

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



479th TFW
INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THE MAGICAL KINGDOM

ONCE UPON A TIME THERE WAS A PLACE, A VERY STRANGE PLACE INDEED, CALLED
THE MAGICAL KINGDOM.

THIS KINGDOM IS VISITED DAILY BY MEN, LIKE YOURSELVES, IN SUPERSONIC
FLYING MACHINES.

HE WHO HAS VISITED THE MAGICAL KINGDOM WILL KNOW OF THE DANGERS THAT
LURK THERE.

HE WHO HAS NOT BEEN THERE HAD BETTER LEARN.

BUT HOW?????

(ENTER INTELLIGENCE OFFICER - BRIGHT, CLEAR-EYED, DEDICATED, A VERITABLE
FOUNTAIN OF KNOWLEDGE, A SERVANT AND FRIEND OF YOU, THE FIGHTER PILOT.)

THE 479th TFW INTELLIGENCE DIVISION IS HERE TO HELP YOU UNDERSTAND THE
SUNDRY MYSTERIES OF THE MAGICAL KINGDOM. WE OFFER YOU FACTS, OR INTELLIGENCE,
THAT WILL HELP YOU DO A BETTER JOB IN COMBAT, THAT MAY SAVE YOUR LIFE.

THE ATTACHED OUTLINE WILL DESCRIBE OUR PROGRAM.

THE ATTACHED MAP WILL SHOW YOU WHERE WE ARE LOCATED.

THE ATTACHED READING INDEX WILL TELL YOU WHAT WE HAVE.

THE MAGICAL KINGDOM AWAITS YOU.

SO DO WE.

SEE US FIRST.

FLT LINE

BLDG
702

WING
D. O.

BASE
OPS

13ST



INTELL



FLT
SIM

BLDG 193




ACAD

BARRACKS
AREA

MAIN STREET



SERVICE
CLUB



NCO
CLUB

OUTLINE: INTELLIGENCE TRAINING PROGRAM

Seven items are required under the TAC RTU Syllabus. The minimum training time for these items is nineteen and one half (19½) hours. With the exception of the Current Intelligence and Aircraft Recognition Briefings, which are given in the squadron, all other courses are given in the Academics Building as part of the overall RTU training program.

- I. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: A series of fifteen (15) minute briefings given each week in the squadron briefing room. This briefing covers such items as aircraft losses, MIG encounters, SAM activity and significant air, ground and sea activity in Southeast Asia. Also includes other intelligence items on a world-wide basis that are considered important from the viewpoint of TAC operational responsibilities. (Total time - 4½ hrs.)

- II. AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION: A series of fifteen (15) minute briefings given each week in the squadron briefing room as an appendage to the Current Intelligence Briefing. This program provides combat aircrews with not only an instant recognition capability but also delves into the capabilities of enemy aircraft. The program is oriented to Soviet aircraft with particular emphasis placed upon those aircraft which are now operational in Southeast Asia. (Total time - 3 hrs.)

- III. S.E.A. ORIENTATION: A general overview of the Southeast Asian nations, including the current military and political situation and the historical background of events leading up to the present American commitment. (1 Hr.)

- IV. RECONNAISSANCE & REPORTING: A discussion of the reporting procedures presently being used in S.E.A. A study of the lines of communication used to move enemy supplies and personnel into SVN, with particular emphasis on those in Laos. A study of enemy camouflage techniques, with photographic examples. (2 hrs.)
- V. AIR DEFENSES: A study of North Vietnamese air defenses, including various types of AAA, the SA-2 system, radars and MIGs. Each defense is analyzed as to its operation, its capabilities and limitations. The main emphasis in this course will be the threat each enemy defense system poses to you as a pilot. (3 hrs.)
- VI. EVASION & ESCAPE: A study of the organization, capabilities and procedures of Search & Rescue (SAR) forces in S.E.A. A study of evasion techniques. A discussion of E&E aids. A discussion of the treatment of captured personnel in S.E.A. (3 hrs.)
- VII. MISSION PLANNING: This item is given in conjunction with the Day Tactics Course. An intelligence officer discusses the intelligence factors that affect the planning of a typical combat mission in S.E.A. (3 hrs.)

PILOT READING INDEX

- I. Weekly Air Intelligence Summary (WATS):
 1. Published weekly by 7th Air Force.
 2. Provides intelligence information on significant events, developments and trends within the 7th Air Force area of responsibility in Southeast Asia.
 3. Includes articles on both In and Out-country air operations, Mig sightings and engagements, North Vietnamese air order of battle, SAM summary, etc...
 4. Excellent and comprehensive summary of air and ground activity in SEA, complete with statistics and selected photography.
- II. TAC Evasion and Escape Bulletin (TEEB):
 1. Published monthly by TAC Ho at Langley AFB.
 2. Best features are the personal accounts by pilots of their experiences as downed airmen in Southeast Asia. A short biography of each pilot's escape and evasion training is given as well.
 3. The publication also contains other articles related to escape evasion, VC interrogation of POWs, etc...
 4. Recommended as your best source for information "from the horse's mouth" on escape and evasion, search and recovery procedures, and personal pilot reaction to the whole experience.
- III. Red Baron Report (R-123):
 1. A "one-time" publication by the Institute for Defense Analyses.
 2. The report deals with F-8 and F-4 encounters with Migs in Southeast Asia.
 3. The publication offers an excellent opportunity to see what those pilots who have been in combat with Migs have to say about all facets of the encounter, the problems they had, equipment malfunctions, enemy skill, etc...
- IV. Defense Intelligence Digest (DID):
 1. Published monthly by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
 2. A classified "Time" Magazine, same format, many pictures, good general coverage

of a variety of subjects.

3. Scope is worldwide rather than SEA oriented, although each issue contains several articles dealing with THE war.

V. TAC Intelligence Digest (TID):

1. Published weekly by TAC Hq at Langley AFB.

2. Each issue contains selected photography of NVN plus articles dealing with current items of interest pertaining both to SEA and other areas of the world.

3. Frequently contains articles dealing with enemy aircraft development and modification.

VI. Foreign Technology Division Publications (FTD):

1. These publications are technical manuals, detailed, and approximate a "Dash-1" publication in both content and arrangement.

2. Fresco (MiG-17) weapon system

3. Farmer (MiG-19) weapon system

4. Fishbed (MiG-21) weapon system

5. Fishbed C & E Aerial Tactics Manual

6. Development of Soviet Fighter Aircraft: a history and future trends.

VII. Defense Intelligence Agency Fact Books:

1. Soviet Aircraft Armament Handbook: Detailed, technical information including diagrams.

2. Soviet Aircraft Performance and Characteristics: Detailed statistics on all operational Soviet aircraft.

3. Southeast Asia Fact Book: Accurate information on all facets of life in the southeast asian countries.(i.e. military, economy, political structure, etc...) presented in easy to read article-type format.

VIII. Daily Messages:

1. Received daily from 7th Air Force in Southeast Asia, Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington D.C., TAC Hq at Langley Air Force Base.
2. A day-to-day running commentary of the latest news around the world, air and ground activity in SEA, aircraft losses, air operations over the North.
3. A weekly wrap-up of the war in SEA is received every Monday and is an excellent summary of the last week's operations, complete with a statistical analysis of the week's effort.

IX. TAC Daily Operations Summaries:

1. Received daily from TAC Hq.
2. Covers TAC-wide air operations including aircraft losses in CONUS (accidents) and in SEA, strikes over North Vietnam and South Vietnam, attacks on US air bases, etc...
3. Excellent as a quick look at TAC "happenings"--15 minutes of highly informative reading.

X. Defense Analysis Intelligence Messages:

1. Received daily from 7th Air Force Hq at Tan Son Nhut AB.
2. Contains detailed reports of downed aircraft of the previous day: Mission profile, radio transmissions, etc....
3. Analysis of high threat SAM and AAA areas.
4. Your best source for information on USAF operational losses in SEA, as they occur, in full.

