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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
28TH MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 9627

AVIC-WE

18 Jan 70

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: Command Historian
APO San Francisco 9637

TO: Headquarters
Department of the Army
ATTN: O. C. M. H.
Washington, D. C. 2031

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation TEXAS TRAVELER, a squadron-sized operation to interdict enemy forces and lines of communication.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 24 - 27 November 1969.
3. LOCATION OF OPERATION: Within a square bounded by XT 4880 and XT 4484, Map Series L8020, Sheet 6232 II N, Republic of Vietnam.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 11th ACR, QUAN LOI, VIETNAM.
5. PERSONS BEING INTERVIEWED: All persons mentioned by name in the EXECUTION section.
6. INTERVIEWING OFFICER AND SPECIALISTS: Captain Joel T. Matulys and SP4 David E. McSpadden, 28th Military History Detachment, 11th ACR.
7. TASK ORGANIZATION: See introduction to EXECUTION section.
8. SUPPORTING FORCES: See introduction to EXECUTION section.
9. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: The Blackhorse Regiment had previously worked in this area of operations during Operation MONTANA RAIDER.

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY ON: 31 Dec 1976

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UNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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10. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Eastern War Zone C: There are two systems of supply and infiltration routes in this zone: the Saigon - Michelin corridor along the Saigon River Basin, and the trails and caches running diagonally from the "Dog's Neck" to the Saigon River (southeast to river junction at XT 4:53). Historically, War Zone C has been an inviolable area from which the enemy has provided manpower and materials to the battlefield. High level headquarters, rear service installations, training centers, and hospitals are located in this area. Base areas 3:2 and 3:3, straddling the Cambodian border into War Zone C, not only contain the Headquarters of Central Office, South Vietnam, (COSVN) but also provide rest areas for Main Force enemy units. Main Force units also infiltrate and initiate the preparatory phases of offensive operations from these base areas.

b. The Threat: From mid-September until early November, enemy initiated activity was characterized by scattered attacks by fire, light ground probes, ground to air firings and logistical operations. However, during the early morning hours of 4 November, FSB IKE and FSB JAMIE received ground probes while FSB ST. BARBARA and FSB VICKIE received attacks by fire. Although the K2 Battalion of the 271st Regiment was identified as participating in the attack on FSB IKE, no other unit identification was made. On 20 November, the future intentions of the 9th VC Division were unknown; however, it was believed that the 4 November attacks, as well as others throughout III Corps, signaled the beginning of the first phase of the Winter - Spring Offensive. According to documents captured in III Corps, the initial phase of the campaign would be from 3 to 25 November. In War Zone C, the 9th VC Regiment was believed to be located in the northwestern quarter of the area of operations, with the mission of attacking FSB'S CAROLYN and IKE. The 271st VC Regiment was believed to be in the central portion of the area of operations and prepared to attack fire support bases in the central and eastern areas. Although its exact intentions were unknown, the 272nd VC Regiment was tentatively placed in Southwestern War Zone C, and it was believed to be destined for Base Area 3:5. Attacks in War Zone C would be supported by 9th VC Division organic artillery and sapper units, and possibly the N-16 Armor Office, COSVN. Resupply activity continued and was expected to increase.

11. MISSION: On the basis of the above intelligence, the 11th ACR was placed under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and Operation TEXAS TRAVELER was planned. Instructions from the First Cavalry Division (AM) Operational Guidance gave the Third Squadron, 11th ACR the mission of locating, interdicting, and neutralizing base areas, cache sites, and the enemy lines of communication emanating from Base Areas 3:0 and 3:2.

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12. CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND EXECUTION: The Third Squadron, 11th ACR, composed of I, K, and L Troops, M Company, and an organic Howitzer battery, was given the mission of conducting an area reconnaissance of the Eastern Sector of War Zone C. The First Cavalry Division (AM) was to provide two companies of 2/7 Cavalry and one platoon of C/8 Engineers, who were to be reinforced by four additional mine sweeper teams. Also under the operational control of the Third Squadron were to be two companies of CIDG from MINH THANH and one platoon from the 919th Engineer Company (Armored).

In conducting their reconnaissance, the Third Squadron would conduct a multiple route, cross country penetration through AO Dallas along the axis of route 246, executing combat assaults along the road to clear it of obstacles. The First Squadron, 11th ACR, would be prepared to reinforce by moving into the area of operations and conducting operations.

a. General: The operation began on 24 November, 1969, with the armor column pushing into the operational area as planned. As they progressed, it became evident the terrain would limit their speed considerably. Also, they encountered increasing signs of enemy presence and finally had a few minor contacts. On 2 November, the Third Squadron's advance greatly slowed, and they fell even further behind their timetable. Because of enemy harrasing action, they were forced into time consuming sweeps, generally to the north and away from their route of march. These enemy actions were very effective, for they slowed the advance, inflicted casualties and equipment losses, and took the elements of tactical surprise and initiative that are so important to armor.

