

CONFIDENTIAL

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HISTORY

OF

3d AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY GROUP
AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY SERVICE (ARRS)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
TAN SON NHUT AB, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

1 OCTOBER - 31 DECEMBER 1966

RCS: AU-D5 (ARRS)

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MICROFILMED
Project MILAGO
19 OCT 70

DECLASSIFIED
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Action Taken: SEP 16 1975

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JAMES J. DUPRE, MAJOR, USAF

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

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1. (U) UNIT. The official designation of this organization is 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group.

2. (U) PERIOD OF HISTORY. 1 October thru 31 December 1966.

3. (U) STATION. Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam.

4. (U) ASSIGNMENT. 3d ARRGp is assigned to the Pacific Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Center of the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (MAC) and comes under the operational control of the Commander, 7th Air Force. The 3d ARRGp exercises control over the following units:

Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSARC), Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
OL 1, 3d ARRGp (Rescue Coordination Center), Danang AB, RVN
OL 2, 3d ARRGp (Rescue Coordination Center), Udon AB, Thailand
37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Danang AB, RVN
Det 1, 38 ARRSq, Udon AB, Thailand
38th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN

The 38th ARRSq controls the following detachments:

Det 1, 38 ARRSq, Phan Rang AB, RVN
Det 2, 38 ARRSq, Takhli AB, Thailand
Det 3, 38 ARRSq, Ubon AB, Thailand
Det 4, 38 ARRSq, Korat AB, Thailand
Det 5, 38 ARRSq, Udon AB, Thailand
Det 6, 38 ARRSq, Bien Hoa AB, RVN
Det 7, 38 ARRSq, Danang AB, RVN
Det 8, 38 ARRSq, Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN
Det 9, 38 ARRSq, Pleiku AB, RVN
Det 10, 38 ARRSq, Binh Thuy AB, RVN
Det 11, 38 ARRSq, Tay Hoa AB, RVN
Det 12, 38 ARRSq, Nha Trang AB, RVN
Local Base Rescue (LBR) Flight, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN

5. (U) COMMANDER. Albert P. Lavelady, Colonel, USAF, [redacted] assumed command of the 3d ARRGp 1 November 1966 vice Arthur W. Beall, Colonel, USAF, FR6797.

6. (U) MISSION. To provide a tactical force for employment to rescue and evacuate personnel engaged in operations in or adjacent to hostile territory; provide Local Base Rescue units at selected bases; plan, organize, coordinate and control the execution of personnel rescue operations; provide command and control of subordinate units; provide Joint Search and Rescue Center and Rescue Coordination Centers at selected operating locations. Geographical area of operations is Southeast Asia.

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7. (U) OPERATIONS.

a. (U) (Grp 4) The Commander, 7th Air Force has search and rescue (SAR) responsibility in the Southeast Asia sub region. This sub region includes the Saigon, Bangkok and Rangoon Flight Information Regions (FIRs) which encompass the countries of Republic of Vietnam (SVN), North Vietnam (NVN), Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma and waters within the FIRs. Commander 7th Air Force discharges his SAR responsibility for the Bangkok and Saigon FIRs through the Commander 3d ARRGp who in turn commands the Joint Search and Rescue Center. The JSARC is designated the central coordination agency for all SAR activity within the 7th Air Force's area of responsibility. A "contingency" Rescue Coordination Center is organized under the Commander 631 Combat Support Group, Don Muang Airport, Thailand and it is responsible for SAR efforts within the Rangoon FIR. This contingency RCC is under the control of the 7th Air Force/3d ARRGp. Although the JSARC has responsibility for coordination of SAR activity within a very broad area, its primary mission is to direct the recovery of downed airmen in the combat zone.

• b. (U) Paragraph 2, SO G-1155, Hq 7th Air Force, 19 December 66 places Commander 3d ARRGp on the staff of 7th Air Force. In this capacity 3d ARRGp Commander is designated Directorate of Aerospace Rescue and Recovery with a 7th Air Force office symbol of DAR.

c. (U) The 3d ARRGp headquarters, JSARC and the JS ARRSq headquarters are co-located in the same building adjacent to the 7th Air Force complex at Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN. Colonel Lovelady, in addition to commanding 3d ARRGp, is a member of the 7th Air Force battle staff. Within the Group headquarters, Lt Col Jack W. Holman is Chief of the JSARC. The JSARC is manned 24 hours a day, seven days a week by an officer controller, enlisted controller and radio operator. Daily the officer controllers receive tactical operations plans from the USAF and USN for the next day's activities and after careful analysis preposition their rescue forces accordingly. The JSARC has two Rescue Co-ordination Centers under its control at Udorn and Danang. Each RCC is fully capable of handling all rescue operations in its area. JSARC representatives provide SAR briefings for new airmen and for pilots aboard USN carriers as they arrive in the theater.

d. (C) (Grp 4) To accomplish the combat rescue mission, 3d ARRGp stages HH-3 helicopters from Udorn at forward operating locations/bases to be immediately available should an aircraft go down; an HC-130 control aircraft from Udorn flies daylight orbit over Laos carrying an Airborne Mission Commander (AMC) who is prepared to assume control over the Search and Rescue Task Force when launched. Danang HU-16s fly daylight orbits off the coast of NVN. The HU-16 amphibian will land (sea state permitting) and recover downed airmen or remain over their position while the AMC coordinates the recovery by other means. HH-3 helicopters from Danang or their forward operating locations stand by for rapid reaction to search and rescue missions as directed by the JSARC.