XI. Additional Publications:

1. The Intelligence Library has a variety of publications, in addition to those listed above, which provide current and significant information pertaining to enemy activity on a world-wide scale. Several are listed below:

2. Weekly Intelligence Digest (WID)
3. Weekly Intelligence Review (WIR)
4. Navy Scientific and Technical Intelligence Bulletin
5. OSI Counter Intelligence Digest

TAC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
REFERENCE TACM 200-1, 200-1A

(1) IN-FLIGHT

This report is applicable to all TAC aircraft and is designed for the rapid reporting of essential information while the aircraft is still airborne. It is submitted as required by the nature of the event at time on target or time of sighting. The lead aircraft will report for the entire flight and the report content will be held to absolute essential to prevent saturation of communications facilities. Data that is to be submitted in the report includes mission results, encounter with enemy aircraft, and encounter with flak or missiles.

(2) HOT NEWS REPORT

The hot news report is applicable to all TAC units. It is designed for the rapid reporting, to higher headquarters, of information regarding events or conditions that may have a significant and immediate effect on current planning and operations, or be of immediate interest at the national level. It is prepared as required by the nature of the event and is usually sent out within an hour, the content of the report pertains to significant events or activity which is created by enemy or unknown sources and includes overflights and interceptions of non-friendly aircraft, enemy military concentrations, and enemy strikes in friendly territory.

(3) MISSION REPORT

The Mission Report is applicable to all TAC missions. In the case of multiple aircraft flights, it will be filed as a flight MISREP. Its purpose is to provide higher headquarters with more detailed information than is practical to transmit by In-Flight Reports. It is designed to provide mission identification, results, and the effects of enemy responses on a priority basis. Unless otherwise directed the MISREP will be transmitted for each mission and is sent out as soon as possible following the return of the aircraft (time is not to exceed one hour for tactical fighters).

(4) CIRVIS REPORT (Communications, Instruction, Reporting Vital Intelligence Sightings)

This report is applicable to all TAC units. It is a rapid communication sent out on all unidentifiable, suspicious, or hostile land or seaborne traffic which is considered as a threat to the security to the U.S. or Canada. The initial report is issued by the pilot while airborne or upon landing.

(5) POPPY SEED REPORT

Pertains to the reporting of interference and jamming of airborne navigation aids and electronic systems and is applicable to all TAC units.

Reference AFR 55-3

UNCLASSIFIED

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

- AA- Anti-Aircraft Weapon
- AAA- Anti-aircraft Artillery
- AAM - Air to air missile
- AEW - Airborne early warning
- AIM-7 - (SPARROW), semiactive radar type, air to air missile
- AIM-9 - (SIDEWINDER), passive IR type, air to air missile
- AIM-9C- (SIDEWINDER), radar guided air to air missile
- ALKALI - Soviet AAM, radar beam rider type
- AOB - air order of battle
- ATOLL - Soviet AAM, infrared seeker type
- AW - Automatic Weapon (s)
- ARVN = Army of the Republic of Vietnam, (South Vietnamese Army)
- BARCAP - Barrier combat air patrol, a migscreen for one or more missions
- BEAGLE - NATO Code name for IL - 28 (light jet bomber)
- CAP - Combat air patrol, an acft patrol provided over an objective area, over the force protected, over the critical area of a combat zone, or over an air defense area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile acft before they reach their target.
- CAS - close air support
- CHAFF - A type of confusion reflector, which consist of thin, narrow mettalic strips of various lengths to provide different responses, used to create false signals on radarscope.
- CHICOM - Chinese Communist
- Chieu Hoi - (literal translation, "open arms"), an amnesty program designed to encourage desertions among VC and NVA personnel
- Chinat - Nationalist China
- COSVN - Central Office for South Vietnam, the organization through which NVN directs the insurgency in the South

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CROWN - Call sign for rescue force commander

DRVI - Democratic Republic of Vietnam - (North Vietnam)

DZ - Drop zone

E&E - Evasion and Escape

Element - AF term for the basic fighting unit, two acft

ELINT - Electronic intelligence

EOB - Electronic order of battle

EW/GCI - Early warning/ground control intercept, (radar)

EWO - Electronic warfare officer

FAGOT - NATO code name for MIG-15

FARMER - NATO code name for MIG-19

FISHBED - NATO code name for MIG-21

Fragged - mission directed by fragmentary operational order from higher Hq

FRESCO - NATO code name for MIG-17

FTD - Foreign Technology Division of AF Systems Command

GAM-83 - BULLPUP, air-to-ground guided missile

ICC - The International Control Commission

IRON HAND - A code name for a flight with special ordnance and avionics equipment whose mission is to seek and destroy enemy surface-to-air missile sites

JCS target - a target appearing on the JCS target list

Jolly Green - HH-3E SAR helicopter

KARST - limestone outcropping or ridge

LOC - Line of communication

LZ - Landing zone

MIGCAP - combat air patrol mission whose actions are directed against MIG acft

MIG SCREEN - mission wherein protecting fighters are placed between the threat and the protected force in a specific area

MOB - missile order of battle

NFLSVN - National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (official name for VC)

NVN - North Vietnam

PANAMA - call sign for GCI site located near DaNang

Pathet Lao - Laotian Communists

Pedro - HH-43 rescue helicopter

PI - Photo interpreter, photo interpretation

POL - petroleum, oil and lubricants

PW - prisoner of war

Ranch Hand - UC-123 defoliation operations

RESCAP - rescue combat air patrol

ROK - Republic of Korea (South Korea)

ROLLING THUNDER - code name for airstrike campaign against NVN

ROUTE PACKAGE - Best geographical location of NVN for purpose of air strikes on targets

SA-2 - Soviet surface-to-air missile system

SAM - surface-to-air missiles/sites

SANDIE - A1E rescue acft

SAR - search and rescue

SPOOKY - AC-47 dragon ship

STRIKE - (AGM-45) air-to-surface radar seeking missile

SVN or RVN - South Vietnam, official name, Republic of Vietnam
(official name of North Vietnam is Democratic Republic of Vietnam)

TAPCAP - Target combat air patrol, acft assigned the air-to-air defenses role in the target area

TOT - Time over target

VNAF - South Vietnamese Air Force

WILD WEASEL - F-105-F specially equipped for locating and attacking SA-2 sites (employed on IRON HAND missions)

EXCERPTS FROM THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, 12 AUGUST 1949*

ARTICLE 2 - In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or to any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.

ARTICLE 7 - "Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention."

ARTICLE 13 - Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act of omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited. Prisoners of war must at all times be protected particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.

ARTICLE 14 - Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honor.

ARTICLE 17 - Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names, rank and date of birth, and army regimental number, personal or serial number, or, failing this, equivalent information. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but in no case taken away from him. No physical or mental torture nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

ARTICLE 18 - All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, shall remain in the possession of the prisoner of war.

* The Geneva Conventions were ratified by the US on 2 February 1956 and by NVN on 5 June 1957.

ARTICLE 22 - Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. The detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds according to their nationality, language and customs, provided that such prisoners shall not be separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture, except with their consent.

ARTICLE 25 - Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the detaining power who are billeted in the same area.

ARTICLE 26 - The basic daily food ration shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies. Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of war. The use of tobacco shall be permitted. Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited.

ARTICLE 27 - Clothing, underwear and footwear shall be supplied to prisoners of war in sufficient quantities by the Detaining Power, which make allowance for the climate of the region where the prisoners are detained. The regular replacement and repair of the above articles shall be assured by the Detaining Power.

ARTICLE 29 - The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to insure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics.

ARTICLE 30 - Every camp shall have an adequate infirmary where prisoners of war have the attention they require, as well as appropriate diet. Prisoners of war suffering from serious diseases, or whose condition necessitates special treatment as a surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any military or civilian medical unit where such treatment can be given, even if their repatriation is contemplated in the near future. Prisoners of war may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities for examination.

ARTICLE 39 - Prisoners of war must, with the exception of officers, salute and show to all officers of the Detaining Power the external marks of respect provided for the regulations applying to their own forces. Officer prisoners of war are bound to salute only officers of a higher rank of the Detaining Power. They must salute the camp commander regardless of his rank.

ARTICLE 41 - In every camp the text of the present Convention and its annexes shall be posted in the prisoners own language, in places where all may read them. Copies shall be supplied on request to the prisoners who cannot have access to the copy which has been posted.