On the morning of 26 November, disaster struck the Third Squadron. Enemy RPG's hit several key vehicles in the Command Post NDP, and the ensuing explosions and fire destroyed a number of vehicles and caused numerous casualties. The remainder of the day was spent recovering from the pre-dawn attack and participating in small reconnaissance operations in the area, in which there was some action. There was little contact the next day; however several mines and caches were discovered. In the evening, I Troop was hit by an attack but there was no ground probe there, nor anywhere else, that night. The Squadron was ordered to return to FSB JAKE, which they did on 29 November.

b. 24 November 1969: On 24 November, Third Squadron began their penetration and Operation TEXAS TRAVELER was underway. M Company, in the lead, rumbled across the bridge spanning the Saigon River at 0630 hours. Six minutes later, L Troop also was on the western bank and I, K, and HHT/3/11 ACR were crossing. By 0655 hours, the MINH THANH CIDG had been airlifted by Chinook to FSB JAKE, and the tracked vehicles of the Squadron were rolling forward in a column formation (L Troop on the right followed by I Troop, and M Company leading the left column followed by K Troop).

The column had moved about one and a half kilometers from the bridge when M Company discovered 8 - 10 fresh bunkers, located only 40 meters from the road.

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Continuing, they realized that the ground was becoming too soft to support the heavy M48's, and M Company was forced to travel on the road (246). They were then by-passed and the right hand column, with L Troop in front, took the lead. As the Squadron pushed forward they found increasing signs of the enemy, but still there was no contact. Only twenty minutes after finding the bunkers, M Company found a 105mm round (XT 603822) and tracks leading west. Nine minutes after this, a Pink Team reported seeing fresh tracks and a one and one half foot deep hole near the road (XT 596822). The farther the column traveled, the less trafficable the ground became, and by 0850 hours, two M Company tanks were mired in the marshy ground near 246. The tankers worked quickly and efficiently to free the vehicles before the march was delayed. About an hour later, L Troop found footprints (XT 585830) and at about the same time I Troop, following L Troop, found a trail that had been used by five individuals about 24 hours before. Minutes later, an aircraft spotted two recently evacuated fifty-one caliber machinegun positions about six kilometers ahead of the approaching column (XT 534875).

During the remainder of the day, L Troop made most of the visual sightings and contact. At 1118 hours, one of their ACAV's hit a mine which was planted about fifty meters from the road, at XT 552845). The mine blew a rear wheel from the track, but caused no casualties. The units rolled forward for one kilometer to XT 538842 where L Troop discovered a trail running north and south which had been used by 20 people. L Troop followed the trail and found a dud, 250-pound bomb which they blew in place. At 1300 hours a forward air controller spotted a major bunker complex at XT 502804 and called in artillery.

The westward move continued with L Troop leading the column. At 1439 hours they were in a brief fire fight in which one trooper was killed---- enemy casualties were unknown. The troop moved forward in vigorous pursuit of the fleeing enemy and finally regained contact at 1507 hours. They suffered no casualties in the short fight. Later, during a sweep of the area, they found one NVA killed, six 60mm rounds, 300-400 pounds of rice, 100 pounds of corn, pots and pans, two helmet liners and a bloody trail at XT 538848. That afternoon K Troop went to the LZ at XT 563843 to pick up the 2/7 Cavalry. The 2/7th Cav would be divided so that one platoon of theirs was with one platoon of armored cavalry. The 2/7 Cav soldiers were to ride on the tracks until a contact developed or the tracks entered a bunker complex. At these times, the infantrymen would dismount and either search or assault, staying between the tracks.

In the early evening (1920 hours), a trip flare on the southern flank of L Troop strong point (vic XT 558840) was ignited. L Troop engaged the enemy with organic fire, using illumination and 12mm rounds. Artillery supported by firing defensive concentrations in the suspected area, and a Light Fire Team that supported reported receiving return fire. Twenty minutes later the enemy broke contact, after inflicting no casualties. Enemy casualties were unknown.

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By the evening of 24 November, Third Squadron had entered the small area in which most of the next three days action would be centered. The terrain fluctuated between lightly and moderately wooded stretches. Most of the trees were dead from defoliation. When the bamboo and occasional gullies made armor operations difficult. When the bamboo and heavy underbrush thickets between the stretches did not cause detours, the swamps surrounded by big trees did. Besides these natural obstacles, there were heavy concentrations of bomb craters in the area. "When I saw the area of operations, I did not think we would cover as much ground as the plans called for," commented First Lieutenant Claire A. Bidlingmaier, second platoon leader of K Troop. "What bothered me were the trails," said First Lieutenant Wilbur C. Fuller, third platoon leader of K Troop. "Some of the recently used trails were well-used, two to three feet wide, hard-packed that showed up easily from the air. But the old trails, overgrown, were the most treacherous. The enemy knows that when armor enters an area, it doesn't use the roads. Thus the trails parallel to the roads were mined. Since they used pressure mines infantry could not detonate them. Since the trails were overgrown, the mines could not be spotted. Those mines had been there a long time, and were probably the first line of defense."