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e. (U) HH-43 helicopters of the 3d ARRGp are located at 13 air bases in SEA that have tactical aircraft to provide crash rescue and aircraft fire suppression within close proximity of the base. Some of the HH-43s are configured with self sealing tanks, auxiliary fuel tanks and armor plating. This gives them a combat rescue capability in addition to their local base rescue function.

f. (U) Rescue aircraft perform emergency medical evacuations when directed by proper authority. The US Army is usually able to air evacuate their own wounded from combat areas; however, rescue helicopters frequently are requested to evacuate wounded soldiers from places inaccessible to Army aircraft.

g. (U) The phrase number of rescue opportunities is defined as that number of times when an incident occurred wherein rescue was requested to respond and the best intelligence available indicated a rescue was feasible within equipment capability. A combat save is any save made as a result of action by hostile forces or personnel retrieved from a hostile area. A non-combat save is any save made that resulted from incidents not directly caused by hostile actions and a hostile environment was not involved. By month these figures were:

	<u>COMBAT RESCUE OPPORTUNITIES</u>	<u>COMBAT SAVES</u>	<u>NON-COMBAT SAVES</u>
October	36	31	5
November	43	35	18
December	<u>21</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>23</u>
Total	100	78	46

h. (U) Eight A-1Es of the 602 Tactical Fighter Sq based at Udorn are under the operational control of 3d ARRGp for rescue operations. In the role of rescue escort (RESCORT), two A-1Es accompany our two helicopters enroute while two other A-1Es proceed to the SAR scene. RESCORT protects the rescue aircraft enroute to and from the incident scene. They locate survivors and determine the best routes for the helicopter to approach the survivors. They take measures to discourage hostile forces from interfering with the rescue effort. Excellent coordination between our rescue helicopters and their A-1E RESCORT has resulted in a highly efficient team, enabling combat rescues to be made under extremely adverse conditions.

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i. (U) In the late afternoon of 18 October 1966, Crown Bravo (HU-16, SN 51-7145) on orbit mission (Det 1-3-78-18 Oct) over the Gulf of Tonkin failed to return to home base at Danang. Control agency became aware of possible emergency because of lack of operations normal reports from Crown Bravo at 1700L and 1730L. Organized search began that evening and continued until 1820L on 25 October 66 with no sightings or findings reported. Aircraft was assigned to 37 ARRSq and had a total of seven crewmen aboard. Loss of the HU-16 amphibian was reported as missing due to hostile action.

j. (U) On 20 October Jolly Green 02 (SN 65-12778) on an ACR mission (Det 2-3-117-20 Oct) was disabled by suspected enemy ground fire. Oil pressure was lost and the HH-3E helicopter was forced to land in a hostile area. The crew and a recently recovered survivor were quickly taken aboard the other HH-3E (high bird) and they departed the area. RESCORT (A-1Es) destroyed the disabled Jolly Green to prevent it from falling into unfriendly hands.

k. (U) On 28 October Pedro 42 (HH-43F, SN 62-4511) on an Army Med Evac mission (Det 9-38-31-28 Oct) near Pleiku was shot down and burned. Three evacuees and the Flight Mechanic in the rear of the helicopter were killed. Army troops and the Pararescueman (PJ) on the ground helped get the Pilot and Copilot out of the burning wreckage under enemy fire. The PJ, Pilot and Copilot were flown out the next morning by another Pedro helicopter. The Copilot subsequently died from injuries received in the shooting down and crash of the helicopter.

l. (U) In the afternoon of 29 Oct Pedro 56 (SN 62-4525) flying in support of the mission (Det 9-38-31-28 Oct) in which Pedro 42 was lost, received a volley of groundfire and had to make a forced landing at Army LZ 3-Hotel, near Pleiku. Crew sustained only minor injuries and was returned to Pleiku that afternoon. HH-43 (Pedro 56) was repaired locally and is back in operation.

m. (U) On 15 November, Detachment 11, 38 ARRSq located at Tuy Hoa AB, SVN became operational. Tuy Hoa is situated approximately 50 miles north of Nha Trang on the Vietnam coast. One HH-43B is presently assigned; however, a second HH-43 will be placed there when resources permit.

n. (U) (SP-4) Jolly Green 52 (SN 64-14229) lost transmission oil pressure (15 Nov) shortly after launch on an ACR mission and made a forced landing. Parts were dispatched and maintenance performed in the field. On return, severe transmission problems developed after short flight and Jolly Green 52 was forced to land. Due to uncertain reception by local populace, crew was evacuated and friendly forces supplied to protect aircraft until repairs could be made. Aircraft subsequently repaired at landing site and flown to secure base.

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o. (C) (S) On 16 November while in a hover on an ACR mission (Det 1-3-86-16 Nov) in a hostile area, Jolly Green 18 (HH-3E, SN 65-12786) sustained battle damage from enemy ground fire and was forced to withdraw and land at the nearest friendly site. One of two recovered pilots and the PJ were injured. The two recovered Pilots and the PJ were immediately air evacuated for medical treatment. The rest of the crew was returned to home station by Jolly Green 15. Jolly Green 18 was repaired and returned to service.

p. (C) (S) At 1805L, 29 Nov 66 an HH-3E, SN 64-14231 assigned to Det 5, 38 ARRSq crashed while landing at a classified destination. Aircraft was engulfed in dust during night landing touchdown and the Pilot evidently lost control; helicopter was totally destroyed by post impact fire. Four aircrew members aboard the HH-3E escaped with only minor injuries.

q. (U) During the period of this history, the aircraft assigned to the 3d ARRGp were operationally ready 82.7% of the time. The 17.3% of time not operationally ready (NOR) were contributed to 9.1 NOR (Maintenance) and 8.2 NOR (Supply). Greater battle damage was sustained by our helicopters in this quarter than the previous one, accounting for a higher NOR(M) rate.

r. (U) Members of the 3d ARRGp have been awarded 6 Purple Hearts, 20 Silver Stars, 102 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 11 Bronze Stars, 13 AF Commendation Medals, 233 Air Medals and 4 Airmen Medals, during the period of this report.

s. (U) Special Order G-204, Hq MAC, 2 December 1966 discontinued Det 1, 3d ARRGp and Det 2, 3d ARRGp in the first paragraph of the order. In the second paragraph of the same order operating locations, OL 1, 3d ARRGp and OL 2, 3d ARRGp, were designated and established at Danang Aprt, Vietnam and Udorn Afld, Thailand respectively, effective 15 Dec 1966.