ARTICLE 44-45 - Prisoners of war shall be treated with the regard due to their rank and age.

ARTICLE 46 - The transfer of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in conditions not less favorable than those under which the forces of the Detaining Power are transferred. The Detaining Power shall supply the prisoners of war during transfer with sufficient food and drinking water to keep them in good health, likewise with the necessary clothing, shelter and medical attention.

ARTICLE 49 - Noncommissioned officers who are prisoners of war shall only be required to do supervisory work. Officers may in no circumstances be compelled to work.

ARTICLE 50 - Prisoners of war other than officers may be compelled to do work connected with the camp, agriculture, construction, transport and industry. They may not be compelled to work in metallurgical, machinery and chemical industries or in any operation that has a military character or purpose.

ARTICLE 52 - Unless he be a volunteer, no prisoner of war may be employed on labour which is of an unhealthy or dangerous nature. Nor shall he be assigned to labor which would be looked upon as humiliating for a member of the Detaining Power's own forces. The removal of mines or similar devices shall be considered as dangerous labor.

ARTICLE 70 - Immediately upon capture or not more than one week after arrival at a camp, even if it is a transit camp, every prisoner of war shall be enabled to write direct to his family and to the Central Prisoners of War Agency. Mail shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any manner.

ARTICLE 71 - Prisoners of war shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards. If the Detaining Power deems it necessary to limit the number, it shall not be less than two letters and four cards monthly.

ARTICLE 76 - The censoring of correspondence addressed to prisoners of war or dispatched by them shall be done as quickly as possible. It shall be done in the presence of the addressee, or of a fellow-prisoner duly delegated by him.

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ARTICLE 78 - Prisoners of war shall have the right to make known to the military authorities in whose power they are, their requests regarding the conditions of captivity to which they are being subjected. They shall also have the unrestricted right to apply to the representative of the Protecting Powers.

ARTICLE 79 - Wherever there are prisoners of war, except in those camps where there are officers, the prisoners shall freely elect by secret ballot every six months, and also in case of vacancies, prisoner representatives who are entrusted with representing them before the military authorities of the Protecting Power, the International Committee of the Red Cross and any other organization which may assist them. These prisoner representatives shall be eligible for re-election. In camps for officers and persons of equivalent status, or in mixed camps, the senior officer among the prisoners of war shall be recognized as the camp prisoners' representative.

ARTICLE 81 - Prisoner representatives may appoint from amongst the prisoners such assistance as they may require. All material facilities shall be granted them particularly a certain freedom of movement necessary for the accomplishment of their duties (inspection of labor detachments, receipt of supplies, etc). Prisoners' representatives shall be permitted to visit premises where prisoners of war are detained and every prisoner of war shall have the right to consult freely his prisoners' representative. All facilities shall likewise be accorded to the prisoners' representative for communication with the organization listed in Article 79.

ARTICLE 82 - A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power. The Detaining Power shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offense committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations or orders. If any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power shall declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to be punished whereas the same acts would not be punished if committed by a member of the forces of the Detaining Power; such acts shall entail disciplinary punishment only.

ARTICLE 83 - In deciding whether proceedings in respect of an offense alleged to have been committed by a prisoner of war shall be judicial or disciplinary, the Detaining Power shall insure that the completed authority exercise the greatest leniency and adopt, wherever possible, disciplinary rather than judicial measures.

ARTICLE 85 - Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the Geneva Convention. NOTE: The Communist Bloc countries fought and made formal reservations to this article on the premise that a prisoner of war convicted of a war crime is removed from the protection of the convention. NVN reserved the right to determine if captives may be tried as war criminals for acts committed before their capture and thus not benefit from the protection of the Geneva Conventions.

ARTICLES 87-90 - In no case shall disciplinary punishment be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health and the duration of any single punishment shall in no case exceed 30 days. Collective punishment for individual acts, corporal punishments, imprisonments in premises without daylight, and any form of torture or cruelty are forbidden.

ARTICLES 92-93 - Prisoners of war who attempt to escape and who are recaptured shall be liable to a disciplinary punishment, even if it is a repeated act. Other prisoners of war who aid or abet an escape are liable to disciplinary punishment only. Offenses committed with the sole intention of facilitating escape and which do not entail any violence against life or limb shall occasion disciplinary punishment only. NOTE: A downed aircrew member is an effective combatent prior to capture. He may kill enemy troops (not civilian population) while evading. This is dangerous however, since the captured POW could conceivably be tried and executed for murder, depending upon the whim or purpose of the competing belligerent. The escaper should be aware that he may be charged, tried, and executed for any murder or other infamous crime committed while attempting to escape after capture, or while escaping from confinement.

ARTICLE 96 - In no case may disciplinary power be delegated to a prisoner of war or be exercised by a prisoner of war. Before any disciplinary award is pronounced, the accused shall be given precise information regarding the conduct and of defending himself. He shall be permitted in particular to call witnesses and to have recourse, if necessary, to the services of a qualified interpreter.

ARTICLE 99 - No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused.

ARTICLE 100 - Prisoners of war shall be informed as soon as possible of the offenses which are punishable by the death sentence under the laws of the Detaining Power.

ARTICLES 104-106 - When the Detaining Power has decided to institute judicial proceedings against a POW, it shall notify the Protecting Power as soon as possible at least three weeks before the opening of the trial. The POW shall be entitled to assistance by a qualified advocate or counsel of his choice. The POW shall have in the same manner as the members of the Armed Forces of the Detaining Power, the right of appeal or petition against any sentence pronounced on him. He shall further have the rights outlined in Article 96.

ARTICLE 115 - No prisoner of war on whom a disciplinary punishment has been imposed and who is eligible for repatriation or for accommodation in a neutral country may be kept on the plea that he has not undergone his punishment. Prisoners detained in connection with a judicial prosecution or conviction and who are designated for repatriation or accommodation in a neutral country, may benefit by such measures before the end of the proceedings or the completion of the punishment, if the Detaining Power consents.

ARTICLE 118 - Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.

ARTICLE 119 - Prisoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offense are pending may be detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the punishment. The same shall apply to prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offense.

ARTICLE 126 - Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Power shall have permission to go to all places where prisoners of war may be, particularly to places of interment, imprisonment and labour and shall have access to all premises occupied by prisoners of war. They shall also be allowed to go to the places of departure, passage and arrival of prisoners who are being transferred. They shall be able to interview the prisoners, and particularly the prisoners representatives, without witnesses, either personally or through an interpreter. The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the same prerogatives. Visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of imperative military necessity and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure.

* * *

PROTECTING POWER - Can be any mutually agreed upon neutral power

who is signatory to the Geneva Conventions. The International Committee of the Red Cross may also serve as the protecting power.

An important aspect of any Evasion or Escape situation is the health or condition of the Evadee/ Escapee. The following article (based upon the experiences of Major Gene N. Lam, United States Army doctor, who was a PW during Korea) presents many helpful hints and ideas on how to take care of yourself during evasion, captivity or while escaping.

You must learn basic first aid - what to do for fractures, cuts, burns, etc. If you go down, you are supposed to have all kinds of things with you - a survival kit, a first aid kit, and printed instructions about using them. Let's assume, however, that you land only with the clothes on your back - it happened just that way to lots of men in Korea. You then must know how to get along with what you have; to make do.

God gave you two important things - your head and your hands. If you think and intelligently use what you have, you can take care of yourself.

SURVIVAL FIRST AID -- When you learn first aid and study survival medicine, you must assume that there will be no one but you to practice it. In survival and evasion there probably will not be anyone else except perhaps men from your own crew. All six doctors captured with me were put in one PW camp, but few USAF doctors are apt to be captured and you may be in a camp of only Air Force prisoners. You may not have a trained medical corpsman - you should not expect to have one.

When most of these observations were made, there were five doctors in the camp with me. Thanks to all of them - including the three who later died - I can tell you these things, not as my own isolated findings, but as our group opinions.

Immunization helps; don't avoid shots. You can save your life by keeping your immunization record up-to-date. No man died in Korea of any disease for which the armed services gave immunization shots.