c. 25 November 1969: The night of 24 November and the early morning hours of the next day were quiet, but sunrise broke the calm. About 0640 hours, an I Troop ambush patrol at XT 543843 received RPG and small-arms fire while they were returning to the NDP. They engaged the enemy and were supported by a Light Fire Team and Blue Max. In the brief fight five US personnel were wounded. After fifteen minutes the contact broke and I Troop swept the area; however, an M551 Sheridan hit a 20-pound mine which blew a rear wheel and the track off. Fortunately there were no wounded from the mine. Little was found during the sweep and enemy casualties were unknown.

As the day's operations began, L Troop swept the area of the previous day's contact (XT 538840) and found nine 60mm rounds, one RPG Launcher with booster and one dead NVA soldier. The NVA wore an NVA uniform, Ho Chi Minh sandals and carried a hammock. The sweep was completed by 0718 hours. About two hours later, I Troop received small-arms fire, automatic weapons and recoilless rifle fire, from their northern flank. The troop, using their organic weapons, swept through the area and by 1040 hours had overrun squad-size unit. There were 2 US killed and five wounded. Enemy losses were unknown. L Troop reacted to the I Troop contact, but were stopped when one of their Sheridans hit a mine in the center of a well-used trail at XT 539844. The mine killed one trooper and wounded three others. It blew a hole in the hull, besides blowing off a wheel and the track, It also left a large crater in the trail.

While this action occurred, M Company received RPG fire from the north and small arms fire from the south at XT 560843. A Light Fire Team, Blue Max and artillery supported their contact. At 1020 hours, the PSYOPS helicopter spotted a bunker complex at XT 560845, and when M Company's contact finally

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ended, their tanks moved to the complex and found one dead NVA soldier in a bunker holding a wire that led to a command detonated mine. M Company also found an AK-47, four AK-47 magazines, one B-40 round, one Chicom Claymore, and three pairs of sandals. M Company suffered one trooper wounded and one CIDG wounded in the contact. Also in the morning, an I Troop Sheridan hit a twenty-five pound mine buried about fifty meters from the road.

In the afternoon, a K Troop ACAV hit a pressure detonated mine which wounded one US soldier and moderately damaged the ACAV (vicinity XT 562844). Later in the day, another I Troop Sheridan hit a mine which cracked the hull and ruptured the fuel tank. It caused no casualties, although it blew a large crater underneath the tank. Soon after this, D/2/7th linked up with I Troop in their NDP. Except for these mining incidents, there was no contact with the enemy that afternoon. The only enemy that were seen were spotted by a psyops helicopter which saw fifteen NVA, who immediately move off their trail and did not fight.

Meanwhile, the 3/11th ACR Command Post and Howitzer battery were moving from FSB Jake to FSB Rita. However, progress was slower than expected, and several dropped out of the march. At 1715 hours, the march column was stopped at XT 544846, and began to form the perimeter for the headquarters. While the perimeter security was being established, the scout ship from the Air Cavalry Troop spotted three or four enemy with 100 meters of the northern perimeter. The scout thought the enemy was unarmed, and several troopers from the Command Post started out to bring them in. The ship was fired on (1820 hours) and called in his wing ship, a Cobra, to expend. Captain Cole, Headquarters Company then moved out to sweep the area with the headquarters ACAV's. They were sweeping the area, reconning by fire, when an RPG hit a vehicle, wounding CPT Cole, a machinegunner, and CPT Robert Myers, who was dismounted at that time. All elements returned to the perimeter where LTC Doyle, CO 3/11th ACR, landed and led the Headquarters Troop back into the area at 1855 hours. SP 5 Freyn, Track Commander of HQ ACAV 60 (one of five tracks sweeping on line), spotted the enemy and opened up, while closing on the enemy. I Troop elements also joined the sweep, but were behind the Headquarters Troop. A Sheridan, 100 meters to the left of HQ 60, spotted movement, and began firing. The I Troop tracks had come up behind the headquarters ACAV's, and in the dim light at dusk, did not see them. When the Sheridan fired, the I Troop elements did too, raking the back of HQ 60 with .50 caliber machinegun fire. SP 5 Freyn had stopped his track to re-load. "We dusted off the former track commander and two Engineers who were riding on the back deck. My track looked like Swiss cheese," he lamented. As I Troop advanced, it finally spotted the HQ Troop's tracks, and both elements swept the area, but found only a north-south blood trail. There were five US wounded. After Headquarters and I Troops crossed the contact area, they continued to the east, southeast to secure the vehicles which had dropped out during the march. Meanwhile, CPT Emerson took over the command post security and had the men dig perimeter fox-holes and prepare fighting positions. The security of the complex was insured by eleven ACAV's, two Sheridans, one Zippo, an M88 with a .50 caliber machine-