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Fuel state at this time, 0305Z, was 1900 pounds. Sandys 1,2,3, and 4 were in the area at this time to relieve Sandy 41 and 42 who had also expended all ordnance and reached bingo fuel. Upon returning to the location, Sandy 3 took Jolly Green 02 down into the area, Jolly Green 02 had positive sighting of the parachute. Entry was made up in a small valley on an approximate heading of 070°. Jolly Green 02 then turned to parallel the slope to 030° and was established in a hover over the co-pilot when ground fire opened up again. Jolly Green 02 pulled off to a safer area after taking two hits in the right side of the aircraft in the vicinity of the cargo door. The Sandys again attempted to sterilize the ridge line where the firing was suspected to be from. Jolly Green 02 was called down again using the same entry. Again no ground fire was received until the aircraft was establishing in a hover, close to the co-pilot. Jolly Green 02 took one hit which completely penetrated the armor plating, glanced off internally, penetrated the floor, and ruptured the forward fuel cell. The Paramedic and Flight Mechanic both received slight cuts from shrapnel. The odor of smoke filled the aircraft and they retreated to a safe area. It was thought later to be the odor of cordite. The Sandys were requested to go in and hit them again. Jolly Green 02 was within 20 minutes of bingo fuel. The crew elected to try once more as the weather in the area was deteriorating. This attempt was successful with no known hits, although the Paramedic heard ground fire. At the time of the rescue, the upper ridges were in the clouds and visibility had dropped to 2 miles in haze and smoke. At no time during their attempts was the pilot sighted. Jolly Green 02 had reached bingo fuel and was advised to recover to base where arrangements had been made to air evacuate the recovered co-pilot in a C-123. 10

Det 9-38-30-7 Oct (RCC Narrative) 14-43B

(b) Detachment 9 was notified at 1910 hours local by the 4th Med, 4th Inf Div, that one Army soldier had a badly cut hand and required medical evacuation as soon as possible. We were advised that the Army Medical Evacuation Unit had been notified but could not accomplish the evacuation since no landing zone was available. JSARC was notified that we would launch our two helicopters as soon as fueling was accomplished and our secondary crew arrived. Re-fueling and launch reaction time was greatly hampered due to the non-availability of fuel truck (out of commission for repairs). This meant we had to fuel one bird from our bladder/pump system and fly it out of the way so the other one could be towed close enough to get fuel. Both crews were prepared to launch at 1920 hours but we ended up waiting an extra 15 minutes because of fueling. We launched at 1935 hours. An AC-47 was provided for RESECT which proved to be a very essential aid in the successful accomplishment of this mission. No particular difficulties were encountered enroute. Near IFR conditions were encountered because it was totally black except for an occasional light on the ground. No horizon was visible. The AC-47 crew advised us of our position and gave estimates to the site. We were notified enroute that two people were to be evacuated.

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Radio contact was made with the ground party and Spooky 23 dropped flares to aid in direction finding. The site was spotted through the use of flashlights held up by the ground party. A low recon was flown and the site was observed to be situated on the very top of a 2500 foot ridge with a sharp drop-off on the downwind side. The terrain was very rough which created highly gusty and variable winds. We were advised that 15 knot winds out of the East prevailed on top of the ridge. An approach was made and a hover established. Without the air-drop flares the site would have presented an even more hazardous approach due to the complete darkness. The top of the ridge was hardly visible without flares. Sgt Brundridge lowered Airman Rosler to the ground on the forest penetrator. The most critically injured man was sent up first. As he neared the cabin door he grabbed the sides to help himself inside and would not let go. Sgt Brundridge had to knock his arms back out of the way and forcefully turn him around to get him inside. Airman Rosler then put the other injured soldier on the hoist with himself, and both were hoisted into the helicopter. The most critically injured one reportedly had severed an artery. The second was slightly injured. Patients were delivered to Oasis rather than Pleiku.

Det 1-3-75-8 Oct (RCC Narrative)

(U) At approximately 1100, 8 Oct 1966, we were notified of a downed aircraft on the 345° radial at 37 miles from channel 37. We topped off the firebird and were airborne at 1105. After airborne we were notified by tower that the crash site was 030/13 nm from Channel 37. We changed heading and followed two Marine H-46s who were heading for the site. We conducted a search after we arrived over the crash site, sighting no survivors. We were aided in our search by the two H-46s, one H-34 and a UH-1B. The seas were moderate and the weather was high overcast. Crown Charlie arrived approximately 15 minutes later and received a beeper in the vicinity of a small group of Vietnamese sampans 3-5 miles from our position. We proceeded toward the sampans and began receiving a strong beeper signal. We got a visual sighting on the Radar Operator riding in the stern of a sampan. We hovered over the sampan and hoisted the RO aboard. Upon questioning the RO we found his pilot to be in another sampan approximately 1/4 to 3/4 miles away. We sighted the second pilot and hoisted him from the sampan to the helicopter. The only difficulty encountered occurred during the first pickup. The sampan the RO was on was proceeding at 5-10 knots and was headed crosswind. Also the RO experienced some difficulty getting onto the forest penetrator. Both the pilot and the radar observer were in excellent shape.

Det 1-3-76-8 Oct (RCC Narrative)

(U) At 1735 hrs on 8 Oct 1966, Pedro 95 received notification that a O-1E pilot had just been shot and was going to crash land near Ba Tung, Republic of Vietnam. At 1738 hours Pedro 95 took off during a thunderstorm in search of the downed pilot.

The lead element departed as scheduled. Jolly Green's 36 and 52 with Sandy's 06 and 07 departed at 1340L. Weather was 2000 overcast to broken, visibility 5 miles with rain cells in the area. Flight to search area was at 7000' to 7500' above cloud deck and around the large cumulus-type build ups. Weather in search area was still poor when the lead element arrived but began to improve with the low broken clouds moving away from the mountain ridge where the team was believed to be located. Jolly Green's 36 and 52 arrived in the search area at 1425L just as 42 Zulu spotted a signal panel. About 3 minutes later 42 Zulu spotted a second signal panel about 200 yards from the first panel. Area of panels was on a shallow saddle of a mountain ridge, elevation about 3400' at the original coordinates given. Area was covered with low trees and scrub brushes. After a thorough low level recon by 42 Zulu and Sandy's 04 and 05, Sandy 04 directed Jolly Green 36 into the saddle area. Jolly Green 36 descended to the area and circled the western most panel. The men on the ground around the panel were positively identified by Jolly Green 36. The tip tanks were jettisoned and a low hover was established over the panel and 5 personnel were hoisted aboard. Jolly Green 36 then circled once over the second panel and, after positive identification, a low hover was established and 3 personnel were hoisted aboard. Sandy 04 directed Jolly Green 36 out of the area and turned lead over to Sandy 06 who, with Sandy 07, escorted Jolly Green's 36 and 52 back home. The team showed excellent knowledge of the use of signal equipment. One person was seen by 42 Zulu trying to use his radio but by then it was believed that the battery was dead. One of the team had been wounded in the foot. All the others were physically OK. Since the mission entailed no quick scramble, the briefing and preplanning resulted in excellent coordination throughout the mission. Sandy 04's directions to the Jolly Green's were clear and short and his supervision of all aircraft in the area to insure no collision courses was outstanding. There was no enemy action involved during the mission.