NOT ADVANCED SCIENCE - BASIC PRINCIPLES -- All of us - patients and doctors alike - depend today upon the wonder drugs, fine laboratories, modern medical equipment. We have too easily lost sight of the "country doctor" type of medicine, of the things men always have that can save them - determination, common sense, and a few primitive techniques. Some of these remedies were practiced by the Greeks, Romans, and Arabs long before the birth of Christ. They are still good today when no other means are available. It's amazing, but man can and does live without penicillin for every ache or pain.

REGARDLESS OF WHAT IT IS - EAT IT -- One basic principle of survival is to eat. After you have been down a few hours, you get hungry. If you can, find something edible and eat it. If you are captured, someone soon will bring in a bucket of slop and, after your stomach has flipped from the sight and the smell of it, you may say, "I can't (or won't) eat that stuff."

You'd better eat it because that's all you'll get and it may get progressively fouler and skimpier. Here "will" comes in. Say to yourself, "I'll eat everything they give me to get through." You must eat everything you can get - issued rations, things you can steal, things you procure from the environment.

We ate dogs, cats, rats, weeds, maggots. For a while we got only ground field corn, boiled for half an hour. It is tasteless, but it will keep you alive. In fact, we were living it up when we got that corn mash.

Most PW's in Korea ate dog, but it was hard to do. Dogs are a delicacy in that area and we weren't issued luxury items, but once in awhile a stray would be shanghaied. The town we were in had a stray cat. Pussy didn't wander long; it was quite delicious, rather like squirrel.

It helps not to be able to identify a strange dish the first time it's served, but, after the first time, the ingredients don't really bother you.

It was difficult to down rats but they were edible. I strongly recommend cooking them because raw they can carry several diseases.

Snakes, of course, are eaten the world over and some varieties are delicious. Just chop off the head, skin the rest, cook, then eat what's left. Even poisonous varieties are edible.

Maggots are something else. Once we were issued rotten fish loaded with maggots. Our English cook protested and wanted to scrape them off. Afraid that some of the fish would be lost, I insisted that he cook fish, maggots and all. We ate the results, which were quite good.

In May 1951, every PW in camp was swollen like a balloon from severe beri-beri. Since spring weeds were beginning to appear, we thought we could boil them as a cure, but there wasn't a weed in camp. However, some of us were taken almost daily to a river for wood and other supplies. The criterion for success soon became not how much wood but how many weeds we could bring back. We didn't know what kinds of weeds they were, but we picked them, boiled them, and ate them. Our beriberi disappeared.

You will be revolted by food given you as a PW, but, if you miss one meal as a prisoner, it will take you weeks to regain your strength. You can't afford to miss a single bite when you are on a subsistence diet. If you're going to live, eat. If you plan to escape, you must have the strength to do it.

DYSENTERY -- Dysentery becomes a problem in enemy territory to most men - be they evaders or prisoners of war. The risk of dysentery can be greatly reduced if you have and properly use halazone tablets or iodine, or if you boil water. But there will be times when you cannot possibly take such precautions. Also, men have gotten dysentery from nothing more than just being scared.

What is dysentery? In our camp we set up an arbitrary standard: 25 stools per day. Eight to ten was normal and 15 was merely diarrhea.

What can you do about dysentery? You will lose water which you must replace. If possible, replace it with boiled water, but, at any cost, drink quantities of liquids. You must also eat, even if that means choking down food.

Charcoal can help. Take any partially burned piece of wood, scrape off the charred portions and swallow them. How much? Oh, about a handful.

Bones - Any kind of bone - can help. They are best if burned and ground into ash, but you can grind bones between rocks to a powder. Just swallow the powder.

The Communists, anxious to "educate" every prisoner of war, usually have lots of chalk around for writing on the wonders of Bolshevism. Steal some ordinary schoolroom chalk, powder it and swallow it. It too will help cure dysentery.

Pull bark from trees, preferably oak trees, but any kind will do. Boil it from twelve hours to three days. As the water evaporates, add more. The resulting brew will be so black, so vile tasting and so evil smelling, that it will choke you. But boiled bark contains tannic acid and that will help cure your dysentery. It will also help further the healing of burns. Boiled bark is so terrible to choke down that we were never really sure whether people willed their dysentery to quit rather than swallow the medicine. We joked that the cure was worse than the disease - but it was a cure. (I remembered this remedy because my grandfather had used tree bark to cure deer hides and I figured that something with enough tannic acid to cure hides probably contained enough to cure dysentery.)

Tea is another dysentery cure because it, too, contains tannin. Men who'd had chronic dysentery for two or three years were cured when we got enough tea. Strong tea solutions which contain tannic acid in concentration, have also been used for centuries for burns.

HEPATITIS -- In the summer of 1951, when the Communists talked mildly about bacteriological warfare, we laughed it off as impossible. We still joked about it when they innoculated us against this ridiculous threat. There was a bottle of Soviet-made serum, one syringe and one dull needle for 110 PW's. The first man had hepatitis. Within a week 35 others had it.

Hepatitis, or yellow jaundice, is a liver disease. When you have it, you don't want to eat, but you must. We force-fed men to keep them alive - pushing rice or anything else available down their protesting throats. We also tried to keep them off duty as much as possible for about six weeks after the jaundice had subsided.

The loss of appetite from this disease is terrible. I know because I had hepatitis twice. The other doctors kept me alive by force-feeding me. At the time I was rugged and I hated them for it - but today, needless to say, I am grateful.

LICE -- As a prisoner of war you will get to know many representatives of the animal kingdom, among them, the louse. This six-legged insect can kill you. There are some 5,600 cc's of blood in the body of a normal man of average size. A single louse sucks one cc of blood a day. A louse-covered man soon dies.

In Korea no PW died of any louse-borne disease. I credit this to immunization. Do keep your shots up-to-date. However, lice can bleed you to death unless you pick them off every single day. Never fail to do this even though you are cold, tired and sick, whether you are a PW or an evader.

One PW complained of being weak and tired. In our makeshift hospital, next to the equally makeshift morgue, I unbuttoned his jacket and shirt and pulled up his undershirt. He was a mass of moving gray bodies. Lice were so thick that I could not see his skin. That man was literally being bled to death.

You must pick lice off frequently, for they breed faster than rabbits. Regardless of how cold it is, you must inspect your entire body and every seam of every garment at least once a day, picking off every single louse. Louse hunting does more than just keep the bug from killing you. It not only provides diversion and entertainment of a sort, it also keeps you busy. Purposeful occupation is important beyond

measure if you are an evader or a PW.

WORMS -- You will get worms - all kinds, round, hook and plate worms. They will come from the food you eat and the dirt and filth where you live. Some will look exactly like angle worms five times enlarged. Although there are other symptoms, positive proof that you are infested is when a worm crawls out of your nose. That undoubtedly will shake you up a bit. It always does.

Personal hygiene is the best preventive measure against parasitic infestations. You may not be really clean from the day you go down until you get out, but there are things you must try to do. Wash your body and clothes as often and as well as you can. And, above all, pick lice off at least daily.

Depending upon supplies, there is a warm remedy: Swallow a couple of tablespoons of kerosene or gasoline. Kerosene is more effective but gasoline will do. Either will make you a little sick, but will make the worms a lot sicker.

BLEEDING -- Here I want to make a plea -- if you are bleeding, DO NOT put on a tourniquet. I believe more men lost arms and legs as a result of tourniquets than from any one type of war wound. A tourniquet destroys tissue, gangrene sets in, and it is often impossible to save the injured member.

Just apply heavy, constant pressure - that alone will stop 99% of all bleeding. If blood is spurting out, stick your finger down on the wound and hold it there.

BURNS -- Suppose you are burned. The book says to wash out the burned area and to cover it with a sterile dressing. What, you ask, can you wash it with when there is no water or none that can pass in the dark as sterile? Well, every man has his own supply of one of the most sterile liquids you can find - his own urine. This is just one of the small bits of knowledge you may be able to put to good use. Trying it under extreme circumstances will not hurt you and may save your life.

As you read earlier, tannic acid is good for burns, as well as dysentery. There is tannic acid in strong boiled bark and tea solutions.