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gun, an M-78, and M-77 with a .50 caliber machineguns.

d. 26 November 1969: Because of the late sweep on the evening of 25 November, which lasted until 2200 hours, the 3/11th ACR Command Post and Headquarters Troop formed a hasty perimeter in the darkness. They set out no trip flares or Claymores. However, the men on guard were instructed to fire four M-79 rounds into the woodline at 2330, 0130, and 0330 hours. The enemy units, which consisted of the reinforced C1 and C3 Companies of the Q170 Independent Battalion, were probably in position for the attack when the rounds were fired, and thus were not deterred by them. The C1 and C2 Companies, composed of a total of 90 men equipped with 24 B-40 Rocket launchers and small-arms, had been reinforced for the attack by a seven man RPG team, equipped with five B-40 and two B-41 rocket launchers, from the the C4 Company.

There were about 160 men in the NDP that night. One man in each track on the perimeter was on guard, but the rest were sleeping. The silence was broken only by the whispered exchange of words as the guards rotated, the occasional crackle of the radios, and the thud and then explosion of the M-79 grenade rounds. At 0330 hours, SP 5 Freyn was asleep on his track, ready to relieve his track commander at guard at 0400 hours. Specialists Four Iasillo and Jones, RTO's of the 3/11 ACR S-2 section, were on duty in the S-2 track. SSG Knox, track commander of HQ ACAV 62, prepared and fired four rounds into the woodling. It was 0342 hours and his shift was almost over. Suddenly, he saw two RPG rounds come from the northeast. These were followed immediately by six more. The first RPG hit a M548 ammunition carrier filled with powder for the Howitzers, and it burst into flames. The second projectile hit a M109 Howitzer, setting it afire. The fire in the M109 soon detonated the full load of ammunition that it was carrying, scattering burning white phosphorous inside the small NDP. About three RPG's were stopped by the mesh screening in front of the S-2 track, but another round struck an L Troop 577. Within minutes the quiet NDP had been transformed into a blazing lolocaust--tracks were burning, ammunition was exploding, and lethal, burning, white phosphorous covered the ground.

The men in the tiny NDP reacted immediately and skillfully to the sudden attack. "We opened up, and when the ammo-carrier exploded, I moved the track forward twenty meters to the edge of a bomb crater. I couldn't go any further," commented SSG Knox. "We took a lot of shrapnel."

SP 5 Freyn, on the south side of the perimeter, helped the Howitzer Battery Commander radio his men and try to move a 548 and 577 ammo-carrier from the fire. "I was told then that my track was needed on the east side, so we moved and I got hit by shrapnel-- but not seriously," he said.

The senior medic, SP 5 Schoolfield, moved his track as the fire spread to the nearby command post. He dispatched one medic to the right of the perimeter where several troopers were wounded by an RPG round that hit a Sheridan. He

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sent another to the left, and he began moving through the middle of the perimeter--ablaze from the exploding rounds. Another medic moved to the landing zone to assist in the dust-offs. The fire had started at 0352 hours and by 0433 hours the white phosphorous rounds were burning alongside the Command Post, setting fire to the tent. Within eleven minutes after that, three Howitzers and several ammunition trailers and carriers were on fire.

About this time, Third Platoon of I Troop was extracted from their strong point and set of secure the northwest side of the perimeter. By 0456 hours three troopers had been seriously wounded. One casualty was SP4 Jones who was with SP4 Iasillo. Iasillo said, "When Jones and I heard the explosion (the ammunition carrier), we thought they were RPG rounds. We crawled from the S-2 track and met Major Sloan (S-3, 3/11th ACR)." SP4 Jones and MAJ Sloan started passing out the steel pots, flak jackets and weapons that hung from the hooks inside the Command Post. Jones told MAJ Sloan that he thought the S-2 track had been hit by an RPG round. MAJ Sloan went to check it. SP4 Jones crawled toward the S-3 track to see if they needed or had extra weapons or flak jackets. "I couldn't find my rifle, but found a .38 and a .45 and put them on. I started to follow Jones, crawling slowly, but a Howitzer blew up (0501 hours) and I stayed down until the shrapnel passed. When I looked up and crawled over, I saw Jones. He had been hit by the spade of the Howitzer, and it had wrapped one of his weapons around his neck and shoulder.. I called for a medic, but it was too late. He was dead."

SSG Knox commented, "When the second Howitzer blew, a piece from the side just cleared my track and landed in the bomb crater in front of us. I was hit by shrapnel in the arm. The fire had started the grass burning, and the flames were up to the edge of my track, but we had no place to go. I don't think we were getting any incoming small-arms or RPG rounds by then, because with the fire to our backs we were silhouetted, and were good targets, but we had no fire directly at us. With those explosions and the other vehicles on fire, it became a nightmare. Everyone was trying to get organized, and it didn't take them long to get organized."