Det 9-38-31-28 Oct (RCC Narrative)

START ↓

28 Oct 66
(or-4) Det 9, 38th ARRSq was notified at 2115 hours on 28 October 1966 by the AF AIO at 3-Golf of the need to med evac nine wounded U.S. Army soldiers, members of the 25th Inf Div, from 14-06N 107-33E. Three of the wounded were listed as critical and it was doubtful that they would make it through the night. JSARC was contacted and told of the circumstances and gave the approval to launch. The secondary crew was in the BOQ and barracks and after notification arrived at the line at 2130. The aircraft were refueled and launched at 2140. The full moon aided in navigation and Plei Djereng was visible from 10 miles East. Contact was made with Compose 02 who was controlling the operation in the area. As we came up on channel, Compose 02 was briefing a flight of A-1Es and an AC-47 for air strikes into the area just east of the point of pick-up. Compose 02 stated that the air strikes would be held until after the med evac was completed.

Compose 02 contacted Cobra 19, the company commander requesting the med evac, and he stated that there had been no contact for forty five minutes. Compose 02 led Pedro 42 into the pick up point and Cobra 19 ignited a flare to mark his exact position. Pedro 56 maintained an orbit at 4,000 feet, while the AC-47 held 4,500 and the A-1Es held 5,000. Compose 02 orbited at minimum terrain clearance. Pedro 42 established his hover and lowered the hoist with the pararescue specialist and two semi-rigid litters. The trees were 100 to 150 feet and it was difficult to thread the cable down, as it was catching on the tree limbs. Pedro 42 picked up the three most critically wounded and lowered the hoist for the fourth pickup. Pedro 42 had been hovering for approximately 25 minutes at the time. Pedro 56 had requested 42 to give some time prior to leaving the spot so that 56 could make his approach to the spot in minimum time. Prior to raising the hoist, Pedro 42 was told, "Pedro, you better get out, we're " and 56 looked to the spot and saw a white flash. There was no radio transmission from 42 or from Cobra 19. Pedro 42 could be seen burning on the jungle floor. The time was 2240. Compose 02 immediately called in the air strikes for the area as planned, napalm and 260 frags. The strikes were directed at an area 100 meters East, 100 meters North and 200 meters South of 42's position. The air strikes by the A-1E's (1st ACS and the AC-47 (4th ACS) were outstanding. Both hit the exact area assigned and both received secondary explosions. The following events took place almost simultaneously and several details only became known after the pararescue specialist Airman Second Class Allen R. Stamek was picked up later on, 29 October 1966. The attack on Pedro 42 was the start of an offensive thrust by the North Vietnamese Forces. Cobra 19 company was hit with small arms fire. The helicopter crashed through 150 foot trees cartwheeled forward and landed inverted. Airman Stamek and several soldiers rushed to the wreckage, and even though it was burning, they broke through the bubble and extracted the pilot. The fire was too intense in the cabin, and though a trench was dug to get the spilled fuel to run off, they were unable to get the occupants out. The four men in the cabin, three wounded and the crew chief, Airman Second Class Francis Rice perished. While the men extracted the pilot and copilot, the company suffered several WIA by exposing themselves. As soon as the pilots were out of the wreckage, Cobra 19 had hand combat at several positions along the defense perimeter. Airman Stanek reported that the NVN Army made suicidal attacks and resorted to jumping into defensive positions. Pedro 56 continued to orbit the area until after the air strikes were completed in the hope that we could return to the site and pickup survivors. Cobra 19 transmitted after 15 minutes and stated that the fighting was heavy. Pedro 56 stayed in the area for another five to ten minutes and then followed Compose 02 to a forward med evac station, 3-Golf, five miles South of the Plei Djereng Special Forces Camp. The company commander told Airman Stanek that he saw the helicopter get shot down. He heard and saw the 81 mm anti-tank rocket leave the tube and followed it to the helicopter. Several of the other men said that they saw the rocket leaving a trail of sparks on its way towards the helicopter. The man that fired the rocket was killed and the company captured the weapon.

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We landed at 2310 and contacted Pleiku AB via field phone, notifying them of the status. At 2345 Cobra 19 advised us not to try and return to the area until daylight. We were told that the pilot and copilot had survived the crash but were injured. We departed 3-Golf at 0005L 29 October and landed at Pleiku at 0030L. This was the first mission that Det 9 received any hits from ground fire. Det 9 has received ground fire on several previous missions both ACR and med evac, but did not sustain any hits. I have several recommendations to make. First I suggest that a hoist with a faster re-wind capability be installed on the HH-43F. Second, as mentioned on previous narratives, I suggested that the heavy armor vests (bullet proof) be made available to all ACR detachments. Though vests are programmed for September 1967, I feel that this is not soon enough. We have a requirement for them now. Several detachments are finding used vests available from some that the Army has discarded. However, I find this less than satisfactory. Third, I suggest that serious considerations be given to the continuance of the med evac mission. It is a necessary one, but gives several detachments much over exposure to hostile action. I do not feel that Air Rescue Recovery Service can say no to the Army, when they have men dying on the battle field and we have the only means of saving their lives. It is a high risk mission, but one we must be willing to assume.* We departed Pleiku at 0720 on 29 October 1966 to pick up Captain Vermeyens and Lt Bonnell and A2C Stanek and one WIA at the crash site of Pedro 42 (14-06N 107-33E). Weather was VFR with patchy ground fog which presented no problem. We landed at Landing Zone 3-Golf at 0745 for briefing on security of area and arrangement of Gunships. After departing the LZ we were advised by the FAC, COMPOSE 05, to sneak up a valley from the south at low level to avoid being seen or heard until we had at least reached the pickup point. This we did at about 90 knots and established a hover over the spot at about 0825. We lowered Sgt Jenkins, our Pararescue Specialist, with semi-rigid litters, to help Airman Stanek who had been out there all night. We hovered for about five minutes when we heard gunfire and the people on the ground waved us off. We had the hoist out about 50 feet and A1C Hull, our Crew Chief, began pulling in what he could by hand while we took off. No hits were taken. We headed out the same way we had come in and orbited at the end of the valley for about five minutes and went back in. The FAC advised us that what we had heard was probably the Gunships making passes nearby and the ground party told us to get out, after experiencing what had happened the night before at this same spot. We went up the valley again and hovered behind a tree over the ground troops. Airman Hull pulled up Lt Bonnell first and then Captain Vermeyens. Lt Bonnell was having trouble breathing and blood was bubbling up through the tracheotomy tube so we decided to take them to LZ 3-Golf immediately so they could be evacuated to Pleiku. It took us about 20 minutes to get them into our bird. We were hovering at approximately 100 feet. It was a 10 minute flight to the LZ where medical help was waiting. We were low on fuel at this time so we flew to the Plei Djereng Special Forces Camp and refueled before going to pick up the Army WIA, Airman Stanek and SSgt Jenkins.