WOUNDS AND SURGERY -- There are three treatments for a wound under extreme conditions: clean it out if possible with hot water; wash it out with urine; and/or pick out all foreign matter. The book says to stick

your fingers in a wound. If you have nothing else and if there are objects of metal or bits of clothing in the wound, pick them out or dig them out with your fingers.

Maggots were an accepted treatment for infected wounds during World War I. Maggots eat only dead tissue and will clean out a wound better than anything else except surgery. How, you ask, do I get hold of maggots? That's easy, if you are anywhere in Asia - just expose the wound. The maggots will find it.

If surgery of any kind is required, remember that the area of a wound is dead. When you realize there is no feeling in a wound, it is easier for you to stick the needle into it, to cut, or to do whatever else is necessary. (We had to amputate a few toes as a result of frostbite. For the first six months, we had a little ether, but later there was no anaesthetic.)

You may never have to use a knife to lance boils, cysts and the like; but, if you do, soak the area in hot water for a couple of days and then, if it is still necessary, open it up.

A most successful hemorrhoidectomy was performed in our camp. A major had a terrible hemorrhoid that bothered him dreadfully. He limped around for days, soaking it in hot water as often as possible. When the condition failed to improve, he came to see me. As he bent over for me to examine him, four trusty colleagues grabbed him. I whipped out my trusty surgical knife, patiently sharpened to a razor's edge on stones but originally a steel arch support from a boot. Out came the offending hemorrhoid despite the patient's belligerent screams and profane threats. The operation was extremely successful. The patient not only lived but lived in considerably greater comfort.

KEEP A SENSE OF HUMOR -- Humor is important in a prisoner of war camp. Even though everything around you is tragic, you must sustain your will to laugh in order to survive. You have to consciously work to retain a sense of humor, a sense of the ridiculous. If the Communists tie you up for some reason, you must be able to find humor in the fact that you can tie better knots than two or three of them are doing.

I actually laughed at men dying. There were symptoms you could assess without being able to describe them: a listlessness, a look, turning from reality. When these symptoms appeared in various degrees

and varying combinations, you could estimate very closely how long a particular man you had come to know well, would cling to life. Another doctor and I had a running bet on life expectancies. Even though I made money on the deal, I hope I never have to face such a situation again.

We used our sense of humor rather effectively in a perverted sort of counter-harassment. Americans are the most unpredictable people in the world - and methodical types like the Chinese Communists were unstrung when they could not anticipate what we would do next. We encouraged this by deliberately moving along in one direction for awhile and then, without warning, make a complete 180.

Such activity seemed to us our little contribution to the war effort, that we had a mission of some sort. Our PW camp was our "front," a small but active area of combat. Although we had no orthodox weapons, we inflicted what damage we could to the enemy we encountered.

MEDICAL SUMMARY -- You, of course, know all the basic first aid the Air Force has exposed you to. And, of course, if possible, you will have with you a standard first aid kit, as well as your own personal one. (Having such kits is a real luxury.) In addition, you must face the possibility or even probability that emergency treatments may extend far beyond those normally covered by peacetime, ZI first aid. You must also face the very real possibility that you may be the only person available to perform such treatments. Under such circumstances, you must use what God gave you: Your head and your hands.

Men with chest wounds - open, sucking wounds, have stuffed them with handkerchiefs or torn shirts and kept going. Men have broken their backs when they bailed out or hit the ground. After regaining consciousness, they have rolled around for a stick or board, strapped it to them in a fashion and moved on. Men with severe wounds have amputated a limb, whittled a crutch, and kept going. Many things are possible to those with will and determination.

Of all the things I've discussed, none is as important as your own will to survive. Regardless of where you are, how miserable your circumstances, what the enemy does to you, **MAKE UP YOUR MIND THAT YOU WILL LIVE THROUGH IT.** Men who should have been dead, simply refused to die. Their secret? They had this one idea and they kept it despite everything: "I'm going to live."

PRÉCIS OF DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE
1954 GENEVA CONFERENCE

The three armistice agreements (for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) ending the eight-year war between the French and the Communists in Indochina were signed on July 20, 1954, and were incorporated in the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference the following day. The United States and South Vietnam refused to accept the Declaration, which was endorsed by the Soviet Union, Communist China, France, Britain, Laos, Cambodia, and the Communist Viet Minh (North Vietnam). The United States issued a declaration of its own instead. Unilateral declarations relative to the peace settlement were also issued by France, Laos, and Cambodia (each of which however, accepted the Final Declaration).

The Franco-Viet Minh agreement, opposed by South Vietnam, established a provisional military demarcation line at approximately the 17th parallel with a demilitarized zone of five kilometers on each side. French forces north of the line were to withdraw to the south within 300 days, while Viet Minh military units were to evacuate to the north by the same deadline. Civil administration to the north and south of the demilitarized zone was to be the responsibility of the side evacuating to the area in question until elections could be held. New troops and arms were not to be introduced into either zone, although provision was made for troop rotation and replacement of used or deteriorated equipment. Neither portion of Vietnam was to allow the establishment of foreign military bases or to join any military alliance. There were also provisions concerning release of internees, assistance to persons who wished to move to the territory of the other party, and prohibition of destruction of property or injury to persons.

Joint commissions were to be set up by the two sides to execute the agreement. A tripartite commission, composed of India (Chairman), Canada, and Poland, was established to supervise implementation of the pact and was to carry out its work in large measure through investigations by mixed inspection teams. Voting in the ICC was to be by majority -- with the exception of questions dealing with violations or threats of violations which could lead to hostilities. In the latter case the commission could make a decision only by a unanimous vote. Majority and minority reports were to be made to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference (Britain and Russia) in the event of lack of unanimity.

In the case of Laos, the Franco-Viet Minh agreement provided for the evacuation of the forces of both sides from the country within 120 days, with the exception of 5,000 French soldiers who might remain for specific purposes. Up to 1,500 French military personnel might be retained for training purposes, and another 3,500 could stay to maintain two remaining French military bases (one at Seno and the other in the Mekong Valley). The "fighting units" of the Pathet Lao, the indigenous Communist military forces, were to regroup in the northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly within 120 days. The Pathets would retain their arms, have freedom of movement between the two provinces by means of a corridor linking them, and remain in their positions until a political settlement had been reached with the Royal government. Internees were to be released within 30 days, and both sides agreed not to engage in reprisals. A Joint Commission and International Control Commission of the sort set up in Vietnam were established.

The Cambodian armistice agreement provided for the departure of all foreign troops within 90 days. The Khmer Issaraks, the Cambodian ally of the Viet Minh, were to be immediately demobilized. The Cambodian government, which signed the agreement (rather than the French) with the Viet Minh, pledged itself to take no discriminatory action against members of the Khmer Issaraks. Implementation machinery was the same as for Vietnam and Laos, except that the Joint Commission was a Cambodian-Viet Minh one rather than Franco-Viet Minh.

Cambodia's government also unilaterally issued two declarations on July 21, one dealing with treatment of the Khmer Issaraks and the other with the country's planned foreign policy orientation. The former pledged the government to integrate all citizens into the national community and to guarantee their exercise of rights and freedoms proclaimed in the constitution. The declaration stated that all citizens could freely participate as voters or candidates in elections by secret ballot. The second statement pledged the government **not** to follow an aggressive policy and not to join any alliance not in conformity with the UN Charter or to allow foreign bases on its soil in the absence of a threat to its security. Cambodia further declared that it would not accept foreign military aid except for defense of its own territory.

An identical unilateral declaration concerning foreign aid, bases, and alliances was issued the same day by the Laotian government. A

second Laotian statement also pledged integration of all citizens into the national community, the guarantee of rights and freedoms provided by the constitution, and free participation in elections. The latter declaration additionally promised measures providing for special representation in the Royal government's administration of Sam Neua and Phong Saly, pending elections, for those who did not support the government in the previous fighting.

Two unilateral French declarations of the same date promised France's readiness to withdraw all its forces from its former Indochinese territories, as desired by the governments in question, and to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the three nations in the settlement of any future problems concerning the effective establishment of peace in Indochina.