LTC Doyle, the Squadron Commander, very coolly organized and led the defenders. In the midst of this confusion and destruction, he calmly gave his assessment of the situation over the radio to the Regimental Headquarters (the unsecure radio was used because the secure mode had been destroyed in the fire). Answering the Squadron Commander's call, the dust-off ships came despite the darkness and danger. Bringing in artillery and air support, LTC Doyle could be heard on the radio saying, "All our friendly forces are in the fiery area. Everything outside the fire is enemy."

The action by everyone within the NDP prevented this attack from being more serious; but even so, the enemy inflicted a heavy toll. By 0550 hours, there were four US killed and thirty-four wounded. One 577, two 551's, two M109's, four M548's, five 1½ ton trailers, and two one ton ammo-trailers were lost. (There were four NVA killed; however, Nguyen Van Nguyen, who rallied to I Troop,

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later in the morning, said that no less than 15 to 20 wounded men from the C1 Company being evacuated to Cambodia.)

At 0640 hours, I Troop's strong point spotted two NVA soldiers (vicinity XT 540848) and killed one. About two hours later, an Air Cavalry Troop helicopter spotted an enemy soldier, but the airstrike that was called in had negative results. Another airstrike was called when an OH-6A, flying at 60 feet and 50 knots, received heavy ground-to-air fire. Again the airstrike and artillery obtained no results. The scene was repeated at 1000 hours, and again the results were negative. At 1116 hours, I Troop received RPG and small-arms fire from an estimated NVA platoon entrenched in bunkers at XT 558858. Blue Max, TAC Air, and a Light Fire Team rolled in on the area. I Troop and the dismounted D/2/7 Cavalry swept the area and found two .30 caliber machineguns, three AK-47's, one RPG Launcher, six Chicom grenades, and components of a .51 caliber machinegun. There was one US soldier killed from D/2/7 and eight US soldiers wounded (D/2/7), and one CIDG. CPT James Tutt, I Troop Commander, and an officer from D/2/7th Cavalry apprehended a Hoi Chanh who had been fighting fiercely. Inside the hole from which the Hoi Chanh emerged were three dead NVA soldiers, literally blown apart by our .50 caliber machinegun fire. The rallier, Nguyen Van Nguyen, pointed out several base-camp areas; then, airstrikes were employed and K Troop swept the areas.

According to Nguyen, he was part of the D170 Independent Battalion. In our intelligence files, however, D170 is also known as the K1 Battalion of the 70th Security Guard Regiment, Central Office, South Vietnam. The 70th Regiment was disbanded in late 1966. The K3 Battalion, 70th Regiment, was incorporated into the 268th Regiment, SR1. (It is believed that D170 was reformed and is now part of the 66th Base Security Regiment, Central Office, Vietnam.)

At 1420 hours, an L Troop ACAV hit a mine (XT 525827). The twenty pound, pressure detonated moderately damaged the vehicle. In the same location, L Troop found and destroyed four twenty pound mines. Meanwhile, a M578 from L Troop struck another mine, wounding two troopers and causing moderate damage to the vehicle. At 1600 hours, an ACAV from a K Troop hit a mine at XT 562842, wounding two and causing the combat loss of the vehicle. K Troop found a bunker complex at XT 552860, at 1800 hours. In the bunkers they found .51 caliber brass and powder, and the bunkers appeared to be an ammunition assembly plant. Further sweeps produced eight B-40 rounds and two NVA uniforms with documents. There were no other findings or contacts during the day and the evening of 26 November was uneventful.

e. 27 November 1969: During the early morning hours there was little action. The CIDG unit working with M Company did spot two VC, which they engaged, but there was no return fire, and in the daylight, when M Company swept the area, nothing was found.

On 27 November, the Squadron was instructed to begin movement back to the

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east with the goal of leaving AO Dallas by 28 November. Also on this day, while searching the area of the bunker complex discovered on 26 November, K Troop found a thousand AK-47 rounds, one anti-tank grenade, two Chicom grenades, one Chicom Claymore, one US Claymore, one US mess kit, four RPG-2 rounds, rice, uniforms, and one and a half pounds of documents. The documents identified the D170 Independent Battalion. Searching further, K Troop found medical supplies and the fatigue shirt of CPT Cole, who had been wounded in the leg the day before.

About 0900 hours, M Company found a mine in the vicinity of XT 543844, and at 1200 hours they discovered another, a Russian T46, at XT 557861. Also, at noon, K Troop found and searched some enemy bunkers about two kilometers north of 246. The complex contained between 25 and 30 bunkers, but little was found—only one bag of rice and some scattered .30 caliber ammunition. In the late afternoon to the southwest, I Troop found a small bunker complex in which they discovered a number of documents that were later evacuated for research.