* Continuation of mission the following morning.

We were returning to the south waiting to go in when Compose 05 advised us that the [REDACTED] was under attack again and the ground party said to stay out. During our [REDACTED] we were advised that a UH-1 had gone down near the river. When we arrived at [REDACTED] crash all crewmen were being picked up by another UH-1. We returned to LZ 3-Golf to wait. While at the LZ a Dustoff pilot asked us to help their pickup eight wounded troops at 14-01N 107-28E. We were told it would be at least an hour before we could get back to our first pickup point, so we followed the Dustoff bird to the new area. We had trouble contacting the people on [REDACTED] and orbited for about 30 minutes looking for them. The Dustoff bird [REDACTED] found them and taken two out. We finally spotted their smoke grenade and [REDACTED]. We were in a hover at 1100 and lowered our last semi-rigid litter. The [REDACTED] picked up had a bad abdominal wound and couldn't be taken off the litter. [REDACTED] had no other means to pick up another man, as our forest penetrator [REDACTED] been left on the ground with Sgt Jenkins. The other wounded were not [REDACTED] so we pulled off the spot at 1110 and took our wounded to LZ 3-Golf. Captain Lowery and I decided to return to Pleiku for horse collars and [REDACTED] litters. We refueled once more and returned to Pleiku at 1200 hours. Captain Tyree and Captain Bergold took over during the afternoon. A helicopter and complete crew were due in that afternoon from Nha Trang and Captain [REDACTED] and myself were to take their bird and return to LZ 3-Golf. Pedro 56 was shot down about 3 hours later and our Headquarters advised us to [REDACTED] evacs. Pedro 98, from Nha Trang, was restricted to LZ 3-Golf. The recommendation for a high-speed hoist cannot be overemphasized. We were put in a tough position by having to pull off the spot with 50 feet of [REDACTED]. With a faster re-wind capability, we could be assured of not dragging the cable through tree tops and reducing the possibility of snapping a [REDACTED] cable.* On 29 October 1966, Pedro 56 had returned to Pleiku at 1200 for [REDACTED] equipment and a crew change. Det 9 was informed the following [REDACTED] requirements existed: (1) three seriously wounded plus our two [REDACTED] (PJs) at the crash site; (2) one seriously wounded at 14-07N 107-42E; [REDACTED] and 3 critically wounded at 14-00N, 107-29E. We were given FAC and [REDACTED] call signs and frequencies. We departed Pleiku at 1300L. When we arrived over Polei Djerang, we contacted the FAC and were advised the first [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] was at the site of Pedro 42's crash. Two gunships that were waiting for us just south of the pickup point were contacted, and the flight flew to the [REDACTED] to the site. The UH-1s made two low level passes over the area and [REDACTED] 56 made an approach. Because we were heavy on fuel, only one man was [REDACTED] and returned to Landing Zone (LZ) 3-Golf. The ground party [REDACTED] [REDACTED] evacs about 10 more out, but another agency, presumably the Battalion Commander, came up on frequency and advised differently. Because none of the [REDACTED] remaining personnel required immediate med evacs, he wanted them to wait until a LZ could be hacked out for dust-off aircraft in order to cut down [REDACTED] time. We agreed. We then returned and picked up our two PJs and [REDACTED] chain saw and fuel to the ground party. At this point, our fuel state [REDACTED] such that we could pick up one additional man, so we proceeded to the [REDACTED] point before dropping our two PJs off at LZ 3-Golf.

* Continuation of mission after crew change.