The Final Declaration of the conference, for the most part, took note of, and indeed incorporated, the main provisions of the several armistice agreements and the Laotian, Cambodian, and French unilateral declarations. The Final Declaration, which the United States and South Vietnam did not sign, emphasized the temporary character of the division of Vietnam as a means of ending hostilities and not as a permanent political or territorial boundary. The Declaration further stated that the settlement of political problems in Vietnam would allow the Vietnamese people to have a democratically established government as a result of free elections to be held in July 1956 under supervision of the ICC. The two Vietnamese governments were to meet to plan for these elections from July 20, 1955, but nothing was stated with respect to what the political problems were or how they would be settled. The Final Declaration particularly took note of the provision in the Vietnamese armistice agreement allowing persons freedom to decide in which zone they would live (a provision suggesting that the division of the state might turn out to be more than temporary). The nations endorsing the results of the Geneva Conference also pledged themselves to respect the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the Indochinese states and not to interfere in their internal affairs. They agreed to consult together on any question referred to them by any of the International Control Commissions in order to ensure that the cease-fire agreements for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were kept.

The United States, in a unilateral declaration of July 21, took note of the Final Declaration and the armistice pacts and pledged itself to refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them. It also declared that it would view any renewal of aggression in violation of these agreements with grave concern and as a serious threat to the peace. On the

question of the Vietnamese elections, the United States reiterated its stand in support of UN supervision.

The several pacts and declarations collectively known as the Geneva Agreements clearly represented a compromise solution to the threatening Indochinese problem as it manifested itself in 1954--and a compromise which in Vietnam probably gave the anti-Communists more than they might have won on the battlefield. At the same time, however, it should be noted that a more vigorous and concerted Western bargaining assault, particularly as it involved US participation, might have forced even greater concessions from the Communists. Immediate disarmament and demobilization of the Pathet Lao, for example, might have been demanded--and obtained. The provisions for implementation and guarantee of the accords, moreover, were primitive in terms of even the limited experiences of nations to date in this type of activity. Too much, however, can be made of this point--meaning that various of the Geneva powers of 1954 (the United States, Britain, and France, for instance) were not prevented from subsequently making individual or collective efforts to maintain the Indochinese settlement.

PRÉCIS OF DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE
1961-1962 GENEVA CONFERENCE

Two important international documents resulted from the Conference on Laos which began on May 16, 1961, and ended on July 23, 1962. These were the 14-nation Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and its accompanying Protocol, the former incorporating the statement of neutrality adopted by the Royal Laotian government on July 9, 1962. An additional important document, the Joint Communique of Zurich of June 22, 1961, represented an agreement among the three chief contending groups in Laos, without which (like the July 9 statement on neutrality) the Geneva Declaration and Protocol of July 23 might not have been possible. Because these several agreements build upon one another, they are summarized in chronological order.

The Joint Communique of Zurich, signed by the three princes associated with the main contending political factions (Souvanna Phouma, Boun Oum, and Souvannouvong), provided for a provisional government of national union to carry out a policy of peace and neutrality. Chief among the matters of internal policy on which the three princes agreed were execution by the provisional government of the cease-fire among the three opposed groups and unification of the fighting forces of the parties into a single national army. Externally, the government of national union would not participate in any military alliance, would not allow any new foreign military bases on Laotian soil, would not allow any nation to use Laotian territory for military purposes, and would not recognize the protection of any military alliance (meaning SEATO). Nor would the three parties approve foreign interference in the internal affairs of Laos in any form. Foreign military personnel were to be withdrawn (and no others introduced), aid was to be accepted unconditionally from all countries, and a policy of friendly relations was to be pursued with all nations.

The statement of neutrality proclaimed on July 9, 1962, by the Royal Government of Laos, followed by more than a year the Zurich Joint Communique. This statement, made at the Geneva Conference by the newly formed Government of National Union, led by Prince Souvanna Phouma, was primarily what it was officially titled, a statement of neutrality which was to be promulgated constitutionally and literally have the force of law. The statement unilaterally pledged the government to various of the points contained in the earlier Zurich

Communique: withdrawal of foreign troops, acceptance of unconditional aid from any country, and such. The degree of change in official external orientation of the Laos government can be seen in its agreement, following the pattern of Zurich, not to enter into any military or other pact inconsistent with a neutral foreign policy, not to allow the establishment of foreign bases in the country, not to allow any country to use Laotian territory for military purposes or to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations and, finally, not to recognize the protection of any alliance--including SEATO. SEATO was specifically named in the July 9, 1962, statement of neutrality; it had not been so designated in the Zurich Communique.

The Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, signed on July 23, 1962, incorporated the Laotian government's statement of neutrality, and pledged its non-Laotian signatories--China, the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, North and South Vietnam, India, Poland, Canada, France, Thailand, Burma, and Cambodia--to respect Laotian sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity in every way. In particular, the states signing the Declaration agreed not to use or threaten force against Laos, not to use Laotian territory to interfere in the internal affairs of other states (or their own territory to interfere in the internal affairs of Laos), and not to introduce troops into the country or seek to establish bases. The signatories also pledged themselves not to bring Laos in any way into any military alliance. As for the wish of Laos not to recognize the protection of any military alliance, including SEATO, the Geneva states agreed to honor the expressed desire of the Laotian government in this regard. In the case of violation, or threat of violation, of the Declaration, the signatories would consult jointly with the Laotian government and among themselves to consider ways to ensure observance of the various provisions of the agreement.

The Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, also signed July 23, 1962, provided for the implementation of the latter. Foreign troops, according to the Protocol, were to be withdrawn within 30 days after the reactivated ICC (chaired again by India and comprising also Canada and Poland) had notified the Laotian government that its inspection teams were at all designated points of departure. The latter, in turn, were to be determined by the government 30 days after the Protocol took effect. Withdrawal was to be only through such points, and the commission was to be notified in advance of planned troop departures. Reintroduction of troops was prohibited, and the ICC was given authority to investigate when there were grounds for

believing that a violation had taken place. The Laotian government and France were to arrange the transfer of remaining French military installations in the country to Laos as soon as possible; a limited number of French military instructors might remain in the country, for a brief period, for training purposes however.

Introduction of armaments, munitions, and war material generally was prohibited, except such conventional armaments regarded by the governments as necessary for the country's defense. The ICC was authorized to aid the government in determining if this prohibition had been violated.

Actual responsibility for execution of the Laotian ceasefire, recognized and supported by the Declaration on Laotian Neutrality and its Protocol, lay with the three political factions and the new Laotian government after its formation. The ICC was given the task of supervising and controlling the ceasefire--with the concurrence of the government, but it was generally considered at the time the article was drafted that this concurrence would be considered to have been given when the Government of Laos signed the Protocol. The commission was to report periodically to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference (Britain and the Soviet Union) as well as to inform them immediately of any violations, or threats of violation, of the Protocol as well as any significant steps it had taken in pursuance of the Protocol.

Substantive or major decisions of the Control Commission, conclusions forwarded to the Co-Chairmen, and recommendations made to the latter were to be decided unanimously. However, decisions on procedural matters or dealing with the initiation or carrying out of investigations were to be made according to a majority vote, but initiation or carrying out of investigations had to be with the concurrence of the Laotian government. The means of communication and transportation used by the commission were to be under its own administrative control.

The Co-Chairmen were charged with the task of recommending on the question of termination of the commission to the members of the Conference within three years--or earlier, if requested by the Laotian government.

Both sides clearly obtained some of the objectives they sought at Geneva in 1961-1962, but the anti-communist nations appear to have paid more dearly for attainment of their ends. The Communists, possessed of both superior military and political strength, in effect agreed to call off their armed attempt to take over Laos immediately.

This can be interpreted as being no more than a postponement of the day when Laos will fall under complete Communist control, either as a result of political conquest or renewed military activity.