In the late afternoon, the Troops of the Third Squadron formed their separate night defensive positions. M Company was at FSB Jake, I Troop was located near the road at XT 543846, K Troop was about one kilometer east of I Troop, and L Troop was located near K Troop. The only significant action during the night occurred at I Troop's NDP, which was mortared quite heavily at 1930 hours. I Troop received about fifteen RPG rounds, but there were no friendly casualties. Spooky, a Night Hawk, and aerial rocket artillery were called in for support. The enemy's losses were unknown.

Later that evening, Colonel Leach radioed Third Squadron's Commander and said that BG Casey was disappointed and concerned that the Squadron had not made better progress, and thought that they should be much nearer to the goal of leaving AO Dallas and returning to FSB Jake. The Regimental Commander stated that he had explained the situation to BG Casey, but he added, "You must finish up the demolition and have all your elements out and across the river prior to 1200 hours tomorrow."

On 28 November, the elements of the Third Squadron returned across the river and Operation Texas Traveler ended.

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HQ, 11th Armd Cav Regt
QUAN LOI (XT8290) RVN
222300H November 1969

OPORD 7-69 (Operation TEXAS TRAVELER) (U)

Reference: Map , South Vietnam, 1:50,000

Task Org

1/11 AGR

A/1/11 AGR

B/1/11 AGR

C/1/11 AGR

D/1/11 AGR

How/1/11 AGR

2/919 Engr(-) OPCON

2/11AGR

E/2/11 AGR

G/2/11 AGR

H/2/11 AGR

How/2/11 AGR

4/919 Engr (-) OPCON

3/11 AGR

I/3/11 AGR

K/3/11 AGR

L/3/11 AGR

M/3/11 AGR

Command and Control GP

C&D Cos 2/7 Cav (AM) OPCON

How/3/11 AGR

1 Plt C/8 Engr OPCON

3/919 Engr OPCON

4 Mine Sweep Teams OPCON

1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces: See Annex A.

B. Friendly Forces:

(1) 1st Cavalry Division (AM):

(a) On 240630 Nov 69, 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), places two infantry companies (AM) with a command and control group OPCON with 3/11 AGR.

(b) O/O 8th Engr Bn, 1st Cav Div (AM), provides engineer support for 11th AGR operations in War Zone C. (See Annex C-Engineer)

(c) 1/9 Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM), provides 11th AGR a liaison team to support operations in War Zone C.

(2) Joint Operational Units: Operating jointly with 3/11AGR, Special Forces CIDG companies will support 11th AGR operations in AO DALLAS with two companies and assist in security of airfield at TONG LE CHON.

c. Attachments&Detachments: Task Org.

2. (C) MISSION: At 240630H Nov 69, 11th AGR will commence area reconnaissance of the Eastern Sector of War Zone C (see Annex D) with one squadron.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

A. Concept of Operations: 3/11AGR, reinforced , conducts a multiple route cross country penetration through AO DALLAS along axis of Route 246 executes CAs along Route 246 to clear it of obstacles. On order 1/11AGR moves to 3/11 AGR AO and prepares for operations in war Zone C. 2/11AGR continues operations in LOC NINH District and prepares for operations along QL 14A in the direction of BO DUC.

b. 1/11 AGR:

(1) On order, move to vicinity XT 7189 and assume resp onsibility for 3/11 AO.

(2) Maintain responsibility for current AO and missions.

(3) Coordinate with BINH LONG Sector and CO 15th AGR (ARVN) for assistance in AOs.

(4) Assume responsibility for security of AN LOC-ON TONG LE CHON Road.

(5) Be prepared to assist in security of TONG LE CHON Airfield as required.

(6) Be p prepared to move into War Zone C to commence operations as required.

c. 2/11AGR: Continue current missions.

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d. 3/11ACR:

(1) At 240630H Nov 69 conduct combat assaults and ground movement into Eastern War Zone C.

(2) Following commitment in Eastern War Zone C conduct joint operations with CIDG as required.

(3) At 240630H Nov 69, accept OPOON of two infantry companies (AM) with a control group, one engineer platoon (AM), 3/919 Engr, and four 6-man sweep teams drawn from platoons of 919th Engineer Co.

e. Air Cav Troop:

(1) Priority of effort to 3/11ACR.

(2) Retain ARPS in readiness for commitment into War Zone C.

F. 919 Engr Co: See Annex C-- Engineers.

g. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) At H Hour, D Day 3/11 ACR assumes responsibility for AO DALLAS (see Annex D) and OP CON of any US/ARVN forces located therein. Additional AO's will be assigned to 3/11 ACR as required.

(2) The artillery LNO assigned to 3/11 ACR will clear artillery fired with that unit's AO.