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It took several minutes to contact the ground party, and then found they had only a heat stroke victim who was up and walking. They were in pursuit of enemy forces and did not want us to pick up their man as it would alert them to the situation. We explained to the FAC that we could not expose our aircraft for a non-serious case. We then proceeded to LZ 3-Golf to drop off our two PJs and to refuel. The last portion of the mission was to extract 3 critically wounded from a partially cleared LZ at 14-00N, 107-29E. After refueling, we once again linked up with our FAC and our two gunships. We arrived over the LZ and the gunships looked it over. It seemed quiet and the ground party said the area had been quiet all afternoon. He requested we expedite as three of the thirty wounded were fading. While we were on final approach, he reported one man had died. The LZ was not suitable for landing, but we were able to hover below the tops of the trees, greatly cutting down our exposure. We lowered Amn Kelsey to the ground and quickly hoisted two aboard. Sgt Brundridge advised one man was in very bad shape, bleeding badly and had a weak pulse. We immediately took off for LZ 3-Golf. After we off-loaded the two men, we were advised the one had died enroute (later were told the man was the one reported having died while we were on final). After about 10 minutes ground time, we departed, joining up with gunships and FAC over the pickup point. Two UH-1s had been in the LZ for a low hover pickup of 2 men each. Then an Army Hiller came in and picked up two more. By the time we arrived over the area, a CH-47 Chinook helicopter was in the LZ at a low hover. Picking up the rest of the wounded and all of the KIA victims, the Chinook departed. We then went in, dropped off three chain saws and picked up Amn Kelsey and one heat exhaustion case. We took off and started our climbout. After flying a short distance and climbing to about 7-8000 feet, we came under automatic weapons fire. We heard several shots, then several hits, then several more shots. The enemy gunner had caught us briefly in the middle of a 5-7 second volley. We called ground fire and maintained course, discovering the helicopter was apparently not significantly damaged to prevent flight. No control or engine damage was apparent, so we continued east toward LZ 3-Golf, which was now about seven miles away. Meanwhile, during the ground fire, Sgt Brundridge saw the Pyrotechnics container take a round. It began smoking, followed by an intense fire between it and the M-16 ammo container. Without hesitation, Sgt Brundridge tossed out the pyro container and observed it to explode with an approximately ten-foot fireball after falling a few yards from the helicopter. He still had the ammo can in his left hand and noticed a six inch torch flame emitting from a bullet hole. Out it went also. Sgt Brundridge's presence of mind and unhesitating action saved the aircraft and crew. About five miles short of the LZ 3-Golf, Amn Kelsey saw smoke trailing from the bottom of the helicopter. I gave a may-day and began an immediate power-off approach to a U.S. Army artillery battalion, LZ 3-Hotel, which lay conveniently dead ahead. Sgt Brundridge, with Amn Kelsey holding his legs, hung out the cabin door and by holding on to a bear-paw, scammed the bottom of the helicopter.

3d ARRGp Hist, Oct-Dec 66

A minimum hover to a power on landing was made and the aircraft was quickly evacuated by one very fortunate crew plus med-evacuee. The smoke must have been pyro smoke that had filled the fuel tank area through the bullet hole. A total of seven 12.75 mm bullets had struck the helicopter. One through a blade just inboard of the spring constant area. It left a 2 inch exit hole, destroying about half of the spar, chord wise, in that area. One bullet drilled a neat hole through the engine oil inlet line continuing into and out of the right shaft housing and damaging the right tower bearing assembly. One came up through the left forward fuel tank, through the ARC-34 radio, the pyro container, deflected through the M-16 ammo container, through a frame member and was stopped by the co-pilot's shoulder-level armor plating. One bullet came up through the chin, then back out just above the chin armor, taking off quite a large portion of the PA horn mount. Two more went through the empanange. The helicopter was secured and stripped of equipment, and the crew began coordinating for a ride back to Pleiku. The Air Force Liaison Officer at LZ 3-Golf was contacted and he began coordinating for any Army helicopters enroute to Pleiku to stop at LZ 3-Hotel to pick us up. However, Pedro 98, an HH-43F from Det 12, Nha Trang had been dispatched into the area and arrived on scene. The crew, commanded by Lt William Wirstrom, took three of us with equipment back to Pleiku, and then made another sortie for the remaining three members of our unit. As a result of the series of sorties flown during this mission, several things have come to light. The URT-10 radio is not reliable when the PJ is directly under the hovering helicopter. Sgt Jenkins had to relay through the company FM radio which was several yards away. This added to the hover time. Although we can never be guaranteed safety, I feel the med-evac mission can be continued with good results by minimizing the danger: (1) by lowering the PJ, all of the litters and a chain saw, the pilots can depart while the PJ completely prepares the area; (2) the PJ then can cut either an LZ or a low-hover area to cut down on the exposure radius; (3) while the hoist operator is arranging an evacuee in the rear of the helicopter, the pilot can lower the hoist for the next pickup. Note: only when the clearing is large enough, and with the HM checking the progress; (4) and by insuring the ground party understands we only bring out the critical cases, leaving the others to wait until an LZ can be built for Army UH-1 dust off aircraft. During this series of missions, the problem of litter spinning was frequently encountered. A 200' rope will be used so the PJ can stabilize the litter from the ground. The litter can be untethered and the rope dropped as soon as the HM lays hands on the litter. It is virtually impossible to take on two or more litter cases when the rear armor doors are closed. Det 9 suggests they be relocated further aft. The semi-rigid litters should be rolled up before lowering to the ground by the hoist as rotor wash swings them around too much. A fast wind, variable speed hoist should be developed for combat use. We further suggest that pyrotechnics aboard the aircraft be carried in an armor plated container. It is the plan of this unit to construct a container from salvaged armor from Pedro 42.

FINISH ↑

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3d ARRGp Hist, Oct-Dec 66

Det 6-38-131-31 Oct

(U) Two HH-43Fs were scrambled to recover survivors of a C-123 crash NW of Bien Hoa. Three crewmen were recovered using the hoist/forest penetrator and flown to Tan Son Nhut AB. No hostile action encountered and no battle damage sustained by the helicopters during the mission.

Det 1-38-9-31 Oct (RCC Narrative)

HH-43Bs

(U) At 0202Z the 35TPW TUOC telephoned me with a medical evacuation request. A unit of Army engineers were involved in a fire fight 5 miles from Phan Rang Air Base. One soldier was reported to have stepped on a land mine and was in danger of bleeding to death. They had requested helicopter evacuation. The Deputy Commander for Operations cleared us to go; we topped off the fuel tanks and scrambled at 0212Z. Just before we took off an unidentified Army captain drove up in a jeep. He confirmed that the pinned down unit had no radio or smoke, and he added the information that the wounded soldier's leg had been almost blown off. He also informed us that "Rascal 21", a FAC was orbiting the area. I asked the captain to give the FAC our UHF frequency and took off. Shortly after take off, I heard Pedro 92 check in on tower frequency from a base support mission. I requested them to fly cover for us. When we arrived in the area Rascal 21 called us but was unable to add much information. He was in intermittent radio contact with the ground party, but the reception was so weak and spotty he hadn't learned much. I could see several stalled vehicles on a dirt road located near the base of a large rocky hill. Rascal 21 pointed out the area of the supposedly secure landing site, however the sight of personnel on the ground crouched behind their vehicles and firing up at the mountain made me doubt the security of the site. I made two passes at an altitude of 200-300 ft and could see 2 individuals waving me toward a small landing spot behind a large crane pulled up along the road. I also noticed 2 men carrying the wounded man toward the landing area dodging from vehicle to vehicle. On the third pass, I intended to land but the copilot and the crew chief saw ground fire hitting the water directly below the helicopter. I took the helicopter around once more and requested Rascal 21 to ask the ground party to try to evacuate the wounded man by jeep. He seemed to have difficulty getting the message through to the ground party, but he informed me that the ground party was unable to evacuate him and intended to cover my next pass with maximum return fire. I had considerable difficulty on my approach because of turbulence and a gusty cross wind of 27 knots, at 0217Z Pedro 92 flew low over the hill while we landed 100 ft from the road, partially protected by a 3 ft earth bank and the crane. We were probably on the ground 30 seconds. The hoist operator jumped out and helped load the wounded man. An Army Lt ran up and shouted a message in my ear, (which was obscured by the din of popping M-16s and the helicopter) then we took off. We returned the survivor to Phan Rang AB dispensary.