What the United States and its allies obtained was: (1) the postponement of an imminent Communist take-over of Laos by military means and (2) the elimination of a situation that seemingly could be altered only by military intervention by the anti-Communist nations, which in the last analysis most of them, including the United States wished to avoid. Whereas the Communists only temporarily called off their military attempt to take over Laos, the United States and its allies agreed to a major diminution of their influence in the country, a coalition government in which the faction supported by the United States held only one-third of the portfolios, and a seemingly totally unnecessary restriction and embarrassment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

The provisions for maintaining the Laotian settlement were sharpened somewhat over 1954, particularly with regard to planned supervision of troop withdrawals and Control Commission administration of its transportation and communications facilities. In general, however, the peace-keeping machinery was the 1954 Geneva model warmed over. If SEATO is regarded as a major prop of the earlier Indochinese settlement, however ineffective a one, it was eliminated altogether in 1962 as a more or less legitimate means of maintaining the seemingly agreed settlement. Even more reliance was placed accordingly upon the ICC and the implicit guarantee of the settlement by the signatories to the Final Declaration and its Protocol.

Finally, there was no assurance that the internal political and military balance would be maintained or that effective integration of the three factions would take place. Indeed, if this occurred, it would probably come as a major surprise. In this respect, the 1962 Geneva settlement can be regarded, at best, as a calculated risk and, more accurately, as a strategic retreat on the part of the United States whether so labelled or not (which, of course, it could not be).

BADGER	WINGSPAN	LENGTH	MAX RANGE	MAX SPEED	SERVICE CEILING	ENGINES
Tu-16						<u>2</u> TURBOJET
MEDIUM BOMBER	110 FT	120 FT	3975 NM	600 KT	50,000 FT	20,950 lb ea

BOMBERS



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT
B-47 (Stratojet)

Wings sweptback and tapered with squared tips. Two wing fences on each wing. Landing gear pods extend beyond wing's trailing edges. Engine nacelles at wing roots extend beyond both edges of wings. Tailplane mounted low on vertical tailfin. Gunner's compartment and turret aft of tailplane. Pointed fuselage may have transparent or solid nose. Gun turret under fuselage aft of wings and on top of fuselage forward of engine intakes. Radome under nose. Air-to-surface missiles may be carried by B and C versions.

USED BY

INDONESIA

IRAQ



BEAGLE	WINGSPAN	LENGTH
II-28	70 FT	58 FT
LIGHT TACTICAL BOMBER		



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

Straight leading and tapered trailing wing edges with squared tips.
 Engine nacelles under the wings extend well forward of leading edge and slightly aft of trailing edge.
 Sweptback tailplane mounted low on vertical tailfin with squared tips.
 Rounded fuselage has blunt, transparent nose and bubble-type canopy.
 Gunner's compartment and turret located aft of tailplane.
 Mascot (U11-28) is trainer version of Beagle with tandem canopies, solid nose, and without tail guns or ventral radome.

USED BY

AFGHANISTAN
 ALGERIA

EAST GERMANY
 FINLAND
 IRAQ
 MOROCCO

POLAND
 RUMANIA
 SYRIA

MAX RANGE	MAX SPEED	SERVICE CEILING	ENGINES
1200 NM	500 KT	50,000 FT	2
			TURBOJET
			5,950 lb ea




COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT

NONE

BOMBERS

BEAR	WINGSPAN	LENGTH	MAX RANGE	MAX SPEED	SERVICE CEILING	ENGINES
Tu-95	165 FT	150 FT	8000 NM	500 KT	44,000 FT	4
HEAVY BOMBER						TURBOPROP
						12,000 eshp ea

BOMBERS



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

Wings sweptback and tapered with squared tips.
 Four slender engine nacelles extend far beyond leading wing edges. Two contrarotating propellers on each engine.
 Sweptback tailplane with squared tips. Gunner's compartment and turret aft of tailplane.
 Long, slender fuselage with solid or transparent nose. Radome under nose. Landing gear pods in line with inboard nacelles extend aft of wing's trailing edges.
 One air-to-surface missile may be carried under the fuselage of some versions.

COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT
B-52 (Stratofortress) (In mission only)



USED BY
 U.S.S.R.

BISON

M-4


HEAVY BOMBER

WINGSPAN

170 FT

LENGTH

162 FT



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

Wings sweptback and tapered. One wing fence on each wing. Outrigger gear pods on blunt wingtips.

Nacelles at wing roots extend beyond both edges.

Tailplane sweptback with squared tips.

Long, slender fuselage with turrets located on top of fuselage forward of wings, under fuselage forward of wing, and in tail. Sighting blisters located on top and on each side of fuselage aft of cabin.

Radome beneath transparent or solid nose.

USED BY
U.S.S.R.

MAX RANGE

6000 NM

MAX SPEED

525 KT

SERVICE
CEILING

45,000 FT

ENGINES

4

TURBOJET

20,000 lb ea



COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT

B-52 (Stratofortress)

(In mission only)



COCK	WINGSPAN	LENGTH
An-22		189 FT
TRANSPORT	211 FT 3 IN.	8 IN.



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

High-mounted wings have tapered leading edges, and nearly straight trailing edges. Anhedral or droop in outer wing sections. Engine nacelles extend forward of wing's leading edges. Huge cylindrical fuselage tapers to tailplane providing for freight doors and ramp. Tailplane mounted on top of fuselage with vertical fins center-mounted on each end of tailplane. Large bulges along bottom of fuselage contain landing gear.

USED BY
U.S.S.R.

MAX RANGE	MAX SPEED	SERVICE CEILING	ENGINES
6,800 NM	400 KT	NOT AVAILABLE	4
			TURBOPROP
			15,000 eshp ea



CARGO/TRANSPORT

-41-


COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT

C-133



COLT	WINGSPAN	LENGTH
An-2		
GENERAL PURPOSE TRANSPORT	60 FT	42 FT

MAX RANGE	MAX SPEED	SERVICE CEILING	ENGINES
			1
945 NM	137 KT	16,400 FT	PISTON
			1,000 hp



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

Biplane with wings of unequal length, braced with one strut between wings on each side.

Tailplane mounted on rounded vertical fin.

Fixed conventional landing gear but may be equipped with skis or pontoons. Short, thick fuselage with radial engine.

USED BY

AFGHANISTAN	BULGARIA	COMMUNIST CHINA
EAST GERMANY	HUNGARY	NORTH KOREA
MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	POLAND
MALI	RUMANIA	U.S.S.R.



COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT

NONE

CARGO/TRANSPORT

FAGOT**MiG-15**

FIGHTER

WINGSPAN

33 FT

LENGTH

33 FT

MAX RANGE

650 NM

MAX SPEED

590 KT

SERVICE
CEILING

51,000 FT

ENGINES

1
TURBOJET
6,000 lb**OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES**

Single-place, bubble-type canopy on short, thick, round fuselage that tapers at blunt nose and tail.

Midmounted, sweptback, and tapered wings with blunt tips. Two stall fences on each wing.

Sweptback tailplane mounted high on sweptback vertical fin. Tailplane and vertical fin extend beyond tail cone.

Midget (UMiG-15) is two-seat trainer version of Fagot.

USED BY

AFGHANISTAN ALBANIA ALGERIA BULGARIA COMMUNIST CHINA CUBA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA EAST GERMANY HUNGARY IRAQ INDONESIA MOROCCO
NORTH KOREA NORTH VIETNAM POLAND RUMANIA SYRIA UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
U.S.S.R.

**COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT**

F-86E (Sabre)



FARMER	WINGSPAN	LENGTH
MiG-19	32 FT	38 FT
FIGHTER/INTERCEPTOR		



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

Midmounted, sweptback, and tapered wings with blunt tips. Large wing fence on each wing.

Sweptback faired tailplane with blunt tips.

Round fuselage with thick tail section. Twin engine exhausts visible behind tailplane. Bubble-type canopy centered on leading edge of wing root.

Ventral fin located aft of wing roots.

Farmer is produced in several versions.

Air-to-air missiles may be carried by one or more versions.

USED BY

BULGARIA	COMMUNIST CHINA	CUBA	CZECHOSLOVAKIA
EAST GERMANY	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAQ
RUMANIA	SYRIA	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	USSR
			YUGOSLAVIA

MAX RANGE	MAX SPEED	SERVICE CEILING	ENGINES
1400 NM	Mach 1+	60,000 FT	2 TURBOJET
			7 700 lb ea



COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT F-100F (Super Sabre)



FIGHTERS

FIDDLER

Yak

LONG-RANGE
ALL-WEATHER
INTERCEPTOR

WINGSPAN

65 FT

LENGTH

95 FT



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

Midmounted, sweptback, and tapered wings with blunt tips. Landing gear pods project from trailing edges.