(3) Fires within 1st Bde/2d Airborne Bde (ARVN) AO's will be cleared through 2/19 Artillery Battalion, 1st Cav Div (AM), call sign: Trail Spike8 Freq: 1.00/

(4) Fires will not be placed within 3kms of the Cambodian border without approval of the Regimental Commander, closer than 2kms without permission of Commanding General, 1st Cav Div (AM)

(5) All air warning data for Eastern War Zone C will be posted through the 2/19 Artillery Battalion, 1st Cav Div (AM), call sign Trail Spike, Freq: 61.00.

(6) As 11th ACR's AO in Eastern War Zone C is extended, fire support coordination will be accomplished in accordance with sub-paragraphs (2) through (6).

(7) Supplemental check points in Annex B are in effect for Operation TEXAS TRAVELER.

(8) This OPOD Executes OPLAN 13-69.

(9) OPOD effective upon receipt for execution at 240630H Nov 69.

4. (U) ADMIN & LOG: See Annex F- Logistics.

5. (C) COMMAND & SIGNAL:

a. Signal:

(1) Current SQU/SSI in effect.

(2) Call signs and frequencies of US/ARVN units in War Zone C:

(a) US UNITS	CALL SIGN	FREQ (P)	FREQ (A)
NCS, 1st Bde (AM)	STING RAY 65	33.30	44.05
NCS, 2-7 Cav (AM)	WHITE SCALP 65	50.20	49.10
PRIMARY			
(b) ARVN UNIT	CALL SIGN	FREQ	
SA, 2d Abn Bde	PONY CORKS 42	50.30	
SA, 3d Bn	POTATO TRIALS 42	50.30	
SA, 9th Bn	CHILLY CAREER 42	50.30	


ALTERNATE

SA, 2d Abn Bde	GRAYSON STEW 42	32.80
SA, 3d Bn	FAIRFAX TORSILS 42	32.80
SA, 9th Bn	NORMAL TRENCH 42	32.80

b. 11th ACR command post remains at QUAN LOI (175290).

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
ANNEX D (OPNS OVERLAY)
TO OPORD 7-69
(OPERATION TEXAS TRAVELER)
MAP REF: RVN 1:50,000



AO SHORT STOP

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
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TO OPORD 7-69
(OPERATION TEXAS TRAVELER)
MAP REF: RVN 1:50,000



AO DALLAS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
TO OPORD 7-69
(OPERATION TEXAS TRAVELER)
MAP REF: RVN 1:50,000



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COPY OF 40 COPIES
HQ 11TH ACR
QUAN LOI (XT8290) RVN
222400 H NOVEMBER 1969



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STATISTICS: US

<u>DAY</u>	<u>MINES HIT</u>	<u>RAIL/ BOM/ LOSS BY CONTACT</u>	<u>CASUALTIES</u>
24 Nov	L Trp-M551 CBL	0	1 KIA
25 Nov	I Trp-M551 CBL I Trp-M551 CBL K Trp-M113 CBL L Trp-M551 CBL L Trp-M551 MOD	M113 by RPG	3 KIA 22 WIA
26 Nov	L Trp-M113 MOD L Trp-M578 CBL K Trp-M113 CBL	(4) M548 (1RPG) (2) M109 (2RPG) (2) M551 (1RPG) (2) 1 T Trl (1RPG) (1) Wtr Trl " (5) 1 1/2 T Trl "	5 KIA 51 WIA
27 Nov	0	0	4 WIA
28 Nov	0	0	0

STATISTICS: NVA

	<u>WELL CAPTURED</u>	<u>CASUALTIES</u>	
24 Nov	100 lb. Corn 400 lb. Rice 1 RPG Launcher (15) 60mm rounds 1 B40 rd	2 KIA	
25 Nov	(9) 60mm rds (1) RPG Launcher (1) AK-47 (1) CC Claymore (1) CC Grenade	1 KIA	
26 Nov	4 AK-47 2 30 Cal MG 8 B40 rds 6 CC Frag Grenades 4 20 lb. anti-tank mines	11 KIA 1 PW	
27 Nov	40 lb. Rice 50 lb. Corn 1 US Claymore 3 CC Frag gren. 7 B40 rds 1 M72 LAW 2 CC Claymores	1000 AK47 rds 32 M79 rds 1 RPG-2 16 60mm rds 4 105 Ydn 2 AK-47 2 20 lb anti-tank mines	0
28 Nov	1 AK-47	6 CC Frag gren. 2 KIA 1 PW	

NOTE: Copy of Recessional & 3 briefing notes.