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3d ARRGp Hist, Oct-Dec 66

2-38-9-23	4	Med Evac 3	0	0
7-38-46-24	3	SAR 17	0	0
1-3-98-24	12	SAR 3	0	0
1-3-99-25	3	SAR 1	0	0
2-3-141-25	2	SAR 2	0	0
1-38-13-26	3	Med Evac 1	0	0
3-38-13-27	1	SAR 2	0	0
4-38-12-28	1	SAR 4	0	0

8. (U) Personnel. Key Personnel.

3d ARRGp, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN.

Colonel Albert P. Lovelady
Lt Col Jack W. Holman
Lt Col William A. Ryan Jr
Major William C. Opfer Jr.
Major Maurice E. Johnson
Major John H. McLeaish Jr.
Captain Franklin A. Lamb
Captain George M. Chastain III
Capt John F. Hagemeister
1st Lt Gerald V. Eddy
1st Lt Robert C. Stanford Jr.
CMSgt Robert T. Hamilton
MSgt Roger F. Clark
TSgt Richard D. Smith
SSgt John W. Veney

Commander
Chief, JSARC
Group Operations Officer
Chief of Maintenance
Information Officer
Plans Officer
Chief of Safety
Flight Surgeon
Chief, Admin Services
Intelligence Officer
Chief of Supply
Maintenance Supervisor
NCOIC, Operations
NCOIC, JSARC
NCOIC, Supply

38th ARRSq, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN.

Lt Col John A. Price
Major Charles R. Kay
Capt Richard H. Smith
1st Lt George Hodges, Jr.
1st Lt Charles W. Carey
1st Lt Jesse W. Jackson, Jr.
SMSgt Jerry Taylor
MSgt Horace E. Todd, Jr.
MSgt Truxton Deane
MSgt Robert E. Lockwood
TSgt Joseph L. Clethen

Commander
Operations Officer
OIC LBR Flight
Maintenance Officer
Supply Officer
Admin/Personnel Officer
NCOIC LBR
NCOIC Personnel
Maintenance Supervisor
NCOIC Operations/First Sgt
NCOIC Supply

37th ARRSq, Danang AB, RVN.

Col Alan R. Vette
Lt Col Walter S. Johnson
Lt Col Harold W. Wallace Jr.

Commander
Operations Officer
Executive Officer

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3d ARRGp Hist, Oct-Dec 66

37th ARRSq (Continued)

Lt Col Marion D. Wasemiller
Maj Rodney Redmond
Maj Irving F. Ross
MSgt Lionel O. Yaw
TSgt Robert L. Hill
SSgt Raymond J. Wedro

Asst Operations Officer
Maintenance Officer
Chief Navigator
NCOIC Pararescue
NCOIC Flight Mechanics
NCOIC Radio Operators

Det 1, 37th ARRSq, Udrone RTAB, Thailand.

Lt Col Manyard R. Rhoades

Commander

OL 1, 3d ARRGp, Danang AB, RVN.

Major James K. Frank

Commander

OL 2, 3d ARRGp, Udorn RTAB, Thailand.

Major Thomas F. Larson

Commander

Det 1, 38th ARRSq, Phan Rang AB, RVN.

Capt Larry A. Nitz

Commander

Det 2, 38th ARRSq, Takhli RTAB, Thailand.

Major David E. Allen

Commander

Det 3, 38th ARRSq, Ubon RTAB, Thailand.

Major John J. Hoye

Commander

Det 4, 38th ARRSq, Korat RTAB, Thailand.

Capt Lucian A. Gunter, III

Commander

Det 5, 38th ARRSq, Udorn RTAB, Thailand.

Lt Col Warner A. Britton

Commander

Det 6, 38th ARRSq, Bien Hoa AB, RVN.

Major David M. Randall

Commander

Det 7, 38th ARRSq, Danang AB, RVN.

Lt Col Victor Goudey

Commander

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3d ARRGp Hist, Oct-Dec 66

Det 3, 38th ~~_____~~ Cam Ranh Bay ~~SE~~ RVN.

Capt Joe H. ~~_____~~

Commander

Det 9, 38th ~~_____~~ Pleiku AB. ~~SE~~

Capt Dale R. ~~_____~~

Commander

Det 10, 38th ~~_____~~ Binh Thuy AB. ~~SE~~ RVN.

Capt Robert ~~_____~~ Capco

Commander

Det 11, 38th ~~_____~~ Tuy Hoa, ~~SE~~ RVN.

Capt Edmund ~~_____~~ Schbeck, Jr.

Commander

Det 12, 38th ~~_____~~ Nha Trang AB. ~~SE~~ RVN.

Major Ralph S. ~~_____~~

Commander

The 3d ARRGp including all the squadrons and detachments has a total manpower authorization of 1,157 personnel. Assigned officers and airmen total 781 which shows the 3d ARRGp to be ~~over~~ manned.

9. ~~_____~~ Equipment. Mission Aircraft.