Sweptback tailplane with blunt tips.

Large, thick fuselage with pointed nose. Engine intakes on each side midway between canopy and wing roots. Large, faired bulge on underside of fuselage. Twin ventral fins located under tailplane.

Air-to-air missiles may be carried on wing pylons.

USED BY

U.S.S.R.

MAX RANGE

800 NM

MAX SPEED

Mach 2

SERVICE
CEILING

70,000 FT

ENGINES
2

TURBOJET

11 000 lb ea



COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT

F-4B (Phantom II)



FIGHTERS -45-

FISHBED**MiG-21**

FIGHTER

WINGSPAN

25 FT

LENGTH

55 FT

MAX RANGE

1000 NM

MAX SPEED

Mach 2

SERVICE
CEILING

60,000 FT

ENGINES

1
TURBOJET

13,000 lb

**OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES**

Midmounted delta-wing with small squared tips.

Three stall fences on each wing.

Sweptback tailplane with squared tips mounted high on fuselage.

Tapered fuselage with dorsal spine connecting bubble-type canopy with sweptback and tapered vertical fin. Ventral fin below tail.

Air-to-air missiles carried on wing pylons.

USED BY


ALGERIA	COMMUNIST CHINA	CUBA	CZECHOSLOVAKIA
EAST GERMANY	FINLAND	HUNGARY	INDIA
	INDONESIA	IRAQ	
NORTH KOREA	NORTH VIETNAM	POLAND	RUMANIA
SYRIA	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	USSR	YUGOSLAVIA

**COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT**

F-106A (Delta Dart)



FISHPOT	WINGSPAN	LENGTH	MAX RANGE	MAX SPEED	SERVICE CEILING	ENGINES
Su-9 ALL-WEATHER INTERCEPTOR	26 FT	56 FT	1000 NM	Mach 2	50,000+ FT	1 TURBOJET 22,000 lb



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

- Midmounted, delta-wing with small squared tips.
- Sweptback, tapered tailplane with squared tips.
- Long fuselage with blunt nose and thick, blunt tail.
- Bubble-type canopy forward of leading edges of wings.
- External ventral fuel tanks.
- Air-to-air missiles carried on wing pylons.

USED BY
U.S.S.R.

COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT F-106A (Delta Dart)



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FIGHTERS

FITTER**Su-7**GROUND ATTACK
FIGHTER

WINGSPAN

30 FT

LENGTH

56 FT

MAX RANGE

1000 NM

MAX SPEED

Mach 2+


SERVICE
CEILING

50,000 FT

ENGINES



1
TURBOJET

22,000 lb


**OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES**

Low-mounted, sharply sweptback and tapered wings with two stall fences on each blunt tipped wing. Wings have straight inboard trailing edges. Sweptback and tapered tailplane with blunt tips midmounted on fuselage. External ventral fuel tanks. Long, round fuselage with blunt nose and tail. Bubble-type canopy in line with leading edges of wings.

USED BY
U.S.S.R.

**COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT**
F-100A (Super Sabre)

FRESCO	WINGSPAN	LENGTH	MAX RANGE	MAX SPEED	SERVICE CEILING	ENGINES
MiG-17	32 FT	37 FT	1100 NM	625 KT	57,000 FT	1
INTERCEPTOR						TURBOJET
						7,600 lb



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

- Midmounted, sweptback, and slightly tapered wings with rounded tips.
- Trailing edges straight near fuselage.
- Three stall fences mounted on each wing.
- Sweptback and tapered tailplane high on sweptback vertical fin.
- Blunt fuselage with bubble-type canopy in line with wing's leading edges.
- Small radome mounted in nose of latest versions.

USED BY

AFGHANISTAN ALBANIA ALGERIA BULGARIA COMMUNIST CHINA
 CUBA CZECHOSLOVAKIA EAST GERMANY HUNGARY INDONESIA
 IRAQ MOROCCO NORTH KOREA NORTH VIETNAM POLAND



COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT F-86F (Sabre)



HARKE	ROTOR DIAMETER	LENGTH
Mi-10	MAIN 115 FT	118 FT
HEAVY TRANSPORT		



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

Long-legged quadricycle landing gear on early versions.
 Short landing gear and supplementary cockpit under fuselage on later version (Mi-10K).
 Twin turboshaft engines drive five-bladed main rotor mounted above cabin.
 Underside of fuselage is flat and extends back to the tail.
 Tail rotor mounted on right hand side of sweptback vertical fin.
 Large external fuel pod mounted on each side of cabin.
 Development of Hook.

USED BY
U.S.S.R.

MAX RANGE	MAX SPEED	SERVICE CEILING	ENGINES 2
310 NM	100 KT	7,250 FT	TURBOSHAFT
			4,700 shp ea



COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT

NONE

HOOK	ROTOR DIAMETER		LENGTH
Mi-6	MAIN	TAIL	108 FT
HEAVY TRANSPORT	115 FT	23 FT	WINGSPAN
			50 FT

MAX RANGE	MAX SPEED	SERVICE CEILING	ENGINES
500 NM	170 KT	14,750 FT	2
			TURBINE
			5,500 shp ea



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

Engine intakes of twin turbines located on top of fuselage aft of cockpit.
 Five-bladed main rotor centered over extremely large fuselage. Stub wings located at top of fuselage aft of exhaust ports.
 Tail rotor mounted on right hand side of sweptback vertical tail fin.
 Horizontal stabilizer fins mounted on end of tail boom.
 Fixed main landing gear and retractable nose wheel.

USED BY

EAST GERMANY
 INDONESIA

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
 USSR




COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT
 CH-37 (H-37) (Mojave)



HELICOPTERS

HORSE	ROTOR DIAMETER	LENGTH
Yak-24	MAIN 70 FT	
MEDIUM TRANSPORT		70 FT

MAX RANGE	MAX SPEED	SERVICE CEILING	ENGINES
300 NM	150 KT	18,000 FT	$\frac{2}{\text{PISTON}}$
			1,700 hp ea



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

Long, squared fuselage with transparent nose and upswept tail section.
 Tandem rotors with front rotor mounted over cockpit and rear rotor mounted on pylon above tail section.
 V-shaped tail stabilizers mounted below rear rotor and braced to motor pylon.
 Fixed quadricycle landing gear with extensive bracing.

COMPARABLE U.S. AIRCRAFT CH-21B (H-21B) (Workhorse)



USED BY
 EAST GERMANY U.S.S.R.

-52-

HELICOPTERS

HOUND	ROTOR DIAMETER		LENGTH
	MAIN	TAIL	
Mi-4	70 FT	12 FT	55 FT
TRANSPORT			



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

Four-bladed single main rotor mounted on top of cabin.

Bulky fuselage with solid, rounded nose. Transparent cockpit sharply narrows to tapering tail boom. Tail rotor mounted on right hand side of small sweptback vertical fin.

Fixed quadricycle landing gear.

Hip is turbine-powered version of Hound.

USED BY

AFGHANISTAN ALBANIA ALGERIA BULGARIA CAMBODIA COMMUNIST CHINA

CUBA CZECHOSLOVAKIA EAST GERMANY ETHIOPIA FINLAND GHANA

HUNGARY INDIA INDONESIA IRAQ NORTH KOREA NORTH VIETNAM

POLAND RUMANIA SYRIA UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC USSR

MADGE	WINGSPAN	LENGTH
LONG-RANGE RECONNAISSANCE		



OUTSTANDING RECOGNITION FEATURES

High-mounted gull wing with stabilizing floats centered between blunt wing tips and engine nacelles.

Large radial engine nacelles mounted at crest of gull wing.

Tailplane with positive dihedral mounted on top of fuselage forward of tail gunner's compartment and turret. Twin vertical fins mounted on ends of tailplane.

Large, bulky fuselage with gun turrets in nose and on top of fuselage aft of wing roots. May have MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detection) gear.

TAC-GEORGE AFB, CALIF