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ENEMY CONTACTS

TEXAS TRAVELER

1. 241439 - L Trp in contact at XT538842, 1 US KIA contact broke 1450H.
241507 - L Trp regained contact XT538842, 1 VC/NVA KIA.
6-60mm rds, 300-400lb rice, 100lb corn, pots and pans, 2 helmet liners, blood trail.
2. 241930 - L Trp Strong Ptn "O" XT538840 had trip flares go off, eng w/org wpns, M551 cannister. Illum fired. Rec'd hvy AK fire in rtn. LFT bounced. Ctc broke 1940H. Neg cas/en losses unk. LFT rec'd ground fire Arty defcons fired in supt.
250718 - I/3/11, XT538840: Sweep of area of ctc 241930H, fd and evac 9x60mm rds, 1xRPG-2 launcher and rd w/booster. RES: 1 NVA KIA.
3. 250645 - I/3/11, XT550840: While extracting from AP rec'd RPG & S/A fire from the north, rtn'd fire w/org wpns, LFT & Blue Max spt'd.
RES: 5xUS WIA/Unk.
4. 250934 - I/3/11, XT540835: In ctc, rec'd S/A fm N, rtn'd w/org wpns Arty, LFT & Blue Max spt'd. Ctc broke at 1050H. RES: 2xUS KIA, 3xUS WIA/Unk.
5. 250943 - I/3/11, XT557843: Rec'd S/A & A/W fm N, rtn'd w/org wpns. Ctc broke at 1050H. RES: 1xUS KIA, 2xUS WIA/Unk.
6. 251000 - M/3/11, XT560843: In ctc, rec'd RPG fire fm N & S/A fm S. Rtn'd w/org wpns, LFT, Arty, Blue Max spt'd. Sweep of area fd 1xAK-47 1xB41 rd, 1xCC claymore, 4xAK mag's, 1xCC rifle grenade, 3xpr HCF sandals, all evac. RES: 1xUS WIA, 1xARVN WIA/1xNVA WIA (later died).
7. 251830 - HQ/3/11, XT544845: Spotted movt around NDP, HQ ACAV eng w/org wpns, rec'd S/A fire and RPG fire in rtn. I/3/11 moving to sweep area of ctc, rec'd S/A fire at 1845, ctc broke at 1850H. LFT spt'd, sweep of area revealed N-S blood trail. Will sweep at first light. RES: 5 US WIA/Unk.
8. 260352 - 3/11 CP, XT545846: CP rec'd S/A, RPG & hvy mortar fire fm N, eng w/org wpns, Blue Max, HFT, Spooky, FAC, Flaeship and Arty spt'd. Sweep of area fd 1xRPG-2 launcher, 1xAK-47, and some docu; RES: Following are CBL: 1x577, 2x551, 4xM548, 2xM09, 5x14T trailers, 2xT ammo trailers, 3xUS KIA, 34xUS WIA/4xNVA KIA.
9. 260640 - I/3/11, XT540848: Strong point spotted 2xindiv's, eng w/org wpns & claymores, neg rtn fire, sweep fd 1xNVA KIA.
10. 261116 - I/3/11, XT558858: Rec'd RPG & S/A fire fm east plt NVA in bks, rtn fire w/org wpns, Blue Max, A/S, LFT, and Arty spt'd. Sweep of area fd 2x30 cal MG, 3xAK-47, 1xRPG-2 launcher, 6xCC grenades, and components of 51 cal MG. RES: 1xUS KIA (D/2/7), 8xUS WIA (D/2/7), 1xCIDG WIA, 3xNVA KIA, 1xHoi Thanh.
11. 270317 - M/3/11 & CIDG LP, XT540850: 400m west of M Co NDP spotted 2xVC (Sappers). Eng w/org wpns neg rtn fire. Extracted at this time to M Co NDP.
12. 271915 - I/3/11, XT543845: Strong point in ctc, LFT, Blue Max, Spooky bounced FAC Flaeship. 4xUS WIA (slightly). No dustoff requested. Arty continuing to fire & Red 22 expending.

NUMBERS REFER TO
ENEMY CONTACTS.
SEE LEGEND ON
OPPOSITE PAGE.



LINES REFER TO TROOP MOVEMENTS:


24 November 69	_____
25 November 69	_____
26 November 69	_____
27 November 69	_____
28 November 69	_____

LEGEND

- | | |
|------------|-------------|
| 1 - Zippo | 10 - M88 |
| 2 - M577 | 11 - HQ 33 |
| 3 - ACAV | 12 - HQ 56 |
| 4 - HQ 60 | 13 - HQ 29 |
| 5 - XO HOW | 14 - HQ 76 |
| 6 - L Trp | 15 - I Trp |
| 7 - M578 | 16 - HOW 63 |
| 8 - HOW 43 | 17 - M548 |
| 9 - M578 | |

The legend gives the bumper numbers of the Headquarters Troop's ACAVs. Other vehicles are referred to by designation, or troop.

Sketch of 3/111 ACR CP -
 morning of 26 November 1969



ACAV



Sheridan



M548



Trailer



RPG Screen



Wire



Foxhole

Note: See legend
 on opposite
 diagram.