONG HORN-NORTH**

**26 - 31 October 1966**

The 227th Aviation Battalion supported the 1st Brigade on operation LONG HORN at the south end of the An Lao Valley. On 28-29 October the 1st Brigade conducted operation NORTH, a show of force in the area north of Bong Son. No significant activity developed during either of these operations.

**PAUL REVERE IV**

**31 October - 27 December 1966**

The 227th Aviation Battalion was released from operations in the Phu Cat-

battalion (-) was assigned to the 2nd Aviation Battalion, supported the base defense.

The PAUL REVERE IV AO extended west from Plei Me to the Chu Pong mountains and east from the southern edge of the Chu Pong mountains to highway 19. The 2nd Brigade made a thorough search of the AO on search and destroy operations. Enemy contact and hostile ground fire against helicopters was light.

The 2nd Brigade conducted two "Bullseye" operations and several cordoning of suspected Viet Cong villages. Both of these operations required the simultaneous landings of three to five separate flights of assault troops. These operations were characterized by precise timing, thorough planning, and close coordination.

The maintenance stand down and flying hour program was routinely adhered to during the operation. This permitted the battalion to maintain a high aircraft availability rate. On two separate occasions the 2nd Brigade declared a tactical emergency. In each case the required number of aircraft were made available within twenty minutes from the time of notice.

One of the combat assaults was conducted with pathfinders parachuting into the landing zone fifteen minutes prior to the arrival of the lift helicopters. The operation was very successful. The pathfinders set up panels and established radio control for the subsequent landing of assault troops.

Weather conditions were excellent throughout the operation. Dust created a problem at helicopter landing areas. One UH-1B was lost when the pilot lost ground reference due to blowing dust. The application of penetrime at helicopter parking and refueling areas eased the problem in the cantonement area. The problem was uncontrollable in landing zones.

THAYER II

27-31 December 1966

The 227th Aviation Battalion was released from the PAUL REVERE IV AO at 1030 hours on 27 December 1966. A mission was assigned to the aviation battalion in the Thayer II AO on the same day. Twenty-five UH-1D's and four UH-1B's were landed at LZ Dog, six kilometers north of Bong Son, at 1500 hours on 27 December. These helicopters were to air-assault the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry, into the mountains east of Bong Son.

The immediate commitment of the 227th Aviation Battalion's assets from one AO to another complicated the move of maintenance and administrative facilities. The twenty-seven UH-1D helicopters that were flown to LZ Dog could not be utilized to aid in the move due to the impending combat assault.

Hostile ground fire was moderate. Several helicopters were hit but all were flown back to Hammond for repairs.

The 227th Aviation Battalion continued to support the 2nd Brigade on operation Thayer II at the close of the year.

## CHAPTER 3

The state of troop morale is accurately measured in the level of professional performance. This battalion was commanded by four officers during the course of the year. Each received splendid, cheerful support from the individuals assigned to the unit. The mission was foremost in the mind of each man - from the commander - to the privates manning the helicopter door guns. Planned missions were started on time, and emergency missions were performed with minimum delay. Individual companies scrambled as many as twelve aircraft and were airborne in seven minutes after notice of a tactical emergency mission.

Flight leaders led as few as two, or as many as sixty helicopters. Missions were successfully completed despite extremely bad weather and enemy ground fire. The tempo of the combat situation at times did not allow time for the normal planning sequence. Flight leaders received mission information over the radio while enroute to pickup the assault troops. In these situations the landing zones were first seen by the flight leader on the initial assault. The numerous individual decorations awarded during the year is indicative of the excellent esprit de corps and dedication that characterized the individuals assigned to the 227th Aviation Battalion.

The response to missions was never impaired, regardless of the living conditions. Operations during the monsoon season were postponed or delayed when it was impossible to take off due to reduced visibility. The poorest living conditions were experienced at Ban Bring. The soil turned to a slippery liquid mud both inside and outside of the tents. One had to walk with extreme caution to prevent slipping and falling into

the mud. The cooks continued to turn out excellent meals although the mess tent was as slippery as ice. Maintenance personnel worked on the helicopters in a steady down pour of rain. The POL personnel worked at the refueling points for hours at a time with their clothing completely soaked. The continuous rain caused the best tents in the area to start leaking. Personal clothing and sleeping bags stayed damp. Under these primitive conditions, the high morale and excellent spirit was commendable.

Some of the men assigned to the 227th Aviation Battalion gave their lives in support of their beliefs. These tragic losses were personal to the unit, and profoundly shared by all of the members of this battalion. The professional and heroic actions demonstrated by individuals within the battalion has motivated others, and demonstrated that these men did not die in vain.

KEY BATTALION PERSONNEL - 1966

BATTALION COMMANDERS

Jan - Apr: LTC Jack Cranford  
Apr - Jul: LTC Walter A. Johnson, Jr.  
Jul - Nov: LTC A. T. Pumphrey  
Nov - Dec: LTC James F. Hamlet

S1

Jan - Aug: MAJ Robert C. Burgess  
Aug - Oct: MAJ John B. Howse  
Oct - Nov: CPT Edward D. Hart  
Nov - Dec: CPT Harold G. Isaacson

S2

Jan - Aug: MAJ Thomas I. McMurray  
Aug - Dec: CPT Eugene B. Abernathy

S3

Jan - Jul: MAJ David L Johnson  
Jul - Aug: MAJ Obel H. Wells  
Aug - Nov: MAJ Samuel J. Hubbard  
Nov - Dec: MAJ Richard R. White

S4

Jan - Jul: MAJ Jack D. Joiner  
Jul - Dec: MAJ Gerald D. Lippert

COMPANY COMMANDERS:

Headquarters Company

Jan - Aug: MAJ William J. Gorman  
Aug - Nov: MAJ Richard R. White  
Nov - Dec: CPT Edward D. Hart

## KEY BATTALION PERSONNEL - 1966

### COMPANY COMMANDERS, continued:

#### Company A

Jan - Mar: MAJ Floyd R. Wirthlin  
Mar - Apr: MAJ Thomas J. McAndrew  
Apr - May: MAJ John J. Jones  
May - Jul: MAJ Larry E. Scoggins  
Jul - Nov: MAJ Harry R. Glidden  
Nov - Dec: MAJ Samuel J. Hubbard

#### Company B


Jan - May: MAJ Fred C. Headly  
May - Jul: MAJ John S. Bond  
Jul - Oct: MAJ Loren D. Eaton  
Oct - Dec: MAJ Samuel M. Pierce

#### Company C

Jan - Jul: MAJ Eugene T. Boyd  
Jul - Dec: MAJ Milton S. Sheridan

#### Company D

Jan - Jul: MAJ William E. Hattaway  
Jul - Oct: MAJ Donald A. Nixon  
Oct - Dec: MAJ Robert M. Gibbs



FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION (A)  
AREA OF OPERATION