Type, Model, Series

	Quantity
HH-43B	18
HH-43F	10
HH-3E	10
HU-16B	5
HC-130H	4

10. (U) Additional Remarks.

a. (U) Colonel Albert P. Lovelady reported to 3d ARRGp 21 October 1966. He immediately began a series of visits to ARRS units in Thailand and Vietnam and by 9 November 1966, completed his first round of visits to each of his units in S.E. Asia. On 1 November 1966 Colonel Lovelady assumed command of the 3d ARRGp.

b. (U) Colonel Donald T. Smith, Commander of Pacific Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Center, arrived at Hq 3d ARRGp 28 November 1966 to inspect ARRS units in S.E. Asia. By 7 December, Colonel Smith completed his itinerary and returned to Hq 3d ARRGp for a final briefing. In his tour of all ARRS units in SEA, Colonel Smith received unit rescue briefings, ~~presented~~ awards and in turn briefed the units on MAC, ARRS & PARRI policies.

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3d ARRGp Hist, Oct-Dec 66

c. (U) On 4 December 1966 at approximately 0120 AM, the enemy launched a mortar attack against Tan Son Nhut AB. At the same time Viet Cong penetrated the base and attacked aircraft parked on the flight line. Personnel billeted on the base were ordered into mortar shelters and the Air Police engaged and killed most of the infiltrators. By daylight the situation was under control. Aircraft damage as well as personnel casualties were very light. There were no casualties or damage to rescue personnel, aircraft or facilities assigned to Tan Son Nhut.

d. (U) During the night of 23-24 December 1966, Binh Thuy AB was mortared. No damage was sustained by rescue personnel, aircraft or facilities.

e. (U) The airmen's mess hall at Korat AB, Thailand was named Pitsenbarger Hall on 25 Dec 66 in honor of A1C William H. Pitsenbarger of the 38th ARRSq. Senator Stuart Symington made the dedication. Airman Pitsenbarger, Pararescue-man, voluntarily rode a rescue hoist to the ground to help Army personnel prepare casualties for evacuation during a mission near Bien Hoa on 11 April 66. After the helicopter made several hoist pickups, the Army position came under attack; Airman Pitsenbarger was killed while assisting the ground forces during the onslaught which eventually over-ran the Army defenses. For his heroic actions Pitsenbarger was awarded the Air Force Cross posthumously. Col Lovelady and Lt Col Price attended the ceremony as representatives of 3d ARRGp and 38th ARRSq respectively.

f. (U) A rescue briefing team from Udorn consisting of three officers spent the month of December briefing personnel in this theater and higher headquarters on rescue procedures in S.E. Asia. The three members of the team were: Capt S.F. Tobik, Det 1, 37 ARRSq (HC-130 representative); Capt Loven, 602 Tactical Fighter Sq (A-1E representative); 1st Lt D.W. Stiles, Det 5, 38 ARRSq (HH-3E representative). The team emphasized the things a downed airman in SEA could do to facilitate his own rescue. Briefings were given at ARRS, PARRC, 7th Fleet, Jungle Survival School, USAF Survival School, Panama Survival School, TAC, MAC, Norfolk, Virginia and San Diego, California.

11. (U) Appendixes. None

12. (U) Documentation.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY SERVICE (MAC)
3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group
APO San Francisco 96307

SPECIAL ORDER
187

1 November 1966

Under the provisions of AFR 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group, effective this date, vice COL ARTHUR W. BEALL, relieved.

Albert Lovelady

ALBERT P. LOVELADY, Colonel, USAF
Commander

DISTRIBUTION
20 Individual
5 1360 ABG BPPDC
1 ea 3ARRG unit
1 ARRS ARDAS
1 ARRS ARPMB
5 PARRC
10 File

SO-187

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225

SPECIAL ORDER
G-204

2 December 1966

1. The following detachments/operating locations are discontinued/eliminated at locations indicated, effective 15 December 1966.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
Det 5, Hq MAC	Tinker AFB, Okla
Det 9, Hq MAC	Edwards AFB, Calif
Det 1, 61 Mil Alft Wg	Kwajalein NAS, Marshall Island
Det 3, 61 Mil Alft Wg	Johnston Island AFB, Johnston Island
OL 1, Det 1, 61 Mil Alft Wg	Eniwetok Atoll AI, Marshall Island
Det 1, 3 ARRGp	Da Nang Aprt, Vietnam
Det 2, 3 ARRGp	Udorn Afld, Thailand
Det 5, 1356 Film Library Sq	Eastcote School, United Kingdom
Det 1, 1352 Photo Gp	Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
Det 6, 1352 Photo Gp	Yamato AS, Japan

Personnel will be reassigned in accordance with AFMs 36-11/39-11. Organizational records will be disposed of in accordance with AFM 181-5. Organizational funds will be disposed of in accordance with AFR 176-2. Equipment will be disposed of in accordance with AFM 67-1. Personnel data changes will be required in accordance with AFMs 35-15/36-11. Action will be reported in accordance with AFR 20-49. Authority: AFM 26-2.

2. The following operating locations are designated and established at locations indicated, effective 15 December 1966.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Management Level Code</u>	<u>MAC ADP Code "6"</u>
OL 3, 1200 Spt Sq	Tinker AFB, Okla	4697	95000003
OL 4, Hq MAC	Edwards AFB, Calif	8292	90000004
OL 2, 61 Mil Alft Wg	Kwajalein NAS, Marshall Is	4127	M5820002
OL 4, 61 Mil Alft Wg	Johnston Island AFB, J I	4127	M5820004
OL 3, 61 Mil Alft Wg	Eniwetok Atoll AI, J I	4127	M5820003
OL 1, 3 ARRGp	Da Nang Aprt, Vietnam	2526	P4030001
OL 2, 3 ARRGp	Udorn Afld, Thailand	2526	P4030002
OL 1, Det 1, 1356 Film Library Sq	Eastcote Schocl, U K	6217	80230101
OL 1, 1352 Photo Gp	Elmendorf AFB, Alaska	6286	80080001
OL 1, Det 3, 1352 Photo Gp	Yamato AS, Japan	6286	80080301

Manpower authorizations will be in accordance with the CMPD. Personnel will be requisitioned in accordance with AFMs 36-11/39-11. Equipment will be authorized in accordance with AFM 67-1. Units are funded by O&M Appropriation. Personnel data changes will be required in accordance with AFMs 36-11/35-15. Action will be reported in accordance with AFR 20-49. Authority: AFM 26-2.